





Seven Years of IBB

Volume 1

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Foreign Policy

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FOREWORD

Seven years of IBB is to my mind a most commendable attempt to undertake a comprehensive and detailed assessment of the work and achievements of an incumbent head of state and government. The seven volume work with a picturesque compendium analyses virtually every initiative undertaken by the Babangida administration since coming to power in August 1985.

The contributors to the work have presented a well researched and analytical appreciation of the regime's bold effort at restructuring of the economy; its imaginative political initiatives designed to usher in lasting democracy and the administration's creative reorientation programmes intended to inculcate a new political culture conducive to the survival of democracy, and to the democratic way of life. They have also proffered suggestions on how to remedy the lapses they observed and identified.

The volumes cover Politics and the Transition, The Economy, Foreign Policy, Labour and Social Development, Arts and Culture, Education and Rural Development, and New Political Culture.

The editors have rightly observed that the Babangida Administration more than most embarked on a number of radical reforms in its seven years of existence. Each of the reforms embarked on by the Babangida administration, for example, the Structural Adjustment Programme, or the Transition Programme is major enough to occupy the full time of any administration. Yet the administration had made commendable efforts in realising the objectives of the reforms. The reforms became necessary as a result of the down- turn of the economy since the late seventies and due to the changing political landscape during that time. What must be remembered is that the political environment in the early 1960's soon after independence, was a period of consolidating Nigeria's independence politically and economically rather than indulging in any reform exercise at the time which would not have been acceptable. That is why, understandably, the first civilian political leadership was too preoccupied with maintaining a fragile political system to contemplate introducing anything radically different from what was bequeathed to it by

the colonial regime. Inevitably, the unstable condition brought about a political change early in the life of the nation through military intervention for the first time.

Successive governments, especially our government after the civil war, did try to embark on reforms aimed at building a more united and economically strong and less dependent Nigeria where our economy is controlled by our nationals. The Economic Development Plan, the series of projects we executed and reforms we introduced in the early 1970's for example, our immediate post-war initiative at reconciliation and reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction, the 3R's, the Universal Free Primary Education and the Economic Enterprises Indigenization Policy were all attempts to address some of the questions that the Babangida administration, to his credit, took up with so much courage and decisiveness than his predecessors. Other governments too did recognize the need for reforms and in fact pursued policies meant to realize the objectives of the reforms. Little, however, has been recorded about the contribution of these governments other than what government-sponsored publications have done.

It is in this regard that I find the initiative of the publishers of this very comprehensive study very encouraging. It is an acknowledgement of the great contribution made by a leader to the socio-economic and political development of our fatherland. I hope that similar studies will be undertaken on the tenure of our leaders so that our future leaders will be encouraged to strive to do their very best being conscious of the fact that history is recording them even as they are still on the saddle.

Seven Years of IBB is an essential reading for any understanding of where Nigeria is today and from the foundation laid, what we hope it will be in the 21st Century. My congratulations to the Authors / Editors for a comprehensive work well done.



(Gen. Dr. Chief F. Gowon)

The Rare Angles of Life

AWAITING THE VERDICT OF HISTORY

History is a product of continuous interaction between man and environment. Seven years is nothing much in the life of a nation particularly one with the size and complexity of Nigeria. But a seven year period during which fundamental assumptions were challenged and modified, when phenomenal changes were effected in Nigeria's social, economic and political scene, and during which issues hitherto reserved for the esoteric class, corporate bodies, and campus eggs heads became subjected to public debate and reactions deserve to be carefully documented and rationally analysed. The 1985-92 period is one that will be a fascinating subject in Nigeria's history books. Historians and social scientists will find the sheer weight and volume of decisions taken, their immediate and lasting effect on the country's outlook, economy and body politic too attractive to ignore. Even before the Babangida regime signs off, the men who captained the ship of state the policies they enunciated, the manner of implementation, the intended and accidental consequences are already being studied.

There has so far been a tendency towards an approach that is essentially biographical; one that seeks to explain the actions of the regime in the light of the vision of the leader. In the *Prince of the Niger*; Chidi Amuta analysed the 1985-92 period from the background of the knowledge of General Babangida's biographical condition because according to Chidi it is by so doing that we may be able to appreciate the deeper roots of the decisions that he had to make and policies he had to pursue. The Orphan at fourteen who through dint of hard work and persevearance came to occupy for seven years the highest position in the country's political hierarchy knows the difference between poverty and wealth, ignorance and knowledge, opportunity and the lack of it. Babangida was said to have for a long time been deeply concerned with the problems of Nigeria out of a patriotic commitment and consulted widely even before coming to power with those who ought to know about the

multidimensional nature of Nigeria's socio-economic and political problems. These along with his personal experience must have influenced his attitude and policies. Events in the life of a nation are no doubt shaped by the perception of the leaders. These perceptions are in themselves influenced by personal experiences.

But it will be misleading to assume that the Babangida factor was the sole determinant of events in the 1985-92 period. Admittedly the regimented command structure of the armed forces compel instant obedience and does not leave much room for arguments and counter arguments particularly with superiors. But Babangida realised that the office of the Chief of Army Staff is not exactly like that of the President. In his maiden address Babangida denounced the Buhari-Idiagbon duo for disregarding the principle of discussion, consultation and cooperation. There was the Armed Forces Ruling Council, the Council of States, the Council of Ministers and the Presidential Advisory Council all of which were consultative bodies at different levels. Even though Babangida left no one in doubt as to who was in charge, the occasional change in aspects of policy formulation and implementation were clearly the result of inputs of individuals and groups to whose opinion Babangida deferred.

There were frequent changes in key personnel of government during the seven year period. But there were a few individuals such as Abacha, Aikhomu, Akilu, Chu Okongwu, Olikoye Kuti, Olagunju and to a lesser extent Jubril Aminu, Alhaji Alhaji, and Bola Ajibola who made inputs into policy formulation and who have clearly influenced events to some degree. Thus if a biographical approach were to be adopted to the study of the 1985-92 period, it will certainly not be complete without a biographical study at least of Vice President Aikhomu and General Sani Abacha. These two individuals will share with Babangida the praise and blame for the successes and failures of the regime.

But whatever judgement is pronounced must be against the background of the circumstances in which Babangida and his team found Nigeria. It is the environment and circumstances that make the man

and the government. It needed a defeated Germany suffering from the implementation of the Versailles treaty to produce a Hitler. Without a regimented and classless society which existed in the Soviet Union, there would not have been any need for Gorbachev to bring about Glamost or Perestroika. The Babangida era would not have had a "raison detre" had the massive corruption and prostitution of democratic values of the Shagari era not been succeeded by the authoritarianism and lack of proper economic focus of Buhari.

The seven books on seven years of IBB seek to record and analyse the interaction between men, ideas, circumstances and environment in the effort to make Nigeria a better place. The approach here is factual and analytical. It is an attempt to document and interpret actions taken by individuals who believed that the objectives suitable to be pursued in the Nigeria of August 1985 are those economic reconstruction, social justice and self reliance. The emphasis on the Nigerian situation before Babangida is one of the central issues being stressed by the editors and contributors of this series. We believe that any attempt to interpret and analyse contemporary situations should begin with an insight into the past. The present is a product of the past. Any balanced analysis of the Babangida era must take cognisance of the Nigerian situation before August, 1985. We need to know where we are coming from in order to appreciate where we are. Some of the critics of Babangida regime conveniently ignore the fact that by August 1985, a combination of the fall in world oil prices, inadequate policies of the past, and rising debt obligation produced a difficult economic situation which adversely affected both external and fiscal balance, they demonstrate a lack of awareness of the fundamental flaw in the structure of the economy which although made worse by the corruption and incompetence of the 1979-83 era needed much more than the "tough-guy posture of Buhari-Idiagbon". The situation called for a fundamental restructuring of the one legged economy operating within the parameters designed by the Breton Woods institutions as a result of which by 1985 44% of the revenue had to be spent on debt servicing.

The Structural Adjustment Programme was adopted by the regime following public rejection of the proposed IMF loan. The programme

was aimed at solving Nigeria's economic problem at its roots. The administration was of course aware that the positive results of SAP might be long in coming while the immediate effect would bring pains to the populace thus making the government somehow unpopular. But the regime realised that it was necessary to plan for Nigeria's long term future beyond the usual four to five year term after which the "buck is passed on". The situation called for courage to take on the established class who benefitted from the existing flaws in the economic structure e.g. import license and even some elements of the lower and middle class who had been accustomed to the usual 'government by patronage and subvention'.

Babangida's worst critics will find it difficult to accuse him of lack of courage to take decisions "Posterity will forgive us for taking wring decisions but will not forgive us if we fail to take decisions". SAP had not been very popular with the populace. The regime however sees it as central to our national economic and political recovery on the long run. It was prepared to be unpopular in order to bequeath an enduring foundation to the future generation of Nigerians.

The manner of implementation of certain aspects of SAP has been a source of concern. Some of the unavoidable extra budgetary expenses have tended to limit the gains of the programme. The long term nature of the measures taken are such that the positive effects cannot be that much visible as of now. But it will be hard to deny the fact that there is already evidence of a radical change in our consumption habits, an inculcation of maintenance culture, an acceptance of the idea of self employment, an increase in food production, the increase in local sourcing of raw materials, and of fundamental reorientation in the psyche of the Nigerian citizenry.

The domestic and international environment during the end of 80's was such that the only realistic approach to the problems of Nigeria was the adoption of SAP. The state of the Nigerian economy in 1985 was similar to those of many African and third world countries. Between 1985, Africa's economic performance recorded an average annual growth rate of GDP of only 0.4 percent capital income which was already low at the end of the 1970 had steadily declined by about

2,6%. Social services and welfare especially education, public health and sanitation rapidly deteriorated. This is why by 1988 about 30 Africa countries had to adopt structural Adjustment Programmes with the support of the IMF and the World Bank. Moreover the mid 80's coincided with the global resurgence of conservative economic and political philosophy and the final act of communism; a period dominated by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. The slogan then was and still is less government in business. What this means is privatisation of many government economic establishments which as has been rightly argued, are best left to the business class. If the former Soviet Union can now be talking of practising a free market economy, the Babangida regime must have right in refusing to get involved with un consequential commercial ventures. It was correct to see its role as that of maintaining law and order and thereby create an enabling environment that would protect investment and encourage productive planing on a sustained basis.

One of the unavoidable consequences of SAP is the economic strain it brought on the middle and lower classes who had to pay higher rates and utility prices arising first from the liberalisation of foreign exchange which devalued the Naira, and secondly the commercialisation of some public parastatals. The government realised the human dimension and the need not to marginalize the greater majority of the population. Babangida was aware that weaker segments of our populace could perish under the yoke of the emergence of a free market regime hence the various ameliorative policies and programmes that they pursued. The President promised that deliberate efforts will be made to ensure that those reform measures that have been put in place to cushion the difficulties at both the urban and rural communities are fully implemented. It was this concern for the welfare of the masses that brought about the establishment of programmes such as the Directorate of Foods, Roads, and Rural Infrastructures DFFRI, People's Bank, Community Bank, National Directorate of Employment and Better Life. Details of the manner of operation and effects of these establishments which have now become established aspects of our national life will be found in the volumes of this project. They constitute what can be described as the "Human Face of SAP" and to a considerable extent

an unconscious implementation of African alternative framework to structural adjustment programmes for socio-economic recovery and transformation as advocated by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa ECA.

The manner and style of Foreign policy implementation is one area in which the Babangida regime distinguished itself from its predecessors. While still retaining the essentially Afrocentric focus there has been a clear emphasis on the need to relate foreign policy to the domestic economic situation. The adoption of Economic diplomacy as the policy thrust meant that issues related to trade and investment came into sharp focus. While still placing emphasis on block unity, efforts were made to strengthen economic links with Africa and the diaspora. The volume on foreign policy will show that foreign policy is one area in which it will be extremely difficult to contest Babangida's claim to success. His performance and achievement as ECOWAS and OAU Chairman, and elections into the top positions at both the Commonwealth and United Nations are among the visible proofs. The technical aid corp programme (TAC) Introduced by the regime has brought so much goodwill to Nigeria in the receiving countries. There is virtually no programme that has ever positively projected Nigeria among the ordinary people in foreign countries. The positive contribution of TAC to the economic and social life of the receiving countries has reinforced Nigeria's image as the mecca for all black people and a country which means for all the black people what Israel means to the Jews.

- The elaborate political transition programme is predicated on the belief that the Nigerian situation as at August 1985 was directly attributable accountability. Democracy as practised by absence of politicians of the first and second republics could not be described as the government the people, for the people. The administration pledged itself to the establishment of a new political order in which not only the letter but also the spirit of the constitution would be adhered to. There was the realisation that for the dreams of SAP to be realised, a stable political order was a necessity, "Our strategy" said General Babangida "has been to pursue a co-ordinated and multi pronged approach to our developmental problems. Our

economic problems also have their political under currents. You cannot solve one without the other".

In seeking to create the new political order, there was a clear obsession with getting the system rooted with the majority of Nigerians. Right from the establishment of the political bureau to the inauguration of the constituent assembly, the creation of new local governments and the elections held into the local governments, state and national assemblies, there was this apparent preference for power to be seen to be derived from the people. It was in reaction to the often repeated allegation that the essence of people's power was often lost in the irregularities that feature in the manner in which electoral votes were cast and counted, that the regime opted for the controversial open ballot system. It was also the desire, to ensure that there is no return to the ethnic politics of the past that the regime decreed the formation of two grass root based political parties after dissolving the 13 political associations formed because they were mere recreations of the first and second republics. With the two parties controlling an almost equal number of states and with neither of both parties having a two thirds majority at the national assembly. it is reasonable to expect that the politics of the third republic will be one of consensus and compromise since no side would be able to go it alone.

It is tempting to regard a publication of 7 years of IBB by the DAILY Times as a mere government propaganda. Such an attitude is understandable given the fact of the government's control of majority shares in the company. The editors and contributors of the present volume are aware of the fact that the sheer weight and volume of activities that took place within the past seven years are such that would normally attract observation and comments particularly after the regime might have handed over. This is not an attempt to whitewash the Babangida era.

What we have tried to do has been to present the facts and analyse them as rationally as possible. We believe that whatever criticisms one may have against the regime will have more to do with implementation than the formulation of policies.

It will be difficult to fault the objectives of SAP. It was the only rational option considering the state of Nigeria's economy in 1985. The fact that 30 African and third world countries are implementing structural adjustment policies attest to the inevitability of the programme given our circumstance. The human face of SAP were the ameliorative programmes such as DFFRI, Better Life, NDE. People's Bank, Community Bank. Like all other aspects of SAP the manner of operation of some of these projects could have been better if not for the inconsiderate ambition and greed on the part of some Nigerians. The reckless manner in which loans were dispensed at the People's Bank, the unsubstantiated claims of DFFRI, the general attitude that government money is there for the taking limited the success of the implementation of some of these otherwise well-conceived programmes.

The chapter on DFFRI, while emphasising the revolutionary nature of the concept in articulating a national programme of rural transformation acknowledged the fact that actual implementation of the programmes had been flawed on several fronts and plagued by several implementation failure. But this, does not rule out the fact that DFFRI, established 25,000 ton storage facilities in selected urban locations, facilitated the procurement and distribution of fertilisers, constructed hundreds of thousand of feeder roads, and executed water supply projects. Despite its shortcomings DFFRI brought some of the good things of life to some elements of the rural community. The same goes for the much criticised Better Lifer for Rural Women Programme. The proposal to get it incorporated within the armpit of the National Commission for Women has the potential of depersonalising the programme and detaching it from the families of state and national political leaders. Whatever might be its shortcomings, the programme has launched 7,635 cooperatives, 997 cottage industries, 1,751 new farms and gardens, 1187 new shops and markets, 419 women's centres and 163 social welfare programmes. Perhaps of more importance is its success in arousing the social and political consciousness of Nigeria's womenfolk. The award of the prize for the sustainable end of hunger to the first lady in August, 1991 accorded the programme the international recogni-

tion and justification that it deserves.

It is obvious that the downturn in the economy which is a world wide phenomenon has resulted in the decline of the quality of social services e.g health and education. Teaching hospitals despite some of them having been designated centres of excellence lack necessary equipments. Some Nigerians have since been in the habit of going abroad to receive medical treatment, Critics of the Babangida administration are inclined to emphasis only this aspect of health sector but will carefully ignore or refuse to mention the fact that the government has been quite successful in its primary health care programme which emphasises the provision of essential medical and health facilities to the community. The primary health care programme deals with diseases and ailments that afflict the majority of Nigerians who live in the rural communities. The teaching hospitals deal mainly with the diseases of the affluence. One is not attempting to justify or rationalise the decline in the quality of health care. What is being said is that the government had tired to focus more on the requirements on the wider populace within the limits of resources available.

The chapter on education makes it clear that the sector took some beating during the Babangida era. But as the editors and contributions of these volumes have pointed out, some the problems which the regime faced and which tended to ignite negative feelings were inherited. The politicisation of university education by which every State Governor wanted to be Visitor started during Shagari era. The Babangida regime regrettably did not arrest the trend. Even State governments that have Federal Universities located in their territories did not feel satisfied until they had their own. Then there came universities of technology and agriculture despite the existence of faculties of engineering and agriculture in the existing ones. Meanwhile the decline in the value of the Naira coupled with the army of competing demands made it difficult for the government to meet its obligation to the universities with regards to funding. Nigeria's best brains left their natural habitat (campuses) either for the private sector or "checked out" to other countries.

With the proliferation of merchant banks and the ease with which less educated Nigerians made money, the value and virtues in reading took a drive. It took a spirited and most constructive industrial action by Dr. Jega led Academic Staff Union of Universities to get the government agree to improve conditions of service of teachers and fund universities adequately.

The important thing is that by agreeing eventually to ASUU demands, the Babangida regime has laid a foundation for the survival of the country's university system. The drift from the country's universities to the other sectors is beginning to cease. As the opportunities for easy money begins to decline, the educated man is likely to get the appreciation that he deserves from the society. It may take some time before the impact of the agreement reached between ASUU and government is felt. This may perhaps be one of the positive effects of the Babangida administration that will take some time to manifest itself on the society.

The Babangida regime had its shortcomings. The situation in the mid 80's till now is such that no regime could do without. In confronting the situations that it met the regime exercised sound judgement particularly in the selection of personnel to face the challenges: With Olikoye Kuti in Health, Jubril Aminu in Education, Ajibola at the Justice Ministry, Kalu Idika Kalu in Finance, Babangida picked those who on paper seemed most qualified for the job. This is not to say that this attitude permeated every section of the public service. But with ministerial appointments Babangida seemed to have been a stickler for quality. As a systemsman, he left most of the implementation to his ministers who on some occasions even initiated policies. Some of the confusions that occurred in some national sectors such as the changing of school calendar, implementation of second tier and fuel distribution are more attributable to the ministers even though as President Babangida takes all the praises and blame.

It has not been an easy seven year period. The problem inherited were formidable. But equally formidable were the determination and resolve not only to overcome the problems but also to lay the

foundation for a greater tomorrow. The editors and contributors have attempted to present the problems and analyse efforts made to confront them. Whatever may be one's individual attitude to the personalities, it will be necessary to remember the magnitude of the problems which were largely inherited before one can be in a position to estimate the success of the efforts made to combat them. There is also the fact that because the regime chose to act with an eye for the distant future and plan for generations yet unborn, the effects of some of the measures it took are not yet discernible. The regime like all others before it will have to wait for the judgement of history.

Prof Ade Adefuye
Nigerian High Commission
London . 1993.

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It was ambitious in conception. Seven Books on Seven Years of President Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, each having seven chapters, looked like an impossible order, especially when then Managing Director Chief Tola Adeniyi also directed that it be completed within four months.

The idea of the books had occurred to Chief Adeniyi, in London, early in 1992. Before he returned from that trip, his first as "Sole Administrator" of the Daily Times of Nigeria PLC, he had discussed the idea extensively with Professor Ade Adefuye, Deputy Nigerian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom. Extensive notes had been made, suggesting book subjects and chapters, as well as book editors and chapter writers. Professor Adefuye was, naturally appointed General Editor of the series. The first announcement of the project was made in the *Sunday Times* on March 1992.

I became involved in the project, when Chief Adeniyi, in a memo, asked me to take charge of the project. After discussions with our then Books Editor, Mr. Paul Akegwure, it was agreed that we needed to mobilise more fully the considerable intellectual power that resides in our Editorial Department, if the task was to be accomplished. A committee that included the Editor, *Daily Times* and most members of the Editorial Board, as well as the Books Editor and the Editor Times Home Studies, was set-up.

Then followed, in consultation with the General Editor, a somewhat drastic revision of book chapters, to cover more areas of the Babangida Revolution, and of Editors and writers on the basis of interest and ability to deliver. Then commissioning and re-commissioning, when some who had accepted failed to deliver. The Managing Director's fascination with the figure 7 was to prove somewhat problematic. But the committee persisted, cajoling contributors and Editors to submit copies, and looking for, and persuading new contributors, on the many occasions we had cause to re-commission chapters.

Co-ordinating this project has been a most educative experience for me. For that, I want to thank Chief Tola Adeniyi, Chairman/Chief Executive of Daily Times of Nigeria PLC for the opportunity. I should also thank our General Editor, Professor Adefuye for his keen interest and advice at every stage of the project. My thanks too to our contrib-

tors, and especially our Editors who had to attend several meetings in Lagos in the process of producing this series. His Excellency General Yakubu Gowon, at our request, wrote the Foreword. I thank him.

But perhaps this project might have been as impossible as it looked at the beginning without the exemplary commitment of members of the committee. Their enthusiasm was touching. So I must thank specially: Gbenga Odusanya and Dayo Alao who oversaw the production of the books; G. G. Darah, Omar F. Ibrahim, Ayo Olukotun, who wrote, edited and constantly revised theirs, and other contributors' copies; Tunji Okegbola, our brilliant and indefatigable Librarian who not only compiled the compendium, but also the indexes of all the books; Mallam Kabir for the cover design, staff of the Times Books & Periodicals Department, for industry and the numerous other colleagues who offered advice, suggestions and sometimes, sympathy.

For all of us who have participated in this project, this has been, I believe, a worthwhile experience. Believing that a good deal of the truly revolutionary programmes of the Babangida administration were either misunderstood or under-appreciated, we had set out to record and analyse the achievements of this period, in an attempt to place them in their proper perspective. It is perhaps indicative of the enthusiasm which developed, that we ended up with eight Books — The Seven Books, plus a Compendium.

It should, however, be stressed here that this is not a government information project. Although government officials, like many other citizens, knew about what we were doing, no government official asked for, or read any part of the series before they were published. Fully conscious that the debate about Babangida's place in history will rage for many years after the man has gone, we made efforts to invite contributors to write on subjects about which they are knowledgeable. What the contributors and the Editors have written represent, I believe, their observations and objective assessment of a period in Nigerian history, about which no patriot can be indifferent. This is our contribution to the prospective debate. I am assured by the General Editor, that Editors and contributors are prepared to bear sole responsibility for all errors of fact and judgement in this publication.

Onyema Ugochukwu,
Chairman,
Co-ordinating Committee.

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Introduction

NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER IBB: PERSPECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY:

By Ayo Olukotun

EDITORIAL CHAPTER:

In spite of a wealth of books and monographs on different aspects of Nigerian foreign policy, it remains very much an underdeveloped subject. Which is to say that the quantitative gains in studying the subject have not been matched with commensurate advances in theory, methodology and epistemology.

As is widely recognised, this maldevelopment is partly a result of the dominance of the received power-politics paradigm and the story-telling approach organised around changing regimes. It is also partly expressive of the failure to anchor empirical studies in the sort of detailed decision-making approaches that will constitute significant advances over unsystematic, illustrative data-gathering that characterise the field.¹

The present volume featuring seven chapters on the major aspects of President Babangida's foreign policy cannot claim to have made any striking theoretical advances. It has benefitted however from a diversity of perspectives as well as the illumination offered by scholars who have been involved in different times in the formulation and implementation of policy.

Thus for example, George Obiozor currently Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs was also formerly Special Assistant to the Minister of External Affairs, Major-General Ike Nwachukwu (rtd), Professor Ade Adefuye currently Deputy High Commissioner in London, Professor Ibrahim Gambari at the moment our Ambassador to the United Nations and Mr. Olusegun Akinsanya a senior official of the Ministry of External Affairs bring to their contributions the close touch of experts involved in decision-making. Similarly I can claim to have seen foreign policy being made at close range while remaining sufficiently distant from the limelight to maintain I hope, critical perspectives.

As historiography in the contemporary period shows us, every study of this nature is very much a child of its own history, of the moment in which it is designed and executed. It should surprise no one therefore that all the chapters bear the imprint of contemporary writing and are subject to the frailties of immediacy. In other words, the events that are hereby chronicled and analyzed may look different from the perspective of historical distance when better detachment could be achieved by scholars.

The foregoing should not be construed to mean that the authors of this volume were laudatory in their assessment of different aspects of foreign policy-making under IBB. Far from it. Their scholarly training made it possible for them to balance the sympathy of closely involved actors with the objectivity and seriousness expected of historical craft of the best kind. Since virtually all of the chapters were written before the November 17 broadcast of President Babangida which extended the tenure of his administration until August 1993, it was obviously impossible to accommodate events of the final part of his administration in the contributions.

