₦4.00

Management IN NIGERIA

ISSN 0025 - 178X

NOVEMBER/DECEMBER, 1987

NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT
(for progress and prosperity)

Serial

LABOUR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND NIGERIA'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY

The problems of policy making in Nigeria

The role of small scale enterprises in the economic development of Nigeria

Executive at work-Focus on stress



SUPER BLUE

OMO

Washes brighter ... and it shows.

Super Clean! Super Bright! For that extra clean and bright wash all you need is Super Blue Omo. A handful of Super Blue Omo goes a long, long way! That is because Super Blue Omo has more concentrated power than any other blue detergent. Use Super Blue Omo for the whole family wash. It makes everything not just cleaner but also brighter.
You can actually see the difference.

Medium: ₦2.00

NNSL

Working in a new era of better services



To NIGERIAN NATIONAL SHIPPING LINE – NNSL – the national shipping policy formulated to boost Nigeria's shipping industry means serious business. And we are responding to this challenge. We've evolved new management team and techniques to achieve maximum efficiency. Our shipping procedures have been streamlined to expedite cargo handling.

The shipping routes are expanded and properly scheduled to cover the trade centres of the world. Checks and controls are enforced in all areas of operation to eliminate irregularities. Also our workforce – re-organised and disciplined – is always at work to ensure prompt and safe cargo despatch and delivery, giving exporters and importers the best value for their money.

And apart from being the largest liner and operator in Black Africa, NNSL is a member of various shipping conferences. To gain greater share of the international trade, we've entered into a joint venture with UKWAL, a group of eight shipping lines. And we'll continue to expand our scope of operations. Truly NNSL is in a new era of better service – fast, efficient and dependable.

Patronise Your National Liner

Nigerian National Shipping Line

HEAD OFFICE: Development House: 21, Wharf Road, P.O. Box 326, Apapa, Lagos, Nigeria.
Tel: 877262, 877121. Telex: 21253

–A force to reckon with in liner shipping world-wide

Sunbeam

MANAGEMENT in Nigeria

Journal of

NIM

Vol. 23, Nos 11 & 12
NOV./DEC. 1987

MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIA is published bi-monthly by the Nigerian Institute of Management, Plot 22, Professional Centre Layout, Idowu Taylor Street, Victoria Island, P.O. Box 2557, Lagos. (Cables and Telegrams NIMROD LAGOS) and printed by Sera Printing Ltd. P.O. Box 678, Apapa, Lagos. Copies of the journal are available to all members of the Institute and obtainable by members of the public through subscriptions.

LABOUR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND NIGERIA'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY

Conventionally, the belief has been that labour management relations is built on conflictual relationship between labour and capital... but flexibility and adaptability are the essential requirements for dealing with industrial crisis... (page 7).

PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC POLICY MAKING IN NIGERIA

The civil service is regarded as an instrument purely for implementing the policies and programmes of the government. Yet, whenever a serious error occurs, the tendency is to blame the civil service. The truth, however, is that a great many of those who blame the civil service for mis-advising the government, may not know that the civil service is not consulted before many crucial decisions are made, and that civil service advice, when sought is sometimes ignored... (page 21).

THE ROLE OF SMALL SCALE ENTERPRISES IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA

The effectiveness of finance for the SME's sector is likely to come to a naught unless its present scope is limited to enterprises of high priority to our present and future needs with potentials...(page 30).

EXECUTIVE AT WORK *(focus on stress)* (...page 44).

Others	page
Editorial	6
Membership News	14
Unclaimed Membership Certificates	15
NIM Courses	25
News from branches	28
Book Seller	32
NIM launches Management Book,	33
News from member organisations	40

EDITORIAL

LOOKING TO 1988 AND BEYOND FOR SURVIVAL


Dele Osundahunsi

AS the year 1987 is gradually rolling to a close, and there is nothing we can do to stop its motion, perhaps the best we can do is to take stock of our activities during the period and end by wishing ourselves the usual compliments of the season. *Management In Nigeria* will offer more than that. It will give the individual and corporate members as well as its readers world-wide, the hints for relative survival in 1988 and beyond.

In July, we celebrated the first anniversary of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP). In the same year, the programme for a return to civilian rule was announced, and the elections into the local government councils have been conducted on the 12th of December.

The National Primary Health Scheme and the MAMSER have been launched as the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructures (DFRRI), continues to make inroads into the rural areas. The National Directorate of Employment (NDE), through the banks continues to encourage young un-employed Nigerians to plunge into self-employment. Some government organisations are to be privatised and others are to be commercialised.

In these areas, Nigeria has taken "giant strides" towards laying rocky foundations for the so-called egalitarian society. Interest rates have been deregulated up to a minimum of 15%; and this has raised lending rates to between 15% and 21%. The basic necesssities of life, (food, shelter and clothing) are virtually shooting out of the range of the ordinary Nigerian. When the envisaged removal on oil subsidy tops these, a chain of spiral inflation will ensue which definitely will not be commensurate with whatever pay increase is promised the worker in the year ahead.

Government policies have drawn a lot of sacrifices from all Nigerians and all sectors. At the industrial and commercial levels, there are back logs of un-sold stock in the warehouses because prices of goods are unaffordable causing a slump in the market. At the individual level, it is a routine tale of "have-not" not even "not-enough". All my colleagues I spoke to in the festive mood of December, are not looking forward to a happy time, because, they are saddened by the possible effects of part removal of oil subsidy. They have therefore, embarked on cost-reduction activities by pruning their bulbs and replacing 60 watts bulbs with 40 watts to reduce electricity bill. But isn't there an earth surface level beyond which the apple can not fall even with the physical laws of force, pull and gravitation?

Perhaps, Government needs to re-appraise its stand, policies and role in the entire polity. Consequently, Government may need to review the guidelines and the management of SAP if SAP is to fulfil the objectives of a constructive antidote. Will the removal on oil subsidy not set in motion spiral inflation within the economy as the commercialisation of the Nigeria Airways has resulted in the low patronage of air services leading to retrenchment and withdrawal of some planes from the fleet? Has this in turn not hampered business activities within the economy? *Management In Nigeria* will like to join other eminent Nigerians to clamour for a review of SAP.

We also want to advise our readers (corporate and individual) to look at cost reduction methods which will enhance productivity, motivate all parties in a business concern as well as improve overall performance of the economy which are the aims of the architects of SAP. In order to assist our readers in this regard, our lead article for 1988 January/February issue will be the Young Managers' Competition award-winning paper titled "Cost Reduction, Productivity and Performance Improvements: Methods and Prospects".

Finally, on behalf of the Council and Management of NIM —our publishers and financiers— MIN wishes all corporate and individual members of NIM, our friendly foreign missions and their agencies, (USIS, USSR, Canadian High Commission, and the British Council), our trainee clients, our reviewers, writers and subscribers, all managers and would-be ones, a merry Christmas and a happy 1988. We hope we have managed to satisfy some of your yearnings and aspirations in 1987. If not, please complain loud and clear. We are here to serve your interest.

—Dele Osundahunsi

LABOUR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND NIGERIA'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY

—by Tayo Fashoyin

Introduction

TWO remarkable developments that took place in our industrial relations system within the past 10 years are noteworthy. First, the labour movement whose structure was so chaotic and inimical to an effective industrial relations practice was reorganized along industrial structure, from which emerged a few but generally large unions capable of maximizing the benefits of the collective bargaining process. Employers who were previously indifferent to combinations suddenly became interested, their reaction being a logical and pragmatic response to the emergence of big unions.

The consequence of this development is equally significant for labour-management relations. In nearly all the industries in which employers' associations have emerged multi-employer or industry-wide bargaining structure, (i.e. bargaining relationships involving several employers on the one hand, and one (sometimes more) union on the other), was introduced. This meant a substantial centralization of major labour relations issues, such as wages and salaries, and other conditions of employment. Correspondingly, there was a dramatic decline both in the scope and importance of enterprise or company bargaining.[1]

The second development is, in many respects, a reversal of some of the outcomes of the restructure. Towards the end of the 1970s but more noticeably at the beginning of this decade, serious decline in the economic fortunes of this country became noticeable. A systematic fall in oil revenue, our principal source of income, led to a chain of other problems of monetary and fiscal crises. The accompanying fall in industrial production and output led to a rapid decline in employment opportunities and a corresponding increase in the rate of unemployment. In the context of labour-management relations, this development produced a number of opposite effects of the first development; i.e. a marked decline in union membership and fiscal resources, unemployment and, equally significant, a move towards a centrifugal relationship in which the emphasis of labour relations became focussed on the enterprise.

This paper is therefore, concerned with this latter development. Let us begin with a brief remark on the nature of labour and management relations. Next we will examine the impact of recent economic policies on labour-management relations and then the consequences for wage determination and compensation management. Finally, we will examine the challenges facing labour-management relations in our present situation.

Labour Relations: the Past and Present

Conventionally, the belief has been that labour-management relations is built on the adversarial concept, based on the conflictual relationship between labour and capital. This view arose from opposing views on the purpose of trade unionism. The union is, on one hand, seen as a cost-raising institution; primarily, because it imposes avoidable labour costs on employers. These costs constitute, ironically, what labour regards as gains towards the improvement of the living standard of the workforce, even though such costs are also a reduction in the employer's profit. In other words, what amounts to a cost to one party, in this case the management is, in fact, a gain to the other, that is, labour.

Therefore, the labour-management relationship is built on conflict which has become institutionalized in the sense that conflict forms part and parcel of labour relations in the workplace. As a cost-raising institution, the union is worth its name only if it studiously fought for the improvement in conditions of work of its members. The resolve of management to minimize the often 'excessive demands' of unions invariably leads to conflict, with adverse consequences on labour-management relations and industrial harmony. However, this construct of the relationship between labour and management is rapidly changing. Let us examine the sources of this development in our own context.

As earlier noted, unfavourable economic conditions arising primarily from the decline in the oil sector and accompanied by mismanagement of the country's limited resources, led to a chain of other problems among which has been unprecedented fall in industrial output during the past 5 years. The result has been catastrophic for industrial relations. Not only has the rate of unemployment risen to conservative proportion of 11 per cent, the structure of unemployment has changed as a result of mass retrenchment and redundancies in companies that had been forced to reduce capacity utilization by rates ranging between 20 and 30 per cent. In other words, employers have been forced to dispense with competent and experienced employees in whom they had invested considerable resources.

Reductions in workforce have during the past 5 years, constituted a major challenge for personnel managers. They are required to evolve strategies that will reduce the workforce to the desired level. Naturally, personnel managers try to develop strategies that will minimize the trauma and psychological impact of retrenchment on employees, but this is generally a difficult task, and more often than not, the role of the personnel manager is often misunderstood by employees who generally see him as the messenger of doom.

The unions have also had their own share of the economic problem. As a result of retrenchments, unions have suffered a substantial decline in their membership which in turn, has adversely affected their resources and ability to pursue industrial relations with vigour and determination. Furthermore, in conditions of hyper-inflation, trade union members, like other members of society, have had to contend with reductions in their standard of living.

Attempts to deal with these problems have gradually shifted the emphasis of industrial relations to the workplace. This is primarily because flexibility and adaptability are the essential requirements for dealing with industrial crisis. Furthermore, despite the general nature of the crisis, it has varying and differential impacts on employers. Consequently, individual company efforts especially in the management of human resources, tend to produce quicker and more beneficial results than the multi-employer approach.

Expectedly, the economic decline has put the unions on the defensive. They are facing a major challenge for various reasons. These include the changing composition of the workforce, the substantial decline in the number of unionized employees, the increased role of the branch unions vis-a-vis the industrial (national) union. In addition, the continuously increasing concern for the quality of working life through better working conditions and working environment which are undoubtedly the logical response to restrictive government policies on compensation, have contributed to a growing decentralization of industrial relations and collective bargaining at company and plant levels in order to deal with labour problems at their actual place of occurrence.

Economic Performance and Labour Relations

I propose to deal with this issue from two standpoints. First, I shall examine how the economic downturn has influenced labour relations practice and second, I shall examine the impact of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and, the SFEM/FEM, on industrial relations.

Given the focus of industrial relations on enterprise labour-management relations, there has developed during the past few years, a tendency to redefine the issues of collective bargaining beyond the customary issues of bread and butter to include non-industrial relations issues. These days, many labour and management discussions and negotiations have focussed on such issues as company's viability with specific emphasis on the problem of raw material procurement and human resource utilization.

During the era of import licences, for example, both unions and management in such industries as textiles and food beverages took concerted effort to persuade government to provide import licenses required for the importation of vital raw materials and machinery in order to sustain industrial production. In other words, both sides of industry have become convinced that corporate survival is essential for individual or institutional survival.[2] With the introduction of the Second Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM) and the merger of the First and Second Tiers brings into being the Foreign Exchange Market (FEM), companies no longer depend on import licenses for their materials. Even then, this situation has hardly diminished the resolve of labour and management to jointly find solutions to the economic problems facing industry.

Furthermore, both sides have re-ordered their priorities with a noticeable shift from 'improvement' to 'sustainance' issues. That is to say that the concern of labour and management is shifting from an emphasis on more economic benefits (wages salaries) to job security, flexible manpower utilization and to some extent, an unconscious move towards workers' participation. During the period 1983—86, employees in many establishments in both the public and private sectors had their benefits reduced while in some cases, particularly in the public sector, benefits were either frozen or cancelled.[3] Even in this period of relaxed policy on benefits under the 1987 income guidelines, I am aware that many establishments, particularly in the public sector, have either maintained the status quo, i.e. maintained the freeze, or they have given an undertaken to restore benefits when their finances improve. For example, the Ogun State Government recently gave a warning that it could not implement the new income guidelines on fringe benefits without adverse consequences on employment.[4]

In our view, the economic problem has created a dilemma in management-labour relations. In many situations, the parties, but mainly the unions, are being asked to make a choice between two undesirable alternatives either to accept reduced compensation in lieu of retrenchment or maintain existing levels of compensation with substantially reduced workforce. As some observers have noted, a choice between these two alternatives is not only a difficult one for unions to make, it makes the latter unappealing to workers.[5] This is primarily because the threat of unemployment always causes a chilling effect on union militancy while unfavourable economic conditions often reduce their bargaining power Given, therefore, the spate of retrenchment, many union leaders now spend a substantial amount of time and effort in persuading employers to maintain existing workforce. In such circumstances, the primary concern of the union leaders is neither the increment in the size of the workforce, i.e. employment of those outside the internal labour market nor the demand for higher wages and/or benefits As an illustration, the Government of Ogun State, as previously noted, blatantly told the unions in April 1987 to choose between promotion and job security because, as it was put, "the difference and choice is clear".[6]

The idea of a choice between two alternatives or more appropriately a *trade-off* is a phenomenon commonly referred to as *concession bargaining*.[7] Typically, the union and its members are made to agree to either a low wage increase, maintain or even a cut in existing levels, and/or readjust other working conditions and work rules in exchange for other employment terms, notably job security and pension rights. Concession bargaining is, therefore, a manifestation of changes in the economic circumstances of the employer on the one hand, and the employment status of workers, on the other.

Approaches to concession bargaining differ depending on the circumstances of the parties.[8] In the textile industry, for example, approaches range from outright cut in the levels of compensation to substantial changes in work rules. In the Kaduna Textile which experienced serious industrial crisis as a result of economic downturn in 1982 — 85, several agreements were signed during this period in order to save jobs. Thus, following a major strike and riot in January 1984, an agreement was reached between the management and labour to reduce salaries by 25 per cent until conditions of the company improved. Some allowances were actually cancelled while certain benefits were frozen on the same principle
Similarly in the food, beverage and tobacco, as well as .electrical appliances and the health care delivery sectors, employers and trade unions agreed on plans which, in the final analysis, reduced compensation in order to save jobs

On the other hand, some agreements simply asked for changes in existing work rules, without resort to tampering with compensation. For example, in the United Textiles, changes in disciplinary rules and procedures gave management a free hand in the enforcement of discipline over bad work behaviour; lateness, indolence and so forth. This agreement helped to shed off unwanted workforce. The importance of this approach is its avoidance of the unpopular and dispute-prone retrenchment plans. I am aware that many organizations have handled their labour relations in this manner. Ironically, however, there is no convincing evidence that the option of reduced compensation in lieu of job security has actually kept workers on the payroll. Our research has shown that it has merely postponed retrenchment and lay-off while it weakens union solidarity and leadership authority. Take, for example, the case of the Textile Union whose membership declined from over 200,000 in 1979 to about 80,000 in 1984, in spite of the series of concession agreements that were signed during 1983 and 1985. As findings have shown, therefore, concessions of various types have not really saved jobs. All indications point to their temporary nature: as the recession bites harder, companies that have opted for reduced compensation unavoidably resort to retrenchment and lay-offs.

A noteworthy example is Cadbury which during 1983—85 combined a series of measures in the management of its human resources to avoid retrenchment. During this period, the company used work relocation schemes, compulsory leave, suspension of overtime and weekend jobs, and flexibility in management enforcement of work rules, all in a desire to save jobs. The effort of this company did pay off. Throughout the 1983—85 period, it maintained, exept for normal adjustments, its employment level. But in 1986, the company resorted to retrenchment! Here is one company that, in my view, has taken serious steps to avoid retrenchment, but had to employ the measure when it proved unavoidable.

Finally, in the public sector, an entirely different picture exists. To start with, let us examine briefly, one major case of 'concession bargaining'. In March 1985, the Governor of Imo State, Major-General Nwachukwu introduced the controversial "Imo Formula". The formula sought to ensure that public sector employees got their salaries as at when due, a major policy objective considering the spread of non-payment of salaries among public sector employers, particularly in the civil services and, educational and teaching sectors. Also, the Imo Formula sought to rationalize public funds while maintaining full employment. To achieve these objectives, the formula stipulated that in any given month, the State will distribute its allocation for salaries among *all* its employees and, depending on the size of the State's revenue in a particular month, the amount paid to each employee will vary. The amount, therefore, could be 50 per cent or more of an employee's salary for that month.[9] But, as we are all aware, this formula did not protect jobs as was envisaged.

For the generality of the public sector, my findings suggest that the term 'concession bargaining' is indeed a misnomer because in cases of compensation or workforce reduction, no bargaining actually took place. Neither Governor Nwachukwu nor other public sector employers ever negotiated the cut in benefits. At best, unions were informed of (employers') Governments' intentions to reduce compensation. Besides, practically, in all public sector employment situations, compensations were not with regard to the protection of jobs but primarily to reduce wage bills.

To illustrate this development, a comprehensive review was announced by the Buhari-Idiagbon administration in November 1984. This review resulted in the reduction, a freeze or cancellation of benefits and allowances paid to employees. Reduced benefits included leave and transport allowances, and medical facilities. Among the benefits that were frozen were overseas tour for families, disturbance allowance and non-accident bonus, while incidental expenses, warm clothing allowances and subsidized lunch were all cancelled. As it is true of other public sector employers, the main objective of the cuts in benefits at the federal level was to reduce the wage bill due to declining revenue, it was not done to save jobs. Indeed, in the public sector generally, there has been no conscious or deliberate effort to save jobs.

while it is true that a good number of the benefits have been restored under the 1987 income guidelines, it is equally true that in many establishments in both the states and federal administrations, these benefits are yet to be restored while cases of workforce reduction are still common.

To forestall any misunderstanding of our argument that cuts in compensation, particularly in the private sector, have not abated the incidences of retrenchment, I must add that realistic efforts are generally made either to prevent retrenchment or where these became inevitable, to ensure that redundant employees are adequately compensated. Thus, in many industries such as automobile, textiles, shop and distributive, metallic and non-metallic, employers resorted to various forms of arrangements to reduce hours of work or the work-week. After the Peugeot Automobile of Nigeria (PAN) reduced its workforce by nearly 50 per cent in November 1986, the work-week was reduced to 3 days for some categories of workers, while another category was put on compulsory leave.[9] Although there was a corresponding reduction in the size of the wages or salaries of the affected employees to reflect the number of hours worked, the determination to keep workers on the payroll constitutes a major policy which seeks to limit the spread and scope of retrenchment.

Other establishments that operated the shift system either reduced the number of shifts from say three to two, or have totally abolished the system. Yet in some other establishments, while shifts were retained, working hours were reduced by half or less. The main objective of these various approaches was to evolve some form of work-sharing among the workforce and thereby save jobs.

Where redundancies became inevitable in the private sector, redundancy and gratuity payments, and in a few cases pension payments, were negotiated between labour and management. In the public sector, there is a well-defined gratuity and pension policy, the main distinction between the public and private sectors is the speed at which redundant employees get paid off. For, in the private sector, all redundant employees are paid, usually immediately redundancies are declared. For example, in the case of the PAN mentioned above, the same medium through which employees were made redundant was used to inform them of where and when to collect their entitlements. In the public sector, on the other hand, it is known that redundant employees spend weeks and months (sometimes up to a year) before they get their entitlements. In a few sad cases, some employees have died before their entitlements were paid.

