



LUGARD
AND THE AMALGAMATION OF NIGERIA
A DOCUMENTARY RECORD



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LUGARD AND THE AMALGAMATION OF NIGERIA

A Documentary Record

being a reprint of the
REPORT BY SIR F. D. LUGARD
ON THE
AMALGAMATION OF NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN NIGERIA
AND ADMINISTRATION, 1912-1919

together with
supplementary unpublished Amalgamation reports,
and other relevant documents

Compiled and introduced by
A. H. M. KIRK-GREENE



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FOR MY WIFE
HELEN



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INTRODUCTION

The development of the politico-administrative unit of Nigeria may be compared with the phased maturity of a man. Its birth occurred in 1900, when the British Government took over the territories of the Niger Coast Protectorate and the Royal Niger Company and the geographical expression 'Nigeria' was first used officially for the two Protectorates now established.¹ In 1914 came its baptism, when the legal entity of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria was recognised; and 1960 saw the coming of age, with Nigeria assuming its sovereign and independent membership of the world assembly of nations. Subsequent events may, if the metaphor is to be continued, be looked on as marriage and threatened divorce.

Documentation and scholarly analysis of the first and last of these watershed years has been gratifyingly evident. Undaunted by the hazard of being too close for distortionless perspective, researchers have been no less happy tackling the total process of decolonisation and the subsequent attitudes of independence² than they have been scrutinising the early period of the prelude to self-government. It has been on the middle event, the philosophy and the actual welding together of the administrative framework from which the independent Federal Republic of Nigeria was eventually to emerge, that markedly less has been written—and this despite a number of classical studies on its detailed operation in the fields of government and economics. One of the major reasons for the dearth of scholarly commentary on the political rationalisation of 1914 may be the difficulty encountered by would-be researchers in laying hands on the key document, namely Sir Frederick Lugard's report on the unification of the Northern and Southern Protectorates.

Nor do the standard texts on Nigerian history contain much in the way of significant comment on this vital event. Though Burns heads two whole chapters 'The Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria',³ he gives no discussion of the Amalgamation Report beyond a one-page summary of its administrative implications. Niven's half-page⁴ does nothing more than rightly underline the resentment engendered in the South through the replacement of the English-patterned Supreme Court by the Northern-style Provincial Courts. Orr was too early, Geary is scant, Buell is too general.⁵ Dike, however, makes a valid point in his Lugard memorial lecture when he acknowledges that 'with amalgamation, the work of state-building in Nigeria by the British may be said to have been completed, so that the year 1914 marks a great dividing line in our history'. He is, however, careful to avoid the facile assumption of equating this constitutional unification with a complete fusion of the Northern and Southern administrations.⁶

Notable exceptions to this criticism are three. Cook has devoted a useful factual chapter to 'Amalgamation and Unification'.⁷ Perham, in both her specialist studies,⁸ gives an informative discussion of unification proposals, and the biographical passages of this Introduction owe a debt of intellectual gratitude to her life of Lugard. Michael Crowder, whose admirable history has the advantage, in so far as its Lugardian chapters are concerned, of being

a 'post-Perham' publication, also offers a satisfactory treatment, though he prefers to see the earlier period of 1906-1912 as one of the most crucial in the history of Nigeria, when 'revolutionary forces'⁹ were set loose. Nevertheless, he does entitle his chapter 'The Unification of Nigeria' and shows a sensitive awareness of the influence of Morel's and Temple's proposals for amalgamation, neglected by many generalist historians. Nor is he in any doubt about Lugard being the man who, 'in a short but dramatic governorship, was to provide the mould in which the jelly of upheaval was to set. . . . The decisions he made in those years were to influence the canalization of those new forces until, after the Second World War, control of the Government was slowly taken over from the British administration by the Nigerian nationalists themselves.'¹⁰

Some observers of the Nigerian scene go so far as to claim that it was not till the late Sardauna of Sokoto's historic eight-word statement in the House of Representatives during the tense crisis of 1953 when the North and South experienced their first major political confrontation—'The mistake of 1914 has come to light'¹¹—that minds were turned seriously to the implications of the original amalgamation of the two Protectorates. Although this pointed reference has long been accepted as the North's first public hint of dissatisfaction with what it had, on attaining its political maturity, begun to look on unenthusiastically as a *marriage de convenance*, there is evidence of a parallel and earlier hint of divorce in the records of the conference held at Ibadan in 1950 to review the Richards Constitution, when the Emirs of Katsina and Zaria threatened that unless the Northern Provinces were granted 50 per cent of the seats in the proposed central House of Representatives, they would 'ask for separation from the rest of Nigeria on the arrangements existing before 1914'—an unambiguous reference to the pre-Lugardian *status quo*.¹² Up to the 1950s, expressed in a broad polarisation, the disposition of the two would-be partners seems to have been that the North never felt any genuine cultural affinity nor that it enjoyed much in common politically with the South, despite the centralising endeavours of Sir Donald Cameron to re-orientate its loyalties towards the governmental strategies of Lagos rather than of Kaduna; while the South, once it had overcome its dislike of certain features of amalgamation (see p. 22), showed equally scant interest in its Northern partner and never, for instance, mounted any serious campaign to reverse the Legislative Council's role so as to allow it to 'govern' the country as a whole. In brief, there is little evidence to indicate that either party undertook any sincere, objective, political attempt to see beyond the stereotype image of each other as reflected to the outside; the myopia of the Hausa by the Ibo and of the Ibo by the Hausa has been one of the most tragic elements in the holocaust of 1966-1967. Such mutual difference and total failure to communicate culturally, and hence societally, appear to have marked the past fifty years. But since 1966—and earlier, some would argue—the whole question of amalgamation or secession, of a unitary state, a federation, a confederation or a collegiate government, has been under constant reference by political scientists as well as by the constitutional commissions set up by both the first and second Military Governments of Nigeria. Thoughts have, since January 1966, inevitably turned back to the 1914 proposals for 'one Nigeria'. Both previous attempts at a unitary government (1945-1951, and May 1966) have now ended in disaster. Discussion of the

merits of a centripetal or a centrifugal constitution has everywhere raised the issue of previous versions of national unification stopping short of unitary government. In consequence, the impetus, philosophy and experiment of the 1914 amalgamation have been very much to the fore.¹³ Yet few have been able to consult the essential literature.

It is to remedy this deficiency in Nigerian research materials that this special documentary volume has been devised. The actual Amalgamation Report¹⁴ has not appeared in book form before, and in the event, only 1,500 copies of the original Parliamentary Paper were printed.¹⁵ This new edition includes other closely related reports never previously published and draws on additional supplementary documents, some of them up to now classified as confidential material. It also includes a fresh examination of the views expressed in the Nigerian press during the amalgamation era of 1912–1919. Hopefully, this source-volume will, unhampered by any editorial comment other than this introductory *mise-en-scène*, enable Africanist scholars—and not least Nigerian students—to have at their disposal not only a basic document that has been recognised as one of the most fundamental, yet hitherto one of the least accessible, *arcana imperii* of Nigeria's administrative history, but also the complementary proposals considered before the 1914 amalgamation was finally effected along with a discussion of the ancillary literature. The value of such a documentary record at this crucial period in the constitutional rebirth of Nigeria is at once enhanced by its topicality. It is already evident that no worthwhile rethinking of the country's political pattern has been unaware of the facts of Lugard's proposals and their subsequent implementation. For good or for bad—and detached political scientists as well as involved Nigerians themselves are happy to argue either case—this is the creative blueprint from which the modern political entity of Nigeria sprang, making its mark as a model colony up to 1960 and, at least up to 1966, as a potential leader of independent Africa.

✓ If, as we shall see, the concept of amalgamating the Northern and Southern Protectorates ante-dated the 1914 inception, it is no less significant that separate administrations had also been a feature of immediate Nigerian history in its European-contact context. In June 1885 the British Government proclaimed a protectorate over what it called the Niger Districts, from Lagos across to the Rio del Rey on the coast and inland as far as Lokoja on the Niger and Ibi on the Benue. By 1899 the area that we today recognise as Nigeria was associated with no less than three administrations, in juxtaposition but separate. There was the Government of the Oil Rivers Protectorate, established in 1891 and two years later renamed the Niger Coast Protectorate, exercising jurisdiction through its Consuls from Lagos eastwards to the Kamerun and responsible to the British Foreign Office; there was the Colony of Lagos, which in 1886 had finally rid itself of its unsatisfactory administrative subordination, first to 'the Governor of the West African Settlement Residing at Sierra Leone' (1866–1874) and then to the Governor of the Gold Coast Colony, and now came under the aegis of a different department in Whitehall, the Colonial Office; and there were the Niger Territories of the Royal Niger Company, administering under royal charter the Coast from Burutu to Akassa and the riparian districts of the Niger and

Benue Rivers through its field agents, and responsible to a private board of directors in London. Additionally, though this is recorded in historical retrospect, the post-1916 Cameroons sectors of Nigeria were at this time under German rule, while France was making determined thrusts into the Borgu hinterland to the west, along the Say-Barrua line to the north, and in the Chad basin to the east, all of which claims had to be settled by international delimitation and boundary commissions spread over the following decade. West African separatism and divisiveness were in the European administrative air.

¶ The assumption of imperial government on New Year's Day 1900 could immediately do little more than legitimise the position by substituting Colonial Office for Chartered Company rule. A triple system of administration persisted. The Colony remained as it was. The 'Protectorate' element of the Colony of Lagos was extended to meet the boundary of the new Northern Protectorate. To this was added that portion of the Royal Niger Company territories which was situated south of Idah, some 275 miles up the Niger, so that the whole area became the Southern Protectorate. The balance of the old Niger Territories now comprised the Northern Protectorate. So much for the Protectorate boundaries, symbolised by the prominent customs post at Idah. The Protectorate of Northern Nigeria had its own civil service, estimates and Governor—resident momentarily at Lokoja, then at Jebba, and finally (that is to say, at least till 1917) at Zungeru. Initially the hierarchy of government in the North comprised a High Commissioner and his Deputy, supported by one First-Class Resident and six Residents. The structure of government was repeated for the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, where the High Commissioner had a staff of four District Commissioners, three travelling District Commissioners and nine Divisional Commissioners,¹⁶ while the Colony of Lagos retained its own Governor and administration up till 1906. It was not until the appointment of Sir Walter Egerton to the joint offices of High Commissioner of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and Governor of the Colony of Lagos in 1904, with express instructions to effect their unification, that Lagos was incorporated into the new administration of the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria on 1 May 1906. The move towards amalgamation and administrative rationalisation had taken its first step.¹⁷ This unit was now divided into three provinces, with a Commissioner in charge of the Eastern Province at Calabar, another at Warri for the Central Province, and the third remaining at Lagos to administer the Western Province (this had at one time been known as the Yoruba Protectorate). These areas approximate to the tri-regional division of Southern Nigeria since 1963. Only in April 1939 did the post-amalgamation Southern Provinces revert to their early titles of the Eastern and Western Provinces, with their authority vested in Chief Commissioners (the title reverted to Lieutenant-Governor in 1951) resident at Enugu and Ibadan respectively.

Meanwhile, up North Lugard had also split his vast territory into provinces. At first he could do no more than nominally divide the Protectorate into three civil provinces—Middle Niger, Benue and (rather optimistically) Kano—and the two military provinces of Bornu and Borgu, the one threatened by Rabeh's son Fad-el-Allah and the other a little too attractive to French expansionism for British comfort. Within the year, however, sufficient progress had been made in stabilising a skeleton administration to allow

Lugard to create nine provinces in 'that portion of the Protectorate of which we are in effective occupation.'¹⁸ These were Ilorin, Kabba, Middle Niger, Lower Benue, Upper Benue, Nupe, Kontagora, Borgu and Zaria. Four more—Bassa, Muri, Bauchi and Yola—were ear-marked for early creation, whereupon the Middle Niger Province would be abolished. In the event, the conquest of the Hausa States led to further provincial decentralisation, so that by the end of 1903 the Northern Protectorate consisted of sixteen provinces. A year later Gwandu was added and the six senior provinces were then combined under three Senior Residents and classified as 'double provinces'.¹⁹ These were Sokoto/Gwandu, Kano/Katagum, and East/West Bornu. Lugard's plan to extend this system of devolution and progressively reduce the number of provinces to six did not materialise, and the pattern of provincial boundaries in the North has, despite minor divisional changes and the major reorganisation of 1926,²⁰ by and large followed its original *raison d'être* and nomenclature.

Few would expect a proconsul of Lugard's genius to tolerate for long the three separate administrations thus created. Indeed, in a private letter to his brother Ned written way back in 1900, he had declared that the three Nigerias had surely to be amalgamated one day and that to be charged with this was the assignment he would dearly have loved. Previous commentaries on the amalgamation scheme for Nigeria tend, except for Perham's, to overlook the fact that the Selborne Committee,²¹ charged by Joseph Chamberlain in 1898 to consider the future administration of the Royal Niger Company's territory, had actually advocated the fusion of the different governments into one 'Nigeria'.²² An examination of the minutes of this Niger Committee makes it clear that they did not envisage their task as 'preparing a full-blown Parliamentary report but simply to answer specific questions 'as would furnish the interdepartmental consideration of the matters referred to'. On the matter of the administration of the three territories they recorded that 'we are of opinion that the object to be aimed at is the eventual establishment of a Governor-General for the whole of the territories, resident in those territories'. Meanwhile, for reasons stated, they preferred to see the administration 'conducted through the medium of provincial Governors under the direct superintendence of the Colonial Office'. To effect this, the committee recommended the creation of a Maritime Province and a Soudan Province, drawn 'between the Soudan regions governed by Mahommedans and the Pagan regions of the Niger Delta, including, however, with the latter the Mahommedan Yorubas'. Given the history of Nigerian administration and constitutions over the following seventy years, the demarcation proposed is a seminal one, as significant as the committee's reference to a possible subdivision of the Maritime Province into West and East regions, with headquarters at Lagos and Asaba respectively.

After a previous approach for at least a fiscal union, it was in May 1905 that Lugard addressed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies a personal and confidential memorandum setting out a proposal for unifying the Northern and Southern Protectorates and the Colony of Lagos. Although he was High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria alone, he had persuaded his Southern counterparts of the wisdom of such an administrative

reorganisation.²³ In his annual report for 1904 he was able to insert the thin end of the wedge—though naturally such blunt terminology was eschewed—by announcing that the duties imposed at the Lagos frontier by the Southern administration had been abolished. It was on this matter of tolls that he went so far as to mention publicly (for Colonial Annual Reports were laid before Parliament) that his recommended system of rebates, increasing proportionately according to distance from the coast, for imported goods delivered at upcountry depots 'could not be introduced until Northern and Southern Nigeria had been amalgamated as one country'.²⁴

In the following year he followed this up in earnest. While on his way home in May 1905 he drafted a top secret despatch to the Secretary of State. This he entitled 'Administration of Nigeria', and it embodies, *inter alia*, the unique Lugard scheme for continuous administration.²⁵ But our interest here must be confined to the idea of amalgamation, and as this is Lugard's first official representation (he was not a member of the Niger Committee of 1898) it is worth piecing together his views on the future of an all-embracing Nigerian administration which can be found here and there in his lengthy memorandum focused on the future government of the North. He raised, for instance, the issue of a common revenue to be 'spent in the interests of Nigeria as a single and indivisible entity'. This, in Lugard's view, could only be effected by 'complete amalgamation under a single Administrator', a goal which he declared to have been 'continuously and strenuously' urged by all the High Commissioners and Governors from 1900 onwards in the belief that the longer such unification was deferred the wider would become the divergence between the policies and practices of each Administration. In support of the respectable ancestry of such an amalgamation, Lugard cited Lord Scarbrough, Chairman of the Niger Company, as having declared that the coast ought to pay for the development of the interior, and any other would be a 'suicidal policy'. Lugard's premise was typically forthright: 'The country is essentially one'—a far cry from the divisive feelings often voiced in 1966 and 1967, indicative of grave doubts whether any fundamental basis for unity existed at all.

Apart from economic advantages, Lugard went on to set down in this 1905 memorandum other reasons for his proposal for amalgamation. Among these were the eventual realisation of a definite and coherent policy on railway planning; 'well-considered schemes for the development of the trade and resources (mineral and vegetable) of the country; as well as a uniform policy in regard to the natives, the judicial system, and other matters of legislation'. From these general references to the desirability of amalgamation, Lugard led into his hobby-horse of continuity of administration, with special reference to the Governor-General's position while nominally on leave in England (the celebrated proposal of 'alternate residence'), and much of the despatch was devoted to these arguments. The central section of the 1905 memorandum in which Lugard set forth his original ideas on amalgamation is now made available for the first time and appears as Document I in this book. The rationale of these proposals finds an effective summary elsewhere in the memorandum, where Lugard wrote:

It would seem to me that the inauguration of such a policy, and of such schemes, would offer but little difficulty when the interests of the country as a whole are

considered. When the Secretary of State had assented to definite principles, and sanctioned the gradual carrying out of a deliberate policy in these matters, the Governor-General would be able to co-ordinate the energies of the Administrators of the Provinces towards a single goal, and so do more for the permanent good of the country than by years of independent effort, however strenuous, which was not focussed on a clear objective. Service in a country so large, and offering opportunities for such responsible work, among a people who inherit an ancient civilisation, could not fail to be popular, and the Administration could command the best material, and impose a standard of efficiency equal, I hope, to that of our Indian Empire.

Lugard based his arguments for amalgamation at that time on finance, on the dangerous divergence of administrative principles in the two Protectorates, and above all on the controversy engendered by the separate ways pursued by the railway construction policy-makers. Ten years later he found nothing to cause him to alter his *point de départ*.²⁶

But this was in 1905. Within a matter of months Lugard had left Nigeria. The idea of amalgamation appears to have been pigeon-holed, or at least neutralised, for the next six years.

Two events of 1911 brought the whole issue back into the open. One was the publication of an outspoken book on Nigeria by the editor of the *African Mail*, E. D. Morel, who devoted the last three chapters exclusively to the necessity of amalgamation.²⁷ The other was a private letter from the Colonial Office to Lugard, then Governor of Hong Kong, stating that they were 'anxious to amalgamate the Nigerian Administration' and inviting him to accept the task of implementing such a reorganisation. Given first Morel's influential position; secondly his implicit advocacy of Lugard as the man for the post, which almost echoes Sir John Anderson in his personal invitation to Lugard, that 'our difficulty is to get the right man for the job—we are agreed that you are the man if you would take it even if only for sufficient time, say three or four years, to give it a good start'; and thirdly Lady Lugard's tireless lobbying and far-reaching influence in Westminster, Whitehall and Fleet Street, it is possible to look upon these apparently unconnected approaches to the resurrection of the amalgamation idea as something more than a coincidence.

Anderson's letter was written in August.²⁸ It reached Hong Kong at a time when, his biographer tells us, Lugard was experiencing a spell of profound personal anxiety. Not only was his term of office as Governor coming up for the usual quinquennial review, but his wife's grave illness in Japan gave rise to serious doubts whether they would, even in the salubrious climate of an oriental post, be able to enjoy what has so often eluded Europeans committed to tropical service, namely the blessing of being able to work together and maintain a normal domestic life. To Lugard, whose twenty years' association with Africa had infected him as unrelentingly as it has since got into the bloodstream of others, here was not only the opportunity to return to Nigeria where his heart lay (Hong Kong had, we are assured, been a mere backwater of life after the strenuous responsibilities of his African assignments), but also a challenge to undertake what he himself considered to be 'about the biggest job in the whole British Empire and one

of the most difficult . . . it is the turning point in the destinies of that vast country'. And had not the Colonial Office written that 'we should not be difficult about salary', quoting the figure they had in mind as £6,000 with a duty allowance of £1,500, emoluments unheard of on the West Coast at that time?²⁹ The Secretary of State went even further, privately and flatteringly indicating that if Lugard turned down the offer the whole proposal for amalgamating the two Nigerias would very likely be shelved. It was thus no surprise that Lugard wrote to his wife: 'Must I confess to you, who can read all my thoughts, that the task does appeal to me?' He was not wrong in his estimate of her perception. Flora read between the lines and cabled him: 'Sorrowfully accept.'

In taking on the appointment to amalgamate the Nigerian governments, Lugard laid down as a condition that he should have neither leave nor an acting governor in his absence, but that he should govern continuously by spending half the year in Lagos and half in London. This was little less than a rebirth of the old plan for his *beau idéal* High Commissionership of Northern Nigeria, which he had thought up in 1904 and had put to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Known in the Colonial Office as the contentious 'Lugard Scheme' for continuous administration, it had been finally rejected by Whitehall (see p. 6 above). Initially it met but little more enthusiasm this time until the British Government's realisation (and maybe Lugard's own, too!) that he was the only man for the job resulted in some sort of a compromise being evolved. Instead of spending twelve months in Lagos followed by six in England, the Colonial Office offered to allow him to spend eight months of the year in Nigeria and the remainder in London. Though they hoped Lugard would allow himself a period of holiday, they were ready to grant him a room in the Colonial Office where he could deal with despatches from Nigeria. After courteously emphasising the extent of the concession he had thus made, Lord Harcourt added in his private letter to Lady Lugard a sentence that was perhaps more far-reaching than he could then have appreciated: 'I cannot tell you what great importance I attach to getting your husband to complete his great African work.'

Having so carefully weighed the pros and cons—his resolve to put his wife's happiness first being matched by Flora's insistence on his career contentment taking priority—and having noted the concessions that the Colonial Office had offered in a sincere attempt to meet him at least half way, Lugard accepted the Nigerian appointment.³⁰ He returned to England in April 1912.

The next six months Lugard devoted to an earnest reflexion on and preparation for the immense task that lay before him of amalgamating the two Protectorates. At the end of June the Colonial Secretary announced to Parliament the new proposals for Nigeria, including the peculiar terms of service he had granted for Lugard's tenure. Perham notes how he spoke of Lugard 'in terms seldom used in the House of any public servant':³¹

It is true that a land stretching from the coast to Lake Chad on the North-east, and towards Timbuctu on the North-west, contains varieties of climate and diversities of population. From the mangrove swamps and the pagans of the South, to the Mahomedans of the plateaux of Zaria and Kano, there is a transition both of circumstances and of creed, but all who know that country best are agreed that there is an essential unity of their administrative future which demands both a method and a man. Happily the man is at hand, with a tried and

proved capacity to supply the method. Though I have been convinced ever since I came to the Colonial Office that this amalgamation was desirable, I frankly admit that I should not have thought the moment opportune unless I had happened to know and been able to command the services of the one man marked out for this great work, Sir Frederick Lugard. I have been able, greatly to the regret of Hong Kong, to induce him to leave that post and to take up what will shortly become the Governorship of the combined Nigerias. Northern Nigeria is in the truest sense the product of his foresight and genius. He reclaimed it from the unknown; he gave it a legal code, differing only in its civilisation from the essential lines of native custom; he established a land system which, combining altruism with revenue, may well be a model and inspiration to other Protectorates. . . . On my earnest solicitation he returns now to the field of his early and brilliant labours to complete and consolidate what has proved, I think, to be the greatest tropical province of the British Crown. All the details cannot be settled now, but I shall hope that Sir Frederick Lugard will spend six months in the Colony and six months at home, but the six months at home will not be treated and will not become leave. . . . I am sending Sir Frederick Lugard out for the moment—and for a comparatively short tour—as the dual Governor of both provinces. I am sending him, so far as I am concerned, with a free hand to examine the situation as to its developments since his last visit; to plan and to organise the amalgamation, to examine the administration, the financial, and the commercial possibilities, and then to return here and to discuss with me the problems of the future.

His biographer depicts the magnitude of the task in a characteristically admirable summary: 'He was now presented, in a chorus of eulogy, with the largest and most difficult task the colonies could then offer. He could approach it with more than his ordinary self-confidence. He knew his Northern Nigeria; the summer would suffice for him to master on paper all he did not know of the Southern part. He had secured his scheme in full for the first year, and in part for those succeeding, and he could thus indulge the two strong desires which had pulled him in opposite directions, the one to maintain uninterrupted control of his territory and the other to spend as much time as possible with his wife. To conclude this satisfying list, he was to have his brother to work with him in the specially created post of Political Secretary.'³²

What were the possible amalgamation plans Lugard considered? He was, in the first instance, directed simply to go out to Nigeria and study the administrative developments that had occurred during his six years away from the country. On this survey—what the international aid agencies of the present decade would identify as a 'feasibility study'—would eventually be based his firm proposals for a scheme of amalgamation. But in addition to his close knowledge of the governmental systems as they had existed in the two Protectorates at least up till 1906, Lugard had to hand several projected schemes for just such an amalgamation as was now envisaged. One we have already examined, his own strictly confidential and unpublished 1905 memorandum to the Secretary of State. Of other major proposals we now have access to more details, and it is opportune to consider these before following Lugard out to Lagos.

Mention has been made of Morel's passionate plea for amalgamation. 'No

interested student of Nigerian affairs', he had written, 'can fail, I think, especially after an examination of the problem on the spot, to arrive at the conclusion that the present dual system of administration, with its artificial territorial boundaries, its differing methods, and its inevitable rivalries, has served its turn and should be brought to an end as speedily as possible'.³³ No mincer of his words, he defined the situation as 'incongruous—in some respects almost absurd', and placed the blame on the self-interest of the two administrations doggedly adhering to separate and at times mutually antagonistic policies,³⁴ to the detriment of Nigeria's weal. A similar belief about the detrimental effect on the country of the frequent confrontations within the predecessor political government may have been a factor in the motivation of the Ironsi and Gowon military régimes of 1966.³⁵ Although Morel held Nigeria to be a single geographical unit, he was aware that the problems of government in the homogeneous northern emirates could not be identified and assimilated with those of the allegedly inchoate administration in the south-east, and accordingly urged that not the *pattern* of government but the *principles* of government should be identical. Citing the polarity of policy over such fundamental issues as education,³⁶ taxation and land policy, he foresaw the gap widening every year so that its eventual yet inevitable bridging would become a matter of greater and greater difficulty.

From an unfavourable comparison of the two administrative systems—the North's 'priceless advantage' of starting afresh in 1900 being set against the South's 'a thing of shreds and patches'³⁷—Morel proceeded to mount a detailed and critical attack on the suicidally self-competing railway systems: honourably intended they might be to both Protectorates, but none the less deplorable and against the public interest. With his scene thus carefully set for reorganisation, Morel introduced his *tour de force*, 'An Unauthorized Scheme of Amalgamation'. This he based on the principles of: (a) financial management lasting beyond the present to making provisions for the economic stability of the future Nigeria; (b) the appointment of the right man to implement his amalgamation scheme—was it just chance that Morel should advocate the unprecedented African title of 'Governor-General', eventually the very one bestowed on Lugard in his personal right, and never restored in Nigeria till the 1954 Macpherson Constitution required it? (c) the division of the country into provinces which corresponded as far as possible with natural geographical boundaries and with the least possible disturbance of existing political conditions;³⁸ (d) a comprehensive scheme of public works, including a uniform railway system.

To effect this reorganisation, Morel presented a map to illustrate what he called 'the four great provinces'. The Northern or Sudan Provinces, consisting of Sokoto, Katsina, Kano, Bornu, Kontagora and Zaria emirates, were to have their headquarters at Kano; the Central Provinces, today's Plateau, Sardauna, Adamawa and Bauchi Provinces along with certain Divisions from Niger and Benue Provinces, would retain the capital of Zungeru; while the Western (today's Western and Mid-western Regions, plus Ilorin, Kabba and Borgu) and the Eastern (today's Eastern Region extended northwards to the Benue river) would be centred on Oshogbo and Old Calabar respectively.³⁹ The capital of this amalgamated Nigeria would, in Morel's estimation, most suitably be situated on the summit of Mount Patti, the plateau overlooking the confluence of the Niger and Benue at

Lokoja which Lugard had himself at one time, albeit momentarily, considered as his headquarters for the Northern Protectorate. Having disposed of the basic provincial problem, Morel went on to consider the administrative and budgetary procedures. He was ready to admit that his plan forward primarily as a basis for 'discussion of a problem of some difficulty but of great urgency', but nevertheless in the conviction that the present 'mush of anomalies' could no longer be tolerated: 'Amalgamation must come. All realize that.'⁴⁰ His concluding remarks strongly suggest knowledge, if not collusion, over the appointment of Lugard: 'As to the man, a last word . . . Any serious administrative error perpetrated in handling affairs in the north would be attended with consequences of exceeding gravity. That is a proposition I think no one will be inclined to dispute. It suggests that the Governor-General himself should be personally acquainted with the political conditions of what is now known as Northern Nigeria. . . .'

But besides Morel's scheme for a revision of the protectorate and provincial boundaries, there was before Lugard another full-dress proposal, this time from C. L. Temple, the acting Governor of Northern Nigeria. The strained relations with his erstwhile chief are today well known, but, important as they are to an understanding of their variant beliefs in their common acceptance of indirect rule as the supreme principle of native administration, they are not pertinent to a consideration of the merits of Temple's scheme, which he now put to Lugard.⁴¹ Temple favoured the division of Nigeria into seven provinces, each under a Chief Commissioner, comprising Lagos the three existing Southern ones and three Northern ones. These latter were to consist of first, the Hausa States of the north-west; secondly, what he termed the Chad territories, roughly modern Bornu, Adamawa (less Muri), Saraduna and Bauchi provinces; and lastly, the Benue provinces, being those central and western areas fronting the Niger. For the justification of the Northern provinces, he offered the following break-down of land and population statistics:

HAUSA STATES

	<i>Area</i>	<i>Population</i>
Sokoto	35,400	1,300,000
Kano	28,600	3,500,000
Zaria	9,847	402,000
Bauchi	18,700	580,000
Niger	300	6,000
Kontagora	5,500	22,000
Total	98,347	5,810,000

BENUE PROVINCES

Kontagora	21,500	100,000
Ilorin	6,300	200,000
Kabba	7,800	140,000
Niger	18,153	394,000
Bassa	7,000	205,000
Nassarawa	17,900	600,000
Muri	25,600	700,000
Bauchi	4,000	80,000
Total	108,253	2,419,000

CHAD TERRITORIES		
Bornu	32,800	700,000
Yola	14,300	300,000
Bauchi	2,000	40,000
Total	49,100	1,040,000
<i>Total</i>	<i>Area</i>	<i>Population</i>
(1) Hausa States	98,347	5,810,000
(2) Benue Provinces	108,253	2,419,000
(3) Chad Territories	49,100	1,040,000
Grand Total	255,700	9,269,000

Temple's scheme has previously been described only in outline, but permission has now been obtained to include his complete memorandum as Document II.

St In the event, Lugard accepted neither of these major schemes, despite the considerable common-sense and informed thought revealed in them both.⁴² Nor did he pay much heed to any of the proposals put up by his predecessors in office, such as Sir Walter Egerton or Sir Hesketh Bell—he had brought Malayan experience to bear on his earlier problem of uniting Lagos and Southern Nigeria—who recommended a federation along the lines of the Leeward and Windward Isles, 'with a view to ultimate fusion', based on three Nigerian Provinces (comprising respectively the territory south and east of Lokoja and the Niger, south and west, and to the north), or by experienced serving officers like Messrs. F. S. James or W. F. Gowers, though he found A. G. Boyle's views very similar to his own. Lugard opted to retain the classic cleavage between the North and the South, a *status quo* which he felt to be sanctioned by cultural history and one that he knew and understood. Even today we are too close to the events caused by this decision to judge whether the marriage—with the stipulation of separate bank accounts, as it were—has been for better or for worse. Characteristically, Lugard devised a scheme which, while acknowledging that the North was not the South nor vice-versa, would nevertheless allow him to exercise the powers of a Governor-General who intended actually to govern a unified country and not be simply a figurehead. This intention is set out unequivocally in the Report to which these pages present an introduction, and it therefore requires no repetition here. One point, however, must be made; and nobody has made it better than Lugard's biographer, Margery Perham:

The dominant theme of the pattern was authority, an authority to be wielded by the Governor-General, and by one who meant to spend part of the year administering Nigeria from England. A closer unification or a new regionalization upon Temple's lines, both untried innovations, would equally have thrown a great deal of day-to-day work upon the Governor, preventing him from travelling, and would have demanded a strong deputy in his absence. This would have undermined the Scheme. But, under his plan, the Lieutenant-Governors could carry on with their dual routine much as before, while he, whether in Nigeria or Britain, held the control of all major policy in his own hands and

gradually remoulded the country upon his own lines. In his first dispatch to the Colonial Office on amalgamation* Lugard made no secret of this reason.⁴³

By considering Temple's scheme, which was not presented to Lugard till 1913, we have in fact jumped ahead of chronology; but for the sake of neatness it seems best to have examined it along with Morel's 1911 proposal for an amalgamated Nigeria.

Lugard sailed from England for his preliminary tour of investigation on 18 September 1912, reaching Lagos on 3 October. Driving rain and a rough passage over the notorious bar did little to encourage his instinctive 'Northern' distrust of Lagos, despite his amusement at the Yoruba boy who over-excitedly yelled at him 'God save the King'. No sooner was he sworn in than the storm gave of its best and the guard of honour was drenched to the skin. With what might have been taken as scant courtesy and is certainly a gubernatorial record, Lugard left Lagos as soon as he could: within less than twenty-four hours he was entrained for Zungeru, which he had literally carved out of the bush ten years earlier, relaxed and content at the thought of getting home again to 'his' North. By 5 October he was already in Jebba.

Persistent touring, north, west and east, and 'wrestling with the arrears of files and the jungle of Nigerian finances', occupied the following weeks until it was time to prepare the advance proposals for the 1913-1914 budget—this time to be cast within a format compatible with the coming amalgamation. He had already suggested, back in May, to the Colonial Office that the Officers Administering the Governments of both Protectorates should be 'instructed to prepare without delay' their estimates of revenue and expenditure, 'and to hold them in readiness for my arrival in the country'.⁴⁴ Writing to his wife in November,⁴⁵ he described some of the gigantic problems of the proposed amalgamation that he was already at grips with:

Generally speaking I have taken over the actual Gov. of both these countries and all papers which should go before the Gov. come to me. . . . The task of grappling with two new Administrations at once has been a colossal one. In this division of my work the subjects I have dealt with wholly defy recapitulation. There are literally hundreds (or thousands). In N. Nigeria the current papers include a large number of Mining questions. . . . In S. Nigeria . . . large issues press for immediate decision as for instance, whether the New Wharves and Railway to them shall be gone on with at a cost of 1½ million (some of the plant costing £200,000 being already under order) . . . how to meet present congestion, without embarking on an ill-digested scheme which may prove money wasted, including also a coal wharf and Petroleum (dangerous goods) wharf. Then there are similar questions in regard to the Electric Supply, and the Tramway . . . shall Gov. do what is necessary or get a private company, and if so on what terms? . . . I am for private enterprise instead of Gov., but the conditions involve much thought. . . .

In Administration there seems to be a perfect chaos, and a great deal of crime and also of official incapacity, etc. Yesterday I had a case of 744 murders by ordeal. . . . Today I have 6 murder cases to consider, a trial of two separate officers with a view to dismissal. . . . It is clear that this Administration wants regularly cleaning out like the Augean Stables. . . . But my primary task has been

* See Document III—(Ed. 1968)

*his to in Cal
Poppy South*

the Estimates. These I have revised and recast both in N. and S. Nigeria, going through them from page to page and item by item over and over again, personally redrafting a good deal of the N.N. Estimates in my own hand. Then there are in addition the Combined Estimates which meant the reorganization of the Railway and an exhaustive examination into the whole Loan expenditure of S.N. . . . the Marine, Customs, etc., these Estimates alone have proved a colossal task, but it is now practically finished, and both are now drawn up in a form to facilitate Amalgamation. Of course in addition to this work there has been the inevitable interviews, entertaining and journeys, so I have been pretty well occupied.

Perhaps not unnaturally for an administrator bred in the Northern emirates, Lugard's estimation of the provincial administration of the south-east was low. Indeed, he doubted its very existence, and decided that what was needed was nothing less than the creation of an administration!⁴⁶ One senior 'Southern' administrator has recently challenged this view, accusing Lugard of first preaching the heresy that 'British rule in the North was planned, skilful and systematic, while in the South it was unplanned and untidy, and sometimes even discreditable'—a view which then, he declares, assumed the aura of orthodox teaching in the doctrinal thought of Perham and her school.⁴⁷ As the recommendations in paragraphs 16–30 of the *Amalgamation Report* make only too clear, Lugard had no hesitation in asserting the quasi-'heaven-born' superiority of the Northern provincial administration over the Southern model⁴⁸ and of deliberately extending it to the South; with all the consequences which, whether seen, or unseen, or should-have-been-foreseen, have been so vigorously questioned ever since.⁴⁹

Lugard was back again in the North by Christmas, refreshed at the contrast which he found 'extra-ordinary—N. Nigeria runs itself. . . . In S. Nigeria, on the other hand, papers pour in and they have large questions of policy, etc., which might have been decided 12 years ago.'⁵⁰ From Zungeru he inspected the experimental West African Frontier Force camp at Kaduna, which he already seems to have had in mind as the new garden-city capital for the North (and, in the final reckoning, for the whole of Nigeria,⁵¹ on India's Simla hot-season model), and thence on to Kano where a magnificent durbar had been arranged for New Year's Day. Its pomp and circumstance must have been enough to satisfy the heart of any ex-'Northerner' making his sentimental journey back to the land of the Hausa-Fulani emirates.⁵²

By March 1913, when he was ready to return to England, Lugard had completed his personal survey of what was destined to become the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. That he had tackled the immense task with typical indefatigability and thoroughness is evidenced by a look at the rapidity of events. He was appointed in May 1912. By October he was in Lagos. By the beginning of 1913 he had toured the whole country and had gained a closer knowledge of its problems, not only those of the South, which was fresh ground to him, but also of the new-look North where a marked shift in emphasis in the interpretation of his classic formula of indirect rule—especially in Temple's and Palmer's urgent advocacy of the novel *Beit-el-Mal* or Native Treasury system—had reformed the emirate administration that he had formerly known so well.⁵³ By April, that is to say within a bare six months, he was back in England. Despite his common complaints to his wife

that he was so busy touring that he rarely had time to stand back and consider in proper perspective the huge problem of amalgamation, he was yet able, within less than five weeks after disembarking and with but a lone typist and his brother to devil for him, to forward to the Colonial Office an all-embracing scheme of amalgamation.⁵⁴ Parliamentary approval was given in September. Lugard was back in Lagos in October, and within only fifteen months of setting foot in Nigeria the amalgamation of the two civil administrations was officially enacted on New Year's Day, 1914.

By the *Amalgamation Report* has up to now invariably been meant the Parliamentary Paper Cmd. 468 of 1919. The origin of the published version of this *Report* can be found in a letter written by Lugard to the Colonial Office soon after his return from Nigeria in 1918. It reads as follows:

I was informed in 1913 that it was Lord Harcourt's wish that my report submitting proposals for the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria should be published in a suitable form. Some delay took place in the preparation of the papers and it was eventually decided to abandon the idea. There is no record in Nigeria accessible to the public of the reasons for the changes which were introduced, and the alternative proposals which were discussed. . . .⁵⁵

He went on to suggest that he should spend his leave in preparing 'a report which should embody such portion of the original as appears to be of permanent interest, together with a review of the five years working of the system inaugurated in January 1914, and some few suggestions resulting from this experience'. The outcome was the Parliamentary report of 1919 which is now reprinted as the major text of this collection of Amalgamation materials. This is the document on which scholars have worked from time to time and which, by virtue of its status as a Parliamentary Paper, must continue to command attention.

But there is also in existence another Report on the Amalgamation. This is Lugard's original proposals for unification of the Colony and two Nigerian Protectorates, submitted to the Colonial Office in May 1913.⁵⁶ To avoid confusion in terminology, I shall in this section refer to Lugard's 1919 document on amalgamation as the *Report* and his 1913 one as the *Proposals*. Up to now the *Proposals* have remained a highly restricted document, and no copy is retained even among the Lugard Papers. However, the recent relaxation of the rules governing public records has allowed access to certain volumes of the Colonial Office Confidential Print series, among them being Lugard's 1913 memorandum containing his original proposals for amalgamation. This important document is now reproduced as Document III. At the time, Lugard cautioned the Colonial Office that 'there are several paragraphs which I submit, it would be inadvisable to make public should it be your intention to print the report', but in the interests of objective scholarship the editor has left the text intact. The detailed financial and staff proposals have been added as Document IV. In only one case were Lugard's recommendations materially modified after their acceptance by Parliament in September 1913 and before January 1914, namely by his despatch to the Colonial Office in which he requested that the names 'Northern' and 'Southern Provinces' should replace his earlier recommendation of 'Northern/Southern

Territories' or 'Northern Nigeria' and 'Southern Nigeria' (at one time he had considered 'Niger Sudan' and 'Niger Coast'). This was approved in a telegram from Lord Harcourt.⁵⁷

Despite the fact that the 1919 *Report* appears at first sight to be over twice the length of the 1913 *Proposals* (it has 206 paragraphs and 9 appendixes in its 88 pages, against 58 paragraphs and 6 appendixes in 38 pages), it must be borne in mind that the former contains a discussion not only of the reasons for amalgamation but also a review of the five years (1914-1919) of its operation and a section on the 1916 accretion of the pre-Mandate Cameroons. Hence sections 67-206 of the *Report* are grouped departmentally under the rubric of 'General Administration and Progress'. A detailed investigation of what differences ensued between the 1913 proposals and the 1914 execution remains without the scope of this synoptic essay, but as a guide to enable a closer comparison of the actual amalgamation-scheme element of both reports to be undertaken, I have drawn up the following parallel table of subject headings (the numbers in brackets against the 1913 entries indicate the relevant paragraphs in the 1919 *Report*: the full contents of the latter's 215 topics is to be found at pp. 50-54):

1913	1919
<i>Introduction</i>	<i>Introduction</i>
1 Résumé of Administrative Changes	1-2 Area, geography, population, etc.
2 Policies and Progress of the Two Governments (16, 24)	3-4 Advent and character of British Rule
3 Financial Position, 1913	5-8 Reasons and nature of amalgamation
<i>Report</i>	<i>Method of Amalgamation</i>
1 The Governor-General (10-11)	9 Amalgamation Day
2-3 Lieutenant-Governors and Division of the Country (12)	10-11 The Governor-General
4 'Nigeria'	12 Lieutenant-Governors and Division of the Country
5-9 Lieutenant-Governors and the Administration (12)	13 Lieutenant-Governors and Central Departments
10 Staff of the Governor-General (11)	14 Reasons for the Division
11-12 Central Departments (13)	15 Provincial Administration and Departmental Control
13-14 Central Secretariat (31-32)	16-30 Native Administration [Note the absence of this section from the 1913 proposals]
15 Public Debt	31-32 Administrative Services, Political and Secretariat
16-17 Judicial (33)	33 Judicial and Legal
18-19 Legal (33)	34-37 Various Departments
20-23 Leave Conditions of Departmental Heads.	38 West African Frontier Force
24-26 Legislative Council (40)	39 The Native Staff
27-29 Nigerian Council (41)	40 Legislative Council
30 Executive Council (42)	41 Nigerian Council
31-32 Laws (43)	42 Executive Council
33 Annual Budget (108)	43 Method of Legislation
34-38 Territorial and Central Capitals (55-66)	44-54 The Courts of Law
39-45 Administrative Changes and Political Staff (15, 31-32)	55-66 Administrative Capitals
47-50 Courts of Law (44-54)	
51-55 Administration of Lagos (12)	

In Lugard's farewell address to his own creation, the Nigerian Council—soon to fall foul of his successor, Sir Hugh Clifford, who buried it with the well-remembered obloquy of 'a debating society in which nobody would enter into a debate . . . those feeble, faint, colourless, meaningless meetings that used to weary us all so intensely'⁵⁸—he summed up what he considered amalgamation had achieved for Nigeria:

The task of amalgamating Southern and Northern Nigeria which was entrusted to me, may now be said to have been accomplished. With the completion of the re-enactment of the Laws and Regulations, Nigeria now has a single Statute Book. The General Orders and Memoranda of Instructions on which the policy of the Administration in regard to the Natives is based have been revised and brought up to date, including the inauguration of direct taxation in the Southern Provinces and the creation of Townships. The Judicial System has been unified and finally the boundary between North and South has been rectified.⁵⁹

This is the point to consider, in some detail, one aspect of the whole scheme for the unification of Nigeria that has not yet engaged the attention of historical researchers to the extent that it deserves: namely the Nigerians' reaction to the proposal of amalgamation. From a close examination of the Nigerian newspapers appearing in the period 1912–1915, when amalgamation was a lively topic for comment, and again in the first half of 1919, when Lugard's retirement and his succession by Sir Hugh Clifford featured frequently in the editorial and correspondence columns, it is possible to build up a compelling picture of the reactions of Lagos and the south-west. It is less easy to discover material expression of opinion in the south-east, which at that time lacked the intellectual and cohesive stimulus to justify the vigorous journalism that had characterised the Lagos–Abeokuta–Ibadan cultural complex since the 1880s, and did not dominate the eastern scene till the establishment of Zik's Press Ltd. in the 1940s.⁶⁰ For the Northern reaction there is nothing of immediate accessibility: if there was such a phenomenon as 'Northern public opinion'—and many *cognoscenti* of the North's political development have argued that there was none until the introduction of the new system of elective local and central government bodies in the 1950s—it had no vehicle wherein to express itself. Indeed, for a quarter of a century it was the Governor in Lagos who, in his absolute discretion if he wished, alone was empowered to enact legislation for the Northern Provinces. There was no newspaper till an official monthly bilingual newsheet was started in 1931, no weekly in English till 1948, nor a daily till 1949.⁶¹ Not until Sir Donald Cameron's wind of change blew gustily through Kaduna in the 1930s, when he warned the Administration that 'It should be evident that if we did so frame our policy as to foster the development of the Northern Provinces as a separate political unit we should be merely seeking to revive a state of affairs that the amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria in 1914 was specifically designed to terminate',⁶² did the North begin to take much notice of the South—the first visit of a major Northern Emir to Lagos was that made by the Sultan of Sokoto and Emir of Kano on their way to England in 1934. No Northerner sat on the Nigerian Council or its successor Legislative Council (other than the official Residents, whose performance evoked from the late Sardauna the

gibe that 'their intellectual ascendancy was apparently so great that they managed [this representation] without opening their mouths save on the most formal motions'⁶³ until the Richards constitution was introduced in 1947 when the Governor was able to say 'for the first time in the history of Nigeria there are directly represented in the Legislative Council not only the people of the Colony and the Southern Provinces of the Nigerian Protectorate, but of the Northern Provinces as well, thus signifying the unity of interest and the common purpose shared by the different regions of this great country'.⁶⁴

So our principal evidence of Nigerian reaction to unification is that adduced in the Lagos press. Fortunately this was, then as now, an exuberant phenomenon. In brief, Yoruba opinion—and in the context of 1914 that was virtually the only opinion that could mobilise itself on any scale capable of drawing the attention of Government: the other method, riots and disturbances, was usually kept for localised crises such as boundary, taxation or chieftancy disputes—can be said to have moved from a readiness in 1912 to hope for the best from amalgamation, through anxiety in 1913 stemming from rumours and lack of information, to a strong feeling of resentment in 1914 which reached its culmination in the opprobrious editorials that bid farewell to Lugard on his retirement in 1919.⁶⁵ This hostility is crystallised in the rejection by Southern public opinion, as exemplified in the Lagos press, of four aspects of the amalgamation: (1) the considerable increase in the judicial powers of the District Commissioners in the new Provincial and Native Courts, and the concomitant abolition of the right of trial by jury and of appeal to the Supreme Court; (2) the extension of what was styled the 'Northern system of administration', successfully implemented in the Muslim emirates under the title of 'Indirect Rule' but castigated in the South as the nefarious 'Nigerian System';⁶⁶ (3) the introduction of direct taxation in the South; (4) the proposal to abandon Lagos and transfer the capital of the new Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria 500 miles upcountry to Kaduna. Before examining the development of the protest campaign against these recommendations, notice may be taken of the extraordinary way in which Nigeria was (or rather, was not) kept informed of the whole project of amalgamation. In vain did editors lament how 'an unprecedented mystery seems to shroud all the plans and movements of the administration, even touching the momentous scheme of Amalgamation, about which little or nothing is known'.⁶⁷ The lack of effective complaint is seen by some as indicative of the resigned feeling that in the colonial situation major policy decisions are unpublished till after the event and are then safely unassailable as *faits accomplis*.