However, the map offered is sufficiently lucid, I hope, to provide rewarding clues to the interpretation of the period after the end of 1992. As will be seen by taking a cursory glance at the range of policy covered, we have not been exhaustive. We deal in detail with West Africa and the African region believing that these were the logical preoccupations and "centre-piece" of the regime's foreign policy.

At the international level, there are contributions on Nigeria's relations with the Commonwealth and United Nations while a chapter is devoted to economic diplomacy because it was elevated in 1988 to the stature of a central motif of foreign policy by the administration. Given the brevity of the work, it was impossible to deal with policy towards Asia, for example, where Nigeria's relations with new centres of industrial prominence is of growing importance. Similarly there are no separate contributions on Nigeria's relations with her external creditors: the United States, Britain, France and Japan. This deficiency however, is partly compensated for in the chapters on the UN mentioned earlier and in the one on

economic diplomacy which deals with the linkages between recession, structural adjustment and economic foreign policy.

Chapter 1 written by the author deals with the important struggle for integration in the West African region. Since IBB was ECOWAS Chairman for roughly three years and given Nigeria's strategic position in West Africa, the chapter is about one of the dominant preoccupations of policy under the regime. It shows that in keeping with neo-functional and radical projections, Nigeria provided the impetus and direction for the still fragile community. It recommends a deepening of the content of official integration policy and makes plans for the need to move from resolutions to deeds in the subregional community. It also demonstrates the abiding linkages between security, economics and the integration agenda.

Two chapters deal with crucial aspects of Nigeria's African Policy. The one by George Obiozor entitled "Nigeria, Africa, and the Black World" provides a succinct overview of the domestic and international background that informed and shaped the devising by the regime of a coherent African policy. Political instability and economic recession at home and a rapidly changing international configuration are some of these. In spite of them, a successful African policy anchored on such projects as the Technical Aid Corps, anti-apartheid strengthening the OAU and ADB and vigorous conflict-resolution strategies were carefully worked out and implemented, Obiozor contends.

Equally noteworthy are the two chapters by Professor Ade Adefuye, the first on Nigeria at the United Nations and the Commonwealth, and the second on the Technical Aid Corps. According to him, the attention devoted to foreign policy by the regime should not be surprising for "It is the first military regime to give dissatisfaction with the conduct of foreign policy as one of the reasons for taking over power". Adefuye goes on to document closely Nigeria's successful use of the Commonwealth and UN fora to further its struggle against apartheid and racism, to push its decolonization agenda, the Namibian Independence issue, disarmament and eco-

conomic development. The interesting struggle for the Commonwealth and UN Secretary-General positions, one successful, the other abortive, are also engagingly discussed.

On the Technical Aid Corp, Adefuye notes its origins in the Council of Ministers memorandum CM 861 of 25th September 1987 which formally established it. He traces the career of the programme from its fledgling beginnings in 1987 to its present mature status. Adefuye shows the spin-offs to Nigeria's external image and foreign policy goals brought about by the programme.

"In Transition to Constitutional Government and Foreign Policy in the 1990s", Professor Ibrahim Gambari first traces the trajectory of Nigeria foreign policy from Balewa to Babangida showing the commonality of themes and similar definitions of national interest by successive regimes. As a foreign policy scholar who has also served as Nigeria's External Affairs Minister, Gambari brings to bear on the chapter helpful insights deriving from his privileged background. He discusses the political engineering of the Babangida government as well as the changes and continuities likely to ensue in the wake of civilian rule in 1993.

The chapter is interesting for its grasp of the sweep of foreign policy under changing regimes and its discussion of the dominant if often conservative motifs of Nigerian Foreign policy from independence up to date.

In 'Economic Diplomacy and Nigeria's Foreign Policy', Olusegun Akinsanya furnishes us with important clues on the design and implementation of economic diplomacy by the External Affairs Ministry under Major Gen. Ike Nwachukwu (rtd). We learn for instance that Gen. Nwachukwu's 253-page Kuru thesis entitled "Strategies for the Defence of Nigeria" written in 1982 provided an early forum for the espousal of what later metamorphosized into economic diplomacy.

As someone closely connected with the policy, Akinsanya provides us a detailed institutional and historical guide to the actual workings of that policy. Even if one does not share his optimism concerning its

several. It was worthwhile following through on Inobri's map of the content of policy-making and execution. Taken together, the seven chapters offer an adequate and interesting discussion of the major aspects of IBB's foreign policy. Even those who do not share the perspectives of the author or their sometimes overt sympathy for the regime will find the discussion for the most part serious, carefully written and lucid. Finally, my chapter on crisis management takes a close look at the administration's crisis resolution strategies especially in Liberia and Sudan.

I have no claims in recommending it to both the scholar and technician of foreign policy as well as to the articulate public whose news often constitutes the backbone for the formulation of policy under the Babangida administration.

ENDNOTES

1. On the state of Nigerian foreign policy writings, see for example, H. Akpan Akpan, *Decision-Making Models Revisited: An Analysis of the Application of Theories and Models of Foreign Decision-Making to the study of Nigeria's Foreign Policy* in Gabriel O. Okunoye and R. A. Akande (eds.), *The Structure and Processes of Foreign Policy-Making and Implementation in Nigeria (1960-1990)* (Lagos: NIJA press, 1990) and my recent article *Economic Diplomacy: Theory, Praxis and Progress in the Nigerian Journal of International Affairs* (Lagos) volume 18, 1992, forthcoming.

2. On Nigeria's recent foreign relations under IBB, for example, see my *Nigerian Journal of International Relations under Bush and Babangida: Political Relations of Last Dependence* in Nigerian Forum Nov./Dec. 1990, 23-27, and *Nigerian United States Relations under the Reagan Administration: A Political Economic outline* in Nigerian Forum Jan./Feb. 1991, 2-12/13.

Chapter I

REGIONAL INTEGRATION NIGERIA AND ECOWAS UNDER IBB

INTRODUCTION : AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES

- *By Ayo Olukotun*

Following an intensive flurry of diplomatic activities by Nigeria and Togo between 1972 and 1975, the draft treaty of the ECOWAS adopted in January 1975 by representatives of West African States was brought before the Conference of the Heads of State which held in Lagos on May 28, 1975. The treaty was signed by 15 countries thus bringing into existence for the first time a Pan-West African Integration Scheme cutting across the Lusophone, Francophone and Anglophone linguistic and cultural barriers of these states.

The ECOWAS which consists of 16 States incorporates a land area of 6.3 million kilometres, a population estimated at 150 million and a G.D.P. of \$130 billion in 1989. The 16 States range from mini-states with population less than 1 million to the more populous ones like Ghana and Ivory-Coast and of course Nigeria whose population is about half of the entire ECOWAS States. It also includes some landlocked countries often at the mercy of Sahelian drought and a number of others which are among some of the poorest in the World.

The treaty runs through 14 chapters and incorporates 64 articles. Its main objectives stated in Article 2 are to promote "cooperation and development in virtually all fields of economic activity, particularly in the fields of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its people, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among its members and contributing to the progress of development of African continent".²

As scholars like SKB Asante have pointed out, some of these objectives tend to be vague and imprecise the way they are stated.³ However, a number of goals stand out from the above. These include the liberalization of trade and the free movement of people and capital. The above also implies the elimination of tariff restrictions and other officially imposed obstacles to the free movement of persons, economic units and activities. It also suggests the harmonization of monetary and fiscal policies and the

taking of joint steps to enhance agricultural, commercial and industrial development.

Traditionally, therefore, the ECOWAS treaty aspires to a common market among West African States with a graduated agenda for step-by-step implementation. The aims of such an integrative effort include capturing economies of scale facilitated by the creation of a wider market; enabling the poorer and landlocked states to take advantage of the community in having access to the sea and to services, the building of capital goods industries and the counter penetration of the industrialized economies by the pooling together of resources and capacities among the integrating States.⁴

Article 8 of the treaty provides for the setting up of an executive Secretariat headed by a Secretary appointed by the highest decision-making organ of the community: the Authority of Heads of State and Government which is assisted by the Council of Ministers. Apart from these, there are technical and specialised commissions on various aspects of the community's work ranging from trade to energy, immigration and so on.⁵

Equally interesting is the provision of Article 50 for a Fund to take care of Cooperation, Compensation and Development: The fund is to be used for project financing, the uplifting of poorer States, the attraction of foreign investment and the provision of compensation to its members. It is to be generated from contributions by member states proportional to their G.D.P., from international economic institutions and from productive ventures embarked upon by the community.

The Community took off- properly speaking - in 1977 following the ratification of the treaty by the required number of member States and the period from 1977 - 1980 can be regarded as a teething period or as one scholar put it of "conceptualization" regarding the modalities of its operations.⁶ However, this period was not barren of achievements for: it enabled the leaders to give content to the broad guidelines and vaguely stated objectives of the treaty, to mount a viable administrative infrastructure, carry out documentation and information-gathering and to define the thrust of integration more clearly.

The succeeding decade witnessed an attempt to consolidate the fledgling initiatives of the first few years. Progress was recorded on the free movement of persons in spite of nationalistic outbursts resulting in the expulsion of West Africans from other countries and recently there

was the printing of the ECOWAS travel card. After staying on the drawing board for many years, some forward movement was recorded on trade liberalization in the last two years. Also partly because of the impetus given by European integration efforts, it is now envisaged to have a common ECOWAS currency by 2,000 AD since the strong monetary links between France and its erstwhile colonies will be severely altered with the onset of the Maastricht treaty.

The general view among scholars and participants is that progress towards the implementation of integration objectives has been very slow indeed. Dr. Abbas Bundu, Executive Secretary of the Community from 1989 onwards told a gathering of experts in Lagos just before the 15th Summit held in Dakar in 1992 that West African States remain as unintegrated as they were in 1977 when the Community took off. He attributed this to the sadly low level of implementation of the Community's protocols and called on the experts to research into the critical gap between theory and practice.⁴

Similarly, Mr. Barber Conable, the World Bank's erstwhile representative in Africa told the OAU Summit held in Abuja on June 4, 1991 of the need for Africa to move from "dreams to deeds" as regards the integration agenda. Mr. Conable, wondered why there were

"So many roadblocks between Accra
and Lagos or between Dakar and
Abidjan." "

in a telling remark on the State of West African integration. In fairness to the ECOWAS leaders it should be pointed out that although the level of West African trade is in the neighbourhood of five percent, progress has been made on the building of roads and highways connecting community members while a number of these are in the pipeline.

Some of the reasons for slow progress on integration include the persistence of colonial trading patterns, inter-state rivalries, the general underdevelopment of West African economies, the lack of political will, poor finances, the existence of rival organizations like CEAO, Mano River Union and some 28 other groupings whose objectives conflict or overlap with those of ECOWAS. We shall later return to some of these problems in the context of assessing IBB's

contribution to integration efforts in ECOWAS between late 1985 and December 1992 - the eve of transfer of power to a civilian democracy.

It should be borne in mind too that the adoption in Abuja in June 1991 of the African Economic Community treaty by unanimous consent has given further impetus - at least at the programmatic level - to the ECOWAS agenda since it is envisaged that the sub-regional groupings will form the basis and building blocs for the eventual formation of an African Common Market. Indeed it could be argued that since 1988 onwards, with the imminent consolidation of the European market, a new urgency has attended the search for integration and development in West Africa although this concern has not been matched by resolute activity. The dominating themes of the years since 1988 have been democratization, Structural Adjustment Policies and the integration agenda. Before focusing specifically on the contribution made by Nigerian leaders during the IBB regime, it is pertinent to provide a conceptual and historical background of the role of Nigeria in ECOWAS.

SECTION II

NIGERIA IN ECOWAS : A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

Both the orthodox and revisionist literature on integration recognize the need for leadership by one or two strong "core states" with the willingness and muscle to pull the weaker members along, to initiate forward movement and underwrite the cost of integration on behalf of those who bear the brunt of these efforts. John Ravenhill for example has argued that a successful integration effort requires the

*"leadership of a strong "core" state willing and able to provide the necessary side-payments to weaker members of the partnership in order to sustain existing integrative arrangement and allow their extension into new areas of cooperation."*¹⁰

It would appear therefore that Nigeria because of its size, weight, influence, role-orientation and power capabilities is singularly placed in a position to act as a facilitator of the integration agenda in West Africa using its economic muscle and the prestige it enjoys among other West African States. In a similar vein, Dr. Omotayo Olaniyan drawing an European integration literature has argued that the leadership function in the process of integration involves three main aspects:

- a) a strategic function which involves decisions about the general direction the process is to take;
- b) a tactical function which is concerned with the selection of specific steps within that or overall strategy and
- c) a continuous negotiating function which is directed at building up the coalition of interests and arriving at compromises necessary to maintain a steady flow of decisions on individual policy issues."¹¹

In view of the above imperatives and coinciding with Nigeria's own strategic, diplomatic and economic objectives in the West African region, she had since the formation of ECOWAS played a pioneering and stimulating role in the progress and consolidation of the organization. Broadly speaking, activist integrationist phases tend to alternate with periods of inward-looking approaches resulting in a recession of commitment to ECOWAS as during the long closure of borders between 1984 and 1986 and the expulsion of immigrants in 1983 and 1985. Using this approach, we may characterise Gowon and Babangida periods as activist integrationist phases while Obasanjo and Buhari were more concerned with national reconstruction rather than the furtherance of sub-regional goals.

Let me elaborate a little however on the strategic imperatives of the integration agenda. Since Nigeria is a 'Middle Power' in the International system, the bulk of her foreign policy transactions and geopolitical concerns are with her immediate neighbours and the subregion. The different versions of 'pax Nigeriana' that have risen and fallen involve the strategic component of securing our contiguous environment and of playing a leadership role in West Africa and on the continent. The use of Nigeria's neighbours as centres for transferring arms to Biafra during the civil war, the hostility during the war of the Francophone Ivory-Coast and the presence of a large French influence in West Africa are among the strategic reasons for cultivating an active West African role. Indeed since 1983 what has become known as the 'Concentric circles theory' in which West Africa constitutes the outer ring of 3 concentric circles has become an axiom of Nigerian foreign policy.

Apart from this, the rising industrial class as well as state officials believe that integration will open up to it a wider market and bigger business opportunities. Sometimes this economic calculation is made on behalf of an envisaged Nigerian Capitalism, sometimes it is seen as a bait to attract foreign investment. But whether autochthonously or in partnership with Transnational Corporations, it is hoped that Nigeria will derive tangible economic benefits from integration. Joe Garba wrote in a 1987 book that "Policy makers in Lagos believe that Nigeria with an internal market of some 100 million people and providing access to the additional market of 15 ECOWAS countries should attract American investors-particularly manufacturing".¹²

Similarly, Mr. Ubu, Nigerian's Commercial Consul in New York argued in 1990 that

"United States companies can use Nigeria as a base for penetrating the ECOWAS market".¹³

In the literature on 'subimperialism' some 'middle powers' in the international system police and control particular subregions on behalf of both their national interest and that of external powers. Fred Halliday is one of the earliest scholars to apply the concept to the study of foreign policy behaviour of rising middle powers, in his case to pre-Ayatollah Iran. It is possible to outline the utility as well as limitations of this concept to Nigeria's West African Policy as I suggested in a recent article but this need not detain us here.¹⁴ In grappling with the IBB period from late 1985 to December 1992, it is important to bear in mind the continuities dictated by some of the imperatives mentioned earlier as well as those features which are his distinctive contributions - themselves the consequence of conjuncture and idiosyncratic factors.

The President himself situated some of his actions within what he called 'the principal considerations of Nigerian foreign policy' in a press briefing on the Liberian crisis on 31st October, 1990. He defined these familiarly as:¹⁵

the defence and protection of our territorial threshold from all acts of aggression whether internally or externally instigated, peaceful relations

and cooperation with neighbours or the 'Ring countries' and concern with the West African sub-region.

The President went on to identify these three elements as constituting Nigeria's "Primary Security Boundaries" which are both "interlocking and coterminous." ¹⁶

Justifying his actions in the Liberian crisis which led to the formation of ECOMOG, he argued that

In fact, in a sub-region of 16 countries where one out of three West Africans is a Nigerian, it is imperative that any regime in this country should relentlessly strive towards the prevention or avoidance of the deterioration of any crisis which threatens to jeopardize or compromise the stability, prosperity and security of the sub-region. It was this very objective that propelled our pioneering efforts for the establishment of ECOWAS and made inevitable our continuing strong commitment to and support for the organization a national imperative. ¹⁷

This enunciation brings out clearly the interconnectedness between the security, diplomatic and economic objectives Nigeria pursues through ECOWAS and the link between her role - definition and the integration agenda. For one interesting feature of the community in the last few years is its increasing involvement with political matters in the shape of its actions over the Liberian crisis resulting in the 30-day ultimatum given to Charles Taylor after the 1992 Dakar Summit and the earlier adoption of "Declaration of Political Principles" at the 14th Summit in Abuja in 1991.

SECTION III : THE IBB YEARS

As in every other sphere of his administration, a tenure spanning a period of seven years has far-reaching implications and impact on the course of events and the context of policy-making. As is to be expected therefore, the President had a rare chance to etch his style and orientation on the Economic Community within the parameters and constraints discussed in the two preceding sections.

One possible if somewhat limited gauge of his achievement in this area was the fact that at the 1992 Dakar Summit of ECOWAS, he was

again offered the Chairmanship of the Community - a position he held twice before but he turned it down and explained valedictorily that it was the last summit he would be attending as Nigeria's President. Of course the offer can be interpreted as stemming not just from recognition but from an 'avoidance syndrome' by less endowed States who are hard-pressed to make ends meet. It could also be read as a deference to Nigeria's prestige and power as the big power of the lot. But it is possible to see it as a measure of the President's commitment to viable and successful integration in West Africa and Africa. Indeed, the adoption of the AEC treaty by the OAU leaders in Abuja in 1991 owed a lot to Nigeria's skilful diplomacy and in the same vein, Nigeria's support for ECOWAS remained steadfast and crucial throughout the period.

First of all, it should be pointed out that the years under discussion coincided with worsening economic crisis and rising indebtedness for West African States, growing involvement of international economic institutions in their economies, political instability and from 1989, pro-democracy challenges to the leaders of these states.

Let us take a few indices of Nigeria's commitment. President Babangida was elected Chairman at the 1986 Summit held in Abuja even though he had just completed General Buhari's tenure who was chairman at the time of the August 1985 Coup d'etat. Again in 1987, the Summit held in Abuja, Nigeria once again hosting the summit and IBB was re-elected as chairman. In both of these summits, Nigeria's participation and commitment was remarkable. Another index of Nigeria's contribution is her attendance of every summit by the President and the taking of initiatives in the discussions. For example, in the 11th Summit of ECOWAS held in Lome from June 24 - 25, under the Chairmanship of President Babangida, Nigeria sponsored strong resolutions on the dumping of toxic waste on the West African Coast. Again at the 12th Summit in Ouagadougou, Burkina-Faso between June 29 and 30, only 10 out of 16 Heads of State were present and Nigeria took an active position. The same thing is true for the 1991 and 1992 Summits held in Abuja and Dakar respectively.

One constant refrain in all the Summits was the arrears of dues owed by member states. In this regard, Nigeria took a leadership

position not only by stepping up its payment of 1/3rd of the budget but by consistently upholding laggard states, persuading and sponsoring resolutions such as "Spirit of Abuja" in 1987 which threatened defaulting members with reprisals. The President was also busily involved in resolving and mediating inter-state conflicts such as those between Ghana and Togo, between Senegal and Mauritania, between Burkina-Faso and Mali and the yet unresolved Liberian crisis.

Nigeria's leadership was also manifest in its proposals to the meetings in the President visiting every West African State and in bilateral arrangements with a number of states in the spirit of integration. In all of these the President was helped by the contribution of the dynamic External Affairs Ministers especially the cerebral Akinyemi and the diligent General Ike Nwachukwu (Rtd). These two had clear ideas about the thrust of Nigeria's sub-regional initiatives as regards the ECOWAS. As will be seen Nigeria's role is also partly dictated by its housing the ECOWAS Secretariat at King George V Road, Crakan, and its involvement with the construction of a permanent Secretariat at Abuja.

Let us now look at the evidence of Nigeria's participation and contributions a little more closely. At the time of the August change of government in 1985, it could be said that West African Integration was in the doldrums. The erstwhile Nigerian leader General Buhari seemed to have been more concerned with internal reforms than with the sub-regional agenda during his tenure. This much was clear from the protracted closure of borders and the expulsion of immigrants in 1985. This is not to say however that he retreated from sub-regional integration efforts. He did not, but rather kept up in a subdued manner Nigeria's obligations to the community.

Nonetheless, TBB started out with more attention to ECOWAS occasioning the New Nigerian to editorialize after the 9th Summit from June 30 - July 2, 1986 of "a reborn ECOWAS". But before discussing this summit, which was the first he attended as Head of State, it is pertinent to mention that in his annual Foreign Policy address during the patron's dinner of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, on 29th November 1985, he had stated that:

Regional integration arrangements such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) represent useful means for the

*promotion of accelerated economic development among countries... We shall continue relentlessly in our efforts to see the ECOWAS survive and prosper and we shall make all the necessary sacrifices within the limits of our economic resources.*¹⁸

The handling of the Abuja Summit of 1986 indicated that he meant those words. The 9th Summit was preceded in the usual manner by a meeting of the Council of Ministers which prepared the agenda for the summit in consultation with relevant authorities. At the Summit, the President upbraided his colleagues pointing out that

*the hall-mark of integration has been inaction and cosmetic commitment.*¹⁹

He blamed the slow progress on trade liberalization and other matters on "cumbersome legislative procedures"²⁰ in each state as well as "insensitivity of relevant government organs to the requirements of the Community"²¹. The Summit also took up the conflict between Liberia and Sierra-Leone which had mutually closed borders against each other as well as the Burkina-Faso-Mali conflict which began in late 1985 and where the Foreign Minister, Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi had tried to mediate. It mandated Nigeria and Guinea to mediate between Liberia and Sierra-Leone.²²

According to West Africa Magazine, the 1986 Abuja Summit "provided considerable evidence" that Nigeria was "willing to do right by ECOWAS after a period in which its commitment seemed to be slipping"²³. Obviously, such steps as the provision of renovated accommodation in Lagos for ECOWAS staff and of land in Abuja for the headquarters as well as a contribution of N5m towards the total cost helped to demonstrate Nigeria's commitment.²⁴

The 'New Nigerian' in a comment talked of a waking up from "a decade-long slumber"²⁵ regarding the community affairs. The thrust of Nigeria's contributions has already been noted. Other areas in which she has helped out include championing a common position on decolonization, apartheid and the debt crisis, giving aid to cash-strapped ECOWAS countries like the Republic of Benin and Liberia in 1989 as well as suing for peace among quarrelling countries in ECOWAS.²⁶ In subsequent years, Nigeria kept up this initial enthusi-

asm. She played an important role in the sponsoring of the "Declaration of Political Principles" adopted in Abuja on July 6, 1991 as a way of tackling the wave of pro-democracy movements. Her own transition programme which was being steadily implemented gave her the needed clout to urge West African leaders to come to terms with the stubborn demand for democracy all over West Africa. Following the dramatic events of 1989 in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, democracy became the battle-cry in many West African States. Nigeria's approach was to recognise the significance of the democratic wave and to urge West African leaders to respond positively to it.

Equally, interesting is the formation of ECOMOG under Nigeria's supervision and inspiration deriving some form of cover from Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations.²⁷ Indeed, it is true to say that the Liberian initiative and the resulting domestic controversies became a preoccupying foreign policy issue between 1990 and 1992. On the one hand it tended to drive a wedge between Francophone countries like Ivory-Coast and Senegal which supported Charles Taylor and Nigeria which sponsored the ECOMOG and supported the interim Presidency of Amos Sawyer. Togo however played the role of a balancer. However, these differences became muted or unimportant as virtually all ECOWAS States became persuaded of the need to resolve the crisis by giving an ultimatum to Charles Taylor during the Dakar Summit. Nigeria succeeded in getting her initiative recognized internationally even though it was dogged by controversies over financing, legality and purpose of its mission. Nigeria has also taken steps to encourage private sector initiative in the ECOWAS States in keeping with its policy of 'economic diplomacy' which started in 1988. It has recently

*"legalized the duty-free importation of unprocessed and handicraft goods emanating from the 16 ECOWAS nations with effect from 1 January 1992."*²⁸

Interestingly, there are frequent domestic criticisms of Nigeria's commitment to ECOWAS and the playing of "a Father Christmas role" in relation to these countries without insisting on commensurate returns. Nigeria's own economic crisis tended to give salience to these complaints.²¹

CONCLUSION : Recapitulation and Prognosis

Side by side with the conscious official promotion of an integration agenda by the government is a growth in entrepreneurial activity across the community in keeping for example with commercialization, privatization and the government's economic diplomacy ³⁰ Although still a feeble one and while there are familiar obstacles like the scepticism with which Nigeria's pharmaceutical products are greeted in other ECOWAS States, it portends good for genuine people - people integration.

The decline in overseas travel by businessmen as a result of high cost has served as an indirect boost to such budding indigenous entrepreneurs as Joe Geld International Company Ltd. based in Nigeria but with business tentacles in Cotonou and Conakry. ³¹ Although Joe Geld operates in partnership with a European firm based in Holland, it is one of the growing number of Nigeria-based concerns exploring the possibilities of the West African market. ³²

Another company worth mentioning in the same connection is Texaco (Nigeria) Ltd. which has made some progress in partnership with Texaco Overseas subsidiaries in Ivory-Coast³³ with regards to getting its products e.g. grease, across to other West African states.