These shortcomings in the management of redundancy in the public sector is partly a reflection of the bureaucratic nature of the public sector and partly, a consequence of the insolvency of the public sector employers.

I now turn to the second issue which is the impact of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) on labour-management relations. In this respect, attention is focussed primarily on the effect of the Second-tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM). The antecedent situation leading to the introduction of SFEM has been treated in an earlier issue of this journal.[10]

Briefly put, the SAP emphasizes the *price mechanism* as a means of strengthening the existing demand management policies while it seeks to restructure and diversify the production base on the oil sector. The SFEM which is one of the main instruments towards a more realistic exchange rate of the naira is an aspect of the financial market for the buying and selling of foreign exchange at *market-determined* rates. In other words, the SFEM is guided by the free market forces of supply and demand.

Although the effects of SFEM on industrial relations are numerous, we shall confine our remarks to the labour management relationship. The main area in which SFEM affects labour relations is through the collective bargaining process

Collective bargaining is the main machinery through which employers and unions (representing workers and employees) adjust employment conditions. In a capitalist economy such as ours, collective bargaining is so important because it is based on the conflictual interest of labour and capital. When the labour movement was restructured in 1978, practically all the unions that emerged pursued the collective bargaining objective with vigour while much of the size and scope of salaries and benefits that we enjoy today are a result of the various negotiations that took place between 1979 and 1982. However, these negotiations took place between labour and management within the framework of the incomes policy programme which was introduced in 1976, following the unfavourable impact of certain economic and social policies of the post civil war period which aggravated inflation.[11] Thus, negotiations on wages, salaries and benefits were permitted within limits imposed under incomes policy guidelines. At the time, the salary of the lowest income earner in the public sector rose by 108.3 per cent while that of the highest income earner rose by 8.8 per cent during the 1975—1982 period.

Between 1983 and 1986 however, a freeze on wages and salaries was imposed. This freeze since 1983 is the only consistent feature of incomes policy guidelines. Ironically, the rate of inflation (which I admit we do not know because official published statistics are not reliable), has undoubtedly risen higher during the freeze period than as at 1976. As we all know, this freeze has only been partially relaxed this year, to allow employers and labour to negotiate on upward increase in benefits.

The objective of incomes policy, in so far as wage and salary controls is concerned, is now questionable. In theory, an incomes policy or wage restraint programme seeks to control the pressure of wage and salary incomes on the price level by reducing the disposable income of workers. However, the concrete evidence on the effect of wages and salaries on inflation is that the former has an inflationary bias, but it is important to stress that the Nigerian inflation ought to be adduced to other factors, such as the disequilibrium between demand and supply of goods, structural limitations in the economy, especially infrastructural inadequacies which restrict the productive capacity of companies, and the equally unsatisfactory method of wage determination.

The argument, therefore, is that the relevance of the wage control policy is now, more than before, very tenuous, partly because the policy has lost its direction and partly because the circumstance of the economy now dictates a relaxation of control measures. I shall explain the latter further. Given that the spirit of the Structural Adjustment Programme is to stress the free market mechanism of supply and demand, continued enforcement of strict controls on wages and salaries is contradictory to the principal objective of both the SAP and SFEM. In other words, since our economy is being deregulated, controls on wages and salaries should be similarly relaxed.

Admittedly, it is unwise to return to an unrestrained collective bargaining as neither party will be better off for it. It is entirely possible and feasible for labour and management to be able to exercise some amount of freedom on the adjustment of wages, salaries and benefits. Where this is done, Government might, through the Productivity, Prices and Incomes Board, insist on vetting agreements before they are implemented as the PPIB currently does.

Wage Determination and Compensation in the Public Sector

One issue of enduring debate, concerns the relevance of, in the context of our present economic situation, the unified salary system which was introduced in the public sector in 1974, following Government's acceptance of the Udoji Commission Report. Under the unified salary system, the wage/salary structure for *all* employers in the public sector, i.e. the civil services of the federal and state governments and most parastatals is the same, as given in grade levels 1 to 17. This system came under the attack of some state governments during the brief civilian administration of 1979—83, and has recently been an issue of public debate following Governor Akhigbe's (Lagos State) expressed concern about its current relevance.

The unified structure was introduced by the Gowon (military) administration which, like all military governments, including the present Babangida administration, operated a fairly uniform development strategy. In such a system, state governments' development policies and programmes are, for the most part, a microcosm of the federal government's programme. Furthermore, in a military era, greater emphasis is placed on centralized social policies and objectives. Consider, for example, the Babangida's policy on rural development which is embraced by all state governments without question. In short, there is hardly any room for marked divergences as to the priority or emphasis of development policies in a military administration.

Two forces have undermined this development strategy. First, the return to civilian administration and the presidential system of government gave considerable leverage to individual states in the formulation and execution of development programmes along the lines dictated by each government's ideological commitment, political leaning, resources and what a particular state government saw as politically feasible or important at a particular point in time. Second, though additionally, even in the military era of today, there are wide and noticeable differences in the financial fortunes of the states, as given primarily by the level of industrialization which largely determines the tax base from which state governments get both direct and indirect tax revenues. Besides, the labour markets facing state governments are differentiated and varied, particularly in the case of new states like Ondo, and local governments which are only just developing their urban centres.

The point of contention is that state governments, being employers of labour, should be free to determine (preferably negotiate) the wages which they pay to their employees, just as private sector employers, such as the UAC, does with its employees. Thus, given the explanation on the varying sources of revenue available to states, is it economically feasible and defensible for a state like Ondo, to pay its employees the same salary grade levels as would Lagos State or the Federal Government?

If the answer to this purely economic question is 'No', then by what criteria shall states determine their compensation packages? I am myself convinced that neither of these questions addresses the issue. For, if states were to pay different salaries to permanent secretaries, for example, it will undoubtedly pose other labour market problems. A young man in Ondo State who seeks a career in the civil service and aspires to become a permanent secretary will probably not stay where a permanent secretary's salary is not comparable with his counterpart in say, Lagos State. Additionally, a state government whose wage structure is not competitive or comparable with those of other employers will not be able to attract and retain good, efficient and experienced employees, precisely for the same reason.

The solution to the problem is, therefore, not merely scrapping the unified salary system. *A more effective and realistic approach is to introduce flexibility in the wage determination process such as to allow states to vary their compensation packages in a manner that reflects their peculiar circumstances.* Note that I have here used the term 'compensation' as an all-embracing concept than the 'wage structure'. Under a flexible compensation package, a state may decide, for example, to pay its permanent secretaries, a rate that is clearly below what another state pays, but compensate for the difference in other aspects of the total compensation package. The range of items in such a compensation package is necessarily wide but the elements or items must be good enough to motivate employees to higher productivity. On balance, the typical employee will evaluate the total compensation rather than concentrate on the single, though important wage/salary element.

The Challenge of Management-Labour Relations

In the foregoing, we have outlinec some of the effects of our current economic situation on the labour-management relationship. These effects are, in many respects, challenges to both sides of industry. As a result of the serious economic difficulties facing our country, the need has now arisen for management, unions and their members to move away from their adversarial roles towards co-operation, collaboration and commitment in order to be able to solve the survival problems of industry. This re-orientation has become imperative because the Structural Adjustment Programme has fundamental implications for labour-management relations. It requires, among others, greater commitment of labour and management to improve productivity and innovation, and to show greater flexibility in the management of human resources.

The challenge posed by a competitive free market system requires that labour and management must direct their collective energies towards the creation of an environment that makes possible the manufacture of products that are desirable by consumers. This will, in turn, enhance organizational and individual goals. This means that our rapidly changing economic system demands that to survive, both sides of industry must continually improve performance, or else companies will find themselves unable to meet the challenges of the new economic system and the tastes of consumers which are probably changing. Obviously, the survival or organizations that are unable to adapt to the changing economic climate is precarious. Indeed, one of the salient aims of the SAP is to reward efficient firms and punish the inefficient ones!

By improved productivity and performance, I do not necessary mean that people must work harder. What is required is that improvement must come from finding better ways to perform job functions. This can be achieved by means of team-work for common-goal, that is, the survival of the organization in which labour and management are stakeholders.

The emerging climate of labour relations, therefore, calls for labour-management co-operation at the enterprise and plant levels. The emphasis on enterprise level co-operation is a desirable objective, as it generally increases the effectiveness of the organization. Where this relationship is evolved, changes can be easily made in work methods and procedures; employees tend to be highly motivated and the workplace becomes a more desirable place to work, thus increasing the organization's retention of good employees, while the latter's ideas may yield improved products and/or output.

In this respect, it seems highly desirable that joint committees and consultative bodies that exist in many organizations should be revived and enhanced to take on the challenge of current economic realities within the framework of workplace industrial relations. Such committees are more effective at the plant level and they should involve those that take part in day-to-day productive processes. The objectives of joint committees should be to increase the productivity of a company's resources and enhance the organization's competitiveness in the labour and product markets, improve the image of labour and management relations, promote labour-management co-operation and communication, enhance labour stability and job opportunities, as well as promote the quality of work life.

It should be made explicit that joint committees are not necessarily a replacement of collective bargaining; rather, it is a supplement to the process. I admit that the evolution of employer-employee committees may raise anxieties among trade union officials; such concern is entirely unnecessary, though union leaders must adapt and develop ways in which unions can play meaningful roles in the context of labour-management relations and co-operation. Industrial union leaders must provide supportive services to their members at the enterprise level in order to sustain the latter's interest and commitment to the unions. They can do this by directing their energies to the provision of welfare services to members, and then concentrate on the defined issues of negotiation at the industry-level, but should not interfere with employer-employee arrangements to enhance productivity, job commitment and satisfaction.

Though the foregoing ideas are equally relevant to the public sector, it is observed that the environment of labour relations is understandably different from what obtains in the private sector.

Historically, neither collective bargaining nor labour-management relations has functioned properly in the public sector and specifically in the civil service. The reasons for this are numerous. They include the very nature of government as an employer, though a special one due to its often conflicting responsibilities as a sovereign and manager or mediator of labour relations; the preference of government for semi-judicial wage tribunals and the intervening roles of government departments in labour-management relations.[12] For these and many more institutional and environmental reasons, unilateral determination has been an important feature of labour relations in the public sector but particularly in the civil service.

During the past 4 or 5 years, employment practices in government establishments have moved towards greater unilateral determination, leading to a near collapse of the bargaining machinery. Two recent examples can be given. In December 1984, the government announced cuts in fringe benefits and claimed that the new rates had the support of the labour unions. Almost immediately the announcement was made, the labour leaders denied ever agreeing to the cuts; that they were summoned to a meeting at which government intentions were made known to them, but that they were unequivocally opposed to the cuts. In much the same fashion, in December 1986, many of the benefits were re-introduced, in some cases with adjustments upwards. Again, these adjustments were not a result of negotiations between labour and management.

Although the environment of labour-management relations is admittedly different and no sane man can recommend the private sector model for the public sector, all the same, to forestall any misunderstanding, the principle of bilateral relationship ought to be recognized and practised within the peculiar context of public sector employment relations. The need for bilateral relationship is greater now than ever before because the economic difficulties make it imperative that consultation through a tripartite approach among the social partners should be evolved in order to find solutions to the serious industrial relations problems brought about by unemployment and inflation.

In conclusion, let me re-emphasize the need for collaborative approaches and joint labour and management efforts in solving the economic and industrial relations problems brought about by recent economic policies. I believe that unions and their members have genuine reasons for collaborating with management and government in the pursuit of economic recovery. Undoubtedly, a de-emphasis of the conflictual concept and confrontational tactics will promote mutual trust, co-operation and create a favourable environment for working towards the survival of their organizations.

REFERENCES

1. For details of the foregoing, see Tayo Fashoyin, 'Emerging Trends in Collective Bargaining in Nigeria' 9, 1 (Jan. — June, 1982), pp. 23 — 30
2. See Annual Report, (1983/84) of the Association of Food, Beverage and Tobacco Employers of Nigeria of UK
3. See, for example, 'Revision of Some Fringe Benefits' *Circular No. B63304 of 21 December, 1984.* Cabinet Office, Lagos
4. National Concord April, 9 1987 ... Lagos.
5. Ibid
6. Everett Kassalow, "Concession Bargaining: Something old but also something New" *Proceedings of the 35th Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association.* New York, 28 — 30, December, 1982 pp 372 — 382
7. Tayo Fashoyin, "Collective Bargaining Challenges during Economic Recession" in Ukandi G. Damachi and Tayo Fashoyin (eds) *Contemporary Problems in Nigerian Industrial Relations.* Lagos, Development Press, 1986, pp 50 — 54
8. Ibid p 51
9. Tayo Fashoyin, *Workforce Reduction and Redundancy: A Study of the Peugeot Automobile of Nigeria.* 1987 (Unpublished manuscript).
10. Ezeilo, C. P. "The Economics of Structural Adjustment Programme", *Management in Nigeria,* May/June, 1987, Lagos, pp. 7 — 11
11. For details see Tayo Fashoyin, *Incomes and Inflation in Nigeria,* London and Lagos, Longman Group Limited, 1986.
12. For details see Ukandi G. Damachi and Tayo Fashoyin, "Labour Relations Practices in the Nigerian Civil Service" *Presented at the 7th World Congress of the International Industrial Relations Association, Hamburg, West Germany, 1 — 4, September, 1986.*

Tayo Fashoyin, Department of Industrial Relations and Personnel Management Faculty of Business Administration, University of Lagos.

MEMBERSHIP NEWS

ELECTIONS IN OCTOBER, 1987

ELECTED MEMBERS

Adisa, Y A
Alolabi, G T
Craig, O O
Enebeli, J E
Enworom, A S (Dr.)
Etukafia, O D
Jibril, M (Dr.)
Keswani, K R (Capt.)
Musa, B
Odalume, R O
Odukunle, O A (Dr.)
Ogbe, N E
Omuero, J A A
Osinuga, O
Salami, I
Dada, O O (Mrs)

ELECTED ASSOCIATES

Abere, S A
Adebari, G O
Adenigba, G A
Barrah, S O
Adefala, M O (Mrs)
Adegboyega, M A
Adekoya, S B
Adeniji, A (Mrs)
Adeoye, M A
Adesiyun, R
Adewole, R A
Adewunmi, M B A
Adeyemi, J
Adeyinka, J A
Adighije N B J (Mrs)
Adimmadu, M E
Idris, M J
Agbe, J O
Ahmadu, M
Ajadi, M S
Ajala, A O
Ajala, V U K
Ajeigbe, A K
Akanni, D O
Akinbola, O O
Akpan, A I
Ali, M M
Aluko, E O
Amaechi, E A
Anagbogu, A N
Anosike, G I
Armoo, F K
Aruoture, J O
Aso, C A
Assan, S T
Baiyewu, O I (Alhaji)
Bakare, M L
Bamgbopa, F O
Bankole, A
Bello, A A
Bojuwoye, A S

ASSOCIATES Contd.

Damjor, J I
Dikki, B E
Ede, A T
Egbuche, E O
Egodo, G L
Eshett, E T
Eyinagho, B O
Ezenwanne, E C
Falako, J A
Feese, B T
Gami, T C (Capt.)
Garba, J D
Haastrup, F A
Habu, D B
Hodonu, A A
Ibamke, Y T
Ibekwe, D I
Ileora, N E (Miss)
Ige, J O
Igwe, A O
Ikegulu, A M C
Iko, S F
Ikwueze, I R
Inegbenebor, O P
Inyang, I A
Isah, A J
Ishola, S O
Jega, U A
Kagara, A A
Kalu, E O (Dr.)
Kalu, A
Kuyinu, I O B L
Mangadi, J
Manzo, R L (Mrs)
Mba, O
Mgbemena, O
Miyim, S
Mohammed, A
Ngige, R C
Ninalowo, O
Njoku, N S
Ntuen, S F
Nwabuwa, M P O
Nwachuku, N E (Dr.)
Nwafor, G O
Nwagbara, C E
Nwaham, I
Nwakalor, D O C
Nwankwo, N C
Nwankwo, S U
Nwokolo, C I
Obi, I E
Ochemba, N O
Oderinde, O
Oduah, W
Oduntan, O
Odusanya, E A
Ogbebor, C O
Ogbenna, V N I

ASSOCIATES Contd...

Oguche, J S A
Ogunmekan, J O
Ogunnowo, B G
Oguntula, J O
Ogutuga, A O
Ojo, K
Oke, T O (Mrs)
Okegbenro, B A
Okide, S O
Okoro, J I
Okoye, C E S
Okpala, C W
Okulaja, O O (Ms)
Oladipo, B N
Olanigan, A A
Olayomi, A A
Abdulazeez, I
Oluokun, O
Omemu, E E
Omole, N K A
Omoniyi, F S
Onuh, S A
Onumbu, G C
Onwujiogu, G I
Onwunali, I U
Onyebibile, N L U
Onyewuchi, M C
Oraka, O O
Osegbo, C N
Osuhor, H I
Osuji, C U
Ottoho, O U
Ovwigho, Y M (Dr.)
Oyun, E O
Romeo, F
Saadu, B
Salau, M O
Shittu, A M
Shoyombo, J O
Shuaibu, M G
Solarin, F O
Somolu, E A
Sotunbo, O A
Soyingbe, A A
Sule, A
Tunde, J A
Uchendu, V C
Udok, E U
Ukaegbu, C E
Uloko, T O W
Umar, M D
Umeadi, A E
Umeh, I E
Umeh, C O
Umenna, G U
Uramu, C O
Yakubu, S B
Ekwensi, J A (Mrs)
Benn, J K

ASSOCIATES Contd...

Ojaruega, R O
Urowayino, A (Mrs)
Uzor, T N F
Wilcox, B E P

ELECTED GRATUATES

Abekhe, S E
Adefihan, O G
Adegbesan, A A
Adeniji, A A
Adeniji, S O
Adeola, G L (Dr.)
Adeyanju, Z S
Alex-Hart, A A
Alhassan, E O
Akano, B W
Akintoye, I R
Arowolo, T D
Babarinde, T A
Bello, S
Esealuka, V E
Essien, I O
Fasoto, G F
Ibe, U J
Idah, I N
Idoro, G I
Nkadi, I E
Obioru, M B
Oboh, S I
Odunlami, K P
Ogale, I O
Ogbe, M I (Mrs)
Ogbe, O V
Ogundana, K I Y
Ogunlade, A S
Ogunlusi, J O
Ohayagha, J A (Miss)
Okechukwu, N M
Okome, E P
Olatoye, S O
Omolodun, M O
Onwukwe, J O
Emerhu, P K
Osinowo, A I
Ososanya, A O
Sule, O N
Turner, I O
Uja, B A
Musa, W F
Adisa, A B
Ahmed, S B
Akomolale, E N
Anieh, U E
Balogun, A A
Clarke, D O
Efere, A
Egoamaka, S D
Ekwunife, C K
Enogha, A R

GRADUATES Contd

Eseonu, A U
Eyo, F A
Fadipe, J O
Gbarazeke, A F
Ibrahim, B
Harisu, K M
Ijenwah, S I
Iwuagwu, C J
Modupe, B A
Okachi, E C
Okereke, S O
Okon, E E
Okorie, S O
Okubajo, O A
Olumoko, A A
Omoemu, V

GRADUATES Contd

Oni, P A O
Onyekwelu, S O D
Onyeukwu, I U
Osakwe, D E
Oyelabi, M B
Wehere, M
Fadero, J O
Ndu, O O
Olisedeme, O F
Sambo, A U
Shettima, M
Ubah, J A
udott, I J
Ugwu, J N
Adesola, J B

Upgradings	*From*	*To*
M A Adediji (Group Captain)	Associate	Member
R O Basorun	Associate	Member
M I Duru	Associate	Member
I S Ekwere	Associate	Member
B E Essien	Associate	Member
W I Essumai	Associate	Member
M A Dadare	Associate	Member
P C Ibekwe	Associate	Member
K J Iroko	Associate	Member
T Lawal-Solarin	Associate	member
V N Mbanefo	Associate	Member
N M Ndu	Associate	Member
F D Okoh	Associate	Member
Olawale-Cole M O	Associate	Member
E B Olokunbola	Graduate	Associate
D O Abimbola	Graduate	Associate
O L Abudu	Affiliate	Associate
S O Aidelomo	Affiliate	Associate
M A Aigbovo	Affiliate	Associate
T O Badewole	Graduate	Associate
A O Bankole	Graduate	Associate
M A O Dare	Graduate	Associate
I O Falaye	Graduate	Associate
A J Ladeji	Affiliate	Associate
J S Nwagbara	Affiliate	Associate
J O Ogunsuyi	Affiliate	Associate
F A Olalunde	Affiliate	Associate
A P Olusanya	Graduate	Associate
J B Onakunle	Graduate	Associate
H O Onifade	Graduate	Associate
G E Onwuaghalu	Graduate	Associate
M M O Oserah	Graduate	Associate
P O Othihiwa	Graduate	Associate
S Otitoju	Affiliate	Associate
N M Uzoigwe	Graduate	Associate