By the time Lugard reached Lagos in October 1912 his unusual appointment as Governor of both the Northern and Southern Protectorates invested with a superordinate commission to bring about their unification into one administration, had been amply reported in the Nigerian press. When the news was first made public, the *African Mail*, whose editor was E. D. Morel, carried a prominent leader captioned 'A Momentous Decision' and spoke glowingly of 'the maker of Northern Nigeria returning to complete his work'.⁶⁸ This was followed by a piece in the *Equatorial and North Africa* which claimed to echo the views of informed newspaper opinion that the problems of Southern Nigeria were in more pressing need of Lugard's attention than

the North. In a sentence that enshrined both Lugard's own opinion and the whole crux of the South's eventual opposition, it surmised that 'In the South the entire legislature and administrative machinery will need to be remodelled'.⁶⁹ The next important public reference to amalgamation was the glowing terms of Lugard's commission in the House of Commons [see p. 8], though to those within the Colonial Service there was another reference by the Secretary of State, Lewis Harcourt, in his speech at the annual Corona Club dinner where he warned of the danger inherent in that *esprit de corps* which makes each Protectorate prefer its own methods and systems to that of its neighbours.⁷⁰ Generally speaking, the first reaction of the Nigerian press was favourable, and when Lugard landed in Lagos he was presented with a memorial by the local chiefs and dignitaries who wished him success in his plan for unification. —

Exceptionally, the *Lagos Standard* raised a doubt right from the start, for in its issue reporting Lugard's arrival it unambiguously declared that 'it is no figure of speech to say that the proposed amalgamation is viewed by the people of Lagos with mixed feelings'.⁷¹ This cautious attitude it based on two grounds. One, a once-bitten-twice-shy experience, for it was Lagos's earlier experiences, when the Colony had been subservient to the governors of first Sierra Leone and then the Gold Coast [see p. 3], which prompted the editor's disenchantment that 'the experiment of amalgamations hitherto has not been such as to give any encouragement as to the benefits to be gained therefrom'. Two, there remained anxiety over the unwieldiness of the governmental machinery when such a large portion of the country would be so far removed from headquarters. However, the Legislative Council met quietly enough for the first time under Lugard's presidentship, and there is no record in its proceedings of any question or motion indicating that the prospect of amalgamation was either alarming or unwelcome. Lugard took the opportunity to replace the Governor's customary address at the opening of a new session by a review that was really a comprehensive report on the state of the nation. In his general observations on the budgetary estimates for 1913, he was at pains to emphasise the fiscal solvency of the Northern Protectorate. He disclosed that as far back as 1904 the three Governors had considered that Nigeria was ripe for unification, 'but there is no doubt that if amalgamation had been carried out at that date, it would have involved a very great strain on the finances of Lagos and Southern Nigeria'. The fact that during the eight years since amalgamation had been seriously discussed by the administrations the revenue of the North had made vast strides through its cotton and mining industries, now easily railed to the port of Lagos, enabled Lugard further to impress on the South the financial advantages of amalgamation.⁷²

During the first few months, while Lugard was on his fact-finding mission of the country [see p. 13], the only sign of inquietude was an editorial reference⁷³ to the panic said to be spreading among Southern Nigerians that their holdings were to be converted to the Northern land tenure practice wherein all land was vested in the Crown. This rumour may have originated in the terms of reference of the Committee on West African land tenure set up in 1912 by the Secretary of State to report on what improvements might be made 'either on the lines of the Northern Nigeria Lands Proclamation or otherwise', rather than in any alleged idea of how Lugard's amalgamation ideas were shaping. In any case, nothing more was heard of such stories.

Then the *Nigerian Chronicle* began to run a series of articles, spread over several weeks,⁷⁴ examining the implications of Lugard's inaugural address to the Legislative Council. These were centred on the specified doubt whether Lagosians would benefit from the proposed economic merger and were duly supported by a host of apt vernacular proverbs dealing with the distribution of the good things in life. Conscious of the Yoruba Achilles heel, the writer raised the bogey of direct taxation: 'On this point we cannot but differ from His Excellency in that peace and freedom could be secured without paying direct taxation. To create unknown conditions by introducing [it] is to turn back the clock.' In a plea echoed, *mutatis mutandis*, so often since, he went on to counsel Government not to overlook the fact that 'the conditions which obtain in Northern Nigeria are different from what we have in the South. . . . It is not a correct policy to make what obtains in Northern Nigeria a standard for the South.' To reinforce its stand, the paper reprinted the whole of Lugard's 1907 *Memorandum on Taxation*⁷⁵ and followed this up with several articles highly critical of its operation even on its home soil of the North.⁷⁶ Clearly Lagos opinion was getting restive, and when the time came for Lugard to return to the United Kingdom in the spring of 1913 without any word being made public of what he had in mind for the future of the country, the *Nigerian Chronicle* took him to task.⁷⁷ Lugard had not, if felt, asked all the questions he should have done, nor indeed so far answered any of them. It concluded that 'Sir Frederick, as a student of Native politics, has yet to speak'. None the less, public opinion was on balance still inclined to accept the maxim about the proof of the pudding, and even the *Lagos Weekly Record* had, in an editorial that was otherwise highly vituperative, no hesitation in dubbing Lugard 'the propeller of the Nigerian Empire'.⁷⁸

Then came the first bombshell. The German newspaper *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* published a specially contributed article under the challenging heading 'Administrative Changes in Nigeria',⁷⁹ in which it asserted that it was the intention of Government to introduce the Northern Nigerian system of administration into the South. At once the Lagos press was up in arms, albeit giving Government the benefit of the doubt—'we credit the Government with better judgment and nobility of character' was the verdict in an editorial captioned 'A Fictitious System of Amalgamation'⁸⁰—and perceptibly more worried by the prophecy that Germany's harsher imperial practice would now supplant the more liberal British principles in Nigerian administration.⁸¹ However, Lagos was evidently alarmed, and the press felt bound to warn Government that if there were any truth in the report it would spearhead opposition. To emphasise this dislike of the system of Native Administration, one of the papers was able to quote the Gold Coast press as saying that 'the Northern Nigerian system introduced to places like Lagos is bound to effect [sic] national interests injuriously', and any spread towards Accra 'must spell for us national degradation'.⁸²

Back in England, the first public utterance of how matters had progressed since Lugard's appointment was his major speech in May to the influential London Chamber of Commerce where, as guest of honour, he replied to the significant toast of 'United Nigeria'.⁸³ Explaining how he was not at liberty to reveal what his proposals to the Secretary of State involved, he nevertheless described amalgamation as 'a necessity which cannot be deferred' and declared himself convinced that 'this important step has not been taken a day

too soon'. While Nigerian opinion pondered over this, the *Lagos Weekly Record* decided to print detailed accounts of a protracted tour of the North by its special correspondent, an unusual enough event in this activist member of the Lagos press to suggest some editorial *arrière-pensée*.⁸¹ The republication from the London *Times* of its authoritative-sounding article entitled 'Southern Nigeria: Impending Improvement in Administration' acted as a new tinder.⁸² In early September it was announced in the British press that Lugard's scheme for amalgamation had received 'the Imperial assent' and that he would be sailing back to Lagos in the middle of the month.⁸³ No details of the plan were given. The *Lagos Weekly Record* now ignited with an editorial⁸⁷ asking its Southern readers how welcome would be the foreshadowed imposition of the Northern system of the District Officer being invested with wide judicial powers and the consequent abolition of the Supreme Court appeals so cherished by the Yoruba. Yet even this was no more than a flash in the pan, for a fortnight later the same editor was happy enough to head his leader 'Unity and Amalgamation of Interest a Desideratum'.⁸⁸

October 1913 saw the return of Lugard to Nigeria. The *Nigerian Chronicle*, in offering a courteous welcome, expressed its regret that nobody had yet been allowed to know what was in store for the country. The fact that plans were still hidden away in the confidential files of the Colonial Office made it difficult to reassure thinking Nigerians who had been alarmed by the two damaging articles in the German and British press. It again warned Government to remember that the South was not Muslim and that the principles of Northern administration were anathema to them. This was especially true of the rumoured introduction of direct taxation: 'the natives are exceedingly sore on this point which they say is not in conformity with the immemorial customs and practices of their country'.⁸⁹ The *Lagos Standard* understandably took a more parochial view of the threat to the South signalled in these two seemingly 'leaked' reports.⁹⁰ Not only did it animadvert on the breach of civil liberty perceived in the judicial reforms, which it 'looked on in the light of a universal calamity', but it fastened on to another story. 'The greatest change, and the one most to be dreaded', it declared, 'is the rumoured removal, after the amalgamation, of the capital from Lagos to some point in the interior'.⁹¹ Such a proposal was tantamount to 'the deathknell of the advancement and prosperity of the progressive town of Lagos' and must be resisted at all costs. At the same time, this paper also rallied support against the dreaded implications of rumoured court reforms in the South, and in an editorial captioned 'Whither are we Drifting?'⁹² launched a vigorous attack on the Northern Nigerian legal system whose extension to the South had irritatingly been claimed as part of 'the process of what has been termed the "speeding up" of the civilisation of the country'.⁹³ By mischance, a series of judicial incidents from the North, reported in gleeful detail in the Lagos press, played into the hands of those who feared the spread of what they repeatedly described as the 'high-handed and tyrannous' administration of justice by District Officers. Among these was the notorious 'Zaria flogging' affair, which became the subject of a parliamentary question in the House of Commons.⁹⁴ The *Nigerian Chronicle* now joined the growing protest against any plan to give District Commissioners in the South the same judicial authority their colleagues exercised in the North, and declared 'We say emphatically and without any attempt at dissimulation that if the power

['of life and death'] is granted, it will be the greatest blunder and injustice to the Native the British Government has ever committed'.⁹⁵

The months of October and November went by, and still there was no official intimation of what form amalgamation would take or even when it would be effected. Then suddenly, on 27 December, the *Nigeria Gazette* presented a Proclamation decreeing that from 1 January the country would become the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. Small wonder that the Nigerian press bristled with indignation. Editorials denounced the secrecy and indecent haste of this eleventh hour statement by Government, evilly and effectively sandwiched between the Christmas and New Year public holidays with all that this meant in the way of nobody being 'on seat'.⁹⁶

For most of January the press contented itself with reprinting the abundant verbiage that invariably marks the birth of a nation, including the proclamation and the official speeches of New Year's day.⁹⁷ One letter appeared which bemoaned the condition of Lagosians and, coining a phrase to be heard again in Lagos fifty years later, envied the Northerners who, 'unlike us here, are the fattened pets of the Government',⁹⁸ but editorial opinion was unanimous in feeling that there was more potential good than harm in the amalgamation now effected.⁹⁹ Only the revived¹⁰⁰ *Times of Nigeria* struck a minor discordant note in those first weeks while the reading public was busily digesting the news and trying to learn exactly what had been decided for it by a colonial government which, almost by definition, was, in the conduct of imperial administration disregardant of public opinion and contemptuous of consultation beyond that with unofficial members nominated to the advisory Legislative Council by His Excellency himself. This was a lone article entitled 'Utopia Ltd', a local sally against the North not being the model administration it was held out to be but rather a region which 'labours under despotism' of District Officers eager to maltreat those who did not respect them.¹⁰¹

It did not take the volatile Lagosians long to peruse their newspapers and wake up to what had happened to them. Then battle was joined. Towards the end of January the *Nigerian Chronicle* opened fire with a series of articles on the Provincial Courts Bill, due for enactment on March 1 and now the focus of Southern fury. 'A union of name', it insisted, 'does not mean or involve a union of customs and manners'.¹⁰² In support, it printed a letter from Patriarch Campbell of the West African Episcopalian Church in Lagos, under the heading 'Does the English Man practise Fair Play and Justice in Nigeria?'¹⁰³ A mass meeting of protest was next called at Glover Hall on 3 February, and a delegation was deputed to present to the Governor a petition embodying the alarm felt by the citizens of Lagos over the threat to their judicial privileges. The barrage was continued by the *Lagos Standard*, which in its leader 'A Dangerous Innovation' initiated a protracted series¹⁰⁴ of uncompromising attacks on the 'evils' of placing the courts in the hands of 'haughty' District Officers as envisaged by this Bill: 'Of all the doubtful changes which are to come into effect with the recent Amalgamation there is none that has been the cause of more serious alarm.' The *Times of Nigeria* fired the next round with an article entitled 'Nigerian Justice: Forecasts of Amalgamation', pinpointing the case of an abused railway guard. 'Our ears have tingled', the editor wrote, 'at the recital of some of the horrible deeds which are being perpetrated in Northern Nigeria under the name and colour of law'. In terms that have been echoed in 1967, he protested that

what amalgamation really meant was nothing less than the inclusion of the whole of the South (here Yorubaland) into the former Protectorate of Northern Nigeria.¹⁰⁶ Indeed, in reading the reaction of Nigerian opinion as reflected in the Lagos press of the opening months of 1914, symbolised in the challenge 'Who would not growl and snarl at oppression such as is now staring the Natives in the face in the present Provincial Courts Bill?',¹⁰⁶ it is hard to keep one's sense of proportion.

While this impassioned opposition to a change in the judicial system of the South continued, the *Times of Nigeria* picked up another stick with which to beat the Government. It lambasted the *African Mail* for its endorsement of Lugard's wish to withdraw to Kaduna and so escape the 'political storm centre' of Lagos that was clearly too turbulent for him, and accused its editor (Morel) of wielding as much backroom power in the Colonial Office as the permanent under-secretary himself.¹⁰⁷ In this condemnation it was joined by the *Nigerian Chronicle*, which disdained any editor of an African newspaper who was not only a European in league with Whitehall but also lived four thousand miles away from the centre of affairs.¹⁰⁸ Other cudgels were to hand. The *Lagos Standard*, not to be outdone, protested loudly against Lugard's tight centralisation of authority even when he was in England on leave and wondered how the Colonial Office could sanction this brazen attempt to found an autocracy.¹⁰⁹ One of the most scathing attacks on the would-be benefits of the Northern system of administration now to be extended to the South came in a *Times of Nigeria* leader which caricatured the Governor of the North, riding proudly through Kano on his horse and preceded by a herald crying 'Behold the Emir of all Emirs'.¹¹⁰

The campaign to discredit certain aspects of amalgamation was now stepped-up. Anti-'Northern' articles, letters, editorials, reports, etc., proliferated in the Lagos newspapers of March and April. Such sustained protests in the press, along with the frequent mass meetings in Lagos, were not in vain. The Government suddenly announced the postponement, on technical grounds, of its controversial Provincial Courts Bill.

But public opinion, as expressed in the local press, had been too far roused to be satisfied by this temporary concession. The *Times of Nigeria*, obviously refreshed after its two years' suspension, had now assumed the leadership of the resistance movement. It published 'A Plain Talk and a Litany' which included the fervent prayer of

'Good Lord, deliver us

From a prancing pro-consul who must have his own way,

From a born-and-bred-in-the-law Chief Justice who mercilessly drafts out oppressive Ordinances;

From a Colonial Secretary who, having been influenced by the man on the spot, deliberately deafens his ears and shuts his eyes to the moans and groans of an oppressed people . . .'¹¹¹

For good measure, it even gave currency to the suggestion that the object of the new railway line from Port Harcourt to Kaduna was a deliberate attempt to injure Lagos by diverting all the Northern export trade.¹¹² Other newspapers preferred to exploit the Provincial Courts issue, playing variations on the theme that 'if the system which is called law and order in the administra-

tion of Northern Nigeria and which is extolled by officials only, be made applicable to the whole of Nigeria, it will be nothing short of dire calamity for us'.¹¹³

By the middle of 1914 the situation came very near to boiling over when the *Times of Nigeria* accusation bluntly alleged in its leader 'The Hidden Meaning'¹¹⁴ that unification was synonymous with a sell-out of the South. 'The amalgamation of 1914', it asserted, 'is, broadly speaking, the conquest and subjugation of Southern Nigeria by Northern Nigeria. Northern Nigerian system, Northern Nigerian laws, Northern Nigerian land laws, Northern Nigerian administration, must be made to supersede every system in Southern Nigeria'. One further weapon was placed in the press's hands when a copy of a confidential despatch to the Colonial Office on educational policy sent by Lugard on his way home in S.S. *Mendi*,¹¹⁵ was leaked to the *Nigerian Chronicle*. They printed it in full under the contentious title of 'The Proposed Installation of Mental Slavery' and, linking it with the remarks the Governor had made when opening the exhibition of school work in Lagos, made it the cause of a severe attack on him for his alleged plan to curb the educational genius of the South.

Two events now intervened, fortuitously, to distract attention. One was the sudden switching by the Lagos press to a stinging assault on one of their sister-newspapers, the recently founded *Nigerian Pioneer*. Because it had dared to praise¹¹⁶ the Governor's speech to the Legislative Council defending his proposals for judicial reform—on which he had invited the Chief Justice to examine the objections raised by the Aborigines Protection Society; these had then been released to the press¹¹⁷—as 'brilliant', it was suspected of the worst kind of Uncle Tomism and its European editor was accused of acting as Lugard's official mouthpiece.¹¹⁸ The *Nigerian Pioneer* replied with a lengthy article on 'The Judicial Reorganisation of Nigeria',¹¹⁹ and the controversy seemed set fair to continue—until an even greater diversion occurred. This was the declaration of war in Europe. From August 1914 onwards this effectively drove Nigerian issues off the principal pages. As a result, Lugard was able to hurry the revised Provincial Court, Supreme Court, and Criminal Procedure Bills through Legislative Council in September, and all the *Nigerian Chronicle* could do was to print a reflective article on the *fait accompli* under the heading 'The Administration of Justice in Nigeria'.¹²⁰ True, in its end-of-the-war survey, the *Lagos Weekly Record* continued to see the high hopes of amalgamation foundering on these new legal ordinances, darkly depicting how 'with gloomy foreboding [the Southern Nigerians] murmur at the sworn determination of the Administration to ride rough-shod over the feelings of the people, and with bated breath the rumour is spread that an evil star has arisen over Nigeria and its peoples cast upon anxious times'.¹²¹ The *Lagos Standard* tried to revive the issue again in 1915, and gave prominence to a series of articles by a retired puisne judge of the former Supreme Court of Southern Nigeria,¹²² but it was now a case of flogging a dead horse. Nor was there much to be gained from attempts to switch to other tactics by exposing the hollowness of the Legislative Council, or by categorising indirect rule and military terrorism as a distinction without a difference that was deceiving nobody.¹²³ By the time other Nigerian affairs regained their urgency in the press—and it must not be forgotten that the war itself was very much a Nigerian concern, for a hard campaign was being

fought on its eastern frontier: even today in Nigeria it is recalled as the Cameroons War rather than the First [World] War—the country had settled down to three years of unified government.

In compiling the record, our concern is the past as a guide to interpreting the present. We must therefore note the climax of the South's dislike—in so far as we may accept the press as the medium of at least an important section of public opinion—of some of the principles of amalgamation as expressed in the significant attitude shown by the Lagos newspapers when Reuter's cable was received in early 1919 announcing Lugard's decision to retire.¹²⁴ The *Lagos Weekly Record*, which had swung from a pro-amalgamation stand in 1912 to a violently anti-Lugard one by 1919, was the first to report the news (the no less outspoken *Times of Nigeria* was experiencing another of its close seasons). In a long article¹²⁵ it described how this cable was 'received with great joy and gladness by the loyal natives of Nigeria', who went on their knees to thank God for 'delivering his dusky children from the baneful effects of an inglorious administration'. It accused Lugard of imposing on the South what it called the notorious 'Nigerian System' of administration, seen as 'the product of his exuberant imagination' and described as 'the most ingenious system that has ever been devised since the days of the Spanish Inquisition for the express purpose of humiliating and depressing the unity of any loyal and progressive community'. Writing him off as a 'Huge Failure', it calculated that his only achievement was to have transformed a model colony into a hotbed of disaffection. The *Lagos Standard* spoke in the same vein.¹²⁶ Commenting on the inadequacy of Lugard's farewell letter to the Officer Administering the Government,¹²⁷ in which he regretted that he had not seen more of his plans brought to fruition, the newspaper blamed his military character. It ascribed his paucity of sympathisers not to any want of charity in what it numbered as his 'host of critics' but to the fact that 'while there was still time every effort was made to point to him the shoals towards which he was steering his bark, but he resolutely held to his fateful cause[sic]'. In virulent leaders, he was accused of grievous maladministration; of racial pride in his 'contemptible' public assessment that one of the greatest difficulties in African administration was, in his own words, the snag of it being 'hard to find honest native subordinates'; of unpopularity with all classes and creeds. His record in implementing the amalgamation was, they felt, a sorry one, and in consequence the verdict must be that 'West Africa has no use for him'. A letter, datelined 'Somewhere in Nigeria' and printed in the *African World*, accused Lugard of 'pride and self-sufficiency', and—in a markedly advanced idiom—talked of the 'non-success of most of the new schemes' he had inaugurated, instancing the slow growth of Kaduna and Port Harcourt and the Abeokuta disturbances as examples of his 'self-glorification' in introducing unwanted changes into the administration of the Southern Provinces.¹²⁸

The same hatred, born of their interpretation of Lugard's role in bringing about amalgamation, came to the surface when a few months later, the Lagos press welcomed the new Governor, Sir Hugh Clifford. Mainly the enthusiasm for his appointment rightly sprang from the brilliant reputation he had acquired in his years as Governor of the Gold Coast, yet there was, too, a feeling that, in the words of one editor, 'anything which will afford any degree of relief—however brief or temporary—from the blighting effects of Sir Frederick Lugard's nefarious administration will be gladly welcomed by all

loyal Nigerians'.¹²⁹ Because in a considerable measure the essence of the South's rejection of certain 'Northern-oriented' implications of amalgamation is located in these *valete* editorials and in the summary of its grievances as set out in the fourteen-point programme offered by the Lagos press to Clifford on his arrival, examples of these revealing documents are reproduced in full as Document VI.

This analysis of the Nigerian press has been undertaken in some detail by virtue of its quality of being the only available method of assessing the reaction of contemporary Nigerian public opinion, in so far as such a phenomenon existed, towards amalgamation. In the decades that followed, its kernel was again revealed in the South's—especially the Eastern Provinces—dislike of the North's successful formula of indirect rule in action, recognised as Native Administration. This rejection found its climax in the East's rapid throwing off of the NA system in 1949 when it substituted a tiered local government system modelled on the English pattern. In the North, where the NA system was in keeping with the traditional administrative genius of the emirates, the act of amalgamation encountered no active opposition until the angry eruption of North-South feelings during the Lagos constitutional crisis of 1953, when, as we have seen (p. 2), the Sardauna of Sokoto momentarily reviled it.

Although this Introduction does not aim at evaluating the balance-sheet of the 1914 amalgamation—to do so would be to introduce the very kind of judgements that we have been at pains to eschew in an essay which has as its primary aim the objective presentation of the documents themselves to students of Nigeria's political history—it is only fair to point out that there exist diametrically opposing opinions of the stature of Lugard's administrative reforms. The determined resistance of the Lagos press, perhaps not fully appreciated in previous reviews of the amalgamation period, has been documented above. Two quotations may be taken to summarise the contrasted assessments. One is the encomium of Perham: 'This plan stood the test of almost every critic and of six years' progressive implementation, emerging at the end as a working system substantially unchanged from his original design. . . . He seemed to *know* from the very first moment what he would do. And it was not as though he saw his work as simply as a piece of administrative joinery. He made it a work of reorganization, indeed of reform, in almost department of government.'¹³⁰ The other is the markedly anti-Lugardian sentiments of a former Lagos civil servant, Ian Nicolson, who has called amalgamation 'a very saddening experience . . . after studying the work of his [Lugard's] forerunners who administered Southern Nigeria'. In harsh words, he castigates Lugard's administrative plans as 'trampling on all the carefully nursed seedlings of civilized government, law and legislature, and substituting authoritarian administrocracy in which the whole emphasis was away from the coast, away from law and education in its widest sense', and concludes that Lugard's amalgamation placed Nigeria in a state of arrested development, with its institutions of government left on the whole 'dormant and static' for the next thirty years.¹³¹ These contrasting views on the wisdom of the very concept of amalgamating the two Nigerias have been widely revived in 1966-1967. In the North voices were heard expressing resentment

at the way the amalgamation dislocated it from its proud Islamic past, geographically, administratively and culturally 1914 has been criticised and, as an act of folly that has brought little but harm. This latter attitude and, of course, the context in which the late Sardauna of Sokoto's classic denunciation of Amalgamation quoted at p. 2 must be seen. The Eastern Region, on the other hand, has given the impression of looking back to the 1914 unification as the ultimate sanction of Nigeria's legal existence, and will concede no argument that reaches back beyond this point in the country's history.¹³² At the centre, General Gowon has patiently sought, often against extremist views to retain the hallmark of a genuine national identity that just began to emerge after 1960. Today civil war has bedevilled talk of imminent national integration.

To quote extracts from the *Amalgamation Report* for commentary would be otiose; students can now read it for themselves. In an Introduction of this genre, it would also, despite the temptation to comment on Lugard's prophecies, fallacies, interpretations and hundreds of small yet significant historical facts, be out of place to duplicate or summarise the Report that follows in full. Such a move would be as gauche an affront as a mere hors d'oeuvre daring to suggest the delicacies of the banquet to come. A glance at the detailed Table of Contents that prefaces the *Amalgamation Report* is indeed a menu of high promise. The *Report* also contains a remarkable amount of hard facts about Nigeria, whose broader knowledge may well have been restricted by its earlier unavailability. There is, nevertheless, a case for drawing attention to one or two contemporary records that contribute to a fuller chronicle of the events.

Of the actual ceremony of New Year's Day, 1914, there are fewer eyewitness accounts than one might have expected. Those that have survived, however, stand out for their historical value over half a century after the event. There are the press correspondents' reports, which fill out the barren details given in the *Nigerian Gazette Extraordinary*, and the series of congratulatory telegrams exchanged between the Colonial Office (relaying a message from King George V) and the Governor-General. Examples of these are reproduced in Document V. There are also Lugard's descriptive letter to his wife and the account in his brother's diary, now filed in the Lugard Papers. It was exciting to come across in Nigeria a folio copy of the Proclamation—addressed for the first time to 'the people of Nigeria'—and of Lugard's official speech delivered on that memorable New Year's Day. The latter is a rare enough document (it is not to be found in the *Report*, though paragraph 9 thereof does make a passing reference to the ceremonies) to justify inclusion in this study among the miscellaneous Amalgamation papers presented in Document V, while the Proclamation offers a conveniently neat summary of the intent of amalgamation. It ran:

His Majesty the King has decided that from today all the country from the sea to near the desert in the North, and from the French country in the West to the German Kameruns in the East, shall be one single country under one Governor-General, so that there may be no jealousy or rivalry between the North and the South, and all may co-operate together for the advancement of Peace and Prosperity. His Majesty has been pleased to appoint me, Sir F. Lugard, as Governor-General, and by the help of God I trust that I may be enabled to

obtain wisdom to discharge this responsible task worthily. It will be my earnest endeavour to promote Peace and Justice for all men, to protect every man in the observance of his own religious faith and to administer equal Justice alike for great and small.

The Southern Provinces, hitherto called Southern Nigeria, will be under the immediate charge of Mr. Boyle, C.M.G., as Lieutenant-Governor, and the Northern Provinces under Mr. Temple, C.M.G., as Lieutenant-Governor, and the Colony of Lagos under Mr. James, C.M.G., as Administrator. These three high officers will be under my orders.

The Colony of Lagos will as heretofore have a Legislative Council, whose functions will be limited to the Colony. There will also be a Council for Nigeria upon which the Europeans holding the highest offices in Nigeria will have seats and also Unofficial Europeans and Natives representing each part of Nigeria. These will be nominated by me.

There will also be an Executive Council consisting of the Principal Officers of the Administration to assist the Governor-General with their advice.

There will be one Supreme Court for Nigeria and Sir Edwin Speed is appointed Chief Justice of Nigeria.

I trust that as one United country Nigeria will increase in prosperity and wealth, and its people in happiness.

F. D. LUGARD

Although, too, this is not the place to analyse the schism and continuity of policy that have marked the succeeding fifty years, or the manner in which certain current problems and principles may be traced back to their source in the unification of the old Northern and Southern Protectorates—and have been brought into the open by the events of 1966 and 1967—one question must nevertheless be posed here, even if its detailed answer is contained in the text of the *Report*. Having now considered its historical antecedents, we may ask what was its rationale. Why was the Nigerian amalgamation necessary?

Apart from Morel's condemnations of the 'absurdity' of the two administrations and Lugard's understandable bias in favour of the sterling merits of 'the Northern system', the explanation on which all historians seem to be in agreement is that of economic necessity. This was brought to a vigorous head by the disastrous divergence of railway policies. The 'pressing difficulty', as Lugard mildly put it in his *Report*, in regard to railway policy and control was both critical and complex. In brief, it centred on the urgent controversy over the exact point on the river Niger where the Baro-Kano and Lagos Northern Railways Extension¹³³ schemes should meet up. The situation became exacerbated by both access lines to the coast being developed as unmistakably rival schemes. One commentator has defined the two administrations as actually 'antagonistic to each other'¹³⁴ by virtue of carrying their 'separateness' to the extent of building competing railway systems. The views of the High Commissioners on railway extension in the two Protectorates had long differed, and their opposition crystallised in 1907 with the appointment of Sir Percy Girouard of the Royal Engineers as Governor of Northern Nigeria. He saw the waterway as the axis of economic development in the North ('the Niger provides the most efficient route to the interior, and by reliance upon it the northern country will establish its most economic outlet for trade'¹³⁵) and was intent on basing railway policy on this premise, whereas the Southern objective was simply the projection of the Lagos-Ibadan line. When giving consideration to the competing railway policies,

the Secretary of State noted in a minute, significantly written in 1907, that, 'as the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria has been decided upon and will probably be carried out within the next four years', the railways must be looked on as the property of the eventual 'Colony of Nigeria' as a whole.

After the advice of Sir John Eaglesome, Lugard's close friend who had followed him from India to take on the Office of Director of Public Works as well as later that of Director of Railways in the North, that the crossing should be at Pategi had been rejected, an enquiry was set up by the Crown Agents. The commissioner condemned the planlessness and extravagance of the Lagos-Ibadan construction in such unequivocal terms that immediate unification of the railway was the only remedy. Even when an extension of the Lagos and the Baro-Kano lines was approved, the North-South antagonism went so far in disagreement over control of the Northern portion of the Lagos line that a full-scale conference of Northern and Southern officers had to be convened at Offa in 1911—the forerunner of the countless North-South conferences that have marked the intervening half-century. The birth of the 'Nigerian' Railway, when the Lagos Baro-Kano lines were unified by Lugard on 3 October 1912, has rightly been seen as opening the way to the eventual political amalgamation of the two separate administrations.

In sum, whatever political praise or blame may, in the nonchalant nature of hindsight, be attributed to the unification of the two Nigerias and the creation of one Nigeria—to this day at least a patriotic motto, implicit in the Republic's first constitution and explicit in its emblem and national anthem—the motive seems to have been primarily that of economic common sense. Hence the unanimous verdict of Nigeria's historians. Various they write of 'owing to financial difficulties and to conflict over railway policy, the British Government instructed Sir Frederick Lugard to bring about an amalgamation . . .';¹³⁶ 'the practical reasons mainly concerned railways and revenues';¹³⁷ 'it [dissatisfaction with divergent railway policies] served to bring matters to a head by hastening the decision in favour of amalgamation';¹³⁸ 'the immediate reason for the decision to amalgamate the two Nigerias was economic expediency . . . furthermore, there was the pressing need to co-ordinate railway policy';¹³⁹ and 'the practical result of the amalgamation was to enable the large revenue of Southern Nigeria to be spread out for the development of the whole of Nigeria [and] to put an end to the financial difficulties of the North . . .'.¹⁴⁰

Such unhesitating certainty stems, of course, from Lugard's own appreciation of the situation in the *Report*, where he summarises the 'necessity for amalgamation' under the two headings of finance and railways. Not only had the Northern Protectorate been running at a substantial operating loss—in itself a direct contradiction of one of the traditional British colonial maxims that every territory must be self-supporting—but its treasury had been subvented by heavy grants-in-aid from both Great Britain and the Southern Protectorate; at the very time when the prosperity of the South was increasing rapidly thanks to the high duties imposed on liquor imports, especially 'square face' or trade gin. Such a source of revenue was unknown to the Moslem North. Ironically, as Crowder observes, the much-vaunted Northern line from Baro to Minna¹⁴¹ was built with funds diverted from the revenue of the Southern Protectorate.¹⁴² With the completion of the Baro-Kano railway line in 1911 the financial position was to be completely reversed, for within a

matter of months the North was showing an enviable surplus from its export earnings now that it had access to the coast. Indeed, the economic consideration of the land-locked North searching for an unimpeded outlet to the sea has twice since, in 1953 and again in 1966, taken on a vivid significance in any rethinking of the country's administrative structure. In a speech to a Colonial Service dinner in 1913, the Secretary of State summarised this financial dependence in a humorous metaphor: 'We have released Northern Nigeria from the leading strings of the Treasury. The promising and well-conducted youth is now on an allowance "on his own" and is about to effect an alliance with a Southern lady of means. I have issued the special licence and Sir Frederick Lugard will perform the ceremony. May the union be fruitful and the couple constant! The Nigerias are not designed to be a great "Trust" but a great "Federation".'¹¹³

Later Lord Lugard was, in his classic testament of imperial administration, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, to refer to both the generalities of amalgamation as the concomitant of decentralisation, where he saw that 'amalgamation (that is, unification) and federation are both natural processes of evolution',¹⁴¹ and to the specific instance of the Nigerian experience. (On the whole, his book contains a disappointingly meagre discussion of the amalgamation of Nigeria.) Here his guiding principle was clearly enunciated:

The scheme of amalgamation adopted in Nigeria was designed to involve as little dislocation of existing conditions as possible, while providing for the introduction later of such further changes as were either foreseen, but not immediately necessary, or might be suggested by future experience. They would then be rather in the nature of natural evolution than of reversal.¹⁴⁵

There remains one point that is touched on but lightly in the actual *Report* and where further commentary is topical. This is the matter of the change in the administrative superstructure and machinery of the new colonial governments. Its relevance has been highlighted by the 1966 disturbances in Nigeria over this very issue of regionalised administrative autonomy or a unitary administration.

We have seen how before 1914 the Northern Protectorate was already administered under a system of thirteen Provinces, each under a senior Political Officer known as a Resident, while the South was governed through three Provincial Commissioners, each in charge of a Division.¹⁴⁶ These latter, which had derived from the earlier hierarchy of a Divisional Commissioner and a Travelling Commissioner responsible for a group of Districts, had become miniature Lieutenant-Governors in all but name. Thus it was that as regards provincial administration, the most obvious change came in the Southern Protectorate, which was now reduced to nine Provinces on the Northern pattern.¹⁴⁷ Intimately linked with the process of provincialisation was the planned extension of the Northern emirates' successful system of 'native administration' to the riverain and southern areas. The *Report* has much to record on the origins of this policy (though the *Proposals* contain no such major section), one whose wisdom continues to give rise to ample debate and dissent, for not all modern administrators find themselves in agreement with the implication in Lord Hailey's evaluation of the amalgamation as 'primarily an act of administrative expediency, designed, among other things,

to give to Southern Nigeria the benefits of the system of local rule which had been established in the North'.¹⁴⁸

In the early post-amalgamation years there co-existed 'central' and duplicated 'regional' departments with, however, a single roster for promotion. Lagos had its Central Secretariat. The Gold Coast experiment of grouping the Political and Secretarial Departments into a single Administrative department to allow political officers to gain some experience in Secretariat procedure and the Secretariat to 'acquire officers with practical experience of native affairs in the provinces'¹⁴⁹ did not find favour in Lugard's eyes, although it was endorsed by the Colonial Office. He, never a field District Officer himself,¹⁵⁰ was yet a vigorous Provincial Administration partisan: not for nothing did he include in both editions (1906 and 1918) of his *Political Memoranda* the credo of Sir Henry Lawrence that 'the work done by a Political Officer in his district, surrounded by the people, is greatly superior to the work done in an office surrounded by untrustworthy officials'. Nevertheless, a single Administrative Service with—at least in theory and nearly always in practice—complete interchangeability between provincial and secretariat assignments and equal promotion prospects evolved over the years; and not until the rethinking of the role of an administrative service in an independent country coincided with the implementation of planned Africanisation programmes was the ethos again seriously questioned.

Sir Hugh Clifford, who succeeded Lugard in 1919, found the Central Secretariat—housed in the gracious building planned by Sir Walter Egerton on the Marina—cumbersome and overcentralised.¹⁵¹ Perhaps it could have appealed only to Lugard, who relied so heavily on his brother in the special post of Political Secretary and who feared the imposition of an Acting Governor while he was on leave. Certainly the Central Secretary was purposely excluded from political matters and 'native affairs'. Clifford abolished it, replacing it in 1921 with a Nigerian Secretariat under a Chief Secretary who was to be very much the second-in-command to His Excellency. The first Chief Secretary was Cameron (later Sir Donald), who, even as Central Secretary, never approved of Lugard's resolve to govern Nigeria 'with no co-ordinating link save the memory of one man'.¹⁵² In the two Regions the Lagos pattern of 'immediate succession' was repeated, with the appointment of a Secretary Northern/Southern Provinces (SNP/SSP). His title did not change to Civil Secretary till the introduction of a ministerial system of government in the early 1950s. Clifford progressively increased his reformed Nigerian Secretariat from seven to twenty-four, and even created the post of Secretary for Native Affairs; this was abolished in 1929, though it persisted in many other colonies.

These Secretariats were established at Lagos and Kaduna, and Lugard gave in his report careful consideration to the best siting of the Administrative capitals.¹⁵³ Plans were formulated to move the Southern headquarters off the overcrowded Island, either to Yaba or to Wilmot Point lying to the south of Lagos. In the North, Lugard was not slow in realistically accepting the unsuitability of the capital he had personally selected, planned and built at Zungeru, and he recommended an uninhabited site where the new railway crossed the river Kaduna at mile 572 from Lagos. Indeed he had more than the North in mind, for he urged that Kaduna, with its central position, its invigorating climate, its open spaces and ample bush for exten-

sions, should not only house the headquarters of the reorganised (by abolishing the separate Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria Regiments) Nigerian battalions of the West African Frontier Force and of the Railway, but should also become the alternate seat of the Central Government:

The Governor-General will spend his time at both capitals, and require a residence at each. From this central site it will be easy for him and for Heads of Departments, to visit either the South-Eastern or the South-Western portion of the protectorate by railway, or the South-Central by the branch line to Baro on the Niger, and the waterway of that river, while being equally in close touch with the North. Lagos, however, will remain the chief trade centre.¹⁵⁴

Kaduna never achieved this distinction; 1966 found Nigeria with one Federal and four Regional capitals, and 1967 has now raised twelve state capitals in their stead.

There was, in the event, one more act to be played out in the administrative growth of Nigeria. It was to be a decisive and revolutionary one, a break with the administrative past even if, in its immediate aspect, the historical development of Nigeria's administration is still reflected.

As we have seen in this narrative, there have been repeated proposals to reconstitute the country's administrative areas: to those of the Selborne Committee, Morel, Temple, Lugard and the Mid-west protagonists already described, there may be added Dr. Azikiwe's wish to create eight protectorates drawn on ethnic lines,¹⁵⁵ the NCNC's creation of multiple states formed on a linguistic basis contained in its Freedom Charter of 1948, the political pressure groups of the 1950s intent on creating separate regions for a Middle Belt State and a Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers state,¹⁵⁶ and Obafemi Awolowo's consistent advocacy of a multiplicity of states drawn on ethno-linguistic lines.¹⁵⁷ Now there has come, in May 1967, the watershed decision to abolish the Regions as agents and centres of institutionalised authority and to divide the country into twelve states. Earlier, General Gowon had made it evident that he was bearing the antecedents and implications of Lugard's amalgamation scheme very much in mind throughout the crucial but nugatory constitutional talks that continued unencouragingly from October 1966 onwards. In March he purposely spoke of 'the community that has grown up in the last half century' and significantly referred to 'the history of the country from the time that the North and South were amalgamated'.¹⁵⁸ But the Eastern Region, even after its eventual agreement to a summit meeting to discuss the revision of the Federal Government's procedural powers and its subsequent dogged insistence on the implementation of what it interpreted as the true spirit of the decisions reached at the meeting held in Aburi, Ghana, in January 1967, edged further and further away from the acceptable basis of negotiation for its participation in the Federation. Its defiant gestures of economic self-determination announced unilaterally in March were followed two months later by open secession under the title of the Republic of Biafra; thereafter it was but a matter of time before civil war ensued, so that it came as little surprise to the world when the Federal Government ordered the military invasion of the rebel republic at the beginning of July. Constitutional

considerations gave way to cannonades, tanks replaced talks, and in the rainy season of the fateful year of 1967 it is force rather than federation that has taken over as the mainspring of Nigerian existence.*

Our concern in the postscriptum pages of this scene-setting introduction to the 1914 amalgamation of Nigeria cannot be with the current civil war. None would hesitate in sharing the widespread regret at witnessing how things in Nigeria fell apart once the rehabilitatory hopes of the Federal Government had been dissolved with regard to its ability to regroup its shaken component parts after the disasters of 1966. Many, too, have noted how the inflamed issue of the East-Central State's rejected position within the new Federation has led Nigeria to the appalling trauma of a civil war in a manner painfully reminiscent of the American drama of a century earlier, fought on somewhat similar grounds of self-determination versus national unity. For us, the story may take as its apt *dénouement* the significant decree issued by the Federal Government on the eve of Biafra's secession.¹⁵⁹ By this stroke of the pen General Gowon not only established twelve states instead of four in Nigeria; he has also brought to an end a way of administrative, political and fiscal life that had endured since 1900, had received confirmation in 1914, and had, despite the political tremors of the 1950s caused by hopes of fission and refusal, remained apparently sacrosanct in the vocabulary of both colonial and independent Nigerian administrative thought.

With but two months passed, it is too soon to evaluate how this new structure of states will work out. There will be modifications, possibly substantial, of the first partition arrangements, and that they are exposed to a rash of inherent problems is doubted by none.¹⁶⁰ For instance, a Boundary Commission will have to give thought to some readjustments on ethno-linguistic grounds: specifically, the unwieldy and curious entity of the North-eastern State, which seems to have encompassed within its borders many of the post-independence problems of potential separatism along with most of the colonial faults of an administrative unit cursed with unworkable lines of communications stretched along the Chad-Benue-Bamenda axis, has already aroused disquiet. Clearly the future shape of Nigeria's new states awaits its post-war consolidation. Complementary to Map 6, and as a finale to this documentary record of the 1914 amalgamation, the basic data arising from the 1967 decree which abolished Nigeria's Regions and brought into being a system of states have been assembled in the Table on page 34.

This is a period in Nigeria's political history when talk of secession, of regrouping, and of the creation of more states, has been countered by discussions of the potential strength of Nigeria through a flexible federation or confederation and the checks and balances of its integral components. Practical administrators and research Africanists alike will therefore find it an advantage to have at their disposal this detailed record of the scheme for the creation of the original 'one Nigeria' as set out in the seminal *Amalgamation Report*. Right up to 1967 its legacy had been intimately reflected in many aspects of the principles and practice of Nigerian government and administration. The military coups of 1966 and their immediate political aftermath had the effect of sharpening everyone's memory of the amalgamation of the former Northern and Southern Protectorates. Throughout these months of crisis it was evident that none of the possible solutions for solving the issue of the

* The events related here do not take this narrative beyond July 1967.

LUGARD AND THE AMALGAMATION OF NIGERIA

THE TWELVE STATES OF NIGERIA (MAY 1967)					
<i>State</i>	<i>Capital</i>	<i>Former Area</i>	<i>1963 Population</i>	<i>Size (sq. miles)</i>	<i>New Revenue Allocation</i>
NORTH-WESTERN	Sokoto	Sokoto and Niger Provinces	5,733,296	65,143	7/100
NORTH-CENTRAL	Kaduna	Katsina and Zaria Provinces	3,948,395	27,108	7/100
KANO	Kano	Kano Province	5,774,842	16,630	7/100
NORTH-EASTERN	Bauchi	Bauchi, Bornu, Adamawa and Sardauna Provinces	7,793,443	105,025	7/100
BENUE-PLATEAU	Jos	Benue and Plateau Provinces	4,009,408	39,204	7/100
WEST-CENTRAL	Ilorin	Ilorin and Kappa Provinces	2,399,365	28,672	7/100
WESTERN	Ibadan	Western Region less Colony Province	9,487,525	29,100	18/100
LAGOS	Lagos	Lagos Federal Territory plus Colony Province	1,443,567	1,381	2/100
MID-WESTERN	Benin	Mid-West Region	2,535,839	14,922	2/25
EAST-CENTRAL	Enugu	Onitsha and Owerri Provinces	6,223,831	8,746	7/40
SOUTH-EAST	Calabar	Calabar and Ogoja Provinces	4,626,317	13,730	3/40
RIVERS	Port Harcourt	Rivers Province	1,544,314	7,008	1/20

optimum deployment of Nigeria's administrative authority advanced by the nation's new leaders and constitutional revisionists could afford to overlook the 1914 experience and its political inheritance.

The fundamental Amalgamation of 1914 seems set to remain a focal point of interest in any discussion on Nigeria's constitutional history for many years to come. Root causes of the national disintegration of 1967 will be looked for in the deliberate unification scheme of 1914, and Nigerian nationals as well as outside political scientists seem destined to spend many an hour in seeking to evaluate exactly when and where what went wrong in the deliberate attempts, first by the British overlords and then by independent Nigerians themselves, to derive from Lugard's concept of a single Protectorate of Southern and Northern Nigeria a unified, independent, and viable nation. The 1967 creation of twelve states is, academically as well as politically, a point of no return that at once lends enhanced significance to the study of the theory and practice of the 1914 unification proposals. Technically at least, there is no further reason to promote the traditional political terminology of 'the North' and 'the South', the trigger-phrases of Nigerian administrative thought since 1914—if not earlier.