President Babangida told a meeting of the Federation of West African Manufacturers (FEWAMA) which held in Lagos in 1989 under the Chairmanship of Dr. Ismalla B. Jose that the businessman should examine how they can institutionalize their coming together as a basis for increasing their inter-State experiences and knowledge of available local resources to produce what the Sub-region needs. ³⁴

It is believed that as trade liberalization and the proposed monetary harmonization measures come on steam, the fledging business cooperation and linkages among the ECOWAS countries will be boosted.

It should be borne in mind too that as a result of the fluidity and porousness of borders, a good deal of trade continues to be via unofficial channels through smuggling and related activities. In spite of official vigil and patrol at Krake, Idiroko, Seme and neighbouring villages, the trade has continued. It would seem that the smuggling

of petrol, wheat and currency trafficking assumed serious dimen-

... of the ... (197) ...

In view of the record, Nigeria's in policies are clearly discernible in the shaping up and reformulation of her foreign policy agenda since 1966. Although it is possible to dispute the content of current official strategies for example by insisting genuine mass involvement, there is no doubt that the administration has made germane contribution to the West African integration agenda. Even at the level of popular images, such steps as the mounting of "Dumpwatch" - an ECOWAS monitoring plan to prevent the dumping of toxic waste on the West African Coast (adopted at Lome in 1988) and ECOMOG are likely to be remembered for a good while.

Nonetheless, the old debate about guns vs butter persists. That is, how much do we spend on foreign policy and how much on solving domestic problems. Foreign policy activism often brings in its wake a measure of domestic backlash from those who think their governments are evading or overlooking pressing domestic difficulties. In view of this Babangida's successor, an elected civilian will have to justify the continuation of the active profile he sustained on integration and foreign policy matters. It is possible that the pendulum will swing back again to a more inward-looking orientation. Nonetheless, as earlier argued, the geopolitical, security and economic imperatives of Nigeria's foreign policy and the integrationist compulsions of the international economy will make it virtually mandatory for Nigeria to carry on with its leadership of West African and African integration.

ENDNOTES

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2. As cited in S.K.B. Asante, "ECOWAS/CEAO: Conflict and Cooperation in West Africa" in R.I. Onwuka & A. Sesay, The Future of Regionalism in Africa - (London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd; 1985) pp. 78

Asante's essay provides a useful account of the fledgling years of ECOWAS and its institutional arrangements.

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6. Asante Opcit. p. 87.

7. Ibid; p. 87.

8. Dr. Bundu's Opening Remarks at the National Seminar on Research Priorities and Integration in West Africa - Feb. 27 - 28, 1992,

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13. As cited in Ayo Olukotun, Nigeria - United States Relations under Bush and Babangida, Nigerian Forum (Lagos), Nov/Dec 1990.

14. See the article cited above. See also my critical review of Timothy Shaw & Olajide Aluko (eds). Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Perceptions and Projections (London: Macmillan, 1983). Published in ODU June 1989.

15. As in Tunji Olagunju & Sam Oyovbaire, For Their Tomorrow. We gave our Today: Selected Speeches of IBB. (Ibadan: Spectrum Publishers Ltd., 1991) p. 271 - 272.

16. Ibid. p. 272. For a similar definition of Nigeria's Security Perimeter, see for example, Captain O.A. Oladimeji (NN), 'Nigeria and West African Security Environment in Nigerian Forum (Lagos) May/June 1989, pp. 154 - 162.

17. Ibid.; p. 272.

18. Published in Olusanya & Akindele Op.cit.; p. 564.

19. Africa Research Bulletin (Devon) Vol. 23, No. 6 July 31, 1986 p. 8264.

20. Ibid; p. 8264

21. Ibid; p. 8264

22. Ibid; p. 8263 - 8264

23. As cited in Africa Research Bulletin Op.cit; 8263 - 8264.

24. Ibid; p. 8264

25. Cited in Ibid; p. 8263-4

26. See for instance Olagunju & Oyovbaire Op.cit; p. 300 - 338.

27. Olagunju & Oyovbaire Op.cit; p. 273.

28. In Africa Research Bulletin (Devon) Nov 16- Dec 15, 1991 p. 10609.

29. On some of the linkages between Foreign policy and public perception in Nigeria See Ayo Olukotun, "Foreign Policy and Democratic Mobilization in Nigeria : An Analysis" in S.G. Tyoden (ed); Democratic Mobilisation in Nigeria : Problems and Prospects Proceedings of the 15th Annual Conference of the Nigerian Political Science Association held at U.I. June 26- July 1, 1988 p. 1282 - 1290. See also the debate between Prof. L.K. Jeje and myself on Nigeria's alleged 'Father Christmas Syndrome' with respect to West Africa in Sunday Guardian, April 16, 1989, p. 7 and Sunday Guardian, April 30, 1989, p. 7.

30. On the origins, philosophy and modalities of economic diplomacy See for example Gabriel O. Olusanya, Bassey E. Ate and Adebayo Olukoshi (eds). Economic Development and Foreign Policy in Nigeria (Lagos : NIIA Press, 1988) and my review notes in the Canadian Journal of African Studies (Montreal) 24 : 3, 1990. See also the more recent U. Joy Ogwu & Adebayo Olukoshi (eds). The Economic Diplomacy of the Nigerian State (NIIA, 1991).

31. Business in ECOWAS (Lagos), December 14, 1987, p. 13.
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33. African Guardian (Lagos), March 13, 1989, p. 31.
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35. On the problem of boundaries and borderlands as well as smuggling and related activities in West Africa, See the useful compendium in Al Asiwaju, P.O. Adeniyi (eds); Borderlands in Africa : a multidisciplinary and comparative focus on Nigeria and West Africa (Lagos : University of Lagos Press 1989) and my review in Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge) Vol. 29, No. 4, 1991 p. 703 - 705.

Chapter 2

NIGERIA, AFRICA AND THE BLACK WORLD

By George Obiozor

Introduction

This chapter focuses on Nigeria's foreign policy actions in and toward Africa and the Black world in the period from 1985 when General Ibrahim Babangida's government was inaugurated. Our chief concern will be to assess the country's foreign policy orientation in Africa, towards African issues, in the wider Black diaspora, and on matters relevant to the black world. In undertaking this assessment, we shall point to elements of continuity and change in Nigeria's foreign policy since 1985. Our starting point will be the domestic and international contexts of foreign policy articulation following the rise to power of General Babangida. We shall then proceed after this to assess the government's Africa policy. This will be followed by a similar assessment of the government's Black diaspora policy. In the final section of the paper, we shall argue, by way of conclusion, that the period of the Babangida regime in office has been marked by a decisively more activist role for the country in African and Black matters.

THE DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL CONTEXTS OF THE BABANGIDA REGIME'S FOREIGN POLICY

At the time the Babangida regime assumed office on 27 August, 1985, the Nigerian domestic environment was characterised by several adverse developments which had repercussions for the conduct of foreign policy. At the level of the economy, for example, the collapse in the early 1980s of the world oil market had drastic consequences for the country. The world oil market crash came at a time when Nigeria had come to depend on oil exports for some 90 per cent of its foreign exchange and export receipts. Predictably, in the context of so high dependence on oil export earnings, the collapse of the world oil market had instant and far-reaching effects on various sectors of the economy, especially the highly import dependent ones such as the manufacturing, construction, and commercial sectors.

The deep-seated economic crisis which began in the early 1980s has remained with the country to this day even as efforts to change the structural basis of the economy continue.

As can be expected, the onset of a major economic crisis in the country had consequences for the conduct of foreign policy. At one level, the dramatic decline in revenue receipts from oil exports meant that a limit was placed on what the country could expect to do at a time when many African and Caribbean states had developed what I have described elsewhere as a "father christmas" image of the Nigerian foreign policy establishment. These kinds of constraints meant that, at another level, innovative diplomatic methods had to be developed in order that the country may remain visible internationally and active in its traditional sphere of influence. As I will argue later it took the emergence of the Babangida regime for these innovative diplomatic methods coupled with a re-prioritisation of our foreign policy objectives to be introduced. General Babangida's predecessors were concerned primarily with sustaining increasingly unsustainable foreign policy apparatuses and methods.

Beyond the economic terrain, another domestic development which was relevant to the conduct of foreign policy was the sharply deteriorating political climate in the country. The disgrace of the politicians of the Second Republic (1979 - 1983) and the dramatic stories of economic and political corruption unearthed by various military tribunals did very little credit to the country's external image. Matters were not helped by the highly authoritarian posture adopted by the Buhari regime (1983 - 1985). The blatant suppression of basic democratic rights, including the freedom of speech and of the press, and the total refusal of that government to discuss the country's political future with a view to setting a date for the return to civilian rule, further undermined the country's external image. The ouster of the jurisdiction of civil courts in important civil matters, the resort to the use of military force to resolve basic disputes, and the government's culture of intolerance served to dent the country's respectability abroad.

While the depth of the economic morass and social decay in the country may have called for equally drastic socio-economic-political measures to curtail them and restore some sanity to the polity, the damage to the country's image arising from domestic political authoritarianism required to be tackled. We will argue that the Ba-

bangida regime attempted to redress this issue by adopting a human rights policy upon its inauguration and setting the stage for the country's return to civilian rule. Where the Buhari regime outlawed all political debate, the Babangida administration encouraged it. The world took note of this and Nigeria's example became a standard reference point for other African states as the leading Western countries urged multi-party democratic transitions on the continent.

At the international level, several international developments were unfolding which, at the time the Babangida regime assumed office, were bound to affect the way the country's external relations were carried on. In the area of the international economy, we have already referred to the world oil market glut which had adverse consequences for Nigeria's domestic accumulation. The glut itself was symptomatic of the recession that had hit the world economy in the early 1980s. As a result of that recession, not only did oil and primary commodity prices fall, foreign investment flows to less developed countries declined in overall terms. Similarly, developing countries of world trade was also declining. For many countries, the challenge posed for their foreign policy by these international economic developments centred on how they could remain relevant in the scheme of things even as many of them bore a huge debt burden and were threatened with further economic marginalisation.

Politically, the world witnessed even more dramatic developments than at the economic level. The emergence to power of Mikhail Gorbachev and his twin principles of Perestroika and Glasnost had started to make themselves felt at the time the Babangida regime was established. The tenor of international politics began gradually to change, international organisations were beginning to regain their influence and relevance, and, as we now have witnessed, the entire basis of post-war world politics, especially the crippling effects of the superpower Cold War, was to be radically altered. Today, the world has witnessed many political developments which in the pre-Gorbachev period appeared almost totally unthinkable - the reunification of Germany, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of Eastern Europe as a politically coherent bloc, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the jettisoning of state socialism across the world and the near universal embrace of multi-party democracy, the uncrippling of the security council of the United Nations under U.S. hegemony, and the wars in Yugoslavia, and parts

of the former Soviet Union. These were truly epochal political developments which no foreign policy regime could ignore. The Babangida regime has had to grapple with the ripple effects of these developments on Nigeria, Africa, and the black diaspora.

Within Africa and in the black diaspora, Nigeria's ability to respond to the changing context of international politics has a special significance. As the most populous African country and the biggest black nation on earth, Nigeria, for better or for worse, must play a leadership role in African and black affairs and its sheer demographic advantage confers on it a special role. Let us now proceed to assess the foreign policy actions of the Babangida regime in and toward Africa.

THE BABANGIDA REGIME AND AFRICA

When General Babangida assumed office in 1985, Nigeria's Africa policy was in a state of limbo and major innovations were due. For instance, the decision of the Buhari regime to close the country's land borders was a source of friction with some of Nigeria's neighbours. The dwindling revenue receipts from oil exports and the declining tempo of foreign policy involvement and activism which it implied was a source of distress for a foreign policy establishment used to a "father christmas" way of doing things. The changing African socio-political landscape, including the movement towards the total decolonisation of the continent called for a new, imaginative foreign policy agenda as did the rapidly changing international environment within which African countries must seek their survival. The central questions which the Nigerian foreign policy establishment had to address were as follows: How, in the face of dwindling resources, was the country to remain central to African affairs? In the context of the changing African and wider international political landscape, how was the country to remain relevant? What sort of balance was to be maintained between the national interest and commitment to Africa?

From the outset, the Babangida administration made plain its commitment to the pursuit of the principle of Africa as the centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy. Within this overall framework, several important innovations were introduced by the government in order to enable the country play a more effective and relevant role

in Africa even in view of its dwindling resources, and without losing sight of the national interest.

Among the innovations introduced are:

(i) The extension of technical aid to African countries that require it under the Technical Aid Corps scheme. Under this scheme, Nigerian professionals and experts whose services were required by other African countries were seconded, at the Nigerian government's expense, to those countries for a period of up to three years. This way, the government sought to ensure that, unlike the previous practice of throwing money at problems without a guarantee that it would be effectively and judiciously utilised, the country's aid programme became targeted at specific projects. Furthermore, the technical aid corps scheme introduced an element of accountability to the country's aid programme;

(ii) The conclusion of bilateral agreements with as many African countries as were willing to institutionalise their co-operation with Nigeria. A host of joint commissions have been established with several African countries. Any additional aid outside the technical aid corps scheme have been channelled to the recipient African states through the joint commission;

(iii) The adoption of the principle of reciprocity whereby, without prejudice to the centrality of Africa to Nigeria's foreign policy, the government would make it a point to consult only with African governments which seek Nigeria's opinion and views on matters that concern them individually or collectively;

(iv) The adoption of economic diplomacy as a new, additional plank and instrument of Nigeria's foreign policy. As it relates to Africa specifically, economic diplomacy was expected to open up business opportunities for Nigerians in other African countries, help formalise existing informal commercial links, and establish new channels. Economic diplomacy represented one aspect of the Babangida administration's response to the changed economic circumstances of the country following the onset of the Nigerian economic crisis at the beginning of the 1980s. It was meant to ensure that the country remained a key and relevant player in the African terrain. Africans with investible capital were encouraged to come to Nigeria to seek out business opportunities. Structural impediments to the expansion of economic ties between Nigeria and other African countries came under serious focus; and

(v) The willingness to intervene directly in violent conflicts between African states and within specific countries as a neutral arbiter and honest broker. This new policy orientation represented a major departure from the stand-offish attitude of previous regimes to major conflicts on account of sensitivity to the Organisation of African Unity's principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states. Given the changing nature of world politics, especially the end of the super-power Cold War, extra-African interest in African conflicts diminished. This called for an African response and the Babangida regime championed the drive for Africans themselves to intervene in flashpoints on the continent rather than wait for increasingly reluctant extra-African powers to come to the rescue. No example better illustrates the Nigerian government position than the country's assemblage of the ECOMOG coalition of West African states with a view to directly intervening, with the blessings of ECOWAS and the OAU, in the civil war in that country that was leading to senseless killings.

In addition to the innovations introduced to Nigeria's Africa policy by the Babangida regime, the government also pursued with vigour some of the existing policy orientations which have formed aspects of the pillars of Nigeria's external relations since independence. Thus, there were important elements of continuity in Nigeria's foreign policy even as the regime introduced bold new perspectives and policies.

Among the existing pillars of the Nigerian foreign policy which the Babangida regime pursued with new vigour are:

(i) The strengthening of Nigeria's commitment to regional economic co-operation in Africa as a whole and West Africa in particular. It was in the spirit of this commitment that the government decided to reopen the country's land borders which had been closed by the Buhari regime. Such was the personal and political interest shown in regional economic co-operation that General Babangida was elected on three successive occasions in the second half of the 1980s to chair ECOWAS. The Nigerian government also financed the relocation of the ECOWAS secretariat from Lagos to Abuja. Furthermore, in the context of the growing international interest in regional integration as evidenced by the drive by West Europeans and the countries of the Pacific Rim towards their own economic communities, Nigeria played a key role in goading

African countries to take seriously the need for greater continental economic co-operation. The outcome of this was the signing, in mid-1991 at Abuja of the treaty of an African Economic Community which, it is hoped, will be fully achieved in the course of the first half of the 21st century;

(ii) The continuing pursuit of the anti-apartheid goals to which all post-colonial Nigerian governments have vigorously dedicated themselves. The Babangida regime, like its predecessors, was unyielding in its opposition to the South African regime. It campaigned for the sustenance of sanctions and provided generous financial and material assistance to the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress. Following the rise to power of F.W. De Klerk as Prime Minister of South Africa, the Babangida regime was in the frontline of those who insisted that sanctions should not be relaxed until it was clear that fundamental changes were underway which suggested that a return to apartheid was impossible. In this connection, it was only with the signal from the liberation movements that Nigeria decided to invite Mr. De Klerk to Abuja to tend support to his actions aimed at ensuring the emergence of a peaceful, democratic and non-racial South Africa. The Nigerian government also played a key role in encouraging the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress to establish a joint political platform to oppose the apartheid regime and ensure the speedy achievement of a democratic, non-racial society. The government has also appealed to various black political leaders to exercise restraint so that growing violence in black township, fanned by racist security personnel, can be brought to a halt;

(iii) The practice of making available Nigeria's good offices for the purpose of achieving the peaceful resolution of conflicts on the continent of Africa has also been continued by the Babangida regime. In this regard, the government hosted a meeting of the parties to the Sudanese civil war in Abuja in order to encourage them to embrace dialogue and abandon two decades of blood-letting. Approaches have also been made to the parties to the Somali civil war.

(iv) The Nigerian commitment to African regional organisations, especially the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the African Development Bank (ADB) has been carried forward by the Babangida regime. Not only does the country remain the biggest contributor to the OAU, it's leader was also elected to the Chair of the continental organisation in 1991

at the Abuja summit. Nigeria was also at the forefront of the campaign within and outside the structures of the OAU for the election of an African to the office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In the ADB, Nigeria remains a key player, with its soft loans trust fund, the so-called Nigerian Trust Fund, providing much-needed development capital to African countries;

(v) The Babangida regime, itself a transitional government which is steering the country toward democratic rule at the beginning of 1993, has encouraged other African governments to undertake necessary political reforms in order to improve the image of Africa in the eyes of the world.

THE BABANGIDA REGIME AND THE BLACK WORLD

As with its Africa policy, the Babangida regime's actions towards the black diaspora contained important elements of innovation and continuity. Some of the innovative policy measures applied in Nigeria's relations with the Black diaspora include the despatch of some technical air corpers to the Caribbean, the promotion of the concept of economic diplomacy in regions of the world outside Africa where there is a concentration of blacks, especially the United States, with a view to encouraging black business people to invest in Nigeria, and the encouragement of cultural and other exchanges through joint commissions. The Babangida regime also liaised with such influential members of the Black diaspora as members of the Black congressional caucus of the United States and the government of Jamaica in its bid to co-ordinate black peoples' response to the problem of apartheid in South Africa especially after the rise to power of F.W. de Klerk.

But perhaps the most important new policy measure adopted by the Nigerian government and which is of considerable interest to the entire black world is the decision to campaign vigorously for reparation to be paid by the West for the enslavement of blacks. As can be expected, this is an issue which has been of great concern to the black world and Nigeria's leadership of the campaign has struck a chord with black peoples in all parts of the world. The 1991 OAU summit in Abuja resolved to formally embrace the reparations campaign, thereby endorsing Nigeria's position on the issue. This has strengthened the Nigerian government's efforts to mobilise all black peoples and nations to join in the struggle for some kind of recompense from the West.

CONCLUSION

We have shown in the preceding pages that the foreign policy orientation articulated by the Babangida regime towards Africa and the black world has been characterised by several innovations even as some of the main pillars of the country's international relations have remained intact. Although the sharp decline in Nigeria's economic fortunes might have been expected to lead to a retreat from the foreign policy arena, and particularly from African and black issues in favour of economic issues, the Babangida regime has been able to bring a new, creative activist tempo to bear on the country's international transactions. Thus, the country has remained a central player in African and black affairs.

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Chapter 3

NIGERIA AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE COMMONWEALTH

1985 - 92

By Prof. Ade Adefuye

✶ The initial pronouncements of the Babangida regime gave a clear indication of the seriousness it intended to attach to foreign policy. It is on record as the first military regime to give dissatisfaction with the conduct of foreign policy as one of its reasons for taking over power.¹

The Buhari regime saw foreign policy mainly as a means of solving inherited domestic problems of economic decline and threat to internal security. The Buhari regime inherited from Shagari a country that was on the brink of economic disaster, internally infested with crime and which was externally threatened by smaller neighbours backed by extra African powers. The regime thus operated from the premise that a credible foreign policy must be conducted in such a way as to enhance the country's national interest.² The Buhari regime was determined and did use foreign policy mainly as an instrument for rebuilding the shattered economy³ and internal security. It was clear in Buhari's statements and actions that where the national interests of Nigeria conflicted with those of our neighbouring States and Africa in general, there would be no automatic yielding to the latter.⁴

But the obsession with economic reconstruction and restoration of internal security seemed to have been carried a little bit too far. In an effort to deal with the problem of smuggling, the government closed the borders and despite the appeal of neighbouring ECOWAS member countries, the borders remained closed throughout the life of the regime. In May 1985, the government decided to expel illegal aliens, most of who were nationals of ECOWAS member countries. Not only was the decision unpalatable, the manner in which it was carried out, the chaos and confusion which characterised the tail end of the exercise attracted unfavourable comments from the international community and deepened the strain in Nigeria's relationship with her ECOWAS neighbours.⁴

✶ The border closure and alien expulsion made some diplomats, academics and journalists begin to cast doubt on Nigeria's commit-

ment to ECOWAS and African Unity. The doubt was strengthened by General Buhari's polite refusal to become ECOWAS Chairman on grounds of pressing commitments at home. Nigeria under Buhari did not make much impact on the Southern Africa situation. The period seemed to have been too close to that of Shagari when Nigeria's performance on the international scene reflected the decaying internal situation. The regime learnt of the Nkomati accord and could only react; a reaction which the Reagan administration easily ignored. Buhari's External Affairs Minister, Ibrahim Gambari attested to this short-coming by saying that "nonetheless the administration should probably have allocated more financial resources than it did in support of the liberation struggle.

The Buhari regime found itself in circumstances in which it seemed to have had no option but to put a high premium on the defence and Nigeria's national security and economic well being and making these objectives the axis around which foreign policy revolved. This rather inward looking approach was criticised as being out of tune with Nigeria's characteristic posture on African issues since 1975, when the country adopted Africa as the centre-piece of foreign policy. Babangida's criticism of his predecessor's foreign policy was partly a reflection of the public attitude towards aspects of Buhari's rule. It looked as if Nigeria was losing friends on the international scene without necessarily making progress on the economic and security sphere.

General Babangida did not allow the necessary preoccupation with the economy to detract from the quality of leadership which Nigeria provided Africa and the influence it wielded around the world. The regime continued to be guided by the objective and principles of Nigeria's foreign policy, the essentials of which had remained constant since 1960. It is necessary to stress that Africa has since 1975 been the centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy. The Babangida regime not only reaffirmed this principle but injected some elements of vigour and dynamism into its application. Details of the performance of the regime on the African scene are treated elsewhere in this book. What is important is that the regime did not limit its concern to Africa but extended it to peoples of African origin located outside the continent in the diaspora. One important aspect of Babangida's foreign policy was its adoption of economic diplo-

macy as its guiding principle. It was a policy designed to cope with the worldwide economic crisis the solution of which in the case of Nigeria called for increased foreign investment and the strengthening of inter-Africa economic cooperation.⁷

In the process of implementing the above policy, the Babangida administration had of necessity to focus on Africa. Unlike its predecessor, there was a more visible commitment to the strengthening of ECOWAS as a regional economic organisation, and the intensification of the ideals of the OAU as an organisation dedicated to the promotion of African economic, cultural and political unity. But the regime realised that for these objectives to be achieved, Nigeria needed the support of international organisations like the United Nations and Commonwealth, the focus of which extend beyond Africa.

According to Olusanya and Akindele⁸, the fourth of the objectives and principles of Nigeria's foreign policy is multi-lateralism which explains not only Nigeria's enthusiastic and instinctive search for membership in key international organisations at both the global and regional levels, but also her support for and leadership in the establishment of the regional organisations. It is against the background of Nigeria's concept and perception of the crucial role that international organisations play in moderating international politics and providing a forum for the smaller states to be heard and in collectively legitimizing their foreign policy aspirations that Nigeria has invested much time and energy to support and secure the country's existence and vitality of the OAU, the United Nations and Commonwealth to mention but a few.

Thus the Babangida regime's commitment to African economic cultural and political and active involvement and participation in the United Nations and Commonwealth do compliment each other. The Commonwealth is made up of 50 countries with a combined total population of 1.4 billion making up a quarter of the world's population. It is an association of former British colonies who for reasons of shared values, beliefs, common language, historical experience and similarity in legal and economic systems continue to associate using existing links to enhance cooperation in the interest of freedom and development". The organisation is guided by a set of principles declared in 1971 which places the organisation in a global setting and

sets out certain principles in the nature of general political commitments. The commonwealth is committed to peace, liberty and cooperation. But it is committed to fight against racial discrimination, colonial domination and wide disparities of wealth among nations. The Queen is officially recognised as the Head of Commonwealth. The highest consultative body of the organisation is the Biannual meetings of Commonwealth Heads of Government during which Commonwealth and global developments are reviewed, decisions on new policies are made and programmes are approved. These are implemented by the Secretariat headed by the Secretary General. The work of the Secretariat has since 1971 been extended into other areas involving practical problems of political, economic and social cooperation among member States.