UNCLAIMED NIM MEMBERSHIP CERTIFICATES

CERTIFICATES of Membership sent by registered post to the following members have been returned unclaimed. Affected members are requested to furnish the Institute with their current postal address, so that the certificates may be re-posted to them

Members who can collect their certificates personally may do so by calling at the

Membership Services Department
Nigerian Institute of Management
Plot P. C. 22. Idowu Taylor Street,
Victoria Island. Lagos

NO	NAME & GRADE	LAST KNOWN ADDRESS
1	S. U. Abdulkarim, *AMNIM*	P.A.S. Training, Office of Head of Service, Sokoto.
2	E. G. Abeji, *AMNIM*	Dept. of Bus. Studies, College of Education (Tech.) Ilorin, Kwara State
3	P. A. Abidoye, *AMNIM*	Guinness Nigeria Limited, Oba Akran Avenue, P.M.B. 2107, Ikeja.
4	J. B. Abiona, *AMNIM*	1, James Avenue, c/o Area Postal Agency, Apa, via Badagry, Badagry—Lagos State
5	A. J. S. Abubakar, *AMNIM*	N. T. A. P.M.B. 12036, Lagos
6	Usman Abubakar, *MNIM*	The Commissioner, Ministry of Works & Transport. P.M.B. 2023, Kaduna
7	A. D. Abubakar, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 7242, Bompai, Kano.
8	A. Adama, *AMNIM*	Dept. of Electrical Engineering Federal Polytechnic, P.M.B. 1037, Idah, Benue State
9	J. A. Adediran, *MNIM*	Managing Director, Lipton of Nigeria Limited, 10, Burma Road, Apapa.
10	A. Adebayo, *MNIM*	P.M.B. 5523, Ibadan.
11	A. A. Adedeji, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 1525, Akure.
12	M. O. Adeduji, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 3466, Lagos
13	D. A. A. Adegboyega, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 4575, Marina, Lagos.
14	Abiola O. Adejobi, *AMNIM*	32, Oyewole Street, Palm Grove, Lagos.
15	I. A. Adekojo, *AMNIM*	Staff Development Centre, Kaduna Polytechnic, P.M.B. 2113, Kaduna.
16	S. A. Adekola, *AMNIM*	Nigerian Paper Mill Limited P.O. Box 581, Ilorin, Kwara State
17	K. A. Adekunle, *AMNIM*	56/495, Oke Olu-Okun, P.O. Box 3007, Mapo Hill, Ibadan.
18	A. J. Adelekan, *AMNIM*	49, Raufu Williams Crescent, Surulere, Lagos.
19	O. A. Adeleye, *AMNIM*	National Bank of Nigeria Ltd. Overseas Branch, 82—86, Broad Street, Lagos
20	A. T. Ademowo, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 1614, G.P.O. Marina, Lagos
21	J. A. Adeniyi, *AMNIM*	Ondo State Investment Corp. P.O. Box 700, Akure.
22	S. Adenubi, *AMNIM*	62—64, Campbell Street, Lagos
23	L. A. Adewusi, *AMNIM*	Prospect Textile Mill Limited. P.O. Box 193, Ilorin
24	J. G. Adepoju, *AMNIM*	11A, Michael Street, G.R.A. Ikeja, Lagos
25	Prof. A. Adepoju, *MNIM*	Research Advisory Services Unit, Faculty of Business Admin., University of Lagos, Lagos.
26	Titus O. Aderotimi, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 87, Okitipupa, Ondo State.
27	D. Adeshola, *AMNIM*	Onakanmi & Partners, 17, Bukuru Bye Pass P.M.B. 21, Bukuru, Jos
28	A. T. Adesina, *AMNIM*	24, Coker road, Ikoyi, Lagos
29	K. A. Adeyemo, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 207, Apapa.
30	J. O. Adeyemo, *AMNIM*	Nigerian Bottling Co., Ltd., P.O. Box 12832, Kano.
31	A. O. Adeyemo, *AMNIM*	17, Ogedengbe Road, Apapa.
32	J. O. Adeyeye, *MNIM*	P.M.B. 1547, Maiduguri, Borno State.

33.	G. O. C. Adibe, *AMNIM*	Dept. of Marketing, Purchasing & Supply, Kaduna Polytechnic, Kaduna.
34.	E. A. Adu, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 850, Oshodi, Lagos.
35.	J. F. Afun,*AMNIM*	c/o S. A. Akinfaloye, P.O. Box 1101, Akure.
36.	O. O. Afuwape, *AMNIM*	12, Brown Street, P.O. Box 286, Oshodi, Lagos
37.	O. A. Agbato, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 4707, Lagos.
38.	O. O. Agbogu, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 1941, Enugu.
39.	J. A. Agboola, *AMNIM*	SCOA Textile, 144, Nnamdi Azikiwe Street, Lagos.
40.	D. O. Aheruvoh, *AMNIM*	1, 3, & 5, Olabisi Street, Memde Village, Maryland—Ikeja.
41.	J. E. Aghaye-Dudu, *AMNIM*	P.M.B. 1215, Benin City.
42.	J. N. Agumanu (Miss), *AMNIM*	Imo State Library Board, P.M.B. 1118, Owerri, Imo State.
43.	Bamji E. Aiki, *AMNIM*	6, Ashanti Road, P.O. Box 357, Apapa.
44.	O. A. Aina, *AMNIM*	N. P. R. C. Limited, P.O. Box 585, Port Harcourt.
45.	K. Aiyedogbon, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 709, Festac Town, Lagos.
46.	A. Aiyedun, *AMNIM*	Niger River Basin Dev. Authority, P.M.B. 1529, Ilorin. Kwara State.
47.	Mrs M. M. Ajayi, *AMNIM*	c/o Mrs E. O. Oyediran, General Post Office, Dugbe—Ibadan.
48.	Mrs Taiwo Ajayi, *AMNIM*	17, Ajao Road, Surulere, Lagos.
49.	G. A. Ajayi, *AMNIM*	N. Y. S. C. Secretariat, 32/34, Opebi Road, Ikeja.
50.	M. O. Ajayi, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 459, Mushin.
51.	J. A. Ajileye, *AMNIM*	Office of the Head of Service, Manpower Development Dept. 33, Moloney Street, Lagos.
52.	F. B. Ajiteru, *AMNIM*	New Town dev Authority, Eti-Osa Local Government. Maroko—Lagos.
53.	G. A. Akanbi, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 2646, Lagos.
54.	D. F. Akerejola, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 412, Okene—Kwara State.
55.	S. S. Akhigbe, *AMNIM*	Rufai and Sons Limited, P.O. Box 600, Kano.
56.	I. A. Akinbode, *AMNIM*	Dept. of A. E. & R. S., Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife.
57.	Yomi Akinnola, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 2495, Surulere, Lagos.
58.	C. A. Akinlua, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 5084, Ibadan.
59.	S. O. Akinwunmi, *AMNIM*	5th Floor, Investment House, 21/25, Broad Street, Lagos.
60.	P. A. Akinyede, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 40, Mushin
61.	J. J. Akpanekon, *AMNIM*	West African Breweries Ltd., P.O. Box 91, Abeokuta
62.	O. J. Alabi, *AMNIM*	c/o P.O. Box 7692, Bodija-Ibadan.
63.	G. S. Aladeojobi, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 985, Ikeja.
64.	C. A. Alao (Mrs), *AMNIM*	81, Ilabere Avenue, Ikoyi, Lagos.
65.	D. U. ALi, *AMNIM*	Raleigh Industries Limited, P.O. Box 2043, Port Harcourt.
66.	M. A. Aliu, *AMNIM*	Dept. of Educational MGT., Faculty of Education, University of Ibadan, Ibadan.
67.	J. O. Aluko, *AMNIM*	Ila Local Govt. Secretariat, P.M.B. 201, Ila Orangun, Oyo State.
68.	M. A. Aluko, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 12757, North Texas State University Denton TX 76203, U.S.A.
69.	D. E. Amadasu, *AMNIM*	Dept. of MGT. Accounting, Faculty of Admin., Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile Ife.
70.	Dr. (Mrs) E. E. A. Amechi, *AMNIM*	Dept. of Business Admin. & Management. Inst. of MGT & Technology, P.M.B. 1079, Enugu.
71.	G. Amissah, *AMNIM*	United Bank for Africa Ltd., 4, Akpakpava Street, Benin City
72.	N. K. Amobi, *AMNIM*	116, Oba Adetona Street, Ilupeju
73.	J. J. Anago, *AMNIM*	NOLCHEM, P.M.B. 3012, Kano.
74.	J. A. Anaza, *MNIM*	P.O. Box 1241, Apapa.
75.	C. I. Anegbe, *AMNIM*	Federal College of Education & Technology, P.M.B. 60, Gombe—Bauchi State.
76.	M. Anibaba, *AMNIM*	c/o M. O. Anibaba, 51, Adelabu Street, Surulere, Lagos.
77.	L. O. G. Anyanwu, *AMNIM*	Federal Inland Revenue Dept. 223, Herbert Macaulay Street, P.M.B. 2002, Yaba.

78	Mrs F. E. Archibong, *AMNIM*	41, Glover Road, Ikoyi.
79.	L. K. K. Are, *AMNIM*	3, Child Avenue, Apapa.
80.	M. O. Areh, *AMNIM*	BEWAC Limited, 1, Commercial Road, P.M.B. 1016, Apapa.
81.	A. M. Argungu, *AMNIM*	Finance Dept., Sokoto University Techning Hospital, Sokoto.
82.	A. O. Ariyibi, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 2979, Ikeja.
83.	K. E. Arua, *AMNIM*	DIGICON (Nig.) Limited, Room 836, Freeman House, 21/22, Marina, Lagos.
84	E. E. Arubayi, *AMNIM*	ARMTI, P.M.B. 1343, Ilorin—Kwara State.
85	M. Asamoah-Manu, *AMNIM*	School of Business Studies College of Science & Tech. P.M.B. 5080, Port Harcourt.
86.	E. D. O. Aluanya, *AMNIM*	EDOASONS & CO., P.O. Box-4120, Lagos.
87.	S. V. O. Atuge, *AMNIM*	West African Portland Cement Company Limited, P.O. Box 1001, Lagos.
88	A. Audu, *AMNIM*	P. A. N. P.M.B. 12034, Lagos.
89	F. D. V. Audu, *AMNIM*	Daily Times of (Nig.) Ltd., 3, Kakawa Street, P.O. Box 139, Lagos.
90	S. B. Awonusi, *AMNIM*	67, Jubil Martin Street, Lawanson, Surulere, Lagos.
91	L. G. Ayamu, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 1167, Surulere, Lagos.
92	Mrs O. Ayantugu, *AMNIM*	32, Shipeolu Street, Palm Grove—Shomolu, Lagos.
93	S. A. Ayodeji, *MNIM*	41, Caulcrick Road, Apapa.
94	J. K. Babatunde, *AMNIM*	Rural Electricity Board, P.M.B. 67, Marina.
95	O. S. Babatunde, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 1063, Ikeja.
96	Z. O. Bakrin, *AMNIM*	Philip Morris (Nig.) Ltd., P.O. Box 106, Ilorin.
97	Lt. I. R. Bamaiy., *AMNIM*	Nigerian Army, Command & Staff College, Jaji—Kaduna State.
98	A. Barber, *AMNIM*	c/o Decca-Services (Nig.) Ltd. P.M.B. 21602, Ikeja.
99	O. A. Bashorun, *AMNIM*	ELF Marketing (Nig.) Ltd. 33, Creek Road, Apapa.
100.	A. O. Bello, *AMNIM*	O. D. S. B. C., P.M.B. 709, Akure
101	T. O. Bello, *AMNIM*	5, Franklin Road, Ebute-Metta, Lagos.
102	Q. I. A. Bilgrami, *AMNIM*	Dept. of Management Studies, The Polytechnic, Ibadan.
103	O. Bola-Sadipe, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 1219, Ikeja.
104	Prof. A. E. Boyo, *MNIM*	P.O. Box 1426, Lagos
105	A. G. A. Buraimoh, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 5271, Lagos.
106	N. S. Chadha, *AMNIM*	Dept. of Marketing, P.M.B. 1375, Ilorin.
107	R. O. Chioma, *AMNIM*	Lipton (Nig.) Ltd., P.O. Box 841, Port Harcourt.
108	V. Chopra, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 932, Apapa.
109	D. O. Chuke, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 100044, Enugu
110	C. E. Chukwu, *AMNIM*	P.M.B. 12558, Ikoyi, Lagos State.
111	S. A. Dada, *AMNIM*	National Educational Tech. Centre, Hospital Road, Kaduna.
112	A. O. Dada, *AMNIM*	C. M. D., P.O. Box 7648, Lagos.
113	B. G. Dahoro, *AMNIM*	Commercial Dept. N.A.A., P.M.B. 1607, Ikeja.
114	S. T. Dogonyaro, *AMNIM*	School of Business, The Polytechnic of Sokoto, P.M.B. 1034, Birnin—Kebbi.
115	C. E. Dorgu, *AMNIM*	Dorec Associates, P.M.B. 1277, Benin City.
116	I. A. A. Edeki, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 13, Ogbelaka Street, Benin City.
117.	T. T. O. Efunkoya, *AMNIM*	W.S.A.I.C., Araromi Rubber Estate, P.O. Box 253, Ijebu-Ode.
118.	T. O. Efunnuga, *AMNIM*	U.T.C. (Nig.) Limited, 23/27, Wharf Road, P.M.B. 1005, Apapa.
119	M. M. Egbujie, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 878, Ikeja.
120	U. G. Egbuziem, *AMNIM*	Federal Ministry of Transport & Aviation, P.M.B. 12577, Lagos.
121.	W. P. O. Eghobamien, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 196, Suleja.
122.	O. E. E. Egwunwu, *AMNIM*	33, Alawode Street, Ikate, Surulere, Lagos.

123.	M. A. Eigbe, *AMNIM*	L. B. N. Limited, Marketing Dept., P.O. Box 15, Apapa.
124.	O. J. Ekanem, *AMNIM*	Leventis Stores Limited, Provision Dept., Iddo House, Lagos.
125.	I. A. Ekpe, *MNIM*	Mainland Hotel, P.O. Box 2158, Lagos.
126.	E. E. Ekong, *AMNIM*	Post Graduate Hostel, 'K' 18, Ekewan Campus, University of Benin, Benin City.
127.	E. Ekpeyong, *AMNIM*	Ministry of Ind. & Tourism, 105, Calabar Road, Calabar.
128.	V. O. Ekwute, *AMNIM*	Estate Management Dept., 40, Balogun Street, Lagos.
129.	B. A. Elutilo, *AMNIM*	13, Jadesola-Shodi Street, Aguda—Surulere, Lagos.
130.	I. F. Emeagwali, *AMNIM*	Ogilvy Benson & Matter (Nig.) Limited, Investment House, 21/25, Broad Street, Lagos.
131.	P. C. Emesih, *AMNIM*	381, Ubberley Road, Bentilee, Stoke—On Trent Staff. ST2. OHA, England.
132.	V. N. Enape, *AMNIM*	House of Assembly, P.M.B. 2356, Makurdi.
133.	Major J. A. Ero, *AMNIM*	14, Field Engineers Regiment, P.M.B. 1118, Apapa.
134.	O. O. Esan, AMNIM	Ministry of Agric & Natural Resources, P.M.B. 1028, Ikeja.
135.	Dr. O. A. Esiemokai, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 1254, Benin City.
136.	O. P. Essang, *AMNIM*	12, Infantry Workshop Nigerian Army, MINNA.
137.	S. O. Eyefian, *AMNIM*	P.O Box 43, Adeja—via Warri, Bendel State
138.	M. B. Eyo, *AMNIM*	*16, Portland Rise, London, N4 2PP.*
139.	D. O. Eze, *AMNIM*	Milverton Insurance Co. Ltd., 116, Calabar Road, Calabar.
140.	F. U. Ezekwe, *AMNIM*	c/o Coatex (Nigeria) Limited P.O Box 747, Owerri.
141.	P. C. Ezeli, *AMNIM*	Akindeinde Allot & Lomax (Nigeria) Limited. P.O. Box 1549 Abeokuta
142.	A. C. Ezenwamelaku, *AMNIM*	Ferdinand Ind. (Nig.) Ltd., P O Box 123, Urualla, Ideator L.G.A., Imo State
143.	J. I. Ezeoke, *AMNIM*	17, Williams Street, Aguda, Surulere, lagos
144.	Chief E. O. Fadairo, *MNIM*	Daily Times (Nig.) Ltd., New Isheri Road P M B 21340 Ikeja.
145.	A. M. Fadeyi, *AMNIM*	P O Box 52287 Falomo—Ikoyi, Lagos
146.	E. O. Fadipe, *AMNIM*	F. B. N. Lagos Training P O Box 1021, Lagos
147.	M. B. Fajemilua, *AMNIM*	Ondo State Water Corp., P M B 531, Ondo
148.	G. O. Faluyi, *AMNIM*	G. E. C. (Telecomm.) P O Box 2213 Apapa
149.	Mrs R. M. Famuyiwa, *AMNIM*	National Postgraduate Medical College, P M B 12003 Lagos.
150.	A. A. Fari, *AMNIM*	*N I D B, P M B 2141, Kaduna*
151.	V. O. Fasae, *AMNIM*	Sandoz (Nigeria) Limited, P O Box 224 Apapa
152.	M. O. Fashegha, *AMNIM*	Ministry of Works & Survey P M B 3068 Kano
153.	V. O. Fashina, *AMNIM*	16/20, Onafowokan Street, Morocco—Basua Shomolu Lagos
154.	O. F. Folarinle, *AMNIM*	Smurfit Printing (Nig.) Ltd. P O Box 156, Ikeja
155.	S. A. Galadima, *AMNIM*	Ministry of Trade & Industry Minna
156.	J. O. Gbede, *AMNIM*	6, Adebambo Street Obanikoro Ikorodu Road Lagos
157.	L. A. Gbadamosi, *AMNIM*	P O Box 344 Ikorodu
158.	O. Glover, *AMNIM*	4 Ayinde-Giwa Street Surulere Lagos
159.	G. E. Gory, *AMNIM*	Ibru Organisation P M B 1155 Apapa
160.	N. A. Hayman, *AMNIM*	P M B 2014 Lagos
161.	A. T. Ibinayo, *AMNIM*	c/o Mr B O Shittu P O Box 50115 Falomo, P O Ikoyi
162.	A. Ibrahim, *AMNIM*	N T T, P M B 2191, Kaduna
163.	E. S. Idiong, *AMNIM*	P O Box 436 Ikot Ekpene Cross River State
164.	E. N. Igbokwe, *MNIM*	Imo Newspapers Limited Owerri
165.	D. E. Igwe, *AMNIM*	4, Etugbo Lane, via Layinka Street, Aiyetoro—Ajegunle, Apapa
166.	J. N. Ijeaka, AMNIM	Standard Polyplast P O Box 432 Umuahia
167.	W. O. O. Ikanone, *AMNIM*	P M B 1155 Oshodi
168.	P. N. Ikeh, *AMNIM*	P M B 12684, Lagos