Today, then, we are on the threshold of a totally new era of Nigerian administration. To grasp the full measure of its implications within the Nigerian context, it is imperative to understand the principles and consequences of Lugard's original plan for the creation of one Nigeria. Here, in short, is 'Nigeria's' first administrative blueprint. An estimate of its successes and shortcomings is the responsibility of modern researchers. With the experience and hindsight of history and with the literature at last available, a new generation of scholars will now be able to formulate its own judgement on the ultimate issue of a 'one Nigerian' balance-sheet. To meet this challenge to analytical scholarship they require, above all, these basic documents of Lugard's Amalgamation of Nigeria.

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NOTES

1. For a discussion of the history of the name, see A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, 'Who Coined the Name "Nigeria"?', *West Africa*, 22 December 1956, p. 1035, and subsequent correspondence, and C. K. Meek, 'The Niger and the Classics: the History of a Name', *Journal of African History*, I, 1960, pp. 1-17.

2. Thus studies of Nigeria's foreign policy, of her voting record in the United Nations, and of her economic and educational aspirations and achievements in the five years since independence had already been published by 1966.

3. Sir Alan Burns, *History of Nigeria*, 5th edition, 1955, pp. 213-239.

4. Sir Rex Niven, *A Short History of Nigeria*, 1957, p. 238.

5. C. W. J. Orr, *The Making of Northern Nigeria*, 1911; Sir William Geary, *Nigeria Under British Rule*, 1927; Raymond Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*, Vol. I, 1928. Dr. A. O. Anjorin of Ife University was unable to let me have an advance copy of his paper on the background to Amalgamation; it will appear in *Odu* (Ibadan). It draws skilfully from P.R.O. material filed in C.O. 446 (see footnote 22).

6. K. O. Dike, *100 Years of British Rule in Nigeria*, 1956, pp. 32 and 36. Cf. p. 10.

7. A. N. Cook, *British Enterprise in Nigeria*, 1943, pp. 190-211.

8. Dame Margery Perham, *Native Administration in Nigeria*, 1937, and *Lugard: The Years of Authority*, 1960.

9. Michael Crowder, *The Story of Nigeria*, 1962, p. 205. In the second edition (1966) he qualifies this as 'a period that in terms of events is really rather dull', but finds the same forces active.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 212.

11. Quoted from *House of Representatives (Lagos): Debates, 1953*, in his autobiography *My Life*, 1962, p. 133. He goes on to say that 'Lord Lugard and his Amalgamation were far from popular amongst us at that time (1953 constitutional crisis) and there were suggestions in favour of secession' (p. 135).

12. *Proceedings of the General Conference on Review of the Constitution held at Ibadan, January 1950* (Lagos 1950) p. 218.

13. See, for instance, the six alternatives for constitutional reform referred to the conference of Regional representatives summoned to Lagos towards the end of 1966 by the Supreme Commander. The two polarised ones were dismissed at the outset: a unitary state or secession. Of the remainder, three were based on Nigerian experience over the previous fifty years, while the fourth was categorised by Colonel Gowon as 'an entirely new arrangement peculiar to Nigeria, which has not yet found its way into any political dictionary'.

14. The full title was *Report by Sir F. D. Lugard on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria, and Administration, 1912-1919*, published as Parliamentary Papers, 1919, Cmd. 468. xxxvi. 609. Here it will be referred to as the *Amalgamation Report*. But see p. 15.

15. Personal communication from the Controller, Her Majesty's Stationery Office. In addition to the formal acknowledgements listed, I should like to express my thanks to the unfailing help received while I was undertaking research for this book from Mr. Louis Frewer, Superintendent of the Rhodes House Library, Oxford, and the staffs of the University Library, Cambridge, and the British Museum, Colindale. Material filed in the Lugard Papers in Rhodes House is indicated here by the abbreviation LP following the source.

16. See A. F. Mockler-Ferryman, 'British Nigeria', *Journal of the Royal African Society*, January 1902, pp. 160-173.

17. It is interesting to find an early minute by Sir Walter Egerton, written in connection with this unification, in which he recorded the view that 'it is generally expected that in the near future the administration of Northern Nigeria will be added to the task of the Governor at Lagos'—Egerton to Colonial Office, 26 June 1906, LP.

18. *Annual Report for Northern Nigeria, 1900*, p. 8.

19. For further details of this scheme, see *Annual Report for Northern Nigeria, 1904* para. 5, and Lugard's *Political Memoranda IX* (1918), para. 78.

20. The principal changes since 1926 have been the creation of Katsina (1934) and

Sardauna (1961) Provinces, and the excision of Kaduna Capital Territory from Zaria Province in 1956.

21. C.O. 446/3, *Report of the Niger Committee*, dated 4 August 1899. Though never published, a typescript copy is retained in the LP.

22. F.O. archives show that Sir R. Moor first raised the issue in 1896, and the African Trade Division of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce in 1897.

23. See *Amalgamation Report*, para. 6, and Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, 1922, pp. 100-102. He noted that 'the grouping or federation of colonies under a Governor-General (which was suggested by me to the Secretary of State in 1907) is an entirely different matter from . . . the advantage of amalgamating contiguous colonies from the point of view of internal administration and economic development' (p. 179).

24. *Annual Report for Northern Nigeria, 1905-06*, para. 134.

25. Perham devotes Chapters X and XI to an analysis of this scheme. For Lugard's own rationalisation, see his *Dual Mandate*, pp. 106-110. The LP contain a mass of correspondence on the subject, including Lord Elgin's angry rescinding of his predecessor's minute (in which he had been prepared to accept the Scheme in principle) occasioned by the premature article advocating its merits that appeared in *The Times* of 5 December 1905, anonymously contributed by Lady Lugard. The quotations that follow here are taken from the typescript copy of the May 1905 memorandum, LP. See also Document I.

26. *Amalgamation Report*, paragraphs 5, 6 and 68. Nevertheless, he regarded amalgamation as something more than the expedient of 'a mere political, geographical, or more especially a financial expression' (para. 8).

27. E. D. Morel, *Nigeria: Its People and its Problems*, 1911. It is clear that Morel was the contributor of the series of sixteen articles on Northern Nigeria, 'by our special correspondent lately in Nigeria', that appeared in *The Times* between 15 August and 14 October, 1911. That of 13 October dealt specifically with proposals for amalgamation.

28. The events outlined in this paragraph are described in detail in Perham, *op. cit.*, Chapter XVIII. The letters quoted here, including Anderson to Lugard, 17 August 1911, and Harcourt to Lugard, 12 September 1911, are preserved in the LP.

29. The final emoluments were £6,500 plus £7,500 duty pay for the Governor-General; £2,400 for the Lieutenant-Governors; and, even more significantly underlining the hierarchical gap, a mere £1,200 for Residents. See also Document IV.

30. *The Times* announced the appointment on 14 February 1912, though the *London Gazette* notice did not appear till 18 May 1912.

31. *Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons)*, 27 June 1912, LX, 511-512. Perham (p. 381 n.) has a misprint in her Hansard reference of 27 June 1913. There are minor textual differences in Harcourt's speech as cited by Perham (p. 380) and Cook (p. 193). The citation here follows the printed Hansard text.

32. Perham, *op. cit.*, pp. 381-382.

33. Morel, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

34. One is reminded of the quip about the mutual hostility and regional loyalty of the Administrative staff of the Northern and Southern Provinces up to 1939: if all Nigerians had withdrawn from the country, there would have been a civil war between the two groups of Europeans! In 1954 the Civil Services were formally reorganised and personnel were no longer recruited to the nominally 'Nigerian' Service. Previously, of course, there had been a growing tendency to contain postings, especially of the Administrative Service, in a given 'region', for obvious reasons of administrative efficiency acquired through fluency in the local vernacular and the pull of continuity, though officers who had worked long in the emirates were generally give a subsequent posting to the very different administrative atmosphere of the 'Middle Belt' chiefdoms.

35. See the Supreme Commander's address to the Constitutional Review Group, March 1966, and the successor Federal Military Government's reference in its *Statement on the Disturbances* (November 1966) to a 'general disillusionment with the political ruling class'.

36. Sonia Graham's study of Sir Hanns Vischer's role in determining the educational policy of the North, *Government and Mission Education in Northern Nigeria, 1900-1919*, 1966, highlights one facet of such developmental divergence.

37. Morel, *op. cit.*, p. 190. See, however, notes 46 and 48, and compare Lugard's softer-worded résumé in the *Amalgamation Report*: 'Each of the two Administrations had much to learn from the other. The North—a younger Government—was capable of improvement in its departmental organisation, and backward both in the development of its material resources and of the facilities (such as roads) required for the purpose. The South required

a better organisation of its Native Administration and of its judicial system' (para. 8). T. T. Solaru notes the same harsh hostility to the South's educational system: 'Lord Lugard's estimate of the products of pre-1914 education in Southern Nigeria was very low indeed', but Solaru finds himself agreeing that 'the situation was truly deplorable'—*Teacher Training in Nigeria*, 1964, p. 23.

38. Apparently justifying the hint of something approaching collusion, this dictum of Morel's is echoed in Lugard's own phrase of his Nigerian scheme involving 'as little dislocation of existing conditions as possible' (*Dual Mandate*, p. 100). The tenacity of Nigeria's provincial administration concept and form is shown by the echo of this sentiment in the terms of reference given to the Hudson Commission set up in 1956 to consider the devolution of certain powers to the provinces, where one guideline was that there should be 'the least possible disturbance to existing administrative arrangements' and that in particular the Native Authorities should be preserved 'as an essential organ of government'.

39. It is interesting to compare this scheme with the current Regional boundaries. Given the claims of the Middle Belt State advocates of the mid-'fifties, a certain similarity becomes apparent. Not until 1964 was the idea of a separate state based on Kano raised again as a political gimmick. At the 1966 constitutional conference, Chief Awolowo submitted a memorandum calling for the creation of eighteen states on an ethnic and linguistic basis. This was rejected by the Northern delegation, which seemed to have been thinking in terms of extra states drawn on a vertical rather than horizontal ethnic basis.

40. Morel, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

41. Temple to Lugard, 1 February 1913, LP. See also Temple to Lugard, 17 October 1912, LP.

42. His official explanation of their rejection is given in *Amalgamation Report*, para. 14.

43. Perham, *op. cit.*, pp. 414–415. In his *Dual Mandate*, Lugard again stressed that his Lieutenant-Governors were by no means to be looked on as his deputies. 'Lieutenant-Governors would exercise responsibility and initiative, and not be merely Deputy Governors with no executive powers of their own' (p. 102). He added, as a footnote: 'Decentralisation is the key of the Sudan administration, where the Governors of provinces have the widest powers'. See also *Amalgamation Report*, para. 14.

44. Lugard to Colonial Office, 12 May 1912, LP. Southern Nigeria's financial year coincided with the calendar year, but that of the North ended on March 31.

45. From a letter to his wife, 13 November 1912, LP. See also the lighter-hearted entries in E. J. Lugard's private diary (LP), including the incident of leaving the King's Commission on board S.S. *Falaba* and the hasty postponement of the ceremony on shore until the baggage was landed later in the day. For a summary of Lugard's own assessment of the enormous nature of the assignment, see *Amalgamation Report*, para. 8.

46. Cf. 37. One recalls, however, Sir Hugh Clifford's, and later Sir Donald Cameron's, scathing comments on certain 'holy' aspects of the Northern administration after their first gubernatorial tours of inspection (both the 1922 Minute and the 1934 Memorandum are given in full in A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *The Principles of Native Administration in Nigeria*). To these can be added Cameron's further castigation in his *My Tanganyika Service and Some Nigeria*, 1939. Dame Margery Perham, in her Foreword to Kirk-Greene, *supra*, speaks of 'the tension in some Northern Nigerian administrative circles soon after Cameron's return from Tanganyika as the cold wind of criticism blew up from Government House' (p. xi).

47. I. Nicolson, 'The Machinery of the Federal and Regional Governments', in John P. Mackintosh *et al.*, *Nigerian Government and Politics*, 1966, p. 146.

48. 'He would have been more than human if he had not felt some partiality for the administration of his own making, but it is probable that the defects of Southern Nigeria could have been demonstrated by any standards of good government'—M. Perham, *Native Administration in Nigeria*, 1937, p. 61. Cf. notes 37 and 46.

49. Indirect rule, for all its success and stabilising influence especially in the North, is currently undergoing a reassessment within the total picture of the achievements of the colonial period. Weighed in the balance by those who worked with it from the inside, it was found wanting by some, e.g. W. R. Crocker in his *Nigeria: A Critique of British Colonial Administration*, 1936: two articles on 'Nigeria's Curse' and 'White-washing' by J. F. J. Fitzpatrick in the *National Review* in the mid-twenties; A. Victor Murray, *The School in the Bush*, 1929, and his 'Education under Indirect Rule', *Journal of the Royal African Society*, July 1935. A similar view is held by the new generation of African administrators in the non-emirate areas (and some who have worked in the emirates, too), exemplified by N. U.

Akpan's study *Epitaph to Indirect Rule*, 1956, and repeated in the undertones of several contemporary Nigerian fiction writers. The Eastern Region's utter rejection of indirect rule was symbolised in its haste to abolish the whole concept of Native Administration. Notice, however, the unexpected approbation of Chief Awolowo, no admirer of the Colonial Administrative Service, that the indirect rule 'idea worked like magic' and that in his opinion 'it is to the immortal glory of Lord Lugard that his device of indirect administration which was a child of necessity, a crucial experiment, now provides the most effective medium of giving the people the necessary training, provided (and this is a big proviso) this device is judiciously, honestly and courageously applied—*Path to Nigerian Freedom*, 1947, pp. 59–60. For the latest reassessments, see M. Hiskett's introduction to the reissue of C. L. Temple, *Native Races and Their Rulers*, 1918, repr. 1968, and the forthcoming study of colonial Africa by Michael Crowder.

50. From a letter to his wife, 24 December 1912, LP. On this superficial difference between the North and the South, one is reminded of the proverbial reaction of the District Officer in a crisis: in the North he would make a prompt and firm decision, justifying it later by reference to his circulars and regulation books, whereas in the South the first thing any wise District Officer would do was to reach for the relevant volume of the Laws of Nigeria!

51. See *Amalgamation Report*, paragraphs 65 ff. A good record of Zungeru in its heyday is to be found in John R. Raphael, *Through Unknown Nigeria*, n.d., Chapters III and IV. In 1964 an eye-witness account of the actual move to Kaduna from Zungeru was given by Mr. Victor Williams of the Ministry of Lands and Survey (one of Lugard's first clerks) in an interview carried on the Nigeria Broadcasting Corporation's Northern network, and in the Regimental Museum I have come across correspondence from the officer commanding the pilot WAFF camp at Kaduna.

52. For accounts of this durbar, see the reports in *The Times* of 5 and 27 February, 1913 (the latter reproduces Lugard's despatch to the Colonial Office). *The Illustrated London News* of 15 March 1913 carried photographs of the parade. Lugard's descriptive letters to his wife are in the LP. Those of 1 and 5 January are also quoted in Perham, op. cit., pp. 400–401.

53. Despite his deep knowledge of the North—'I was intimately acquainted with the method of Administration there, for the creation of which I had been responsible' (*Amalgamation Report*, para. 7)—Lugard was too thorough an administrator not to have been aware of the likelihood of change—and, in the event, distortion—in his policy during his six years' absence. For a discussion of the shift of emphasis, especially in the interpretation of indirect rule, see Perham, op. cit., Part III, and the Introduction to Kirk-Greene, op. cit.

54. Curiously, the actual report is dated 30 May, while Lugard's covering letter is dated 9 May. A description of his working in the basement of the Colonial Office is given in Perham, op. cit., pp. 411 and 609. Harcourt, in an address at the annual Corona Club dinner (June 1913), referred to this room as 'the crucible of amalgamation' (LP).

55. Lugard to Colonial Office, 21 December 1918, LP. There are also extant interesting comments on the draft 1913 report by A. J. Harding (London), Donald Cameron (Lagos) and H. S. Goldsmith (Kaduna).

56. It is located in *Colonial Office Print: Africa (West) No. 1005, Confidential: Correspondence 15 May 1913 to 27 January 1914* (61 documents).

57. Lugard to Colonial Office, October 1913, *passim*, culminating in Colonial Office to Lugard, 21 October 1913, LP.

58. *Address to the Legislative Council*, 18 February 1924. Earlier Clifford had warned that 'I like a thing to be real and effective, or not to have it at all', and so he replaced the Nigerian Council with the Legislative Council. This body could not, however, legislate for the North, for whom the Governor acted by decree until 1947.

59. Lugard also created the Nigerian national emblem, which survived till Independence came in 1960. Of its origin we have the following note: 'The design of the interlaced triangles is, I think, called the Solomon's Seal. I do not know if and when it was adopted as the seal of Islam, but it was found on the lid of a very handsome goblet or jug of brass or copper covered with designs and with the serpent's head as a mouthpiece, which was captured by the troops when the Emir of Kontagora was defeated. I thought it an appropriate badge for Northern Nigeria, and as far as I can remember it was my own suggestion.'—Letter from Lord Lugard, quoted in *Nigeria Magazine*, No. 30, 1949, p. 324 (addressee not given). Lugard once wrote how he regarded the whole concept of amalgamation 'as a means

whereby each part of Nigeria should be raised to the level of the highest plane attained by any particular part'—*Amalgamation Report*, para. 8.

60. As early as the 1880s there were at least three newspapers current in Lagos: *The Anglo-African* (1863), *The Lagos Times and Gold Coast Advertiser* (1880), and *The Eagle and Lagos Critic* (1883). *The Lagos Weekly Times* was started under the editorship of the colourful John Payne Jackson in 1890, becoming *The Lagos Weekly Record* in the following year. *The Nigerian Times* started in 1910, becoming *The Times of Nigeria* in 1914 (after one of its many periods of suspension) and the *Nigerian Daily Times* in 1926 until its present title of *Daily Times* superseded this in 1947. The next growth of newspapers came with the opening of Zik's Press Enterprises, which saw the *West African Pilot* start in Lagos in 1937, the *Eastern Nigerian Guardian* (Port Harcourt) in 1940, and the *Nigerian Spokesman* (Onitsha) and the *Southern Nigerian Defender* (Warri) in 1943. *The Comet* was transferred from Lagos to Kano in 1949, becoming the first independent daily newspaper in the North. An official *Northern Provinces Newsheet* began publication in 1931, and the Gaskiya Corporation published the *Nigerian Citizen* as a twice-weekly English newspaper from 1948, supplementing its Hausa newspaper *Gaskiya ta fi Kwabo* which succeeded the official *Nigeria ta Arewa* at the beginning of the 1939–1945 war. For a recent survey of Nigerian journalistic history see Rosalynde Ainslie, *The Press in Africa*, 1966, pp. 21 ff. Much more detailed histories are to be found in two unpublished theses, F. Omu 'The Nigerian Newspaper Press, 1859–1937' (Ibadan Ph.D., 1965) and W. D. Edmonds, 'The Newspaper Press of British West Africa, 1918–1939' (Bristol M.A.). Increase Coker has written a general survey, *Seventy Years of the Nigerian Press* (Lagos, n.d.). Mr. J. D. Chick, lecturer in Political Science at Ahmadu Bello University, is about to complete his thesis 'The White Press': A Study of the Role of Foreign-owned Newspapers in Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, 1946–65' (Manchester Ph.D. 1967).

61. Cf. 'Newspapers are still a thing of the future in the Northern Provinces' (*Nigerian Pioneer*, 31 July 1914). The editor felt that, even then, they would have to be in Hausa as an English edition would have no circulation, and so welcomed the Government's wish to develop the use of the vernacular in education. It is interesting to note how the new-look editorial of the *Lagos Weekly Record* celebrated the Amalgamation with a leader addressed, not overtacfully, to 'Our Provincial Kinsmen', and claimed that it was now 'everything but in name the Nigerian Paper. . . there is nothing sectional or parochial about us. . . To the millions of the Hausa country, to the millions of the Ibo country, to the tribes of the Niger Delta, we say "Come"'.—19 July 1919.

62. Sir Donald Cameron, *Memorandum on Native Administration*, 13 July 1934, para. 5.

63. Ahmadu Bello, op. cit., p. 61.

64. *Proceedings: First Session*, 20 March 1947, p. 3. Significantly enough, the first question ever asked by a Northerner in the Legislative Council was 'Whether Government is aware of the low standard of education in the North as compared with that of the South' (ibid., p. 19), followed by Malam Abubakar Tafewa Balewa's complaint about the shortage of European staff in the Northern Provinces (p. 21).

65. This intense, if local, unpopularity is not apparent in the standard biography of Lord Lugard despite the frank appraisal in Chapter XIX of 'The Lagos Opposition'. There are a few extracts from the 1914 editorials but none from the bitter climax of the 1919 ones. Nor does Lugard's own book of press cuttings include any of the numerous comments printed by the Nigerian press during those strenuous years of Governor-Generalship. Almost breathtaking in their venom are the leaders in *Lagos Weekly Record* of 1 February and 14 June 1919, and the pen-name articles in the *Lagos Standard* of 12 March, 2 April and 7 May 1919. Examples are given in Document VI.

66. Spelled out in the editorials of *Lagos Weekly Record* reproduced in Appendix VI.

67. *Lagos Standard*, 31 December 1913—the very eve of Amalgamation Day!

68. *African Mail*, 23 February 1912.

69. *Equatorial and North Africa*, March 1912. See Also *Amalgamation Report*, para. 8.

70. 'Amalgamation is easy to write on paper, it is not always so easy to carry into effect'—Address by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Corona Club, 18 June 1912, LP.

71. *Lagos Standard*, 9 October 1912.

72. *Proceedings of Nigerian Legislative Council*, 21 November 1912.

73. *Lagos Standard*, 1 January 1913.

74. *Nigerian Chronicle*, feature articles 20 and 27 December 1912; 17, 24 and 31 January 1913.

75. The Memorandum was originally submitted to the Colonial Office as an appendix to

the *Annual Report for Northern Nigeria, 1905-06*—Lugard to CO, 27 November 1906, LP. It had also appeared in the *West African Mail*, 24 May 1907.

76. *Nigerian Chronicle*, 21 February 1913.

77. *Ibid.*, 14 March 1913, in an editorial entitled 'The Near Departure of Sir Frederick Lugard'.

78. *Lagos Weekly Record*, 8 March 1913. See also the 'wait and see' leader, 10 May 1913.

79. It was reproduced locally in *Lagos Weekly Record*, 22 March 1913.

80. *Nigerian Chronicle*, 28 March 1913.

81. *Lagos Standard*, 2 April 1913.

82. *Gold Coast Leader* quoted in *Nigerian Chronicle*, 16 May 1913.

83. *The Times*, 21 May 1913. The speech was more fully reported in *Nigerian Chronicle*, 4 July 1913.

84. Carried serially in the issues of August 1913.

85. *The Times*, 9 July 1913. Here a hint was given of three Regions, under Lieutenant-Governors at Kano (North), Auferu (Central) and Calabar or Lagos (South).

86. *The Times*, 9 September 1913.

87. *Lagos Weekly Record*, 9 August 1913.

88. *Ibid.*, 23 August 1913.

89. *Nigerian Chronicle*, 3 October 1913.

90. *Lagos Standard*, 8 October, 1913.

91. *Ibid.*, 3 September 1913.

92. *Ibid.*, 26 November 1913.

93. *Ibid.*, 15 October 1913. The reference is presumably to the remark contained in a speech made by Sir William Byles in the House of Commons, where he questioned 'the wisdom of endeavouring to "speed up the civilisation" of the country [Nigeria] by giving the power of life and death over these natives to some Assistant Commissioner or District Commissioner' (*Debates, House of Commons*, 1913, 56, 845).

94. *Debates, House of Commons*, 31 July 1913, where a question was tabled about '... the public floggings of clerks ... who were playing football in the market place. They were stripped naked and publicly flogged in sight of the residents, and it was generally stated there that this was because they refused to prostrate themselves before the magistrate.' Cf. Mr. Molteno's question 'Whether prostration is insisted upon by the British Government officials in Northern Nigeria; and if so whether those prostrations are demanded from natives and non-natives alike, not only for the officials but for their wives'. The Secretary of State replied in the negative (*ibid.*, 1913, 51, 816).

95. *Nigerian Chronicle*, 17 October 1913. On another occasion it castigated the provisions of the Bill as 'obnoxious, unrighteous and inhuman' (17 July 1914). However, the paper did produce one delightfully humorous vignette of a youthful District Commissioner just posted to Nigeria, full of public school ideals: see 'The Adventures of Tim Burgoyne', 26 December 1913.

96. E.g., *Lagos Standard*, 31 December 1913. So upset, it seems, was this newspaper that its first issues of 1914 all appeared with the dateline of 1913!

97. The *Lagos Standard* added a highly patriotic ode dedicated to 'United Nigeria'.

98. *Ibid.*, 7 January 1914.

99. For example, see *Nigerian Chronicle*, 16 January 1914; *Lagos Standard*, 7 January 1914; *Lagos Weekly Record*, 14 February 1914. The last-named, however, upset its sister papers by its unexpected welcome of the proposal to move the capital to Kaduna, citing in its support the reasoned views of the *African Mail*.

100. *The Nigerian Times*, which became *The Times of Nigeria* and subsequently the current *Daily Times*, enjoyed several periods of suspension at this time. It did not appear at all between 30 October 1911 and its rebirth as *The Times of Nigeria* on 6 January 1914. It was again dormant between 19 November 1918 and 6 October 1919, when, without any editorial explanation, the issue no. 63 of the latter date simply followed no. 62 dated eleven months earlier!

101. *Times of Nigeria*, 6-13 January 1914 (one issue).

102. *Nigerian Chronicle*, 23 January 1914. Cf. the statement of the Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria that Nigeria has long shown that it wants 'association, not unity' (reported in *The Times*, 14 February 1967).

103. *Nigerian Chronicle*, 30 January, 1914. He also added that all the benefits claimed to accrue from amalgamation seemed to have fallen to the Europeans' lot, in the way of promotions and appointments, and the African officials had not even secured one Assistant

District Commissionership. For the usual protests of why Clerk X had been passed over in favour of Clerk Y, see *Lagos Standard*, 25 February 1914.

104. *Lagos Standard*, 2, 11, 18 and 25 February 1914; and again 22 and 29 April, and 6 May.

105. *Times of Nigeria*, 3 February 1914. See also correspondence columns 10 February.

106. *Nigerian Chronicle*, 6 February 1914.

107. *Times of Nigeria*, 17 February 1914.

108. *Nigerian Chronicle*, 13 February 1914.

109. *Lagos Standard*, 15 April 1914.

110. *Times of Nigeria*, 3 March 1914. It also reported that the Hausa trading community had been 'shocked' to hear of Temple's promotion, for they were said to have been hoping that amalgamation would squeeze him out of the Service.

111. *Ibid.*, 24 March 1914.

112. *Ibid.*, 21 April 1914.

113. *Lagos Standard*, 6 May, 1914. See also *Lagos Weekly Record* leader of 23 May, headed 'Impending Crisis', and *Times of Nigeria* editorial of 9 June, 'Those who Sow the Wind'.

114. *Times of Nigeria*, 5 May 1914.

115. It was No. 366 of 16 April 1914, but became popularly known in the local press as 'the Mendi despatch'. See *Nigerian Chronicle*, all issues of July 1914. Lugard was probably not unaware of the British public's shocked reaction to the revelation of educational failure and anarchy in Valentine Chirol's condemnation of Western education in Indian university life described in his *Indian Unrest*, 1910.

116. *Nigerian Pioneer*, 24 and 31 March 1914, in reporting His Excellency's speech of 12 March.

117. The Chief Justice's memorandum is to be found in *Nigerian Chronicle* of 27 February 1914, followed by critical analyses in the three next issues. See also Lugard's carefully written justification in *Amalgamation Report*, paragraphs 44-54.

118. *Times of Nigeria*, 2 and 16 June 1914; *Nigerian Chronicle*, 5 June; *Africa and Orient Review*, 7 April; *Lagos Weekly Record* 20 June.

119. *Nigerian Pioneer*, 10 July 1914.

120. *Nigerian Chronicle*, 9 October 1914.

121. *Lagos Weekly Record*, 2 January 1915. Cf. Lugard in his *Annual Report for Nigeria 1915*: 'I regret to say that in the town of Lagos profuse protestations of loyalty were accompanied throughout the year by a continuance of agitation. . . . The subject of the establishment of Provincial Courts and the proposed enactment of a criminal code were . . . matters on which the agitators endeavoured to mislead the ignorant' (p. 31). No Annual Report was published for 1914.

122. Mr. W. H. Stoker.

123. *Lagos Weekly Record*, 1 March-31 May 1915 (one issue). A further attack on indirect rule was published in the issue of 7 June 1919.

124. *The Times*, 13 January 1919. On February 10 it carried an announcement of a dinner in Sir Frederick's honour to be organised by his old friend H. S. Goldsmith; the dinner was duly reported in the issue of March 21. The Lugard Papers reveal a measure of 'deliberate' misunderstanding by the Colonial Office over his wish to resign which has elements of a *comédie bouffe* within the seriousness of the move.

125. *Lagos Weekly Record*, 1-22 February 1919 (one issue). See Document VI.

126. *Lagos Standard*, 12 March 1919 and 2 April.

127. Published in the official *Nigerian Gazette*, 27 February 1919.

128. *African World*, 26 April 1919.

129. *Lagos Weekly Record*, 14 June 1919.

130. Perham, *op. cit.*, p. 411.

131. Nicolson, in Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

132. I am grateful to Mr. M. Hiskett of the School of Oriental and African Studies in the University of London for his confirmation (in a communication from the field) of the tenacity of this view in Nigeria in 1967, thus supporting the attitudes revealed by a number of Nigerian students resident abroad at this period.

133. It is interesting to discover, even to this day, relics on the railway stations and elsewhere (e.g. the Jebba cemetery) recalling these two lines. Zaria and Minna stations still carry a miniscule 'B.K.R.' on their notice-boards, the significance of which has eluded many travellers.

134. Kalu Ezera, *Constitutional Developments in Nigeria*, 1960, p. 213.

135. This and the following quotations are taken from a well-illustrated but sadly under-documented article by Tekena N. Tamuno, 'Genesis of the Nigerian Railway', *Nigeria Magazine*, 1965, 83, pp. 279-292, and 84, pp. 31-43. The Parliamentary Papers on railway construction in Nigeria at this time are very full—see Cd. 2787 of 1905 and Cd. 4523 of 1909. See also A. Lethbridge, *West Africa the Elusive*, n.d., Chapter XXIII.

136. Buell, op. cit., p. 646.

137. Perham, op. cit., p. 409.

138. Cook, op. cit., p. 213.

139. Crowder, op. cit., p. 213.

140. Geary, op. cit., p. 250.

141. Crowder, op. cit., p. 213.

142. See Appendix II to the *Annual Report of Northern Nigeria, 1910-1911*, for this success story. The 356 miles of track were laid in record time, and the first train from Baro steamed into Kano just three years and eight months (28 March 1911) after the cable from the Colonial Office sanctioning the project had been received in Nigeria.

143. Speech by the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Harcourt) to the Corona Club, 17 June 1913, LP. This was the opinion generally held. The editor of the *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) welcomed Amalgamation with a parallel, and politically significant, metaphor: 'Northern Nigeria has been a pensioner on the Imperial Government, perpetually starved in all directions. . . . Southern Nigeria, on the other hand, has been able to spend freely, sometimes lavishly, and has perhaps concentrated an undue share of its resources upon one particular sector of the country, giving that sector an undue prominence both materially and politically' (2 January 1914, LP).

144. Lugard, *Dual Mandate*, p. 97.

145. One of these 'further changes' was, interestingly enough, given the 1939 creation of the Eastern and Western Provinces out of the old Southern Provinces and the 1963 establishment of the Mid-West Region out of the Western Region, the foresight that 'it would be possible (should the experience gained point in that direction) to create three Lieutenant-Governorships' (Lugard, op. cit., pp. 100-101).

146. Hence the justification of the rank of the archetype District Commissioner in the Southern Provinces (the rank was unknown in the Northern Provinces) in the Wallace novels. In his *Political Memoranda*, Lugard drew a clear distinction between the senior ranks of Resident and Provincial Commissioner: 'The term "Resident" implies duties rather of a Political or advisory nature, while the term "Commissioner" denotes functions of a more directly Administrative character' (Memo. I, para. 4).

147. Paragraph 15 of the *Amalgamation Report* gives a useful tabulation of the names, size and population of all the Provinces in 1914, and makes an interesting comparison with today's internal administrative boundaries.

148. Hailey, *Native Administration in the British African Territories*, 1951, Part III, p. 2.

149. *Amalgamation Report*, para. 32.

150. P. C. Lloyd, in a review of Perham's *Lugard: The Years of Authority* (Ibadan, November 1960), has made this point and asked whether Lugard may therefore have failed to grasp in their entirety some of the real problems of provincial administration in practice.

151. His condemnation of the unworkability of Lugard's 'Secretarial [sic] system' was published in the *Nigerian Gazette* of 21 November 1920.

152. Quoted in Perham, op. cit., p. 418.

153. *Amalgamation Report*, paragraphs 55 ff., and the map at Appendix V to the *Report*. Government House, Lagos, would make an excellent hotel, Lugard thought, if the transfer to Kaduna was achieved. See also Buell, op. cit., p. 646, and the illustrated article 'The Capitals of Northern Nigeria', *Nigeria Magazine*, 1955, pp. 130-172.

154. *Amalgamation Report*, para. 65.

155. Nnamdi Azikiwe, *Political Blueprint of Nigeria*, 1943, p. 11.

156. For a very useful presentation of the major separatist movements of this political decade, see Michael Crowder, op. cit. p. 297 (1966 edition).



157. While enumerating eighteen such states in 1947, he added that 'even as many as 30 to 40 Regional Houses would not be too many in the future United States of Nigeria'—*Path to Freedom*, 1947, p. 48. During his attendance at the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference of late 1966, he again spoke in these terms and in his *Thoughts on the Nigerian Constitution*, 1966, he recommended eighteen states based on linguistic lines (pp. 99-101)


and map. Interestingly enough, the May 1967 announcement of twelve states closely resembles the Action Group resolution rejected by the House of Representatives in March 1962, calling for the creation of eleven regions, five of them to be carved out of the then monolithic Northern Region.

158. *The Times*, 27 March 1967.

159. This decree, which came into effect on 27 May, was entitled, 'The States (Creation and Transitional Provisions) (Amendment) Decree 1967' and substituted a new schedule of the country's administrative divisions. It took decentralisation a step further than that permitted under its predecessor Decree No. 8 of 1967.

160. Major-General Gowon made this clear in his nation-wide broadcast of 27 May 1967, in which he promised redress for 'any divisions or towns not satisfied with the states in which they are initially grouped'. Appeals would be heard by a Delimitation Commission but during the state of emergency the definition of any Administrative Division would have to remain as set out in the 1964 Constituency Delimitation Commission's report. See also three on-the-spot reports published in *West Africa*, 'The End of the Regions', 10 June 1967, 'This our State', 17 June, and 'The End of Kaduna', 24 June 1967.





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REPORT ON THE AMALGAMATION OF NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN NIGERIA

by SIR F. LUGARD

PART I. INTRODUCTION AND PRELIMINARIES TO AMALGAMATION

THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF NIGERIA

1. *Geography, area, and climate*

Before dealing with the amalgamation of the two separate Governments of Northern and Southern Nigeria, it will perhaps serve a useful purpose if I sketch briefly the character of each country, and indicate the causes of their divergent forms of Administration and the reasons which led to the necessity of amalgamation.

The area of 'Northern Nigeria' was about 255,700 square miles, that of 'Southern Nigeria' including the Colony, being about 76,700 square miles. The former consisted for the most part either of open prairie and cultivation, or was covered by sparse and low forest of the deciduous 'dry zone' type. The central portion—Zaria and Bauchi—forms a plateau varying from 2,000 to 4,500 ft. in altitude, with a bracing climate. The dry desert wind—the 'Hamattan'—which prevails in the winter months causes the temperature to fall rapidly when the hot sun goes down, so the nights, especially on the plateau, are often very cold. The rainfall is small, decreasing towards the confines of the Sahara, which forms the northern boundary.

Southern Nigeria, on the other hand, is situated in the zone of equatorial rainfall. A great part of the country is, or was till recently, covered by primeval forest. It is low-lying with the exception of the water-parting, which traverses it from East to West, and divides the watershed of the Niger and Benue to the North from that towards the sea in the South. The southern portion is intersected by a network of salt-water creeks, bordered by mangrove-swamp or vegetation so dense that it forms almost a wall of giant trees and undergrowth interlaced with creepers.

Horses, donkeys and vast herds—aggregating millions—of cattle, sheep, and goats flourish in the North, but animal life is scarce in the South, where the yam fields of a dense population cover every acre reclaimed from the grassless forests, which are infested with tsetse and other biting flies. There are, of course, exceptions to these generalities. Districts in the South from which the forest has disappeared tend to resemble the open character of the North, and there are districts in the North on the banks of the Niger and Benue which approximate to the characteristics of the South. These two great rivers are a prominent geographical feature of the country. The Niger, flowing North and South, divides the Southern Protectorate roughly into

halves. Some 250 miles from its mouth its course lies with a sharp inclination to the West, and the Benue, which joins it here, forms with it a continuous waterway of some 700 miles from the Cameroon frontier in the East to Jebba in the West, where the Niger, bending northwards again, is broken by rapids almost to the point where it first enters Nigeria from French territory. The River in the extreme East is the only other river which is navigable by large steamers, with the exception of the creeks and the affluents of the Niger Delta.

2. *Ethnography, population, religions, etc.*

The population of the North—described 60 years ago by Barth as the densest in all Africa—had by 1900 dwindled to some 9 millions, owing to inter-tribal war, and, above all, to the slave raids of the Fulani. But these dreaded horsemen could not penetrate the forests of the South, where a population estimated at 7½ millions (probably an over-estimate) found refuge. These tribes are of purer negro stock than the Hausas and other negroes of the North. Though in the more open areas they show themselves to be admirable agriculturists, many of the delta tribes live a semi-aquatic life in their canoes, fishing and collecting the abundant sylvan produce (especially of the oil palm), both for their own sustenance and for trade with the middlemen who carry it to the coast merchants.

From a very early date the influence of Islam had made itself felt in the North, and the religious revival of the early years of the nineteenth century had formed the motive for the Fulani conquests, which swept the country from Sokoto in the north-west to Yola, 1,000 miles to the East, and from the Sahara to the confines of the Equatorial Belt. The social and religious organisation of the Koran supplemented, and combined with, the pre-existing, and probably advanced, form of tribal administration handed down from the powerful Songhay Empire, which had extended from Chad to Timbuktu. The courts were served by judges erudite in Moslem law and fearless in its impartial application. The system of taxation was highly developed, and the form of Administration highly centralised.

A rapid deterioration had, however, followed the decay of the religious zeal which had prompted the Fulani *Jihad*, and at the time when the Administration was assumed by the Imperial Government in 1900 the Fulani Emirates formed a series of separate despotisms, marked by the worst forms of wholesale slave-raiding, spoliation of the peasantry, inhuman cruelty and debased justice. The separate dynasty of Bornu on the Chad plain had fallen before the armies of Rabeh from Wadai, who at this time was looting and ravaging the country. The primitive Pagan races held their own in the inaccessible fastnesses of the mountainous districts of the plateau or in the forests bordering the Benue river. Others had come under the domination of the ruling race and lived a hard life.

The South was, for the most part, held in thrall by Fetish worship and the hideous ordeals of witchcraft, human sacrifice, and twin murder. The great Ibo race to the East of the Niger, numbering some 3 millions, and their cognate tribes had not developed beyond the stage of primitive savagery. In the West, the Kingdom of Benin—like its counterpart in Dahomey—had up to 1897 groaned under a despotism which revelled in holocausts of human victims for its Fetish rites. Further West the Yorubas, Egbas, and Jebus had

evolved a fairly advanced system of Government under recognised rulers. The coast fringe was peopled by negro traders and middlemen, who had acquired a smattering of education in Mission schools, and who jealously guarded the approaches to the interior from the European merchant. In the principal towns (Lagos, Calabar, etc.) there were some few educated native gentlemen who practised as doctors, barristers, etc.

3. *The advent of British Rule*

The British Government, which had maintained a Consul at Lagos since 1852, obtained the cession of the island in 1861 with the sole object of putting an end to the overseas slave traffic. In the following years the abandonment of all West African settlements was contemplated, and any extension of responsibilities with the interior was vetoed. It was not therefore until the 'Scramble for Africa' which followed the Berlin Act of 1885 that any steps were taken to secure the coast line from Lagos to the Cameroons and to establish a claim to the hinterland as a British 'sphere of influence'. This area was then placed under the Consular jurisdiction of the Foreign Office (under the name of the Oil Rivers Protectorate), to whom also the Royal Niger Chartered Company, who were endeavouring to open up the districts bordering the Niger, were responsible. Colonial Office control remained limited to Lagos Colony. It was not until 1893-4 that, in consequence of friction with France, the Foreign Office was compelled to champion the cause of the Niger Company and to declare a Protectorate over the Niger territories. The Oil Rivers then became the Niger Coast Protectorate. With the advent of Mr. Chamberlain to the Colonial Office in 1895, British West Africa entered on a new era. British influence was extended into the Lagos hinterland. The 'French crisis' was brought to a close by the Convention of June, 1898, and steps were taken to buy out the Charter of the Niger Company. This was completed on January 1st, 1900, and the Governments of Northern and Southern Nigeria were created. The former included all territory North of Lat. 7° 10' (approx.) and the latter the old Niger Coast Protectorate, with the addition of such parts of the Company's territory as lay to the South of that line. Lagos formed a third Administration.

4. *Character of British Administration*

The divergent conditions which I have described—geographical, ethnographical, and climatic—together with the very different manner in which the two countries had come under the direct control of the Crown, had, as was to be expected, profoundly influenced the form which British Administration took in each. The early Administrations in the South were confined to the Coast area, where a large revenue was at hand from the duties imposed on imported trade spirits—small though the duties were at that time. Access to the interior was the first desideratum, the creation of roads through the primeval 'Bush', the clearing of waterways blocked with sudd, and, later, the creation of a port at Lagos and the commencement of a railway. Any coherent policy of Native Administration was well-nigh impossible in such circumstances, and the material was very unpromising except among the tribes in the interland of Lagos. Gradually the wall of opposition which barred access to the interior was broken down. Systematic penetration of the almost wholly unexplored country East of the Niger began in 1900, and in

1902 the Aro Fetish, whose ramifications extended throughout the eastern portion of the country—a cult of human sacrifice and slavery—was crushed by force of arms.

The inauguration of British rule in the North was in strong contrast. Here the Chartered Company, restricted by financial considerations, had been compelled to confine their depots chiefly to the banks of the Niger and Benue Rivers. The very existence of any organised Government was threatened by the haughty insolence of the Fulani armies. The condition of Bornu—where the French had intervened—compelled immediate action. Nothing could be done until a force strong enough to cope with these powerful Emirates had been created.

The West African Frontier Force was raised in 1898–99, and on its return from its successful campaign in Ashanti, the task of dealing with the Moslem Emirates was undertaken, in 1902–3. Kontagora, the noted slave-raider, who had boasted that, like a cat with a mouse, he would 'die with a slave in his mouth', was the first to be coerced. Nupe, who had also threatened the existence of the new Administration, followed. Bornu, overrun by Rabeh's army from the Egyptian Sudan, which in turn had been defeated in British territory by a French force, placed itself under the Government, and General Morland's force, *en route* thither, brought Bauchi under control, and its Emir was deposed in reprisal for his ruthless massacre of the people of Guaram. Zaria offered no opposition to peaceful occupation, but the murder of Captain Malony, Resident at Keffi, precipitated hostilities with Kano. The fall of this great city and that of Sokoto in March, 1903, was followed by the submission of the minor Emirates, and convinced those which had already submitted that their belief that the British would be exterminated by these powerful Emirs was vain.

When this had been accomplished, and the forces of disorder had been broken, the British Administration was faced with the insistent urgency of creating a new organisation and of developing a native policy without delay. The system evolved will be described in a later paragraph.

The necessity of securing means wherewith to carry on the Administration was no less insistent than the reorganisation of the Native Administration. There was no revenue to be got from spirits, which were wholly prohibited, while the cost of the large force necessary for the control of the country absorbed the greater part of the wholly inadequate grant from the Imperial Government.

5. *Necessity for Amalgamation: (a) Finance*

Such in brief were the antecedents which had given to the North and South their divergent characteristics and policies. In 1906 a further step in amalgamation was effected in the South. Southern Nigeria and Lagos became one Administration under the title of the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. From this date the material prosperity of the South increased with astonishing rapidity. The liquor duties—increased from 3s. in 1901 to 3s. 6d. in 1905—stood at 5s. 6d. a gallon in 1912, and afforded an ever-increasing revenue, without any diminution in the quantity imported. They yielded a sum of £1,138,000 in 1913.

The North, largely dependent on the annual grant from the Imperial Government, was barely able to balance its budget with the most parsi-

monious economy, and was starved of the necessary staff, and unable to find funds to house its officers properly. Its energies were concentrated upon the development of the Native Administration and the revenue resulting from direct taxation. Its distance from the coast (250 miles) rendered the expansion of trade difficult. Thus the anomaly was presented of a country with an aggregate revenue practically equal to its needs, but divided into two by an arbitrary line of latitude. One portion was dependent on a grant paid by a British taxpayer, which in the year before Amalgamation stood at £136,000, and had averaged £314,500 for the 11 years ending March, 1912.

6. (b) Railways

To the financial dilemma there was now added a very pressing difficulty in regard to Railway policy and control. The North, to ensure the development of its trade and to secure its Customs duties, commenced a railway from Baro, a port on the Niger, to Kano in 1906.* The South responded by pushing on the Lagos Railway to the frontier, and obtained the Secretary of State's sanction to carry it on in the North, to effect a junction with the Baro-Kano line at Minna. In the opinion of Sir John Eaglesome, Director of Railways, the line, when it reached the Northern Nigerian frontier at Offa, should have crossed the Niger at Pateji, traversing a well-populated country and tapping the great trade centre at Bida—thus avoiding the extremely costly and difficult bridge at Jebba, and the uninhabited country to the North of it—the distance to Minna being precisely the same. But no single railway policy had been possible, and the two outlets to the sea were now in acute competition. Major Waghorn, R.E., was sent out to report on the two railways, and propose some system of joint use and control. He animadverted very strongly on the needless cost which had characterised the construction of the southern section of the Lagos line. It was full of sharp curves and dangerous gradients, which had to be rectified at an expenditure of £200,000. It was stated that the section to Ibadan, which presented no special difficulties, had cost two millions (over £15,000 a mile). Immediate unification of control with a view to checking extravagance was recommended. The advent of the railway, moreover, accentuated the need for a revision of the apportionment of Customs duties collected at the port. The growing divergence of administrative methods, as the interior became opened up in the South, also called for a common policy. In a long memorandum, dated May, 1905 (while still High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria), I advocated amalgamation, a policy supported by the then High Commissioner of Southern Nigeria and the Governor of Lagos, and there was increasing evidence that it could no longer be postponed.