The history of the origin and activities of the United Nations organisation are too sufficiently well known to warrant its being repeated here in much detail.¹⁰ It is an organisation dedicated to world peace and security. Since its charter came into force on October 24 1945, the United Nations has been dedicated to the maintenance of international peace and security, the development of friendly relations among nations, the achievement of international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural and humanitarian character and the harmonisation of State acts in the attainment of these goals. The one hundred and eleven Articles of the Charter provide for six principal organs which implement the objectives of the organisation. The organs namely the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trustee-ship Council, International Court of Justice, the Secretariat as well as its many agencies provide instruments through which collective effort is made to deal with problems in international relations varying from socio-economic crisis to serious disputes.

It is clear that the ideals of both Commonwealth and the United Nations tally with the principles and objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy. The Babangida regime realised this and in spite of the emphasis on Africa and Economic diplomacy, a harmonious relationship was developed and maintained with the organisations. The result was that the machinery of both the United Nations and the Commonwealth became instruments through which some of Nigeria's policy objectives were realised. For the purpose of this chapter, the

discussion of Nigeria's relations with the Commonwealth and the United Nations will be under the following headings: 'The Struggle against Racism and Apartheid; Disarmament and Peace, Economic Development and the Promotion of the Interests of Africa and Africans.

The Struggle Against Racism and Apartheid

Two months after the Babangida regime was installed in August 1985, the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Nassau, Bahamas established the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons as a united Commonwealth response to the challenge of apartheid. The initiative was that of British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. The group was to establish contact with leaders of all political groups in South Africa with a view to initiating an end to the apartheid system thereby avoiding the bloodshed that might follow. As of that time, Nigeria's policy has been that of no dialogue with the apartheid regime. The logic was that if the leaders of the regime cannot discuss that future of the country with the black population, there is no point in discussing with them. But on the strength of Margaret Thatcher's strong appeal and out of respect for the other Leaders of the Commonwealth, Nigeria decided to participate in the work of the Group and approved the appointment of former Head of State, General Obasanjo as Co-Chairman. Other members of the Group were Mr. Malcolm Fraser, former Prime Minister of Australia as Co-Chairman, Lord Barber of Went Bridge, Dame Nita Barrow of Barbados, Mr. John Malecela, former Foreign Minister of Tanzania, Sandra Swaram Singh, one time Foreign Minister of India, Revd. Edward Walker Scott and Bishop Kootenay of Canada.

The Eminent Persons Group held a series of meetings with the principal characters in South African politics after which it submitted its recommendations to the Secretariat. The Group declared that South Africa's continued refusal to dismantle apartheid, its illegal occupation of Namibia, and its aggression against its neighbours constitute a serious challenge to the values and principles of the Commonwealth, a challenge which the Commonwealth countries cannot ignore. The authorities in Pretoria were called upon to take certain steps to dismantle apartheid as a matter of urgency.

The report concluded by saying that if the South African government does not cooperate, a set of sanctions which include the ban on air links, new investments, government procurement and tourism be imposed ". A special Summit of Heads of Government was held in London in May 1986 to consider the report. When it became clear that the South African government was not going to implement any of the suggestions of the group, the Commonwealth Leaders except for Thatcher came out strongly in favour of a strategy of sanctions. The argument of the British Prime Minister was that sanctions do not work and even if they did in the case of South Africa it is the majority blacks not leaders of apartheid that would suffer. The hollowness of this argument is revealed in British support for sanctions against Iran, Cuba and the Sandinistas of Nicaragua.

British refusal to embrace sanctions against South Africa was infuriating to Nigeria. She had consistently maintained a policy of no dialogue with the racists. General Obasanjo's participation in the Eminent Persons Group was a capitulation to pressure by well meaning Commonwealth Leaders who urged Nigeria to give the apartheid Leaders a chance to avoid bloodshed. The opportunity to strike back at Margaret Thatcher came during the preparation for the 1986 Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh. The Babangida regime decided to boycott the games and urged many African, Caribbean and Asian countries to do so in protest against Margaret Thatcher's thinly disguised support for the racists. Thirty countries joined Nigeria in the boycott. The Games still held but with only 18 countries out of the expected 48 participating. It was a mere shadow of what it used to be.

Ever since the independence of Zimbabwe, Nigeria's focus on Southern Africa had shifted to the issue of the independence of Namibia. When after the battle of Cunene, the South African regime felt compelled to negotiate and Chester Crocker brokered a peace settlement as a result of which the apartheid regime agreed to implement United Nations resolution 435 of 1978 on Namibia, Nigeria geared up efforts within the United Nations and the Commonwealth to help the process of Namibia's independence. Nigeria's Permanent Representative at the United Nations, Prof. Ibrahim Gambari in his capacity as Chairman, United Nations Committee Against Apartheid worked actively to resist efforts by some Perma-

ment Members of the Security Council to reduce the cost to be made at the level of both the civilian and military personnel envisaged for the United Nations Transition Assistance Group UNTAG. The African Group, the Frontline States, the United Nations Council for Namibia and the Movement of the Non-Aligned countries were able to exercise pressure on the Secretary General making him to issue a statement in February 10, 1989 in which he reaffirmed and reiterated the original provisions of Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978. On 16th February 1989 the Security Council adopted an enabling Resolution 632 1989 approving the Secretary General's report as an explanatory statement and authorising the implementation of its earlier resolution 435 of 1978. On the 1st of May 1989, the reconvened General Assembly approved a total of US 416 million dollars as the budget of UNTAG for a period of one year starting 1st April 1989. Nigeria's assessed contribution to this amount was US 162,674.00.

The Babangida regime both from Lagos and through its Permanent Mission in New York took active part in the process of the decolonization of Namibia. A 182-man Police Contingent, the single largest was sent to UNTAG. Infact a Nigerian Police Commissioner, Mr. Ezedinma Ifejika was appointed the Deputy Police Adviser of UNTAG. 40 electoral personnel, the single largest was sent to assist UNTAG. A retired Senior Career Ambassador Olujimi Jolaoso was sent to Head the United Nations observer Mission in Namibia during the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435. The government also pledged a US 1 million dollars at the Namibia Pledging Conference held at United Nations Headquarters. The money has been used to finance specific economic and technical projects during the immediate post independence period.

The Commonwealth was also concerned with Namibia. The organisation had since 1975 begun a multi-lateral training assistance programme for Namibians. It was in that year that the Commonwealth offered to welcome an independent Namibia into its fold. When South Africa announced her preparedness to implement United Nations Resolution 435, the Commonwealth was anxious and took steps to ensure that the progress towards Namibian independence was neither stalled nor sabotaged.

The concern with Namibia was part of the Commonwealth's overall interest in the struggle to bring an end to colonialism and

apartheid in Southern Africa. At its 1987 Ottawa meeting of Heads of Government, the organisation established a Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (CFMSA) membership of which included Nigeria to monitor and report to Heads of Government the progress made towards establishing majority rule in Southern Africa. At its August 1987 meeting, the Committee recommended that a Commonwealth observer group be sent at short notice to Namibia in order to report on preparations for new elections into the Constituent Assembly. The recommendations of the group headed by Mr. Alf Parsons contributed to the process of decolonising Namibia.

When the effects of the economic sanctions compelled the South African regime to begin to initiate moves to dismantle apartheid, the CFMSA monitored events and reacted thus influencing the attitude of the international community. Special meetings were summoned to react to important and decisive steps taken by the De Klerk regime. Following the announcement of the repeal of the Lands Act of 1913 and 1936, the Group Areas Act of 1956, the Population and Registration Act of 1950 and the statement in Parliament that the apartheid regime endorsed the idea of a multi-party Conference to advance constitutional negotiations, a meeting of the CFMSA was summoned in London. Nigeria's Foreign Affairs Minister, General Ike Nwachukwu cautioned against an over-enthusiastic response to these developments¹³. He successfully resisted attempts by Canada and Australia to lift many of the sanctions as a way of encouraging President De Klerk. Nigeria's argument was that the South African government need not be rewarded for undoing what they ought not to have done in the first place. By the time the CFMSA met in New Delhi in September 1989, agreement had been reached between the South African government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the repatriation of an estimated 40,000 exiles. There had also been progress on the release of political prisoners. The Committee was then faced with the question of how to implement the Programmed Management approach to sanctions which it adopted at its January 1989 London Meeting. The approach meant relating any change in the application of sanctions to real and practical steps towards the ending of apartheid. While agreeing to lift what was described as People -to - People Sanctions which include Sport,

Cultural exchange and tourism, General Nwachukwu led the opposition to the idea of lifting sanctions on trade and investment arguing convincingly that this should be delayed until a transitional government is in place. It was agreed that the arms embargo should not be lifted until a fully democratic regime is established. Events in South Africa has confirmed the wisdom of that decision. The South African government support for the Inkatha Freedom Party, the collusion of the Security Forces with Inkatha to attack ANC positions, the vents in Boipatong and Ciskei show that it is still premature to lift the arms embargo.

The Babangida régime also worked through the United Nations to sustain the momentum towards the eradication of apartheid and in particular getting the activities of Council for Democratic South Africa (CODESA) going. Following the Boipatong Massacre in June 1992, Nigeria's Permanent Representative at the United Nations who is also Chairman of the United Nations Committee on Apartheid led the African group to successfully pressurise for a special meeting of the Security Council to discuss the peace process in South Africa. The meeting was addressed by ANC leader, Nelson Mandela and South African Foreign Minister, Pik Botha. The result is that the international community and other international organisations had become interested in the peace process, making the progress towards the emergence of a non-racial South Africa a pre-condition for dealing with the country.

DISARMAMENT AND PEACE

It is not only in Southern Africa that Nigeria has been advocating just and lasting peace. Successive Nigerian governments have through membership of the United Nations Disarmament Committee drawn attention to the consequences of the massive investment in arms and armament particularly by the two super powers and their allies. Nigeria's view links arms and armament with insecurity, and disarmament with peace and development. The Babangida regime welcomed the end of the cold war exemplified by the rapprochement between the two super powers and the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Vice President, Aikhomu in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly in 1990 expressed the hope that the positive trends will provide the requisite climate to enable the

developing countries to pursue their objective of development in freedom and peace 14. The Babangida regime had expressed support for the Contadora Peace Plan in Latin America and supported the search for regional solutions in Indo- China. Nigeria's Ambassador to the United Nations is currently the Chairman of the Committee on Peace Keeping. As of now Nigeria is taking part in six United Nations Peace Keeping Operations in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Angola, Iraq - Kuwait border and Western Sahara. This is apart from bearing the brunt of expenses of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The Babangida regime emerged at a period when the world is experiencing a recession, the effect of which is felt more in Africa. The prices of most primary commodities have fallen, oil prices became unstable. African countries experienced food shortages, famine drought, deteriorating terms of trade, reduced resource flows and huge debt burdens. The United Nations held a special session in 1986 to focus attention on and find solutions to the economic crisis facing Africa. At the end of that meeting, the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAAERD). It contained policy measures to be implemented by African governments and support measures by the international community including financial assistance. But by 1988, Nigeria Foreign Minister, General Nwachukwu had to point out to the General Assembly that while most African countries had undertaken extensive economic reform programmes including IMF Structural Adjustment Programmes, the implementation process has been hampered by the failure of the international community to meet its commitment under UNPAAERD and the continued unfavourable external economic environment.

The Babangida regime had used the United Nations as a forum for expressing its concern about the debt crisis and the inadequacy of solutions being proffered. In view of the decline in oil revenue, Nigeria has had to make use of the assistance available from United Nations organs and specialised Agencies such as UNDP, UNICEF, UNIDO, FAO and World Bank. The FAO has assisted in the establishment of an agricultural data bank and a grazing reserve. It is

also funding the National Bureau of Plant Genetics and assisted the Nigerian Seed Programme. Nigeria used the World Health Organisation's (WHO) guidelines in planning its programmes in the health sector. Nigeria adopted WHO's health for all by the year 2000 which President Babangida launched in 1987. The Expanded Programme on Immunisation (EPI) is another WHO programme adopted by the Babangida regime with considerable success in its implementation.

The Commonwealth has also been involved in the economic development of Nigeria. The industrial development unit of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation has been involved in a number of activities designed to facilitate the attainment of the objectives of the Structural Adjustment Programme. The unit has been assisting Nigerian entrepreneurs to develop small scale food processing projects and other import substituting industrial activities. It has also been addressing the problems of environmental pollution and that of energy efficiency problems of manufacturing industries particularly that of iron and steel. For the year 1991 - 92, the Unit has been undertaking twelve projects. Among these are those that deal with the rehabilitation of the Federal Superphosphate Fertilizer Company, development of edible oil processing industry, assistance to the Aba Textile Mill and the Solar drying of timber and wood preservation in Ogun State. One of the aims of the Structural Adjustment Programme is the increase in the volume of Nigeria's non-oil exports. The Industrial Development Unit of the CFTC cooperated with UNIDO to promote Nigerian industrial projects through an investment promotion forum held in Abuja from 6 - 10 May 1991. The Forum presented over 150 projects to potential investors.

It is on the issue of debt that the Commonwealth has been very supportive of Nigeria's bid to reduce the debt burden of the developing countries of Africa. Of the 50 member countries of the organisation, 46 are categorised as developing. The estimate of debts of developing countries still outstanding in 1990 rose significantly to some 1.3 million dollars constituting a high percentage of Gross National Products and exports. The Commonwealth had been monitoring the debt issue since 1983. In 1987, Nigeria supported the decision of the Commonwealth to initiate the Lawson Plan which

called on the Paris Club to reschedule debt on more concessionary terms. This later evolved into the Toronto terms which allowed either a cancellation of one third of debt or equivalent measures in terms of concessional rescheduling or longer maturity in grace periods. A second major Commonwealth initiative was launched by Mr. John Major, then British Chancellor of Exchequer at the meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers in Port of Spain in 1990. The Trinidad and Tobago terms proposed a cancellation of two-thirds of the entire stock of official bilateral debt, and consolidation of the remaining one-third to be repaid over twenty-five years including a five-year grace period and the consolidation of the moratorium interest of the first five years. The proposal from which Nigeria would have benefitted was stalled by the refusal of Japan and USA to go along during the 1991 G.7 meeting in London. In his report of the G.7 to selected Commonwealth Leaders including General Babangida, the British Prime Minister indicated his preparedness to continue efforts in this direction.¹⁵

The Babangida regime has gone further than its predecessors in the implementation of what Olusanya and Akindele described as the fourth principle of Nigeria's foreign policy, that is, the belief in multilateralism. The regime seemed no longer content just to participate actively but also to field and support Nigerian and African candidates for important position in international organisations. One of the criticisms which African Foreign Ministers have of Nigeria is the tendency to grab as many positions as possible in international organisations. In September 1989, the Babangida regime successfully lobbied African countries at the United Nations to adopt Major General Joseph Garba as the President of the 44th Session of the General Assembly. It took a great deal of diplomatic manoeuvring to get Egypt and Cameroon both of which had signified intentions to contest the post to step down. Nigeria had since the mid-70's occupied the post of Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid. Following the appointment of Prof. Ibrahim Gambari to replace General Garba as Nigeria's Ambassador to the United Nations, a number of African countries signified intention to head the Committee. The Babangida regime managed to hold on to the post.

One of Gen. Babangida's greatest foreign policy triumph is the election of Chief Emeka Anyaoku as the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth. Following the end of the tenure of Shridath Ramphal, the former Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Malcolm Fraser decided to contest for the post. Nigeria fielded Chief Anyaoku, then Deputy Secretary-General with a distinguished long period of service to the organisation. At first it seemed that the aura of a former Prime Minister would overshadow Chief Anyaoku's candidacy. But the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the leadership of Gen. Nwachukwu (Rtd) mounted a highly effective and well co-ordinated campaign basing her argument on Chief Anyaoku's long and distinguished record of service and familiarity with the Commonwealth and the fact that it was time for an African to occupy the position, the previous holders having come from Canada and Guyana. The almost total support of Africa and Caribbean countries eventually clinched the position for Nigeria and Chief Anyaoku.

But Nigeria's attempt to field a candidate for the post of United Nations Secretary-General did not work out. General Obasanjo failed to get the endorsement of the OAU as the official candidate because many African countries felt that with Emeka Anyaoku as Commonwealth Secretary-General, Adebayo Adedeji as Head of ECA and Nigeria's Chairmanship of United Nations Committees on Apartheid and Peace Keeping, other African countries should be given a chance. The OAU eventually presented a list of six candidates from which the world body was asked to pick a Secretary-General. General Babangida in his capacity as OAU Chairman spearheaded the effort to get an African elected. In his first and only address to the United Nations General Assembly, General Babangida reminded the world body that no African has ever held the position but by presenting six candidates, Africa is set to give the world her best in the pursuit of the lofty goals which informed the establishment of the United Nations. He concluded by saying that "We strongly believe that the next Secretary General should be an African."¹⁶ Thereafter Nigeria's Ambassador to the United Nations coordinated the strategy of African Ambassadors at the United Nations which eventually saw the emergence of Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister as the first African Secretary General of the United Nations.

CONCLUSION

The Babangida regime implemented the essential ingredients of Nigeria's Foreign Policy. It maintained the primacy of African affairs and in response to the dictates of the times emphasised economic development. But in pursuing these objectives, it cast its net wide and utilised her membership of international organisations such as the United Nations and the Commonwealth. General Babangida became the second Nigerian Head of State to be Chairman of the OAU. He is also on record as having hosted the OAU Summit at which the treaty formally establishing the African Common Market was signed. But the achievement with regards to the liberation of Africa as evident by the independence of Namibia and the progress made towards dismantling apartheid were made possible by the active involvement and cooperation of the United Nations and the Commonwealth. The two organisations were also actively involved in Nigeria's efforts to achieve the objectives of the Structural Adjustment Programme. It is indeed a fitting tribute to the Babangida government's active involvement in the activities of the Commonwealth and UNO that it played a decisive role in the selection of the administrative head of both organisations.

ENDNOTES

1. See Gen. Babangida's maiden broadcast on August 27 1985.
Daily Times August 28 1985.
2. For more details see Ibrahim Gambari: **Theory and Reality in Foreign Policy making Nigeria after the Second Republic**
Humanities Press International Inc. New Jersey 1989. P. 207
3. For details of the Management of the Nigerian economy under the Shagari regime. See T. Falola and J. Ihonvbere: **The rise and fall of the second Republic**
London : Zed publishers, 1985
4. See Ibrahim Gambari : **Theory and Reality in Foreign Policy making.**
op.cit. p. 34
5. The Ghanaian Times, the Canadian Mail wrote editorials condemning the manner in which the expulsion order on aliens was carried out by Nigerian Security Organisations.
6. The point was made that expelling 100,000 aliens would not solve the problem of 85 million Nigerians. The irony of the episode was that for all the unfavourable comments; it engendered for Nigerians the border closure and expulsion of aliens did not solve the problems of economic decline and threat to national security. One of the critics was Bolaji Akinyemi, Babangida's first External Affairs Minister.
7. For details see Ade. Adefuye: **Culture and Foreign Policy - The Nigerian Example.** Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. October 1992 Chapter 6.
8. See G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele (eds.) **Nigeria's External Relations - The First Twenty-Five Years.** Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1986 p. 4
9. See **Report of the Commonwealth Secretary General.** Pall Mall London, 1991
10. See **United Nations Charter** United Nations, New York.

11. See **Mission to South Africa**: The Commonwealth report foreword by Shridath Ramphal. Penguin Books for the Commonwealth Secretariat London 1986.

12. For details see **Nigeria at the United Nations**. A publication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. New York 1989 p. 62.

13. The writer was a member of Nigeria's delegation to the meeting.

14. See Text of Speech by Vice President Augustus Aikhomu to the 45th Regular Session of the United Nations. General Assembly. September 29 1990 New York.

15. For details see Ade. Adefuye - **The Commonwealth and Nigeria in a New World Order**. Text of the first Olasupo Ojedokun Memorial Lecture. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs April 24 1992. Lagos.

16. See Text of Gen. Ibrahim Babangida's address to the United Nations General Assembly New York 4th October 1991.

Chapter 4

TECHNICAL AID CORP

By Ade Adefuye

One of the salient foreign policy legacies of the Babangida administration is the Technical Aid Corp programme (TAC). It is one programme that has demonstrated in very concrete terms Nigeria's total commitment to the economic and social development of Africa and the black world. TAC gave concrete expression to Africa being the centre piece of Nigeria's foreign policy.

General Babangida's first External Affairs Minister, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi had consistently expressed his preference for a grandiose, assertive policy towards the black world. There is the conception in Akinyemi that with Nigeria's relative huge human and material resources, the country should live up to its destined role and play for Africa the role which Israel plays for her Jews.¹ What this means is that Nigeria should within the limits of her resources seek to identify with the developmental aspirations of the black and African people.

Nigeria has always been inundated with requests for economic support by African and Caribbean countries either in form of manpower or monetary grants to meet expenses arising from natural disaster or other unexpected developments. But as the Ministry of External Affairs rightly observed, the dispensation of such aid had been largely uncoordinated. Each government department had felt itself competent to enter into bilateral agreements with recipient countries without a clearing house to assess and place such aid within the context of foreign policy interests.² There were even cases when such aid fell into wrong hands.

The Technical Aid Corp programme was designed to correct whatever imperfections that existed in the Nigeria's dispensation of aid and put it in a more regularised and organised fashion. When the proposals were first announced, a section of the press criticised it on grounds that the prevailing economic situation in the country does not allow for such huge expenditure to be committed to aiding other countries. The Ministry provided figures to show that the programme would involve very little in terms of increased expenditure because³ there had always been budgetary provision for aiding less fortunate African brothers and contributing to the relief efforts of friendly countries that experience unexpected natural disasters.

A Council of Ministers Memorandum CM 861 on 25 September 1987 formally established the programme. Thereafter, the Ministry of External Affairs sent letters to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries asking them to list areas in which they would require assistance in form of personnel. The countries were informed that while Nigeria would be responsible for the return flight and salary of the personnel for two calendar years, the host countries would provide, accommodation, medical care and transportation from office to residence. Advertisements were placed in Nigerian newspapers after which shortlisted applicants were interviewed. One hundred and sixty-one young men and women were selected as the first batch of Nigerians Technical Aid Corpers.

The programme was formally launched by General Babangida on the 7 November 1987. By January 1988, the last set of 102 corpers eventually left Lagos for twelve countries. The young Nigerian experts made up of medical doctors, engineers, accountants and teachers were deployed to health, educational and related institutions of the recipient countries. During the 1987/89 service year the country distribution of the TAC members were Cape Verde 8, Equatorial Guinea 2, Fiji 1, Gambia 12, Jamaica 4, Kenya 9, Shelter Afrique Kenya 2, Lesotho 4, Mozambique 18, Sierra-Leone 14, Seychelles 7, African National Congress School Morogoro Tanzania 8, and Zambia 2.

The Technical Aid Corp Secretariat was headed by late Ambassador J. K. Umar.⁵ It was responsible for the day-to-day administration of the programme, receiving reports and monitoring the activities of the corpers particularly the function of the host countries. By end of 1988, the programme which used to be administered and funded through the Ministry began to be funded directly by the Presidency. Its headquarters was moved to Abuja. Salaries of the corpers were paid through Nigeria's Diplomatic Missions. The high level of professional competence and good personal conduct displayed by the first set of corpers seemed to have established a good reputation for the programme that the demand for its personnel increased from year to year. Countries bordering those in which the first set of corpers served got to know of the programme and requested that the programme be extended to them. A good example is the Caribbean region.

The first set of four corpsers were made up of two accountants and two doctors. The performance of the two accountants both of who were assigned to the College of Arts, Science and Technology (CAST) in Kingston, Jamaica was such that at the end of their service period, the authorities appealed for an extension of the programme for six months. This was granted. At the end of the extension, the College permanently employed one of them while his colleague was offered appointment as Lecturer in the Department of Accounting, University of the West Indies.

But it was in the health sector that TAC made most of its impact on Jamaica. There had all along been an acute shortage of doctors and nurses. Locally trained medical personnel migrated to the United States for better pay and conditions of service. By the time Vice President Admiral Aikhomu paid a State Visit to Jamaica in August 1989, the quality of services rendered by TAC four nurses and two doctors had become highly appreciated by host government. Prime Minister Michael Manley during the Jamaica-Nigeria Bilateral discussions made a special request for more Nigerian doctors and nurses under TAC. When in February 1990 fifteen TAC nurses and five doctors arrived Kingston, it was the lead story in the print and electronic media. The gesture was so much appreciated that Nigeria's TAC programme particularly the nurses and doctors was mentioned during the Governor General's speech at the official opening of Parliament."

The demand for and supply of Technical Aid Corpsers had since been on the increase. The 1988/90 service period featured 105 volunteers deployed to Fiji 11, Gambia 7, Jamaica 24, Mozambique 1, Djibouti 2, Guyana 2 and Burkina Faso 8.⁷ Nigeria's first real contact with the Commonwealth of Dominica in the Caribbean began with the demand which Prime Minister Eugenia Charles made on Nigeria's High Commissioner to Jamaica that the service which had been receiving such positive commendation from the Jamaican government and public be extended to her country. Two medical doctors were sent in 1991. They were eventually joined by three nurses and one Pharmacist. There had since been requests for more particularly in the teaching profession. Djibouti, an Arabic speaking country in the East and Central African region requested for an English teacher. The Comoro Island made a similar request. Zambia

which enjoyed the services of two pioneer volunteers requested for 50 during the 1988/90 service period, 24 were provided.