169.	P. O Inegbedion, *AMNIM*	Nigerian Wire Industries Ltd., P.O. Box 50, Ikeja.
170.	S U. O. Ininje, *AMNIM*	Nigerian Pools Co. Ltd., P O. Box 2453, Lagos.
171.	E I. Inwang. *AMNIM*	Federal Polytechnic, School of Management, P.M.B. 2223, Yola.
172.	I. N. Inya, *AMNIM*	Office of the Governor Parastatals Dept., Calabar.
173.	Mrs C. M E Inyang. *AMNIM*	University of Calabar Teaching Hospital St. Margaret Annexe, Calabar.
174	L. A. Inyang, *AMNIM*	Dept. of Customs & Excise, P.O. Box 1027, Ikeja.
175	B. A. Iwambe, *AMNIM*	Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning, P.M.B. 102101, Makurdi—Benue State.
176.	G. O. Iwuala, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 1125, Owerri, Imo State
177.	M A O Izekor, *MNIM*	Ibru Organisation, P.M.B. 1155, Apapa.
178.	C. M Jack, *AMNIM*	4th Avenue, 401, Road. 'C' Close, Block 2, Flat 2, P.O. Box 2708, Festac Town.
179.	J. Kalegha (Esq). *AMNIM*	Enterprising Consultanting Group Limited, 69C, Ajao Street P.O. Box 6868, Lagos.
180.	M. A. Kareem, *AMNIM*	NEWDEVCO Finance Services Limited, P.O. Box 151, Kafuna.
181.	Mrs O. A. Kehinde, *AMNIM*	P.O Box 3944, Surulere
182.	R. O. Khalidson, *MNIM*	N. E T., P.O. Box 1973, Lagos
183.	P J Kissane, *AMNIM*	Flat 2, 51, Mission Road. Cremorme, New South Wales 2090, Australia
184.	T O. Kolade, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 9165, Lagos
185	R M Kupolati, *AMNIM*	Command & Staff College, P.M.B. 2128, Jaji.
186	Mrs A S Kusamotu, *AMNIM*	A. C B. Limited, Ijora Branch, P.M.B. 1008, Apapa.
187	J Kuye, *AMNIM*	Ondo State Television Corp. P M B. 782, Akure.
188	E. O. Kuye, *AMNIM*	176. Herbert Macaulay Street, Yaba.
189	Alhaji M A. Laguda, *AMNIM*	19 Basheer Augusto Street, off Bode Thomas/Eric Manuel, Surulere.
190	J O Latunji, *AMNIM*	G.P.O. Box 10509, Dugbe—Ibadan
191.	A M Lawal *AMNIM*	Basic Training Wing Police College, Ikeja.
192	Sq. Ldr. T A Lawal, *AMNIM*	P O. Box 1786, Ikeja.
193	L A B Lawal, *AMNIM*	Hqr. Training Command. Nigeria Air Force, Kaduna
194	R. M. Lawson-Jack, *AMNIM*	45, Accra Street, Port Harcourt
195	M A Leigh *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 763, Surulere
196	R A Lingnau, *AMNIM*	5, Ijora Causeway, P.O. Box 192, Lagos.
197	S A Mangbe, *AMNIM*	P.M.B. 2084, Jos.
198	Mohammed Madaki, *AMNIM*	Lake Chad Hotel Limited. P.O. Box 368, Maiduguri.
199	S O Madubuaku, *MNIM*	Vice Chancellor's Office (Planning Unit) University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Enugu.
200	B C Madukwe, *AMNIM*	Bayer Pharmaceutical Nig. Ltd. P.O. Box 250, Apapa.
201.	O Makanjuola, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 442, Ikeja
202	O Makanjuola, *AMNIM*	U B. A Limited. P.M.B. 1142, Benin City.
203	M G Mailafiya, *AMNIM*	Metropolitan Building. P.M.B. 1600, Maiduguri.
204.	O A Majekodunmi, *AMNIM*	P O. Box 8252, Lagos.
205.	S D Makama, *MNIM*	Plateau Publishing Co. Ltd. P.M.B. 2112, Jos.
206.	Mrs F M Masha, *AMNIM*	77, Ibidun Street, Surulere
207.	S I Metu, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 540, Festac Town, Badagry Road, Lagos.
208.	E C Mgbokwere, *AMNIM*	SEMAC Limited, 1A, Ahmadu Bello Way, Kaduna.
209.	C. P V. Mobee, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 8872, G.P.O. Marina—Lagos.
210	R O Modupe, *AMNIM*	Ministry of Works & Transport, Akure.
211	D Mohammed, *AMNIM*	Associated Tractional (Nig.) Ltd., 60, Maganda Road, P.O. Box 815, Kano.
212.	Mrs F O Mohammed, *AMNIM*	23, Ogunlana Drive, Surulere.
213	K A. Mohammed, *AMNIM*	P.M B. 2346, Sokoto
214	Y B Mohammed, *AMNIM*	N.N.S.C. 29, Burma Road, Apapa.

215.	H. T. Molokwu, *MNIM*	P.M.B. 12574, Benin City.
216.	O. O. Moluga, *AMNIM*	1, Falolu Road, Surulere.
217.	N. V. Monyei, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 3453, Benin City.
218.	F. O. Mukoro, *AMNIM*	Petroleum Training Inst. P.M.B. 1116, Warri.
219.	K. H. Nagelsehmitz, *MNIM*	1, Jibowu Street, Ikorodu Road, Yaba.
220.	J. A. Nami, *AMNIM*	140, Calabar Road, Calabar.
221.	Ebong E. Ndada, *AMNIM*	N.P.R.C., P.O. Box 585, Alesa-Eleme Port Harcourt.
222.	P. C. Ndukwe, *AMNIM*	May & Baker (Nigeria) Ltd., P.O. Box 373, Aba.
223.	A. A. Nebedum, *AMNIM*	202, Bruke Hall, University of Pitts, Pittsburgh.
224.	N. E. Ngenegbo, *MNIM*	Board of Internal Revenue, Hqrs Office, Enugu.
225.	Mrs C. Njoku, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 9227, Lagos.
226.	J. O. Njoku, *AMNIM*	Ministry of Commerce & Ind. P.O. Box 1262, Owerri.
227.	K. U. Nkume, *AMNIM*	7B, Onike Road, Yaba, P.O. Box 1451, Lagos.
228.	W. C. Nwachukwu, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 12, P. & T. Training Centre, Cappa—Oshodi, Lagos.
229.	F. O. Nwagbo, *AMNIM*	Frederick Whyte Int. Co., P.O. Box 748, Port Harcourt.
230.	L. N. Nwaugbor, *AMNIM*	Eastern Wrought Iron Ltd., P.O. Box 602, Port Harcourt
231.	A. C. Nwoko, *AMNIM*	Federal College of Education (Tech.) P.M.B. 60, Gombe—Benue State.
232.	I. M. Nwokoma, *AMNIM*	Roberts Asbestos Ltd., Box 360, Umuahia, Imo State.
233.	I. D. Nworji, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 1223, Kano.
234.	J. I. Nwume, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 52216, Falomo Post Office, Ikoyi.
235.	E. D. Nyiam, *AMNIM*	Ukelle Local Government Office, Wanokum, Cross River State.
236.	N. O. Nze, *AMNIM*	Board of Internal Revenue, P.M.B. 1110, Owerri.
237.	C. G. Nzewi, *AMNIM*	N. N. P. C. Kaduna Refinery, Kaduna.
238.	F. K. Obalaja, *AMNIM*	A. O. M. C. Limited, P.M.B. 1021, Okene—Kwara State.
239.	D. E. Obasi, *AMNIM*	Jubril Martins Memorial Grammar School, Campus 4, Iponri—Lagos.
240.	M. Obaye, *AMNIM*	BEWAC Limited, Apapa.
241.	F. O. S. Obayiuwana, *AMNIM*	44C, Gerrard Road, Ikoyi.
242.	O. O. Obayomi, *AMNIM*	Ministry of Works & Transport, Finance & Admin. Division, Abeokuta.
243.	I. C. Obi, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 9167, Lagos.
244.	F. A. Obi, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 162, Oshodi—Lagos.
245.	N. C. Obuh, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 54660, Ikeja.
246.	R. R. Odejayi, *AMNIM*	21, Bode Thomas Street, Surulere, Lagos.
247.	M. O. Odeyemi, *AMNIM*	Inter Basic (Nigeria) Ltd., P.O. Box 7518, Secretariat, Ibadan.
248.	O. A. Odubogun, *AMNIM*	Akintola Williams & Co., P.O. Box 965, Lagos.
249.	S. E. Odubu, *AMNIM*	Jahswill Group Limited, P.O. Box 1597, Apapa.
250.	Mrs P. O. Odufuye,	28, Raymond Street, Yaba, Lagos.
251.	Jacob A. Odulaya, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 557, M/Mohammed Airport, Ikeja.
252.	A. O. Oduneye, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 6192, Kakuri, Kaduna.
253.	B. A. Oduwole, *AMNIM*	National Bank of Nigeria Ltd., Districk Office, 28, Kano Street, Ebute Metta.
254.	O. J. Ogbode, *AMNIM*	Benue State House of Assembly, P.M.B. 2356, Makurdi.
255.	Chief O. V. Oghojafor, *AMNIM*	c/o Motor Licensing Office, Auchi, Bendel State.
256.	P. N. Oguejiofor, *AMNIM*	C.F.A.O. (Nig.) Ltd., P.O. Box 520, Suleja—Niger State.
257.	O. J. K. Ogundele, *AMNIM*	Agrotec Services Ltd., P.O. Box 377, Mushin
258.	A. T. Ogunade, AMNIM	Bolajoko & Co. Ltd., P.O. Box 3736, Ikeja
259.	G. O. Ogunlola, *AMNIM*	Dept. of Educational Management, University of Ibadan, Ibadan.
260.		
261.	B. A. Ogunneye, *AMNIM*	P.O. Box 1140, Lagos.
262.	I. B. Ogunsuyi, *AMNIM*	Ondo State Agric Credit Coy, P.O. Box 158, Ondo

Problems of Public Policy Making in Nigeria

—by Chijioke Dike

DEFINITION

PERHAPS the most serious problem of public policy in the governmental sphere is the absence of an agreed definition of the term "public policy". While some claim that "public policy is whatever governments choose to do or not to do", others assert that "policy is what governments actually do... not what they intend to do or say they are going to do".

To some extent, these two definitions are right in relating public policy to the deliberate decisions or actions of governments; yet, it would be dangerous to accept them as a proper basis for policy analysis. First of all, they tend to encourage the notion that governments may do or refrain from doing whatever they like. This, undoubtedly, is a totalitarian precept which should not be encouraged.

Indeed, nothing but confusion and failure will ensue from a situation where governments make policies arbitrarily and change them equally arbitrarily. There is, therefore, a need to ensure that every policy decision is preceded by a clear articulation of its objectives and a thorough examination of its implications, its probable consequences and possible remedies.

Another reason for rejecting the definitions of public policy cited above is that they fail to provide a basis for distinguishing policy-making from policy implementation. According to those definitions, all actions and decisions of a government are public policies even when they are mere applications or extensions of other decisions. The foremost problem here is the inability of the definitions to provide a basis for evaluating the success or failure of specific policies.

In order, therefore, to overcome these difficulties, it is suggested that public policy should be defined as a governmental programme contained either in the nation's laws or in a public statement by a competent functionary of government.

Examples of public policies in Nigeria are the promotion of African unity and of the economic union of West African States, support for liberation movements, promotion of national unity, maintenance of a Federal character, respect for fundamental human rights, War Against Indiscipline, the 6-3-3-4 system of education, Operation Feed the Nation (OFN), and the Structural Adjustment Programme.

We recognise each of these as a public policy because, at one time or another, they had been proclaimed by appropriate public officers in Nigeria; because each of them has had a complex of strategies devised for its achievement; and because it is possible, viewing them as statements of goals and objectives, to assess the extent of their success, and indeed the extent to which success or failure was owing to defects in formulation or implementation.

IDENTIFICATION

YET, identifying specific public policies is not always easy. The problem arises, not only because in many countries, policies are made and changed ever so often, but also because sometimes, conflicting statements are made by various public officers on the same policy issue.

In the early post-Independence years, for instance, there were several instances of conflicting statements on Nigeria's foreign policy by the Federal Prime Minister on the one hand, and the Regional Premiers who weilded strong political power on the other. There was also the sharp conflict between the Ministries of External Affairs and Information over who should control Nigeria's image-making overseas.

On the domestic scene, there were times when differing statements were made by public functionaries, notably with regard to private ownership of schools, monetary reform, the privatisation of state enterprises and the role of the civil service.

Fortunately, the incidence of policy conflicts in Nigeria is not widespread or frequent, but the potential for such conflicts ought not to be under-estimated, considering the fact that Nigeria is a federation with an increasingly articulate citizenry.

In order, therefore, to avoid as far as possible, the embarrassment of public disagreement between public officers which could create confidence problems for the government, it is suggested that the right to make policy statements be limited to the various Heads of Government and Cabinet Ministers/Commissioners or their accredited representatives. In the case of Ministers and Commissioners, the right to make policy statements should be restricted to their areas of responsibility.

Ordinarily, a policy is identified when it is publicly announced by a competent authority. It is, therefore, not correct to say that a policy which has not passed through the prescribed processes, is invalid. What is true is that such a policy is unlikely to be as good and effective as it ought to have been. However, in many countries, there are no public pronouncements on what the policy is in many areas of governmental activity.

Evidently, a government which operates without definite policies is like a traveller without a destination. He may cover many kilometres and yet not be able to say where he is going or how far he has gone.

To some, this may appear a covenient way to avoid public criticism for unfulfilled promises; but in reality, it could cause public disenchantment, because a nation lives not by actual achievements alone but also by the hopes and inspirations generated by imaginative leadership. One would, therefore, recommend that governmental policies be announced publicly, as a strategy for public mobilisation, motivation and direction.

On the other hand, one must warn against the danger in succumbing to the public pressure usually mounted on an incoming government to declare its policies before it has had time to assess the terrain.

In fairness, all that should be expected of a new government upon taking office is to affirm its commitment to the general principles of civilised government such as respect for fundamental human rights, and its determination to solve speedily the pressing problems of the day. Thereafter, the Executive must move swiftly to assess the various problems and resources before it, with a view to making appropriate policy pronouncements.

EXPLICATION

IT is, of course, not enough to announce a policy; it is equally necessary to explain it to those concerned. To illustrate this fact, one may need to point out that more than six years after the adoption of the 6-3-3-4 system of education, most people in the country still appear not to be very conversant either with the aims of the system or its requirements. One even suspects that many of those whose duty it is to operate the system may also be unclear about some vital aspects of its modalities.

Indeed, whether the cost implications of the new system have been fully worked out, and the dangers of allowing significant shortfalls in the inputs appreciated, is a matter for doubt. All these uncertainties are no doubt the result of inadequate official explication of the policy, which can ultimately affect the chances of the new policy achieving its objectives.

Again, in the area of agriculture, Nigeria has, in the last ten years, been engaged in major efforts to increase food production. Yet, the rural farmer, who forms the basis for achieving enduring agricultural transformation in the country, knows little about the programme, particularly the various facilities available for his use and how he can take advantage of these facilities. Unfortunately, where some enlightenment effort is made, it is not sustained, owing sometimes to logistical inadequacies.

The case of the Second Tier Foreign Exchange Market in Nigeria, though recent, presents another illustration of the problem of inadequate explication of a new policy. Several weeks after the coming into force of the new system, even key officials of leading banks across the country, who were to operate the system, still appeared not to have basic information on its modalities.

Such a situation naturally opens up vast opportunities for abuse and exploitation by the privileged few, while creating unnecessary difficulties for the majority whose lives are seriously affected in very many ways by the change. It thus seems necessary for this as for other policy decisions, that an effective campaign of explication should be mounted by the responsible government departments prior to, at the same time as, or soon after the commencement of new policies.

FORMULATION

THE actual process of policy formulation has two main kinds of problems: structural and procedural. At the structural level, the question is, who is the policy maker, and what is his operational machinery? At the procedural level, the question is, how is policy made?

The answers to these two questions depend in part on the definition of public policy which we adopt. Evidently, if we accept the difinitions which we examined at the beginning, then every public functionary becomes a policy-maker. This, of course, would be absurd. Therefore, a policy-maker is one who decides, or participates in deciding, the goals and programmes of the government.

In some countries, the policy-makers are named by the constitution; in others, those who exercise final authority in the government are deemed to be policy-makers. But whether policy-makers are to be found in the Executive or in the Legislature, the crucial structural problem of policy formulation is in the undefined role of the civil service.

In most countries of the world, the civil service is regarded as an instrument purely for implementing the policies and programmes of the government. Yet, whenever a serious error occurs, whether the problem arises from the policy-maker or the policy executor, the tendency is to blame the civil service. If the charge is not poor execution, it is bad advice, even where the civil service is restricted to policy implementation. The truth, however, is that a great many of those who blame the civil service for mis-advising the government, may not know that the civil service is not consulted before many crucial decisions are made, and that civil service advice, when sought, is sometimes ignored.

It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that government should clearly and publicly define the role of the civil service, preferably by constitutional or other statutory enactment. In this exercise, the questions that need to be asked and answered are: Should the civil servant always obey the Executive, or may he refuse to obey when the order is illegal or harmful to the national interest? In the event of disobedience, must the civil servant quit his job, or should the Executive re-examine the issues raised?

In this context, it ought to be recognised that, however much political executives might wish to look down on civil servants, the best principles of management prescribe that if an organisation's goals are to be achieved, those who are to execute a given policy should also participate in its formulation. In countries like Britain, Canada and India whose administrative system we are supposed to have adopted, the top echelons of the civil service actually play the dual role of policy advisers and executors In these countries, a close relationship exists between the political executives and the civil service leadership, which enables ministers to take responsibility for the activities of their departments, while civil servants are then able to combine without conflict, loyalty to the government of the day with loyalty to the nation.

One other reason why the civil service should be involved in policy formulation, is because political power, however absolute, is ephemeral, whereas the civil service is a permanent body of professionals who control the basic materials and machinery without which the business of governing would be impossible. In other words, in as much as public policy cannot be made in a void, it is essential that civil servants who constitute the link between the past, the present and the future should make an in-put and in fact, initiate the processes of policy formulation. Civil Service participation in policy formulation should, therefore, not be seen as a concession by the politician but as a duty owed by government to the governed. This fact has not always been properly appreciated in Nigeria.

Quite often, when civil service advice is not sought or is disregarded, the result is failure, which is then ironically blamed on the civil service. This is not to say that civil service advice has always been faultless. Rather, we counsel that the advice of the civil service leadership should always be sought and carefully considered before decisions are made by the policy-makers.

In fact, the process of policy formulation should ideally include wide consultation and research involving relevant experts within and outside the public service, as well as interest groups, provided that such involvement is not prejudicial to the national interest.

Sometimes, the issues to be decided may be so vital that a referendum is called for. This was done in 1975 by the British Government over the question of British membership of the European Economic Community, and in 1959 by the United Nations over the question of the future of Southern Cameroons. The referendum was also a decisive instrument in the politics of Gaullist France.

In 1985, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria consulted the nation on the issue of the IMF loan as well as on the question of a new political system for Nigeria. In fact, the growing number of policy debates which have been organised by the present Federal Military Government show that it is following a deliberate programme of involving the general public in the process of policy formulation.

The advantage is that policies made on a basis of wide consultation have a better chance of gaining popular support and of being effectual and more enduring than decisions reached by resort to the rule of the thumb or under the pressure of interest groups.

It must, however, be understood that referenda or other forms of popular consultation are extraordinary instruments which should not be used frequently. It is rather recommended that a Policy Research Bureau should be set up at Federal and State levels made up of acknowledged experts from the civil service, the universities, parastatals and the private sector. This blending of experience and expertise is indispensable for a realistic, effectual and enduring formulation of public policies. By implication, relying solely on the civil service or the academia, or on interest groups, or even on members of the Executive, with respect to policy formulation, is unwise, as advice given by any one of these groups will tend more or less to be narrow and partisan.

IMPLEMENTATION

POLICY implementation is the process by which a policy decision is translated into action. This branch of the policy process derives its justification from the fact that, if it does not exist, there would be no way of assessing the success of policies after they might have been made.

It is often said that when a policy fails, its failure is traceable to deficient implementation. This is not entirely true. We know that some policies fail because they were not carefully thought out at the formulation stage. For instance, a new policy, unknown to the policy-maker could be in fatal conflict with an existing policy. Again, a policy that was not cost or not properly cost at the beginning, might prove impossible to implement if the necessary personnel, materials or funds turn out to be unavailable. Also, if the possible reaction of the public who are most likely to be affected, is not ascertained in advance, the policy could easily be killed by public opposition at a huge cost of money, energy and time.

A second kind of problem which afflicts policy implementation is political interference. This problem arises when a government leader interferes with the implementation process in a way that either violates the norms, or changes the direction of a given policy. For instance, a political executive who uses his position to evade tax or the payment of custom duty, or to divert a government programme away from its approved location or direction, thereby frustrates the policy in question. The same is true when a Chief Executive distorts his government's budget or development plan by introducing new projects midstream. The abandonment of several capital projects in Nigeria is traceable to some or all of these factors. There is also the problem that is created when a policy-maker takes decisions on economic matters purely on political considerations, thus causing heavy financial losses to the State. Unfortunately, the consequences of such interventions are seldom fully appreciated by the public or even by those responsible for the intervention.

It cannot, however, be denied that some policy failures occur as a result of weaknesses in the bureaucracy. Most commonly criticised of these weaknesses are lethargy, timidity, lack of dedication, incompetence, indiscipline, corruption and what is called red tapism. The pity of these criticisms, however, is that among those who make them are some government leaders who, not only have the authority, but have in fact the duty to change the situation. An even greater pity is the fact that, although the right experts abound both within and outside the civil service through whom Government could achieve the necessary reform of the system, Government sometimes prefers to side-step the established machinery in order to work with an ad hoc bureaucracy.

Unfortunately, many, though by no means all, of such "Task Forces" and agencies turn themselves very rapidly into veritable conduit pipes for siphoning public funds, with very little evidence of solid positive result. Indeed, while the civil service is widely accused of non-performance, the task forces demand, and frequently obtain with ease, facilities and incentives which the civil service does not have.