7. Decision to Amalgamate

Towards the close of 1911, Mr. (now Viscount) Harcourt, Secretary of State for the Colonies, invited me to undertake the task. I was at the time Governor of Hong Kong, having previously been High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria from its inauguration in 1900. I was therefore intimately acquainted with the method of Administration there, for the creation of which I had indeed been responsible. Reaching England in April, 1912, I was

* This had been pressed by me in 1905, not only on these grounds but in order to render possible the realisation of the direct tax paid in kind, which was in danger of failure owing to the difficulty of finding a market for it, and to cheapen Administration.

appointed Governor of the two separate Administrations simultaneously, and after spending several weeks in England, to acquaint myself with the current views on some important matters, I proceeded to Africa in September, 1912. I returned in the following March, and submitted my proposals for amalgamation in May. They were accepted in September, when I returned to Nigeria, and on January 1st, 1914, the new Government of Nigeria, as set up by fresh Letters Patent and other Instruments, was proclaimed.

8. *Nature of the Task*

It was clear that so large a country as Nigeria, with an area of 332,400 square miles—of which the North and South were connected only by a single railway and the uncertain waterway of the Niger, while no lateral means of communication existed at all—must be divided into two or more dependent Administrations under the control of a Central Government. The first problem therefore which presented itself was the number of such Lieutenant-Governors, their powers, and relations to the various departments, together with the subordinate Administrative units throughout the country, and the control of such departments as the Railway and the Military Forces, which were common to the whole of Nigeria. The functions, and future constitutions, of the Executive and Legislative Councils, the unification of the Laws and the Regulations based upon them, and of the Executive 'General Orders' and other instructions, the Judicial system, the methods of Taxation direct and indirect, and the disposal of the Revenue so as to benefit the country as a whole, without creating jealousy and friction, the assimilation of the policy of Native Administration—these, with many minor problems, had to be solved by any scheme of amalgamation which should have any prospect of permanency. In every one of these matters the systems of the two Governments differed essentially as I shall show in discussing each in detail. The alarm and suspicion caused among the native population of the South by the appointment of a Committee to enquire into the question of land tenure added to the difficulty of the task. Amalgamation in my view was 'not a mere political, geographical, or more especially a financial expression'. I regarded it rather 'as a means whereby each part of Nigeria should be raised to the level of the highest place attained by any particular part'. Thus regarded each of the two Administrations had much to learn from the other. The North—a younger Government—was capable of improvement in its departmental organisation, and backward both in the development of its material resources and of the facilities (such as roads) required for the purpose. The South required a better organisation of its Native Administration and of its judicial system.

PART II. METHOD OF AMALGAMATION

GENERAL SCHEME. DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY—CENTRAL DEPARTMENTS

Amalgamation, January 1st, 1914

On January 1st, 1914, the former Governments of Southern and Northern Nigeria were formally amalgamated with some fitting ceremonial. After the oaths of office had been taken at each capital—Lagos and Zungeru—by the

Governor-General, the Lieutenant-Governors, and the Chief Justice, etc., a Durbar was held on the great plain at Kano, which was attended by all the chief Moslem rulers from Sokoto to Chad, who met for the first time in common friendship to swear allegiance to His Majesty, and by representatives of the principal Pagan tribes. Though the retinue of the chiefs was necessarily limited by considerations of food supply, etc., it was estimated that not fewer than 30,000 horsemen took part in the picturesque display. Each in turn marched past and then gave the Salute of the Desert, charging at full gallop with brandished weapons. Nor was the gathering a mere ceremonial. Hereditary rivals met as friends. The Shehu of Bornu was the honoured guest of his quondam enemy, the Fulani Emir of Kano, and no friction or dispute of precedence among their somewhat turbulent following disturbed the harmony of this remarkable gathering, which undoubtedly had a very beneficial effect. A uniform time for Nigeria (viz., 7½° meridian)—half an hour fast of Greenwich—was established for railway and telegraphic convenience. A single weekly Gazette, with a supplement containing all ephemeral matter, superseded the former publications. The 'General Orders' of the former Administrations were cancelled, and replaced as soon as possible by Standing Orders common to all Nigeria. The printed forms in use in all departments were revised and largely reduced. A new Colonial badge was introduced consisting of the interlaced triangles known as 'Solomon's Seal'.

10. *The Governor-General*

The whole of Nigeria—the size of which approximates to one-third that of British India, with a population of 16 or 17 millions, the largest of the Crown Colonies and Protectorates of the Empire—was placed under the control of a Governor-General, but it was intimated that the title was personal to myself. The Letters Patent and other Instruments setting up the new Government omitted the usual provision that when the Governor was absent from Nigeria his Deputy should administer the Government, for it had been decided that the Governor should spend four months of each year *on duty* in England. The object of this somewhat startling departure from precedent was to preserve continuity of Administration, to keep closer touch, by the personal presence of the Governor, with the Colonial Office and the commercial and other interests in England, and to give the Governor some time to carry through the heavy work of re-drafting laws, etc., while relieved of the onus of comparatively unimportant daily routine in Africa. He was when absent from Nigeria represented by a Deputy, fully empowered to deal with all matters of urgency, with whom he was in telegraphic communication. It was not desired to decrease the responsibility of 'the man on the spot'—the change, as Mr. Churchill expressed it, consisted rather of a definition of 'the spot' due to the rapid means of transport and communication which steam and telegraphy had introduced. A room was provided at the Colonial Office for the use of the Governor and his Private Secretary and clerk.

The system served its purpose, and without it I doubt if the work could have been accomplished. It presented obvious difficulties, and the Secretary of State decided to cancel it in 1917. It demands only a brief reference here, as an integral part of the method by which amalgamation was carried out.

LUGARD AND THE AMALGAMATION OF THE NIGER

Policy of Governor

The Governor directs the policy in respect of State Administration, and
initiates the initiative in all projects in the areas of Education, Regula-

tion and Councils which are of a general nature with the advice of
the Executive Council, and in respect of the general instructions

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territory had not yet been explored, and depending on no geographical or ethnological features—were carefully revised so as no longer to bisect tribal units, except where by the usage of 17 years a fraction of a tribe had become incorporated with its neighbour.

13. *Duties and Powers of Lieutenant Governors.—Central Departments*

Each Lieutenant Governor is (under the general control of the Governor-General) charged with the direct administration of the area to which he is appointed, submitting to the Governor-General any question which affects Nigeria as a whole, or which involves a ruling as to general policy or legislative action, or is otherwise of sufficient importance for reference. He also keeps the Governor-General informed on all matters. He submits his annual budget of Revenue and Expenditure for approval and incorporation in the general budget. He is not superseded by the presence of the Governor-General in his area of jurisdiction. To enable him to undertake these duties the statutory powers vested in the Governor by Ordinance are, as required, delegated by Gazette notice. Similarly the executive powers which a Lieutenant Governor is authorised to exercise are formally notified, in order that no confusion may arise.

Each Lieutenant Governor has a private secretary, a Secretariat and the various departments necessary to an Administration, *e.g.*, Political, Medical, Public Works, Forestry, Agriculture, Education, Police, Prisons and Mines—to which in the Southern Provinces are added Marine, Customs and Printing. The two former were for special reasons at first treated as Central (*see* paras. 34 and 35), but were later included in the Southern Provinces, to which their work is almost entirely confined.

The 'Central' Departments, under the direct control of the Governor-General as being common to both, are the Railway (including the Colliery), the Military, the Audit, Treasury, Post and Telegraphs, Judicial and Legal (each Lieutenant Governor having a legal adviser) and the Survey. The heads of these Departments when on leave are replaced by an officer exercising their full powers. To these will be added this year a Geological Survey. In addition 'a Director of the Medical and Sanitary Services' acts as Adviser to the Governor-General and superintends the Departments in both Administrations, without interfering with their departmental organization (*see* para. 36). A similar office is held by the 'Director of Forests', while the 'Director of Railways and Works' not only bears the same relation to the Public Works departments in the North and South, and to the 'Open Lines' railway, but is directly responsible for all new construction, and advises on matters of Railway policy and extension and on Loan Works (*see* para. 37). No substitutes are required for these 'Common Heads' when on leave.

14. *Reasons for the Division*

Various other schemes of amalgamation had been put forward. They were all based on the principle of dividing the territory into a large number of units—from 4 to 7—each under the control of a high official responsible to the Governor-General. They were fully described in my original report, and there is no need to discuss them here.

My reasons for preferring the retention of the old boundaries—subject to modification later—were as follows: (1) There appeared no adequate reason

for creating a third Lieutenant Governorship, since the work and responsibility which had hitherto devolved upon the Governors of Northern and Southern Nigeria, would under the new scheme be considerably reduced by the transfer of all larger questions of policy, with legislation, regulations, general orders, and the control of all Central Departments to the Governor-General. (2) Each of the two former Administrations was under a separate body of laws, and the executive policy embodied in general orders and other instructions differed, as also did the conditions of service of both European and Native Staff. A territorial re-division which transferred portions of one Administration to the other, or included portions of each in a new Administration, would have been productive of chaos, and interminable appeals for 'Rulings', at a moment when the inevitable pressure on the Central Government was greatest. It appeared to me incontestable that the unification of the laws, general orders and policy, and the adjustment of the finances, should precede the creation of any new Administration. Moreover, the multiplicity of Secretariats, and the reduplication of Departmental Heads, involved by the creation of a number of subordinate Administrations appeared to me to be an insuperable objection, involving unnecessary correspondence, duplication of work, and needless cost. Without such duplication the Lieutenant Governorships would become mere provinces, under a greatly overweighted and highly centralised Government. This would inevitably result (*inter alia*) in much delay, in a country of such vast distances and imperfect communications. It would in effect have been the adoption of the 'provincial system' of Southern Nigeria (which is described in the next para.) rendered more than ever difficult by increased distances. The Governor-General would be tied to headquarters and the management of a large Secretariat. He would be unable to travel, and would have great difficulty in preserving uniformity of policy among the several Administrations, and little time to devote to larger questions of policy. Owing also to the system of leave in West Africa, the large powers vested in the Lieutenant Governors must have been exercised by others in their absence, necessitating a very large number of men qualified to exercise high office. The simultaneous creation of 4 to 7 new Governments, the distribution from existing Secretariats of the records belonging to each, and the absence of buildings for public offices, would all add to the difficulty, and postpone effective amalgamation for many years. My conception on the other hand was that the office of Lieutenant Governor should be one of recognised executive responsibility, to which should be delegated many of the statutory and executive functions of the Governor-General by a process of decentralization.

15. *Provincial Administration and Departmental Control*

Prior to Amalgamation Northern Nigeria had, for the purposes of Native Administration, been divided into 13 provinces under 'Residents'. Illorin and Kabba, two very small ones South of the Niger, were now amalgamated, and later Bassa and Muri were reorganised. The provinces of the North are now approximately as indicated in the table on p. 65.

Southern Nigeria had comprised three 'Divisions' under Provincial Commissioners—viz., the territories of the former Southern Nigeria east and west of the Niger, and the hinterland of Lagos. The Provincial Commissioners were charged with the supervision of all Departments in their Divisions, and

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Name of Province	Area in sq. miles	Population	Name of Province	Area in sq. miles	Population
*Sokoto	35,400	1,262,300	Kontagora	27,000	
*Kano	28,600	3,398,300	Illorin	14,100	118,400
*Bornu	32,800	679,700	Nassarawa	17,900	330,100
*Bauchi	24,700	679,700	Munshi	17,000	582,600
*Zaria	9,850	390,300	Muri	15,600	471,000
Nupe	18,450	388,500	Yola	14,300	407,800
Total Area and Population			255,700		291,300
					9,000,000†

* First class.

† Approximately 5,855,000 Moslems, 3,135,000 Pagans and 10,000 Christians.

were in fact, though not in name, Lieut.-Governors, but without adequate Secretariat assistance. As their duties increased the tendency for the Commissioners' Office to become a small Secretariat developed. The Provincial Commissioners, charged with much administrative and departmental work, found, they said, little time to supervise the District Staff, and the Governor and Colonial Secretary were quite out of touch with the administration of native affairs. Since the supervision of both the 'District' and the Native Courts was in the hands of the Puisne Judges, the District Commissioners looked to them in a great part of their work. The District Commissioners were also largely employed in departmental duties connected with the Customs, Treasury and Public Works, which seriously interfered with their duties as Administrative Officers. All Departmental officers corresponded through the Provincial Commissioners, even on technical details—a system which involved delay and circumlocution, rendered the position of the Head of the Department most difficult, and deprived him of control. Stores were ordered from England by the Provincial Commissioners independently, with the result of extra cost and accumulations.

With the creation of Lieut.-Governors with definite areas of administration, and not merely as the *alter ego* of the Governor, the function of the Provincial Commissioner naturally expired. The Southern Protectorate was divided into nine Provinces, averaging considerably less than half the average size of Northern Provinces, but with an approximately equal population, each under a Resident (as in the Northern Provinces) and divided into three or more divisions under 'District Officers' (1st and 2nd Class) with their assistant District Officers, the number varying according to the size, population and needs of each Province. The five most important in the Northern Provinces, and three in the Southern Provinces, are '1st class' under Residents of the 1st class. The area and population of the Provinces of the Southern Administration are as given in the table on p. 66.

Since the beginning of 1919 the Cameroons occupied territory South of Lat. 7° 10' (18,000 square miles) has been added as a Province to the South, while the smaller areas in the North were absorbed in the Provinces of Yola and Bornu.

There are, therefore, 21 Provinces in Nigeria (exclusive of the Colony and the Cameroons) with an average of 16,000 square miles and a population of

<i>Name of Province</i>	<i>Area in sq. miles</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Name of Province</i>	<i>Area in sq. miles</i>	<i>Population</i>
*Oyo	14,872	1,027,000	Onitsha	7,579	1,342,000
*Owerri	7,613	1,272,000	Ondo	6,041	384,000
*Abeokuta	6,694	552,000	Benin	8,799	567,000
Calabar	6,248	871,000	Warri	9,342	515,000
Ogoja	8,211	1,066,000	<i>The Colony</i>	1,335	154,000
Total Area and Population				76,684	7,750,000

* First Class. British Cameroons area 31,440 square miles. Population 600,000 (?).

about 800,000. The average Staff for the administration of these large units (reduced by over one-third during the War and by the Staff required for the Colony and Cameroons) is 12 officers (viz., 8 in the country and 4 on leave) inclusive of sick, vacancies, etc.

The Resident of a Province, as the senior Government official, is, generally speaking, responsible as such for the efficiency of the Public Service in his Province. He is, however, primarily concerned with the Native Administration, including the conduct of the Provincial and Native Courts. Control of his subordinates by the Head of each Department is now preserved. He delegates duties and responsibilities to them as may be necessary, and not to an Administrative officer, and conveys his professional and technical orders direct. If a difference should arise between the Resident and a Departmental officer it is referred to the Lieut.-Governor or to the Departmental Head, and if necessary eventually to the Governor-General.

NATIVE ADMINISTRATION

(16.) Reason of Divergent Policy in the North and South

It is a truism to observe that in a country possessing a native population of upwards of 16 millions, the policy of the Government and its methods of administration of the native races stands first in importance. It is the natural protector and the permanent trustee of the welfare of these races, while safeguarding the interests of the comparative handful of traders and missionaries who form the constantly changing European population, few of whom remain for very many years in the country. It is almost equally obvious that since the boundaries of North and South were, as I have already described, mere parallels of latitude, in many cases leaving part of a tribal area in one Administration and the remainder in the other, some uniformity in policy was highly desirable. At the time of Amalgamation, however, both policy and method were profoundly divergent.

This divergence was in part due to deliberate differences of Administrative method and organisation, in part due to the earlier history of each Government and the circumstances which had moulded its development under British rule, and in part to the characteristics of the people themselves. Southern Nigeria had been much longer under British rule. Its wealth in oleaginous produce had attracted large numbers of traders, chiefly British and German, whose influence had naturally been in the direction of material

development of roads, waterways, and trade. Northern Nigeria, prior to the transfer from the Royal Niger Company in 1900, had practically no system of Native Administration, and the officials of the Chartered Company were unable to go far from the banks of the Niger and Benue. The interior was dominated by powerful Emirs, who commanded large armies. The initial task of the new Government had been to check slave-raids and constant warfare, and this could only be done by defeating the Emirs and imposing upon them the authority of Government. As a consequence the problem of Native policy and Administration was one which forced itself upon the Northern Government at the very beginning, whereas in the South the trader and the missionary were the pioneers, and it was only such events as the massacre at Benin, the outbreak at Brass, or the unavoidable necessity of dealing with such barbarous cults as that of the Aro fetish, with its whole-sale human sacrifices and slavery, which compelled the Government to take strong action. The Southern Provinces were populated by tribes to take the lowest stage of primitive savagery, without any central organisation, in the West where the Yorubas, Egbas, Benis and some minor allied tribes had developed a social organisation under paramount Chiefs, but, in the early years, they were still addicted to many barbarous rites. A great part of the North, on the other hand, had come under the influence of Islam, and the Hausa States and Bornu had an elaborate administrative machinery, though it had become corrupt and degraded. There remained, however, in the North a vast population of Pagans in a similar stage of savagery to those in the South.

17. *Treaties in the Lagos Hinterland: (a) Jurisdiction of the Crown*

The position in the former 'Lagos Protectorate' was complicated by the existence of various treaties and agreements. The Egba Treaty of 1893 purported to guarantee the independence of the tribe, on condition that they encouraged trade and Christian missions, but made no mention that they international obligations incurred under the Brussels Act, the 'Wild Animals Protection' Convention, &c. The treaties with the Yorubas and with the many small tribes and 'Crowned Kings', as they were called, were less explicit. Notwithstanding these treaties the whole of the Lagos hinterland was in 1901 declared a Protectorate. A 'Native Councils Ordinance' was enacted, and Councils were set up 'from one end of the Protectorate to the other', over which Government officials exercised a supervision which was 'not merely nominal, and the natives acquiesced in this exercise of jurisdiction by the Crown'. The Councils at the same time refused to accept the Forestry law, &c., which was applicable to the rest of Southern Nigeria. I found that no one—neither the Colonial Office nor the Chief Justice—had any clear idea as to what jurisdiction could legally be exercised by the Crown, or what executive powers were, under the Treaties, vested in the Colonial Government, in these important districts lying astride the railway which is the main artery of Nigeria.

The Chief Justice of Southern Nigeria, at my request, investigated this subject and wrote a long and valuable Memorandum. Though many records were found to be missing he cited 83 'treaties, agreements, proclamations, &c.', relative to the question. The report, from which I have already quoted phrases, is too lengthy to reproduce here, but I think it may accurately be

described as a pronouncement that the whole question of jurisdiction was in a chaotic state, and that the administration of the Colonial Government in the past was full of anomalies. Even the boundaries of the Colony proper had never been defined. He summarised his conclusions thus: 'It appears to me . . . that His Majesty has now acquired such complete jurisdiction throughout the Protectorate, with the possible exception of Egbaland, as to be able to legislate in any direction, not only for Europeans and resident non-natives, but for the natives themselves.' And he added: 'The establishment of British Courts throughout the Protectorate appears to me to be essential.'

18. (b) *Executive Powers of the Government in Lagos Hinterland*

Meanwhile the Residents and Commissioners were in an anomalous position, uncertain of their powers and of the policy of Government, which the Commissioner of Egba understood to be 'the building up of a strong State, independent financially and otherwise, so as to relieve the Colonial Government of the cost of Administration'. The Provincial Commissioner whom I deputed to report on the Administrative position, stated that the further his enquiries extended the more chaotic he found it—bribery and extortion were rampant, in some districts transport and food were refused to Government officials, and Administrative officers acted on lines of their own. At Abeokuta (Egba) and Ibadan (Yoruba) and elsewhere a Government official was in residence, and was supposed to maintain order. The Colonial Government had, however, declined to allow these communities to maintain any armed force, either military or police. The absolute necessity of this restriction, apart from obligations under the Brussels Act, can only be fully realised by those whose experience has taught them how strict must be the discipline and how watchful must be the control exerted over armed Africans if misuse of their powers is to be avoided. The Native Governments were incapable of exerting such a discipline, the meaning of which they did not understand, and successive Governors, though fostering their 'independence', had inevitably recognised this essential limitation.

It is unnecessary to demonstrate that a Government, deprived of the instruments on which the ultimate enforcement of all law, even in the most civilised States, depends, is an anomaly, and is independent only in name.

19. *The Egba Government*

The Egba Government was conducted in the name of the Alaki—a loyal and well-disposed but wholly illiterate Chief—by an able and educated native. It was a hybrid, with an exterior pleasing to those who reckon progress among natives to consist in imitating European methods. Side by side with a Secretariat, and minute papers which only the Secretary and a few clerks could read, with Estimates prepared on the Colonial model, and Orders in Council and Regulations passed by an illiterate body of conservative Chiefs, practically all of whom were very old men who looked on these proceedings probably with amused indifference, there existed the ancient *régime* with all its abuses—extortionate demands from the peasantry, corruption and bribery in the Courts, arbitrary imprisonment and forced labour. By such methods a large number of Chiefs of various grades—there were over 2,000 in Abeokuta, I believe—lived a life of idleness and sensuous indulgence. Their power received the sanction of their Government, which was recognised by the

Suzerain Power on the one hand, and was rooted in the Fetish observances of the Ogboni Society and native superstition on the other. In virtue of the former, prisoners condemned by Courts, over which the Government exercised no control, were confined in prisons not subject to the Colonial laws (some of them under Government supervision, and some wholly native), or transferred to Lagos prison under a warrant signed by the Governor. If the people rebelled Government troops were requisitioned in the name of the Alaki. In virtue of the latter, the ignorant peasantry were terrorised into the acceptance of the demands of the Chiefs. A fiscal frontier had been set up on which customs on certain articles, agreed to by the Colonial Government, were collected. The Egbas are not a large tribe—probably little over a quarter of a million—the wealth of the country in palm produce, and its proximity to the port of Lagos, results in the people being very well-to-do. In character they are inclined to lawlessness and impatient of control.

20. *The Yoruba Government*

The Yorubas, numbering over a million, owed allegiance to the loyal and enlightened Alafin of Oyo, but for many years there had been a tendency for the Ibadans (a very large section of the tribe) to flout his authority, and to set up a separate rule under their own Bali. This tendency had, it appears, been encouraged by the Colonial Government. There was here no attempt at 'educated' government, though the Bali and his Baloguns passed Orders in Council at the instance of the Resident, independently of either the Colonial Government or the Alafin. The large and densely populated cities of Iseyhin, Ikirun, Oshogbo, and Ogbomosho displayed a similar tendency to separation under their own Balis, although these were by tradition the deputies of the Alafin.

21. *Demand for Government Troops at Abeokuta*

An armed disturbance at Abeokuta—for almost every male Egba owned a gun—occurred simultaneously with my arrival in 1912, and, as on previous occasions, a detachment of troops was hurriedly despatched from Lagos to preserve order, and protect the Alaki from his subjects. No Alaki prior to the present holder of the office had been allowed to survive beyond three years. A similar outbreak occurred in 1913, and I then informed the Alaki that I could no longer consent to suppress by force disturbances the causes of which were outside my control, and which for all I knew may have originated from gross misrule. Nor could I tolerate the incarceration of Egba prisoners, of whose guilt or innocence I had no knowledge whatever, in a Government gaol. I pointed out also the disadvantage of a fiscal frontier. With the concurrence of the Secretary of State I invited him to reconsider, with his Chiefs and advisers, the treaty of so-called independence. I suggested for his consideration that he should place his territories under the guidance and control of the Government on a basis similar to that of the Emirates of the North.

22. *Abolition of Egba and Ibadan Treaties*

The Secretariat system of government had already become unpopular, and the Alaki gladly adopted my suggestion. The treaty was denounced, the Ordinances relating to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court were repealed, and a new Agreement, dated September 16th, 1914, took their place. (See Appendix 2.) By virtue of this instrument the judicial system applicable to the

rest of Nigeria was made operative in Egbaland. Egbaland, with Jebu, Ilaro, and Meko, was constituted a 'Province' under a Resident with the usual staff. The fiscal frontier and the 'Native Government' Customs staff were abolished. A similar procedure was adopted in Oyo and Ibadan, but since the treaties in Yorubaland did not guarantee 'independence' it was not considered necessary to substitute any Agreement.

23. 'House-rule'

Such was the position of native affairs in the Western Provinces. In the Provinces bordering the Coast, East of Lagos Colony, a curious system known as 'House-rule' prevailed. The coastal Chiefs, by preventing European access to the interior, had in the early days of British rule grown rich as middlemen. Their custom was to advance goods to Members of the 'House', who carried them by the creeks in canoes to the hinterland tribes, and brought saleable produce in return, on which great profits were made. The 'Houses' were, in fact, primarily trading concerns. The members of the Houses largely consisted of slaves, and were recruited by the addition of new slaves. The House Rule Ordinance of Southern Nigeria empowered the Supreme Court to award a year's imprisonment, and inflict a fine of £50 upon any member who refused or neglected to submit to the authority of the head of the House. The oath of the head of the House without further evidence was sufficient for conviction. Any person wandering abroad, and unable to prove that he had means of subsistence, or that the lack of them was not the result of his own fault—phrases wholly inapplicable to conditions of Native life in Africa—could be arrested without warrant, and imprisoned for a year. Any person, including Europeans, who employed a Member without the consent of the Head of the House was liable to a year's imprisonment and a fine of £20.

An amending Ordinance of 1912, recognising in effect that many members were slaves detained by force, instituted a method of self-ransom. The Commissioners of the Supreme Court received and paid out the ransom money. The machinery of Government was employed to arrest without warrant, and to restore to the head of the House, any fugitive member—resistance was punishable by a year's imprisonment and a fine of £50. The repeal of this Ordinance, which was incompatible with the Slavery Law, was deferred till January 1st, 1915, so as to give fair warning. House rule was not thereby abolished, but the denial of the assistance of British Courts in enforcing the will of the head of the House, and of Government police in capturing fugitive members, struck a death-blow to the system.

24. *The System of Native Administration in the North*

The system of Native administration in the separate Government of Northern Nigeria had been based on a recognition of the authority of the Native Chiefs. The policy of the Government was that these Chiefs should govern their people, not as independent but as dependent Rulers. The orders of Government are not conveyed to the people through them, but emanate from them in accordance where necessary with instructions received through the Resident. While they themselves are controlled by Government in matters of policy and of importance, their people are controlled in accordance with that policy by themselves. A Political Officer would consider it as irregular to issue direct orders to an individual native, or even to a village head, as a

General commanding a division would to a private soldier, except through his commanding officers. The courts administer native law, and are presided over by Native Judges (417 in all). Their punishments do not conform to the Criminal Code, but on the other hand, native law must not be in opposition to the Ordinances of Government, which are operative everywhere, and the courts, as I shall presently describe, are under the close supervision of the District Staff. Their rules of evidence and their procedure are not based on the British standards, but their sentences, if manifestly faulty, are subject to revision. Their prisoners are confined in their own native gaols, which are under the supervision of the British Staff. The taxes are raised in the name of the native ruler and by his agents, but he surrenders the fixed proportion to Government, and the expenditure of the portion assigned to the Native Administration, from which fixed salaries to all native officials are paid, is subject to the advice of the Resident, and the ultimate control of the Governor. The attitude of the Resident is that of a watchful adviser not of the interfering ruler, but he is ever jealous of the rights of the peasantry, and of any injustice towards them.

This system is clearly only adapted in its fullest application to communities under the centralised rule of a paramount Chief, with some administrative machinery at his disposal, and finds its best exposition in the Moslem communities of the North. Nevertheless, its underlying principles are applied, to the varying extent to which it is possible in each case to apply them, even to the most primitive communities in the North. The first step is to endeavour to find a man of influence as chief, and to group under him as many villages or districts as possible, to teach him to delegate powers, and to take an interest in his 'Native Treasury', to support his authority, and to inculcate a sense of responsibility.

25. *Revenue of Native Treasuries*

There are 50 separate Native Treasuries in the Northern Provinces, with an aggregate revenue in 1917 of £441,000. Their reserve funds, invested at interest, stand at £255,600. The single Emirate of Kano has a revenue at the disposal of the Native Administration of about £69,000. They share in the cost of the Provincial (Government) Schools, and the Arts and Crafts Industrial School at Kano is (with the exception of the British instructor) entirely supported by them. A second is being started in Bornu. The receipts from the Native Courts, fines and fees, are paid to the Native Treasury, which pays the salaries of the judges and other officers. In 1917 the receipts were £28,500 and the expenditure £26,500. They devote large sums to the improvement of roads and other works.

26. *Efficiency and loyalty of Native Administrations. Northern Provinces*

The loyalty throughout the War of the Moslem rulers (who could appreciate something of the magnitude of the struggle) has been remarkable, and there is reason to believe that it is no mere profession, but arises from a genuine conviction. There has been no vestige of unrest in these States, and when the Tuareg rising occurred in 1916 in French territory, they were eager to join in the assistance we gave. Prayers have been daily offered in the mosques, the Treasuries have offered about £50,000 each year [total, £150,000 plus £3,100 to Red Cross to end of 1917] towards the War costs. Last year,

when a contribution towards Red Cross funds was suggested, £11,000 was offered, but the Sultan of Sokoto declined to subscribe from his Treasury funds, saying that he and his Chiefs would contribute from their private means. They co-operated heartily in raising troops and carriers for service overseas. With the efficiency of the Native Courts, and with their large-minded and generous attitude towards the slavery question, I shall deal in later paragraphs.

27. *Application of 'Indirect rule' to Southern Provinces*

The system may thus be said to have worked with good results in the North, and I desired to introduce its principles in the South. It is, however, obvious that it depends essentially on the principle of direct taxation, which provides the means whereby the Native Administration can pay salaries to the paramount Chief and all other officials, and so put an end to the unlimited exactions on which they had previously lived, and reduce their number to those actually required for the service of the Native Administration. The Secretary of State was unwilling to authorise this innovation, while hostilities were going on in the Cameroons, and the position in regard to Yoruba and Egbaland became in consequence one of great difficulty, for there was nothing to substitute for the native misrule, which had received a severe check in consequence of the steps I have already described.

In the Kingdom of Benin a new situation was created by the death of the ex-Oba, Overami, who had been in exile since the conquest of his country after the massacre of a British mission in 1896. In response to the wishes of the people, his son was recognised as Oba, and he willingly accepted the Government policy, including the direct tax. As Benin was conquered territory, the Oba was informed that while the regulation of the occupation of land by natives was left to his control under native law and custom, leases to non-natives and aliens required the approval of the Governor, and their rentals would be divided between the General Revenue and the Native Treasury. The Governor could take any unoccupied land required for a public purpose without payment, or on payment of compensation if occupied.

28. *Direct Taxation in Southern Provinces*

Towards the close of 1916 the financial position, owing to the War, had become very serious, and I was accorded permission to introduce direct taxation in Yorubaland, Egba, and Benin on my own responsibility, and subject to the proviso that both chiefs and people voluntarily agreed to it, and that no more was asked of the people than they were already paying by tribute and other levies to their chiefs. The favourable moment of transition to the new régime had already passed. Misrepresentation by the horde of idle parasites, whose occupation would be gone, had had time to do its work, and though taxation had not as yet been introduced a serious disturbance took place at Iseyin in Yoruba towards the close of 1916, and a still more serious one in Egba early in 1918. The causes, however, of this unrest were complex, and it would not be justifiable to ascribe them to any one motive.

During 1918 taxation was successfully introduced in Yoruba; the people appeared thoroughly convinced of the advantages of consolidating the demands made upon them in a single payment, and there was something almost approaching enthusiasm in the way the money poured in. Receipts

were given to each taxpayer, and the District Officer states that in one centre £3,400 was paid in 24 hours, and in another a similar sum was received in six hours amid scenes of great good humour. 'The system of taxation', writes the Resident, 'is not unpopular, and if we can keep our pledges by protecting the people from old exactions, free labour, and injustice, the contentment will continue.' The total received in 1918 was £72,000, and the estimate for 1919 is £133,000. The Illesha division and the Ondo province have asked to be included in the scheme. In Benin the tax was paid without difficulty, and in Egba the assessment was completed, the Alaki and the second principal Chief insisting on paying their heavy income tax as an example to the rest, though exempted as salaried chiefs. The inauguration of Native Administrations was then a comparatively easy matter. The division of the province into districts, each under a Headman, the assessment of salaries to them and to the Chief's Council, the preparation of Estimates of the Revenue and Expenditure were all completed by the end of the year. The Revenues of the Native Administrations of Yoruba and Egbaland will probably be very large.

29. *Reforms in Yorubaland*

The disintegration of Yorubaland was arrested, and the supreme authority of the Alafin recognised by all, to the immense benefit of the country. A check was put on the depredations of Lagos land-speculators, whose actions, backed by certain native lawyers, had already gone far to break down the native system of land tenure. The difficult question of existing leases or freeholds acquired by aliens was investigated, and the authority of the native chiefs re-established, but not without difficulty. A strong Native Government is in process of being built up under its own rulers, which will be able to resist the sinister influence of more or less educated aliens which was rapidly destroying it. The Native Courts are reported to be a 'huge success'.

30. *The remainder of the Southern Provinces*

The difficult task still remains of extending these principles to the remainder of the Southern Provinces when the Secretary of State consents to this course, which is strongly urged by the most responsible officers. The Native Revenue Ordinance, hitherto applicable to the Northern Provinces only, has recently been applied to the whole of the Southern Provinces. This step had been deferred (as in the Northern Provinces) until actual experience should show the form of legislation required. The Lieut.-Governor expresses the view that before many years the tax should yield a Revenue of a million sterling, thus fully replacing the indirect tax accruing from duties on spirits.

DEPARTMENTAL ORGANISATION AND COUNCILS

31. (a) *Administrative Services (Secretariats and Political)*

The duplication of departments (other than "Central") in each Lieut.-Governorship is a measure of decentralisation which would in any case be advisable in so vast a country. There is, however, a single roster for promotion, modified for the present by pre-existing claims which it would be unjust

to ignore. This interchange is in every way beneficial, and constitutes the service as a single entity.

The departments under a Lieut.-Governor correspond direct with each other, but on matters of importance, or those which concern a different part of Nigeria, they correspond through the appropriate Secretariat. Central departments adopt the same rule. All correspondence with the Governor-General, dealing with matters which do not refer exclusively to either the Northern or Southern Administrations, are recorded in the Central Secretariat. The Central Secretary checks and reports on the Annual Estimates of the Central Departments, and completes and co-ordinates the Estimates as a whole. He makes up and records the homeward mails and distributes the outward. He prepares the Annual Blue Book and Staff List, edits the Gazette, superintends the printing of Laws, Regulations, Standing Orders and Annual Departmental reports, deals with the affairs of the Central Departments, but has nothing to do with political matters and native affairs. On these, and all local departmental questions, the Lieut.-Governors correspond with the Governor-General, who, when a matter appears to be of general interest or one affecting general policy, directs the Minute papers to be passed to the other Lieut.-Governor. That this machinery has worked effectively and without friction during the past four years goes far to prove that it is well adapted to the circumstances of the country.

The Head of each Political or Administrative Department is the Lieut.-Governor himself, and the Governor-General is the 'Common Head', and issues the instructions upon which the conduct of native affairs is based. These instructions take the form of a series of printed Memoranda on the principal problems of Native Administration, addressed through the Lieut.-Governors to Residents and their staff for guidance.

32. *The grouping of Administrative Services*

The system of grouping the Political and Secretariat Departments as a single 'Administrative Department' for purposes of promotion and employment—a partial adaptation of the system in vogue in the Eastern Colonies, which had been adopted in the Gold Coast—has recently been tried in Nigeria. The object in view is that political officers should obtain a training in Secretariat method and a wider horizon than that of their Administrative district, while the Secretariat should benefit by acquiring officers with practical experience of native affairs in the provinces. The disproportion of officers in the Political and Secretariat branches respectively [at present 259 (including station magistrates) to 35 (including Lands Department)] makes the system difficult to apply in Nigeria, and this difficulty will be enhanced when the Political Department is increased, as I recommend elsewhere. To allow even a small proportion of the Administrative branch to obtain only a modicum of training in the Secretariat robs the latter of continuity, which is so vital a necessity in that department, and the Lieut.-Governor cannot depend on the correctness of references and on that knowledge of previous action taken for which he looks to his Secretariat. The system is especially unworkable in the Central Secretariat, which has nothing to do with Native Administration, and does not, therefore, benefit by the experience of district officers, who in turn derive less benefit from their period of work in the Secretariat.

33. (b) *Judicial and Legal*

On Amalgamation the Chief Justice and Puisne Judges of Northern and Southern Nigeria were abolished, and a single Chief Justice with four Puisne Judges for Nigeria were appointed, in lieu of the previous seven Judges.

Instead of the normal privilege leave of five months and some days absence (including passages) after each complete year in Nigeria, the Secretary of State agreed, at the same time, that the judges should take their leave after eight months' residence—coincident with the annual Court vacation—between June 1st and October 1st, provision being made by the Chief Justice for a vacation judge to carry on any urgent business. Since it is almost impossible to hold assizes in the rains, and litigation at that season decreases considerably, the new system utilises the time of the judges much more advantageously, and the full bench is present at the time when their presence is most needed. This change, in combination with those described in the section on Courts of Law, has resulted in the work of the Court being for the first time well up to date.

The three police magistrates, required for Lagos and Calabar and their relief, are placed under the Chief Justice for administrative purposes. It is now usually a condition of appointment that they shall be qualified barristers, and they have adequate prospects of promotion in the Judicial and Legal Departments. Station magistrates, on the other hand (who were at first included in the Magistracy), have been merged in the Administrative branch, to which they naturally belong. Their magisterial functions are secondary to those of the 'Local Authority' of the township of which they are in charge. When the former duties become too onerous a Police Magistrate is appointed. They replace the former cantonment magistrates in the North.

A single Attorney-General was appointed for Nigeria, and each Lieutenant-Governor is provided with a Legal Adviser. A Crown Prosecutor completes the legal establishment.

34. (c) *Customs*

Prior to Amalgamation a series of Customs stations were nominally maintained by Northern Nigeria on the N., N.W. and N.E. land frontiers, and also in Illorin [to collect the surtax on salt imported *via* Lagos]. The latter, of course, ceased, since the North and South now become a single fiscal unit. The former were allowed to fall into abeyance—though Illo and Yola, which were ports of entry under the Niger Transit Regulations, were temporarily maintained as Customs stations. It had been impossible to exercise adequate European supervision over the frontier stations, or to incur the heavy cost of a preventive service between them. Evasion was thus easy, and bribery and extortion by subordinate native officials was almost impossible of detection. Since the railway had rapidly destroyed the trans-desert trade from Tripoli (which was finally extinguished by the War), the stations had become of less and less importance. The Customs Department now functions on the coast only (though stations were for some time maintained at the railway termini (Kano and Rahama) and at Onitsha for the convenience of merchants).

Controversy had arisen in the past as to the proper share of the Northern Administration in the Customs collected on imports at the coast ports. Lord Selborne's Committee in 1898 had laid down the obvious principle that on

amalgamation 'the Customs receipts must be divided according to the Budget requirements of the Provinces'. The Customs was for these reasons at first made a 'Central Department', but it was later included as a department of the Southern Provinces, though Customs receipts continued to be included in the Central Budget.

35. (d) *Marine*

The Marine similarly became a Central Department for the first two years, until its reorganisation was completed. The northern Niger fleet was practically rebuilt, and an agreement was made with the Niger Company with the object of adjusting rail and river rates at high and low water. A Government transport service was maintained on the Niger (until war conditions made its temporary abandonment necessary) in order to ensure fair treatment to small traders. Forcados became the centre of all repair work, and Burutu the transport and Customs station. The charge of the Ice-plant at Lagos was transferred to private enterprise, and I desired to deal with the various transport services in the same way but the scheme did not mature.

36. *Director Medical and Sanitary Services*

The appointment of a Director of Medical and Sanitary Services, whose functions I have described in paragraph 13, has proved of great value in promoting discipline and economy in this Department, and his advice on the Executive Council has been most useful. He co-ordinates the two Departments, edits their annual reports, secures uniformity of policy and equality of personnel and material. In case of divergence of technical recommendations by the Principal Medical Officers he is the Governor-General's adviser. Unhampered by the administrative work of a large department he is able to travel frequently on inspection duty. His small establishment (to which the Government dentist is attached) is included as 'Central'. The 'Medical Research' and 'Laboratory', whose duties are not confined to the Southern Provinces, should be included under his direct control. Like other 'Common Heads' of departments he addresses Lieutenant-Governors on matters affecting their administration and the Central Secretariat on matters for reference to the Governor-General.

37. *The Director of Railways and Works*

The general functions of the Director of Railways and Works have already been described (para. 13). In regard to Loan Works he confers with consulting engineers in England, and in some cases renders their employment unnecessary. As a member of Executive Council and Adviser to the Governor-General he is referee on all technical engineering matters, revises estimates, reviews schemes for work of a novel character, and generally promotes uniformity and economy. While not interfering with the General Manager's control of the Railway, he advises the Governor-General on all questions of railway policy, and in particular assists him in deciding as to the capital requirements for which annual provision is made. In addition to his special responsibility for Loan Works, he is charged with the preparation of all plans for new railway projects, and with the direct supervision of all new construction, the estimates for which he prepares. In consequence of Major Waghorn's strictures regarding extravagance (*see* para. 6 (b)) he was appointed in 1912,

and the railways were unified in 1913 prior to amalgamation. The holder of such a post must obviously be a man of acknowledged pre-eminence as a railway engineer, with experience in many other branches of engineering, such as harbour works, wharves and docks, waterworks and reservoirs, irrigation, etc. Tact and economy are essential.

38. *West African Frontier Force*

The troops were reorganised under a single Commandant, two Infantry Battalions and a Battery of Artillery being stationed in the North and South respectively, with the headquarters at the central position of Kaduna. The Mounted Infantry remains in the North. The total strength is 174 British officers, 192 British N.C.O.'s and 4,977 rank and file, with 440 non-combatants including gun and Maxim carriers. The cost is approximately £270,000 per annum. The varying rates of pay which had obtained in the two previous Governments were made uniform, a double ration allowance being given in the Southern Provinces, where food is more costly. The Southern Nigerian volunteers—a native Corps at Lagos, largely composed of educated natives—ceased to exist. On the outbreak of war it was replaced by the Land and Marine 'Contingents', consisting of European volunteers—since converted into a small Artillery Volunteer detachment. I recommended also in my original report that immediate steps should be taken for the defence of the ports of Lagos and Forcados.

39. *The Native Staff*

The subordinate native staff in Nigeria may be roughly divided into two groups—the clerical (in which I include telegraphists and others whose duties necessitate a knowledge of English reading and writing) and the artisans, whose primary qualification is technical knowledge and manual skill. Of the former there are probably not less than 4,500 in the Government service, and of the latter there are probably 2,500 in permanent employ, besides the very large number casually employed. The salaries of the clerical branch range from £24 to £300 per annum—those of the artisans from the pay of the unskilled labourer (£12 per annum) to £200 per annum. The total cost of this native staff shown on the Estimates is about £500,000, but the actual cost, including temporary hands, is much greater. These numbers show the pressing need for a large continuous supply.

The conditions of service varied greatly in the two former Governments, and have now been made uniform, the rights of present holders being preserved. Promotion in the North is by a general roster, and in the South (at the wish of the staff) by departments. The multiplicity of grades of clerks has been reduced to five, so as to ensure for longer periods the receipt of the annual increment of salary.

I shall have some further observations to offer regarding the native staff in the section on Education, and I will here only remark that the Government has so far failed to devise a scheme acceptable to the staff for ensuring provision to widows and orphans in case of death, either during service or after retirement on pension. The African is of improvident temperament, and neither a Widows' and Orphans' Fund, such as is in operation throughout the European service, nor a Provident Fund, such as applies to the native staff of the railway, meets with general favour.

There is a temptation for young men to leave school with a mere smattering of education, in order to take up appointments as junior clerks either in the Government or commercial employ. The supply of really efficient clerks is thus rapidly being depleted, while parents deplore the tendency of mere schoolboys to escape from parental discipline and embark on an independent career, which in such circumstances can offer no promise. To meet this very real evil I proposed a scheme of clerical apprentices, somewhat similar to that adopted for artisans. Such apprentices, who might be designated 'Cadets', would be afforded facilities for continuing their studies during their early years of Government service. They would remain under parental discipline, and be relieved of the cost of setting up a separate establishment.

40. *The Legislative Council*

Prior to Amalgamation, Northern Nigeria had neither Executive nor Legislative Council, while the laws affecting the whole of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria were passed by the Legislative Council of the Colony of Lagos. This body was ill adapted to deal with the varying conditions of the interior tribes, and would be altogether inappropriate for dealing with the advanced Moslem communities of the North. Owing to the immense intervening distances and the difficulties of transport, its unofficial representatives were invariably drawn from the population of Lagos only.

The agents of firms in Lagos were fairly representative of unofficial European interests in the South, though the Niger Company, one of the largest, was without representation. But in an amalgamated Nigeria the important interests at Kano and the minefields in the North would be without representation. Moreover, the principals of the firms at Liverpool had declared that their agents had no authority to act or to express views without previously consulting them.* The native unofficials necessarily represented only the small, though important, class of educated natives of the coast, and indeed the interests of Lagos were at times antagonistic to those of Opobo and Calabar. Few, I believe, of the intelligent native gentlemen, who for many years past had represented Southern Nigeria on the Legislative Council, had even visited the coast ports outside the Colony proper, and none, I think, had any personal knowledge whatever of the interior tribes, other than the Yoruba-speaking community to which they belonged. Even the official Members were necessarily Heads of Departments resident in Lagos. In such circumstances the Council is necessarily deprived of initiative, personal knowledge, and debating power. Experience, both prior and subsequent to Amalgamation, has shown it to be of little value as an expression of public opinion and original criticism.

It is a cardinal principle of British Colonial policy that the interests of a large native population shall not be subject to the will either of a small European class or of a small minority of educated and Europeanised natives who have nothing in common with them, and whose interests are often opposed to theirs. Thus in India the Governor-General legislates without reference to his Council for scheduled (*i.e.*, backward or primitive) districts and for native States. In Natal the Governor had a commission as 'Paramount Chief' for the control of extra-Colonial natives, and the Legislative Council

* See Mr. G. Moore's remarks in West African Currency Report [Cd. 6427], Oct., 1912, Question 99.

could not interfere with this jurisdiction. At the Cape the High Commissioner governed the Protectorates, and legislated for them in a separate capacity from that in which he presided as 'Governor' in the Cape Legislature. A Council in such circumstances (as Sir C. Dilke observed in Parliament) 'is not a liberal institution, but a veiled oligarchy of the worst description', and responsible autocracy is preferable. The point is of special importance in Northern Nigeria, where the intelligent Emirs are in acute importance in religion and social status from the natives of the coast.

The functions of the Legislative Council were therefore, on amalgamation, restricted to the passing of Ordinances which apply to the Colony, including the Colonial Estimates in the annual 'Supply' Bill. Its Unofficial Members are generally identical with the Town Council of Lagos, with a view to avoiding friction between the two. The Governor-General is *ex officio* President, but his place is usually taken by the Lieutenant-Governor or Administrator. Exclusive of him the Council consists of six official and four unofficial Members. Of the latter, two are generally Europeans and two are natives.

In order to avoid the possibility of hasty legislation, and to give time and opportunity for the expression of public opinion, including the opinion of those in England interested in Nigeria, it was provided in the Royal Instructions that every Bill (unless it is urgent, or for any reason publication is inexpedient) must be published for two full months in the *Gazette* prior to enactment, with a full statement of its objects and reasons.