Belize in Central America has a population made up of Africans, Caribs and Maya. The Africans are the largest single group and had been complaining of a lack of orientation towards Africa in the school curriculum. The Government was concerned that continued disregard might have serious political repercussions. There was also the problem of acute shortage of medical and health personnel. When the news of the success of TAC in Jamaica reached Belize, the Nigeria High Commissioner in Jamaica with concurrent accreditation to Belize was approached. The TAC agreement was signed for Jamaica by the High Commissioner, Prof. Ade Adefuye and Belize Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Said Musa in September 1991. The first batch of 15 TAC volunteers including a professor of African history arrived Belize in February 1992, African history with emphasis on West Africa and Nigeria is now being incorporated into secondary and Post Secondary School syllabus. The professor is himself attached to the University College from where he conducts outreach programme.

The demand for the services of the corpsers continue to rise, the more so as the current global economy situation reduced the ability of some developing countries to meet their objectives. The Babangida administration is determined to continue to use the programme as a means of demonstrating its commitment to black and African unity. The projected figure for 1992/94 service period stands at 237. The expected regional distribution are West Africa 16, East and Central Africa 33, Southern Africa 96, The Caribbean 57, The Pacific 15, and South America 19. By the end of the 1992/94 service period, 101 volunteers would have served in the West African region, 101 in the East and Central Africa, 256 in Southern Africa, 121 in the Caribbean, 31 in the Pacific, and 21 in the South America.

The steady and , phenomenal rise in the level and calibre of experts requested by the various beneficiary countries, the excellent record of performance and the growing popularity of the programme in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries are clear testimonies of the success of the programme and a vindication of the rationale for its creation. TAC has further established Nigeria's foreign policy im-

peratives as they relate to the economic emancipation of ACP countries. Against the background of the tendency of Western investment to flow more to the new democracies in Eastern Europe, and the consequent neglect of ACP countries, the need for these countries to articulate programmes for economic cooperation and self help becomes evident. The Technical Aid Corp is a major and bold initiative in this direction.

This is why TAC has continued to generate interest and receive acclamation in many countries. It has received government and press appreciation in Namibia, Swaziland, Jamaica, Belize, Fiji and Dominica. But TAC has not only benefitted from the recipient countries, Nigeria and Nigerians have immensely benefitted from the programme. To begin with the two year period of exposure to service in a foreign country constitutes an important landmark in the career history of a young Nigerian professional. In the process of providing service, they learn more on the job and in the process meet their own colleagues or more experienced professionals trained in different institutions. TAC has allowed many of the participants the opportunity of beginning life in a more comfortable economic condition. TAC has also made it possible for the quality of training provided in Nigeria's educational and professional institutions to be appreciated by many other countries and international organisations. In Jamaica for instance, only the Doctors and Nurses trained in Ibadan and ABU were recognised and accorded automatic registration by the Jamaica Medical Association until 1987. But following the impressive performance of TAC doctors and nurses trained in other Nigerian Universities, steps are now being taken to extend automatic registration. In Fiji, Nigerian lawyers are now automatically admitted to the country's bar.

One other important effect of TAC is that the recipient countries have since begun to look to Nigeria for the recruitment of their professionals because of the high quality of performance of TAC volunteers. It has become easier for Nigerian professionals to secure employments following the path laid by TAC volunteers. Nigerian doctors who applied for jobs on their own in Belize have been offered employment. Indeed the government approached the High Commissioner for assistance in setting up a programme by which Belize doctors could receive post-graduate training in Nige-

rian Teaching Hospitals. In Namibia, the government while asking for 25 new TAC volunteers for the 1992/93 years is willing to employ any of the serving 54 volunteers under a substantially more favourable local contract. Between 1989 and 1990, five Nigerian doctors and three nurses were employed directly by the government of Jamaica. TAC has therefore been helping to solve the problem of graduate unemployment in a positive manner at the international level.

International organisations have reacted favourably to TAC. The United Nations volunteer service, an arm of the UNDP has recruited ten of the pioneer volunteers. The organisation has invited the TAC Directorate to look into the possibility of working out a modus operandi by which the deployment of volunteers would be harmonised by the two organisations without any of them losing its identity.

TAC has served as an instrument for strengthening bilateral relations between Nigeria and the receiving countries. Prior to the establishment of TAC, the only Caribbean country with a resident Diplomatic Mission in Nigeria was Trinidad. Nigeria established a Diplomatic Mission in Jamaica in 1975. But it was the Jamaican Ambassador in Ethiopia who was concurrently accredited to Lagos. Between 1987 and 1991, the Nigeria High Commission in Kingston embarked on an intensive programme designed to forge closer relations and make Jamaicans feel attached to Africa. A series of agreements on economic and cultural matters were concluded and implemented. Nigeria established a programme of exchange of scholars between Nigerian Universities and the Universities of West Indies. These activities were reinforced by the exposure of Nigerian artists and professionals to Jamaican and Caribbean audience. TAC further cemented the efforts. The Nigerian presence was so strong that when Vice President, then Chief of General Staff, Admiral Aikhomu visited Jamaica in August 1989, the Prime Minister could no longer resist the demand of the Jamaica-Nigeria Society for a Jamaican Diplomatic Mission to be established in Nigeria.⁹ It was at the banquet held in honour of Admiral Aikhomu that Prime Minister Michael Manley announced the establishment of a Jamaican High Commission in Lagos. The Chairman of the Jamaica-Nigeria Society, Mr. Dudley Thompson was named as the High Commissioner.

TAC has enabled Nigeria to reach out and co-operate with

some countries with which hitherto Nigeria did not have diplomatic relations. Among such countries are Fiji, Cape Verde, Comoros, and Solomon's Island. In addition, countries in which Nigeria was represented by a non-resident Ambassador but which benefitted from TAC have been drawn closer to Nigeria. Among such countries are Belize and Guyana. The Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Dominica, Mary Eugenia Charles was so impressed by the concept and performance of TAC that she felt the need to draw closer to Nigeria and establish bilateral relations. She has in fact made a request for the approval of an appointment of a non-resident Honorary Consul to Nigeria.¹⁰

The goodwill generated by the TAC programme has served to assist Nigeria in achieving some of her foreign policy objectives. It has become easier to seek the understanding of Nigeria's views on a number of issues. During the campaign for Chief Anyacku's candidacy for the post of Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, Nigeria received enthusiastic support from the countries that had benefitted from TAC. The same thing happened when Nigeria fielded General Obasanjo for the post of United Nations Secretary-General.

TAC has contributed to the improvement of Nigeria and Africa's image in the Caribbean and Central America. Historical and geographical factors especially proximity to the U.S.A. has led to a situation in which the colour of the skin of an individual is an important element in the estimation of his personal qualities. ¹¹ Western literature in an attempt to rationalise the slave trade and colonialism has so much maligned Africa that some blacks had come to believe that Europeans did them a lot of good by taking their ancestors out of the continent through the slave trade. Media presentation of Africa was one in which what was mainly reported about the continent had to do with white oppression of blacks in South Africa, civil disorder and famine. The result was that even in countries where blacks were in the majority, the reluctance to identify with Africa was evident. The Nigerian Missions did a lot to change this image, but in addition TAC provided a living evidence of the level of development in Nigeria to the ordinary man on the street. The doctors, nurses, engineers and teachers interacted with the communities thus educating the people and informing them about Nigeria. The fact that a Nigerian TAC doctor, Dr. J. Odeh coordinated the

efforts to deal with the outbreak of typhoid in Jamaica's Hanover Parish, an event which was publicised by the local and international media contributed to the high regard enjoyed by Nigerian Medical personnel. TAC as well as other activities of the Nigerian Missions has made Blacks in the diaspora come out to indentify with the mother continent. It has since been difficult to sustain the image of African backwardness by the Western oriented media.

There is no doubt that TAC has been a useful instrument for the attainment of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives. It is to be hoped that the interest and momentum generated by the programme will continue to be maintained by adequate funding. If volunteers are to continue to give off their best, then their welfare must be of paramount importance. The allowance paid in some cases do not take into consideration the prevailing economic situation in the country of service. The Babangida regime created it without a statutory legal backing. This issue should be resolved before the end of the present administration in order to prevent a temptation to discontinue the noble programme.

ENDNOTES

1. These views are reflected in A.B. Akinyemi: **A Farewell to Policy.**
2. See J.K. Umar. **The Nigerian Technical Aid Corper Abroad**
Text of an address delivered to the first batch of Technical Aid Corpers. Senate Chambers October 1987.
3. See for instance Bolaji Akinyemi: **Nigeria Technical Aid Corp Programme.** Address at the opening of the education programme for first batch of Technical Aid Corpers. National Assembly October 16 1987.
4. Figures were supplied by the Directorate of the Technical Aid Corp programme. The writer is grateful to the Founding Director Ambassador J.K. Umar of Blessed Memory and the current Director Ambassador U.J.Ekong.
5. Ambassador Umar was recalled from his post in Brussels to be the Founding Director of the programme. He threw so much of his time and energy to put the programme on a good footing. He was affectionately called **Father TAC** by the corpers. May his soul rest in peace.
6. See Text of the speech from the throne by the Governor General of Jamaica William Glaspole April 1 1990 Kingston.
7. See figures released by Technical Aid Corp, Directorate, Abuja.
8. This issue was raised by Foreign Minister, Said Musa with the writer while serving as Nigeria's non-resident High Commissioner to Belize in September 1991.
9. For details see Ade. Adefuye **Culture and Foreign Policy: The Nigerian Examples.** Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, October 1992. Chapter 5.

10. The request is being treated by the Federal Government. Among the individuals present when TAC was established at the Prime Minister's Office in Rousseau Dominica was Mr. Justice S.A. Piper, a Dominican national who was a High Court Judge in Nigeria. See text of Despatch to TAC, established in the Commonwealth of Dominica. Ambassador Ade. Adefuye to Major General Nwachukwu, August 1990.

11. An example is that of Brazil. See Ambassador Dele Cole in a Diplomatic despatch to General Nwachukwu. Status of Blacks in Brazil. Probable options for Nigeria April 7 1988. It shows how blacks are badly treated and oppressed in the society. In Jamaica, blacks constitute over 90% of the population, but the 5% non-blacks control the economy.

**ADDITIONAL NOTE ON THE TECHNICAL AID CORPS
[TAC] PROGRAMME**

By - Directorate of TAC

The implementation of the Technical Aid Corps Programme commenced towards the end of 1987. Since then, it has become prominent in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. Four months after inauguration, the first batch of volunteers made up of 101 young men and women left the Nigerian shores for their respective countries of deployment. The young Nigerian experts made up of Medical Doctors, Engineers and Science teachers were deployed to health, educational and other related institutions of the recipient countries. More specifically, the country distribution of these young Nigerian experts during the 1987/89 service period were: CAPE VERDE (8); EQUATORIAL GUINEA (2); FIJI (1); THE GAMBIA (12); JAMAICA (4); KENYA (9); SHELTER AFRIQUE, KENYA (2); LESOTHO (14); MOZAMBIQUE (18); SIERRA LEONE (14); SEYCHELLES (7); A.N.C. SCHOOL, MOROGORO, TANZANIA (8); and ZAMBIA (2).

The 1988/90 service period featured 105 volunteers, deployed to FIJI (8); THE GAMBIA (7); JAMAICA (24); GHANA (1); KENYA (SHELTER AFRIQUE) (2); LESOTHO (10); SEYCHELLES (14); ZAMBIA (24); MOZAMBIQUE (1); DJIBOUTI (2); GUYANA (2); BURKINA FASO (8); and DOMINICA (2).

Djibouti, an Arabic speaking country in the East and Central African region requested for one English teacher to become the first in the region. The Comoros Islands was soon to follow suit in that region. Similarly, Zambia in the Southern African region, which enjoyed the services of two pioneer volunteers requested for 50 during the period under review, but only 24 out of the requests could be met. During the same period, Tanzania doubled its request to 8. The Commonwealth of Dominica and Belize in the Caribbean, and Surinam and Guyana in South America however made enquiries on the operation of the Programme during the period under review.

It is significant to note that between the first and second quarters of 1991, a TAC volunteer, Dr. J. Odeh received official commendation from the Jamaican authority for the role he played in the control of the typhoid epidemic in one prominent area of the country where the

epidemic was widespread. His performance became a celebrated case on the Cable Network News [C.N.N]. The Jamaican authorities also re-engaged the services of at least six volunteers at the expiration of their service, on a separate mutually agreed terms. The Pacific region has not been left out of the Programme. Fiji's request for one volunteer in 1987/89 service period rose to 8 in the 1988/90 service period. The Government of Solomon Islands has also sent feelers concerning its interest in the Programme.

There were 189 volunteers during the 1990/92 service period and the country distribution were: NAMIBIA (54); JAMAICA (19); BELIZE (10); ANGOLA (4); COMMONWEALTH OF DOMINICA (5); FIJI (7); A.N.C. SCHOOL, MOROGORO, TANZANIA (10); SEYCHELLES (1); COMOROS ISLANDS (5); THE GAMBIA (19); CAPE VERDE (9); SIERRA LEONE (5); MOZAMBIQUE (19); LESOTHO (10); SWAZILAND (4); and CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (8). The total number of volunteers that served including those still in the field add up to 395.

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF TAC VOLUNTEERS SINCE INCEPTION OF THE PROGRAMME

REGIONS	SERVICE PERIOD			
	1987/89	1989/91	1990/92	1992/94
WEST AFRICA	36	16	33	16
EAST & CENTRAL AFRICA	26	18	24	33
SOUTHERN AFRICA	34	35	90	96
CARIBBEAN	4	26	34	57
PACIFIC (FIJI)	1	8	7	15
SOUTH AMERICA (GUYANA)	-	2	-	-

* Projected figures for the 1992/94 service year

The projected figure for 1992/94 service period stands at 237 and the expected regional distribution are: WEST AFRICA (16); EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA (33); SOUTHERN AFRICA (96); THE CARIBBEAN (57); THE PACIFIC (15); and SOUTH AMERICA (19). By the end of the 1992/94 service period, 101 volunteers would have served in the West African region, 101 in the East and Central Africa, 256 in Southern Africa, 121 in the Caribbean, 31 in the Pacific, and 21 in South America. A salient feature is that participation by African countries cuts across all linguistic and geographical zones within the continent.

The phenomenal rise in the level and calibre of experts requested by the various beneficiary countries, the excellent record of performance and the growing popularity of the Programme, African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries are clear testimonies of the immense success of the Programme and a vindication of the rationale for the creation of the Programme.

The concept of the Technical Aid Corps Programme as a means of furthering established Nigerian foreign policy imperatives as they relate to the economic emancipation of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states was not only appropriate but most timely. It is also relevant when viewed against the back-drop of the unfolding socio-political developments in the erstwhile Eastern European countries in the context of the impending but inevitable "Fortress Europe". There are glaring signals to indicate that the prospect and direction of investment, finance, aid from traditional donor agencies and flow of other resources would be diverted to the emerging countries of Eastern Europe to the detriment of the African, Caribbean and Pacific states in particular and indeed the developing world in general. It therefore behoves these developing countries, and especially the ACP states to start articulating unified strategies for cooperation and self-help among themselves, in order to achieve their developmental aspiration and objectives.

The Technical Aid Corps Programme therefore represents a major bold initiative by any black African country to achieve these objectives within the context of South-South cooperation, inspite of the economic doldrums Nigeria has found itself.

CONCLUSION

The coming years will be crucial as the Programme has to contend with the challenges that would be posed by the need for re-adjustment and consolidation of the success and gains so far recorded. In this connection, the objective of the Programme has to be kept under constant review to reflect the changing circumstances of our times and the greater heights envisaged in the years ahead. There should therefore be no hesitation in re-defining and re-addressing some of the objectives of the Programme where the need arises.

A very potent area of the Programme where many concerned compatriots have had cause to raise their voice, time and time again, relates to the legal status of the Technical Aid Corps (TAC) Programme in the context of the present administration which created it without statutory legal backing. This issue should therefore be resolved before the lifespan of the present administration runs its full course, to prevent future reversal of this noble programme.

Chapter 5

ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY AND NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

By Olusegun Akinsanya

Introduction

Perhaps more than in any other sphere of Nigeria's national life, the Babangida Administration has made its greatest impact on the country's Foreign Policy by infusing new dynamism, purpose and direction to its content and conduct. It is general knowledge that since the attainment of independence in 1960, Africa has been the centrepiece of Nigeria's foreign policy. However, the past few years have witnessed not just the credible application of the entire foreign policy apparatus towards unravelling some of the seemingly inextricable political situations in Africa which necessitated the 'centre piece' emphasis, but equally brought under central focus, the attainment of other policy objectives, proximately relevant to Nigeria's present circumstances. Without necessarily departing from old dogmas, no structures have been allowed to hinder the responsiveness of the foreign policy to the prevailing domestic economic circumstances in Nigeria.

Termed "Economic Diplomacy", the new thrust of foreign policy seeks to fine-tune the country's foreign policy postures, to the realities of our domestic circumstances, which were characterized by pervasive economic difficulties culminating in corrective reform measures, known as Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The policy focus was, on a wider consideration, a response to changing attitudes to issues of economic survival, international economic cooperation, international trade and flow of foreign investments, transfers of technology, environment, rural development etc.

The new policy focus in its theoretical conceptualisation and implementation did not mean a shift from the erstwhile afrocentric commitment of Nigeria's foreign policy, but constituted a pragmatic infusion of economic objectives into foreign policy perspective. Accordingly, issues related to trade and investments came into sharp focus, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs carved for itself a key role as an arm of Government concerned with Nigeria's path to economic growth and sustainable development.

In this study, we shall endeavour to lay bare the scope of Economic Diplomacy, both in its conceptual framework and actual field of application by the present administration in Nigeria. Attention has been focused on the strategies and institutional machinery contrived to implement the new policy. The task in so doing has been less simplified by dearth in literature, dealing particularly on Nigeria's Economic Diplomacy save for the recent studies undertaken by the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and the Nigerian Society of International Affairs, both of which were edited by Joy Ogwu and Adebayo Olukoshi. That is I have endeavoured to engage in an objective and appraisive exercise, but one's sense of analysis cannot obviously be as detached as that of a bystander, since I have been associated with this policy thrust from its beginning.

THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY

According to Roy Marcrdis, 'no aspect of policy making is more intriguing and complex than foreign policy.'¹ It is therefore not unusual that copious time and intellectual endeavour has been expended to explain the underlying and motivating factors behind state behaviour in the international scene. Over the years, scholars, researchers and policy makers have ascribed varying weight to considerations such as morality, pursuit of peace or need for survival.

The behaviours of nations in the international scene and changes in their postures normally find explanations in multi-casual considerations. There are no valid and therefore universally acceptable theories in this direction and as Jacobson and Zimmerman assert "some would even deny that such theories can be developed."² This process becomes more challenging when it is considered that Diplomacy - the main device for foreign policy implementation is still shrouded with secrecy and circumspection. While studies in the natural sciences favour empirical and determinist results based on given circumstances, the behaviour of states as a form of aggregate human expression lack precision.

These misgivings notwithstanding, the analysis of foreign policy could still have a scientific methodology based on objective, precise and valid generalisation. Academia has also made much inroad in providing conceptual tools with a very high margin of contextual applicability in state practice. From the literature it is safe to agree with Lurt London that 'the whole foreign policy of nations reflect the

sum total of those principle which have grown out of nations history, beliefs, or ideologies, power potentials and its predilections."³ While the same from the labyrinth, the state's reaction to various situations and the impact of its position predicates on its ability to generate and expend power. He elaborates power as including physical geography (size, geopolitics, resource endowment) economic geography (character and density of population)⁴

ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES & PURSUIT OF NATIONAL INTERESTS

It is argued by some researchers and policy makers that the dichotomy between foreign policy and domestic policy is artificial. On the contrary, the environment for the formulation of both are the same. They are both structured, processed and determined, according to Prof. Sanda by the pressure and influences surging from the socio-cultural mix, political and economic circumstances and the prevailing national and international environments. Nigerian Foreign Minister, Gen. Ike Nwachukwu describes the linkage more precisely thus:

"The foreign policy of any nation, is no doubt a reflection of its domestic reality. It begins with identification and articulation of nation's interests. It is safe therefore to assume that whatever these national interests represent, they become the principal consideration in the formulation and execution of national policies both at itsdomestic and international levels.

Although the nature of public policy allows a lot of room for subjectivity in the analysis, statesmen claim to be ultimately governed in their behaviour by what is loosely summarized as national interest. According to Prof. G. Olusanya, "at the heart of any country's foreign policy is undoubtedly the conception, definition and promotion of its national interest.⁷ Unfortunately, the scope of national interest is as wide as its frequent applications. It may therefore be verbose to engage in a review of various paradigms, definitions and approaches to national interest. But suffice it to note that national interest denotes in various forms the ends not only for which state policies are formulated, but also those targets to which they are directed. It also depends on the prism of the

political elite.

At the 1986 "All Nigeria Conference on Foreign Policy" Kuru, Jos, President Ibrahim Babangida proffered his definition of Nigeria's national interest as it relates to foreign policy as constituting solely the country's "national security interests". This perspective relates closely to the extant theoretical concept of some state pursuing policies of self preservation. That is a state pursuing policies which will enhance its social and economic development internally and fledging existence within the comity of nations.

Since 1986, the shuttle diplomacy embarked upon by former Foreign Minister, Prof. Akinyemi to the world's business and financial centres to explain SAP provided an illustration of the desire to pursue broader policy objectives with more relevance to Nigeria's immediate economic needs. At that stage, however, no explicit decisions, concepts or strategies were developed as to the additional economic goals which the foreign policy and its apparatus were expected to pursue. It was however at Gen. Nwachukwu's first major foreign policy statement as Foreign Minister on 30th June, 1988, that is on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee Anniversary of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, that he shared his dream and vision of Nigerian's foreign policy. The Minister on that historic occasion clearly articulated his credo and expatiated on President Babangida's definition of national interests of Nigeria. His blueprint for the course to be followed towards achieving these objectives were:

*"to be guided by the past ... but should not neglect our changing national circumstances as well as adapt to the realities of a rapidly changing international environment. It is certainly not without justification that issues of international economic cooperation and development have featured prominently on the global agenda. Indeed considering Nigeria's present circumstances, economic issues have regained added significance and should in my opinion be given priority attention in our foreign policy."*⁸

In series of related public statements delivered shortly afterwards, particularly at the Command and Staff College, Jaji and at a seminar on Export Development and Management organised by the Association of Nigerian Exporters, at the Sheraton Hotel, Lagos, the Minister explained that the new focus - Economic Diplomacy, did not mean disregarding Nigeria's enduring Pan -Africanist posture, especially the commitment

to total liberation of the continent and ultimate eradication of the apartheid system in Southern Africa. Within the context of Economic Diplomacy, the erstwhile accent and concern of the foreign policy bureaucracy about such issues is considered as sound policy, and were to be pursued more vigorously. However, "the test of integrating clearly defined economic objectives into the foreign policy perspective" was equally compelling. It was obvious at this time that Nigeria's foreign policy was at the cross-roads. On the one hand the need to revamp the economy and on the other hand our commitment to broader regional concerns. As President Lydon Johnson of America once said "two streams in our national life converge (today) the dream of a great society at home and the inescapable demand of our obligations halfway around the world."¹⁰ This necessitated an effective policy posture to join the seemingly contradictory direction.

Economic Diplomacy, therefore as conceived by Gen. Nwachukwu and its implementation never sought to shift the focal points of Nigeria's international relations from issues of politics to economic, but in a well articulated manner, bring both into equal platform. In the actual conduct of modern inter-state relations, economic and political issues receive equal attention, therefore the essence is to bring this parity and inject into the foreign policy process the desired dynamism. One point which has little been emphasized is that foreign policy interests of Nigeria is the leadership role in Africa politically, but by virtue of its relative economic leverage (arising from its natural resource endowment, and the corollary human and industrial endowment) act as a catalyst of economic and social growth in African people. Gen. Nwachukwu simply summarized the nation in his conclusion that:

*"Our commitment to the total liberation of the entire continent should not go hand in hand with the fight for total economic liberation of Africa so that the peoples of our continent are spared the ravages of hunger, disease, poverty and all forms of under-development."*¹⁰

THE REASONS FOR ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

The primary reason for the Economic Diplomacy Policy has been summarized by Gen. Nwachukwu as a fulfilment of the need to harmonise "the administration's domestic and foreign goals". He

has also suggested explanations in terms of other variables of foreign policy analysis.

Firstly, the Minister has also explained the policy thrust in the context of the argument for an integrated approach to the study of politics and economics which has received considerable attention in the various social science literature. It is argued that political and economic processes have large areas of confluence and overlapping and that their study can only be rewarding through a fused approach. Gen. Nwachukwu described the relationship as inseparable and similar to "two overlapping circles with large part of one falling into the other". It is therefore not uncommon to observe that the practice of diplomacy is again beginning to see inter state relations with this fused inter-disciplinary outlook.