Nevertheless, there are no facts to support the common view that Nigeria would long have caught up with the Great Powers if she had replaced her public service managers with those in the private sector or with men of the ivory tower. As the well-known management expert, Prof. Peter Drucker, put it:

> "There is no reason to believe that the people who staff the managerial and professional positions in our 'service' institutions are any less qualified, any less competent or honest, or any less hardworking than those who manage business. By the same token, there is no reason to believe that business managers put in control of service institutions would do better than the 'bureaucrats'. Indeed, we know that they immediately become 'bureaucrats' themselves.

The sad truth is that most people who criticise bureaucratic methods do so, not always out of concern for efficiency but often because they want to feel free to serve themselves and their friends, and to deal with their enemies and others who refuse to gratify their desires. Indeed, there is very little that is worthwhile which cannot be accomplished within the rules if the will to do so exists. In any case, discretionary initiative is also permissible in public administration where the public interest demands and compels a departure from the letter of the rules in order to achieve their essential objective. But the circumstances must be clearly compelling and not merely contrived to facilitate the attainment of personal ends. In summary, one has to stress that the observance of rules is an essential process in the performance of a public function, and that the free-wheeling and dealing of the private sector is not an acceptable ethic for the public service.

EVALUATION

Policy evaluation, as the assessment of policy results, is an exercise which most politicians in developing countries regard as unnecessary. This is so because, by and large, our politicians do not like to be told that their policies have failed or were wrong ab initio, just as they do not like to be told what policies would best serve the national interest. Consequently, governments come and go, faithfully repeating the blunders of their predecessors, and equally faithfully blaming the civil service for their own poor performance. A statesman, on the other hand, should seek to find out why past policies failed in order to avoid the pitfalls and construct better alternatives. The truth, however, is that developing nations which do not invest in policy research, will never develop, as they will always be at the absolute mercy of the developed nations for their planning philosophy, their technology, and even for the supply of basic goods.

CONCLUSION

The essence of this article is that the greatest problem of public policy-making in Nigeria is that of low integrity both in the formulation and in the execution agencies. Next to this is the lack of an integrated approach to planning at the policy level, and insufficient dedication, caused by many factors, at the operational level. There is also the problem of inadequate study of issues and undue haste in implementation. Some possible solutions to these problems are:

(i) the emergence of a selfless and highly patriotic leadership through an ethical revolution;

(ii) the establishment of a bureau of experts at both Federal and State levels whose functions will be to conduct research and recommend appropriate policies as well as evaluate existing policies for the various departments of government;

(iii) a clearly defined role for the

(Continued on page 48)

NIM COURSES

Starting Dates	Course Title	Duration	Location
	MARCH 1988		
14/3/88	How to improve Managerial Performance	1 week	Kaduna
21/3/88	Management Appreciation	1 week	Lagos
21/3/88	Supervisory Management	1 week	Lagos
21/3/88	Effective Selling Skills	1 week	Lagos
21/3/88	Developing Supervisory Leadership Skills	1 week	Lagos
21/3/88	Management Appreciation	1 week	Kanb
21/3/88	Management Appreciation	1 week	Aba
	APRIL 88		
11/4/88	Management Course for Executive Secretaries and Personal Assistants	1 week	Lagos
11/4/88	Production Planning and Control	1 week	Lagos
11/4/88	Accounting for Supervisors and Senior Clerks	1 week	Lagos
11/4/88	Leadership and Motivation	1 week	Lagos
11/4/88	Leadership and Motivation	1 week	Kaduna
18/4/88	Management Accounting	1 week	Lagos
18/4/88	Field Sales Management	1 week	Lagos
25/4/88	Maintenance Management	1 week	Lagos
25/4/88	Financial Management for Directors	1 week	Lagos
25/4/88	How to improve Managerial Performance	1 week	Kaduna
25/4/88	Management Appreciation	1 week	Aba
	MAY 1988		
9/5/88	Supervisory Management	1 week	Lagos
9/5/88	Finance for Non-Finance Executives	1 week	Lagos
9/5/88	Managing People for Desired Results	1 week	Lagos
9/5/88	Developing Supervisory Leadership Skills	1 week	Kano
9/5/88	Supervisory Management	1 week	Aba
16/5/88	Managing Accounting Departments	1 week	Lagos
23/5/88	How to improve Managerial Performance	1 week	Lagos
23/5/88	Advanced Management Accounting and Information Control	2 weeks	Calabar
23/5/88	Products and Brand Management	1 week	Lagos
23/5/88	Developing Supervisory Leadership Skills	1 week	Lagos
23/5/88	Management Appreciation	1 week	Kano
30/5/88	Inventory Management	1 week	Lagos
30/5/88	Managing The Team	1 week	Lagos
	JUNE 1988		
6/6/88	Corporate Strategy for Directors	1 week	Lagos
6/6/88	Organization and Methods for Office Administration	1 week	Lagos
6/6/88	Budgeting and Budgetary Control	1 week	Lagos
6/6/88	Marketing Research	2 weeks	Lagos
6/6/88	Middle Level Management	2 weeks	Kaduna
6/6/88	Leadership and Motivation	1 week	Aba
13/6/88	Internal Auditing	1 week	Lagos
13/6/88	Understanding Human Behaviour Course for Senior Nursing Officer	1 week	Lagos
20/6/88	Middle Level Management	2 weeks	Lagos
20/6/88	Work Study	2 weeks	Lagos
20/6/88	Accounting For Supervisors and Senior Clerks	1 week	Lagos
20/6/88	Management Appreciation	1 week	Calaba
27/6/88	Management Auditing	1 week	Lagos

NIM COURSES

	JUNE (Continued...)		
27/6/88	Leadership and Motivation in Management	1 week	Lagos
27/6/88	Leadership and Motivation in Management	1 week	Jos
	JULY 1988		
7/7/88	Supervisory Management	1 week	Lagos
7/7/88	Banking and Corporate Cash Management	1 week	Lagos
7/7/88	Effective Selling Skills	1 week	Lagos
7/7/88	Middle Level Management	2 weeks	Aba
11/7/88	Management Appreciation	1 week	Lagos
11/7/88	Management Accounting	1 week	Lagos
11/7/88	Effective Human Relations in the Organization	1 week	Lagos
11/7/88	Management Appreciation	1 week	Kaduna
18/7/88	Corporate and Board Room Management for Directors	1 week	Lagos
18/7/88	Net-Work Analysis and Project Management	1 week	Lagos
18/7/88	Managing Accounting Department	1 week	Lagos
18/7/88	Field Sales Management	1 week	Lagos
	AUGUST 1988		
1/8/88	Management Course for Executive Secretaries and Personal Assistants	1 week	Lagos
1/8/88	Practical Purchasing Management	1 week	Lagos
1/8/88	Credit and debt Management	1 week	Lagos
1/8/88	Marketing and Sales Management	3 weeks	Lagos
1/8/88	Personnel Management	3 weeks	Lagos
1/8/88	How to improve Managerial Performance	1 week	Aba
8/8/88	Production Planning and Control	1 week	Lagos
8/8/88	Finance for Non-Finance Executives	1 week	Lagos
15/8/88	Advanced Management Course	3 weeks	Benin
15/8/88	Supervisory Management	1 week	Lagos
15/8/88	Leadership and Motivation in Management	1 week	Owerri
22/8/88	Advanced Management Accounting and Information Control	2 weeks	Kano
22/8/88	Leadership and Motivation in Management	1 week	Sokoto
29/8/88	Work Study, Productivity and Cost Reduction	4 weeks	Lagos
29/8/88	Selling of Industrial Products	1 week	Lagos
29/8/88	Developing Supervisory Leadership Skills	1 week	Lagos
29/8/88	Supervisory Management	1 week	Port Harcourt
	SEPTEMBER 1988		
5/9/88	Accounting for Supervisory and Senior Clerk	1 week	Lagos
5/9/88	Personal Effectiveness Self and Time Management	1 week	Lagos
5/9/87	Management Appreciation Course	1 week	Port Harcourt
12/9/88	Management Appreciation	1 week	Lagos
12/9/88	Financial Management for Directors	1 week	Lagos
12/9/88	Effective Selling Skills	1 week	Lagos
12/9/88	Managing People for Desired Results	1 week	Lagos
19/9/88	Top Management for Senior Executives	1 week	Jos
19/9/87			
19/9/88	BBC	1 week	Lagos
26/9/88	Leadership and Motivation in Management	1 week	Lagos
16/9/88	Management Appreciation Course	1 week	Kano
26/9/87	Effective Selling Skills	1 week	Aba

NIM COURSES

OCTOBER 1988

3/10/88	How to improve Managerial Performance	1 week	Lagos
3/10/88	Internal Auditing	1 week	Lagos
3/10/88	Field Sales Management	1 week	Lagos
10/10/88	Organization and Methods for Office Administration	1 week	Lagos
10/10/88	Industrial Relations	1 week	Lagos
10/10/88	Leadership and Motivation in Management	1 week	Maiduguri
17/10/88	MBO Adviser Course	3 weeks	Lagos
17/10/87	Management Auditing	1 week	Lagos
17/10/87	Marketing and Sales Management (RD)	1 week	Lagos
17/10/87	Employment Laws and Regulations	1 week	Lagos
17/10/88	Management Appreciation	1 week	Owerri
31/10/88	Supervisory Management	1 week	Lagos
31/10/88	Management Accounting	1 week	Lagos
31/10/88	Advertising Sales Promotion and Merchandising	2 weeks	Lagos
31/10/88	Developing Supervisory Leadership Skills	1 week	Lagos
31/10/88	Middle Level Management	2 weeks	Kaduna
31/10/88	Middle Level Management	2 weeks	Port Harcourt

NOVEMBER 1988

7/11/88	Inventory Management	1 week	Lagos
7/11/88	Advanced Management Accounting and Information Control	2 weeks	Ilorin
7/11/88	Job Evaluation and Salary Admin	1 week	Lagos
14/11/88	Work Study, Productivity and Cost Reduction (RB)	1 week	Lagos
21/11/88	Middle Level Management Course	2 weeks	Lagos
21/11/88	Maintenance Management	1 week	Lagos
21/11/88	Managing Accounting Departments	1 week	Lagos
21/11/88	Managing People for Desired Resultsd	1 week	Lagos
21/11/88	Management Appreciation	1 week	Zaria
21/11/88	Supervisory Management	1 week	Aba
28/11/88	Credit and Debt Management	1 week	Lagos
28/11/88	Effective Selling Skills	1 week	Lagos
28/11/88	Effective Selling Skills	1 week	Aba

DECEMBER 1988

5/12/88	Supervisory Management	1 week	Lagos
5/12/88	Budgeting and Budgetary Control	1 week	Lagos
5/12/88	Leadership and Motivation in Management	1 week	Lagos
5/12/88	How to improve Managerial Performance	1 week	Kano
5/12/88	How to improve Managerial Performance	1 week	Aba
12/12/88	Management Appreciation	1 week	Lagos
12/12/88	Field Sales Management	1 week	Lagos
12/12/88	Developing Supervisory Leadership Skills	1 week	Lagos
12/12/88	Banking and Corporate Cash Management	1 week	Lagos

News from branches

New Executive for Jos Branch

THE Jos Branch of the Nigerian Institute of Management has elected a new executive for the 1987/88 year.

The post of Chairman went to Dr. Samuel A. Olaiya while the new Secretary-General is Mr. E. E. Umoren.

Other officers elected for the current year were Mr. S. Z. Jakande (vice-Chairman), Mr. U. Mallam (Treasurer) Mr. S. Agu (Assistant Secretary), Mr. Abel Nwankwo (Financial Secretary), Mr. A. U. Musa (Publicity Secretary), Mr. N. F. Byanyiko (Ex-Officio member) and Mr. A. M. Offiongodon (Ex-Officio member).

Dr Olaiva in an address to the new executive committee of the Branch at its inaugural meeting held last August, listed the parameters for their success which include membership drive; providing information on NIM's activities to non-member organisations and individuals; response of the branch to headquarters activities; the impact of the branch on management practice in Plateau State; the commitment of members to programmes aimed at achieving the objectives and goals of the Institute plus payment of dues

He acknowledged the private visit of the NIM President, Dr. Christopher Kolade, to Jos and his swift meeting with him.

Dr. S. A. Olaiya, Chairman.

Mr. E. E. Umoren, Secretary-General

NIM BRANCH CHAIRMAN RECOMMENDS PEOPLE—ORIENTED POLICIES FOR MANAGERS

A call has been made on Nigerian managers to show human sympathy and consideration to their workers in order to evoke in them a sense of belonging and brotherhood which is instrumental to job satisfaction and peak performance.

The call came from the Chairman of the Enugu Branch of the Nigerian Institute of Management, Mr. Ikedi Mpamugo, while opening a seminar on the theme: "Managing for Effective Results". The seminar was organised by the Enugu Branch of the NIM and held at the Hotel Presidential in Enugu.

Mr. Mpamugo went on to say that the human factor was the most important in any organisational set-up. He therefore enjoined managers to adopt, at all times, people-oriented policies since *"management* is people and the concern for them will always pay off'.

The seminar also examined the following sub-themes, namely: setting the climate for effective performance; setting organisational and unit objectives; management development and management succession, planning as well as performance and use of potentials.

Management at Grassroots —The Dynamics of Economic Revival

MANAGEMENT has again been pronounced the hub around which organizational tools, techniques, methods and expertise revolve.

In a paper entitled: *Management at Grassroots: the Dynamics of Economic Revival*, Dr (Mrs) M. Georgina Di-Ibor of the Faculty of Education, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, explained that the dynamics needed in the struggle to revive the nation's economy or even to tackle the problem of ineffective entrepreneurship in business enterprises in the nation, is embodied in the principles of management.

The paper was presented at a public lecture organised by the Zaria Branch of the NIM on the occasion of the presentation of certificates to participants at the

(Continued on page 29)

News from Branches

(Continued from page 28)

Grassroot Business Workshop earlier organised by the Branch for businessmen and women in Zaria and its environs. The certificates were presented by the Emir of Zaria.

Mrs Di-Ibor summarised all the papers presented at the workshop and noted that by organising the workshop, the Zaria Branch of the NIM was demonstrating its belief in the systems approach to problem-solving.

She commented on the part played by each of the following in ensuring the effectiveness of small and medium scale businesses—marketing techniques, personnel management and human relations as well as law.

On marketing, Mrs Di-Ibor noted the inadequate attention given to marketing research by small and medium scale businesses in the country. Environmental conditions which should determine the nature of marketing strategies and techniques are not usually studied, she said. The result of this neglect, she went on, is over-pricing as well as deceptive advertising both of which evoke suspicion and product boycott from consumers.

The university don emphasized the importance of book-keeping to all small and medium scale businesses and said that accounting records should be such that can give adequate information to all the interest groups in the business, such as the owners, creditors, shareholders, employers and the general public.

All business enterprises, be they large, small or medium scale, should use banking facilities, she said, "if only for the preservation of assets". She enjoined enterprises to be conversant with the services offered by the various types of banking institutions, particularly commercial banks, merchant banks, and development banks since any of them could prove useful in particular circumstances.

Dr. Di-Ibor recognised the importance, to an organisation, of an effective management of its cash flow. She listed the common problems of financial managers as having to do with *(a)* the reviewing of budgets, delegating authority and evaluation (administrative); *(b)* projection ability (forecasting) and *(c)* the ability to ration available capital and liquid resources among competing investment opportunities (resource management). To overcome these difficulties, she recommended the adoption, by business managers, of organised systems of accounting which provide financial records on past operating results and current financial conditions.

The university don also explained the importance of corporate bodies seeking insurance cover for their operations as a wedge against risks which are prevalent in all business activities. An insurance system, she noted, is "a mechanism for reducing the adverse financial impact of random events that prevent the fulfilment of reasonable expectations". She recommended four types of cover for business, namely: fire, crime, liability and life, and stressed that all insurance contracts must be valid in order to be legally enforceable.

To provide adequately for the welfare of workers, Dr. Di-Ibor recommended that small and medium scale businesses should employ personnel managers. Such men or women, she said, must be knowledgeable enough in personnel management and industrial/human relations; must be good judges of human affairs; must be friendly, firm, patient and impartial; and must be able and prepared to tolerate dialogue between management and staff, to promote teamwork, to review personnel policies for continuous improvement of working conditions and staff morale and must demonstrate concern for the development of the staff by allowing them attend courses, seminars and workshops.

Dr. (Mrs) Di-Ibor, Senior Lecturer, ABU.

Finally, Dr. Di-Ibor advised business managers to be acquainted with legal provisions of business such as the Registration of Business Act of 1966. the Business Names Act of 1961. The Partnership Act of 1890, the Companies Act of 1965, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act of 1972 (amended 1977), the Finance (Miscellaneous Taxation Provision) Decree of 1985 and other similar legislation affecting business.

OBITUARY

NIM announces the death of High Chief A. A. Adegbie, a founding Council member and one-time President of NIM (1976—1979).

In two separate letters of condolence sent to the family of the deceased, both Dr. C. O. Kolade, President and Chairman of Council and Professor J. O. Ogunlade, Director-General, noted the significant contributions and dedication of late High Chief A. A. Adegbie to the growth of NIM and wished him peaceful eternal rest while condoling members of his family.

NIM was well represented at his burial ceremonies in Lagos, and Ondo, from Thursday October 29th to Saturday 31st October, 1987.

May his soul rest in perfect peace.

The role of Small Scale enterprises in the economic Development of Nigeria

by S. I. Owualah

The effectiveness of finance for the SME's sector is likely to come to naught unless its present scope is limited to enterprises of high priority to our present and future needs with potentials—

PUBLIC debate on the contributions of Small and Medium-Enterprises (SMEs) to a country's economic development is continuing[1] At all levels, the debate appears to be fired by the growing awareness of the potential social and economic importance of a viable SMEs sector

The social importance is attributed to their influence in stimulating indigenous entrepreneurship and technology That, by acting as a seedbed or nursery, usually for the indigenous population, they serve as vehicles for the propagation and diffusion of innovative ideas of far-reaching dimensions Of no less importance although open to debate is their role in providing avenues for "moonlighting" thus contributing to labour stability in those sectors (such as in the public sectors of developing countries) prone to high rate of labour turn-over due to wage inequalities.[2]

A second social contribution of SMEs is the transformation of traditional industry. In both developed and developing countries, the traditional sector has served and continues to serve as the springboard for launching a vibrant modern sector To a greater extent in the former, the modern sector has evolved through a structural transformation and modernization of their traditional type—cottage or artisan industries. Thus a fledging SMEs sector can be a means of achieving a smooth transition from the traditional to the modern industrial sector.

The creation of employment is of no less significance economically as it is socially though their role in the latter has been more emphasized in the literature. Arising from their more copious use of labour, SMEs are credited with being one of the effective ways of tackling the problem of unemployment. They are also regarded as a means of engendering equity in the distribution of employment opportunities as well as income between the urban and rural localities and residents respectively Economically, SMEs are believed to aid the dispersal of economic activities through encouraging the development and modernization of these activities outside the major metropolitan areas. Their great locational flexibility is assumed to be the source of their strength in playing this role.

Their ability to mobilise financial resources which would otherwise be idle or untapped by the formal financial institutions is another economic role of the SMEs. More often than not, the initial capital invested in these enterprises comes from personal savings or from funds diverted from luxury or unproductive end-uses.[3] Furthermore their resource utilization encompasses the greater use of local raw materials or even by-products of the Large-scale Enterprises (LEs) which would normally be discarded Also SMEs facilitate the conservation of foreign exchange and the development of the scarce resource of management in developing countries. They are able to economize on these limited resources because of their size or scale of operations and ownership or management structure which is not usually sophisticated. Whereas the foreign capital invested in LEs tends to favour the interests of their promoters, usually foreigners via distorted transfer pricing policy, a high percentage of the profits of SMEs most of which are locally owned, is known to be reinvested to ensure a higher rate of future growth.[4]

Above all, they are potentially strong in aiding the diversification of the industrial structure. Apart from facilitating the process of import-substitution, thus transforming trade capital into production capital, they help in fostering flexibility in the industrial structure. The impact of this is manifested in their greater ability to cater for diversified consumer needs especially at the lower economic echelon aside from producing goods and services with high intrinsic value-added content.