41. *The Nigerian Council*

In order to afford an opportunity for the expression of public opinion, drawn from a wider circle than that of Lagos, a Nigerian Council was established on amalgamation by Order in Council. The official membership consists of the Executive Council, the 1st Class Residents, the Political Secretary, and the Secretaries of the North and South. The unofficial membership comprises six Europeans and six natives—the former representative of Commerce, Shipping, Banking and Mining (the Lagos and the Calabar Chambers of Commerce and the Chamber of Mines each nominate a member), the latter representative of both the Lagos and Calabar Coast population, and of the principal progressive native communities in the Southern and Northern Provinces. It is unfortunate that at present few of the latter are able to speak English, but the honour of appointment is greatly appreciated, and I trust that in future years, the linguistic disability will be remedied. The Sultan of Sokoto announced his intention of being present this year—involving a journey by road and rail of 1,000 miles—and the Emir of Katsena, though not a member, was present by invitation last year. The Council meets once a year, like the General Council of French West Africa, and its sitting is not prolonged beyond three days.

So far as I am aware the opinion is universal that the Council serves a very useful purpose. At its annual meeting at the close of the year, the Governor-General is able to give a summary of matters of interest during the past year, to review and forecast the position of trade and finance and to emphasise and explain any questions of policy and legislation of importance. This general review is followed by a debate, both on the Address and on motions previously submitted by members to the President. This affords ample scope for

criticism or suggestion in regard to legislation past or future, and any other matters which members may wish to bring forward. The meetings during the past four years have invariably been well attended, not only by members but by an independent audience, and many instructive and interesting debates have taken place on motions submitted by unofficial members. In 1916 a resolution was unanimously passed, conveying to His Majesty's Government the desire of Nigeria to accept as its own £6,000,000 of the Imperial War Debt. By no other means could a vote so representative of all communities and sections of the people have been obtained. The Association of West African Merchants have raised the question of directors of firms coming out to attend the Meeting of Council as temporary extraordinary Members. The Council is yet in its infancy, but I hope that in the future it may prove an increasingly valuable instrument in the administration of Nigeria.

42. *The Executive Council*

On amalgamation, an Executive Council was set up for the whole of Nigeria. The Governor-General presides, and the members include the two Lieutenant-Governors (and Administrator), the Attorney-General, the Director of Medical and Sanitary Services, the Director of Railways and Works, the Commandant, the Treasurer, the Director of Marine, the Comptroller of Customs and the Central Secretary. Colonel Moorhouse and Mr. Bedwell were made special members in view of the fact that they have been Councillors on the former Council of Southern Nigeria. The Secretary of State, moreover, wrote: 'I agree that any first-class Residents who are available should normally be summoned as extraordinary members, when any matters in which their advice would be useful are to come before the Executive Council.' All proposed Ordinances are 'passed' by the Governor in Council before publication.

43. *Method of Legislation*

Laws relating to the Colony are, as I have said, passed by the Legislative Council. Those for the Protectorate (now also called 'Ordinances'—not 'Proclamations' as heretofore) are enacted by the Governor-General, after review in Executive Council, and two months prior to publication. The majority of Ordinances apply wholly or in part to both, and are passed 'in so far as they relate to the Colony' by the Legislative Council and assented to by the Governor, who simultaneously enacts them for the Protectorate. All Ordinances apply to both the Northern and Southern Provinces, unless any part of Nigeria is excluded from its operation by a clause in the law itself.

The unification of the laws, and of the regulations made under them, was of course the main task of practical amalgamation, and occupied four years. Many far-reaching changes were introduced, to some of which I shall allude in Part 3. The pre-existing laws of North and South were carefully collated, and minor amendments introduced in all, while the style was altered from the redundant verbiage of former days to the utmost brevity consistent with clearness of diction. The result may I think claim to be as concise and practical a Statute Book as is possessed by any Colony. Full Regulations were simultaneously issued, consolidating pre-existing Regulations, and for the first time a volume reproducing all existing Regulations, Orders in Council, Rules and legal Gazette notices was issued in May, 1917.

44. *The Former System*

The 'Supreme Court', the 'Provincial Courts', the 'Native Courts' and the 'Criminal Procedure' Ordinances of 1914 effected very important changes in the judicial system of the South, which was assimilated to that prevailing in the North, while no change of importance was made as regards the Colony. These changes curtailed the activities of the local Bar in certain directions, and have in consequence been the subject of much criticism, and of several petitions to the Secretary of State. Their intrinsic importance, and moreover, justifies a full account, both of the alterations introduced, and of the effect which they have had.

(a) *Supreme Court*.—Under the pre-existing system the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court extended, for all practical purposes, throughout of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria with limited powers ceded by treaty in Egba-land, [which was 'independent' and where a 'Mixed Court' existed] and also in Oyo, Jebu-Ode, and Ife. The rest of the old Lagos Protectorate was not subject to the jurisdiction of any British Court, or if subject no provision had been made for the exercise of any such jurisdiction. The Chief Justice and Puisne Judges sat at certain places, and visited on Assize the 'District Courts' held by Political Officers, who sat as Commissioners of the Supreme Court and submitted to the Judges monthly their lists of cases. These lists operated as appeals and there was also an independent appeal. The procedure of these Courts was of course that of the Supreme Court.

45. (b) *Native Courts*

The Native Courts of the former Southern Nigeria Protectorate exercised a jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Supreme Court, and had powers up to six months' imprisonment, and in civil suits up to £25 fine. (To the Native Courts of the Lagos Protectorate I shall refer later.)

The District Officer sat as President *ex officio*, and exercised in that capacity higher powers than he possessed as a Commissioner of the Supreme Court in his District Court. He passed sentence, but was largely relieved of responsibility, since the judgement was in theory that of the Native Chiefs, in whose name it was recorded. A large number of Native Chiefs were appointed as members and sat by rotation, but the Courts were without educative value to them, since they also were deprived of responsibility by the presence of the District Officer.

To each Court was attached a native clerk, who was supposed to keep full records, and since the Court was conducted in accordance with Supreme Court procedure, and apparently administered English law [modified by native custom in marriage cases, &c.], the clerk, a semi-educated person on a low salary, dominated the native chiefs in the absence of the District Officer, and exercised an undue authority in the issue of the processes of Court with its manifold printed forms. He was exposed to great temptation and not unnaturally often succumbed to it. Cases were reported in which the clerk had accepted bribes, tried cases himself, and even terrorised the Chiefs by publicly turning out any member whom he wished to disgrace. There were

other and even worse charges in some cases, though many no doubt have done their duty to the best of their ability. Mr. Osborne, Chief Justice of Southern Nigeria, stated that in his opinion 'the dishonesty of the Native Court clerks was the chief evil of the system'. The fines and fees of Court were I believe in some cases the perquisite of the Native Judges, but in the Eastern and Central Divisions were credited to a Fund, which amounted to a very large sum, and was at the disposal of the Provincial Commissioner. It was spent partly on sitting fees and salaries, partly on road making, &c. It was subject to no audit and did not appear in the Budget.

The Judges of the Supreme Court could transfer any case to another Native Court, to the District Court or to the Supreme Court. They were supposed to review the cases (as well as those of the District Courts), but it was impossible for them to discharge such a task, nor were the records kept by the Court Clerk adequate for the purpose.

The number of cases heard in these Native Courts was more than double the number heard in the Supreme, District and Police Courts combined. An appeal lay to the Supreme Court, and such appeals, prompted by native lawyers, naturally led to endless litigation among a very litigious and illiterate people, to the benefit of the lawyers and the ruin of the suitors.

At the time when Native Courts were first established in the old Southern Nigeria Protectorate, the tribal authority had already broken down, and had been succeeded by a complete collapse of native rule under the disintegrating influence of middlemen traders, and of the Aros. The latter are described as professional slave-traders who ruled by the terror of their *Juju*. The Native Courts no doubt did much to re-establish tribal authority, and their usefulness is shown by their growing influence and the number of cases with which they dealt. They had prepared the way for a further advance.

In the old Lagos Protectorate the Native Councils Ordinance purported to set up native tribunals, but it was practically a dead letter, and was never really brought into force except perhaps at Ibadan. In the small unimportant and neglected territories of Illesha and Ondo practically the old Native Courts continued to try cases under, or perhaps without supervision by, the District Commissioner, who as a matter of fact did not sit on the Native Council except perhaps in very important cases. 'It is difficult to describe a system where in fact no system existed' says the Chief Justice (Sir E. Speed), from whose account I have quoted. The Native Councils exercised a complete jurisdiction, without appeal or revision, and were empowered to inflict sentences of death or of penal servitude without review by the Supreme Court or any judicial authority. Any interference with them was political not judicial, and some of the Chiefs who exercised these powers had very bad reputations. The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction, or at any rate exercised none in the Lagos Protectorate except under the agreements with Ibadan, Ife, and Jebu-Ode.

46. *Description of Former System by Chief Justice*

The judicial system of Southern Nigeria as it existed prior to 1914 is described by the Chief Justice in his report of October, 1917 [see Appendix 3]. He pointed out that Assizes could only be held in a limited number of places. Cases must therefore be heard at great distances from the scene of action, and at infrequent intervals, so that prisoners were kept for long periods

awaiting trial, and cases broke down owing to the absence of witnesses, who had often to be treated as prisoners themselves. Difficulties and friction with the Executive arose from actions at law prompted by lawyers' touts, involving decisions with regard to tribal boundaries already adjudicated after careful investigation by political officers, and finally district officers had, in consequence of the pressure on the Judges, often been entrusted with the full powers of the supreme Court regardless of qualification.

Not only was the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court limited by the Treaties in the Western Division, but throughout the Protectorate 'its activities were circumscribed by the fact that its organisation was faulty. It was never adequately manned. The greater portion of the territory had been very recently brought under control, means of communication were limited or non-existent, and the Court was unprovided with the necessary equipment to enable it to perform the duties nominally imposed upon it by law. Its staff was so small, and its organisation so rudimentary, that outside the trading centres and coast towns its criminal jurisdiction was rarely exercised, and its civil jurisdiction was only invoked for the purpose of adjudicating upon disputes on land boundaries fostered by the large army of native lawyers attending in the Native Courts.'

Speaking of the criminal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice writes: 'The greatest enemy to the efficient administration of the Criminal Law is delay, and delay is inherent in the Supreme Court system . . . A considerable proportion of the crime thus goes unpunished, and a further considerable proportion is inadequately punished, in order to avoid committal for trial, or remitted to Native Courts and tried without much reference to the principles of English justice.' With regard to civil actions the late Chief Justice of Southern Nigeria (Mr. W. Osborne) had also expressed the view that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in civil cases in newly administered districts was a danger. The results were so bad that in 1911 an Order in Council had been passed depriving the Supreme Court of a large part of its jurisdiction in matters relating to land. (See Mr. Osborne's report in Appendix 3.)

47. *Object and Nature of Changes in 1949*

It is evident from this brief summary that reform was urgently needed, and prior to my return to Nigeria in 1912 I had examined the whole question at the Colonial Office, with a view to extending to the South in its main essentials the system which I had set up in the North in 1900, and which had proved suitable there. Sir Edwin Speed, Chief Justice of Northern Nigeria, who had had long experience as Attorney-General in the South, and who became Chief Justice of Nigeria on amalgamation, undertook to draft the necessary legislation. Mr. Willoughby Osborne, Chief Justice of Southern Nigeria, was fully consulted while in England, and agreed with the drafts in principle. Sir E. Speed's object was 'to evolve a system applicable to the whole country, with only such disturbance of existing conditions as was necessary in the interest of good government'.

The considerations which presented themselves to him in making his recommendations are set out in his Report (see Appendix 3). Briefly they were that the Colony of Lagos (as distinct from the Protectorate) was in possession of a properly organised judicial system, which had for many years

proved adequate and which no one with any local knowledge would have thought of disturbing, that the functions of the Supreme Court of Northern Nigeria could easily be performed by the Supreme Court of the Colony of Lagos with only a slight increase of staff; that the Provincial Court system, which had been in operation in Northern Nigeria for over 10 years [for five years of which he had himself revised the returns and confirmed the sentences] had proved itself an unqualified success.

With the object therefore both of reforming the judicial system of the South, and of establishing uniformity throughout Nigeria, the Northern system with some slight modification was adopted, and Provincial Courts were established throughout the Southern Provinces, together with Native Courts subject to strict supervision by Political Officers, and invested with a jurisdiction strictly limited in accordance with the capacity of the members. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was confined to the commercial centres, where alone it had been continuously and regularly exercised from the time when the territories were first administered, with due provision for whatever extension circumstances should appear to require. In addition to its original local jurisdiction the Supreme Court was constituted a Court of Appeal from the Provincial Courts in civil matters, and the widest possible powers of transfer thereto from the Provincial Courts were vested both in the Governor and the Chief Justice.

When introducing the Supreme Court Bill in March, 1914, I informed the Legislative Council that these Ordinances had been drafted more than a year previously by the Chief Justice of Northern Nigeria, and submitted for the comments of the Chief Justice of Southern Nigeria, whose valuable suggestions had been for the most part adopted, and in principle they had received the approval of the Secretary of State. They were, therefore, 'the result of mature and careful consideration, with the highest technical and legal advice'. They were supported almost unanimously by the officers of the longest judicial and legal experience in the country. Sir E. Speed wrote, 'The Supreme Court system has been tried in the Southern Nigeria Protectorate, and has in my opinion proved a failure, . . . I have every confidence that these measures will secure a more efficient administration from a judicial as well as from an executive point of view.'

48. *The New System: (a) Supreme Court*

Under the new Ordinance the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited territorially to the Colony, and certain defined areas in which a large number of non-natives and native foreigners reside, while it exercises a concurrent jurisdiction with the Provincial Court over all non-natives throughout Nigeria. The definition of a 'non-native' was simultaneously revised and simplified. By a later arrangement Egbaland and Yorubaland were fully included under the jurisdiction of the Supreme and Provincial Courts, so that a single judicial procedure was established throughout the whole of Nigeria. Any case can at any time be transferred, with the consent of the Chief Justice from a Provincial to the Supreme Court, on application by one of the parties, or by a Resident. Mr. Osborne desired to vest the power of transfer in the Governor only. Police and station magistrates, and any Political Officer exercising judicial functions within the 'local limits' of the Supreme Court, does so as a Commissioner of that Court.

49. (b) *Provincial Courts*

The Provincial Courts now set up in the South had been in successful operation for nearly 15 years in the North. The full powers of the Court, which are unlimited, are exercised only by the Resident of the Province in which it is constituted, and by such other officers as may from their qualifications be granted such powers by the Governor. All Political Officers are Commissioners of the Court with varying powers, and any other officer may be so appointed. Unofficials of standing may, in exceptional cases, be appointed Justices of the Peace, and thus also become Commissioners of the Court. The Court exercises jurisdiction over all classes of persons throughout the Province, except in those areas in which the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction. All sentences in excess of six months' imprisonment, 12 strokes, or £50 fine, require confirmation by the Governor-General, who may reduce or modify the sentence, or order re-trial before the same or another Court. These powers of confirmation have, in practice been delegated to Lieutenant-Governors, advised by their Legal Advisers (but *see* paragraph 53). In the Southern Provinces, however, for some time past the duty has been discharged by the Chief Justice, and in the Northern Provinces all capital sentences are reviewed and confirmed by him. Appeals in Civil Causes over £50 lie to the Supreme Court. No legal practitioner may appear before the Provincial Court, or in an appeal to the Supreme Court, except in the latter case, by leave of the Chief Justice or the presiding Judge when any legal point is in dispute.

50. *Provincial Courts contrasted with the former System*

Contrasting the Provincial Court system with the system which it superseded in the Southern Provinces, the Chief Justice observed that it brings English justice practically to the door of everyone. The same law is administered by the same men who as Commissioners of the Supreme Court sat as District Court Judges, 'the only difference being that the procedure is summary . . . and that *no* cases come automatically before the Judges of the Supreme Court'.

Dealing with the objection that some of the Provincial Court Judges are not trained lawyers, he pointed out that under the new Ordinance the District Commissioners are 'surrounded by safeguards which practically prevent any serious miscarriage of justice', that only the senior and experienced officers have unlimited jurisdiction, subject to review and confirmation, and that against the lack of legal training must be set knowledge of the locality and people, and an increasing knowledge of the language, while the free exercise of the power of transfer to the Supreme Court must not be ignored. The result of the new law is in fact greatly to curtail the independent powers of district officers, which are now granted according to qualification, while all important sentences must be confirmed. These officers have now to pass an examination in law, and also in the native language, and their promotion largely depends on their judicial work, which now comes under the purview of the Executive.

In reference to the complaint that the right to be represented by Counsel is denied in the Provincial Courts, the Chief Justice remarks that 'every single officer political and judicial who has had any experience of districts recently brought under control has pronounced emphatically against it'. He points

out that when the Judicial Agreements with the Egba, Ibadan, and Oyo native authorities were negotiated, they insisted of their own accord on inserting a clause excluding lawyers from the Courts in their territories. He added various cogent reasons for their exclusion (*vide* Appendix 3). The late Chief Justice of Southern Nigeria, Mr. Willoughby Osborne, and many others of experience were also particularly insistent on the advisability of this exclusion, which he proposed should extend to all appeals from Provincial Courts heard in the Supreme Court. There can be no doubt that the appearance of Counsel in the District Courts—and even in Native Courts—under the old system, had led to the fomenting of litigation by lawyers' agents, especially in land cases, with disastrous results to the ignorant people who had spent their substance in bootless litigation.

51. (c) *The New Native Courts*

The Native Courts set up under the new Ordinance were also modelled on the Northern Nigeria principle, but considerable changes were introduced. The Courts are of three types, and each Court exercises such powers, as are accorded to it by the Warrant under which it is constituted. The powers are 'graded' and the Court is described as of the A to D grade according to the powers vested in it.

(a) The 'Judicial Council' is a Native Court usually of the A or B grade, presided over by a Paramount Chief with his principal officials as members, including as a rule in Moslem States an 'Alkali' or other person learned in Moslem law. Under a separate instrument it is vested with executive powers by the Governor-General and forms the Head Chief's Council. Its judicial functions may be limited to quasi-political matters, such as land disputes, &c., or it may exercise a general jurisdiction, though ordinary criminal cases are left to the Alkali's Court.

(b) The second type is the single Judge Court, presided over in Moslem States by a trained 'Alkali', and in Egbaland by a native with some judicial training. He may sit with native assistants or assessors. The powers vested in these Courts vary considerably, and there is usually a right of appeal from the district and market Courts to the Chief Native Court at the provincial capital.

(c) The third type consists of a number of petty chiefs, and is usually vested with very limited criminal jurisdiction, but more extensive civil powers for dealing with matrimonial, debt, trespass and petty assault cases. It is adapted to the primitive Pagan tribes, and in the Southern Province consists of as many as 20 or 30 members, who sit sometimes with a permanent President, but more often under the presidency of one or other by rotation, and are paid sitting fees when summoned to attend. The number of members is being steadily reduced, partly by the selection only of the most capable, and partly by the creation of additional Courts to serve more restricted areas. Most of the Courts in the Southern Provinces are of this type and exercise much less power than they formerly did.

The powers vested in the Native Courts are entrusted to the Chiefs (or Native Judges) themselves, closely supervised by the District Officer, who is not a member, but has access to them at all times, and may transfer any case at any stage to his own Court, or order a re-trial, or suspend or modify any sentence. The clerk is the servant, not the master of the Court, which is

conducted with as simple a procedure as possible, and deals with native law and custom only. His power is therefore greatly curtailed. The object in view is to educate the chiefs by giving them a sense of responsibility, and gradually to extend their powers as they show themselves to be qualified.

Courts of the A grade may inflict the death penalty, but these powers are restricted to a few Courts presided over by Alkali learned in Mohammedan law. The case is reviewed by the Resident, and before the sentence can be carried out it, of course, comes before the Governor in Council.

Natives who are either Government servants (in which term carriers and labourers are not included), or who are not ordinarily subject to the jurisdiction of Native Courts, and do not reside permanently in the Court's jurisdiction, are amenable to the jurisdiction of a Native Court, in civil cases only with their own consent or that of the Resident (who can only give his consent in certain circumstances), and in criminal cases, only with their own consent or that of the Lieut.-Governor. The Governor may also exempt any person, or class of persons, from the jurisdiction of any Court. These provisions are made to meet the case of native British subjects, or other aliens residing in the jurisdiction of the Court. Legal practitioners may not practise in the Courts, the procedure of which is in no way modelled on that of the British Courts. They administer native law and custom only.

52. *Result of the Change*

Such is the new system in contrast with the one it superseded. At the end of the year the Chief Justice was already able to write: 'The new judicial system, as far as I am able to judge, is a complete and unqualified success. I have heard no complaints as to the curtailment of the Supreme Court jurisdiction, and I am quite confident that no legitimate Civil business is being, or is likely to be excluded, while crime is being, and will be, more rapidly and as satisfactorily tried as under the old system. There are now practically no arrears in either division—indeed, the success of the system has exceeded my most sanguine expectation.'

A year later (January, 1916) he reported that the volume of business was equal to the previous average in both divisions of the Supreme Court and had been handled without any special effort, and without delay, other than that attributable to the parties, and there were no arrears. The whole of the arrears of the old Southern Nigeria Supreme Court had been cleared off. 'That the work is up to the average, in spite of the fact that most of the land cases, which formerly almost filled the cause lists, have been withdrawn from the jurisdiction, amply justifies my original opinion that legitimate commercial business would soon compensate the profession for the loss of a class of work which brought neither credit to the profession nor advantage to the public.' He concludes, 'the result of the first year's working has been to show that, for the first time in the history of the Colony and Protectorate, the Supreme Court has been adequately manned, arrears having been cleared off and business kept up to date without any outside assistance, and that an organisation has been brought into existence capable of meeting all reasonable demands which may be made upon it'. 'These words', he added later, 'have been fully justified by the result of the second year's working'.

In October, 1917, the Chief Justice again reported, at my request, on the

working of the judicial system as a whole, which had not been in operation for three complete years. He was the better able to do so since he had for the previous nine months undertaken the duty of confirming sentences and revising the returns of the Southern Province, as he had previously done in the Northern Province for five years. Extracts from his report will be found in Appendix 3. Briefly, his opinion is that cases had been carefully and well dealt with, and that the Provincial Courts had proved themselves well adapted to the circumstances, on account of the simplicity and rapidity of their procedure. This was proved by the few transfers applied for, which were in almost every case at the instance of the Court itself, while the number of appeals were insignificant. (From Calabar, whence the loudest protests had emanated, there were only two appeals, both in land cases, and both were upheld.) In three and a quarter years leave to appeal was granted in eleven cases. There were 18 applications for transfer to the Supreme Court made by parties, of which 8 were refused. To facilitate appeals he had simplified the procedure.

Meanwhile the business of the Supreme Court has increased and has been dealt with without assistance or delay, in spite of the withdrawal of the land cases. The powers of confirmation had in the Southern Provinces been delegated to the Chief Justice instead of the Lieut.-Governor, and he expressed the view that this should be done in the Northern Provinces also, not because the Chief Justice was likely to take a different view from the Lieut.-Governor, but because it was possible that political officers might regard the Courts as an arm of the Executive, and they should be under purely judicial control.

He expressed a lack of confidence in the Native Courts except the higher tribunals in the Northern Provinces, but agreed that by British tradition the people were entitled to be trained to take part in their own administration, and the political staff could not possibly provide sufficient Courts to settle all petty disputes. He arrives at the conclusion that the new system has fully justified expectations, that the Northern Provinces have benefitted by a wider horizon, while in the Southern Provinces the Yorubas have for the first time had access to a British Court, and Government can effect by law what it previously could only do by political pressure. Elsewhere in the Southern Provinces the system is a great improvement, and is understood by the people; all who require, or have a traditional right, to resort to the Supreme Court can do so, and the necessary safeguards against oppression and corruption in the Native Courts have been maintained and strengthened. He concludes as follows: 'In conclusion I venture to express the opinion that the organisation of the Courts of the Colony and Protectorate, which has now stood the test of three years' working, has answered the expectations which were formed of it, is adequate for the needs of the community, and is capable of expansion and development, sufficient for any situation which can reasonably be anticipated for a considerable time to come.'

It is also noteworthy that the number of convictions has very greatly increased since 1913, the reason given being that justice is now adequately enforced, whereas previously the difficulty and delay resulted in the condonation of crime.

53. *The Powers of Confirmation*

I have discussed with the Chief Justice his suggestion, that the Governor's

powers of confirming sentences and revising the Cause Lists should be delegated to the Chief Justice, instead of to the Lieut.-Governors acting on the advice of their Legal Advisers. The argument in favour of the latter course is that the Lieut.-Governors, by studying these lists, are enabled to keep in close touch with what is going on in the provinces, and to form a very good estimate of the capabilities and fitness for promotion of the political staff. For this reason both Lieut.-Governors were at first anxious to retain the power. The Government, moreover, can not always count on having as a Chief Justice a man with the breadth of view, the wide experience of the country, and the sympathy with the Provincial Executive which Sir Edwin Speed had acquired during his 18 years' service there. There is also some risk of confusing the exercise of the prerogative of remission and pardon vested in the Governor as representing the Crown. By vesting the power of delegation in the hands of the Governor-General a wise discretion is, in my judgment, allowed.

The course which appears to me to minimise the difficulties is to leave the scrutiny of cases which do not require confirmation to the Lieut.-Governor and his Legal Adviser, and to delegate the powers of confirmation to the Chief Justice. Or (as proposed in my original report and approved) First Class Residents may cease to exercise judicial powers, and confirm sentences up to and including 1 year, Lieut.-Governors up to 10 years, while those and over 10 years are referred to the Chief Justice. At the present time the powers of confirmation and revision are, as I have said, delegated by the Governor-General to the Chief Justice in the Southern Provinces and to the Lieut.-Governor in the Northern Provinces, with the exception of death sentences, which are confirmed by the Chief Justice. As regards the Native Courts, I hold it to be a matter of the utmost importance that the Political Staff should be so increased as to enable them to exercise a very close supervision over these tribunals. Reports from all provinces, however, indicate a steady and satisfactory progress under the new conditions in the Southern Provinces.

54. *Reasons for Opposition to New System*

The system thus outlined has been the object of continued hostility in the Southern Provinces, and of several petitions to the Secretary of State. These, according to the Chief Justice and all other informants, have been promoted solely by local practitioners (and their friends), who resent the loss of profits which their exclusion from the Provincial and Native Courts involves, and who obtained the signatures of a large number of persons ignorant of the real issues. They reside almost entirely in the Colony or other local limits of the Supreme Court, in which the Provincial and Native Courts exercise no jurisdiction.

The foregoing account will, I think afford an answer to all the points which have been raised. But as it may perhaps be of use to take those which appear to be plausible and indicate the answer which they merit, I have briefly summarised the principal criticisms and their answers in Appendix 4. In the same appendix will be found some comments and reports by the Acting Lieutenant-Governor and by Residents on the working of the reformed Native Courts in the Southern Provinces.

ADMINISTRATIVE CAPITALS

55. *Urgency of the Question*

The sites of the capitals of the two areas placed under the immediate control of Lieutenant-Governors, and the question of the seat of the Central Government, naturally received consideration among my proposals for Amalgamation. There were strong reasons, as I shall presently show, for a change both in the South and the North, and a decision one way or other could not, it seemed, be postponed. In the South, at Lagos—the Southern Capital and the residence for the time being of the Governor-General—the need for more houses to accommodate the staff was an almost daily dilemma, accentuated by the influx of those officers belonging to Central Departments, whose location would eventually be at the Central Headquarters wherever it might be located. The native staff were in a similar dilemma, and could only obtain houses with much difficulty and at very high rentals. The institution of the water rate was made a pretext for still further increasing rentals out of all proportion, and there was no alternative but to pay whatever was demanded. The police are without barracks, and live where they can in the town, a system which does not conduce to discipline, and makes it difficult to summon them on emergency. The native hospital is closely adjacent to the European hospital—an obviously undesirable arrangement. In the North the wooden houses were worn out and in need of replacement.

56. *The Capital of Southern Provinces: (a) Lagos Island*

Lagos Island, the Capital of the Colony proper, is for many reasons ill adapted to be the Capital of the Southern Provinces. Its climate is enervating, with damp winds from the sea. The part occupied by the Town is congested with a densely packed population of 57,000 (1911 census), viz., about 30,000 to the square mile. It is surrounded by evil-smelling swamps, the complete reclamation of which is impossible though it is in contemplation to reclaim, in the course of some years, particular areas near Wilmot Point, Apapa and Iddo Island. Segregation is also impossible in so densely populated an area, where the very great value of land precludes the formation of a non-residential dividing belt, and where the residences of Europeans and natives are already so hopelessly intermixed. Drainage of surface and sullage water on an island little raised above sea-level is a difficult problem, and the scheme proposed is estimated to cost £150,000 to £200,000. The present troublesome and costly method by which night-soil is carried by a tramway for dejection into the Lagoon presses for improvement, for it is no longer possible to deal with it all on the ebb tide, and the flood brings it back into the Lagoon with disgusting effluvia. As the port develops the Marina upon which Government House, the Lieut.-Governor's house, and the Colonial Hospital, *inter alia*, are situated, will become increasingly unsuited for residences. The dense clouds of smoke and fumes emitted by every passing steamer drift through these houses, and the noise of working winches, and the screams of syrens and whistles, make it difficult for the patients in hospital to get proper rest.

57. (b) *Proposed Site at Yaba*

I proposed that the new Capital of the Southern Provinces should be located at a site between $4\frac{3}{4}$ and $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles on the railway near Yaba on the

mainland. There is a steady rise to 79 feet at mile $4\frac{3}{4}$ culminating at 83 feet (mile 6), and falling again to 75 feet at mile $6\frac{1}{2}$. The Director of Medical Services, the late Principal Medical Officer (Dr. Langley), the present Principal Medical Officer (Dr. Best) and the Senior Sanitary Officer (Dr. Pickles) strongly favoured this site, which would be close to the junction for Apapa, and within 20 minutes by motor-car (and less by rail) of either Iddo or Appa. The main passenger station would be moved from Ehute Iddo or Appa below the new site. It will not be at too great a distance from the power-station, which will probably be centrally situated on Iddo Island, supplying current to Apapa, Lagos and Yaba. The pipes from the water-works at Iju pass through the site.

The atmosphere is very different from Lagos, being much drier and more invigorating, and the average rainfall for the last four years (since a record has been kept at Yaba) is less by 12.84 inches per annum. The soil appears rich instead of being merely sea-sand as in Lagos Island—in part dredged from the lagoon to fill in primeval swamp, and in part pre-existing and saturated with sewage. Since the endemicity of yellow fever has been proved, and commercial firms have, I believe, recognised the necessity of no longer compelling their European agents to live on their trading premises, and some of them will probably be attracted to the new Capital. The cost of the move would be very largely reduced by the sale of the valuable Government land and houses on Lagos Island, which will be required for commercial purposes. If only those towards the South end of the island are used as dwelling-houses, it may be possible to create a small fairly segregated area as a Government House could be converted into an excellent hotel.

Dr. Langley recalled the fact that Governor McCallum, as long ago as 1899, was so impressed with the necessity of moving from Lagos, and with the advantages of Yaba, that he selected a site not far from that now proposed, and since no bridge at that time spanned the lagoon he was prepared to ferry officers backwards and forwards morning and evening. Professor Simpson also advocated 'the high salubrious land about five miles up the railway line' as a preferable site for the Government Capital, whenever it might be financially possible to vacate the island.

The site appeared to offer a fine level area covered with thick bush and scrub, and the Director of Medical Services and Senior Sanitary Officer after careful inspection reported favourably upon it. As the Secretary of State had approved my proposals, an acquisition notice was issued, and I directed that an accurate survey should be made. Traverses were cut through the bush for this purpose, and disclosed the existence of one or two swampy areas, but the Director of Medical Services, the Principal Medical Officer, the Senior Sanitary Officer, and Director of Public Works were unanimous in their recommendation that the site should not be abandoned on this account, though its position was somewhat altered. By the end of March, 1914, the claims of native landowners were being investigated, and all preparations made for clearing and building. It was intended to commence the erection of a new hospital and medical quarters without delay. Even though some expense would be incurred in filling up and draining the low-lying ground, there was every prospect that a thoroughly sanitary township could be laid out on up-to-date lines. The native reservation of the new township would be formed between the European reservation and Lagos, where clerks and other

Government employees might rent houses from Government on moderate terms, and police and soldiers' barracks, with a native hospital, might be constructed on sanitary lines. This is a matter of urgent importance.

58. (c) *Possible site outside the Colony*

The Director of Medical Services and other Medical Officers, though confident that this site was the best available within a radius of 8 or 9 miles, thought it probable that a better might be found some considerable distance up the railway. This would, however, mean the abandonment of the port as the capital, for any greater distance would be prohibitive for those whose work was at Lagos—which, as the commercial and banking centre, the terminal of the railway and the chief port, must necessarily be the capital. Moreover, a filtered water supply and electric light and power had been installed here at great cost. The Customs and Marine must necessarily remain in any case, as well as a considerable railway staff.

The question of removing the Capital altogether out of the Colony was not, however, lightly dismissed. The place which seemed to have the next best claim was Port Harcourt, which would also be a railway terminal and port. It is two days further from England; the cost involved by new waterworks, electric supply, &c., would be incomparably greater; the area is very restricted and surrounded by unreclaimable swamp; and the move could not be made for probably five or six years. In these circumstances there was no question but that a site in close proximity to Lagos was preferable, and the Secretary of State concurred in this view.

59. (d) *The Wilmot Point Site*

An alternative site had been proposed in the opposite direction, viz., to the South of Lagos island (*see map, Appendix 5*), and since this is still favoured by Mr. Boyle, Lieut.-Governor, and I believe by some others, it is worth while discussing its comparative merits.

It is urged that it is nearer to Lagos town (about 3 miles from the Post Office); that it would enjoy sea-breezes and would not be so hot as Yaba. A large part of the area and its surroundings is at present either primeval and very fetid swamp or low-lying land subject to floods. These would of course be reclaimed on the actual site and between it and the sea front. The site does not recommend itself to me for the following reasons:

- (a) It must be thrown back a considerable distance from the lagoon, for the reasons which I have described as rendering the Marina on the island increasingly unsuitable for residence, and between it and the lagoon there will probably be a line of stores, workshops, coal wharves and jetties, which will impede the view and add to the noise and smoke. Already Elder, Dempster & Coy. have appropriated a large area for such purposes, which they desire to increase, and it is in contemplation to transfer the whole of the marine yard to this front. It will, however, have a very limited sea front towards Victoria beach. (*See plan.*) The site is somewhat limited, and intersected by creeks.
- (b) It is removed still further from the railway, either at Iddo, Ebute Metta or Apapa, than even the present quarters on the island. The distance to the nearest possible railway station (for the railway can never be brought

- to the island) is about 5 miles, and to Apapa by land about 7 miles. [The water supply can be extended to it without difficulty, and its distance from the electric power station will be about the same as Yaba.]
- (c) Great delay (probably 6 to 10 years) must take place before it can be rendered fully fit for occupation, since it must await very extensive reclamation, which cannot be undertaken until that at Apapa is complete. There will still be swamp out of reach of reclamation in the vicinity.
- (d) It shares the disabilities of Lagos island in regard to drainage, &c., in that it is practically on sea-level, and also as to climate, rainfall, &c.

This site was reported on by the late Dr. Langley, who considered it undesirable on the grounds of '(a) lack of elevation above sea-level; (b) close proximity to the surface of the ground water-level and its probable fluctuations in height; (c) direct exposure to a sea breeze, which is sometimes unpleasantly strong and often laden with moisture. These three conditions alone, if they would not actually prove injurious to health, are yet the very factors which would engender enervation and lassitude. . . . A sewage scheme would be costly.' He goes on to point out the difficulty of foundations on recently reclaimed mangrove swamp and the cost of houses which must be raised 8 or 10 feet.

60. *The Northern Capital: Reason for leaving Zungeru*

The Capital of Northern Nigeria had been transferred in 1902 from Jebba, which was merely the former strategic camp of the West African Frontier Force during the crisis with France of 1897-98, to Zungeru. This was the most central place to which at that time it was possible (by the waterway of the Kaduna and a light line of 22 miles) to gain access. It has served its purpose well, but it is excessively hot, with much surface rock, and infested with mosquitoes. The temporary wooden houses urgently required replacement. They were described by the Senior Sanitary Officer as dilapidated, verminous and so bat-infested as to be very unhealthy, and he considered that if it were not possible to replace them it would very soon be necessary to vacate them even in favour of native-built huts.

61. *The new site at Kaduna*

I recommended, therefore, that the Capital should be moved to the point where the railway, having reached the top of the plateau at an altitude of over 2,000 feet, again crosses the Kaduna at mile 572 from Lagos. The climate here is invigorating, the soil is good and adapted for vegetable and flower gardens, the water supply pure and inexhaustible, and the site is within 50 miles of the great trade centre of Zaria. The Senior Sanitary Officer (Dr. Blair), whose long experience and uncompromising idealism in sanitary matters makes his views of especial value, was an enthusiastic advocate of the new Capital.

These proposals were approved as part of the scheme of Amalgamation, the cost being found from the accumulated Colonial reserves, but, as in the case of the Southern Capital, the War interfered with their execution. So urgent, however, had the housing question at Zungeru become that it was decided to

move the Northern Capital, while deferring the transfer of the Central Government and the railway headquarters.

62. *Move to the New Capital*

The West African Frontier Force had already been located here since 1912 to test the site, and during 1914 and 1915 a number of houses were erected, preparatory to a move early in 1916. They were of a much improved type, built of brick, and some are fitted with fireplaces. Each officer has a separate house, which is situated in its own garden of at least $1\frac{1}{2}$ acres, in accordance with the recommendations of a strong Committee and the approval of the Secretary of State. This secures privacy and is popular, but it adds enormously to the size of the township, the mileage of the roads, and the distances to be traversed in going to and from daily work. I fear, too, that the obligation to keep these compounds in good order will be found to involve considerable expense upon occupants, and will be a perennial source of trouble, unless my proposals regarding prolonged residential service are introduced, so that each occupant will feel his house to be his home for an appreciable length of time, and be assured of reaping the benefit of the care he bestows on his garden and its produce. The site was covered with sparse forest, of which the better-grown trees have been retained. The planting of Dhub grass, to supplant the coarse prairie grass, has progressed. A temporary piped water supply, pumped from the Kaduna, is provided. A racecourse, polo, tennis, cricket and golf grounds have been cleared and laid out, and are in much request. Exclusive of Government House, 51 residential quarters had been erected by the end of 1918.

In consequence of the financial stringency caused by the War, only the smaller public offices (Military, Public Works, Postal, and Police) have as yet been erected. The Secretariat and other large offices, as well as the hospital, have been located in six of the houses designed as residential quarters. It was not till the end of 1917 that the new large permanent hospital—which will be one of the finest in West Africa—was begun. It was practically completed in 1918. It had been hoped that a hospital would not be much in demand, but the assumption proved to be wrong, for though the local admissions were much fewer than at Zungeru, the central situation of the Capital, and its climate attracted patients from all the neighbouring Provinces, who had hitherto been without the benefit of any hospital and good nursing. The only temporary house erected was the old wooden Government House, which was transferred from Zungeru, but fitted with the brick fireplaces which form a feature of some of the houses, and are welcome on the cold evenings of the Hamattan season. The Public Works Department are well provided with stores and sheds. Orderly rooms, armourers' shops and other buildings have been erected for the troops. Nine miles of partially metalled roads with avenues have been constructed, including a fine motor road to the 'Junction' on the further side of the river.

The native reservation of the new township, shared by both the 'Capital' and the railway location at the 'Junction', and separated from each by 400 yards of non-residential land, has been laid out with care on thoroughly sanitary lines. It already accommodates a population of about 3,000 natives, consisting of aliens and Government employees. A fine prison, with accommodation for 198 prisoners, with 56 warders' quarters adjacent, a good native

hospital (to be enlarged later), permanent barracks for 320 soldiers, and quarters for 92 native clerks and 32 artisans were completed by the end of 1918. The total expenditure was about £154,000. The township is now a 'going concern', and no very excessive expenditure will be required to provide the public offices, court houses, and other necessary buildings, and the roads, water supply and sewage system which are still required.

63. *Verdict on the New Capital*

The new Capital is, I believe, increasingly popular. The Lieut.-Governor writes: 'It is difficult to estimate the value of transferring the headquarters of the Northern Provinces from Zungeru to Kaduna. It is generally admitted that officers so transferred have taken on a new lease of life, and as soon as more quarters are erected for the staff, the change should permit of an extension of the present 12 months' tour. The sickening radiated heat at Zungeru operated adversely in getting the best work out of men employed there. The capacity for work, and to enjoy the usual games at Kaduna, is far greater than could ever be the case during the best season experienced at Zungeru, and the officers formerly residing at Zungeru fully appreciate and welcome the change to a cooler and more bracing climate.' The Principal Medical Officer in his annual report for 1917 says that the transfer to Kaduna has already been justified, and that the change has produced a distinctly beneficial effect on health, which he has no hesitation in saying will become more and more marked with further development. The Senior Sanitary Officer writes in similar terms. The rainfall is 52"—higher than almost any other place for which records are kept in the Northern Provinces.

64. *Railway Headquarters*

Sir J. Eaglesome and the General Manager were eager to make this the headquarters of the railway. The large European workshop and running staff would thus be withdrawn from the temptations of a coast port, and a bracing climate would be substituted for the enervating atmosphere of Lagos. Situated at the junction of the two main trunk lines, the General Manager could control both. Coal for the power-station, for workshops, and lighting could be brought here from Udi in trucks, which, having conveyed bulky produce to the Coast, would otherwise be returning almost empty, and therefore at less cost than it could be conveyed to Lagos. There is abundant space, and the quality of the water for engine purposes is very good.

The railway location—known as 'the Junction'—is on the left, or South, bank of the river, which here forms a right-angled bend with steeply inclined banks. Twenty-eight fine houses of cement blocks have been erected. The 'Capital' on the northern bank, which falls gradually to the river, is some three miles distant, on the top of the rise.

65. *The Central Seat of Government*

The central position of this site, its advantages of climate, and the presence of the Railway and West African Frontier Force Headquarters, recommended it strongly to me as the proper site for the seat of the Central Government of Nigeria. The Governor-General will spend his time at both Capitals, and require a residence at each. From this central site it will be easy for him, and for Heads of Central Departments, to visit either the South-Eastern,

or the South-Western portion of the Protectorate by railway, or the South-Central by the branch line to Baro on the Niger, and the waterway of that river, while being in equally close touch with the North. Lagos, however, will remain the chief trade centre. I hope that the time may not be distant when this move can be effected, and the Southern Capital relieved of its present congestion.

66. *Utilisation of Zungeru*

The strictest economy was practised in the move. The old buildings at Zungeru were carefully dismantled, and every sheet of roofing and every sound plank which could be extracted was used for outhouses at the new Capital. This process was arrested when, shortly after the completion of the Cameroon war, Nigeria was afforded an opportunity of sending troops to East Africa. Zungeru with its permanent barrack accommodation, its European and native hospitals, and its remaining bungalows, at once became the largest training centre, thereby not merely saving the Imperial Government a very large sum of money, but expediting the despatch of drafts, and ensuring the health of officers and men. On the return of the troops, and the formation of the 'Service Brigade', it continued to serve the same useful purpose.

Almost the only permanent brick structure of any value at Zungeru was the prison—and this I propose to convert into a lunatic asylum for the whole of Nigeria, which is most urgently required. A central leper asylum will also be established here, and a Native Medical Officer will supervise both. The situation of Zungeru on the railway, half-way between Lagos and Zaria, and its excellent health statistics—in spite of the heat which was so trying to Europeans—renders it well adapted for the purpose.

PART III. GENERAL PROGRESS

TRADE AND INDUSTRY

67. *General Review*

Nigeria affords an immense field for British trade, and though it has developed at an extraordinary rate, it is capable of indefinite expansion. In 1900 its total value was about 3½ millions sterling, by 1913 it had more than trebled, and in 1918, in spite of the severe set-back caused by the War, it had reached 17 millions, the highest ever recorded. The exports consist of raw materials, the principal of which are oil and oil seeds, hides, skins, cotton, cocoa, rubber and tin-ore. The imports are manufactured goods, textiles, hardware, &c., with salt and kerosene. Formerly the largest import consisted of trade gin for sale to the natives. Nigeria has the great advantage of being many thousand miles nearer to the United Kingdom than most of the other countries of the Empire—India, Malaya, Ceylon, &c.—from which tropical produce is exported. Lagos, which in the 'Times Atlas' of 1895 is shown as 33 days from Liverpool, is now less than half that time, and the magnitude of its trade, and the number of passengers, already justify a direct service which should not take more than 12 or 13 days. Nigeria has an enormous wealth and

variety of products, a large and fairly industrious population, good communications by water and by railway, and the conditions of life and health are not worse than those of other tropical countries, and have rapidly improved.

68. *Effect of Amalgamation*

Amalgamation gave a great impetus to trade in United Nigeria. The railway systems were unified, the fiscal frontier for the levy of the surtax on salt for the North was abolished, the marine transport on the River Niger with separate depots was now controlled by a single department, all Customs stations on inland frontiers (with the exception of Illo and Yola, which were ports of entry under the Niger Navigation Order in Council) were abolished, the northern law imposing licences on traders was repealed. These were some of the outward manifestations of the new spirit of mutual co-operation which amalgamation rendered possible.

69. *Effect of the war on trade generally*

The year 1914 opened (as will be shown in the Section on Finance) with prospects of great development and prosperity. This was arrested by the outbreak of war, but before the War ended, as will be seen in the following paragraphs, a great recovery took place, and (as the Niger Company reports to its shareholders) a 'very promising trade with America' developed. While, in 1913, Germany took £3,885,000 of the total trade (exclusive of specie) (the exports to that country being nearly the same as to the United Kingdom), and America only £300,000 (no exports), in 1917 the trade with Germany was nil, and the United States had increased to £1,812,000, of which £1,118,000 were exports. In 1913 Nigerian trade with the Empire was about 8½ million pounds out of 13½ million. In 1917 it was over 12 million out of nearly 14½ million, and of the £2,200,000 which was done with foreign countries £1,812,000, million, and of the £2,200,000 which was done with foreign countries £1,812,000 was taken by America.

Soon after the outbreak of war all Germans were deported, their stocks, and later their immovable properties, were sold by a Receiver acting under the orders of the Supreme Court. In view of the very considerable value of these properties, the Receiver, acting as Trustee, held it right that they should be widely advertised and that the sales should take place in London. The conditions, as in other Colonies, imposed no restriction on sale to Allies or Neutrals. This gave rise to considerable controversy in Parliament. The estates realised very large sums, and were, I think, in all cases secured by British purchasers, to whom fell the entire trade hitherto carried on by the Germans. The enormous prices paid for these properties was believed to have resulted in giving a fictitious value to land at Lagos.

The disturbing effect of the War differed in the early and later periods. They were caused in the first year by the Cameroon Campaign, in which Nigeria bore a large part; by local outbreaks among the primitive tribes caused by rumours that the British were about to leave Nigeria—rumours traced in some cases to German agency, in others due to the withdrawal of Political Officers and troops for the Cameroon Campaign or lent to the Imperial Government; and finally by the action of the British Banks which refused credits, and by the sudden disappearance of the German firms. In the later years of the War, the demand for oleaginous produce and the opening of the American market for

hides, skins and other produce went far to re-establish trade, and the chief disturbing elements were the shortage—and even more the uncertainty—of shipping, the high ocean freights and the diminution and high prices of all imports. The shipping entering Nigerian ports fell from 884,740 tons in 1913 to 409,146 in 1918. To this, at the close of the War, may be added a very serious deficiency of coin for which a Note issue did not compensate.