Secondly, at a meeting with members of the Nigerian private sector, preparatory to the Abuja Summit of the OAU, Gen. Nwachukwu described the new policy thrust as a return to classic diplomacy which used to be defined in terms of the pursuit of vital economic interest by Kings, Prince and their Statesmen. Until the period after World War 1, Diplomacy was the pre-occupation of the nobility and aristocratic class, directed towards achieving targeted objectives in the external scene. A study of history will show that these objectives were more often economic. Inter state relations, from the Greek City State, through Medieval Europe to the chain of events leading to the emergence of the nation-state system, were all motivated by the need to preserve and promote vital economic interests. In African History for instance, the maze of contact as recorded in the book, **The Golden Trade of the Moors** reveals a rather fascinating expose on 'not just how the Sahara enriched the Carthagians and bewildered the Romans or Jews, Arabs and Europe,' but the diplomacy that went along to protect these vital trade routes.¹² Similarly Rotberg's study of East Africa and the Orient offers a rendition of thriving trade and diplomatic relations, some dating back to 100 BC. It is needless to emphasise that the celebrated European voyages of exploration which eventually opened the way for colonialism were inspired primarily by economic objectives as medieval trade brought wealth, security and leisure to the commercial and aristocratic classes. In a closer context, History also has it that the Kings of Portugal, the pioneers of overseas exploration and not only ex-

changed Ambassadors with the Kings of Manicongo and Benin, on the West African coast, but also maintained full diplomatic relations with them based on trade and technical operations. All these point to the fact that Economic Diplomacy is not necessarily a new concept in the conduct of foreign relations among states, but became suppressed in course of events. It may then be propitious to ask "How did economic factors become submerged in the current of international system, the need arose to secure its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The emphasis of inter-state relations therefore became dominantly political, although its underlying motivation remained economic as states and governments exist to protect their perpetuity. The experience of the two world wars and the need to preserve global peace, again eclipsed the attention on economic matters. Most developing countries were accordingly, ushered into the international arena, as independent states with a colonial bequeathal of contending ideological blocs and the dominance of the political agenda, racism, colonialism, neocolonialism, disarmament. The effect of the colonial umbilical cord determined the foreign policy posture adopted by most of these countries on attainment of independence.

In modern times, the importance of economic factors in determining the attitude of states is becoming more relevant. The World Bank 1991 Report asserts that economic "development is the most important challenge facing the human race today". Global attention since the past forty years has shifted repeatedly to thinkings on development. By development is meant not just the need to raise wages or experience growth in per capita but overall upliftment of the human person through better access to education health, nutrition, clear environment, access to opportunities, and individual freedom, richer cultural life, etc. In spite of the great in-road and new frontier into science and technology made in the recent few years, one fifth of the world's population live below the poverty level, with predominant concentration in Sub Saharan Africa the area considered as the centre piece of Nigeria's foreign policy. Available data show that poverty is most replete in Sub Sahara Africa where GNP of some countries is barely \$200 as against \$2,576 in Europe, and \$3,164 in Latin America and life expectancy is 50 years. Despite the fact that abundant natural resources are trapped in most developing countries and the adoption

of appropriate development strategies could remove this scourge of poverty over time, for most African countries, the forecast is gloomy. In fact the expected growth of real GDP per capita for Africa during the 1990s is 0.3% which for say East Asia is 4.2% - 5.3%.

This picture shows that most of the Sub-Saharan African countries are merely floundering on the fringes of the international system and therefore lack the capacity to participate effectively in international politics. The vital crucible of diplomacy is power which is defined in terms of military or economic might. The recent changes in the global political landscape have further diminished the importance attached to the possession of military might as an ultimate gauge for international prestige and influence. The emphasis has in fact shifted to economic might, hence the USA, Japan, Germany and the other G.7 countries form an inner caucus on a kind of Mount Olympus, overlooking the world and determining the course of events in various nations. As Gen. Nwachukwu has advanced in various fora, it is obvious therefore that a poor country depending on food aid and external sources for basic budgetary needs cannot be expected to effectively participate in world events in a worthy manner. The expectation therefore would be to pursue policy objectives which will strengthen the domestic production base.

THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY

2 For Nigeria, the adoption of Economic Diplomacy at the time it did had a lot of meaning. Economic Diplomacy came at the heels of the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) by the Government in 1986. SAP itself was adopted after many years of unsuccessful economic planning and management.

Since attainment of independence in 1960, Nigeria has embarked on five Development Plans aimed at bringing about stable economic growth. As at 1960, agriculture played a leading role in the economy as employer of over 70% of the labour force and contributor of over 80% of government revenue. By late 1960s and early 1970s, oil emerged as the major revenue earner for government - a trend which has since then persisted in geometric increases. While oil contributed 57.6% to the GDP in 1970, over-time, it moved to 97.20% in 1986. Trade at this stage deviated to oil exports which brought in huge returns. As regards investments, the thinking among economic planners was to direct the excess revenue derived from oil sales

(especially in the wake of rising oil prices in 1970s) to construction, services and commerce. Construction entailed building of infrastructure and industrial plants, the service sector was equally diverse while commerce sector related to import trade. It is estimated that between the oil boom in 1971 to the period of recession in 1981, the Nigerian government earned over N100 billion, of which about N70 billion is believed to have been spent in the construction industry alone.¹⁷ What this meant in real terms is that little efforts were made to stimulate domestic resource growth outside the external capital inflow from crude sales. Although investment in the manufacturing sector rose by 10% during the period, the percentage compared to overall earnings was lowered. Moreover as the pattern of development depended on imports, in the wake of neglect of domestic resource base, these industries depended entirely on imported raw materials, imported spare-parts and expatriate technical personnel. In the absence of policy measures to promote domestic production in the non-oil sector, import substitution was a fashionable policy instrument in dampening inflationary pressure at home arising from low internal supply base. Monetary and fiscal policies were oriented towards making credit or 'cheap money' available to government and the private sector and deficit budgeting.

The risk of this trend for the economy was that massive liquidity and the corollary expansion of demand engendered by ostentatious consumption was at variance with visible models of economic development as entire supply was externally sourced. The cracks of disequilibrium started to emerge by the late 1970s, following unfavourable developments in the world economy, international currency market, international real interest rates and changes in commodity prices. By 1981/82 world oil prices tumbled with an impact in drop of government revenue from \$22 billion in 1980 to \$16.7 billion in 1981 and \$14.4 billion in 1982. The preponderance of this fall in current account receipt was negative balance of payment indicators as there was no immediate and corresponding reflection in externally dependent consumption. Instead in 1980 imports rates increased by \$14.2 billion with a foreign reserve of \$4.8 billion which increased to N35 billion in 1981. As the external reserve and domestic savings were all committed to defray the resultant gap, thereby leading to depletion, government resorted to borrowing

from within and outside to keep the economy going and avert a sudden collapse. In 1980 the Federal Government borrowed N3 billion from the Central Bank of Nigeria as against N158 million in 1979, while on the external front, the amount of debt received moved from N1.9 billion in 1980 to N19.1 billion in 1982. Debt servicing ratio as a percentage of export earning moved from 8% to 33% in 1982.

The sadness of this was that the oil boom resulted in marginal improvements on per capita income of the ordinary Nigerian which as at 1986 was \$625 (this was far below some other oil producing countries like Libya \$6,271, Algeria \$2,789, Gabon \$3,124). The annual growth of the GDP also remained as low as 3.3% same level as growth of population. With contribution of only 27% to GDP as against 60.7% in 1960, the agricultural sector had gone down and the country now depends on imported food. The economy was therefore suffering from what former World Bank Representatives in Nigeria, Tarqi Hussein called 'Dutch Disease' and compelled drastic transformation.

STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME AND THE IKE NWACHUKWU INTERVENTION

By 1981, in the wake of the world oil recession the need to restructure the economy became imminent. The precursor of SAP - Austerity Measures were introduced in 1981 with restriction in imports, quota systems, cutback on subsidies and reduction in public spending. The effects were tenuous although it succeeded in reducing public sector deficit from 11.6% to 2.9% between 1981 - 85. However, the overall implications on the economy were grave. The restrictions on importations had an effect on raw material and machinery inputs for the entire manufacturing sector. At the same time a number of consumer items were placed under prohibited list of import, while trade in the mono product (oil) trickled and in 1986 oil prices tumbled to \$13 per barrel, investment as proportion of GDP fell from 28% in 1981 to 14% by 1985 and capacity utilization in industry fell sharply to 25%. Unemployment, scarcity of supply and spiralling inflation, urban migration, became the order of the day. This trend revealed the structural problems in the economy which required fundamental adjustment measures. Against these circumstances, the Federal Government adopted a Structural Adjustment

Programme in 1986. Its main objectives were to use macro-economic policies to restructure and diversify the productive base of the economy, bring about short term fiscal balance of payment, and liberalize the economy to allow accelerated and balanced growth. Accordingly a number of incentives were introduced to improve the enabling environment, thereby attract foreign investment and create avenues for expansion of non-oil exporters. Monetary and fiscal measures were also taken to reduce the national debts stock and facilitate easy capital movement, debt rescheduling programme, debt conversion programme, market oriented foreign exchange facilities, were introduced. Similarly, privatisation and commercialisation programmes are still being embarked upon.

At the beginning of the tenure of Gen. Nwachukwu as Foreign Minister in 1988, the hardships occasioned by SAP had become highly prevalent among the populace and the response of the international community to the adjustment measures was negligible. The Foreign Minister, therefore resolved to bring to fruition his vision of using the instruments of foreign policy for the social and economic development of not just Nigeria but the entire continent as well. Gen. Nwachukwu through his ideas has demonstrated dogged commitment towards employing the foreign policy resources to assume a pivotal role in the nation's efforts towards rapid economic recovery and stable growth. Gen. Nwachukwu whom Prof. Adefuye calls "a living evidence of Nigeria's cultural diversity"¹⁶ has always been associated with a track record of innovation and strong empathy for the economic upliftment of the citizenry. Both as a Military leader, State Governor, or Minister of Labour and Employment by introducing new policy measures leading to the creation of National Directorate of Employment (NDE). The NDE has since been engaged in generating self employment for thousands of Nigerians. Adefuye records that as early as 1982, Gen. Nwachukwu who was a student at the prestigious Nigerian Institute of Policy & Strategic Studies (NIPSS) Jos, had written a 253 page thesis on "Strategies for the Defence of Nigeria". There he highlighted ideas of building up a strong economic base as a step towards defense capability. The ideas in that paper are believed to be the percussors of Economic Diplomacy. At his NIJA lecture he stated that "now that the structural weakness in the economy are being addressed by the Government

we feel that it is the responsibility of our foreign policy apparatus to advance this course of national economic recovery. This entails negotiations and activities that will attract both foreign investments and other assistance required for the successful accomplishment of our national economic goals. This is principal reason for our heightened interest in advocating a foreign policy orientation that is geared to advancing policies and strategies that promote our self-reliance. In furtherance of this objective the Administration has taken measures to reduce the fears of foreign investors by enhancing the investment climate in the country."¹⁷

THE SCOPE OF ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

The scope entailed promoting the objectives of revamping the economy and setting it on a smooth path of economic growth. Its target was therefore to promote foreign investment for the purpose of broadening the domestic productive base and generating employment, encouraging export of Nigeria's non-oil products and finally bring about better debt management arrangements. Gen. Nwachukwu defined the process thus:

"This entails negotiations and utilisation that will attract both foreign investments and other assistance required for the successful accomplishment of our required economic goals".¹⁸

In another context the Minister explained that the primary objective of the new thrust was to work toward regaining the confidence of the international community on the Nigerian economy. The policy will therefore endeavour to articulate the improved enabling environment in Nigeria by offering explanations on the incentives Nigeria has put in place.

TOOLS AND ASSET OF ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

The pronouncement of the new policy focus or orientation always has its implications in terms of setting up appropriate institutional mechanisms and adopting strategies to ensure its implementation. For economic diplomacy, the main institutional machinery or 'capacity building' as R.A. Akindele ¹⁷ puts it, is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Diplomatic Missions abroad working in concert with

other government departments and the private sector.

All across the world, diplomacy exerts itself to meeting the needs of a clientele. Like its counterparts in other countries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had always performed economic duties in the conduct of the countries foreign policies. Principally, it serves as a clearing house for the negotiation and conclusion of various bilateral and multilateral economic agreement, protocols, etc. These functions are covered by the International Economic Cooperation Directorate (IECD) headed by a Deputy Director-General. The Directorate is further divided into Bilateral Economic Cooperation Department, and Multilateral Economic Cooperation Department. These departments are the main link on economic matters between the appropriate economic departments of Government, the private sector and the Foreign Missions in Nigeria. At Nigerian Missions abroad, specific officers are normally assigned to handle economic matters in most cases under the direct supervision of the Head of Mission. The other roles Missions play are economic reporting, attending to trade enquiries and providing information on the Nigerian economy.

In general, however, the Ministry's economic role was limited to servicing issues originating from other departments unless it is specifically requested to do so, as in cases of Inter-Ministerial meetings where it was expected to present briefs or position papers or in the coordination of Joint Commission matters.

In a recent paper, Amb. (Dr) Dapo Fafowora adduced three reasons for the erstwhile limited role of Nigeria's diplomatic missions on economic matters²⁰. Firstly he argues that the conduct of diplomacy all over the world, gained a tradition of emphasis on political matters until recent time which was inherited by the Nigerian service. Secondly, international trade expanded in the past through the energy of the entrepreneur and not the conscious routine intervention of the diplomat whose duty is only to create the legal framework. Even in Britain, it was not until the report of the Fuston Committee in 1972 that the foreign service became encouraged to focus on the promotion of British exports. Thirdly he argues that it is not possible to sell what a country does not have especially where there exists low and under utilised industrial capacity, nor attract investment to a politically and economically unstable and weak base. Moreover, aside from import substitution, there was virtually noth-

ing to export.

With the new policy thrust, the IECD in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was re-organised through the creation of an additional "Trade and Investment Department (TID) to effectively tackle the new challenges. The TID was to apply itself to the efforts being made to restructure the economy and thereby act as a centre for dissemination of information to the outside world. Beyond that, it was expected to collate and analyse global responses to the adjustment measures as well as contribute to Government's decision making process. The department was also mandated to initiate its own strategies to enhance the economic growth of the country.

On the external front, directives were made to Nigerian Missions abroad on the need to strengthen the economic desks. The missions were expected to change their focus from a postal function to a promotional one. For instance they were expected not just to forward trade enquiries to the relevant agencies in their host countries, but to actually engage in trade promotional activities. While it is not expected that all missions abroad have economic attraction, Gen Nwachukwu repeated to various sets of Ambassadors appointed during his tenure that the yardstick for measuring the performance of missions will be the extent to which economic objectives are met. This pattern is being adopted by several other countries. Ambassador Fafowora confirms this pattern when he recounted a discussion with a departing Foreign Ambassador, "recently the departing Ambassador of foreign country in Nigeria visited me and in the course of our discussion informed me that he had accomplished his economic mission here ... he had been set a target to win contracts worth N200 million and also secure sales of his country's products in Nigeria to the value of N500 million."²¹

To enhance the effective performance of officers posted abroad, Foreign Service Academy of the Ministry has added additional subjects in its curriculum to give emphasis to briefings by officials of the economic departments and representatives of the private sector. The Ministry has also started to accord priority attention to the postgraduate training in Economics, Business Administration, and Economic related aspects of International Relations of its staff to enhance their performance. Similarly, its staff in the economic departments have begun to be exposed to various short term training

programmes, such as seminars and workshops on export development and management of international trade and investment, financial services, etc. Its staff also take part in the planning of economic activities of both government and the private sector such as trade fairs, trade missions, annual general meetings. The essence is to monitor the overall operations of the economy, its potentials, strengths and weaknesses, the constraints and areas that demand government support or intervention.

For Economic Diplomacy to succeed it was imperative not just to have a strong backing and support of other government departments which have statutory responsibilities over matters of trade in various fields and to see on, but actually carry them along. This was especially necessary as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not wish to continue to play a postal role, but actually bring to the fore the strategic interests of Nigeria with the outside world on policy formulation.

Similarly, the planner of Economic Diplomacy also had the daunting task of convincing the private sector that it was "born again" and ready to work cooperatively. Again, Ambassador Fafowera who has spent a lot of time with the public and private sectors remarks on the existence of 'appalling misconceptions' on both. The circumspection and often less ebullient attitudes of diplomats who often rely on directives or clearances from their headquarters, are not always savoury to the more determinist and assertive businessman. The task of wooing the friendship and confidence of the private sector was imperative if the exercise was to be result-oriented. Even the whole exercise of SAP is deregulation and greater focus on the private sector. President Babangida has stated on several occasions that the private sector is the real engine of economic growth.

Some of the government departments which the Trade and Investment Department is needed to work closely with are the Presidency, Federal Ministry of Communication and Tourism, Federal Ministry of Industries & Technology, Federal Ministry of Finance and Budget, Ministry of Petroleum and Mining, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and other technical Ministries, such as parastatals as Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Raw Material Research and Development Council (RMRDC), Nigeria Export Promotion Council (NEPC), Custom &

Immigration Departments. In the private sector, contacts were made with the various organised groups such as Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines & Agriculture (NACCIMA), Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN), Association of Nigerian Exporters (ANE), World Trade Centre of Nigeria, Lagos Chamber of Commerce, Kaduna Chamber of Commerce, Enugu Chamber of Commerce and the bilateral Chambers of Commerce. The doors of the Ministry also had to be opened up to individual business enquiries.

The institutional focus of economic diplomacy was therefore Inter-Ministerial/Private Sector with the Trade & Investment Department and the rest of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs serving as a nucleus of operation. Possibly gingered by the collective national effort to restore the economy, on the path of durable growth, the response to Economic Diplomacy in both Government and the Private Sector has been spontaneous. The attitude of the private sector has been particularly encouraging as they have always responded enthusiastically, quite often, committing substantial material resources.

STRATEGIES

In the implementation of the policy, a flow line type mechanism had to be put in place. While raw inputs received from missions are processed and used to fuel domestic policy making system, a parallel output line conveys policy guidelines which require promotion and dissemination. A similar line of communication with the private sector was opened up. In collaboration with these government departments some strategies were adopted to enhance the effective implementation of the policy thrust, both at the bilateral and multilateral levels.

One main approach was to embark on promotional activities such as organising Trade Missions or Trade Exhibitions abroad. In this direction, the Ministry has organised Nigerian Trade Missions to Ghana, Liberia, Jamaica, India, Namibia, South Korea, Brazil, Yugoslavia, Italy, France, USA, UK, Germany, Malaysia, Indonesia, Zimbabwe, etc. Similarly, through the initiative of Nigerian Missions abroad, Trade Missions have been received from these and several other countries. Unlike in the past, Trade & Investment Department now co-ordinates all such visits including arranging meetings with government departments and the private sector. In other cases where it is not directly involved, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assists the private sector to organise its Trade Missions

abroad. These include Trade Missions to Algeria, Malaysia, Indonesia, New Zealand, Taiwan, Australia and Hong Kong organised by NACCIMA, ECOWAS countries tour by Lagos Chamber of Commerce, ASEAN tour by Nigeria/ASEAN Chamber etc.

Related to this is the Ministry's role in the organisation of other promotional activities such as Solo Exhibitions of Nigerian goods and coordination of international participation in Trade Fairs. Such exercises have been undertaken in several countries. These are co-ordinated by the NEPC, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs participate at all stages. On the other hand, Nigerian Missions abroad have been more active in promoting foreign participation in Trade Fairs held in Nigeria, especially the Lagos, Kaduna and Enugu International Fairs and other specialised fairs. Here again, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs serves on the Trade Fair Committees and participates in all major Nigerian Trade Fairs.

The other set of promotional activities which the Ministry has organised in concert with the Federal Ministry of Industries and relevant arms of the private sector are Nigerian Investment Forum held in London in November, 1990, Nigerian Investment Forum in Abuja, May, 1991, Nigerian Investment Forum in New York in October, 1991. These fora provided potential foreign investors direct opportunities to explore possible areas of investment in Nigeria. The Abuja Forum which was co-sponsored by UNIDO was particularly epoch making for the promotion of foreign investment in Nigeria.

In all these steps the strategy has been to carry the private sector along. The Nigerian private sector and the government have come to see each other as partners in a goal directed at improving the well being of the people. On its part the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ensures that where relevant, such as joint commissions, some private sector operators are carried along. Similarly, since the Nigeria/UK Bilateral Talks held in March, 1988, leading members of the private sector have been invited to accompany the President, Vice President or the Foreign Minister to most of their official visits abroad. This approach which President Babangida calls "Nigeria Incorporated" is to enable members of the private sector take advantage of the political goodwill arising from such occasions to follow up the decisions made.

The pursuit of Economic Diplomacy also has its multilateral dimension. The focus here is to enhance Nigeria's economic development through the coordination of efforts with other developing countries in the

pursuit of more equitable terms of international economic relations. At a higher global level, Nigeria has been active in the on-going Uruguay Round of Trade negotiations under the framework of GATT. The other approach has been to strengthen Nigeria's negotiating position with the economic agencies of the United Nations and the international financial organisations. Some of the UN agencies like UNESCO, UNICEF, play an enormous role in funding social service projects such as health-care and educational services which UNIDO & UNDP contribute directly towards creating the appropriate enabling environment. Along with the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, European Development Bank, Africa Development Bank, and so on, they provide advisory imputes for the transformation of the economy towards a more "market friendly" outlook and provide funds for specific private sector related projects.

However, the main strategy in this direction is to promote viable South-South forms of cooperation. Nigeria played a major role leading to the establishment of the South Commission and in 1990 organise a workshop in its report, in Lagos. In line with conclusions of the South Commission's report, concerted efforts are being made to strengthen the South-south element of Nigeria's international economic cooperation. The advantage lies in the elimination of the periphery - centre-type of relationship which often forms the basis of cooperation with the more industrially developed countries. Moreover, the relatively weak economies of the south need to coalesce resources to be able to cope effectively with a more sophisticated international economic system.

This attitude also informs Nigeria's role at the regional and sub-regional levels. It was Nigeria's pivotal role that led to the creation of the Africa Economic Community at the Abuja Summit of the OAU in 1991. These are expected to act as a platform for the development of intra-Africa economic cooperation based on the principle of comparative complementarity. These efforts could also be situated in the context of averting complete marginalisation of Africa in a world economy increasingly characterised by integrationist tendencies even by the more industrialised countries.

In the multilateral sphere, the Nigerian private sector has been greatly encouraged to relate effectively with their counterparts in other countries. Nigeria therefore plays a leading role in the Group of 77 Chambers of Commerce, G.15 Cooperation Council which emerged as the private

is the founding President of the Association of African Chambers of Commerce while both the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce and the federation of West African Manufacturers Association are not only chaired by Nigerians but have their Secretariat in Nigeria.

THE GAINS OF ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

Some authors have argued as to whether a policy such as Economic Diplomacy can yield meaningful results in what Femi Badejo describes as a 'trapped economy'. Ogwu and Olukoshi argue rather pessimistically that "economic diplomacy is hardly meant to promote self reliant developments nor does it have room for independent Africanist "radical" foreign policy action or even economic nationalism at home."²¹

Without expending further efforts in reviewing various models of development, as to determine whether or not liberalization and deregulation are right steps, available research findings show that the economies of developing countries which experienced highest growth rates and therefore developed into the status of newly industrialised countries are those that encouraged open market-oriented economic policies. Infact no economy can develop effectively without meaningful input of capital and technology both of which are internationally scarce and have to be sought for. That is what Economic Diplomacy has attempted to do and done well so far. Of course the appropriate domestic setting especially entrepreneurial skill have to be in place. In fact Prof. Ogwu's conclusion are slightly at variance with the position taken in her extensive studies on the Brazilian experience where the conclusion is that "significant diplomatic efforts in support of economic developments"²² is considered an integral part of the foreign policy apparatus. With the East Asian countries, such objectives have been pursued for over thirty years.

Another reason which makes economic diplomacy so compelling is the fact that it is cost conscious using what we already have, to get what we need. In financial terms, it has not resulted in any additional costs as the main institutional machinery is carved out of existing structures. At the same time Economic Diplomacy has not resulted in neglect of our erstwhile foreign policy obligations or commit-

ments. Rather it has the potential of enhancing our efforts towards playing a more effective role in Africa and in the international scene. Unless it could be shown otherwise, strong economic development will act as a good basis for a dynamic and result oriented foreign policy.

It may suffice to mention for instance that during the period, Nigeria has remained in the forefront of African affairs leading to the independence of Namibia, and the dismantling of Apartheid in South Africa. It has also been at the forefront of regional efforts aimed at bringing about peace in Liberia, Sudan, Angola and also held her Chairmanship of ECOWAS and OAU. In broader international context, Nigeria's role during this period has even been more appreciated as exemplified by urgent election to the Presidency of the United Nations General Assembly, Secretary General of the Commonwealth and the election of an African as Secretary General of the United Nations. At the bilateral level, Nigeria has even increased its level of cooperation with various countries, especially in the Third World where the Technical Aid Corps scheme has continued to be an important component.

It is not easy to quantify the gains of a particular foreign policy measure by the use of an accounting balance sheet methodology as the impact of such measures normally permeate into all facets of a country's national life. The objective of Economic Diplomacy, the instrument of foreign policy, to facilitate economic growth has yielded some results. Latest figures from the Central Bank of Nigeria show that the Nigerian economy has made some improvements in the past few years. There are modest gains experienced in the macro economic environment which have brought about tremendous confidence and international goodwill to the economy. The international business community is once again beginning to see Nigeria as a worthy partner and the level of foreign investment has begun to show an appreciable increase.