2. Promotion of SMEs as a strategy for economic self-reliance and Rural Development—Relevance to Nigeria's Development

The secret behind the success of a self-reliant strategy does not lie in any particular political philosophy so much as in the people's basic attitude to enterprise and in the extent to which the right incentives adequate enough to make risks worth taking are provided Economic history is replete with enough insights into the humble beginnings of present-day giant corporations. At inception, almost all of them were back-street enterprises growing as their industry grew and through their sheer ability either to produce existing products more cheaply or improve their utility.[5] Even at the country level, in the early stages of her industrialization, Japan's economy was dominated by traditional industries and by a large number of small firms drawing their strength not from an abundance of capital but rather from her vast supply of labour. During the inter-war years and after, government policies accorded and continue to accord due priority to the country's SMEs.[6] This has been in recognition that they constitute the fountain head of vitality for her national economy and consequently their problems have been viewed as those of the nation by virtue of their number, diversity, penetration in all sectors of production and marketing, contribution to employment and to the prosperity of particular regions. In concrete terms, SMEs in Japan account for about 99.4 per cent of the non-primary business establishments, employ 81.1 per cent of the country's labour force and contribute to 51.8 per cent of the shipment value of all her manufactures.[7]

Along the same considerations as above but more, as giving greater meaning to her system of private enterprise and free competition, SMEs' problems in the United States of America have come to be viewed as intricately interwoven with other national problems, hence the establishment of the Small Business Administration (SBA). The same can be said of the other Western industrialized nations of West Germany, Italy, Canada, France and the United Kingdom.

Thus, contrary to the widely-held views in the fifties and sixties during which modern industrial development was equated with Large Enterprises because of considerations of economies of scale and Small Enterprises were viewed as a sign of technological backwardness; their rapid decline in index of development, and the recognition of their complementary role have now gained wider currency.[8] This in turn has led and continues to lead to a reconsideration of their roles in the economies of both the advanced industrialized and developing countries. While their growing emphasis in the former lies in their role in the sustenance of non-inflationary growth and high employment,[9] their role in the latter would seem to be in consideration of their being a veritable instrument for achieving economic self-reliance and rural development. Their role in resource utilization was cited in Section I. Nevertheless, it needs to be added here that this role in itself fosters self-reliance; enabling a country's resources to be channelled into those economic activities which move her out of a "dependency economy" status to one of self-sufficiency, at least, in her basic needs as well as into those activities in which she is resource-abundant and has a comparative advantage in following an export-oriented strategy with the passage of time.

Serving as a potential breeding ground for indigenous entrepreneurship, they are best suited as launching pads for the take-off of indigenous based technologies; an adaptation and testing ground for "imported" technology rather than by the tortuous and sometimes frustrating road of acquiring technological transfer through large Multinational Corporations (MNCs). Experience is enough guide to the disappointment of those who have relied on the transfer of "imported" technology through the platter of MNCs. Coincidentally, a vast expanse of the rural areas of developing countries are patently neglected and most of their inhabitants either unemployed or underemployed. Unemployment of equal proportions is steadily threatening the urban cities formerly thought to be a safe haven for employment; with hordes of unemployed but able-bodied youths now a sign of daily life. The role of SMEs in providing labour-intensive employment thus augmenting the LEs' supply has already been cited in Section I. But equally important is their contribution to rural development helping to stem the wave of urban-rural migration and its attendant pressure on the limited urban infra-structures such as housing and utilities and contributing to a well-balanced, all-round regional development.

A few examples of developing countries which have harnessed the potentials of their SMEs in the pursuit of a self-reliant industrialization strategy can be cited. In his study of the small-scale enterprises of two emergent industrial Third World countries of Taiwan and Korea, Ho (1980) notes the transition from a traditional to a modern economy in which the small enterprise sector as a whole but in particular, small factories continue to be important. For Taiwan in particular, he observes that the wider dispersal of industry resulting from the linkages between small and larger manufacturing enterprises has important and positive effects in some areas. These are on the development of rural and regional industries and on employment and income distribution in the countryside.

Writing on the issues of technology transfer among developing countries, Bhattasali (1972) demonstrates vividly that India owes a lot of credit to her SMEs in the realisation of her self-reliant strategy of industrialization. Also on the contributions of small-scale and village industries to India's recent economic fortunes, Donde (1978) evaluates them in terms of 80 per cent of the total labour force and of 50 per cent of the total national output involving a wide range of modern products.

The implications of the issues examined here for a viable SMEs sector in a country like Nigeria in dire need of a self-reliant industrial strategy to turn her economy round and save her from the instabilities inherent in a mono-cultural economy[10] are far-reaching to warrant the attention of not only

(Continued on page 35)



BOOKSELLER

REVIEWS

Title: Pension Schemes in Nigeria
Author: Patric A. Uzoma
Publishers: Gentle Press Limited,
P.O. Box 4579
International Airport,
Ikeja.
Reviewer: Dele Osundahunsi
Price: ₦15.00

THIS is an addition to the few books on Life Insurance and Pensions Administration in Nigeria.

The book contains 10 chapters which deal with the following subjects—framework for personal welfare, funding a scheme, insured versus uninsured schemes, insured staff retirement benefit schemes, benefits under employee retirement benefit schemes, establishing a new scheme, scheme administration, National Provident Fund (NPF), Public Service scheme, Pension fund investment.

Chapter One is an attempt to clarify, explain and define pension schemes and death in services as Two examines how to fund a scheme. Chapters Three to Five examine the merits and demerits of insured and non-insured. Chapters Six and Seven concern themselves with procedural issues of establishing and administering schemes. Chapters Eight and Nine respectively, highlight the Public Service Scheme.

As a practical working tool to pension administrators, the book has five appendices namely: Guide to Approval of Pension & Provident Fund Scheme in Nigeria (1982); National Provident Fund Act (1961); Pensions Decree 1979; Government and Other Securities (Local Trustee Powers) Ordinance and The Trustee Investment Act of 1962.

The book is finally aided with a lot of bibliographical references which students of insurance and pension schemes will find very beneficial.

How does the author categorize it? Is it a text-book, monograph or an occasional publication? If it is a text-book, have the advertisements inserted not created digressional antithesis for the well-intended work?

NEW BOOKS ON MANAGEMENT

1. TITLE: Multinational Corporation of Nigeria

   AUTHORS: B. Onimode, J. Ohorhenem & T. Adeniran

   PUBLISHERS: LESSHYDRADEN NIGERIA LIMITED, Ibadan.

   PAGES: 144

2. TITLE: Guide to Nigerian Taxes.

   AUTHORS: Farayola, G. O.

   PUBLISHERS: All Crowns Nigeria Limited, Ikeja.

   PAGES: 498.

NIM LAUNCHES MANAGEMENT BOOK

NIM on Saturday 14th November launched a book titled *Management Concepts, Techniques and Cases* written by Mrs J. A. Akanni, the Chief Accountant of the Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State.

The 455-page book covers aspects like development of modern management thought, social roles of managers, planning process, forecasting, managerial decision making, organising, delegation and decentralization, personnel administration, career development, compensation, leadership roles, and motivation. In addition, the author dealt with tools of management like communication, human elements, finance, budget control, management information systems including the history and role of computer in management decision making.

One of the highlights of the book is the inclusion of cases with theories to test readers' understanding and application of theories learnt in the book.

One of its shortfalls is that a lot of the references cited in the book are not cushioned off in the 1½—page skeletal bibliography pinned to the work. Perhaps the second edition will take care of that.

The book printed in Nigeria has also demonstrated that Nigerian printers can perform as well as their counterparts in other parts of the world. Its aesthetic quality is high in terms of printing and illustration; but its academic quality could have been enhanced with more painstaking desk editing.

Mrs Akanni holds a B.Sc and MBA of the Long Island University in New York and Brooklyn campuses in USA respectively. She is currently the Financial Adviser and Head of Finance Department of the Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State in Ibadan. In addition, she is the General Secretary of the Oyo State Branch of the Nigerian Institute of Management in Ibadan as well as a member of the Membership Committee of the Institute.

In a speech at the launching, the Director-General of NIM congratulated her on the achievement and called on trainee managers and training managers to make good use of the book. Management In Nigeria also congratulates Mrs Akanni on this achievement.

Management In Nigeria Increases Advert Rates

THERE has been a marginal increase of 20 per cent in the advertisement rates of *"Management In Nigeria"* effective from January, 1988.

The increase is necessitated by increased production cost and it is the barest minimum that can be considered in the present circumstance.

Details of the new rates are as follows:

Outside Back Cover (OBC)	₦2,160
Inside Front Cover (IFC)	1,944
Inside Back Cover (IBC)	1,872
Page Opposite the Inside Back Cover	1,728
Fourth Page to Outside Back Cover	1,584
The Page Opposite the Content Page	1,728
The page Opposite the Inside Front Cover	1 728
Centre Spread Full Colour	3,000
Four-page Pull-out (Full Colour)	6 240
Full Page Black & White	1 224
A Double Page Advert (Full Colour)	2,874
A Double Page Advert (Black & White)	2 304
Half Page Advert (Full Colour)	864
Half Page Advert (Black & White)	803
One Spot Colour	360

CLASSIFIED ADVERT

3" × 3 columns or 9" × 1 column	₦576
7½" × 1 column	480
¼ Page (4½" × 3")	408

Existing terms and conditions for acceptance of advertisements will continue to apply.

NEWS FLASH

MOST NIGERIANS WORK FOR ABOUT 100 DAYS OUT OF 365 DAYS A YEAR

MOST NIGERIANS WORK FOR ABOUT 100 DAYS OUT OF 365 DAYS A YEAR

Column 1	*Column 2*	*Column 3*	*Column 4*
Excuses	No. of days off	Cummulative Total Total of Col.2	Commulative annual 365—column 3
Saturdays	52	52	315
Sundays	52	104	261
Xmas day/Boxing day	2	106	259
New Year day	1	107	258
Id-El-Maalud	2	109	256
National Day	1	110	255
Good Friday	1	111	254
Easter Monday	1	112	253
Id-El-Kabir	2	114	251
May Day	1	115	250

MOST NIGERIANS WORK FOR LESS THAN 100 DAYS OUT OF THE 365 DAYS A YEAR

Column 1	*Column 2*	*Column 3*	*Column 4*
Sick Leave	15 days (average)	130	235
Casual Leave	7 days	137	228
Past week-end/public holiday hangover	3	140	225
Un-official telephone calls	10	150	220
Receiving private visitors/visits others at work	10	160	210
Gossip time	5	165	205
Official break time at 1 hr per day, for five days in the week	11	176	194
Buying/Selling time at 10 minutes per day	2	178	192
Lateness to work at 1 hr. per day.	11	189	181
Attendance to/thinking of about Family problems/lovers at an average of 1 hr. per day.	11	200	170
Medically, an average person works up to 60% efficiency	$\frac{60}{100} \times 170 =$		102 days

Prof. K. B. Adadevoh

Mr. Kalu Agwu emerged as the winner of the 1987 Young Managers' Competition.

Details will be carried in the 1988, January/February edition of *Management In Nigeria.*

(Continued from page 31)
policy makers but also academicians. The merits of such a course of action are very compelling not only because this sector accounted for 53.6 per cent of value-added in manufacturing in 1978 (a figure likely to have been exceeded since then) but also that 45 per cent of total employment of industrial establishments in Nigeria are provided by this sector. It is also known that as at the end of 1979, over 80 per cent of all establishments registered under the Factory Act were small-scale industries.[11]

3. State of Finance for SMEs in Nigeria

Undoubtedly, shortage of finance is not the only problem of SMEs in Nigeria. Others include unfavourable government regulations (such as biased tariff restrictions and licensing, low demand by government for their services and lack of necessary fiscal incentives), inappropriate technologies and relatively unsophisticted management. Nevertheless, a case can be made for shortage of finance as constituting a major obstacle to the growth of a viable SMEs sector in Nigeria. The real shortage of finance exists within these enterprises for both fixed investment and working capital while it could be opined that surrounding them is a surfeit of investible capital seeking for a well-conceived delivery system to reach the ultimate point-of-impact. Indeed here may lie the anti-thesis of Schatz's (1965) thesis of a "capital shortage illusion" which he attributes to ineffective demand by indigenous entrepreneurs.

But before delving further into this issue of delivery, let's pause and examine a few definitional problems. To put the size of enterprises under consideration into proper perspective, it is necessary to define SMEs as applicable in the Nigerian context. As of date, there is no unanimity in the definition(s) used for SMEs in Nigeria. However a common point of unanimity exists in their de-emphasis of number of employees as a criterion for classifying these enterprises.

The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) defines small-scale enterprises (SSEs) as establishments whose annual turnover (sales figures) does not exceed ₦500,000.[12] The Federal Ministry of Commerce and Industries' Small-scale Industries Division designates enterprises with total capital investment (including land, building, machinery and equipment and working capital) of ₦250,000 and employing not more than 50 persons as falling into the category of Small-scale enterprises. The Ministry's definition allows enough elbow-room to accommodate manufacturing units exceeding this ceiling of capital investment and employment stated above provided the technology of production is fairly labour-intensive and the plant size relatively small.

The Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry (NBCI) like the Federal Ministry of Commerce and Industries, defines Small-scale enterprises in terms of total capital investment but excludes cost of land in the computation of a ceiling of ₦300,000. In the prevailing definitional circumstance, it is only safe to adopt the ceiling of ₦300,000 in total capital investment (including building, machinery and equipment and working capital but excluding land) and that of ₦500,000 in annual sales turn over both employed by the financial institutions since they are expected to be the major purveyors of institutional finance to this sector.

Furthermore, the category of enterprises under review here are those engaged in non-agricultural activities. The problem of finance for agricultural and agro-based enterprises appears to have received greater attention, at least in relative terms although it must be admitted that the extent of success in financing the country's agricultural sector remains open to question.[13]

Three major sources of institutional finance in the formal market to the SMEs can be easily identified, namely the Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), the Commercial and Merchant banks (including the Cooperative banks) and the Federal and State governments. At the national level with particular respect to the DFIs, the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry (NBCI) is vested with the statutory responsibility of financing the SMEs' sector among other functions. Appendix I illustrates the size structure of enterprises financed by NBCI from her inception in 1973 to 1975.

Based on the bank's definition for small-scale enterprises, it is evident that only 31 of these enterprises—that is enterprises within the ceiling of ₦300,000 in capital assets—were financed by her out of a total of 61 projects for the period. A summary of her total approved projects per state of the Federation as at the end of 1983—a decade after the establisbment is shown in Appendix 2. Although a remarkable improvement in the number of projects financed is noticeable, judged by the average size of projects approved per state, an impression is created that her scale of financing was outside the range defined for small-scale enterprises. This is unlikely to be the case in practice particularly as the bank has since 1981 taken over the administration of the Federal Government's budgetary appropriations for small-scale enterprises.

The Nigerian Industrial Development Bank (NIDB) is another DFI statutorily obliged to finance industrialization in Nigeria. However, her policies preclude her from financing such activities as cottage industries and other small-scale industries among other activities even though most of these are within her minimum lending exposure of ₦50,000. Thus the bank's role in financing SMEs must be assessed against the backdrop of this operational framework. Nevertheless, according to the Bank's Managing Director, Abdulkadir[14] from 1964 to 1984, the NIDB assisted IOI projects whose project costs were less than ₦250,000 or 195 projects whose costs were below ₦500,000. In financial terms, the bank's commitments in these projects amounted to ₦19.9 million representing 3.5 per cent of her total commitments in all projects financed. Data is not readily available to evaluate the contributions which on the aggregate could be significant.

Commercial banks have had a long history of association with Nigeria's indigenous businesses that it is very tempting to credit them with much of the latter's achievements.[15] While this might not be far from the truth, what is in doubt is whether they could not have done better given their "elevated" position in the nation's financial structure. The banks on their part admit their failure to go beyond the statutory obligations imposed on them by the monetary authorities but defend their shortcomings with reasons which in themselves have at least a face value. Their merchant bank counterparts have not fared better in financing the SMEs because of their interest in the "Big businesses". Since 1979/80 fiscal year, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has stipulated a mandatory lending minimum [16] of, 10 per cent to small-scale enterprises out of total banks' loans and advances of 70 per cent reserved for indigenous borrowers. This minimum lending rate has since the 1980 fiscal year risen to 16 per cent of loans and advances for indigenous borrowers.

By size structure, this minimum allocation for small-scale enterprises is as follows:-

Classification of Small-scale enterprises based on Annual Sales Turnover

	1979/80	*1980—To Date*
	%	%
Up to ₦25,000	1.0	1.6
Over ₦25,000 — ₦50,000	1.0	2.0
Over ₦50,000 — ₦100,000	2.0	3.2
Over ₦100,000 — ₦200,000	2.5	4.0
Over ₦200,000 — ₦500,000	3.5	5.2
	10.0	16.0

In financial terms, lendings by commercial banks to small-scale enterprises in compliance to the above mandatory lending stipulations from 1980 to 1985 are shown in Table 3.

Table 3: AGGREGATE LOANS AND ADVANCES TO SMALL-SCALE ENTERPRISES BY COMMERCIAL BANKS (1980 — 1985)

	1980	*1981*	*1982*	*1983*	*1984*	*1985*
			₦'million			
Up to ₦25,000	12.1	20.5	26.6	42.9	113.9	'19.4
Over ₦25,000 — ₦50,000	16.2	21.4	18.8	38.8	88.9	97.6
Over ₦50,000 — ₦100,000	16.0	25.8	22.0	32.5	110.7	382.6
Over ₦100,000 — ₦200,000	22.3	24.7	32.0	42.6	139.8	127.4
Over ₦200,000 — ₦500,000	46.8	92.6	107.3	194.5	252.4	243.6
Total (Aggregate)	113.4	185.0	206.7	351.3	705.7	970.6
Aggregate Loans and Advances by Commercial Banks	6379.2	8604.8	10,277.0	11,100.0	11,550.6	12,170.3
Percentage allocation to SSEs	%	%	%	%	%	%
Up to ₦25,000	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	1.0	0.9
Over ₦25,000 — ₦50,000	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.8	0.8
Over ₦50,000 — ₦100,000	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.9	3.1
Over ₦100,000 — ₦200,000	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	1.2	1.0
Over ₦200,000 — ₦500,000	0.7	1.1	1.0	1.8	2.2	2.0
	1.8	2.1	2.0	3.2	6.1	7.8

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Lagos

A third source of institutional finance to SMEs is the government—both Federal and States. Apart from their investments in the Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) numbering 23 at the moment—wholly or partly owned by them, they make further specific financial contributions to the SMEs sector via annual budgetary appropriations. These appropriations are channelled through Small-scale Industries Credit Schemes under designated Federal and State Ministries. Appropriations for small-scale enterprises during the various National Development Plan periods at both Federal and State levels are shown in Table 4.

Table 4: APPROPRIATIONS TO SMALL-SCALE ENTERPRISES IN THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS BY FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS

	2nd NDP (1970 — 74)	*3rd NDP (1975 — 80)*	*4th NDP (1981 — 85)*
Federal Government	₦'000	₦'000	₦'000
(i) Direct—SSI Credit Scheme	n.a.	20,000	295,000
(ii) Indirect—Industrial Development Centres	800	33,000	n.a.
State Governments			
SSI Credit Scheme	4,040	28,600	n.a.

Source: Federal Government of Nigeria —National Development Plans (various).

The increase in the share capital of the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry (NBCI) from ₦50 million to ₦200 million through the conversion of existing loans to her by the Federal Government into equity is a clear demonstration of renewed interest in this sector.

Coming back to the issue of what kind of delivery system for financing the SMEs might be appropriate for Nigeria, a reference to the deliberations of the 20th Annual Banking Seminar of the Nigerian Institute of Bankers is necessary here. In this seminar whose theme "Self-reliance through Small-scale Enterprises" focused on a wide range of problems facing the SMEs sector in Nigeria, a number of far-reaching suggestions was advanced for improving the sector's financial base. Speaking on the role of development banks, Akwaeze[17] in his paper of the same title expressed the opinion that in order to shield commercial banks from the risk of defaults associated with SMEs' loans which they dread so much, they should be directed to implement his following recommendations.

1. To apply 50 per cent of their required commitments in this sector for the purchase of "Special government stocks" which in turn would be on-lent to an apex institution for the SMEs.
2. That the remaining 50 per cent be disbursed as loans to the apex institution through the latter's issue of Certificates of Deposits (CDs). Or in the alternative, commercial banks should disburse this half directly to the SMEs "if their personnel have the requisite project appraisal and supervision skills".[18] His latter recommendation appears to have failed to address the real issue as there seems to be very little differences in lending skills to LEs and SMEs which should necessarily place the latter on a greater disadvantage. As a matter of fact, if conventional reasoning is any guide, project appraisal of the complexity inherent in lending to LEs is more likely to be outside the capabilities of commercial banks and not the other way round. For one thing, SMEs' capital requirements are known not to be as lumpy as those of LEs which of necessity, demand more rigorous appraisal while the injection of more funds in the former can be phased according to financing needs. Viewed from another angle, taking over the financing of SMEs from the commercial banks because of the paucity of skilled personnel amounts to denying them the opportunity of "learning by doing"[19] which should be encouraged.