With the successful completion of the Cameroon Campaign, the quelling of the local unrest, and the growing stability of the produce market, conditions, however, again tended towards prosperity.

70. *Action by Merchants*

Fearing, as they stated, the loss of their Markets, the principal firms formed agreements in England, with the double object of reducing the price paid to the native producer to the lowest possible limit, and of assuring to him the stability of this minimum price, even if it should involve a temporary loss to themselves. By omitting, however, to take the local Government into their counsels, or even to inform it of the course upon which they had embarked, misunderstandings inevitably arose.

With the loss of the Hamburg market, which had absorbed the bulk of the palm kernels before the War, there was a temporary fall in prices, but it soon became evident that the produce of Nigeria was essential to the prosecution of the War, and that the United Kingdom was able to take the whole output. Prices rose quickly and surpassed those which had been offered before the war, and though the home prices were presently controlled, much larger profits were made on imports from causes which I shall presently explain. Large profits accrued later instead of the losses which the merchants had anticipated, but they had to incur many risks. Shipping was uncertain, control prices and freights might at any time be altered, and exports restricted. Since their motives for forming the combine had not been made public they were, not unnaturally, accused of unfairly exploiting the native producer, to whom they were giving only bed-rock prices. When the reasons by which the merchants had sought to justify the formation of these 'Combines' had ceased to exist, they were continued on the grounds that staff and unnecessary expense were thereby saved.

71. *Allocation of Shipping Space*

Owing to the uncertainty regarding shipping and the need for rapid despatch of vessels, storage accommodation at Lagos or on the railway now became a matter of the first importance. In its absence consignees could not take delivery of produce railed from the interior, and trucks remained loaded with a consequent congestion, and shortage of rolling stock. The Government was thus forced to intervene so far as rail-borne produce at Lagos was concerned, and a committee was appointed to allocate shipping space in proportion to visible stocks. Sixty per cent. of available freight was assigned to rail-borne produce and 40 per cent. to the island trade, 60 per cent. of the former was given to the combined firms, who settled among themselves as to its distribution, and 40 per cent. to non-combined exporters. This system has worked well, and the Government has found no reason to alter the proportions.

In round figures, six-tenths of the exports from the Port of Lagos are brought from the interior by rail, and four-tenths are brought by canoes from

the districts accessible by the network of creeks and rivers connected with the Lagos lagoon. With the allocation of shipping space by the shipping company for this 'Lagoon trade' the Government did not interfere.

72. *The Export Trade*

The War at first caused a considerable congestion of produce at Nigerian ports, which deteriorated, owing to lack of storage and material for erecting it, while capital was locked up. Latterly, however, the demand for oleaginous produce caused the Ministry of Shipping to send out extra vessels, and this, with the expanding American market, actually resulted in the total value of exports exceeding any previous records. Exclusive of tin ore and gold dust, the value of native produce exported in 1913 was £6,200,000 (having risen from just over 3 million in 1908). In the next three years of war it fell, but in 1917 it had reached a total of £6,985,000. Inclusive of tin-ore the figures are:

1908	£3,100,000
1917	£8,482,000
1918	£9,359,000

73. *Export Duties*

I have explained that British merchants engaged in the export trade made large profits at the beginning of the War (though their risks were great), and latterly on the import trade, from which substantial sums accrued to the Imperial Exchequer in the form of Excess Profits Tax. In these profits the local Government has not attempted to participate, except to the extent of imposing moderate export duties on palm oil, kernels, and cocoa in 1916, to which hides, skins, and ground-nuts were added in 1918. They realised little more than one-third of the revenue lost by the cessation of the spirit trade (*see* paragraphs 112 and 146), and with the introduction of direct taxation into the Southern Provinces they could be abandoned, unless retained to pay the interest on the £6,000,000 War Debt assumed by Nigeria on behalf of the Imperial Government. Whereas in 1913 Customs duties were 51·2 per cent. of the total revenue, they formed only 36·3 per cent. of the estimated revenue in 1918. Trade has thus been relieved of 15 per cent. of indirect taxation. Export duties tend to improve the quality of the exports, since the lowest priced pays equally with the best.

74. *Native Exporters*

The large profits made by exporters before prices were controlled and sea-freights raised, due to the low price paid to the producer by the combined firms, brought in a large number of native speculators—chiefly in the Lagos Lagoon trade—some of whom made large fortunes. They raised some controversy regarding the amount of shipping space allotted to them by the shipping company—a matter with which Government had nothing to do since their goods were not rail borne—while the British merchants complained of their immunity from the Excess Profits Tax and Income Tax.

75. *Profits on Exports*

I am informed that prior to the War merchants looked for their profits

almost entirely to the import trade, and the native producer got the benefit of any rise in price in the home market. As the export market became steadier it was natural that the speculative profits on exports should cease, and trade resume a more normal course. This has to some extent happened—especially at Lagos—but even there the price of oil was in 1917 £1 17s. below pre-War prices, and £3 18s. less in 1918. For kernels it was £3 2s. 6d. less per ton in 1917 and £3 10s. 10d. in 1918. For cocoa it was 20s. 6d. less per cwt. in 1917 and 27s. 8d. in 1918. This decreasing price to the producer is much to be regretted, while the price of imports continues to rise. Without a fuller knowledge than is at my disposal regarding the cost of marketing freight, insurance, and profit realised, I am not able to form an opinion as to its necessity, but I am assured that no more than a working margin was left to the merchants.*

76. Exports from Northern Provinces

These conditions do not apply to the Northern Provinces, for the staple products of which, ground-nuts, hides and skins, prices are paid greatly in excess of those obtainable a few years ago. Moreover, the natives of the North are not so dependent on imported goods as those of the South. The Hausa of Zaria or Kano when faced with inflated prices, or (as has recently occurred) the absence of the cheap class of cloth he desires, no longer exports his raw cotton but reserves it for his own looms. This was evident at the Zaria ginnery in 1917 to the detriment of the Cotton Association, and Manchester. It is earnestly to be hoped that interference with the economic laws of supply and demand will soon be no longer necessary.

77. Commercial Imports. Effect of War

The importation of trade liquor, which had been checked in the first year of the War by a heavy increase in duties, decreased when the spirits became increasingly difficult to obtain as shipping grew scarcer. Its place in the purchase of produce had of course to be taken by other imports. In proportion as the home industries became more and more concentrated on the output of war material, textiles, hardware, and other staple imports rose steadily in price, to which higher freights had to be added. Merchants had in any case no option but to put up prices, for their stocks could with difficulty be replaced and had they run out the purchase of produce must have ceased. Though the volume of commercial imports fell by over 6,000 tons in 1917, their value

* The following figures have been lately given to me. War risk insurance, which was 1 per cent in 1916 rose to 5½ per cent. in 1917. From March to August, 1918, it fell to 3½ per cent. and then to 3 per cent. Freight rates in June, 1918, had risen as follows:

On Oil	**	**	From 47/6 and 50/- to 140/- a ton.
On Kernels	From 40/- and 45/- to 100/- a ton.
On Ground Nuts	From 75/- to 240/- a ton.

To these figures the export tax had to be added.

A return recently sent to me from Nigeria shows the following increases (allowing for the scale ton) imposed by the Shipping Controller in 1918 over the rates for 1917.

	1917		1918			1917		1918	
	s.	d.	s.	d.		s.	d.	s.	d.
Kernels	38	5	91	6	Ground-nuts	38	5	87	9
Palm oil	48	7	97	6	Cocoa	30	0	90	9
Hides and Skins	27	6	86	0	Cotton	7	0	77	6
Timber	30	0	87	9					

increased by £634,000 (including specie).^{*} Most of the articles in chief demand increased from 150 per cent. to 300 per cent. The import of kerosene (increase 80 per cent.) fell from four million gallons in 1913 to two and a half million in 1917, but the value remained about the same, and vegetable oils, so urgently required in England, began to replace it as a luminant. Salt is stated to have increased 220 per cent. in price, but in the absence of other commodities the imports rose from £62,734 in 1913 to £281,700 in 1917.

78. *Effect of Prices on the Producer*

The native, unable to pay these prices, preferred to accept cash and to await a decrease. This withdrawal of cash from circulation, and the impossibility of obtaining adequate supplies from the home mints, has in turn caused much anxiety. This of course cannot continue indefinitely, and the supply of imported goods to pay for raw produce is of vital importance.

Much has been said about giving a fair price to the native producer, and the merchants have addressed the Secretary of State on the subject with reference to the control price in England. But it is, of course, futile to discuss the price the producer receives for his produce, while ignoring the price he has to pay for his imported purchases. So long as these are restricted, their price must rise, and his position can only be bettered by unrestricted imports and unfettered competition without artificial control. It may, I hope, be anticipated that, now that British industries have resumed a more normal course, these prices will rapidly fall as a result of competition.

The fact that exports of produce instead of decreasing actually increased so largely, may be attributed to the fact that the native had to collect so much more in order to pay for such necessities as he could not do without, while hoarding the remainder of his cash, partly also perhaps because he considered himself fortunate to obtain for his produce prices which contrasted not very unfavourably with those he received at the outbreak of war.

79. *Effect on Cost of Living*

In the supply of local foodstuffs, alike to Europeans and to the native clerks and artisans, control prices were impossible. For these the producer has naturally demanded more, so as to enable him to purchase the highly-priced imports he needed. The result has been a great increase in the cost of living, both to Europeans and to the native staff. The Government was thus compelled to grant a war bonus, which formed a new and heavy charge on the revenues. Local victualling of ships, and the assembly of large bodies of troops for service overseas, no doubt added to the scarcity and price.

80. *Government Imports and Local Subsistues and Industries*

Already prior to the War I had taken steps to decrease Government expenditure by replacing imports by local material, and by manufacturing locally such articles as were within the compass of local skill. The enormous increase in cost of imported building materials and other necessities, caused by the War, acted as a great stimulus to this policy. Of Nigeria it could be said with equal truth, as it has been said of India by the Industrial Commission, 1916-18, that she is 'rich in raw materials and in industrial possibilities, but poor in manufacturing accomplishment. . . . Her labour is inefficient, she

^{*} All values in the Statistical Abstract were calculated *f.o.b.* to the end of 1914 and since that date as *c.i.f.* Values throughout this report are quoted from the Abstract.

relies almost entirely on foreign sources for foremen and supervisors, and her educated people have yet to develop a right tradition of industrialism.' It has been a pernicious tradition of West Africa to order everything—doors, window frames, and even bricks and tiles—from England. As a result, not only has industrial development been arrested, but the materials with which the country abounds have been unexplored. With industrial education I shall deal in another paragraph.

81. *Coal, Timber, Lime and Tiles*

The coalfield at Enugu soon rendered the Government independent of imported supplies of coal. The imports fell from 84,600 tons (£100,000) in 1913 to 25,744 (£83,730) by commercial firms only in 1917. These will, I hope, be locally supplied in 1918 (*see* paragraph 135 *et seq.*). The exploitation of local timber and the erection of sawmills and drying sheds have already made us equally self-sufficing in this matter, with an output of one-quarter million cubic feet of timber, or 1,800,000 sup. ft. of planking. The new Forestry Ordinance was very successful in protecting not only the well-known and valuable classes of timber, but also those formerly thought to be worthless. Of these, three new kinds were found to make good substitutes for pitch pine. In the year before the war about 6 million sup. feet of timber and dressed wood was imported, valued at £60,000. In 1917 this had fallen to 1,070,000 sup. feet, value £18,000. The new carpentry establishment at Lagos undertook the supply of all wooden furniture, doors, windows, &c. for Government buildings, and no supplies were imported by the Government.

Prolonged and systematic search resulted in the discovery of limestone 11 miles from the coalfield, where it can be cheaply burnt and transported by rail. Also near Ilorin on the Western Railway, and at Itobi on the Niger. All these deposits, situated on the three main arteries of communication, are being developed and will almost entirely replace imported cement, the cost of which has nearly trebled. The import had already fallen from 18,000 tons in 1913 (£34,360) to 11,700 tons in 1917 (£61,650). The saving to the Government will be very great, and the lime makes a first-class building mortar. Ground limestone may also have a considerable agricultural value especially the deposit at Ilorin which is near to the large cocoa plantations of Yoruba and Egba-land.

A good roofing (and also a good flooring) tile has now been produced. It requires, of course, heavier timbering than corrugated iron sheeting, 'Eternit' and the other roofing materials hitherto imported, but even hand-made tiles compare favourably in price (including extra timber) with these materials taken at pre-War rates, while they add greatly to the coolness and healthiness of dwelling-houses, cost less to maintain, and have a longer life. The cost of manufacture will be greatly reduced by the use of tile-making machines. The economy of using tiles made on the spot is of course much greater in the Northern Provinces, where the railway freight on imported materials must be added to the landed price, while the coolness of the tile-roofed house is more important in the greater heat and dryness. Since iron sheeting has, during the War, been almost unobtainable, even at more than treble the former price, the saving has been very great. In 1913, 8,600 tons at a cost of £117,000 were imported. In 1917 only 447 tons valued at £19,554. Floor-tiles in lime-setting will further reduce the import of cement. (*See* Appendix 6.)

82. *Minor Substitutes and New Industries*

The same policy has been applied to many minor requirements. 2,600 lbs. of cord and twine, which is imported to the value of over £45,000 has been made in Lagos prison from *adda* and other fibres, at a fraction of the imported cost; and there is no reason why the manufacture of gunny bags, of which some 350,000 dozen are required, should not become a local industry. Their cost has increased by 600 or 700 per cent. Solder for workshop use is made from local tin, and fire bricks from Enugu clay of high quality; oil-casks, coal-baskets, and cotton-seed oil for paints, are other instances of the effort to supply local needs by local industry.

In the desire to promote the development of industrial enterprise, it is possible to carry the principle further. Soap, of which 4,760 tons were imported in 1913, has just doubled in price, and native-made soap already competes with the foreign article. Sugar has been successfully made at Zaria. Many others could be cited. These replace goods imported for sale to the natives. They do not, as in the cases which I have cited at length, tend to cheapen administration, and *pro tanto* reduce taxation or increase the funds available for development of the country, and I am inclined to think that in the present stage the native is more profitably employed in growing and collecting raw materials for export than in endeavouring to compete with the output of organised labour and the power-driven machinery of civilised countries. In regard, however, to the development of new products, I shall have a few words to say in a subsequent paragraph. (See paragraph 98.)

Had it not been for the local development which I have described, I am at a loss to know how Nigeria could have got through the years of war. Certainly her financial position would not be what it is. I trust that private enterprise, both European and native, will follow the lead of the Government, whose functions, except in regard to the training and use of prison labour, should cease to be in any way commercial.

83. *Partial Manufacture for Export*

The question of partial manufacture of raw materials involves a quite different principle. Here the object is to conserve the best qualities of the article exported, as in the case of the local expression of kernel oil, which is crushed before it turns rancid, loses its glycerine content, and generates fatty acids. Another example is the fermentation of cocoa and the curing of tobacco which should be done by the merchants (and not by the producer) in properly designed drying houses. Or it may be to reduce bulk and save shipping freights, as in the partial tanning of hides and skins, for which local material is available. Much cost would be saved in rail freight were ground-nuts crushed at Kano and the oil exported in tanks. Its quality would also be improved. Or concurrently with these reasons, the object may be to utilise cheap unskilled labour, and place the produce on the home market in a condition in which it will command a higher price. I think that in these several directions, more initiative might be shown by merchants.

84. *Reconstruction in India on Parallel Lines*

The Governor of Madras, addressing the Chamber of Commerce, well expressed the views which have guided this policy of development in Nigeria. 'India', he said, 'will emerge from the War with her resources practically

unimpaired, but the work of reconstruction in other countries of the world will make such demand on their reduced capital, and on their own material resources, that India will, in all probability, no longer be able to rely to the same extent on the capital and on the manufactures of other countries to supply its own requirements. If India . . . is to advance, it must be prepared to develop, and to rely more and more on its own resources.' The Government of India through its Munition Board has already taken effective steps for replacing imports by local products.

85. *Conditions of Future Success in Trade*

In my judgment the essential conditions for the success of Nigerian trade in the near future may be summarised this:

- (a) Closer co-operation between the merchants and the local Government;
- (b) Increased attention to the quality of exports, and their possible partial manufacture with the object of reducing freight and increasing value by the use of local labour and material;
- (c) The supply of local requirements where possible by local resources, with a view to cheapen the cost of Government;
- (d) The substitution for the haphazard collection of sylvan produce of cultivated products in well organised plantations, and their improvement by scientific methods and research;
- (e) The use of oxen in agriculture, and of wheeled transport to replace head carriage.

Since amalgamation some steps have been taken along each of these lines, but the War has arrested progress except as regards (c).

86. *Trade Commissioner and Department*

No doubt a Trade Commissioner, under the new Government scheme, will be appointed to assist in the development of British West Africa. He should be supplemented by a well organised trade department in Nigeria, under a well qualified officer, whose salary must be sufficient to secure his continued services, for he would otherwise be eagerly sought after. The Department would be a development of the former Commercial Intelligence Department which expired when Mr. Birtwistle retired, owing to the difficulty of replacing him. The duties which I consider should devolve upon such a Department would be:

- (a) To study any particular article of export, and present a considered report on its development, embodying the opinions of the Agricultural and Forestry Departments as to its improvement in quality and quantity, with notes as to preparation, marketing, shipment, &c.
- (b) To study the requirements and fancies of the natives, and offer suggestions as to imports, which will on the one hand stimulate the producer who desires to purchase, and on the other hand raise the standard of comfort and the volume of output by the use of labour-saving appliances, such as agricultural implements, ploughs, harrows, decorticators, &c.
- (c) To study the possibilities of development of particular areas, the crops

and the means of transport best adapted to them, the local markets and requirements, and improved methods of preparing produce for the market, and grading qualities.

- (d) To edit a local journal for the diffusion of knowledge thus acquired, with notes and excerpts from the mass of literature received on subjects useful to trade and agriculture; to co-ordinate all local information with extracts from the reports of Residents and of the Agricultural and Forestry Departments, and prepare a 'trade index' for the information of new comers, and to attract new capital.

87. *Absentee Merchants*

But adequate success cannot be looked for by the efforts of Government unless the merchant community is prepared to adopt progressive methods. If the Government invites the opinion of the local Chamber of Commerce or commercial firms, or asks for information on some matter on which legislation is contemplated, the reply has generally been either colourless, or an intimation that they would consult their principals in England. It is surprising that in a Colony whose trade amounts to 17½ million pounds with a revenue of over 4 millions, there should be no Chamber which can promptly voice the opinion of the commercial community. When the local representatives have ventured to express an opinion, the Liverpool principals have frankly informed the Government that they are mere agents on whose opinions no reliance can be placed, and have resented such enquiries from the local staff instead of from themselves. Mr. Moore, Chairman of the African Section of the Liverpool Chamber, writes, 'We hold that advising the Government is not part of the work of local agents', and he placed this view on record in evidence before the West African Currency Committee [Cd. 6427] of 1912.

The day has passed when the West African merchant can remain in England, and expect to conduct the trade of a country in which he has never resided, possibly never even visited for many years, if at all, and regarding which he is dependent for first-hand information on the agents whose responsibility to Government he denies. Such methods of carrying on business—peculiar, I think, to West Africa—are no longer appropriate now that the conditions of health and the amenities of life have so greatly improved. The merchants who gain wealth from Nigeria have a duty to the country, which transcends the task of safeguarding their purely personal interests. It is the duty and privilege of the leading unofficials in a Crown Colony to assist the Government with their advice. In Nigeria they have a special opportunity in the Nigerian Council, whose debates are not confined to special items of legislation. Of what value in debate can the views of local agents be when they are not allowed to give information without the consent of their principals in England, who may repudiate their opinions? There are partial exceptions to this rule, but in practice matters of importance are frequently held up, at the urgent instance of merchants, for discussion when the Governor is in England.

In other parts of the Empire the managing director is on the spot, and I would invite West African merchants to consider whether it has not now become necessary to conduct their business on similar lines, if they desire to meet competition, and to have a voice in the legislation and policy of the country in which their profits are made.

88. *Staple Exports.—(a) Oleaginous Produce*

The exports of Nigeria consists of raw materials only, of which oleaginous produce (palm oil, palm kernels, ground-nuts, shea nuts, cotton seed and beniseed) is the most important.

The total quantity of oil and oil seeds exported from Nigeria in 1913 was approximately 397,800 tons valued at £5,371,000. In 1917 the quantity was approximately 317,400 tons and the value £5,266,000. Though Nigeria exports considerably more than half the total bulk of kernels shipped from West Africa (including the Congo) the Agricultural Department reports that the produce of millions of palms is still wasted. Since kernel oil is now used for margarine, it is a product of great value, and it is stated to be the declared intention of the British Government to look mainly to West Africa for its supplies. The export of kernels in 1918 reached the enormous total of 205,167 tons, and of oil 86,400 tons, in both cases much exceeding any previous record.

The export of ground-nuts has increased from 19,000 tons in 1913 to 57,500 tons in 1918. If ground-nuts were crushed at Kano, a ready market for the cake as a cattle food during the months of drought would be at hand. Bulk shipments and elevators would save much cost in bagging. Of palm kernels before the War 65 per cent. went to Germany, but the bulk of the remaining oil seeds went to England, though France receives large quantities of ground-nuts. During the war kernels and ground-nuts were shipped to the United Kingdom, with the exception of small quantities to France, and under special permit to America.

89. *Restriction of Markets and Control Prices*

During the War the exports of Nigeria have been subjected (a) to restricted markets and (b) to control prices. These exports were required either for munitions of war, or to provide foodstuffs in the United Kingdom which were deficient because shipping was required for war purposes or had been destroyed by enemy action. No one will be found to deny that Colonies which owe their freedom to the sacrifices made by Great Britain in the War, should not gladly accept their share of the burden, and even though hostilities have ended, war conditions have not ceased, and will not cease for some time. The extent, however, to which these war restrictions should operate in the future, and the methods which may be adopted, are matters which involve great principles, and I may perhaps be allowed to submit some very brief observations here upon a question which so intimately concerns the trade and prosperity of Nigeria.

The majority of the Edible Nuts Committee* (of which I was a member) recommended the imposition of an export duty on palm kernels shipped from West Africa, to be refunded on proof that they had been crushed in the United Kingdom. The object of this duty was to divert the kernel trade after the War from Hamburg to the United Kingdom. It may be noted in this connection (a) that 'with the exception of the small fraction which came to the United Kingdom, all exported kernels during the last 30 years went to Germany'. The restriction proposed, therefore only affected the German market and (b) that the recommendation referred to palm kernels only and to no other produce and was purely temporary—for five years after the War. The control

* [Cd. 8247] of 1916.

prices, and restriction of markets imposed during the War, and still maintained, affect all oleaginous produce, and most other produce as well. The Empire Resources Committee have proposed schemes of exploitation, with the object of securing a profit to the Imperial Government which should help to pay off the British war debt. The traditional Colonial policy of Great Britain is that no tariff or preference should be imposed for her own exclusive benefit, and that the profits accruing to the State by the operation of any law or tariff belong to the Revenue of the Colony, to be devoted to its development or in reduction of taxation. The War has, however, introduced novel considerations. Raw materials are so urgently required alike by ourselves, our Allies, and our enemies, that unrestricted free trade—or even a trade restricted to ourselves and our Allies—would probably result in a shortage of raw materials and tropical food-stuffs in the United Kingdom, and in any case in an enhancement of prices to the home consumer which would add greatly to the burden he has incurred for the defence of the Empire. It seems clear, therefore, that an obligation rests on the British Colonies to see that the United Kingdom is served first, and that her necessary supply of tropical produce is assured. This obligation is incurred partly in discharge of the share of the Imperial burden which falls upon the Colonies, partly in order to maintain the industrial life of the United Kingdom, and her ability to maintain the Navy, &c., on which the Colonies depend for protection.

If then it be necessary during the continuance of war conditions to control the price of African produce in the United Kingdom, the necessity must be recognised by the country of its origin as an integral part of the conditions resulting from war—to be abandoned as soon as possible. This control price (plus cost of freight, insurance, marketing and merchants' profit) would be taken as the bed-rock price, and should, I submit, be settled by the Home Government in consultation with the local Government, so that the native producer may be assured of a fair price. The local Government would then impose an export duty on all produce consigned to foreign countries, of such amount as would continuously maintain the home market as the one most profitable to the exporter. The Empire alone would obtain the bed-rock price.

The duty imposed would be used for the development of the country, and to pay the charges on the portion of the Imperial war debt assumed by the Colony. It should vary (at the discretion of the Imperial Government) so that Allies would pay only such small increase as would ensure that the Empire is served first, while neutrals and enemies respectively paid higher rates. The Home Government would have to accept the responsibility of controlling re-export by unprincipled speculators from the Empire ports of destination and of transshipment at intermediate ports. Great Britain would thus control the price of raw materials and foodstuffs from her tropical Empire to the entire world, and the anomaly would no longer be presented of America selling tobacco and kerosene to the Nigerian native at 80 per cent. above their pre-War value, while obtaining her palm oil at an artificially reduced price—or the similar anomaly that because the world is short of raw produce, the country of origin should get a less price than before the War. Under the system proposed it would seem to be possible to abolish the control price in England altogether. The merchant would be relieved of the difficulty and hindrance to trade caused by the necessity of obtaining a certificate to prove that the kernels have been crushed in England.

It is not conceivable that Great Britain would impose any export duty or restriction upon the export of her manufactured goods, but if she did so, she would grant a reciprocal preference to her tropical Colonies, in return for the temporary preference accorded by them to the Empire.

90. *Methods of Collection of Palm Produce: Research*

The evidence taken by the Edible Nuts Committee, and the experience gained by the development of rubber indicate that the era of haphazard collection of the fruit of wild palm trees must soon give place to a system of organised plantations, with local mills to deal with the freshly-gathered fruit. Rancidity robs it of its valuable glycerine content and increases the deleterious fatty acids. Mr. Smart and others asserted in their evidence that by cultivation and improved transport, the yield could be enormously improved both in quality and quantity. By present methods nuts of any age are mixed together, there are no adequate means of checking destruction of the trees by tapping for palm-wine—a more lucrative product than the fruit—no precaution against the spread of fungoid or bacteriological disease which might destroy the industry, and any systematic attempt to improve the quality of the produce is beset with difficulty. Agricultural industry should be developed by native agencies, but the European must give the lead and create the model for the native to follow, if Nigerian oil products are to hold their own in competition with rivals in many lands. The Government can do much through the agency of the Agricultural and Forestry Departments, by research and experiment, to produce a palm whose yield both in quantity and quality shall greatly surpass that of the wild tree. In some palm fruit the kernels are thin-shelled, in others the oil in the pulp is much above the normal, and so on. The problem is to convert varieties into species, which shall breed true to type, and to concentrate all the improvements in one species. Since the seedling takes many years to mature, such experiments are necessarily much more protracted than in an annual like cotton. Continuity with very fully recorded statistics is essential.

91. *Agricultural Leases*

'Agricultural Leases' of Crown lands for plantations are 'ordinarily' limited by statute to 1,200 acres each, with a term of 45 years, but renewal is contemplated. Rent may be periodically revised, but 'improvements' (including betterment of the soil, growing trees, &c.) are not taken into account in such revision, which refers only to site value. No restriction as to the number of leases is laid down. The terms of such leases in the Southern Provinces are to be found in the Crown Lands Ordinance (No. 7 of 1918), and the regulations under it (34 of 2.5.18), and in the Land and Native Rights Ordinance (No. 1 of 1916) and Regulation 8 of 28.2.18 as regards the Northern Provinces. The chief stipulation is that the land must be brought under cultivation in a reasonable time. Though the regulations may appear somewhat onerous in their bald legal phraseology, the Government is desirous of giving every assistance while safeguarding the interests of the native population. They are framed so as to exclude the grant of 'concessions' of many square miles in extent, which has been the curse of the Congo State, and some other African territories. Leases of lands other than Crown lands may also be acquired in the Southern Provinces under the Native Lands Acquisition

Ordinance (No. 32 of 1917) (Regulation 23 of 30.8.17). These form the vast majority of lands in the Southern Provinces. No restrictions as to size, or duration of lease, or revision are prescribed by statute, but the terms (except as to revision) usually approximate to those of Crown leases.

92. (b) *Minerals*

With the exception of a small quantity of gold (2,865 ozs. in 1917), and of coal (which is for the present a Government monopoly) the only mineral developed in Nigeria is tin, of which 9,966 tons of ore were exported in 1917, valued at 1½ million sterling (4,140 tons in 1913). In furtherance of the desire of the Imperial Government to explore fully the mineral wealth of the Empire, a geological survey has recently been inaugurated. I thoroughly subscribe to the view that all mineral syndicates should produce proof that their capital and control are predominantly British. Since minerals in Nigeria are the property of the Government this presents no great difficulty. Already before the War it was not permissible to export tin elsewhere than to the United Kingdom from whence a smelter's certificate (under penalty of forfeiture of the export duty) was at first required. A certificate of entry, and that it is not for re-export, now suffices. The revised Mineral Ordinance and Regulations of 1916 appear to have given satisfaction and worked well. The creation of 'mining rights', for low grade properties, has given much encouragement to individual holdings and small capitalists, and this class, as opposed to the Lease-Ownning Companies, is beginning to occupy an important place in the mine field. The imposition of a nominal surface rent (1*d.* to 3*d.* an acre) became a necessity when the Ordinance was made applicable to the Southern Provinces, where the system of land tenure differs widely from the North. The industry suffers by the distance of the field from the sea port, some 700 miles. Liberal concessions have been made by the abolition of the sliding scale of railway freights (varying with the market price of tin). The fixed scale effected a decrease of £1 5*s.* when tin was below £190 a ton and of £6 3*s.* 6*d.* when it was over that price. The new Eastern Railway will reduce the distance by 173 miles. Tin has commanded unprecedentedly high prices during the War, the highest being £400 per ton as against a lowest rate of £138 in 1913. Of the 80 mineral leaseholders, 67 were mining tin in 1917.

Since the cost of working is estimated at £100 a ton, large profits must have accrued, but as a 'tin-mine' is a wasting asset, much dissatisfaction has been expressed at the incidence of the Excess Profits Tax, and the result has been to work the poorest ground to the detriment of the output, though urgently required for the War. There are at present engaged in the industry about 160 Europeans, over 300 alien natives, and about 18,000 local labourers.

93. (c) *Hides and Skins*

The trade in hides and skins (tanned and untanned) has developed very rapidly; the value of these exports in 1913 was £197,200, and in 1917 the quantity had increased nine-fold, and the value had reached £887,000 in spite of war restrictions. The Home market was closed, and shipments could only be made under strict regulation to the United States. If cheap transport can be secured to the Northern and North-eastern frontiers, it is possible that the enormous potential output of the regions towards the Egyptian Sudan and the Mediterranean sea-board, in which cattle, sheep, and goats are raised in vast

numbers, might find its outlet through Nigeria. Camel transport is fairly cheap, and would be used beyond our frontiers. Wheeled ox-transport must follow the bridging of the few rivers which have to be crossed unless and until railway extension is possible (*see* paragraph 130 and Appendix 8). Weight and bulk may perhaps be reduced by partial tanning.

94. (d) *Ranching*

Stock-raising—an industry from which I had hoped much—has not so far been a notable success. The conditions of Nigeria do not admit of ‘ranching’ in the proper sense of the word, since there are no vast prairies tenanted only by bison, on which great herds of stock can be grazed by European owners. In those districts, such as Bornu, where there are great spaces sparsely inhabited, the lack of water and paucity of forage, surround the problem with difficulties.

Existing conditions may be thus described: large areas with a scanty population are to be found in Kontagora, Kabba and Borgu, but they are mostly infested with tsetse, and covered by sparse forest or giant grasses unsuitable for forage. Further North and East there are also great areas more or less suitable for cattle, but in so far as water and fodder permit, they are already grazed by vast herds of nomad and village cattle—estimated at 3 million—and flocks of sheep and goats (6¼ million), which are, in all probability, as much as the land in its present state can carry. Epizootic disease is rife.

The Government is pledged by the terms of the Land and Native Rights Ordinance (and indeed it is the root basis on which the policy of the country has been moulded) to act as Trustee for the native in regard to the land, and it would be contrary to this policy to exclude him from grazing areas so large as to afford scope for what is properly known as a ranch. On the other hand, it is manifestly desirable that British initiative and the results of scientific experience should be introduced, not only for the benefit of the revenue (which is to the eventual benefit of the native) and for the advantage of British trade, but also more directly for the benefit of the native—since it is only by ocular demonstration that these wild cattle tribes can be taught to adopt better methods. Were the annual increment of stock, which is at present lost by recurrent epizootic diseases, saved for export, it would probably form no mean cattle trade.

In these circumstances—if I have rightly apprehended and described them—the European stock-owner must adopt one or other of the following courses:

- (a) He may acquire a tract of country, useless to the indigenous cattle owners by reason of deficiency of water and good pasture, and by deep well boring and mechanical appliances, and by clearing the ground and planting good fodder grasses, he may develop this area for his exclusive profit during his lease. By so doing he confers a great benefit on the country, for his methods of improving stock, of combatting disease, of irrigation, of fodder production, and of preparing his beasts and his hides for the market will afford an object lesson to the ignorant herdsmen, who employ to-day methods which were in vogue in the time of Abraham, while the introduction of imported stock will

- improve their tired strain. One such area exists in Bornu and is available for exploitation with adequate capital, but the law will require amendment;
- (b) Or he may acquire a comparatively small area under the existing Ordinance—say of 10,000 acres—as a model stock farm (not as a ranch), improve local stock by imported bulls, and fatten purchased cattle for the market, looking to the native herds to maintain the supply;
 - (c) Or finally, in conjunction with the scheme just described, he might be able to enter into some kind of partnership with native cattle owners, improving the breed, saving loss by preventive inoculation, disposing of the annual increment and sharing profits.

95. *Markets for Stock*

There is a very large local market at highly remunerative prices. The Southern Provinces are densely populated, and the people make large profits by the sale of the abundant palm produce. They were able to spend over 1½ million sterling per annum on imported spirits. Meat is scarce since pasture is lacking, and their craving for it sometimes manifests itself in cannibalism. As happened in Fiji, this degrading practice would cease were meat procurable. The Eastern Railway, when completed, will provide cheap transport from the cattle districts to the heart of the most densely populated areas. The demand in Lagos alone (served by the Western Railway) is said to be 400 head a week. In times past hundreds of thousands of cattle have been driven on the hoof from the North to supply this demand. The emaciated and diseased residue which survived the tsetse and the hundreds of miles of fodderless country lived only a few days and commanded very high prices. There is, therefore, a remunerative market for prime, rail-borne cattle, which would largely replace the sale of imported liquor. To this may be added the demand by Europeans for first-class meat, kept in cold storage, replacing the unnecessary and unnutritive tinned meats imported from Europe and America.

The demand in the United Kingdom for chilled beef is illimitable, and since Nigeria is much nearer than the Argentine or Rhodesia, the value of this industry, if it could be established, can hardly be over-rated. Chilled beef must be within 22 days by steamer of its market of consumption—Nigeria is only 15 days—and the supply must be absolutely regular and reliable. The local stock is reported to be excellent, easily fattened, and requiring but little improvement. The local production of ground-nut cake would supplement food at a time when fodder exists only in the marshes, and the herds are emaciated.

96. (e) *Cotton*

Cotton has been a fluctuating export due in part to variations of climate and rainfall, in part to a variety of more or less transitory causes. Thus the increase in the price of imported textiles no doubt led to a revival of local weaving, and hence increased the local demand for raw cotton. The disturbances in French West Africa led to the cessation of the local demand from the Sokoto Province, and hence to an increased influx to the ginnery at Zaria; and the high prices realised by ground-nuts competed adversely with

the cultivation of cotton. But the policy of the British Cotton Growing Association of consistently raising the purchasing price, whenever home prices admitted of it, of maintaining the price at a uniform level throughout each season, and of paying cash, has, I think, resulted in establishing the industry on a sound basis, and the future promises well. The success of the Agricultural Departments, in both North and South, is producing greatly improved varieties ('Allen's' in the former and 'Georgia' in the latter) have stimulated the natives, who are quick to appreciate their value, and steps have been taken in the North with the aid of the Native Administrations to preserve the crops from deterioration by hybridisation. The Association, which has four ginneries in Nigeria (three in the South and one in the North), gives a higher price for these varieties, which have a larger yield, and a much greater proportion of lint than native cotton. Georgia is medium staple, and is as yet only in the experimental stage. Allen's, which is now extensively grown around Zaria, is long staple, and the Association declares that as soon as it is fully established the future of cotton in the Northern Provinces is assured. Both are valued at $\frac{1}{2}d.$ to $\frac{3}{4}d.$ per lb. more than 'Middling American'. As cotton is planted when other crops are nearly ripe, and gathered after they are harvested, its future is secure.

Cotton was granted priority in export during the War. The Statistical Abstract shows the quantity in 1917 at 2,357 tons, which was less than 1913—2,835 tons (=15,872 bales)—but the value had increased from £159,200 to £234,300. Owing to the reasons described already, 1917 was not a good year for cotton. The price paid for Allen's was double the previous rate, its export rose from nil in 1913 to 461 bales in 1916-17, and it is anticipated that 3,000 bales will be shipped this year.

The native of Nigeria is extremely shrewd in his estimate of what pays best to cultivate, and (as occurred at Abakaliki) will prefer to take his cotton back again, even after he has brought it to the buying station, rather than accept an unremunerative price. It would seem to follow that, except as a secondary crop planted with yams, cotton cannot be grown with success in the equatorial belt, where palm oil and kernels, cocoa, tobacco, rubber, and kolas are all more valuable. Even in the North cotton can only compete in value with ground-nuts when the price is in the neighbourhood of $1\frac{1}{2}d.$ per lb. for seed-cotton (£14 a ton), for though this is an outside price for ground-nuts, they are more easily transported (being less bulky), and the Hausa peasant is fully alive to the advantages of a leguminous crop for his fields, while cotton involves much more work, and greater risks from weather, parasites, &c. There is fortunately, however, another factor to be considered, which operates strongly in favour of cotton when planted as a mixed crop, viz., that it is harvested after all the other crops are off the ground.

It is of importance to establish beyond question, whether cotton can be grown successfully by irrigation as a dry-season crop, viz., whether it will withstand the great heat of the sun, and the excessively dry and parching Hamattan wind of this season. There are large areas in the North (see paragraphs 94 and 199) which could be irrigated by scientific methods, and if cotton can be grown upon them in the dry season, its future in Nigeria would be full of promise. The War and consequent depletion of the Agricultural Department has prevented experimental work of this nature.

The governing factor in considering whether any great extension of cotton-

growing can take place in Nigeria is of course the labour question. This consideration alone would make it impossible for a European to grow cotton successfully. Nor is there any superabundant labour for the cultivation of cotton, even as a native industry. (See paragraph 197.) In the densely populated South, there are, as I have quoted, millions of palms, with their fruit ungathered—a product more valuable than cotton—and there is little or no land which can be spared from the cultivation of foodstuffs. The dense population around Kano in the North, is engaged in growing foodstuffs, of which there is none too much, and devotes its margin to ground-nuts—an easy and soil-improving crop. It is of no use describing ideal tracts of waste land in Kontagora and elsewhere when the population only averages four to the square mile.

What are the remedies? Increase of population by the eradication of venereal disease; a greater output of foodstuffs per acre arising from improvement in the varieties grown; saving of labour by the use of the ox in agriculture, the plough, the stump extractor, and of mechanical or animal transport, so that carriers may be employed in productive labour (but see Appendix 7), and finally, in the case of cotton, improved varieties which shall give an out-turn of not less than $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. lint, of the best staple, commanding a price which shall compete favourably with other crops, and (if it be possible) the realisation of cotton as a dry-season irrigation crop, when labour released from ordinary cultivation is abundant.

I offer a few suggestions, with reference to the effort to extend the growing of cotton within the Empire as it affects Nigeria.

(a) It is desirable that a minimum price for fully 5 years should be offered, by which time the improvement in quality, and out-turn of lint, and the decrease of contingent expenses, should fully justify the price. If the fact that the Central Agency alone possesses ginning plant is not sufficient to secure it as the sole purchaser, and the market price exceeds the guaranteed price, the agency must pay the higher price to the producers in order to retain control in their own hands. This is preferable to creating a monopoly by legislation, or to any other course which is open to the charge of limiting the free native market to serve British interests. If this guaranteed price should occasionally result in loss to the purchasing agents, the eventual results will abundantly justify the expenditure.

(b) In order to maintain a liberal guaranteed price (sufficient to induce the native to grow cotton in preference to other crops) the Imperial Government, in view of the great interests involved to the British industrial community, should, I submit, decrease the contingent expenses to the lowest possible margin, even if by so doing the industry in its infancy might be described as 'bounty-fed'.

At present I understand that when Nigerian cotton commands a price of 15*d.* per lb. in the home market, a local price of $2\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* only can be given for seed-cotton. If the yield of lint is $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. (which is higher than the average, though Abakaliki cotton was reported to yield $35\frac{1}{4}$ per cent.) this would mean that the price of seed-cotton is 5*d.* (exclusive of seed value) of which only half goes to the producer and half is absorbed in freight and marketing charges. Lower ocean freights, improved local transport, the elimination of the middleman's profit by direct purchase (paragraph 101) and the absence of dividends to the Central Agency, should result in a better price

to the producer, while the progressive improvement of the staple, and out-turn, due to the efforts of the Agricultural Department should result in a higher home price. The price paid for 'Allen's' in the North ($2\frac{1}{2}d.$ lb.), viz., £23 a ton has resulted in an eager demand for seed, and (as I have said) an increase of output from nil in 1913 to an estimated 3,000 bales this year.

To offer a price which could not be maintained would not only be open to the criticism that the native had been induced to take up cotton under false pretences, but since the crop is an annual, and he would promptly cease to grow it if the price fell below the profit to be made in other crops, the eventual loss would be on the agency, since the supply would cease. The price offered would, of course, vary within well defined limits according to quality, e.g., a higher price would be given for exotic than for local cotton—but *not* according to appraisalment at the ginnery, so that the producer can be assured of his price, subject to stringent deductions for adulteration, or increase of weight by watering etc. It would be subject also to variation according to locality, provided that the areas are sufficiently large, viz., all cotton in the Zaria and adjacent districts should command a uniform price (subject to the above reservation), Abakaliki another, and Yoruba-Egba another, according to transport charges which affect all other produce equally. (For an examination of the question of transport, see paragraphs on Railways and Transport, Appendix 7.)

(c) In order to save transport I suggest that ginneries and presses should be established in the centre of the cotton districts—not on, but within 40 miles of the railway, with which they would be connected by a motor road. This would save a third of the weight to be transported, and the seed would be available for distribution on the spot, instead of being re-transported back again. An oil-expressing plant should be associated with them for treating the surplus seed, and the oil sent to rail in tanks.

Ginneries—and of course purchase—must be conducted by an agency. Government cannot undertake it, and it would be undesirable as a matter of policy that it should. Each ginnery should be a centre of research, experiment, and advice to native cultivators. Additional sites suggested are Maska, Katagum, Keffi, Abakaliki, and possibly Ogoja.

Ginneries should not be erected until the need for them is fully assured. Failure to realise this has resulted in three 'silent' ginneries in the Yoruba-Egba country, while the remainder are insufficiently supplied. Questions of transport and of the feasibility of a remunerative price must first be studied, or 'an ideal cotton district'—like Abakaliki—may prove to be a failure after heavy expenses have been incurred.

It is also essential, as the Director of Agriculture (Southern Provinces) points out, that cultural tests should be made, so that it may be assured that cotton can hold its own against other competing crops. Ilorin is a case in point. The Government was said to be backward in its zeal to establish cotton in this district many years ago. Today the Agricultural Department reports that after five years of continuous experiment and failure it is proved to be unsuitable.

(d) It is desirable that a cheap and also a better class of cloth should be imported (without size), which will compete with locally-woven cloth, so that the large proportion of raw cotton at present used in the country should be available for export.

(e) By the importation of ploughs, stump extractors, ped-rails and country carts, and by the education of the peasantry in their use and in the use of the ox in agriculture, much, as I have said, can be done to save labour and increase cultivation. Possibly the Agency might undertake the stumping of an area, and then hand it over to native cultivators, on the condition that it is used for cotton cultivation for sale to the Agency. Purchases must be made in cash. To the introduction of 'barter' the failure in Ishan (where the best cotton in Nigeria was grown) was primarily due—as in part was the failure at Abakaliki.

97. (f) *Cocoa*

Cocoa is a crop which commands a high price, with the minimum of labour and attention, and therefore (as Sir Hugh Clifford has observed) it is one which especially commends itself to the African natives. It is very badly prepared for the market, in spite of the untiring efforts of the Agricultural Department to introduce proper methods of fermentation, etc. The climate and soil of the Southern Provinces are well adapted to cocoa, and the quantity exported is increasing yearly. The quantity exported in 1917 affords no criterion of the output, since export was restricted, but even so 15,422 tons, valued at half a million, were shipped, as against 3,621 in 1913 (£157,500).

98. *New Products*

I cannot in this place devote more than a very short paragraph to the many openings which invite development in Nigeria. Coconuts would give a most profitable yield in copra, and need little cultivation. Their growth could be indefinitely extended. Limes grow luxuriantly and yield heavily. A recent report on the Government lime-juice factory in British Guiana states that 16 per cent. profit on capital outlay was realised. It combines a coffee-huller and pulper, a grain mill, and a rice-huller and polisher. Ginger (£5 to £6 a cwt.) is another possible source of profit. Fibres of all kinds, including sisal and jute, have not received proper attention. Para rubber-seed, and indeed cotton-seed oil are almost neglected. Tobacco offers excellent prospects. The better quality for export should be cured by skilled Europeans. Of unmanufactured tobacco for sale to natives, 2,773 tons, value £184,000, were imported in 1913. (2,050 tons, value £195,455, in 1917.) Potatoes grow well, and have become a native crop in the Bauchi highlands.

Rice can be grown to any extent to replace the present import, which in the four years prior to the war averaged 10,800 tons at £10 15s. a ton. The example already quoted of British Guiana is apposite, where an import of 11,300 tons in 1899 was by 1915 converted into an export of 9,000 tons. Handmills weighing 330 lbs., with an output of 100 lbs. per hour, would be of great use (made by Douglas & Grant, Kirkcaldy). Ripe bananas can be dried, on the system adopted by the Germans in the Cameroons, and would form a valuable export. Fish abound off the coasts, and there is little sea-fishing. A trawler made large catches before the war, when the import of dried fish amounted to 4,550 tons, valued at £135,000.

Very many other products might be instanced.

99. *Questions affecting trade. (a) Credit*

The extent to which it is desirable to give credit to native middlemen is

one which affects trade very much and merits a brief consideration. Liberal credit was a feature of German methods of trade, and added greatly to their popularity with the natives as traders. Some British merchants have emulated them, and I learnt in 1913 that the aggregate indebtedness of the middlemen at Opobo to the half-dozen merchants there was probably over £200,000. At Abeokuta one firm gave very large credit.