One major constraint in this direction has been the spate abroad of fraudulent business activities and letters of intent to that effect addressed to international business community by some criminals in Nigeria. Most of these letters popularly called '419' in Nigeria, originate from few criminals, but their activities have in some respect brought disrepute to the entire Nigeria business community. Most

of the criminals have been apprehended and efforts are on to assure the international business community of the level of development of the Nigerian private sector, which can compete favourably internationally.

CONCLUSION

The adoption of economic diplomacy as the 'new thrust' of Nigeria's foreign policy was a turning point in not only the country's foreign policy orientation but in the overall development efforts. Economic Diplomacy has succeeded in propagating Nigeria's economic potentials to the world. The dividend of the policy is a renewed confidence and acceptability of Nigeria in the world business community. The expectation is that with the passage of time, Nigeria will be in a better position to play her role as leader of the Black and African World more effectively. One cannot end this review without mentioning that the present efforts to promote trade and investment in Nigeria cannot make lasting impact if relapses are allowed along the way. On the other hand, these should be integral policies in the overall economic development strategy of the country and permanent features of the foreign policy.

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Chapter 6

NIGERIA: TRANSITION TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1990's

By Prof. Ibrahim Gambari

For many people, Nigeria as a country remains an object of serious analysis and study. The recent undertakings to return to popular democracy and a constitutional government has even heightened anousity in her affairs. Nigeria attracts a broad interest from the global community not only from prospective investors but perhaps more importantly from the academic. The importance of this fact can be gauged from the role which members of the academic and media-
the attentive public plays in setting a nation's agenda and in influencing the perception of a country's politics and policies by the global community.

There is a clear linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy in Nigeria. The way we do diplomatic business and the effectiveness of our positions abroad are related in part to the process and objectives of our internal politics. Foreign policy pursuits are, in any case, the external projections of interests which are defined at home. Moreover, there is a self-perception by Nigerians that theirs is a leading country in Africa, given her population, size, natural resources and resourcefulness. This perception is generally shared by the international community. The fact that one out of every five Africans is a Nigerian, influences the perception that the country's pronouncements, policies and role in the international system are fairly representative, if only symbolically, of Africa's interest.

This perception notwithstanding, Nigeria as a nation has become herself an interesting subject for political pundits and analysts. A country in her thirtieth year of independence, she has perhaps more than any other African nation, attracted attention to herself by her achievements, failures and, most importantly, her foreign policy stance on many issues. One area which has been remarkable, symbolic and curious has been her form of government. In thirty years, Nigeria has had two constitutional governments. First, from 1960 to 1966, it had a British "Westminster" type parliamentary system. Second, from 1979 to December 1983, it had a United States-style presidential system. So, in thirty years, Nigeria had only nine

years of constitutional government and participatory democracy while the remaining twenty-one years have been characterized by military rule including the incumbent regime which, though headed by a President, remains nonetheless non-constitutional and a non-democratic form of government.

Today, Nigeria is at the threshold of her third attempt to establish a constitutional government in 1992. The first was the pre-independence arrangement while the second was the successful handing-over of government by the Murtala-Obasanjo military regime to the civilian administration led by President Shehu Shagari in October 1979. The advent of the Third Republic, envisaged in 1993, has attracted obvious attention due to the novel and experimental processes adopted by the Babangida administration to ensure not only a smooth transition to a constitutional government but one which will stand the test of time. As President Babangida said on 13th January, 1986 when he inaugurated the Political Bureau which formalised the plan to return Nigeria to a constitutional government; "Today, we commence the search for a new political order. The setting up of the Political Bureau is the first step. As part of the strategy towards evolving a viable political order, I expect the ensuing debate to capture the nature of the threshold of the transition process. In particular, I expect the debate to come up with suggestions as to how we can evolve a political system which can enable us to aspire to a predictable and stable political culture..."¹

With that pronouncement, and the tacit acknowledgement that a constitutional government is to be preferred over a non-elected military regime, President Babangida inaugurated Nigeria's march to a constitutional government in the 1990s with the following terms of reference:

- (a) Review of Nigeria's political history and identify the basic problems which have led to our failure in the past and suggest ways of resolving and coping with these problems;
- (b) Identify a basic philosophy of government which will determine goals and serve as a guide to the achievement of government.

(c) Collect relevant information and data for the government as well as identify other political problems that may arise from the debate.

(d) Gather, collate and evaluate the contributions of Nigerians to the search for a viable political future and provide guidelines for the attainment of consensus objectives;

(e) Deliberate on other political problems as may be referred to it from time to time.²

And so, with that mandate, Nigeria commenced her arduous journey to a return to participatory democracy. What was remarkable in the mandate given to the Political Bureau was the absence of any mandate or reference to Foreign Policy matters. This could hardly have been an oversight. There were perhaps two reasons for excluding foreign policy from the mandate of the Political Bureau. First, while not denying that the Foreign Policy of any country is an extrapolation of her domestic policies, it was accepted by all and sundry that Nigeria's political problems notwithstanding, she had continuously maintained a consistently broad outlines of foreign policy objectives irrespective of which regime was in power. The degree of activism in foreign policy by the various regimes was often dictated by availability of resources to finance foreign policy objectives and the personalities of the head of government. The second reason was that Nigeria's foreign policy objectives have continuously enjoyed a pride of place in the nation's agenda. Since Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa set the basis and criteria for Nigeria's international relations on October 7, 1960, during Nigeria's admission into the United Nations, the country's basic foreign policy goals have not really been abandoned by any succeeding regime. Of recent, however, General Babangida had accorded Nigeria's foreign policy its deserved recognition by convening an All-Nigeria Conference on Foreign Policy held in Kuru, Jos from 7th to 12th April, 1986 to carry out a comprehensive review of the nation's foreign policy. In the belief that foreign policy was hardly the exclusive preserve of those in government, the Babangida administration set out to find for Nigeria a basis for a sustained, dynamic and vibrant foreign policy. To underscore the importance of foreign policy in the life of the Nigerian nation, the theme of the Conference was "NIGERIA AND

THE WORLD: FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS UP TILL THE YEAR 2000".

Delivering the opening address at the Conference, General Babangida posed some questions which he felt were basic to Nigeria's re-evaluation of her foreign policy. He asked: "What were Nigeria's goals at independence and have these goals remained static? If no, what are our goals today and what should they be in the next quarter of the century? Have we related these goals to the instruments of implementation? Have these goals been clearly defined to meet Nigeria's place and position in the world today?"¹

In responding to the questions, General Babangida undertook an excursion into Nigeria's foreign policy since independence. He did identify three distinct phases. The first phase, 1960 to 1965, the immediate post-independent era, he identified as a period of uncertainty given that the "Balewa government was not quite prepared and well equipped to respond adequately to (these) policy issues". Moreover, within a few years after independence, the regime was preoccupied with one domestic political crisis or another until it was overthrown by the military. The second phase in his assessment was 1967 to 1970 which also coincided with the Nigerian civil war period. He noted that foreign policy at that point was largely dictated by, and predicated on, the civil war situation. National security and interest, then dictated a new emphasis on better relations with Nigeria's immediate neighbours. The civil war also meant for Nigeria an added impetus in the role of the OAU (the Organisation for African Unity), as well as adjustment of her relations with the great powers, which in turn, gave an even greater impetus to Nigeria's non-aligned stance which she has maintained from independence till date with varying degrees of commitment.

In General Babangida's assessment, the third phase of Nigeria's foreign policy commenced in 1975. In his words, "that is the period of progressive radicalization of foreign policy goals..."⁴ He noted that the period was remarkable not only for General Murtala Mohammed's pronouncement at the Extraordinary OAU

Summit, in January 1976 that "Africa has come of age" but that Nigeria became activist and played vital roles in Angola, Chad, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and the formation of ECOWAS. While that phase did not introduce Nigeria's Afrocentric foreign policy, it no doubt marked the denouement of such policies. As can be gleaned from available records, General Obasanjo's regime basically continued with the policies enunciated by the regime of General Mohammed which it succeeded.

The Shagari administration once in office was confronted with two serious foreign policy issues which, by their nature, had direct bearing on Nigeria's internal security. First, there was the altercation between Nigeria and Cameroon border personnel, in which some Nigerians soldiers lost their lives. It is noteworthy that in spite of the calls and campaign by many Nigerians for a military response to the Cameroonian incursion, the matter was contained through diplomatic efforts and mediation. This effort was in the true spirit of good neighbourliness enshrined in both the OAU and ECOWAS Charters.

The other issue was the situation in Chad. Chad, torn by a civil war had become an "albatross" around Nigeria's neck, since Nigeria bore the burden of the spill-over of the crisis especially, the influx of Chadian refugees. Similarly, the contiguous borders shared by the two countries meant that some Nigerian nomads invariably became casualties or victims of the war. In keeping with Nigeria's Afrocentric policies, Nigeria undertook a mediation effort between the various warring factions in Chad notably the ones led by Hissen Habre and Goukoni Weddeye. The effort which resulted in the Kano-I and Kano-II Accords unfortunately were not long-lived or wholly successful given the intransigence of both parties. But it could hardly be denied that Nigeria lived up to expectation, at least in intent. Nonetheless, it was a period in which it was as if Nigeria had rapidly slipped back into the policies of subservience to the West and hesitancy in African affairs closer to the situation in the 1960s. I remarked elsewhere that in my assessment, Nigeria's foreign policy under President Shagari was bureaucratic, vague, and possibly out of tune with the aspirations for our country held by the informed public.

Foreign policy under the Buhari Administration in which I served as Foreign Minister remained Afrocentric but with a greater shift to the centre which was Nigeria's national interest. In general, the Buhari administration decided that the defence of Nigeria's national security and the welfare of her citizens would be the axis around which foreign policy would revolve. We thus projected the country's national interest along the lines of concentric circles of policy priorities, an orientation of foreign policy that was conceptually sound and consistent with the recognition of reduced national financial resources and power.

Our national interest also dictated that we temporarily close our land borders and expel illegal aliens from Nigeria, actions which appeared to be out of step with our declared policy of concentric circles with priority to be given to relations with our neighbours but were necessary pending when permanent solutions were found for the problems. Distractive as those actions were, they did not detract from our overall objective to pursue an Afrocentric policy since the centre which was in this instance Nigeria had to be consolidated for effective policies to extrapolate to the outer confines of the concentric circles.

I have deliberately focused on President Babangida's assessment of Nigeria's foreign policy since independence for several reasons. First, that conference was the second in Nigeria's history to be devoted solely to foreign policy. Second, given the title of this address, one could hardly shy away from the fact that the Babangida administration as architects of the ongoing transition to a constitutional government, would bring to bear its views and perceptions of what would at least constitute a basis for acceptable foreign policy goals for Nigeria. Indeed, the objective of the conference under reference was to articulate policy objectives or at least the basis for such objectives from 1986 the year 2000. We are, therefore, still within the time-frame for which the review and assessment was undertaken.

Let me now turn to the issue at hand. The title of this paper,

Transition to Constitutional Government and Foreign Policy in the 1990s, to some extent presupposes that since Nigeria is in a transition process, her foreign policy goals may change. Secondly, there is also the implicit supposition that a return to participatory democracy in 1992 may drastically alter Nigeria's foreign policy. As I remarked in the earlier part of the paper the cardinal principles of Nigeria's foreign policy were articulated by Prime Minister Balewa during Nigeria's admission into the United Nations. In retrospect, that policy has hardly changed through the Ironsi, Gowon, Mohammed, Obasanjo, Shagari, Buhari and even the Babangida administrations. Rather, what has happened has been varying emphasis on different areas depending on the perceptions of policy articulators and the resources available. Of course, given the dynamism of global politics itself, geo-political considerations have invariably affected the emphasis and scope of Nigeria's foreign policy but definitely not the cardinal objectives. I will in due course illustrate this thesis with examples.

Before I do, I merely wish to state that the benefit of hindsight and empirical evidence and changing global politics notwithstanding, I do not envisage a radical departure in Nigeria's foreign policy objectives come 1992. Indeed it can be safely deduced that there has been no dramatic shift in Nigeria's foreign policy under the Babangida administration as it oversees the transition to constitutional government in 1992. There has been, of course, new emphasis on certain areas, while key policy areas such as ECOWAS, Africa, Non-Aligned Movement and Southern Africa have been sustained. This view, I believe, has been espoused by some eminent Nigerians who have been active in the foreign policy arena and the implementation of the transition programme.

One of my distinguished predecessors as Nigeria's Foreign Minister, Major-General Joe Garba "Diplomatic Soldiering" had this to say: "The Challenges of Nigeria's Foreign Policy look somewhat different in 1987 than they did at the end of 1983. True, the basic concerns has not changed: the region and the continent, particularly its southernmost part remains Nigeria's preoccupation, and Africa is no more left to solve its own problems now than before. And yet the role of other nations, of East and West, and our relationship to their

actions in especially the mounting crisis in Southern Africa, are not quite the same...⁵ In essence, General Garba acknowledged that often times what changes in Nigeria's Foreign policy consideration are personalities and emphasis - these invariably affect the modalities and style of decision-making but rarely the cardinal principles and objectives.

For instance, in analysing foreign policy under the Murtala regime, Professor Alaba Ogunsanwo states that "Any meaningful consideration of the role of the Nigerian military in foreign policy during 1975-1979 must inevitably begin with the far-reaching structural changes they sought to effect in the instrumentalities and modalities of decision-making and implementation in foreign policy."⁶ He went on to say that "it may be argued that such changes wherever they are attempted in any Foreign Service hardly affect the substance of policy and the effectiveness of such policy abroad. It may, however, be more difficult to deny the impact of such changes on the internal acceptability of a nation's foreign policy, especially where such changes move in the direction of relative democratization of decision-making at least in so far as the relevant members of the opinion-making community are concerned."⁷

The Second Republic, a constitutional government headed by President Shehu Shagari, came at the heel of the Murtala/Obasanjo regime and its activist foreign policy. It would normally be a "hard act" for a civilian regime replete with bureaucratic impediments that retard decision-making to follow a military government which never contended with such impediments. But as we see, while the dramatis personae change from administration to administration, the fundamental elements of policy hardly change as far as Nigerian foreign policy is concerned. In his maiden address to the OAU Summit in Freetown, Sierra Leone in July 1980, President Shagari gave prominence to the following issues: Situation in Chad; Western Sahara; Horn of Africa; Zimbabwe; South Africa; Economic Co-operation and the Middle East Situation. Speaking twenty years after Nigeria's independence on the 7th of October, 1980, President Shagari had this to say: "Some African States, quite tragically, have fought one

another across borders. They have fought not to colonise anyone but in order to defend their perceived patrimony, to safeguard their territorial integrity; others have fought in order to be independent, more are yearning to be free, and they will soon be free and independent...Never again will Africans be colonised. Never again will Africans tolerate living under racist domination and exploitation". Like Balewa in 1960, and Mohammed in 1976, President Shagari made Africa the central focus of his 1980 address to both the OAU and the United Nations on global problems. Undoubtedly, Africa has been central to Nigeria's foreign policy irrespective of regimes and administration.

As a practitioner, I was only conscious of Africa being the refrain of Nigerian foreign policy. However, while emphasizing the need to maintain continuity I endeavoured to re-define Nigerian foreign policy approach within "concentric circle" framework. Nonetheless, the approach remained Afrocentric. In an address I gave at Princeton University on 10th October, 1984 in my capacity as Minister of External Affairs in the Buhari regime, I had this to say about Nigeria's foreign policy: "A country's foreign policy revolves around its national interests. Nigeria is not and cannot be an exception to this. While Africa remains the centre-piece of our foreign policy, we cannot but operate within a series of concentric circles which now effectively guides our behaviour on the African and world scene. The innermost of the circles of national interest involves Nigeria's security - and that of the neighbours of Nigeria... The second circle involves our relations with the ECOWAS sub-region where we intend to take more active interest in development of social, economic and political nature... We are ready to continue to promote good neighbourly relations with our sister states in the region without, however, compromising on any issue of vital national interest to-us nor hesitating in affirmatively protecting such interests... The last circle of interest involves our relation with organisations, institutions and states outside of the African Continent. This is not to say that we do not regard this level of relationship as important..."⁸

It is interesting to note that those last words, tally with the caveat put forward by Prime Minister Balewa in his maiden address to the United Nations when he said "...I have concentrated on the problems

of Africa. Please do not think that we are not interested in the problems of the rest of the world. We are intensely interested in them and hope to be allowed to assist in finding solutions to them through this organisation, but being human, we are naturally concerned first with what affects our immediate neighbourhood."⁹

Put differently by President Babangida, for Nigeria's foreign policy to be meaningful, it " should be pursued within the context of her security interests."¹⁰

I have drawn on pronouncements from different administrations both civilian and military in Nigeria to show that there is remarkable consistency in Nigeria's foreign policy. Whereas my immediate successors in the Ministry of External Affairs - Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi and Major General Ike Nwachukwu did respectively give impetus to the "Concert of Medium Powers" also called "The Lagos Forum", and Economic Diplomacy; it is noteworthy that both having served under the Babangida administration and thus part of the transition process, remained vehemently loyal to Nigeria's Afrocentric Policy. Their respective commitment to the Non-Aligned Movement, the OAU, ECOWAS and fervent anti-apartheid stance were reflective of the persistent continuum in Nigeria's foreign policy since independence. Similarly, it is evident that every Nigerian administration since independence while not abandoning its bilateral obligations has remained committed to the principle of multilateralism and especially those principle enshrined in the Charter both of the OAU and the United Nations.

If there is a lesson to be drawn from my excursion so far in Nigeria's foreign policy undertakings, it is the fact that both military and democratic administrations have remained loyal to the cardinal objectives of Nigerian foreign policy. It can be surmised, therefore, that the Third Republic is likely to follow the same pattern. But before drawing that conclusion, other factors and variables must be brought into play. The First Republic was strictly a parliamentary system. The Second Republic was an Executive Presidential System. Both were perceived as having failed in Nigeria as far as domestic politics were concerned but I am yet to hear that they failed due to their foreign policy efforts or lack of them. The succession of military

leaders in Nigeria may have failed in their efforts to find a sustainable political system for the country, but none has yet been accused of radically redirecting the foreign policy objectives of Nigeria to the country's detriment.

It is, therefore, plausible to argue that irrespective of the nature and character of any administration in Nigeria, the odds are far in favour of that administration maintaining a policy consistent with the nation's foreign policy objectives, on which there appears to be a reasonable degree of consensus. Given the inauguration of a two-party system in Nigeria, either the Social Democratic Party (SDP) or the National Republican Convention (NRC) will come to power in August 1993. It is most instructive that while the manifestoes of the two parties are different in many areas, in the realm of foreign policy they converge towards a primarily Afrocentric policy. For instance, the SDP foreign policy objectives emphasize mutual co-existence and observance and obligations towards international organisations to which Nigeria belongs, as well as fostering South-South co-operation, while resisting imperialism, racial discrimination and external interventions. The NRC manifesto embraces the said principles but in a different context. For the NRC, Africa was explicitly mentioned as the centre-piece of its foreign policy. Providing leadership as well as ameliorating the sufferings of all black people in the diaspora are the other objectives of the party. There is no doubt that the similarities far outweigh the differences in both parties' objectives. Admittedly, the manifestoes of these two parties were handed down to them by the administration, before they were formally adopted by the parties.

Another point worthy of note even if only tangential in relevance, is that the Chairman of the SDP, Ambassador Babagana Kingibe, not only served as a career Foreign Service Officer in the Nigerian Foreign Service, but indeed, was a member of the "Kitchen Cabinet" in the Obasanjo regime. It is hardly possible that having been active during those years of fervent Afrocentric policies that he will now depart drastically from them or fail to bring his experience to bear on the objectives of his party or the implementation of the policies. This, of course, redirects our attention and focus to three other important

variables; those who formulate and implement policies, other nations with which Nigeria must deal with in the course of her external diplomatic preoccupation and intercourse, and finally, resources available for prosecution of foreign policies mandates. I wish to address these variables now.

Those who formulate policy are not necessarily those who execute them. The question of foreign policy is particularly unique for each Head of State is his own chief policy formulator and executor depending on his interest. So, while a Foreign Minister may be the 'vicar' of his country's foreign policy (apologies to Al Haig), the scope of his operation is determined by his principal's interest in foreign policy and how much responsibility he wishes to designate. Even when so much authority is granted, a Foreign Minister's tenure becomes either a mitigating or enhancing factor.

In Nigeria today, the average tenure for Foreign Ministers has been about twenty-four months. This no doubt has implications for policy formulation and sustenance. This is also perhaps why most Foreign Ministers are loath to stray into radically new areas of foreign policy endeavours. Also within the realm of personalities who execute foreign policy, it is obvious that Nigeria could hardly be an exception to established patterns. Consequently, I believe that those who formulate and execute foreign policy under a civilian regime are allowed a broader leeway, a brisker response and reaction to issues and questions. Certainly, it is easier and quicker to get an Ambassador appointed and confirmed under a military regime than it would be under a civilian regime. For instance in a constitutional government all ambassadorial appointees must go through Senate confirmation - a process that is often long, arduous and, at times, protracted due to differing party views and interest group pressure. As far as Nigerian Foreign policy efforts go, there abound possibilities that in the Third Republic, a more involved approach would be adopted in confirming ambassadorial appointees. First there is the need to ensure some degree of equitable geographical representation in choosing ambassadorial appointees. Also in a constitutional government, political appointments are more often than not ways of rewarding political allies and cronies.

The second variables are those nations Nigeria must deal with. In a fast changing global political system no nation is an island and Nigeria could hardly afford to be one, while she may not wish to alter her goals and policy objectives, she is bound by other extenuating factors often not within her control to react and adjust to crisis and events. Given her previous role and disposition to most African and global issues, Nigeria can no longer be a passive on-looker in world politics. Her size also confers on her certain inevitable responsibilities as does her active membership and participation at different multilateral fora. In a world riddled by regional conflicts, she is bound to be active in resolving these crises. Similarly, recent developments in Eastern Europe, particularly, in the Soviet Union has shown that it is impossible to isolate political reform from economic reform. This has also been the case with China. The implication of these developments in these countries is that for most developing countries, Nigeria included, reforms being made at the economic level (whether home-grown or externally-induced) must be accompanied by reforms at the political level.

There is also the growing marginalization of Africa in world politics and international economic relations. The Soviet Union appears to be willing, sometimes even eager, to give up the only area in which it has had pre-eminence over the West Africa, notably support for liberation efforts. And it is clear that once this recent Soviet tendency is operationalized fully, the interest of the West in African security problems, sustained by East-West rivalry, would be sharply reduced thereby imposing on African States obligatory responsibilities if the status quo must be maintained.

In the same vein, international and other foreign policy obligations even if only symbolic, must be undertaken even at extra cost and risk of domestic dissent and opposition. Two instances stand out clearly. The Babangida administration was severely criticised in certain quarters for offering cash assistance to the Soviet Union after the American earthquake disaster and for giving a similar assistance to Jamaica after Hurricane Gilbert ravaged that country. The point of contention for the critics was that given Nigeria's domestic problems, making such cash donations was at best frivolous. On the part of

government, the cost-benefit ratio of such assistance in the long-run outweigh any short-term domestic objectives.

A recent event would also suffice as an additional example. Recently, following the crisis in Liberia, Nigeria joined with other members of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee in organising an ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The role of ECOMOG was to assist the Committee in monitoring and enforcing the ceasefire by all the parties to the conflict in Liberia with a view to restoring law and order and then creating the conditions conducive to the holding of free and fair elections. Although the objectives of ECOMOG may arguably be seen as a violation of the non-interference policy of both ECOWAS and the OAU, the overriding factor remains the need for Nigeria to fulfil its policy objective which as I articulated in my Princeton address mentioned earlier, includes active interest in developments of social, political and economic nature within the West African sub-region.

Nonetheless, Nigeria's participation on ECOMOG is made easier because the country is presently under a military regime. Under a constitutional government, it would have definitely been more difficult for Nigeria to get involved in a military operation in Liberia. If for nothing else, committing Nigerian forces abroad would have required the concurrence of the whole Senate on the recommendation of the Armed Forces Committee of the Senate. There would also have been the question of cost.

Finally, there is the question of resources available for financing foreign policy objectives. General Joe Garba and many Nigerians who belong to the attentive public have often advocated a foreign policy based on *quid pro quo*. I subscribe to the dictum that "there is no free lunch"; and while admitting that *quid quo pro* is at times essential in international intercourse, I might add that foreign relations cannot be predicated on such a stance all the time. Foreign policy has to be financed in every instance. As I have argued at another forum, for an effective Foreign Service to deliver the "goods", there must be the ability to do so. This ability is by and large made

possible by the financial resources made available to the policy executors. Unfortunately, the tremendous growth in the Foreign Service personnel and in Nigeria's external responsibilities and activities since independence have not been matched by corresponding budgetary allocations especially in recent times. It is interesting to note that some countries in Africa with lesser external responsibilities, fewer overseas missions and smaller consular problems involving their citizens abroad, allocate a higher percentage of their total budgets to their foreign policy goals defined in national security terms, must be justified not on the grounds that it will protect national security but that by enhancing such security, it will serve to protect ultimate values such as individual liberty and human welfare".¹¹

Perhaps the most critical factor in evaluating the impact of transition to constitutional government on Nigeria's foreign policy will be the freedom guaranteed by the constitution and the rights arrogated to those who must discharge those duties. In a military regime, such as exists in Nigeria today, foreign policy formulation and execution falls squarely within the domain of the Executive Branch, whereas in a constitutional government, there are shared responsibilities between the Executive and Legislative branches of government. Similarly, in a participatory democracy, the involvement of private citizens and interest groups in influencing foreign policy is more pronounced than in a military regime, since these representations are made through elected representatives who must be responsive to the yearnings of their constituencies.