The apathy shown by commercial banks in lending to SMEs derives mainly from the higher transaction costs (administrative costs and risk of defaults) experienced in dealing with this category of borrowers. This is usually couched in such familiar phrases as... "unrealistic financial projections, poor staffing and incompetent management and questionable integrity of the promoters", among others by banks.[20] The claim implied in Akwaeze's propositions that the NBCI possesses an antidote for the risks which all the commercial banks put together find dreadful is to say the least unrealistic? Moreover, SMEs encompass a diversity of activities scattered over an equally diverse area of Nigeria. With only a branch office of the NBCI in each state of the country excluding the head office, much cannot be expected from her to strike at points of greatest impact in assisting the SMEs financially. Assigning so much responsibilities to the NBCI invariably creates a bureaucracy by default which can hardly match the effectiveness and efficiency attainable through the branch network of commercial banks.

Even if the argument that commercial banks' funds are short-term and therefore, ill-suited for the medium and long-term needs of the SMEs would seem plausible, one would rather recommend a role which takes this defect into consideration—such as the provision of working capital. Such a role makes less demand on sophistication in project appraisal involved in loans for start-ups. This point of view is in tune with Okigbo's (1981 p. 231) views... "the question that is difficult to answer is whether the critical bottle-neck in the small-scale sector is finance for capital equipment or for working capital. Both are in short supply. By sheer size of this sector, the gap in working capital funds would seem to oom larger than that for equipment and fixed investment. If indeed the working capital needs can be met in the most part by the banking system, the fixed investment needs can then be a subject of specialized institutions"

The foregoing discussion suggests that a specialised institution like the NBCI has a "niche" in the financing of SMEs which leaves other institutions with a role, even if a subsidiary one. Therefore, the role of the NBCI must be seen as complementary; not competitive. The kernel of the whole issue of finance for SMEs is embedded in designing a machinery which can ease the problems faced by lending institutions so that they can contribute more significantly to their growth and development...and in so doing, that of the country as a whole. It is in this respect that a dynamic financing policy begs for attention.

4. THE CASE FOR A DYNAMIC FINANCING POLICY FOR SMEs

In Section 3, the contributions of the various sources of finance for SMEs in the formal financial sector in Nigeria and the debate on which holds the best hope for closing the capital shortage gap in the sector were highlighted. Considering the size of the SMEs sector, whether or where a line of demarcation in financing her should be drawn between the various financial institutions, remains unsettled. However, the consensus would appear to be that all of them have joint as well as individual roles to play in closing this gap. Individually, commercial banks as a group represent an indispensable vehicle for reaching a larger section of the SMEs. This view is founded on their longer association with Nigerian business of all sizes and diversity. Others are their wider distribution of branch net-work in both urban and rural localities and greater financial resource base even if much of it is in "liquid" form.[21]

Commercial banks have been severely criticized for their lack of dynamism, over caution and rigid attitude to lending to SMEs.[22] Behind the thick veil of this lack of dynamism, overcaution and rigidity in attitude might lie some hidden explanations. One explanatory variable suspected of greatly influencing the attitude of banks can be proffered here: that is, the higher transaction costs (administration costs of loan appraisal, supervision and collection as well as the risks or probability of arrears and defaults) compared with the returns accruing from lending to the SMEs on one hand and other investment options on the other hand. Thus when alloting their funds, banks are more likely to consider SMEs as marginal borrowers at best especially in tight money market situations. One of the resolutions in the final communique of the 20th Annual Banking Seminar of the Nigerian Institute of Bankers calling for the establishment of a Small-scale Credit and Insurance Scheme appears to be directed at this problematic issue. Without doubt this recommendation offers some but not all solutions to the problem of arriving at an acceptable level of costs which can significantly encourage lending institutions to be less lethargic in this respect. A related issue in improving the credit-rating of the SMEs is the real lack of managerial and technical skills in the generality of them. Tackling the financing bottlenecks facing most, if not all of them, remains one way of tackling their other defects. Admittedly, the high cost of borrowing and limited availability of capital compel them to pursue sub-optimal policies which affect their acquisition of these skills or even employ people with requisite skills.

The main thrust of government initiatives in the financing of SMEs should revolve around a sharing of the burden of the risk involved rather than what appears to be "buck passing" at the moment. If current efforts at revitalising the country's SMEs sector through a judicious injection of credit among others must succeed, prospective lenders to the sector should be shielded to some extent from the enormous risks involved. This does not seem to be the case currently. Merely compelling banks to lend a stipulated percentage of their funds to this sector subject to stiff penalties for failing to do so, without adequate incentives is like applying the "stick without the carrot." Commercial banking and in deed all types of banking institutions with the exception of the Central Bank are profit oriented in their operations. Consequently, they should not be over-burdened with the task of financing our economic development especially when other economic units are less burdened, without cushioning the side-effects of this responsibility.

What is being advocated here is not a policy of a general subsidised credit scheme aimed at supporting the entire SMEs sector which may end up financing many inefficient ones that are wasteful users of scarce capital. Rather, the goal should be to map out a continuum of well-edited objectives...such as export promotion, attaining self-sufficiency in specific areas of our national life within a target time, *et cetera*, and promoting those of these SMEs necessary for achieving these objectives. At present, the criterion for lending to SMEs by commercial banks emphasizes indigenous ownership with a proviso that annual sales turnover would not exceed ₦500,000. The credit guideline does not go beyond categorising the enterprises to be financed according to their annual sales turnover and stipulating the percentage of loans and advances to be extended to each of these categories. There is no distinction between those which can make greater impact in the country's pursuit for self-reliance and those which cannot, given the scale of our national priorities. The implication is that all the SMEs are accorded the same weight in our national priority list inspite of the multiplicity of competing demands for our scarce financial resources. Apparently, the criterion of annual sales turnover as a yardstick for lending to SMEs, places on the same financing pedestal an indigenous enterprise trading on imported manufactures which competes with another enterprise trading on local manufactures of equivalent end-use. But let's stretch the argument farther and consider the case where the imported goods enjoy a wider consumer acceptance and which consequently boosts the sales turnover. This in effect *catapults* the seller to an advantaged position. This would seem to be the case since the higher the annual sales turnover, the greater the possibilities of being accommodated using the Central Bank's yardstick.

Aside from possibly slowing the pace of realising the self-sufficiency goal given the "scalar" nature of the national policy on SMEs, the present coverage of the financing arrangement is very unwieldy. At best, it leaves the selection of enterprises to benefit ultimately to commercial banks. Little wonder then that in prevailing milieu, the enterprises which received the greatest patronage since the inception of the credit guidelines on the financing of small-scale enterprises are the large ones in terms of annual sales turnover as evident in Table 3.

What has happened in effect is a crowding out of the smaller ones apart from the fact that it is doubtful if those favoured more, occupy a superior position in the ranking of our national priorities Whether annual sales turnover is a valid yardstick for determining the volume and direction of credit to SMEs, or whether it should suffice as a definitional tool for delineating them from the LEs, deserves being considered. In the final analysis, in whichever manner[23] the government takes up the risk sharing being advocated, the effectiveness of finance for the SMEs sector is likely to come to naught unless its present scope is limited to enterprises of high priority to our present and future needs with potentials of having a multiplier effect on the rest of the SMEs which also have potentials of future growth but not covered immediately in the financing programme. On a final note of caution, time has arrived for a clean break with the present "breath but no depth financing syndrome" for SMEs in Nigeria.

FOOTNOTES

1. In the U.K., this debate culminated in the Bolton Inquiry on Small Firms published in 1971. In Nigeria, the on-going debate is mirrored in the 1st National Workshop on the "Development of SMEs in Nigeria" in March, 1985, and the 20th Annual Banking Seminar of the Nigerian Institute of Bankers on "Self-reliance through Small-scale Enterprises" in September, 1985.
2. Harper, M. *Small Business in the Third World*. John Wiley and Sons (1984). p 13.
3. United Nations *Industrialization of Developing Countries Problems and Prospects. Small-scale Industry*, UNIDO Monograph No. II, New York (1969). pp. 11 — 12.
4. Harper, M. op cit. p. 15.
5. Storey, D. J. *Entrepreneurship and the New Firm*. Croom Helm London (1982), p. 6.
6. Owualah S. I. "SMEs and the Public Sector in Japan—The Role of the Japanese Government" (Unpublished).
7. JETRO Promotion of Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan". *Now in Japan*. No. 31 pp. 2 — 3.
8. Storey, D. J., Op. cit pp. 5 — 6.
9. See the Economic Declaration on Growth and Employment of the 1985 Bonn Summit of Heads of State of seven major industrial nations and the President of the EEC.
10. These instabilities stem from the country's over-dependence on the oil sector as the main source of government revenue and foreign exchange earnings and which is constantly threatened by poor external market situation.
11. Babalola, G. O., "The Role of Small-scale Industries in Industrial and Economic Development in Nigeria", p. 4 and Abdulkadir A. "Self-reliance and Small-scale Enterprises", p. 7. Papers presented at the 20th Annual Banking Seminar of the Nigerian Institute of Bankers (8 — 14 September, 1985).
12. Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Monetary Policy Circulars—Credit Guidelines (since 1979/80 fiscal year).
13. The Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund (ACGSF) was established in 1977 to provide guarantees to banking institutions for 75 per cent of their loans and advances granted to the agricultural sector. Between April 1977, and December, 1983, a total of 6089 loans amounting to ₦179,590.9 million were guaranteed under the scheme.
14. Abdulkadir, A. Op. cit. p. 13.
15. The history of commercial banking in Nigeria dates back to 1891, with the opening of a Nigerian out-post of the African Banking Corporation then operating in South Africa. As at the end of 1983, there were 25 commercial banks sharing between them a net-work of 1100 urban and rural branch offices throughout Nigeria.
16. This and other policy directives of great national economic importance are issued in the Annual Monetary Policy Circulars—Credit Guidelines to Commercial and Merchant banks by the Central Bank of Nigeria((CBN).
17. Akwaeze, G. C., "The Role of Development Banks". Paper presented at the 20th Annual Banking Seminar of the Nigerian Institute of Bankers. September, 1985. pp. 10 — 11.
18. Ibid p. II.
19. Anderson, D. "Small Enterprises and Development Policy in the Philippines. A Case Study". World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 468 (1981). p. 4 notes the effect of "learning by doing" in enhancing the quality of screening and appraisal of Small-scale enterprises' loan applications by lending institutions in the Philippines.
20. These are in the words of Ogundipe, V. A., in his paper "The Role of Commercial Banks", presented at the 20th Annual Banking Seminar of the Nigerian Institute of Bankers September, 1985 p. 6.
21. On these three counts, the commercial banking group is unrivalled by any of the other groups in the financial system.

(Continued on page 42)

BEWAC BETTER IN SECOND HALF

BEWAC Nigeria Limited rose from a group loss of ₦491,000 during the first half year to a net (after-tax) whole-year profit of ₦221,000 on its operations during the past year that ended 31st December, 1986.

This revelation was made by the company's acting chairman, Mr. Allison A. Ayida, during the 38th annual general meeting held at Central Hotel in Kano, last October.

On the general trading results, Mr. Ayida stated that the group turnover in 1986, reduced by ₦13.2 million or 34% to ₦25.6 million.

Mr Ayida reflected that 1986 was a most difficult trading year as a result of the Structural Adjustment Programme and its attendant Foreign Exchange Market.

Two executive directors of the company, Mr. D. B. Otrofanowei and Alhaji K. Shaibu retired voluntarily during the year and the acting chairman attributed this to "the continuing rationalization programme going on in the company".

SBN RECORDS GROWTH IN MANY SECTORS

The Savannah Bank of Nigeria Limited has hit the ₦1 billion mark in its total assets and this is a reflection of the fact of its substantial growth during the past year ended March 31st, 1987.

In his report to shareholders at the bank's annual general meeting held at the Congress Centre, NICON NOGA Hilton Hotel, in Abuja, recently, the Chairman, Chief S. O. Lawani, said that increase in asset base was 59.5% and that other increases were ₦101.348 in deposits (which stood at ₦667.037 million); ₦8.464 million or 47.8% in pre-tax profit (which was ₦26.185 million) and 46.4% in after-tax profit which was ₦18.523 million.

Gross and net earnings also rose by 24.3% and 28.4% respectively to ₦117.6 million and ₦80.4 million.

A dividend of 8.0 kobo per share which amounted to ₦5.588 million was paid to shareholders.

The chairman also intimated the shareholders of the three new services launched by the bank during the past year. These were the Special Savings Scheme for the youth under 21, the Time Deposit Open Account (TDOA) and the Export Promotion and Finance Scheme.

The under-21 scheme, he said, would enable the youth to borrow up to twice the amount in his savings account to assist him set up a business of his own, go into agriculture, or invest in quoted stocks. The TDOA will enable depositors to earn interest on funds which are as good as on current account while the Export Promotion and Finance Scheme will help link Nigerian exporters with purchasers abroad and also provide financial support and advice.

FLOUR MILLS, IN N2.6m PROFIT

Four Mills of Nigeria Limited made a net after-tax profit of ₦2,669,000 and consequently declared a dividend of ₦1,300,000 for the past year ended 31st March, 1987.

Making these assertions on Thursday, 22nd October, at the Banquet Hall of the National Theatre, Iganmu, Lagos, was the Chairman of the company, Mr. G. S. Coumantaros.

He stated that the turnover of the company decreased from ₦142.6 to ₦120.8 million and profit before tax decreased from ₦5.6 million to ₦4.4 million. Group turnover decreased from ₦165.5 million to ₦160.1 million. Group profit before tax however increased to ₦12.5 million from ₦11.3 million.

The decrease in net profit, the chairman explained, was due to the company's late receipt of import licence which was not issued until March, 1986.

The chairman also disclosed their plan to convert part of their wheat production lines to maize milling since wheat supply had been inadequate.

He congratulated staff on their dedication and loyalty which he said was the only magic behind the success made.

ALLIED BANK CELEBRATES SILVER JUBILEE

Allied Bank of Nigeria Limited was 25 years in business in the country on the 19th of September, and the occasion was celebrated with, among other activities, the opening of the bank's Apapa branch, and a lavish dinner at the Federal Palace Hotel Lagos.

The bank started business in the country as a branch of the Bank of India Limited, Bombay, on 10th September, 1962, and had its first office at Balogun Square in Lagos.

It became Bank of India (Nigeria) Limited, on May 30, 1969, and when changes were made in its ownership structure, in line with the provisions of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotions Decree of 1976, the name of the bank was changed in January, 1980, to Allied Bank of Nigeria Ltd.

By December 31, 1986, the bank had 40 branches spread throughout the federation.

ADEOSUN MOVES TO FIRST BANK AS MANAGING DIRECTOR

The Managing Director of First Bank of Nigeria Ltd., Chief Oluwole Adeosun, has attributed the tremendous success of his former organization—the NAL Merchant Bank—to stability in its leadership.

Chief Adeosun was responding to his toast at a send-off dinner held for him by NAL Merchant Bank where he was Chief Executive before being appointed to First Bank in August.

In a special tribute paid to him by both NAL chairman, Air Vice Marshal A. D. Bello (rtd.), and its new Chief Executive, Mr. John D. Oyetan, Chief Adeosun was said to have improved the operations of NAL Merchant Bank during his tenure (1979 — 1987), to the extent that the bank moved from fourth position among the country's merchant banks (with respect to assets, profits and return on assets) to the first position. It placed second only in total assets.

The First Bank Chief Executive said that since 1974, when Mr. Gamaliel Onosode became the first Nigerian Chief Executive of NAL Merchant Bank, no one had come from outside, and that Mr. Oyetan was the third successive chief executive to be appointed from inside the Bank. That stability, he said, was responsible for the great strides made by the bank.

USIS DONATES BOOKS

The United States Information Service (USIS), has donated 186 volumes of books to the Nigerian Institute of Management.

The books, which cover a wide range of management subjects were presented by Mr. E. Anyaso on behalf of the USIS.

The books among others include:

1. Gregg Shorthand Dictionary, by J. R. Gregg
2. Accounting Principles (computerized practice set), by Smith/Keith/Stephen
3. Marketing Management, by J. P. Guiltinam; and
4. Financial Institutions, Markets and Management, by R. O. Edmuster.

The 186 volumes promise to be a big aid to the staff and members of N.I.M. who, currently, form the bulk of the users of the library.

NIM Cooperators elect Officers

MR. A. O. Jolaoso emerged President of the NIM Cooperative Thrift and Credit Society in an election conducted at the Courtyard of Management House, on Wednesday, 18th November, 1987.

Mr. Jolaoso, like Margeret Thatcher, defeated three other contestants to wear the presidential crown for the third term. He is currently the Project Manager of NIM.

Other officers elected into office in the three-year old Cooperative Society are Mr. Adebayo, (Vice President), Mr. P. C. Opara (General Secretary), and Mr. A. A. Hodonu (Treasurer).

Other Exco members include Mr. C. A. Oloruntuyi, Sola Alonge, G. U. Njoku, Ade Akintomide and Mrs E. I. Olatunbosun.

According to Mr. Opara, the new General Secretary, the objective of the society is to help workers make ends meet by obtaining loans which are repaid with non commercial interests. The society also engages in the purchase of essential commodities for distribution to members at affordable prices.

The NIM Cooperative, Thrift and Credit Society is open to all cadres of workers of NIM.

Giwa Mans Lever Brothers

Chief Rufus Foluso Giwa has been appointed the Chairman and Managing Director for Lever Brothers Nigeria Limited, a member of UAC Group, to succeed retiring Mr. Abidogun.

Chief Giwa, who is a Chartered Accountant, joined Lever Brothers about twenty-one years ago as a Management Trainee, having obtained a bachelors degree of the University of Lagos, specialising in Accountancy.

He became a fellow of the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants on 18th October, 1974, and a fellow of the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators on 22nd April, 1975.

Chief Giwa had the singular honour of being the first Nigerian Financial Controller and the second Nigerian Commercial Director of Lever Brothers, and the rare opportunity of being the first Nigerian Commercial Officer in the Financial Group of Unilever, London, from 1982 — 1984.

Mr. Giwa is a Fellow of the Nigerian Institute of Management which he joined in 1970, as an Associate. He was upgraded to full membership on the 28th of July, 1983. Mr. Giwa is a member of the Council of the Nigerian Institute of Management.

In a letter to Chief Giwa congratulating him on this appointment, the Director-General, Professor J. O. Ogunlade, noted that although the tasks ahead are challenging, Chief Giwa's qualities will not only guide him to success, but to excellence.

"Management In Nigeria" also congratulates the Chief.

(Continued from page 39)

22 Ojo, J. A. T. "Role of Traditional/Informal Financial Institutions in Financing Small-scale Enterprises". Paper presented at the 20th Annual Banking Seminar of the Nigerian Institute of Bankers September, 1985 pp 4 — 6

23 A number of measures which is not exhaustive include:

(i) permitting market rate of interest to be charged

(ii) establishing a small business credit guarantee and insurance scheme.

(iii) establishing a refinancing facility or a secondary market for rediscounting small business loans

(iv) allowing a fixed per cent of losses on loans to small businesses to be written off for corporate tax purposes

(v) establishing a small business extension programme drawing on the services of related institutions as well as relevant faculties of universities and colleges of technology

Table I SIZE STRUCTURE OF NBCI'S COMMITMENTS (1973 — 75) ₦'000

Activity	Under ₦150	₦150 — ₦300	₦300 — ₦500	Over ₦500	Over ₦1000
Food and Beverages	6	3	2	—	4
Textiles	—	—	1	1	1
Wood and Wooden Products	1	1	—	2	1
Pulp and Paper	—	2	—	1	1
Chemical	—	2	—	2	—
Non-metallic Minerals	1	2	1	—	3
Machinery, Basic metal	—	3	—	1	2
Electronic, electrical	—	2	1	1	—
Other Manufacture	—	2	—	—	—
Tourism	1	2	—	1	1
Other Services	2	1	3	—	—
TOTAL	11	20	8	9	13

Source: P. N. C. Okigbo. Nigeria's Financial System Structure and Growth. Longman (1981), p. 142

APPENDIX II

Table 2: SUMMARY OF TOTAL APPROVED PROJECTS BY NBCI AS AT 31ST DECEMBER, 1983.