These credits were regarded rather as an advance of capital for trading purposes than as a mere loan, and their object was to exclude competition and create monopolies. The Native 'Houses' (see paragraph 23) were convenient agencies for the purpose, and thus resembled 'tied houses' in England. Debts were secured by mortgages on land and property, to which the mortgagor often had no proper title, and which belonged to the community of which he was the titular head. The result was to foster the conception of individual ownership of land in the coastal area, which is opposed to the native land tenure.

Under this system the native middleman obtained goods on 'trust', traded in the interior, and sold the produce to his creditor. Prices to the producer are cut down to the minimum, while the merchant must accept the procedure without discrimination as to quality, and ship it—often to the detriment of the standard and reputation of Nigerian produce in the home markets. As a result he was eager for Government inspection in interior markets.

This system has, I believe, been much modified in the past four years, largely owing to the exodus of the German firms, and 'trust' is now comparatively negligible. The ignorant middleman who has to do without this credit, as the peasant has to do without his gin, is apt to regret that the Germans who fostered both have gone.

I submit that attempts to create monopolies for individual firms or groups of firms, whether by 'trust', or by exclusive spheres of trade, are inimical to the development and prosperity of the country, and it is for this reason that some have welcomed the advent of American or Dutch participation.

100. (b) *Produce Inspection*

A system has gradually grown up by which the Comptroller of Customs employs men to inspect produce offered for sale at the ports and in certain interior markets, and to prohibit the sale and even fine the vendors, if the produce does not come up to an arbitrary standard of purity. The salaries of these native inspectors are paid from a fund to which, by an informal arrangement, the merchants contribute. They strongly support the system, and press for its extension.

In my view the procedure is unsound and undesirable. It is clearly the duty of Government to use every endeavour to detect and punish fraudulent adulteration, but a vendor who, without intent to defraud, or to make his produce appear other than what it is, offers inferior produce for sale commits no criminal offence, and cannot be legally interfered with. It is for the merchant to refuse to buy, or to offer a reduced price to cover the cost of cleaning.

It is argued that competition is so keen that inferior produce will find a purchaser at unreduced rates to secure the goodwill of the vendors; that in

these circumstances inferior produce would be exported were Government inspection withdrawn. Nigerian products would then command lower prices in the home markets, by which the exporter of good produce would suffer.

To such arguments it suffices to reply that it is not the function of Government to interfere in order to save traders from the results of their own folly in purchasing at a loss in order to outbid each other. The Government can, however, fix a standard of purity, and conduct a test inspection at the ports before shipment—a task which falls more naturally within the sphere of the Customs Department than the endeavour to control interior markets, with which they have nothing to do. Increased vigilance against fraudulent adulteration may be desirable by the police, and by inspectors under the control of the District Administrative Staff, and this is preferable to the employment of men who are not under any proper control, and are exposed to the temptation of accepting bribes, and of a misuse of power, which it would be almost impossible to detect. Mr. Trigge, of the Niger Company, in his evidence before the Edible Nuts Committee opposed the demand of the Liverpool merchants for Government inspection prior to purchase. He stated that the exports of the Company, which had never been subject to inspection, bore as good a reputation as any. This may to some extent be explained by the fact that in most of the Niger Company's markets there was little competition, and they could therefore refuse to purchase inferior produce. Mr. (now Major-General) Gray, a merchant of great experience, supported this view, and held that it was the duty of traders to inspect for themselves, and regulate the price according to quality.

The distinction therefore between the sale of adulterated, or merely of inferior produce, was made more clear in the new Ordinance of 1917 than it had previously been. Regulations provided for a standard of purity and inspection before shipment—not before purchase—but the matter has been allowed to remain in temporary abeyance during the War. It is desirable that the merchants should themselves encourage producers to maintain a good standard by offering a better price for what is clean and fresh—for soft oil, and for properly fermented cocoa for instance—which command higher prices in the home markets.

101. (c) *Middlemen*

'The Times' (20.7.17) describes 'the unnecessary middleman' as 'a mere parasite of industry, whose operations add to the price, but not to the value of an article'. In the purchase of raw material in Africa, however, the merchant himself generally speaking acts as middleman between the native producer and the home manufacturer. The native middleman, who purchases in small quantities in distant markets, and sells in bulk, arranging for transport to the merchant's store, is often an agent no less indispensable than the merchant himself—especially in the Southern Provinces. The multiplication, however, of hands, through which produce passes before it reaches the shipper (each of whom adds his profits to its cost), and the interference of middlemen where they are not required constitute a burden on trade.

Railways, roads, and the security afforded by Government, have brought the merchant into closer touch with the producer than was possible when the native 'houses' barred access to the markets and collected the produce, which they had sold at what arbitrary prices they chose. Numerous European

trading depots are now established in the interior, but firms are still too apt to follow the old tradition, and wait for middlemen and touts to bring the produce to their stores. There are noteworthy exceptions. It is very desirable in the interests alike of the merchant and of the producer, that purchasers should make every effort to get into personal touch with the native, to acquire his language, to study his tastes and stimulate his requirements, and to teach him how to prepare his produce for the market. Were the native for instance to be taught to distinguish between hard and soft oil, and to prepare only the latter he would gain from 10 per cent. to 15 per cent. Improved methods of transport would inevitably follow—whether mechanical or by the use of ox-drawn carts, which would at once reduce cost, and set free human labour for productive enterprise.

Present methods need only be described, and any sane critic must condemn them. Let me instance the ground-nut trade. With the advent of 'the ground-nut season' (September to April) Kano is flooded with an undesirable influx of aliens from the South—who set up their weighing machines on every avenue of approach, and seize the produce from the peasant forcing their own price upon him, and making exorbitant profits by re-sale to the merchants. The latter complain that the ground-nuts are adulterated with sand, that cotton is mixed with stones and sand, and is watered—bales being purposely left in the rain and bags thus rotted—though before the advent of these parasites the produce was clean. Yet the merchants in their eager rivalry with each other, lend weighing machines free of cost, supply empty bags and advance them large sums of money without security (for they are without capital) with which they occasionally abscond. One firm reports that it loses as much as £800 annually on such advances, another quotes a loss of £500 lent to one individual. It is said that the profit made by these middlemen often amounts to £1 per ton, and the result of this trade rivalry has helped to put up the price from £5 or £6, which is remunerative to the producer, to £10 to £12 a ton. Hides and skins are similarly affected and are now adulterated with blood and sand.

In the interest of the peasantry Government has been forced to intervene, and restrict all dealings within a certain radius of Kano, to an authorised market, where some degree of control is possible. Free competition is most desirable, so long as the enhanced prices go to the producer and stimulate production, but the employment of touts and middlemen who purchase produce already on its way, and close to the market, is a curse to the trade, and only encourages an undesirable class.

The subject is too large to deal with fully here, but as a result of a full investigation of it, I am convinced that the only remedy both for the improvement of the quality of produce, and for the prevention of reckless exploitation of the soil by native owners whose only object is to make rapid profits, is that merchants should employ expert buyers and pay according to quality, and that Government should inspect before shipment and refuse to allow shipment of inferior produce. This is the conclusion arrived at by the Committee appointed in India in December, 1917, to report on this subject, and it was by drastic refusal to allow export of inferior maize that the Government of South Africa revolutionized the quality of that export.

It is impossible that inspection by Government before purchase can be made universal or compulsory, and it cannot, therefore, be effective—I am

informed that one firm decided to buy only hides of good quality, but as others were buying indiscriminately their purchases fell by 75 per cent. and they were forced to revert. The large increase of small native shippers (the Customs reports that shippers have increased in Lagos from nine (pre-War) to over seventy, and in Ibadan from eight to over twenty) compels an inspection at the coast if the standard is to be maintained.

The Acting Director of Agriculture, Southern Province, even suggested that it should be made a penal offence for a trader to buy inferior produce. This would be no less unjust than to penalise the vendor who sells without intent to deceive, and would be equally ineffective and impossible in practice. If 'the merchant's function is the exchange of commodities' and nothing more (as argued by Mr. Miller in a letter to the press) and he holds the view that he can make profit on this exchange whatever the quality, which it is the function of others to improve—he will presently find that he has lost his market.

102. *Currency and Barter*

Trading by barter is still carried on in some parts of Nigeria, in spite of the efforts of Government to put a stop to it, and the assurance of principals that they do not encourage it. There is abundant evidence to show that the attraction of the apparently 'double profit' to be gained by ignoring currency as a medium of trade, and selling and buying in a single transaction, has done much to destroy trade. Where this system has been replaced, and cash is now offered for produce and accepted for goods sold, trade has increased greatly. The growing scarcity of gin—formerly the chief article of barter—has done something to effect improvement, but there are still districts in the Benue region in which the native in exchange for his produce, can only obtain articles which he does not want. He sells them for what they will fetch in the native market, where, in consequence, they may often be bought at a much lower price than from the merchant's store.

Another archaic method of trade is the continued use of 'manilla' (a heavy horseshoe of brass and alloy), brass and copper rods, &c., as currency, chiefly in the Southern Provinces. The Association of West African Merchants writes, 'The merchant only accepts the manilla in quantity in the dry season, when trade in produce is restricted. He takes it as a pledge against advances in goods, and not as an actual purchase. This enables the native trader to carry on, as the goods are sold against the approaching produce season . . . during which the use of the manilla is confined almost entirely to dealings between the producer and the middleman.' The merchant thus countenances the use of manillas while complaining of its adverse effect on trade. It is peculiarly objectionable as a form of currency owing to its great weight, which absorbs transport.

Some years ago certain enterprising merchants shipped a quantity of manillas to England, and 'did not lose in the transaction', but they abandoned the scheme for lack of 'encouragement'. The merchants now enquire whether Government has any 'policy' in this matter, and demand that it should buy up the whole existing circulation. I made early enquiries (since repeated when metal was required for munitions) as to the cost involved by thus demonetising the manilla, but its currency value has become so greatly enhanced, that I did not feel justified in appropriating revenue for the benefit of a comparatively small section. It is a matter for consideration whether the

Currency Board should not assist in buying up these manillas, since it has large funds at its disposal, and they will be replaced by coin currency.

SLAVERY AND FREE LABOUR

103. *Slavery in Northern Provinces*

I cannot here deal at any length with the subject of slavery, but the question of labour-supply so intimately affects the development of Nigeria, that a few words regarding it will not be out of place. It was mentioned in paragraph 2 that in 1900 when the Administration of Northern Nigeria reverted from the Chartered Company to the Crown, large armies led by Fulani chiefs annually raided for slaves, and had depopulated the country. With the conquest of the Moslem States, these organised raids were put an end to. By the abolition of the 'Legal Status' of slavery, a slave had power to assert his freedom. It was not, however, illegal to possess a slave, but the status was a voluntary one. All children born after March 31st, 1901, were free at birth.

The sudden abolition of the institution of domestic slavery would have produced social chaos, and the wholesale assertion of their freedom by slaves was therefore discouraged. A slave freed by redemption was in native opinion and in his own eyes, truly a freeman, while one who was arbitrarily emancipated by Government (unless for good cause), or who asserted his freedom by desertion, was not. Redemption with the co-operation of the native courts was encouraged.

104. *Result of Government Policy*

Generally speaking, it may be said that to-day there are no slaves in the Moslem States who are not well aware that they can assert their freedom if they choose, that the native courts deal liberally and impartially with all cases, and that the masters not only acquiesce, but increasingly recognise the advantages of free labour, while all persons under 18 years of age are free-born. In Sokoto, which received tribute in slaves, and where at the time of its conquest in 1903 the great majority of the labouring class, were slaves, and the masters most tenacious of their rights under Moslem law, the registers show 21,711 slaves freed by regular process up to the end of 1917. This represents only a fraction of the number who have gained their freedom. The number thus liberated in the Northern Provinces increases steadily each year, and exceeded 55,000 at the end of 1917—with 7,212 in that year. Residents report that even as regards those who voluntarily remain, the old relation of master and slave is practically dead and is replaced by that of master and servant. The traffic in children, especially in the Benue regions, has been suppressed with difficulty and recrudesces from time to time.

The example set by Government of prompt payment to the individual labourer (and not through the intermediary of a chief), the introduction of currency, and the unwearied counsel of the political staff, have all contributed to the formation of a free labour market. The former slave owners are appreciating the advantage of being relieved of the responsibility of maintaining their slaves, and the many other disadvantages of the system of slave-labour, since they can now enforce their contracts in the courts. Hired labour is now largely employed by them.

105. *Slavery in Southern Provinces*

In the Southern Provinces the new Slavery Ordinance decreed the emancipation of all persons 'heretofore or hereafter born in or brought into' the country, a decree of emancipation justified by the successive enactments against slavery in past years, and by the fact that Moslem law, which recognises the institution, is not applicable in any part of the Southern Provinces.

106. *Employment of Free Labour by Government and Others*

The admirable way in which naked savages employed on the Baro-Kano Railway construction, and later on the Port Harcourt Railway, and at the Colliery (*see* paragraph 138), had been handled, the direct cash payment to the individual, and the gradual introduction of piece work, has familiarised these primitive tribes with the idea of free paid labour, and of a fair day's wage for a fair day's work. The educative value of these Government works, and of the similar treatment on the mine-field, has been incalculable.

Some pressure through their chiefs was in the first instance necessary in order to obtain workers on the railway, &c. When to their surprise they found that they were regularly paid, given facilities for purchasing food and other requirements, and allowed to return at the proper season to sow or reap their fields, this pressure became less and less necessary, and they returned of their own free will.

'Political labour' as it was called, is now in turn abolished in the Northern Provinces, and the intervention of Government will, I trust, soon be equally unnecessary in the South, as the good treatment and pay become generally known, and prove attractive as they have done at the Colliery and on the Eastern Railway construction.

107. *Warning to Employers of Labour*

On the other hand it is well that employers of labour, whether on the mine-fields or elsewhere, should realise two important facts in regard to labour. First that the Government policy, being radically opposed to coercion in any form, even for works of such urgency and importance to the country as railways and roads, will not employ it in order to procure labour for private undertakings. Employers must, therefore, make the conditions of service sufficiently attractive to secure the labourers they need. To effect this high wages are not necessary, and they are to be deprecated. An employer who pays more than the standard wage does an injury to the development of the country. Labour will be secured only by kind and fair treatment, decent hutments, the entire absence of blows and rough usage, and the facilities already described.

Secondly, the employer must recognise that employment in agriculture, and the collection of saleable produce are more lucrative than wages. Probably the peasant who grows ground-nuts can earn double what he could get as a labourer for wages, and such labour, at his own times and in his own way, is more congenial to him. He can, moreover, employ his women and children in his field and add to his earnings. Land is abundant, and the class which prefers daily wages is not large. Probably the majority prefer to work for wages only in the off-season, when their crops do not require continuous attention. It is advisable therefore that the employer should introduce power plant, and labour-saving machinery to as large an extent as possible. He will

have only himself to blame, if, by failing to do so, his venture does not succeed for lack of labour.

FINANCIAL

108. *Preparation of Annual Budget*

On amalgamation the revenue and expenditure of the two former Governments were merged in a single Budget. The financial year, which on account of the grant in aid had in Northern Nigeria ended, as in England, on March 31st, was from January 1st, 1914, made identical with the calendar year, as in Southern Nigeria. The expenditure of the Colony proper, so far as it can be conveniently separated from that of the Protectorate, is printed separately, and a corresponding sum is assigned from the General Revenue. These estimates are laid before the Legislative Council, and may be altered in accordance with their criticisms. The usual Supply Bill is then passed.

The Lieutenant-Governors of the Southern and Northern Provinces prepare their respective estimates, and all changes are carefully scrutinised by, and discussed with, the Governor-General—more especially the programme of capital expenditure, which is adjusted to the available balance. The Heads of Central Departments submit their estimates through the Central Secretariat, and the Governor-General personally goes through all changes and the programme of capital works, with the General Manager and with any other Head when necessary. The three Budgets are printed separately in a single volume, the Revenue and Expenditure of each being shown under each head in parallel columns and totalled in the Central Secretariat. The Revenue forms a single fund to meet the aggregate expenditure. The Financial Statement and Appendices, &c., are added by the Treasurer. The financial unification is thus complete.

109. *Financial Position prior to Amalgamation*

When, in 1912, the Imperial Treasury was consulted regarding the proposed Amalgamation of Nigeria, it was pointed out that the combined deficit (or excess of expenditure over revenue) of the two Governments in that year was estimated at £357,000, and that the average deficit of the last four years stood at £229,000. The Secretary of State considered it evident that for some time to come, and even with the most careful economy in Administration, the Revenues of Amalgamated Nigeria would not suffice to meet the expenditure. He proposed that the grant in aid should be fixed at £100,000 for five years, after which it would cease, and with this limited assistance he anticipated a deficit of about £200,000 in the first year, which he proposed should be met from the Colonial reserves of Southern Nigeria. These in the previous year (1911) stood at £1,007,625. The proposal was accepted after scrutiny by the Lords of the Treasury, and the reduced grant commenced on April 1st, 1913.

110. *Position at close of first year of Amalgamation. Effect of the War*

On Amalgamation I was able to effect considerable economies in the expenditure of the Southern Provinces, which much more than compensated for some increase in the Administrative Service of the North. But the outbreak of war threw unexpected burdens upon the Budget. Customs receipts

fell by £267,000 in 1914, owing to dislocation of trade, and the cost in 1914 of the Cameroons War was estimated at £167,000. Excluding, however, an advance to the new Eastern Railway, which was met from Colonial reserves, the first year of Amalgamation closed with a credit balance of £80,500 instead of the anticipated deficit of £200,000—which, owing to these unexpected burdens, might have been expected to have increased to £634,000. The balance of surplus assets of the combined Administrations stood at £1,273,000 in spite of the advance to the railway construction of £629,000. These were astonishingly satisfactory results.

111. *Financial Position during the war, and at present date.*

The Secretary of State had decided that the new railway should be completed to the colliery (150 miles), but that all further construction should be suspended. To effect this and carry on the Administration to the end of 1915, it was estimated by the Colonial Office that we might require a loan of one and three-quarters million from the Imperial Treasury. By the close of 1916 the whole of the reserves had been absorbed in financing the Eastern Railway, and there was actually a small deficit of £124,411. But Nigeria has not had to ask for any loan whatever. The first 150 miles of the Eastern Railway has been completed at a cost of about £2,000,000, including purchases of material for the remainder of the line to which the Government was committed. Additional expenditure incurred on account of the War amounts to about £700,000, with approximately an equal sum in payment of salaries of officers lent to the Imperial Government, and similar charges borne on the estimates (£705,000 to end of 1918). The revenue has meanwhile lost a sum of £1,120,000 (receipts in 1913) from duties on trade spirits which have ceased to appear on our estimates. The recovery in the last two years is indeed surprising, and shows the enormous wealth and potentialities of the country. The surplus assets on December 31st, 1919, are expected to reach £871,609, an increase since January 1st, 1917, of £995,000. They stood at £702,785 on December 31st, 1918. The revenue for 1919 is estimated at £4,070,525. The receipts for 1918 were £4,014,189, viz., £652,085 over the estimate. On the other hand the restoration of the normal staff, the rehabilitation of the railway and buildings (upon which inadequate expenditure for maintenance has been incurred during these years of stress), the necessary expansion of several departments arrested for four years, the increased salaries or war bonuses, the enhanced cost of all materials and of prisoners' food, will involve increased expenditure. There will also be the interest and sinking fund on the £6,000,000 of the Imperial War Debt, which Nigeria has declared her readiness to undertake, commencing six months after the termination of the War, viz., a sum of £13,250,000, spread over 36 years. Towards the debt charges on this War Loan, the Native Administrations will probably be able to contribute a sum of £70,000 per annum. I have no fear that the expanding revenue will not be able to bear this burden. The estimate of revenue for 1919, large as it is, was prepared when the duration of the War was still uncertain. With the expansion of trade due to increased imports, and of shipping, with reduction of freights, it may probably be exceeded, for it is certain that there will be a strong demand for all the produce the country can export. It exceeds the estimated expenditure for 1919 by no less than £288,000.

The realised revenue in the first year of Amalgamation (1914) was £3,048,381

(including a grant-in-aid of £100,000). The conservative estimate for 1919 is, as I have said, £4,070,525 without a grant, in spite of the loss from trade spirits, and the war conditions, which I have described. The rehabilitated reserves are available for arrears of capital expenditure. These figures justify a hopeful outlook. I shall have some few suggestions to make in Part IV.

112. *Reasons for satisfactory financial position*

It is difficult, without an analysis of figures which would be out of place here, to describe how these results have been obtained. They cannot be ascribed to heavy war taxation for the only war taxes imposed were (1) an export duty on three staples (increased in 1918 to six) which affected the articles so slightly that the control price in England was not altered from that obtaining for other West African Colonies, while the local output was greater than ever (*see* paragraph 73).* (2) A surtax of 25 per cent. on all imports except spirits, unmanufactured tobacco and cartridges, and a surtax of 30 per cent. on railway freights. The former yielded £108,000 only in 1917. The latter was not more than was necessary to meet the increased cost of fuel and other necessities of the railway. That it had no adverse effect on the development of traffic was proved by the fact that the receipts rose from £632,130 in 1913 to £1,267,000 in 1918—just double.

Increased revenue was obtained by steady increase in the yield from direct taxation in the North, by the development of the colliery, by the high prices (and consequently increased royalties) on tin, by larger receipts in fines and fees owing to the increased efficiency of the Courts, and larger railway receipts from the volume of produce carried. Decreased expenditure was affected by the unavoidable reduction of the civil staff, and the absence of part of the military force, by the reduction to the lowest possible point of all capital works, and by general economy in every detail.

113. *The Debt of Nigeria*

The total debt of Nigeria amounts to about eight and a half millions (chiefly incurred by Southern Nigeria), viz., about two years' revenue. Of this about six millions has been spent on railways, for which, in the South, Major Waghorn considered an inadequate mileage had been constructed. On the total sum an annual debt charge of £448,400 accrues, which is more than met by the surplus earnings of the railway after paying all working expenses, and by receipts from harbour dues. These receipts may be expected to increase largely and rapidly, especially from the Eastern Railway, the earnings of which are at present chiefly confined to the carriage of coal from the colliery. Since it traverses one of the richest districts in West Africa with a dense population, its commercial prospects are immense, and with the return of normal conditions and the completion of wharf facilities at Port Harcourt, there can be no doubt of largely increased revenue.

114. *New Debt Charges*

The service of the existing debt is, as I have said, fully covered by the receipts from the remunerative works upon which it has been expended. The war debt assumed in relief of the Imperial Exchequer, deducting the share borne

* Palm kernels, £1 2s. 6d. a ton; palm oil, £2 a ton; ground-nuts, 10s. a ton; cocoa £2 6s. 8d. a ton; tanned hides and skins, 3d a lb.; untanned or haired skins, 2d. a lb.

by the Native Treasuries, will probably involve an annual expenditure of about £290,000, and a new loan, say, of £3,000,000 will be required, making in all a total new annual debt for loan service of £470,000. We must look to the Colonial reserves for the capital outlay for rehabilitating the railway, for the new capitals, and for the large housing programme (*see* paragraph 118).

The new loan should be devoted to (1) the completion of the Eastern Railway, including the Benue Bridge, and the short branch line to the mines, together with its share of the Kaduna workshops. (2) Wharves and harbour improvements at Lagos and Port Harcourt, including the mole-works and dredged channel, for which only about £154,000 remains from the present loan. (3) The terminal at Apapa. (4) The repayment to Colonial Reserves of the advances made for the Eastern Railway, as may be required for the purposes just enumerated. The completion of these works will no doubt cost more than double the loan I have proposed, but before a further sum is required the portions of the works completed will be bringing in revenue.

The profits on coinage in the hands of the Currency Board amounted at June, 1917, to £1,700,000, and must now be over two millions. The larger portion of this belongs to Nigeria, and should be available to save borrowing.

115. *Future prospects: (a) Revenue*

It is worth while to examine these forecasts of revenue and capital for 1919 in order to judge how far they represent normal conditions. The estimate of revenue is £4,070,525, of this, £28,700 is non-recurrent (sale of S.S. 'Dakar' and refund from Cameroons Province). Customs and Harbour receipts may both be expected to increase rapidly under peace conditions. The Direct Tax, only recently instituted in a portion of the Southern Provinces, may be expected to yield a much larger sum in a future year when more universally applied. The yield steadily increases each year in the Northern Provinces. The profits on the Colliery by sales to shipping, &c., may be expected to increase rapidly. In illustration it may be noted that the receipts from the following items show an increase in the estimates for 1919 over the receipts for 1913 as follows: Railways by £750,870, Colliery by £147,000, Direct Taxes by £283,022, Royalties on tin £34,000. Thus, deducting the non-recurrent items, we have a Revenue of £4,041,000, which it is reasonable to expect will increase very rapidly.

116. (b) *Expenditure*

The estimated expenditure in 1919 is £3,782,648. War bonuses have been increased by £170,000 (included in the estimate) and will be replaced by a permanent revision of salaries. If to this be added the filling of vacancies and the increase of staff, especially in the Political and Education Departments, it would be advisable to add not less than £200,000, but this would be greatly affected by the adoption of the proposals made in paragraphs 207 to 223. The provision for the West African Frontier Force amounts to £292,974. The normal cost of the Force should not exceed £176,000 (paragraphs 38 and 243); decrease £117,000. The £25,000 provided for interest on temporary loans disappears, and also the charges for Eastern Railway Construction and Harbour Works—in all £88,000. The debt charges will be increased by £470,000 (*see* paragraph 114). The 1919 estimate of capital expenditure on railways and public works is fairly liberal. The British Staff of the Medical

Department, though reduced by 45 per cent. during the War, has, with the aid of motor cars and additional native staff, worked very successfully. The actual pre-war cost (1914) was £123,300; the estimated cost in 1919 for a somewhat depleted staff is £127,500. The normal cost should not, I think, exceed £100,000. These adjustments would add £412,500 to the 1919 estimate bringing the expenditure to £4,195,000, as against a minimum revenue of £4,041,000, a deficit of £154,000.

117. *Summary of Prospects*

These calculations are necessarily based on mere guesses and assumptions, but they will serve to show that the prospect is reassuring. They take no account of the expansion of revenue, which may be expected from a large increase of imports and of harbour dues and railway freights which will accrue from the liberation of shipping and the rapid increase of trade. Duties on spirits for sale to natives are entirely eliminated, but, as will be seen from the section on Liquor, I hope that the Revenue may derive a substantial sum from the excise on locally-brewed beer. The incidence of indirect taxation is now, as I have shown, much reduced. Expenditure, on the other hand, should be further reduced by the use of local timber, lime, and tiles, &c., and it may reasonably be expected that the present abnormal prices for supplies of all kinds imported from England and America will decrease. Generally speaking, there are grounds for anticipating a rapid increase over the four million pounds which I have assumed as the present normal revenue, and ample justification for the loans proposed, without recourse to any spirit duties.

In my original report I observed that the financial position presented two unsatisfactory features—first, that nearly two-thirds of the Customs' revenue was derived from trade spirits; and secondly, that the exports were not sufficiently diversified, so that if any disease attacked the oil-palm, or for other reason palm products were to fail, the prosperity of Southern Nigeria would collapse. Both drawbacks have, I trust, now been removed; ground-nuts, cotton, cocoa, skins and hides and tin may now all be regarded as staple exports.

118. *Expenditure of Reserves*

The Treasurer's financial statement anticipates that the Colonial reserves at the close of 1919 stand at £871,000. This calculation will, of course, be altered by the changes I have outlined but it is justifiable to assume that the reserves will be in the neighbourhood of a million sterling.

In view of the progressive increase of revenue and the encouraging outlook, there is no good reason for maintaining reserves at anything approaching this sum. Liquid assets should be devoted to rehabilitating the railway, to a large programme of house-building, and to the completion of the two Capitals.

Not only are houses for Europeans desirable in order to implement the promise of free quarters and advantageous to Government from a health point of view, but they would effect a financial saving. A sum of approximately £6,500 is spent yearly in erecting temporary houses, and a further sum of between £5,000 and £6,000 is disbursed to officers as compensation for quarters. This aggregate annual expenditure is equivalent to the interest on the capital sum required to build from 150 to 200 houses, together with depreciation and maintenance charges. The most pressing railway needs are

for rolling stock and workshop equipment, especially at the new centre at Kaduna Junction, already sanctioned but postponed by the War. Large orders have already been placed. The renewal of rails on the southern section will also soon be a pressing matter. Regarding the new Capitals I have written elsewhere.

119. *Cameroons. Native Administrations*

No special reference has been made in this brief review of the addition to Nigeria of the occupied territories of the Cameroons, except in so far that this province would participate in the increase of staff and the capital expenditure which has been included. The separate estimates, which have been prepared annually, show that with economy its normal revenue should nearly meet its normal expenditure.

The Native Administrations in the Northern Provinces are in a very prosperous condition and well able to contribute the sum named to the Imperial War Debt. Their aggregate revenue has increased from £70,895 in 1906-7 to £441,070 in 1917; the total in 1913 was £324,449, an increase of over 35 per cent. in four years. They had at the end of 1917 £255,600 invested, and are increasingly able to undertake provincial capital works, roads, &c. (See paragraph 25.) The Native treasuries in the Southern Provinces will also I am assured, soon be in a position to contribute.

120. *Grants in aid*

The grant in aid to Nigeria from the Imperial Exchequer has now ceased. Apart from a sum of £611,000 which was paid for the West African Frontier Force between 1897 and 1901, viz., before Northern Nigeria was transferred from the Chartered Company, and while it was mainly employed in Ashanti, the total grants made amount to £4,261,000. Even if the cost of the West African Frontier Force be added while it was employed on Imperial Service on the French frontier and Ashanti (where otherwise British troops would have been required at far greater cost) we have a total of less than £4,900,000. To this may be added the sum paid to the Royal Niger Company for expropriation, £865,000. On the other hand a great part of the grants was transmitted to Nigeria in silver coin on which the Treasury admitted a profit of 58 per cent. On the most liberal calculation, therefore, the cost of acquiring Nigeria has not exceeded, say, £4,700,000.

The Uganda Railway alone cost a much larger sum, and since Nigeria has already incurred an expenditure approximating a million, and proposes to accept a further six millions on behalf of the Imperial War Debt, it will be seen that this vast country, which affords an increasing market for British industry and commerce, has been acquired at no cost whatever to the British taxpayer.

RAILWAYS

121. *Financial Position*

The total sum expended on railway construction in Nigeria to the end of 1918, whether from Loan Account or from Colonial Revenue and Reserves, is shown at £8,670,145. The expenditure on the existing railways (whether recurrent charges or Capital Account) is estimated in 1919 at £825,363 (actual in 1917 £757,700). The earnings in 1919 are estimated at £1,383,000

(actual in 1917 (£1,009,323).* If to the 1919 expenditure be added the full charge for Interest and Sinking Fund on capital cost (whether from loan or advances from revenue) it will be seen that the railways are not only paying these debt charges, but show a margin of profit of about £60,000.

It is true, as I have said elsewhere, that an inadequate sum has been spent on maintenance during the War, and a considerable sum must therefore be added to the capital account for additional rolling-stock—workshop equipment, and in some sections for renewal of rails, but considering the increased cost during the War of fuel, and of all materials, and war bonuses to staff the financial position of the open-line railways may be considered eminently satisfactory. There is, moreover, every prospect of a large increase in earnings as soon as the removal of war restrictions, and an adequate supply of shipping, render the expansion of trade possible.

122. *Mileage of open lines*

The mileage (and gauge) of existing open lines in Nigeria is as follows:

Western Railway, 3-feet 6 inches gauge, Lagos—Kano	704½ miles
Western Railway, Baro Branch, 3-feet 6 inches gauge, Minna—Baro	111 "
Bauchi Light Railway, 2-feet 6 inches gauge, Zaria—Bukuru	143 „
Eastern Railway, 3-feet 6 inches gauge, P. Harcourt—Udi	151 „
Total	1,110 miles

The length of the extension from Udi to Kaduna, which was under construction until arrested by the War, is 430 miles, making a total mileage—open or under construction—of 1,540 miles. Much economy was affected when the system was unified prior to amalgamation.

The Eastern Railway to Udi is laid with rails 60 lb. to the yard. The first 60 miles of the Western Railway from Lagos to the stone quarries at Aro should be re-laid with 80 lb. rails. It is worth considering whether it would not be worth while to relay the remainder of the Western Line with 60 lb. rails, using the present 45 lb. rails for new extensions.

123. *Railway and river outlets to the sea*

A reference to the map of Nigeria which forms Appendix I shows that the railway from Lagos running N.E. to Kano, serves the western portion of the Southern Province and at Kano is roughly midway between the French frontier on the west, and the Cameroons on the east. The Niger waterway, fed by the Benue, serves as an outlet for the produce of the central portion of the Southern Province and is connected with the Lagos—Kano Railway line by a branch from Baro, a port on the Niger, to Minna. The Cross River, towards the extreme east, affords a means of transport for those districts for a distance of about 100 miles northwards from the sea. They are navigable only for a few months in the year. Between these two rivers, with their ports at Forcados and Calabar, lies a belt of country about 100 miles broad, which

* The actual Revenue of the Railways in 1917 was £1,009,323, and in 1918 it was £1,267,004 of which the Western Railway earned £1,077,146 and the Eastern £189,858, the profit per mile of open line being £485 10s. The increase on the Western Railway over 1917 was £129,513, viz. 13.6 per cent., and on the Eastern Railway £128,168, viz. 207.7 per cent. Total increase £257,681.

is probably one of the most densely populated in Africa, and also one of the richest in palm produce. It naturally strikes the eye when looking at the map, that the great Bonny estuary, situated in the very centre of the coast line of this area, would form an ideal port. When, however, questions of general railway policy were discussed some 15 years ago, Sir R. Moor stated that it was altogether impossible to make a port on this arm of the sea, or to obtain railway access to it, by reason of the extensive mangrove swamps by which it was bordered.

124. *Investigation of Bonny Creek*

The desirability of finding a port which would serve as the terminus of a railway traversing this belt was accentuated, and became a matter of immediate importance, in connection with the development of the Udi coalfield. It was manifestly inadvisable to base the colliery railway on a port such as Onitsha on the Niger situated 140 miles up a river, difficult of navigation, except for a limited period each year, if a possible seaport could be found.

With the object of investigating this problem, I visited the Bonny Creek in December, 1912, shortly after my arrival in Nigeria, accompanied by Captain Child, R.N., Director of Marine, and Sir J. Eaglesome, Director of Railways and Works. The Bonny Bar at the entrance to the creek, 325 miles east of Lagos, shows 21 feet of water at high tide; which contrasts favourably with Forcados or Lagos. The forbidding expanse of mangrove swamps which border this great estuary for miles had apparently discouraged investigation heretofore. Deep water was found up to Okrika, 30 miles, where the mangrove swamp was interrupted, and Sir J. Eaglesome reported that no insuperable difficulties existed to the construction of a railway terminal; he was in fact, at first sight much impressed with its possibilities.

Beyond this point the estuary was uncharted and had been little explored. It was reported that navigation was difficult. A careful survey of the whole estuary, up to and surrounding this point, was at once put in hand. In the course of this survey it was found that the deep water extended for a considerable distance beyond Okrika, and some eight miles north-west of it the mangrove swamp suddenly gave place for a distance of 1,400 yards to red cliffs 45 feet high, which appeared to afford a much better site for a railway terminus. There was at this point a fairly large basin for a harbour with deep water 200 yards across at the narrowest point. The site was cleared of dense forest, and it was found to be well adapted for the purpose, though limited in area. Further investigation established the fact that access could be obtained to the mainland, without crossing any swamp or tidal waterway—a piece of good fortune which could not have been anticipated in a district so intersected by back waters—mangrove swamps and creeks. Approval to the project was at once given by the Secretary of State, Mr. (now Viscount) Harcourt, who took a keen personal interest in the scheme, and the port was named after him.

125. *Creation of Port Harcourt*

Port Harcourt is situated about 38 miles from the mouth of the estuary, and at no point along this length was there a less depth of water than 27 to 30 feet—to which depth it was proposed eventually to dredge the Bonny Bar. At the port itself the depth was between 30 and 40 feet (18 to 20 feet along-

side), the minimum breadth of the channel being about 700 feet, widening out at the entrance of the harbour to over 1,000 feet. The first task was to cut down the high cliffs, the spoil from which sufficed to reclaim considerable areas of adjacent swamp, and to lay out a model terminal and township. Segregation was provided for by European and native reservations, separated by a non-residential belt, and houses for the construction staff were rapidly erected. It was not to be expected that the site would be either healthy or attractive at first, and it proved to be infested with every species of biting fly, but when the nearest swamp was reclaimed, the excavations finished, the forest and undergrowth cleared, and gardens and avenues created, it quickly became more salubrious.

126. *Construction of Eastern Railway*

The construction of the railway was put in hand at once, and it reached the coal mines at Udi in May, 1916. The distance had been estimated at 130 miles, but proved to be 151 owing to the very difficult nature of the country—for the line in this section crosses the water-parting from which streams flow to each quarter of the compass, on the north to the Benue, on the east to the Cross River, on the south to the sea, and on the west to the Niger. It is a hilly rugged country intersected by deep ravines. Preparations were made for the further extension to the Benue, and from thence to the junction at Kaduna. Large quantities of material were conveyed to each of these points, and the entire survey was completed, the total actual length of track from the sea to Kaduna being 581 miles. Construction was also begun at Kaduna, and 30 miles were actually completed, while a very careful survey of the bed of the Benue was made for the foundations of the great bridge which will span that river. The point selected for crossing was at the 'Munshi Narrows', 18 miles below Abinsi, where the river is not more than 800 yards broad, but it was found that, deep as the water is here, there existed a fissure at the bottom of the river of unknown depth, and the greatest possible care in placing the pier foundations would be necessary.

The outbreak of war upset all plans. Construction beyond Udi was suspended, but the line was completed up to that point, and had it not been for supply of coal thus rendered available, it is difficult to imagine the collapse which must have resulted from the lack of fuel for the Western Railway. Not only would the prosperity of Nigeria have been most seriously impeded, but the supply of oleaginous produce and tin, so urgently required in England for war purposes, would have been very seriously interfered with. With the cessation of hostilities the construction should be at once resumed. The line and terminal have cost about £2,000,000 sterling, and has so far been entirely financed from revenue and reserves. Meanwhile, the construction of a permanent quay wall was commenced, and coal tips were constructed so that vessels should be able to bunker direct from the wagons. The wharf is still under construction, and has proved a difficult task necessitating the purchase of a costly dredger.

127. *Prospects of Eastern Railway*

The railway traverses one of the richest oil-palm districts in West Africa, with a dense population estimated at 176 to the square mile. The Commercial Intelligence Officer writes: 'Its extraordinary richness is sufficiently indicated

by the export figures of Opobo, Bonny, and the other ports near by, which in 1911 totalled a million in value (one-fifth of the total exports of Nigeria), though there was not a single inland factory.' The advent of the railway will not only cheapen transport, but will set free for productive work the great army of labour at present engaged in transporting produce to the coast. Each portion of the section to Udi as it was opened to traffic at once began to earn revenue.

The further sections will traverse a country well populated by industrious agriculturists, and suitable for cotton. The railway will probably capture the Upper Benue trade. (Ground-nuts, cotton, palm-oil, fibres, beni-seed, hides and skins, shea and livestock.) It will serve the minefields, and give access to the proposed sanatorium.

The township building plots at Port Harcourt were eagerly taken up by merchants and realised large premia. Sites at the principal stations along the Railway route were also at once appropriated. The excellent prospects of the railway were, however, considerably upset by the War, for but little shipping could be allotted to Port Harcourt, where, moreover, pending the completion of the wharves (for which it was difficult to procure material), rapid despatch could not be given to vessels, and bunkering was difficult.

In spite of these drawbacks a fair amount of produce was carried, and the passenger traffic was good, but 70 per cent. of the earnings were made by the carriage of coal from the mines; with return loads of pit props cut from the mangrove forests. The whole section was first included in the General Railway Returns as 'Open Lines' in 1917. Its earnings for that year were £61,700. The estimate for 1919 is £228,000 (of which £155,000 is from coal freights).

128. *Further Extensions: (a) Jemaa-Bukuru*

The branch from Jemaa to Bukuru, the centre of the tin mines (*see* Map, Appendix 1), should be undertaken as an integral part of the prolongation of the Eastern Railway. It is as yet unsurveyed, but the Katab Valley is stated by Mr. (now Major-General) Collard, Chief Surveyor, to afford much the best route for surmounting the escarpment which forms the western edge of the Bauchi Plateau. Its length scaled on the map is only 74 miles.

Bukuru is at present connected with the main (western) line by a light 2-feet 6-inch track which ascends the escarpment by serpentine curves, and steep gradients, and has already become quite inadequate. It would, in any case, have to be replaced by a standard gauge line. The proposed branch not only reduces the distance from the coast by 173 miles (*viz.*, about 50s. a ton), but would enable Udi coal to be delivered at Bukuru at a cost of 50s. to 60s. a ton or less, as against £5 a ton for Welsh coal, or oil at £18 a ton—at pre-War rates which are now indefinitely increased. Since it is an *upward* freight carried by trucks which would otherwise be returning almost empty for produce, the traffic would be particularly valuable to the railway apart from the additional market for Government coal. With a cheap fuel it is possible that smelting would be undertaken locally, a saving of 30 per cent. in rail and ocean freights. The line would also serve to tap the labour supply from the densely populated districts in the South. From these figures it is clear that the advantage to the tin industry would be very great, both in shortening the distance for imports (machinery, fuel, &c.) and the export of tin, while the traffic would be lucrative to the railway and colliery.

Mr. Best, a mining engineer (for whose figures I cannot personally vouch), declared in June, 1912, that if a railway were built, assuring a reasonably cheap fuel to the mines, the output would be increased at least tenfold, viz., by 20,000 to 30,000 tons. Each machine imported would save 270 labourers. At that time Port Harcourt was not discovered, and he contemplated a line to Onitsha, on the Niger, with the costly breaking of bulk.

129. (b) *Kano to Frontier*

Another short extension of great importance is the prolongation of the main line from Kano to the French frontier. At present, goods which are the property of the French Government and consigned by rail to French territory, are free of Customs duties, while private goods, if dutiable, are entered in transit and pay only the difference (if any) between the British and French tariff. The total in 1917 was about 2,000 tons (value, £62,457, exclusive of specie).

Goods for Zinder are carried from Kano to the frontier (72 miles), and those for Fort Lamy (Chad) to Maidugari, in Bornu (330 miles), by camels and human carriers, at a minimum cost of about 9*d.* per ton mile. (See Appendix 7.)

The difficulty of obtaining transport has continually caused a congestion at Kano, and the French are anxious for a better method. Moreover, the demand both for transport and supplies, especially on the long march to the eastern frontier, naturally causes some embarrassment to the Nigerian Government and enhances the cost of both to British traders. The adjudication of the inevitable petty questions which arise adds also to the work of the British administrative staff. With the question of this Kano-Bornu route I will deal presently. I am here concerned with the northern extension towards Zinder.

The provision of a good road on which motor lorries might be run would not be a satisfactory solution, for the cost of petrol at a base 704 miles from the sea by rail, would be very heavy indeed, and its transport onwards by motors would add to the working expenses enormously. On the direct route to Babera there is no ballast beyond the 25th mile, and it would be necessary to adopt either the route *via* Zango (85 miles) or *via* Katsina (132 miles) for 100 miles of which (to Katsina), a fairly good road already exists. These obstacles would no doubt be greatly reduced by the use of ped-rail tractors drawing a train of vans (see Appendix 7), and I regard this as the only practicable alternative to railway extension. A light 2-foot 6-inch line such as that between Zaria and Bukuru would cost not less than £2,000 a mile, and since it would involve a break of bulk I should deprecate any extension, except on the standard gauge at, say, £4,500 a mile, viz., £350,000. There is a good prospect that the rail would be remunerative. For a fuller examination of this project see Appendix 8.

130. (c) *Rail to Bornu*

The project of a railway to Bornu and Lake Chad is one which has been frequently alluded to by writers since the days when the Lagos Railway was first begun, and the then Governor (Sir Wm. MacGregor) pictured 'the iron horse from Lagos drinking the waters of Lake Chad'.

The lacustrine plain, which forms the greater part of Bornu, supports large

herds of cattle, and flocks of sheep and goats. It is badly watered. The Yobe River on its northern frontier, the Hadeija on the west, and Lake Chad on its eastern boundary, are almost its only perennial waters, and the subterranean supplies cannot be tapped by wells with a less depth than 200 feet and more. By deep boring and the mechanical raising of water no doubt this vast country would be immensely rich. Already its output of cattle, hides and skins, and of valuable gums from its acacia forests, offer great possibilities of trade, which are being increasingly developed. The Chad districts offer first-rate possibilities for cotton. In no part of Nigeria, and possibly of Africa, is grain so plentiful and cheap, but low value produce would hardly bear the transport charges. A railway would not only develop these resources but would tap the limitless markets to the north and east which have no other outlet, including the Northern Cameroons whose only outlet is by the Benue River (230 miles south of Chad) for three months in the year only. Its great needs are a good water supply in its central area, and cheap transport for its produce.

Proposals and suggestions, in the absence of accurate data and surveys, are necessarily of little value and apt to be misleading, and I, therefore, do not propose to do more than indicate very briefly in Appendix 8 the aspects of the question as it presents itself at the moment. There appear to be three possible routes to Maidugari (the capital of Bornu 70 miles south-west of Chad).

(i) From Kano, due east, 330 miles. The country is mostly flat, with few rivers to cross, and construction would be cheap—say, $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 million sterling. Population dense for the first half and fair throughout. Total length from seaport (Lagos), say, 1,060 miles (360 new).

(ii) From Bukuru (assuming the branch from the Eastern Railway discussed in paragraph 128 to have been made) the direct distance *via* Bauchi and Fika, north of the bend of the Gongola River, is the same as from Kano (330 miles), but the country would be more difficult and the actual length greater, say, 370. It would traverse the minefield, and bring to them the cheap food supplies of Bornu. Distance from seaport (Port Harcourt), 960 miles (370 new), saving 100 miles and cheaper fuel from Udi.

(iii) The third route is from Afikpo, near the Udi coalfield, to Yola, where the Benue would be crossed above all its main tributaries. It would run parallel to, and about halfway between, the Benue and Cameroon frontier, and would anticipate the projected German line from Dualla to Garua and thence to Chad. It would divert the whole of the Benue trade, for the waterway is so unsatisfactory that trade increasingly tends to go overland both North to Kano and South to Onitsha, &c., from Yola, now that the routes are safe. Even by canoe transport to Lokoja 1s. to 1s. 6d. is charged for a hide, and 9d. to 1s. for a bag of salt. It would, no doubt, be a difficult line to construct. The length scaled on the map is about 600 miles, but the railway track would probably not be less than 15 per cent. more. It would open up a thickly populated country throughout its whole length and tap the trade of the Cameroons. Length to seaport (Port Harcourt), say, 795 miles (690 new). Cost probably $5\frac{1}{2}$ millions. This line would be 190 miles nearer to its fuel supply (Udi) than the Kano line—a matter of the utmost importance in cost of working. The routes compare as follows:

Route	Already constructed	Approximate new construction	Total mileage to seaport	Possible cost
Via Kano	704½	355½	1,060	2 million @ £5,700 p.m.
„ Bukuru	587½	372½	960	2½ „ @ £6,800 p.m.
„ Yola	105	690	795	5½ „ @ £7,000 p.m.