Then, of course, there is the question of constitutional dictates and limitations. For instance on 3rd May, 1989, during the promulgation of the New Nigerian Constitution, certain aspects of the constitution which will impact on foreign policy operators but not necessary the policies themselves were brought to light. Though the Constitution Review Committee had recommended, and the Constituent Assembly endorsed certain clauses of the Constitution, the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) found it necessary to expunge some of those recommendations. For instance, the Council deleted Clause 149(2) which says that: "Any appointment to the Office of Minister of

Government of the Federation shall be made by the President after consultation with the Senate". In its place, the Council retained Clause 135(2) of the 1979 Constitution which says "any appointment to the office of the Minister of Government of the Federation shall, if the nomination of any person to such office is confirmed by the Senate, be made by the President". Emphasis here is to change the "Consultation" to "Confirmation" and thus strengthen the hand of the Senate while ensuring that the practice and the requirement of the principles of checks and balances are maintained. This change is remarkable since major Presidential appointments affecting external relations such as the Foreign Minister and Ambassadors require Senate confirmation.

In another respect, the new Constitution, while taking cognisance of the need to establish certain Federal Executive bodies, separate and distinct from the Federal Civil Service, was silent on the need for a Foreign Service Commission which has been long sought by Foreign Service Officers and advocated by many political analysts. It is a matter of regret that the Nigerian Foreign Service is still subsumed within the Civil Service Structure. The obvious pitfalls of this arrangement are not only administrative but political. Given the existing set-up, the Foreign Service is denied the opportunity to recruit and promote its own personnel. Welfare of the officers apart, this arrangement has had and will continue to have dire implications for policy formulation and execution.

Recognition must be given to certain issues which have hitherto preoccupied Nigerian Foreign Policy executors and at times proved themselves protracted irritants in Nigeria's relations with her neighbours and other states. These issues remain unresolved and would have to be addressed by the Government that comes to power in 1992. Yet unresolved are the questions of boundary disputes and trans-border relations notably with Cameroon; the question of illegal aliens and our policy towards a post-apartheid South Africa. We can expect a livelier debate although less tidy approach to finding solutions to these problems. Nonetheless, I do not foresee however that these issues would warrant the wholesale reformulation of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives in the years to come, as the policy

of good neighbourliness; non-interference in the internal affairs of others and promotion of African solidarity, to mention a few, will continue to guide the formulation and execution of policy.

CONCLUSION

Let us conclude by noting that evidence available over the thirty years of Nigerian independence and her conduct of independent foreign policy is not in the least indicative that there has been any radical changes or shifts in policy under the various administrations. No doubt, emphasis has shifted at different times under different administrations, but Nigeria's foreign policy under both military and constitutional governments have, by and large, remained the same with Africa being its central focus. There is also no indication that the ongoing transition would alter this stance. Nor that the Third Republic will for that matter depart radically from the time-honoured commitment to a largely Afrocentric Policy. The real challenge would be how to adapt the broad national consensus behind our foreign policy to the rapidly changing international economic and political systems.

In a changing world marked by the shift from a bipolar system to an emerging multi-polar system, Nigeria could hardly escape having to deal with the political imponderables. The prognosis, however, is that with the ascendancy of regionalism and new economic blocs, Nigeria's long commitment to the viability and desirability of regional organisations such as the OAU and ECOWAS would be vindicated. She will nevertheless continue to be active in the multilateral forum such as the United Nations where, along with other member-states, she can at least protect her own national interests and help promote international peace, security, co-operation and development.

Finally, although it is difficult to predict with certainty what the orientation and priorities of foreign policy would be in the nascent Third Republic, one can surmise that there would probably be more continuity than radical change. This is partly because, as has been demonstrated, the guiding principles of Nigeria's foreign policy are

well-anchored on the nation's interests. Also, a country's interests tend to be fairly stable, at least in the short and medium term, barring the emergence of significant external impulses that would de-stabilize such interests. Having said that, it would be safe to predict that the pace, and perhaps the style of policy formulation and execution are bound to change given the inevitable 'push and pull' of partisan domestic politics and the usual rivalry between the Executive and Legislative branches of government in a democratic political system.

Moreover, the strong inputs by the press and various interest groups coupled with the continuing need to revamp the economy would all combine to make Nigeria's foreign policy of the Third Republic less cohesive but more broad-based, especially in its formulation. The personality, style, interest in foreign affairs and skill of the President may well tilt the balance in the direction of an activist foreign policy especially as that is what the politically aware Nigerians demand of their government whether under military or constitutional rule.

ENDNOTES

1. Report of the Political Bureau (Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1987), P.4
2. Ibid. P.11
3. See Major General (now General) Ibrahim B. Babangida's Opening Address to the All-Nigeria Conference on Foreign Policy held at Kuru, 7th - 12th April 1986.
4. See above address.
5. Joe Garba, Diplomatic Soldiering (Ibadan: Spectrum books Ltd, 1987) P.221.
6. Alaba Ogunsanwo, Our Friends, Their Friends: Nigeria's External Relations 1960 - 1985 (Lagos: Alfa Communications Ltd; 1986 P.40
7. Ibid. P.40
8. See the Hon. Minister of External Affairs, Prof. Ibrahim Gambari's Address at Princeton University on 10th October 1984.
9. Cited in Mahmud Tukur, Nigeria's External Relations: The Conduct of Foreign Policy in the United Nations, October, 1960 December 1985: Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Pittsburg, 1966.

Chapter 7

CRISIS MANAGEMENT UNDER IBB

By

Ayo Olukotun

INTRODUCTION

Crisis management is a regular feature of contemporary domestic and international politics. On the domestic scene, an unanticipated workers' strike, a sudden eruption of communal / religious crisis can trigger off earnest crisis management and conflict resolution efforts to prevent a deterioration in the crisis and to facilitate a return to social peace.

In the same manner, a myriad of crisis situations ranging from armed threats to civil authority in a neighbouring country to border clashes between two nations can constitute the backdrop to the deployment of crisis management initiatives.

It should be borne in mind that there are related concepts in international politics dealing with broadly the same phenomena. Hence in a recent Publication by the United Nations Secretary-General, Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali titled "An Agenda For Peace",¹ the concepts, "Preventive diplomacy", "Peacemaking" and "Peacekeeping" were used to refer to current efforts of the United Nations to prevent, manage or resolve crisis within the International System. Since these concepts have a bearing on our discussion of crisis management under the Nigerian government, it is worthwhile noting their definition and application in the publication referred to.

Preventive diplomacy was defined as "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur."² One can trace the application of this concept in the United Nations' contemporary interventions in Somalia, and Angola for example.

The second concept which relates to our subsequent discussion is that of *Peacemaking* defined as "action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in chapter VI of the charter of the United Nations"³ and the last more familiar one *Peace-Keeping* refers to the "deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the

parties concerned normally involving United Nations military and or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.”⁴

The first two concepts are similar to the conflict-resolution efforts traditionally undertaken by Nigeria under the auspices of the OAU or ECOWAS or at its own behest. Thus, for example at the 1988 Lome Summit of ECOWAS, General Ibrahim Babangida used his good offices to mediate the festering conflict between Ghana and Togo. A modified version of the last concept, *peace-keeping* is relevant to the crisismanagement initiatives of Nation-States within the international system.

Our discussion of crisismanagement under IBB will incorporate the concepts of *Preventive diplomacy*, of *peace making* as for example in Nigeria's on-going intervention in the Sudanese conflict and of a variant of *peace-keeping* as in the ECOMOG initiative in Liberia. Hence we shall be concerned broadly with Nigeria's initiatives unilaterally or multilaterally to mediate in conflict situations or keep the peace where the situation has already degenerated into war.

Since a number of the case-studies used here discuss on-going and yet unresolved conflict-situations, we are wary, scientifically, of theorizing ambitiously. The rest of the paper is divided into three sections. The next section deals with Nigeria's mediatory role in African conflicts arising from security, geopolitical and African organizational concerns while a section is devoted to empirical accounts of the interventions in Liberia and the Sudan. A concluding section ties up the issues together.

SECTION II

Nigeria's crisismanagement objectives in Africa are closely bound up with her founding role in the OAU, commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes as an axiom of foreign policy, fending off great power intervention in Africa and finally to her subregional power status.

As Professor Olajide Aluko pointed out in "Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy", Nigeria has been closely involved with almost every conflict-resolution effort between African States since the OAU was founded.

Take a sample from the early years. A Nigerian was appointed Chairman of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration which was set up by the OAU in 1965. Similarly, Nigeria played an active role in the adhoc Commission set up by the regional organization to mediate border conflict between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya as well as between Morocco and Algeria in the early 60's.⁵ Nigeria's early conflict management role within the OAU was given further impetus after the Nigerian civil war. As will be recalled, Nigeria's objective to prevent or substantially reduce the internationalization of the civil war was achieved because of the strong support offered her by the OAU. Nigeria was able to insist that the conflict was first and foremost an African mess to be sorted out by Africans. She then got the support of the OAU leaders for regarding the civil war as a "purely internal affair".

Nigeria emerged from the civil war as an enhanced power, a regional leader who could reasonably be relied upon to keep order around her.

Infact it could be argued that apart from her commitment to liberation and the anti-apartheid struggle, the dominant motif of Nigerian foreign policy in the 1970's and 1980's had to do with crisis and conflict management in Africa. When Nigeria could not be actively involved as the case of General Obasanjo mediation in the Ogaden conflict late in the 1970's she made financial contributions to help in the search for peace on the continent in Africa. She made both military and financial efforts to aid the search for peace as in Chad in 1979 and 1981. At another level, these efforts were buttressed by one of giving aid either through unilateral or multilateral auspices to needy African States.

As earlier explained, part of the objective of Nigeria's mediation in interstate conflicts, border clashes and domestic crisis with international potential is that of keeping out external intervention. For external intervention however benign takes away the initiative from African States and contains the potential to exarcerbate the conflict. Sometimes however as in Chad, Nigeria played a key role in putting together a multilateral intervention force under United States auspices in order to end the intermittent Chadian civil crisis.

In the next section, we examine in some detail the crisis management strategies devised by the Babangida administration to tackle the

crisis in Liberia and the Sudan in line with some of the theoretical and historical perspectives developed in this and the preceding section.

SECTION III

CRISIS MANAGEMENT:TWO CASE STUDIES

A. LIBERIA AND THE ECOMOG INITIATIVE

The roots of the Liberian civil war which broke out in December 1989 can be traced back to the harsh and oppressive rule of Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe who in 1980 overthrew the government of and killed President William Tubert. President Tubert, it is popularly agreed had headed a government in which a tiny but powerful America-Liberian elite controlled and cornered the dominant political and economic positions.⁶

Doe's regime based mainly on the dominance of the krahn ethnic group to which he belonged was marked increasingly by a personalist, messianic style, the brutal suppression of opponents and dissenting views and the use of naked force to quell opposition. Following his farcial election as president in 1988, Doe proceeded to buttress his hold on the levers of power, ferretting out and executing opponents, coup plotters and tragically, unarmed civilians whom he suspected of maintaining an oppositional posture.

The conscience of the International Community was repeatedly horrified by reports of the slaughter of unarmed civilians one of the most notorious of which was the brutal killing of over 600 refugees who reportedly had fled for refuge in a local church. Matters came to a head in Liberia with the coup attempt undertaken by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor late in December 1989.⁷

Spectacularly, Taylor's motley ensemble of civilians and poorly trained guerrillas proceeded to overrun major Liberian cities and began feeling their way into the seat of power in Liberia's capital.

Gradually, Monrovia came under direct military forays with the consequent threat posed to the diplomatic community in that city and

the lives of many West African nationals.

Early debates in Nigeria centered around the slowness with which Nigerians evacuated its nationals apparently in order to give the impression that things had fallen badly apart in that strife-torn country.

As Margaret Vogt pointed out in a recent article, what at first may have passed for restraint on Nigeria's side worked against her with the ensuing massacre of Nigerians, the sacking of the Nigerian embassy amidst a general deterioration in the crisis and the slide to anarchy.⁸

In June 1990, Nigeria began to take a more direct interest in the Liberian crisis with the president taking remedial relief measures with respect to Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone and generally outlining a doctrine of Nigerian responsibility with respect to preventing further escalation of the crisis.

By the time the 13th summit of the Heads of Government of ECOWAS States held in Banjul in July 1990, enough attention, acrimony and spill-over had been generated by the crisis to warrant full discussion and action by the community.

By this time for example, there were reports of armed and logistical support for Charles Taylor by Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso. At Banjul, the proposal made by Nigeria was accepted to set up a standing committee to mediate in the Liberian crisis and similar troubled spots in the future.⁹

The committee then proceeded to outline an immediate agenda consisting of ¹⁰:

- (1) stopping the warring factions
- (2) call for a ceasefire
- (3) seek to persuade Samuel Doe, who had already lost control of over 70% of the country and was holed in the presidential mansion, to step down; and
- (4) convene an all-party conference of Liberians to appoint an interim government which would then conduct elections for a truly national government to be formed.

This was the immediate antecedent of the ECOMOG which was at first a monitoring group to which Nigeria, Sierra Leone, the Gambia and Guinea contributed troops.

As a strategic analyst has pointed out,¹¹ the strategic role of ECOMOG was at first confined to the police and peace keeping ones of restoring order in Monrovia so that an effective interim administration could be put together as well as rescuing nationals of other countries trapped by the escalating fighting. The ECOMOG received the blessing of the United States which supported the programme for peace outlined by the group but did little beyond offering formal and token sympathy. At the emergence of the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) under Prince Yormie Johnson the ding-dong on the battle field led to the strengthening of ECOMOG under Nigerian auspices and its metamorphosis into what experts described as a "a striking force".

This however was not before the tragic assassination of Samuel Doe in September 1990 by forces controlled by Yormie Johnson. Following this event, Major-General Joshua Dogonyaro of Nigeria replaced Lt Gen. Arnold Quianou of Ghana as Commander of ECOMOG.

Clearly the Nigerian initiative in ECOMOG was strong and this drew criticisms from domestic analysts and some West African countries. These criticisms span the legality, propriety, timing and operative cost of the intervention as well as issues relating to whether Nigeria's commitment to the late Doe had prevented it from seeing some of the larger implication of the crisis.

These queries in turn prompted a battery of official statements defending Nigeria's role on geopolitical and security grounds as well as under Article 52 of the UN charter.

This latter reference to the UN charter's provision on regional security was formally upheld by the United Nations security Council in November 1992 in its Resolution 788.¹²

The 1992 ECOWAS summit in Dakar was also quite concerned with Charles Taylor's refusal to honour the Yamoussoukrou accord of 30th October, 1991, the Paris peace plan and other less

known efforts (all involving Nigeria) to hammer out a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict. It must be pointed out that Nigeria used its diplomatic influence at various multiateral fora to explain its role in Liberia, to elicit a joint

West African position (inspite of early differences) and to get the combatants to peaceful negotiation and resolution. In order to understand Nigeria's role, reference must be made to the fact that it was careful not to be seen as meddler or 'aggressor' in Liberian internal affairs. She therefore used the prestige of her status in Africa to try to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict. It could be argued that the successive beefing up of ECOMOG the most recent under Major General Olurin were usually in reaction or retaliation to provocations by Charles Taylor's NPFL.

As President Babangida once argued "infact, in a sub-region of 16 countries where one out of three West Africans is a Nigerian, it is imperative that any regime in this country should relentlessly strive towards the prevention or avoidance of any crisis which threatens to jeopardize or compromise the stability, prosperity and security of the sub-region...."¹³

Hence, Nigeria's crisis management initiatives in Liberia ("a unique model of peace-keeping") is seen here as built up with her own security objectives as well as commitment to West Africa integration and prosperity.

The success of Nigeria's diplomatic efforts in putting its role in Liberia on the agenda of global dialogue and approval can be gauged from the tone of Resolution 788 (1992) adopted by the United Nations Security Council at its 3138th meeting on 19 November 1992.¹⁴

The document regretted the failure of the combatants to abide by the Yamassoukrou IV accord of 30 October 1991 which "offers the best possible framework for a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict by creating the necessary conditions for free and fair elections in Liberia."¹⁵

It went on to applaud the "continued commitment of the ECOWAS to and the efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict."¹⁶

The statement can be regarded as an endorsement of Nigeria's activist role in crisis management under Babangida auspices and under the various peace initiatives which included the Committee of 5 meeting at Cotonou of 20 October 1992 and the Final Communiqué of the First Meeting of the Monitoring Committee of Nine issued at Abuja on 7 November 1992.

SECTION III

B. CRISIS MANAGEMENT-INITIATIVES IN THE SUDAN

Although the largest country in Africa, Sudan's population is in the neighbourhood of 25 million. It shares with Nigeria a similar colonial ancestry under the British and its major political problem is the atavistic division between its northern part with its Arab affinities and linkages and the southern section with a christian background and which looks more to its African origins and neighbours."¹⁷

As the delegation of the Nasir Faction of the SPLM/A to the June 1992 Abuja peace talks rightly noted in their opening statement, the Sudanese problem can be traced to British colonial administration which amalgamated North and Southern Sudan on the eve of their Independence in 1956 without thorough regard to the divergent events, conflicting way of life, orientation, historical antecedents and culture of the two sections."¹⁸

That was why even as Independence drew near, and even before the British departed, war erupted between the two parts of Sudan. This however was patched up hastily as el-Azhavi gave way to Abdallah Khalil as Prime Minister under a coalition government formed by the latter.

Sudan had an early taste of military government when on 17 November 1958 General Ibrahim Abboud overthrew the civilian coalition government and held power up till November 1964.

Under Abboud's government, the Southern question resurfaced

dramatically with the launching of a guerrilla movement in the South calling for secession and denigrating the Central government as an Arab-imposed administration. This led to a backlash in which Southern Christians especially missionaries were persecuted and quite a number took refuge in neighbouring countries. This was the situation of things when Colonel Gaafar el-Nimeri took over power in a radical coup d'état in May 1969.

What is remarkable about the early phase of Nimeri's role from the point of view of the National question was his liberalism towards the South which culminated in the famous Adis - Ababa peace talks of 1972 which formally ended another round of civil war. Within the framework of the talks, the south was granted regional autonomy with a Regional People's Assembly, which commenced sitting in 1973.

This agreement however proved to be a short-lived experience for papering over the cracks in Sudanese nationhood as it was later to be spurned by the Central government in the 1980's.¹⁹

Renewed civil war broke out again in the South in the early 1980's following President Nimeri's suspension of the 1972 Regional self-Government Act and the further division of the South into three smaller regions. Disturbances mounted in the south with the resultant unleashing of the military to quell unrest.

Matters were not helped with the introduction of Sharia Law in 1983 a move which the South saw as an attempt to "Islamize" the country. It was under this atmosphere that the SPLA (Sudanese People's Liberation Army) was constituted following the breakaway of 2 battalions from the Sudanese Army. Colonel Joseph Garang became the leader of the SPLA, a revolutionary movement committed to Sudanese transformation which soon grew to control most of the southern region.

The worsening economy and generalized unrest led to the fall of Nimeri in August 1985 and a short-lived return to some form of constitutional rule in August 1986 after 17 years of military governance.

The civil war however continued and fighting prevented elections from being held in some southern districts. Between 1986 and 1988, the Southern war raged on complicated by the outbreak of famine on a large scale in the South as well as the international and domestic politics of relief and succour. The emergence of a more fundamentalist Central government under Al-Bashir following a succession of inept military cliques made agreement or truce with the south difficult. Most of the mediation efforts including one brokered by ex-president Jimmy Carter of the USA came to nought.

Colonel John Garang now outlined a peace agenda consisting of four points.²⁰

(1)The formation of a broad-based government to include all the non-sectarian political parties and trade unions and the release of all political detainees not accused of corruption.

(2)The formation of a new army; the army of the new Sudan would include the SPLA and the Sudanese army and which would be qualitatively different from the army of the old Sudan.

(3)The convening of a national constitutional conference to resolve the fundamental problems of the country and to draft a permanent constitution for the new Sudan.

(4)Elections to an assembly that would ratify the draft constitution.

Fighting and political pressure continued until the Sharia was abolished in January 1991 with respect to the South. This in itself however did not put an end to the conflict.

NIGERIAN MEDIATION STRATEGIES

As General Ike Nwachukwu (rtd) pointed out in his address at the 1992 Abuja mediation conference, there are strong resemblances

between Nigerian and Sudanese history. The fact of Nigeria having fought a civil war over the issue of nationalities makes it easier for her to relate to and appreciate Sudanese turbulent search for integration or cohabitation.²¹

Nigeria's federal constitution also provides an experiment in political engineering that could have wide application in other parts of Africa. The mid-year 1992 peace conference organized by Nigeria at Abuja to reconcile the disputants in the Sudanese conflict had its origins in 1990. That year, President Ibrahim Babangida appointed a Special Envoy, Ambassador Olu Sanu to explore the possibilities and prospects of bringing the two sides to a roundtable to negotiate their differences.²²

The Nigerian government gave the envoy good back-up by offering to the Sudan the possibility of using Nigeria's Federalism as a model of resolving ethnic hostilities. For example, when Brigadier Pio Onkwang Deng came to Nigeria in 1990 to see President Babangida, the latter suggested a federal solution to Sudan's vexed nationalities and regional problems.

Nigeria's mediating efforts were to receive further fillip when General Ibrahim Babangida became the chairman of the OAU in June 1991. It was then possible to use the conflict - resolution capacities of the continental organization to facilitate the return of peace to Sudan. The Abuja peace talks of 1992 was the upshot of these developments. Dr Tunji Olagunju, then minister of Internal Affairs was appointed by the president as chairman of the peace talks.

In his address to the major factions, Dr Olagunju called on the disputants to be willing to negotiate meaningfully and be flexible in the positions they already adopted.²³

Although some observers are of the view that the mid-year peace talks did not achieve more than providing a forum to air and discuss differences, it is clear that it was a good first step towards resolution. At the time of writing, preparations are in high gear for the second round of the negotiations under Nigerian auspices.

Sudanese military president, Mr Omar Hassan Al-Bashir has called on the Southern factions to come to the second round of the conference in order to allow for "a comprehensive and lasting" solution to be found to the conflict.²⁴

In the Sudanese instance, the major parties respect Nigeria and pay glowing tribute to the statesmanship of her leaders. The issue now is to make the most of Nigeria's prestige as a factor of mediation and conflict-resolution.

CONCLUSION

Nigeria's crisis management initiatives span the African continent. Mediatorial efforts have been launched around the continent and in various inter-state conflicts in West Africa.

The two cases examined here point to:-

- (a) Nigeria's readiness to use its influence in Africa to resolve African conflicts
- (b) a desire to take charge and limit or contain foreign intervention in Africa
- (c) the intractability of crisis situations which make it difficult to reach answers quickly
- (d) the mobilization of international goodwill to support Nigeria's mediatorial and conflict management initiatives
- (e) President Babangida's contribution to the search for peace in Africa through the deployment of Nigeria's influence in crisis management and conflict - resolution efforts.

ENDNOTES

1. Boutros Boutros - Ghali, *An Agenda For Peace* (New York; United Nations, 1992.)
2. *Ibid*; p .11
3. *Ibid*; p .11
4. *Ibid*; p .11
5. Olajide Aluko, *Essays On Nigerian Foreign Policy* (London; George Allen and Unwin Ltd; 1981).
6. Much of the discussion in this section is based on the enlightening articles by Margaret A. Vogt, Nigeria's Participation in the ECOWAS Monitoring Group - ECOMOG, *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs* Vol. 17, No 1991, P. 101-121 and Olusola Akinrinde, From Hostility to Accommodation; Nigeria's West African Policy, 1984-90 *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*. Vol. 18, No 1, 1992, P. 47 - 77.
7. Vogt, *Opcit*, P. 104
8. *Ibid*, P. 105
9. *Ibid*, P. 105
10. As Quoted Verbatim in *Ibid*; P. 106
11. *Ibid*; P. 106. See also Akinrinade *Opcit*; P. 63 - 66
12. United Nations Security Council Resolution 788 (1992) S/Res/788, P.1 1992.
13. Cited in Tunji Olagunju & Sam Oyovbaire, *For Their Tomorrow, We Gave Our Today*; selected speeches of IBB. (Ibadan; Spectrum Publishers Ltd; 1991) P. 272.

14. Resolution 788 **Opcit**, P 1 - 3

15. **Ibid**; p.1

16. **Ibid**; p.1

17. A good deal of the historical background is based on the account in **Africa Today** (London; Africa Books Ltd; 1991) PP. 1776.

18. Opening statement of the Delegation of the Nasir faction of the SPLM/A to the Abuja Peace Talks, P.1-2. (DEAP/PN)

19. **Ibid**; P.2

20. **Africa Today Opcit**; P. 1775 (Quoted Verbatim)

21. Opening Address By The Honourable Minister of Foreign Affairs, Major General I.O.S. Nwachukwu at the Peace Conference between Representatives of The Government of The Democratic Republic of Sudan and Representatives of The Sudan People's Liberation Army/Sudan People's Liberation Movement SPLA/SPLM, P.5

22. **Ibid**; P.1

23. **Daily Times**, 17 December 1992.

24. **Daily Times** 27 November, 1992.

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