State	*Number of Projects*	*Total Amount (₦'000)*	*Average Amount (₦'000)*
Anambra	24	25.278 2	1.053.26
Bauchi	14	42.365 1	3 026 10
Bendel	36	28.269 4	785 26
Benue	14	25.817 5	1 844 11
Borno	25	15.012 4	600 50
Cross River	10	12.275 6	1 227 56
Gongola	6	4 277 0	712 83
Imo	25	21.773 7	870 95
Kaduna	10	11.178 0	1.117 80
Kano	23	21.779 3	946 93
Kwara	14	13.822 8	987 34
Lagos	51	42.833 5	839 87
Niger	16	14.395 0	899 69
Ogun	17	17.546 8	1,032 16
Ondo	12	15.318 3	1 276 53
Oyo	25	13.839 0	553 56
Plateau	10	5.135 7	513 57
Rivers	16	18.303 0	1 143 94
Sokoto	14	24.297 8	1 735 56
Abuja	6	20.068 2	3 344 70
TOTAL	369	393 586 3	

Source: G. C. Akwaeze. "The Operations of Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry". *Bullion (Siver Jubilee Edition) Volume II (1985) p. 40*

References

1. Anderson D., "Small Enterprises and Development Policy in the Philippines. A Case Study." *World Bank Staff Working No 468 (1981)*
2. Bhattasali B. N., *Transfer of Technology Among the Developing Countries* Tokyo. Asia Productivity Organisation (1982)
3. Central Bank of Nigeria *Bullion—Silver Jubilee Edition* Vol. II 1985 *Monetary Policy Circulars—*Credit Guidelines (various years) *Annual Reports* 1981, 1982, 1983
4. Committee of Inquiry on Small Firms—Small Firms Cmmd 4811 HMSO London (1971)
5. Donde W. B. "Small-scale Industries in the National Economy" *Small Industries in India* Commemorative Volume. Ministry of Industry, New Delhi
6. Federal Government of Nigeria, Lagos. National Development Plans (various Plan periods)
7. Harper M. *Small Business in the Third World*. John Wiley and Sons (1984).
8. Ho P. S. Sam "Small-scale Enterprises in Korea and Taiwan. "*World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 384* (1980)
9. Okigbo P. N. C., *Nigeria's Financial System Structure and Growth* Longman (1981)
10. Schatz S. P. "The Capital Shortage Illusion. Government Lending in Nigeria", *Oxford Economic Papers* No. 2, 1965 pp 309 — 316
11. Storey D. J., *Entrepreneurship and the New Firm* Croom Helm, London (1982)
12. United Nations. Industrialization of Developing Countries Problems and Prospects Small-scale Industry *Unido Monograph NO. 11*. New York (1969)

NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT

26TH ANNUAL NATIONAL MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

The 26th Annual National Management Conference of the Nigerian Institute of Management will be held:

ON : The 14th and 15th of April, 1988.

VENUE : Ogun State Hotel, Abeokuta, Ogun State.

THEME : Managing the Economy in a Recession

SUB THEME I : Monetary and Fiscal Policy to Boost Nigeria's Economic Recovery.

SUB THEME I(a) Role of Public and Private Sectors in Achieving a Bouyant Economy.

FOR WHOM : All Senior Managers in Industry and Commerce; Top Functionaries in Government and Trade Unions; Academicians; Members of Professional Institutions and Senior Employees in the Parastatals.

FEES : Member (per person) ₦300.00 | Non Member (per person) ₦350.00

Delegates are being requested to register for the Conference. The Fee covers Conference Materials, two launches, cocktails and other refreshments at period to be stated.

REGISTRATION forms can be obtained from:

Professor J. O. Ogunlade
Director-General
Nigerian Institute of Management
Plot 22, Idowu Taylor Street,
Victoria Island.
Post Office Box 2557, Lagos.

THE AREA MANAGER (North)
c/o The Northern Area Office, NIM
57, Airport Road.
P.O. Box 6382, Kano.

THE AREA MANAGER (East)
c/o The Eastern Area Office, NIM
215, Port Harcourt Road,
P.O. Box 3272, Aba.

YOUR HEALTH

EXECUTIVE AT WORK
Focus on Stress
by O. O Famuyiwa

Dr. O. O. Famuyiwa

THE post-independence political epochs in Nigeria have resulted in enormous economic challenges which are being met with desperate economic policies and draconian fiscal measures. These trends are manifesting themselves in the increased risk of psychological disorder among the ordinary citizens inclusive of the Nigerian Executive. This discourse will delve on some important questions. **Who Is An Executive? What is Stress and How Can Stress be Minimised and Handled by the Executive.** The answers to these questions should assist in the identification of 'rules' which if obeyed by the executive will augur for efficiency, productivity and personal contentment.

The word executive connotes one who acts or performs in a purposive manner towards specific and productive goals and it implies possession of a sense of responsibility and accountability. An executive can be anybody from a housewife who nurtures her children and make life comfortable for her husband and a school head-prefect to the head of a government. An executive in consonance with his specific values in the development and growth of the community be it local or national, can be defined as an individual who heads a corporate body or a significantly viable fragment of it with organisational skeleton framed towards productivity.

He belongs to the very small but highly placed sub-culture of mortals who manage men and money and whose activities mirror the direction of national economic goals. The executive bears responsibility for the performance of several others under him and he also reports 'progress' to someone else or a group of people.

STRESSES ON THE EXECUTIVE

The stresses on the executive may arise primarily from his own organisation, his personality, the political system and his socio-cultural environment. The operating forces in these four spheres are intricately intertwined. However, for the sake of description, each will be dealt with as discrete issues. Taking off with intra-organisational stress, let me extract from Uris's thoughts, says he "There are factors at work in most business organisations that thwart their executive, and the most capable are often the most hurt. Accordingly, the average company is a cesspool of resentment, frustration, anguish and hate. And these destructive emotions still further cut down on the availability of executive talent".

Stress on the executive emerges right from the moment he is officially notified of his executive status and during the infancy of his new executive role. More often than not, despite proven professional adroitness and personal probity which earn him the executive status in the first place, there are transient fears and ambivalence regarding the anticipated challenges and chances of success. These emotional states can cause a few sleepless nights and psychological distress of considerable dimension more so if fears and indignations about management destabilisation were contingent to the performance of the executive's immediate predecessor.

Secondly, I wish to invoke a model of micro-sociological conflict where stress is an expected by-product of inter-personal friction with either one's superiors or subordinates. In the context used here, interpersonal conflict does not refer to honest disagreement on organisation's principles and policies but they refer to grudges, hateful envy and allied negative human reaction patterns which are related to the qualities in the person of the executive vis-a-vis his colleagues. Such retrogressive, if not sadistic reactions, manifest themselves in gratuitous opposition to, and reluctance to taking legitimate instructions from the executive. There could be bickering and even false libelous allegations.

Contemporaries beaten to the job (particularly if he is older than the executive) could be potential sources of unwarranted opposition.

In the traditionally minded indigenous executive, belief in metaphysical forces and the probability of their invocation could create intolerable anxiety and sense of insecurity.

The sum-effect of these human factors are obstacles to the executive's freedom of action and smooth display of his values for the gains and glory of his establishment. No executive enjoys these adverse phenomena but he must overcome or come to terms with them in order to function effectively. This is where the stress arises. The executive's own constitutional (personality?) defects may have an important role to play in the interpersonal conflicts alluded to above. The obsessive-compulsive executive—the perfectionistic man who sets supraideal rules and standards virtually impossible to attain in realistic terms will create stressful situations for himself. Can you imagine an executive who bangs his desk because his secretary's only error in an extensive typing work was omission of a semi-colon in a sentence? The same executive who insists on a monthly report when quarterly submissions are clearly sufficient and who by being over-conscientious leads by repeatedly checking his workers' performance and making unnecessary demand on them!

Thirdly, the nature of the relationship of the executive to the management higher quarters, e.g., the Board of Directors is a fertile soil for stress. This sort of functional relationship varies in no small measure from one organisation to another. An equilibruim can be facilitated when the executive on the basis of mutual trust and confidence is given a free hand to manage the affairs of his organisation—of course within the context of his employment terms.

We have the all-pervading national political policies which may act in diverse ways to exert stress on the executive. The factor of prejudice of racial and ethnic colouring totally unrelated to ability can lead to the executive being side-tracked in the career race. There is no doubt that some of these policies in Nigeria, for example the 'Federal Character' or 'Quota System' do have merits such as ethnic balancing of development and hopefully national unity, yet they can be anathema regarding particular circumstances of an executive.

Fifthly, draconian economic measures such as restriction of imports essential to manufacturing industries, foreign exchange constraints and so on, can mar an executive's resources for progressive action and even eventuate in workers' union's disenchantment.

Sixthly, the executive's perception, of how he should best attain his goals has significant implication for his own emotional health. The distinguished heart physicians Friedman and Rosenman described the *Type A Personality* as associated with heart disease. This personality type is characterised by extreme competitiveness, drive for success, restlessness, dynamism, hyperalertness, extreme sense of time urgency, pressure of commitment and impatience.

The seventh stress derives from the complexity of our cultural matrix in which a number of demands of social obligations emanating from human interdependency are noteworthy. The executive, is part of his society and the need to resolve conflicts which may arise from these cultural obligations can be very stressful. For instance, he may need to bear responsibility of the welfare and career ventures of members of his extended family system or by virtue of his birth-right may be expected to be actually involved in community development programmes. These responsibilities are outside the executive's organisational roles, but moral constraints may compel him to justify these roles, and unresolved conflicts arising thereof can spill-over to disturb the smoothness of his fuctioning at work.

The eighth stressor can arise in relation to domestic issues ranging from chronic marital to health and behaviour problems of children and other dependants. The home should be a peaceful base for relaxation after a hectic day's work' and whose shelter and severity the executive should dearly long for. It is often advised that a man should not carry work problems to his home and vice versa. However, this rule will be broken in the face of better marital upheaval.

We may ask how can an executive prevent, minimise or combat stress? Rule 1—The executive must firstly understand himself thoroughly. Accurate self-perception of one's assets and weaknesses is a hallmark of a stable personality and certainly the attribute essential to setting of realistic goals in life. There ought to be a concordance between one's expectation of success in a particular career venture and the realistic personal qualities cognate to one's goals. A psychologist once illustrated this point by asking "Do you fully realise that you may not be a sow's ear, exactly, but you will never be a silk purse? On the other hand, are you aware that you may have at hand all the materials to make a silk purse if only you use them and put them together right?

Do you know that to become Number One man requires a great deal of continuous self-schooling and self-discipline?"

Rule 2—Adopting a life style in which there is ordering of daily priorities and deliberate slowing down of pace of activities. Adequate sleep is most essential. Set aside a short period of self-analysis during which you retrieve your personal failings and successes and strive to make necessary amends where necessary. This should be in a quiet lonesome but safe place lasting say two or more one hour sessions or four half hour sessions in a year! Unnecessary journeys for non-essential socio-cultural obligations should be reduced as much as possible.

Use of alcohol is to be restricted to just social conviviality and be sure you are physically fit and in a good frame of mind before drinking. It is very important to stress that drinking is to be avoided while one is in a state of depression or anxiety. Above all, know your limit of intake above which your composure may become undignifying and your physical health in jeopardy.

Rule 3—Have a good doctor and request for a complete medical check-up at least once in six months, particularly if you are aged 40 years and above. Some qualities of a good doctor are experience, ability to be a patient listener, decorum, and taking an interest in his patient as a person. If you are in doubt, you may request the opinion of two or more other patients who have been on the doctor's list for a considerable length of time.

Rule 4—Be very cautious about high-caloric, carborhydrate diet which promote obesity with attendant high risks of hypertension and heart disease. It is beneficial to concentrate on low-far protein (e.g. lean meat, beans) and vegetables; Tonic and vitamin preparations are usually not necessary except with prolonged lowering of appetite and during recovery from a major illness. Self medication with tranquilising drugs is mentioned to be condemned. Their use should be brief and under the advice of a doctor.

Rule 5—Non-vigorous physical exercises such as jogging and playing table-tennis help to relax muscle tone, and improve the functioning of the heart! Two kilometres of jogging twice a week should be adequate for most executives. If outdoor activity is not personally fancied, relaxation and breathing exercises such as those which form part of transcedental meditation (Yoga for instance) are useful. However the precise choice would depend on age and residential convinience.

Rule 6—Avoid what has been termed "executivitis" meaning a state of mind stemming from egocentricity which generates feelings of omniscience, arrogant superiority over subordinates and the feeling of being able to solve problems without joint study or consultation. This pattern of leadership manifests mainly in the reluctance to delegate responsibilities to subordinates. Delegation is not avoidance of responsibility or abandonment of roles. The executive still oversees most affairs directly, but delegatory responsibilities allow him breathing space to concentrate on crucial issues.

Rule 7—This relates to what I call beneficial use of leisure in the office. Specifically, I am referring to brief moments during office hours when the mind is taken off work and directed towards mentally relaxing spheres. For instance, a few minutes gaze at the landscape or the lagoon or a garden through the office window should be emotionally soothing. Part of lunch break could be spent in window shopping. Soft background music has been found to be a very potent measure for reducing stress and I have personally found it to be so.

CONCLUSION

Finally, let me summarise by retrieving some salient points from the foregoing. Stress is the natural response to the bustling and hustling of daily living and the Nigerian executive, by virtue of his peculiar status which carries enormous responsibility and accountability is highly vulnerable. Stress cannot be completely avoided; indeed, it should be regarded as inevitable ordinary experience of daily living. However, measures that have been found to be effective in reducing it include: a well-organised and ordering of personal schedule on daily basis, regular medical check-ups from reputable medical practice, regular physical exercises, transcedental meditation, avoidance of dietary indiscretion and the cultivation of the habit of delegation of responsibilities. It is my hope rather than belief that with realistic self-appraisal, self-discipline and the emergence of a more economically viable Nigeria, the Nigerian executive should be able to come to terms with himself, his organisation and his society.

REFERENCES

1. Alexander, F. (1950): Psychosomatic Medicine Its Principles and application. W. W. Norton, New York.
2. Ayonrinde, A. (1983): Mental Health and Everyday Living- An Insight into Practical Issues of Life. Evans Brothers, Ibadan.
3. Durkheim, E. (1951): Suicide. Free Press of Glencoe (Macmillan) New York.
4. Friedman, M. and Reseman, R. H. (1974): Type A. Behaviour and Your Heart. N. Y. Knopf.
5. Jennings, E. E. (1967): Executive Success, Stresses, Problems and Adjustment. N.Y. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
6. Kiev, A. (1974): A Strategy for Handling Executive Stress. Nelson Hall Company. Chicago, Illinois.
7. Page, R. C. (1981): How to Lick Executive Stress Cornerston Library. Simon & Schuster, New York.
8. Phillip, J. (1982): Stress, Health & Psychological Problems in th major Professions. 2nd Edition.
9. Selya, (1974)): Stress Without Distress. Phila, Lippincott, 1974.
10. Shepard, W. P. (1961): Executives, Health, Secrets. Bobbs, Mervill.
11. Tanner, Ogaden, (1976): Stress—Human Behaviour. Time-Life Books. New York.
12. Uris, A. (1972): The Frustrated Titan: Emasculation of the Executive. N.Y., Van Nostrand, Reinhold Co.

Dr. O. O. Famuyiwa, is a Senior Lecturer with the College of Medicine of the University of Lagos and Consultant Psychiatrist to the Lagos University Hospital, Surulere.

NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT

MANAGEMENT EDUCATION AND CONSULTANCY SERVICES

DIPLOMA IN MANAGEMENT

December, 1987, Examination Results

PASSED

DPE87/02
DPE87/04
DPE87/09
DPE87/17
DPE87/27
DPE87/30
DPE87/38
DPE87/45
DPE87/58
DPE87/64
DPE87/67
DPE87/82
DPE87/92
DPE87/94
DPE87/96
DPE87/112
DPE87/114

REFERRED

DPE87/01 (I)
DPE87/05 (I, III)
DPE87/06 (I, II)
DPE87/07 (I, II)
DPE87/08 (I)
DPE87/12 (II)
DPE87/12 (II)
DPE87/14 (I)
DPE87/16 (I, II)
DPE87/18 (II)
DPE87/22 (I)
DPE87/24 (I)
DPE87/25 (I, II)
DPE87/26 (I)
DPE87/28 (I, IV)
DPE87/32 (I, II)
DPE87/35 (III)
DPE87/36 (I)
DPE87/42 (I)
DPE87/43 (I)
DPE87/44 (I, III)
DPE87/47 (I, II)
DPE87/52 (I, II)
DPE87/53 (I, II)
DPE87/54 (II)
DPE87/54 (II)
DPE87/55 (I)
DPE87/56 (I)
DPE87/63 (III, IV)
DPE87/65 (I)
DPE87/66 (I, III)
DPE87/69 (II, III)
DPE87/71 (I, IV)
DPE87/72 (II, IV)
DPE87/73 (I)
DPE87/75 (I)
DPE87/78 (II, IV)
DPE87/79 (I, II)
DPE87/81 (I, II)
DPE87/84 (II, III)
DPE87/85 (III)
DPE87/87 (I, II)
DPE87/89 (I, II)
DPE87/93 (I)
DPE87/97 (I, II)
DPE87/101 (I)
DPE87/104 (I, IV)
DPE87/105 (IV)
DPE87/107 (III, IV)
DPE87/109 (I, IV)
DPE87/110 (I)
DPE87/118 (III)
DPE87/119 (I)
DPE87/120 (I)
DPE87/122 (II, III)

Interpretation on References

(I) = Economics
(II) = Statistics
(III) = Law
(IV) = Communications

Prof. J. O. Ogunlade
DIRECTOR-GENERAL

stop press

NIM VEHICLE STOLEN

A Grey Peugeot 505 GL., was stolen at the University of Lagos, Akoka premises, around 7.15 a.m. on Sunday, 6th December, 1987, if found please contact the nearest Police Station or Management House Plot 22, Idowu Taylor, Victoria Island. Telephone 615105, 616203.

Particulars of the vehicle are:

Make: Peugeot 505 GL.	**Engine No.:** 1871893
Registration No. LA 9887 DB	**Colour:** Ash Metallic
CC: 1971	**Type of Body:** XSaloon
Chasis No.: 1871893	**Year of Make:** 1986

NIM (Nigerian Institute of Management) is boldly written on both sides of the Vehicle.

PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC POLICY MAKING IN NIGERIA

(Continued from page 24)

civil service, followed by appropriate changes in its structure and rules;

(iv) a re-examination of the process of publicising public policies effectively using trained public relations experts either within or outside the public service;

(v) the evolvement of better development strategies to execute few projects which have multiplier potentials.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Akpan, N. U., *Public Administration in Nigeria*, Longman, 1982.
2. Anderson, J. E., *Public Policy Making*, Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd. 1975.
3. Brownlie, Lan. *Principles of International Law:* Alfa Publishing Co. 1985.
4. Dike, Chijioke., *The Nigerian Civil Service:* Owerri: Alfa Publishing Co. 1985.
5. Drucker, Peter, *Management:* London, Heinemann, 1974.
6. Dye, T. E., *Understanding Public Policy:* New Jersy, Eaglewood Cliffs, 1972.
7. Hogan, Brian, *et al. Criminal Law:* Butterworths, 1973.
8. Treitel, G. H., *The Law of Contract:* Stevens & Sons, 1975.
9. International Labour Office, *First Things First:* Addis Ababa, 1981.

Chijioke Dike is a Permanent Secretary with the Ministry of Education, Owerri.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

THE articles in this journal have always been subjected to painstaking reviews before being accepted for publication.

"Management In Nigeria" therefore wishes to express its gratitude to the following, who, during the past year, spent time and effort to review the major papers that were published in the journal:

Adedoyin A. O.
Ademosu A. O.
Agboola Duro
Arogunmati Bob. Joe
Anikpo M. O. C.
Asika Nnamdi (Dr.)
Asaolu J. O.
Balogun A. A.
Chizea B. (Dr.)
Damachi U. G. (Prof.)
Egungwu V. N.
Ekpott I. D. (Chief)
Emefiele G. I.
Enwerom A. S. (Dr.)
Essien Effiong (Chief)
Fagbule M. O. (Prof.)
Fashoyin Tayo (Prof.)
Ibekwe Olliver
Ibraheem Deen
Ikpong F. N.
Iyiegbuniwe W. (Dr.)
Ndekwu E. C. (Dr.)
Nwachukwu E. C. (Prof.)
Nwokolo Paul
Okediji Olubunmi (Miss)
Omodele E. A.
Omogbehin V. A. (Dr.)
Ubeku A. K. (Dr.)
Ugorji R. U. (Dr.)
Ukoh E. O.
Urieto J. E.


REAN

And now...

New Fire Retardant TEXCOTE

...Not just pretty, but pretty safe from fire spread too!

The New Fire Retardant TeXcote finish is the latest dimension in textured coatings – by BERGER.

With New Fire Retardant TeXcote, your plain-looking partitions are not only transformed into beautifully patterned wall designs, but are also made fire retardant. And in these days of frequent fire outbreaks, New Fire Retardant TeXcote finish is certainly the wall paint coating you need now to reduce potential fire hazards. A wonderful advantage! Plus more.

One coat of New Fire Retardant TeXcote textured finish conceals all surface imperfections leaving on a new sensational outlook.

New Fire Retardant TeXcote is tough, durable, water impermeable and permanently resistant to fungi and abrasions. Available in twelve stunning fade resistant colours to suit your mood.

And many stylish rollers for variety.

Price: ₦195.00

A new horizon in high-build coatings

BERGER
-the Paintmakers
Berger Paints Nigeria Limited