Sir J. Eaglesome, who is of course the highest authority from the point of view of construction, writes regarding these three alternative schemes: 'From the point of view of railway working No. 3 is undoubtedly the best, as following the valley of the Benue keeping sufficiently far from the river to avoid the estuaries of the larger tributaries; and from the same point of view No. 2 is the worst, involving a climb to a height of more than 4,000 feet. The Bukuru branch if built might be extended to serve Bauchi and the district south of the Gongola. If extended thence to Lake Chad it would traverse waterless country, the water from wells being unsuited to locomotive boilers. No. 1 route *via* Kano would be round two sides of a triangle. An alternative is to convert the Bauchi 2-foot 6-inch line to 3-foot 6-inch probably as far as Duchin-Wai (about 40 miles) and to continue to Maidugari. All the bridges on the Bauchi line to Bukuru will carry 3-foot 6-inch rolling stock.'

The Duchin-Wai extension would appear to suffer from the same objection as regards water as Nos. 1 and 2. I may add my own opinion, that from the point of view both of administration and of economic development No. 3 is the best, apart from the immense saving of distance from Maidugari to the seaport which will lessen freight on produce, the advantage of starting from the fuel supply at Udi, and the relief to the Northern Section of the main line. The saving by the utilisation of a portion of the 2-foot 6-inch tract under the fourth scheme would be comparatively trivial, and this line would like No. 1 traverse two sides of a triangle—though a less extended one than *via* Kano.

The main objects of the line to Bornu would be two-fold; (a) to secure the trade of the whole Chad basin as far as the Egyptian Sudan, and to forestall the French Cameroon line from Dualla; (b) To open up the vast plains of Bornu, the soil of which is said to be equal to that of the Egyptian Sudan for cotton cultivation. For the former purpose the cheapest possible freights to the Coast are essential, for the latter purpose railway access to labour supply is the first consideration. There is little available labour in the Kano district where the Resident reports that the dense population is wholly absorbed in its own agricultural industry. The regions traversed by the Udi-Yola railway, however, are populated by millions of industrious pagan tribes.

131. (d) *Aba—Ikot-Ekpene*

A branch line from Aba (39 miles from Port Harcourt) eastwards to Ikot-Ekpene (50 miles), through a country phenomenally rich in oil-palms and densely populated, has been generally considered as one of the most remunerative lines which could be constructed. Sir J. Eaglesome, however, observes: 'Every stream crossed will be in competition with it for cheap transport to the sea, so I doubt if it would pay.* The wharf and shipping facilities at Port

* After perusing this report he comments, 'This remark refers to local traffic. If extended to Ikot-Ekpene, the branch would tap the Cross River traffic if it were desired to bring this to Port Harcourt.'

Harcourt would attract produce, and possibly oil-mills may be erected there. It would be of value administratively as linking up Calabar with the Central Administration.

132. (e) *Extensions to Sokoto*

There remains the north-west district, with the important city of Sokoto, 246 miles from Zaria, as its objective. There is already a considerable volume of trade from this region, including the French territory to the north of it, in cattle, flocks, hides, skins and cotton. The country is well populated, and great quantities of ground-nuts are grown. Maska, 30 miles from Zaria, is the centre of the cotton industry. A railway from Zaria or Kaduna to Sokoto would be of administrative value, and would anticipate the French line from Paraku to Gaya, which otherwise will capture the trade of this region.

An alternative route from Jebba was suggested by Captain (now Major-General) Manse, R.E. Running parallel to the Niger for 140 miles past the rapids to Sekachi, traffic could then be carried by the waterway of the Niger and Jega River, to that town, pending the extension of the railway. The length to be constructed would be not less than 330 miles, running through an almost uninhabited country till it reached the Sokoto Province, but the total distance from Sokoto to Lagos would be less by about 220 miles.*

133. (f) *Warri line*

The proposal to construct a railway with its outlet at Warri or Sapele deserves consideration, the more so that a majority of Lord Selborne's Committee (Lord Selborne, Sir C. Hill, Sir G. Goldie and Sir R. Moor) preferred this line to one debouching at Lagos. Circumstances have, of course, entirely changed and a line with Warri or Sapele as its port would now be merely a subsidiary one designed for the development of the rich hinterland. The two places lie near each other at the head of navigable creeks. They are approachable by vessels of 18 or 19 feet draught, but the channels are long, narrow and tortuous, and the harbours afford little turning room. They would, however, probably suffice for a subsidiary line. The railway would probably have to cross several great rivers or creeks at much cost in bridging. The line might effect a junction with the main trunk-line at Offa or be carried on to the Niger, crossing it eventually at Pateji and joining the Lagos Line *via* Bida at Minna.

134. *Summary*

The immediate task is the completion of the railway already begun from Udi to Kaduna, with the branch of Bukuru. The northern extension of the main line to the French frontier involves questions of policy. It would probably be remunerative. The eastern and western extensions to Bornu and Sokoto (of which the former is the more important) are larger propositions which must wait, with the Warri line, for the present. There are many short branch lines in the South which would develop trade, and would give good returns. For a more detailed examination of these projects *see* Appendix 8.

Since the open lines are now paying interest and sinking fund on the entire

* Sir J. Eaglesome thinks a possible alternative might be found by following the valley of the Kontagora river. He adds, 'Lines radiating from Kaduna or Zaria all emphasize the importance of a junction at Kaduna, with alternative routes to the sea'.

capital expended upon them, the loans already raised do not constitute any burden on the revenue, and the financial position fully justifies a large programme of railway construction, which in the interests of trade and development, and the cheapening of administration should be undertaken without hesitation.

THE COLLIERY

135. *Discovery of Coal and Lignite*

The existence of coal in the Udi district had been known for some years, as well as that of lignite in the districts on the western banks of the Niger. The latter being more accessible were first investigated, and the Director of the Imperial Institute urged the establishment of a briquetting factory, and supplied much useful information regarding the processes employed in Westphalia. The expense was, however, very great, and the cost of transporting the briquettes from the factory to the Niger, and thence to Lagos or Baro for use on the railway, rendered it extremely doubtful whether that form of fuel could compete, at the same calorific value, with imported coal. Its suitability for river steamers was more probable, but Government transport on the river had dwindled since the advent of the railway. The Niger Company, which owned a large fleet, obtained the lease of a lignite field at Okpanam, and sent out an expert to examine it, but after his report was received they did not pursue the matter further.

136. *Access via the Niger unsuitable*

Early in 1912 a survey of the district between the Niger and Udi was undertaken by Government at a cost of about £3,000, with the object of building a railway (60 miles), and a considerable sum was spent in borings to ascertain whether the coalfield approached nearer to the river. Applications for leases of portions of the coalfield were at this time under consideration. The difficulties and cost of Niger navigation made it sufficiently obvious that it would be much more advantageous to bring the coal down to the seaboard if it were possible to find a port, the more so that such a railway would open up a country exceeding rich in palm produce, and would be a remunerative investment apart from the coalfield; whereas a line from Udi to Onitsha—about 150 miles up the Niger—would be of comparatively little value. The navigation of the Niger had become increasingly difficult of late years, and only shallow-draught vessels could reach Onitsha except during three months in the year. The investigations, which in December, 1912, led to the discovery of Port Harcourt, and the decision to build a railway from the port to the coalfield have already been described (paragraphs 124-5). The line reached Udi in May, 1916, and the first truck of coal arrived at the seaport at the end of that month.

137. *Early Development*

Meanwhile considerable development had taken place. The Government had decided that the coalfield should be retained and worked as a Government monopoly, at any rate until full statistics had been obtained of the extent and value of the deposits and the cost of working. The coal outcrops on the side of a short range of hills, running north and south, which fall steeply to the general level of the country traversed by the railway. The rail-

level here is 774 feet above datum at Port Harcourt, and the coal seam where first located was at 1,048 feet.

A small staff was organised under two capable and experienced men, selected by Professor Cadman, who was nominated as Consulting Engineer. They arrived in October, 1914, and at once selected the most suitable place for driving an adit into the hillside. An inclined plane was constructed, down which the coal tubs should run, and deliver the coal into the railway trucks below. Surface and underground labour gangs were organised, and by the time that the railway was sufficiently completed to carry the coal to the coast, 9,207 tons were ready stacked.

138. *Native labour*

The coalfield is situated near the large native town of Enugu, and the surrounding country is densely populated. The natives under the sympathetic handling of Messrs. Leck and Hayes came forward in large numbers, and there has never been any lack of purely voluntary labour, in spite of its arduous nature at high temperatures underground. They soon learned to appreciate payment by results, and the present wage is fixed at 3*d.* to 4*d.* per tub to 5 to 6 cwt. Natives are gradually being trained to replace Europeans. Quite recently the re-lining and heightening of the main drift, including the extraction of the timber and the blasting out of two feet of stone from the floor and re-timbering, was successfully done chiefly in night shifts, under the sole supervision of a native foreman engaged in February, 1915. A section of the mine has also been placed under a native, with good results. A convict prison has been established at Enugu, and the prisoners are employed on suitable surface work.

139. *Nature of the Coalfield*

The friable nature of the over-burden necessitated an unusual quantity of pit-props and continuous roofing (adding considerably to the cost of the coal). These were supplied from the mangrove forest surrounding Port Harcourt and sawn on the spot.

Exploration continued *pari passu* with development. It was found that the coal dipped downwards, and Mr. Hayes ascending the valleys of the two small streams Obweti and Iva on either side of the great spur in which the workings are situated, located the outcrop at two points separated by only 2,000 yards, where the neck which connects the spur with the main range is narrowest. Both these points being at approximate rail level, were accessible by sidings from the main railway, and he submitted a scheme for driving a tunnel in the coal between them, and excavating on the rising gradient of the coal stratum towards the present adit, so that the whole underground workings will have a natural drainage outwards. The line of this tunnel would mark the point at which the coal seam dips below the general ground (or rail) level. Throughout the spur coal will be excavated and loaded on tubs running on a down gradient to rail level—on the other side of the tunnel they must ascend. It is estimated that there are about twelve million tons of coal in the area taken up.

140. *Later development*

The siding to the Iva Valley ($4\frac{1}{2}$ miles) was at once put in hand, and was

completed in November, 1917. The coal here is at the level of the siding and progress has been made in driving the main horizontal shaft; while winning the coal from the 'districts' on the rising gradient to left of it. A labour camp, and the houses for the staff, were erected. It is not at present intended to start work on the Obweti side.

The present output is over 400 tons a day—maximum 768. It can be increased indefinitely according to the demand, the supply of tubs, and the capacity of the railway to handle it. An output of well over 200,000 tons is anticipated in 1919, and there should be a surplus, when Government requirements are satisfied, of 8,000 tons a month for sale to the public. The cost of winning will, of course, be decreased the greater the output, and by the installation of proper machinery, and the employment of native skilled labour. Meanwhile the high market price of coal has enabled the colliery to pay for all development work out of earnings, and in addition to contribute about £47,400 to revenue. As soon as it is possible to procure the machinery the electrification of the mine will be undertaken, and proper haulage engines and fans will be installed.

141. *Calorific value and cost*

The pit mouth cost, exclusive of interest on capital outlay for development and exploration, has varied from 9s. 2d. to 7s. 2d., the Iva Valley output being of course much cheaper. Railway freight to the port and handling charges there, add 19s. 6d. a ton. The cost f.o.b. at Port Harcourt may therefore be put at 28s. a ton. It fetched 33s. a ton during the War.

The normal cost of freight to Lagos cannot at present be calculated accurately owing to the abnormal cost of shipping. The cost by vessels chartered from the Admiralty is put at 24s. 6d. a ton—with a margin of profit. The shipping line charges were 40s. a ton. The cost to Government departments ex wharf Lagos in 1917 was 58s. 6d., reduced to 56s. in 1918. The value of the coal for steam raising purposes is estimated at 80 per cent. of the best Welsh; this percentage can probably be considerably increased by the adaptation of the fire-boxes, since Mr. Lumley, Superintendent Engineer (Marine), has discovered that the coal requires a large amount of air to obtain the best calorific value. Forced draught merely results in waste.

Before the War the price of Welsh coal landed in Lagos was about 37s., at which price the Udi coal cannot compete until the cost of winning has been reduced by better machinery, larger output, and cheaper ocean transport. Welsh coal is practically unprocurable now, but commanded 105s. a ton at Lagos in 1916. At that figure the relative price of Udi coal would be 76s. 2d.

142. *Value of the Colliery*

To the energetic development before the War of this coalfield and the railway which serves it, Nigeria owes more than is easily calculable. Without it the Western Railway, which is earning £1,200,000 a year, could not have been kept running at full capacity, even at enormous expense, and the supply of oleaginous produce and of tin, so much needed in the United Kingdom, would have been greatly restricted, the exploitation of local timber would have been impeded, and the administrative machinery would have suffered the greatest inconvenience. Great as these direct advantages are, the indirect and permanent results are hardly less. A particularly turbulent tribe has been taught

to seek labour for wages, and has earned not less than £34,000 in cash, with which to purchase imports, and improve its standard of living. The new railway has been able to pay its way, instead of being a burden on the depleted revenue; a new outlet has been afforded for native skilled labour with a new means of training it, and a coin currency has been promoted through a large and densely populated district.

143. *Future Policy*

The prospects of the colliery are very promising. The spur cut off by the tunnel to be constructed from Iva to Obweti should, in my opinion, continue to be worked by Government for its own requirements. Leases of other areas can be granted to private enterprise as soon as the railway is able to provide adequate haulage, and the wharf and other arrangements at Port Harcourt are able to cope with the traffic. Government is now in a position to fix a reasonable royalty from actual knowledge.

The Chief Accountant has calculated that at present the working costs of a company (including directors' fees, &c.) would be 8s. 4d. a ton, and that with a pit's mouth price of 10s. a dividend of 8 per cent. would accrue on the capital outlay with 1s. royalty, or 12 per cent., with a royalty at 6d. The profits would be largely increased by a greater output and up-to-date machinery.

144. *Mineral Oils, &c.*

Many believe that subterranean oil exists in this district. The preliminary borings between Udi and the Niger disclosed artesian water, but so far no oil has been found.

Samples of coal were tested for oil in October, 1917, by the Petroleum Oil Research Department of Munitions under the low temperature carbonization process (Del Monte System) with the results below. Sir Boverton Redwood reported that 28-13 gallons of good quality oil per ton was obtainable from the sample, compared with 21 gallons only from the Midland coal. It was estimated that about 5,000 cubic feet of gas, and 30 to 40 lbs. of sulphate of ammonia would also be obtained, but as the test was for oil only this was conjectural.

Water	9.2
Volatile Matter ..	29.7
Fixed Carbon ..	55.9
Ash	5.2
	<hr/>
	100.0

INTOXICATING LIQUOR

145. *Nature of the 'Liquor Traffic'*

The importation of vast quantities of Continental spirits, and their utilization as a principal source of revenue, is, I believe, peculiar to the West African Colonies. It is a matter which so closely affects both trade and finance, and, moreover, is a question of so much importance in regard to native policy, that it merits some special consideration. Their introduction into Northern Nigeria was prohibited by the Brussels Act, as being a territory in

which, at that date (1892), its sale was not already established. This prohibition has been rigorously enforced, and it is to the credit of the Royal Niger Company that they had not introduced spirits into this area prior to the passing of the Act.

Whether the traffic tends to the demoralization of the native races, in view of the quantity imported relatively to the population, the quality of the spirit, and its replacement by native-made liquor, is a matter of controversy into which I do not propose to enter. A strong Committee appointed by Lord Crewe in 1909 reported very definitely in an opposite sense. I will merely observe that, in my opinion, many of the evils attributed to imported spirits, *e.g.*, physical deterioration, decrease in birth-rate, and spread of tuberculosis and insanity, are traceable to the appalling prevalence of venereal disease, for the control of which measures are urgently needed.

But, however this may be, no one can deny that it is a sterile import, upon which the native wasted over one and a half million sterling annually, without securing any improvement in his standard of comfort, or increasing productive output, that it is a disgrace to an Administration that the bulk of its Customs, and nearly half its revenue, should be derived from such a source; and that it is a foreign product, and *pro tanto* decreases British imports of a more useful character. Before the War spirits were imported chiefly in German bottoms. Mr. Chamberlain stated that he held it as a matter of deep conviction that the traffic was discreditable to the British name, and disastrous to British trade.

It has been argued on the other hand, that if the supply of imported liquor were curtailed, its place would be taken by native-made liquor at a sacrifice of over a million of revenue, and the purchasing power of over four million gallons of spirit in native produce, with possibly worse effects on the moral condition of the people, and a danger of destroying the wealth of the country. I hope to show that these fears are at least greatly exaggerated. Whatever residuum of truth may remain will not form a justification for participation, in the view of any impartial exponent, of the obligations laid upon a Government which is in the position of trustee for the welfare of the native population. Freed from this reproach it is the duty of the Administration to control as far as possible the abuse of native intoxicants. Other parts of the Empire, *e.g.*, India, Hong Kong, and the Straits, have made an equal sacrifice in the matter of opium.

146. *Quantity and value, 1913-1917*

In the paragraphs relating to trade and finance I have mentioned the fact that revenue from trade spirits ceased in 1917 to appear in the Budget of Nigeria. In the year before the War the import of these spirits was over 4½ million gallons (or 3,616,000 gallons at 50° Tralles). The revenue derived from these imports reached a sum of about £1,120,000.* In March of that year (1913) the duty per imported gallon was raised from 5s. 6d. to 6s. 3d., with 2½d. for every degree over and 1½d. for every degree under 50° Tralles. In January, 1915, this was again raised to 7s. 6d. in January, 1916, to 8s. 9d., and in 1918 to 10s., practically double the pre-War rate. This represents 500 per cent. on the normal pre-War value *c.i.f.*, and was imposed with the

* The figures are not exact since the returns do not give the duty on trade spirits, separately from the comparatively small quantity of quite different spirits imported for Europeans. The total sum was £1,138,000, of which it is fair to assume £18,000 for the latter.

declared intention of crushing the trade, and not for revenue.* The cost of a case of gin which was 9s. 3d. in 1913, rose to about 16s. The import fell from 4,635,000 bulk gallons to 269,000 bulk gallons. This was due to the difficulty and cost of shipping spirits from Rotterdam during the War, and to the increasingly heavy duty.

147. *Loss to Revenue*

The loss to revenue has only to a very small extent been recouped by the duty on British textiles, &c., which to some extent have replaced the spirits, nor can it ever be made good by such substitutes, since the duty on trade spirits is about 500 per cent. *ad valorem*, while that on British manufactures is only 10 per cent. Thus in 1913 four and a half million gallons, valued at about £450,000, yielded a revenue of about £1,120,000 when the duty was at 5s. 6d. and 6s. 3d. only. When increased to 10s. the revenue would be about £1,800,000. Textiles, &c., to the same value would yield only £45,000. Indirect taxation has thus been greatly reduced. Whereas, before Amalgamation, spirits formed 34.26 per cent. of the revenue of Nigeria, they had fallen to 2.8 per cent. only in 1917 (1.23 per cent. in 1918). I have already described how this loss has been made good.

148. *Beer as a Substitute*

I hope that the demand for a comforting beverage may, at any rate, in the coast towns and closely adjoining districts, where a very large proportion of the spirits are consumed, be met by the establishment of a brewery in Lagos, where a light beer, containing not more than 4 per cent. of alcohol—ginger beer, I believe, usually contains a certain percentage—may be locally brewed. Arrangements are already nearly completed with the promoters.

I understand, however, that such beer will not stand transport to the interior, nor would its price admit of transport charges. It is reported that such beers are popular, but being imported in the bottle they are very expensive. The local brewery aims at selling at 1s. a gallon. The love of the natives for bitters is shown by the demand for imported beer and the immense demand for the bitter kola-nut, of which 1,130,000 lbs. paid duty in 1917, in addition to the imports over inland frontiers and the considerable local supply. I have, therefore, hope that such a beverage would largely replace spirits, and counteract to an equivalent degree their replacement by local 'palm-wine'. The Excise duty would, at the same time, yield an appreciable sum. The French, I observe, advocate the substitution in their Colonies of French claret.

149. *Methods of Restriction*

Total prohibition of imported spirits for the natives accustomed to their use for decades, while admitting spirits for Europeans (and they should not, I think, be wholly prohibited in West Africa), would violate the principle which forbids class legislation and would be unjust. I have suggested a prohibitive tariff for foreign-made spirits, and I should welcome a refusal on the part of the shipping company to carry them, but I do not desire to see the

* The duty had been progressively raised from 3s. in 1901 to 5s. 6d. in 1912, but as the Interior was opened up the imports increased, and the duties appeared to have no effect in restricting the trade.

manufacture transferred to British firms as advocated by Mr. G. A. Moore, and unanimously endorsed by the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce (*vide* Appendix D in [Cd. 8247], of June, 1916, page 46) and by the Agent-General of the Niger Company. This attitude has, however, been entirely changed as the result of recent experience—see paragraph 154. I propose, therefore, a progressive increase in duties—whatever the source of origin—on this class of cheap spirit, until the prime cost plus duty equals the prime cost plus duty of ordinary whisky.

150. *Trade Spirits unnecessary for Revenue or Trade*

I claim that the facts I have recorded establish two conclusions: First, that the Government of Nigeria can dispense with revenue derived from spirits. Even the export duties can be abolished as soon as direct taxation in the Southern Provinces is fully developed, or they may be retained solely to pay the interest &c. on the six million war debt assumed by Nigeria. Secondly, that the produce trade can be conducted successfully without them. In the year 1917 the value of the native produce exported, exclusive of tin-ore and gold dust, was £6,996,840, the highest value recorded, and in excess of 1913 by £785,000 and of 1912 by £1,856,000. Yet in 1917 the import of spirits had practically ceased and existing stocks had almost completely disappeared. The gallonage in Government bonded warehouses had fallen from 141,603 in 1913 to 2,039, in 1917. The allegation that the native would not produce except for spirits has thus been abundantly disproved.

The Comptroller of Customs writes: 'Continental trade spirits were the mainstay of German outward cargoes, and Germany's African trade was built up on them. In Lagos in 1913 two German firms imported nearly as much as all the British firms put together.' The extended use of specie, and the substitution of a cash for barter trade, tend to limit the spirit traffic, and the use of gin as a medium of currency and banking reserve, and are a direct benefit to trade. The profits arising from the minting of silver coin should be paid to revenue, in part replacement of the duties on liquor, which currency replaces as a medium of trade.

151. *Foreign duties and smuggling*

Writers in England have assumed that no individual colony can deal effectively with this question, unless its neighbours agree to a common tariff, owing to the danger of smuggling, and have bent their energies to International Agreement, by a modification of the Brussels Act. With the need for such action in other colonies (British or foreign), I am not at the moment concerned, but the facts I have adduced show that Nigeria has not considered it necessary to defer action on such grounds, or make its policy dependent on that of a foreign Power. The vast size of the African Protectorates minimises the importance of such smuggling as may take place over a short frontier.

The area in Nigeria in which imported spirits may be possessed by or sold to the indigenous natives (whether by licence or otherwise) is 66,500 square miles out of 335,700 square miles, and the French frontier bordering this area is only about 100 miles long. To institute an effective preventive service over such a distance is not a matter which presents any practical difficulty.

Germany, though she led the way in the spirit trade in British Colonies, did not hesitate to impose a duty of 13s. 8d. in the Cameroons, more than double that of Nigeria in 1913, and already our duties are 60 per cent. higher than in French Dahomey.

152. *The Liquor Law of 1917*

The Liquor Ordinance of 1917, the enactment of which had been delayed by the complexity of the subject, for the first time attempted the control of the sale of imported spirits throughout the whole of Nigeria. It is described by the Comptroller of Customs as 'the most important law ever enacted in Nigeria to regulate the liquor traffic' (Annual Report, 1917). It dealt with the possession and sale of all imported intoxicating liquors, including denatured spirits, and prohibited all local distillation. Native fermented liquor was dealt with in a separate ordinance.

For the purpose of the Ordinance Nigeria is divided into 'prohibited areas', 'licensed areas', and 'restricted areas'. Possession of imported intoxicating liquor by natives of the first-named areas, and sale or gift to them is absolutely prohibited. Sale to other than 'prohibited natives' must be by licence. For the first time the line of prohibition was clearly drawn from east to west and included in the prohibited area not only the whole of the Northern Provinces, but also the whole of the Administrative districts of Obudu, Ogoja, Okwoga, and Idah to the east of the Niger (approximate latitude 6° 25'), and on the west of the river the whole of the Ubiaja division, and that part of the Asaba division, which is north of a line drawn due west from the mouth of the Anambra River.* The system of licences for aliens in a prohibited area (especially in the Moslem States) was carefully revised and made much more stringent to prevent abuse.

In 'licensed areas' imported intoxicating liquor may only be sold under licence. In these are included the whole of the Colony proper, all the more important townships on the coast, and Onitsha, and all land (not included in a prohibited area) within half a mile of any railway. 'Restricted areas' include the remainder of the non-prohibited area. In these no intoxicating liquor may be sold to natives by a non-native or native foreigner (e.g., one who is not a native of Nigeria), except under licence, while the sale of liquor by natives may be restricted by rules made by the Governor, or by by-laws made by a Native Authority. Licensing boards were appointed and licences extended to the manufacture and sale of beer and wines. It is hoped that by these steps the frame-work of a control of the sale of intoxicating liquor other than native liquor has been created which can gradually be made more and more effective. Complete prohibition was enacted in the occupied Cameroon area.

153. *Transport by Railway and Government vessels*

The Government was desirous of refusing to carry any trade spirits what-

* Previously importation had been prohibited by the Niger waterway north of Onitsha (Latitude 6° 10') by the Cross River north of Obubra (6° 5') and by the railway north of Ikirun (7° 53'), the only three arteries of commerce by which they could be imported in bulk. But the whole of Southern Nigeria remained a liquor-free area, and there was no line between these points across which liquor could not be transported by land carriage, and north of which possession of trade spirits was an offence, short of the frontiers of Northern Nigeria (except that trade spirits were forbidden in Obudu and in certain district in 1912).

ever on Government vessels on the Niger, but since the Niger Company would continue to carry them on its own behalf, and proposed to charge 20 per cent. extra if they carried them for other traders, Government was forced to carry them, or to allow the Company an unfair trade advantage by the monopoly of the spirit trade.

In order to prevent the Government railway from being used as a means for conveying trade spirits cheaply into the interior, the rates from the port of entry were readjusted in 1914 to a very rapidly increasing 'taper' as may be seen from the following table:

		Total miles	Per ton	Rate per ton mile
Western Rail from Lagos	First. 60 miles to Abeokuta	60	16/-	6½d.
" " "	Next. 62 " Ibadan	122	67/-	9½d.
" " "	" 76 " Ikirun	198	161/-	15d. Limit
Eastern Railway from Port Harcourt	First. 39 " Aba	39	21/5	6½d.
" " "	Next. 28 " Omo Ahia	67	44/9	10d.
" " " "	" 39 " Afikpo	106	83/9	12d. Limit

N.B.—The surtax of 30 per cent. is additional. A ton equals 125 gallons approximately.

N.B.—Less than 5,000 gallons of spirits were carried by the Eastern Railway in 1917, of which little more than half went beyond Aba (39 miles).

154. *Attitude of Home Government and of Merchants*

I am glad to record that the Association of West African Merchants have recently urged the temporary prohibition of all trade spirits (including British and American cheap whisky and brandy), with a view to an investigation of the whole subject, and the probable extinction of the trade, in collaboration with the Union Coloniale Française. They declare that 'if prohibition is ultimately decided on, *now* is the time to enforce it', before the trade is rehabilitated by the large consignments which Holland is preparing to send out. America too, I am informed is offering gin in barrels, for which a shipping permit has been granted. The Manchester merchants are also strongly in favour of abolishing the trade. I am glad also to note that the Director of the War Trade Department, writing in September last, states that 'no facilities for the transshipment in the United Kingdom of Dutch trade gin, no matter what may be the country of destination, or of any Dutch spirits destined for West Africa can be granted . . . and appeals against the decision cannot be entertained'.

155. *Native-made Liquor*

The control of native fermented liquor is a matter of extreme difficulty. The Native Liquor Ordinance, 1917, empowered the Governor-in-Council to specify areas in which sale should be prohibited except in licensed premises under strict control. It was at once applied to all areas other than those occupied by Pagan tribes, to all townships, and land within a mile of those of the first and second class, and to all mining leases and exclusive prospective areas, and to all land within half a mile of any railway. No licences might be issued in the Northern Provinces.

Native liquor is usually of two kinds—that brewed from surplus grain (in effect a fermented gruel, and nutritive as well as intoxicating), and that made from the sap of various palms (in Uganda from the ripe banana). The former is used in the grain-producing districts of the North; and in the constant orgies held by primitive tribes, whole villages, including women and small children, indulge in continued intoxication. Crime and bloodshed are the constant concomitants. The greatest check on this vice is the creed of Islam, which forbids the use of intoxicants, and Government can rely on the assistance of the Moslem Native Administrations in the Northern Provinces. To some extent taxation has an indirect influence by taking toll of this surplus of the harvests.

The latter form of liquor is prevalent in the South, where the raphia (*vinifera*) palm is abundant. In districts where this source of supply does not suffice the oil palm is tapped, but there does not seem to be any strong evidence of much increase in this. Tapping does not hurt the tree (though it may somewhat decrease its fruiting), if the flow of sap is obtained by an incision in the flower-stem, but the more common forms of 'cabbage' and stem tapping destroy the tree, and may very possibly render it liable to the disease of bud-rot (which attacks the cocoa-nut palm) and thus endanger the commercial staple of the country (Farquharson). Such tapping is now prohibited by law, and efforts are made to enlist the co-operation of the Native Courts, since, in most districts, it is also opposed to native law. Repression in the interminable forest of oil-palms is not easy, the more so that individual ownership of trees is often claimed—though it should not be recognised, as they are never planted.

The late Mr. Farquharson showed that the output of a tree in palm-wine is more remunerative than the sale of its fruit. He calculated that a man could earn 3s. 11d. a day by selling palm-wine, and there was no middleman's profit to deduct.

Unfortunately it is wholly impracticable to enforce any direct check by means of excise or licence, on these primitive tribes. Repression must depend mainly on the adequacy of the Administrative staff by whose agency any measures for limiting sale in markets, and checking wholesale drunkenness must be enforced, co-incidentally with civilising and educational improvement. It is premature to expect that tribes still addicted to cannibalism and in the lowest stage of evolution, can be taught self-control without prolonged efforts. In the Congo territory prohibition of liquor over 8° strength is enacted by law. I have no information as to how it is enforced. In Benin liquor has been largely replaced by a beverage made by soaking cocoa-beans in water and by coffee.

156. *Summary of Government Policy*

The policy adopted by the Government of Nigeria in regard to liquor as affecting the native population may therefore be summarised as follows:

- (a) The extinction of the traffic in spirits, whatever their origin, as an article of trade with the natives, and the restriction of the import of spirits by the imposition of heavy duties on cheap trade spirits up to a point at which the prime cost plus duty will equal the prime cost plus duty of spirits usually imported for European consumption.

- (b) The control of the sale of imported liquor by a system of licences in all those areas in which such control is at present feasible, and the gradual extension of the licensing system.
- (c) The rigorous enforcement of prohibition in those areas at present closed to the sale of spirits to natives, and the extension of those areas where it is found to be feasible.
- (d) The substitution of light beer for imported spirits.
- (e) The control of the sale of native-made fermented liquor in places where direct European supervision is possible, and in districts under Moslem law where the assistance of the Native Administration can be relied upon. Prohibition of tapping oil-palms in such a way as to injure the tree.
- (f) Prohibition of local distillation except by special sanction for scientific purposes or of denatured spirit for commercial purposes under strict safeguards.

In Appendix 9 will be found a graphic chart showing the quantity of trade spirits imported for the past ten years, with figures showing its relative value to trade and revenue.

EDUCATION

157. *Position as regards Education*

Of the many problems which Amalgamation presented there was none comparable in importance and in urgency with that of education. The problem differs so profoundly in the North and South, not merely in its history, and the stage which had been reached, but in some respects in its very nature, that it is desirable to review briefly the conditions of each Administration separately.

(a) *In Southern Nigeria*

In Southern Nigeria, of which the coast area had been open to European influence for upwards of half a century, there were (as might be expected) a very large number of schools, by the agency of which a great part of the coast population had attained a degree of education varying from a few barristers and doctors who had qualified in England, to the less than half educated school boys who, with a smattering of English and arithmetic, seek admission to the lower ranks of the clerical and other services. In 1913 the average attendance at Government schools in the South was about 4,600, and in assisted mission schools about 12,500. To these must be added a number of pupils vaguely estimated at from 20,000 to 30,000 in unassisted schools, which were not only under no control or inspection by Government, but of whose very numbers or existence the Government had no precise information.

Both Government and assisted schools were lamentably understaffed. With the exception of King's College, a small school for the sons of comparatively wealthy parents (average attendance 50)—the only Government schools which possessed a British instructor were at Warri and Bonny. The remainder of the European personnel of the Education Department consisted of inspectors who assessed the grant for assisted schools after an annual examination in set subjects. Nor was the personnel of the qualified native teaching staff in any way adequate. In Government schools it numbered 31

only, viz., one teacher to 148 pupils, in mission schools 1 to 91, in unassisted schools it was estimated at 1 to 800.

The cost of the Government schools was about £12,500, and of the grants to, and inspectorate of, assisted schools about £15,300. The net amount spent on education from revenue in the Southern Provinces and Colony in 1913 stood at £30,915, being 1.16 per cent. of the ordinary revenue.

158. *Government Schools in Southern Nigeria*

King's College, Lagos, with a staff of three British masters, afforded the highest and most expensive education for the sons of leading natives, or for boys of marked ability who had obtained scholarships. Some of its pupils completed their education in England, and entered the professions of law and medicine. It was not a boarding school. In the two boarding schools at Warri and Bonny, adult 'apprentices' were associated with small boys, with bad results. They were under no indentures, and the Heads of Technical Departments found that their manual training had all to be begun afresh when they came to the workshops with power-driven machinery. The average attendance at these two schools in 1913 was 151 apprentices and 187 boys.

Three Moslem schools in the Colony, and 48 other elementary or primary schools under native instructors, where carpentry and agriculture, &c., were taught, completed the list of Government schools, with an average attendance of 4,200.

159. *Non-government Schools, Southern Nigeria*

The control by Government over education was only exercised to a very limited extent. Of the total number of pupils attending schools probably one-tenth were in Government schools, three-tenths in mission-assisted schools, in which the conditions of the grant code (which referred chiefly to examination subjects and buildings) had to be observed, and six-tenths in unassisted schools. These latter consisted of private venture schools and mission schools, which either had not qualified for, or did not desire to apply for, a grant, on the ground that the code was too rigid and presented gratuitous difficulties to the teaching of religion, which was the chief object of the mission schools.

Of the private venture schools there are, according to the reports of Residents, an enormous number which, in Mr. Fisher's words, are 'frauds on the public', and are conducted for profit by half-educated boys and others who cannot read or write properly themselves. They are lacking in discipline and in loyalty to any constituted authority whatever, and the local chiefs find it very difficult to exercise any control over them. In some districts they are reported to be created as 'outposts' by the minor missions and of no educational value. They are popular as the native considers that a 'school' of any kind adds to the prestige of the village.

160. *Results of Education: Southern Nigeria*

That the results of the system of education were, in the words of the Secretary of State, 'generally admitted to have been very unsatisfactory' (and the same words are used by Mr. Carr (a native), Senior Inspector of Schools, after 22 years' service), is no reflection on the self-sacrifice and devotion of the missionaries, to whose efforts the country owes the existence of the class from which its supply of clerks to carry on the Administration are drawn. Some of

these had done admirable work, notably the Church Missionary Society Training College at Oyo, and the Hope Waddell Institute at Calabar. But with the missions religious training was naturally the first object, towards which education was merely ancillary. That the system was at fault, as has since been admitted in India, does not detract either from the praise due to the work of the missionaries, or from the debt which the country owes to them.

It is, however, true that, with some notable exceptions, education seems to have produced discontent, impatience of any control, and an unjustified assumption of self importance in the individual. No doubt such results of the extension of education are not confined to Nigeria. The local press, inspired by a superficial and misdirected education, is, in the opinion of responsible and thoughtful natives, doing much 'grievous harm' (Carr), especially among its clientèle of school-boy readers, by fomenting racial animosity, by its misrepresentation, and its invective against all Government action. This attitude is not one of recent origin. So long ago as 1882 a society had been formed in Lagos which was described by Sir G. Denton as 'constituted for interference with political affairs in the interland, and capable of much misrepresentation and agitation'. Its effect was to paralyse the efforts of the officer in charge of the Lagos 'hinterland'.

The situation had gone from bad to worse, and early in 1914 the late Mr. Sapara Williams, C.M.G., Senior Native Member of the Legislative Council, declared at a public meeting in Lagos, that the indiscipline and vanity of the young men produced by the schools had become so intolerable that parents were discussing the withdrawal of their sons. Something, he declared, must be done to rescue the rising generation from this deplorable state. Mr. Carr described them as ill-educated, unreliable and lacking self-control.

161. (b) *Education in Northern Nigeria*

It was, as I have related elsewhere, only in 1903 that the Moslem States in the North were conquered, and access to them became possible. The task of organising an Administration absorbed all the energies of the small staff, while the natural suspicion and dislike with which the Christian Government was at first regarded by the Moslems rendered it inadvisable, even if it had been possible, to embark on any educational efforts at first. The earliest attempts to formulate a policy were made in 1905, but it was not till 1909 that Mr. Hans Vischer was able to form a small class of pupils at Kano, whose ages varied from 6 to 60. They were mostly sons of chiefs and men of influence, who had been brought from various provinces under pressure by Government. An industrial class was also formed by bringing artisans from Kano city, who plied their native trades and gave some instruction to pupils. The experiment was, however, regarded with intense suspicion and dislike by the Moslem chiefs, who thought they saw in it some deep-laid plan to subvert their religion; and the fact that Mr. Vischer had formerly been a missionary in Nigeria is said to have accentuated this fear. Moreover, the obligation to send their sons to a distant province was very unpopular among the chiefs of outlying districts.

Towards the close of 1913 I was able to create two new schools (at Sokoto and Katsena), so that when Amalgamation took place there were, in all, three Government schools, with an average attendance of 354 pupils, all in the Moslem area. Meanwhile, many different missions had arrived to reinforce

the efforts of the Church Missionary Society. They had opened altogether 43 schools, with a total attendance of about the same as that of the Government schools, and were almost entirely confined to the non-Moslem districts. No financial assistance had been given to these schools, and they were subject to no inspection or control by Government. Thus, at the time of Amalgamation the total number of pupils in Government or mission schools was between 700 and 800, out of a population of some nine millions.

Government did not interfere in the indigenous Koranic schools, in which reading and writing in the Arabic and Ajemi character, and memorising passages from the Koran formed the curriculum. They were estimated at some 25,000 with over a quarter of a million pupils. These Koranic schools had produced a literary class known as 'Mallamai', learned in Arabic and the teachings of the Koran and commentaries, from whose ranks the officers of the Native Administration, the judges of the Native Courts, and the exponents of the creed of Islam were drawn. They are a very influential class, some of them very well read in Arabic literature and law, and deeply imbued with the love of learning.

162. *The Language difficulty*

Throughout the Fulani Moslem States Hausa—a language easily acquired by the British staff—is spoken. In part of Bornu it is replaced by an Arabic dialect, and in Illorin by Yoruba. These languages have been reduced to writing in the Roman character, and much progress has been made in preparing text books. Hausa before the advent of the British was written in the Arabic or Ajemi character. Owing to his keen trading (and slaving) instincts the Hausa is ubiquitous, not merely in Nigeria, but throughout the Gold Coast and even as far as Sierra Leone and the Egyptian Sudan (in which pilgrims have settled). There is therefore hardly a Pagan village in which Hausa may not be heard, and it is the aim of the Administration to make it the *lingua franca* of the North except in Bornu and Illorin.

The intertribal wars and slave-raids, which constituted the early history of Nigeria, had resulted in fragments of tribes being herded together, so that to-day it is said that in one single province over sixty different languages have been identified. In Yola, Fulani (the original language of the conquering caste) is still spoken. Nupe is the language of a very large tribe, and Munshi is spoken by fully 10,000 people. Kanuri, the tongue of the aboriginal population of Bornu, is said to be impossible for a European to acquire. Some of these various languages have been studied, and reduced to writing by missionaries, but they present great difficulties and text books are not in existence. They will, no doubt, gradually be replaced by Hausa.

In the Southern Provinces, Yoruba, though a very difficult language, in which few Europeans have acquired fluency, is spoken (it is said) by three million people, and cannot be displaced. Ibo is said to be spoken by over two millions, but its dialects differ so greatly that for practical purposes they are separate languages, and the attempt to create a standard Ibo has so far had little success. For the rest there are said to be sixty-five different languages in the Southern Provinces, which have hitherto only been explored by the philologist or by an occasional missionary.

It will be realised how immensely these conditions complicate the problem

of education, compared with Colonies in which there is a single vernacular with a literature of its own. In the circumstances the three languages, Hausa, Yoruba and Arabic (Shuwa dialect) should I think, alone be recognised as media of instruction, and with this exception I venture to agree with Lord Kimberley that English must be the medium, and 'though instruction in English must be given through the medium of the vernacular, instruction in the native languages may safely be left to the stimulus of self interest, and Government subsidies are not required for its encouragement'. Mission schools naturally take a different view, since their aim is to teach pupils to read the Bible in the vulgar tongue. The education officers—and especially the native staff—must acquire sufficient knowledge of the vernacular to enable them to teach elementary-school pupils the language which will form the medium of their later instruction.

163. *School Fees*

Another difficulty which presents itself in Africa is the value attached to child-labour, which manifests itself also in the kidnapping and enslaving of children. Parents, especially among the primitive tribes, are apt to consider that instead of paying school fees they should themselves be paid for allowing their children to attend school. On the other hand, the African is especially liable to undervalue what costs him nothing. I therefore attach much importance to the principle of school fees (not from a revenue point of view), and their payment is insisted on, even though they may be compounded under the guise of scholarships granted by Government or by the Native Administration.

164. *Inadequate supply of Clerks, Teachers and Artisans*

The rapid expansion of the country, and in particular the development of railways, has created an enormous and an increasing demand for clerks, accountants, commercial agents, dispensers, dressers, sanitary and other inspectors, guards, stationmasters, and others with a good knowledge of English and accounting, and an increase in the supply has become a matter of vital and pressing necessity. There are about 2,500 posts under Government with salaries between £60 and £300 per annum, and about 2,000 from £24 to £60, with perhaps an additional 1,000 among commercial firms, aggregating in salaries about £500,000 a year. Yet the number of candidates who succeed in passing the easy entrance examination for clerical appointments steadily decreases, and fell from 51 in 1910 to 17 only in 1914, and these figures include boys from other colonies. Mr. Carr estimates that the output of the secondary schools is from 200 to 300 at the most.

The result of this demand and inadequate supply has been not merely to raise the pay disproportionately to the qualifications of the candidates, but to tempt boys who can neither read nor write properly to leave school for lucrative employ, and withdraw them from parental discipline. (I have in paragraph 39 referred to a scheme of 'Clerical Cadets' by which it is hoped to combat this evil.) The standard of the native official service was thus permanently lowered, and the majority of the candidates were unfitted for posts of responsibility.

The teaching profession, which could not (especially in mission schools) compete with the salaries offered to good clerks, was thus placed at so serious a

disadvantage, that Mr. Carr was driven to advocate the wholesale importation of foreign teachers, who are, however, in any case, unobtainable. The attempt to introduce West Indians he admits to have had 'no satisfactory results'. The paucity of teachers had indeed become the chief difficulty alike in Government and in mission schools.

The demand for trained mechanics in the rapidly expanding industries was no less than that for the clerical class. It has been met on the whole with considerable success by agencies entirely dissociated from the Education Department or mission schools. The Railway, Marine, Public Works, Telegraphs, Survey and Printing Departments had for many years taken an increasing number of apprentices into their shops and establishments, and had trained them with much success. There were 500 apprentices in the shops at the end of 1916. The departments owed it, however, to the mission schools, that there was a class of young boys, with some rudiments of education, upon which they could draw. These departments had also now begun to feel the difficulty of obtaining suitable candidates.

165. *The Nature of the Problem*

Such was the nature of the problem, and such were the results achieved. In the South the rudiments of education were fairly widely distributed, if such a phrase is permissible when probably not more than one in every 180 children of school age had any sort of education whatever. Its results were evident in the decay of family and social discipline, and too often in discontent and hostility to any constituted authority, masquerading as racial or national patriotism, or as the vindication of rights unjustly ignored. In the North a well-defined student class looked eastwards for the language and literature of its classics, while the first small beginnings of modern teaching were groping their way amid suspicion and dislike.

The questions which demanded immediate solution were:

- (a) How to promote a better standard of discipline, self-control and integrity, combined with educational qualifications more adequate to the demands of the State and of commerce.
- (b) How to increase the output so as to keep pace with the demand.

166. *Objects of the New Code*

The New Ordinance, with its Regulations, which superseded the Grant Code, sought to lay down principles, alike for Government and for assisted schools, which it was hoped would in course of time produce better results. It was drafted early in 1914, and after circulation to all school managers was submitted to the Secretary of State in November of that year. After much delay it became law in December, 1916. It embodied the following general principles:

- (a) That the primary object of all schools should be the formation of character and habits of discipline; and that the grant in aid should be in part based on success in this direction.
- (b) That the value of religion, irrespective of creed or sect, and the sanction and incentive it affords, should be recognised and utilised as an agent for this purpose, together with secular moral instruction.

- (c) That the proportion of teachers to pupils should be adequate, and that they should be properly qualified, and their status improved, and made equal to that of clerks. Adequate grants must be given to assisted schools (from which Government and commercial clerks are also drawn) to enable them to pay adequate salaries to their staff.
- (d) That educational agencies, whether controlled by Government or by missions, should co-operate with a common object, and as far as possible by similar methods of discipline and instruction.
- (e) That continuation and evening classes, and institutions and classes for the training of teachers, should receive special encouragement.
- (f) That Government should exercise some measure of control over all schools, even though not assisted by grants, and endeavour to bring them into line with the general policy.
- (g) Finally, it was sought to adapt the teaching to the needs of the pupils, whether they were intending to qualify for clerical or other like service, or desired to become artisans and mechanics, or on the other hand had no desire to leave their village, and the pursuits their fathers had followed.

These principles are applicable to both North and South, in both of which there are large Pagan populations and large numbers of Mohammedans.

167. *Education Ordinance, 1916*

The Ordinance set up Boards of Education in the North and South, of which the Lieutenant-Governor was President and the Director of Education a member. Their object was 'to facilitate co-operation between Government and non-Government educational agencies—selected representatives of which would be given seats on the Board—to ventilate and focus the difficulties which surround the problem of education in Africa, and to assist the Governor in solving those problems with the good will and assistance of those who have daily experience of the practical work of education'. School Committees were also set up in every province which would include local chiefs of influence as members.

In order to check any tendency to set up rival schools in the same town, the Governor may exclude any new school from the Grant List, if he considers it superfluous on this account.

The Regulations prescribe that the grant to assisted schools should no longer be based on fixed percentages of marks obtained in an annual examination in certain set subjects, but should be awarded approximately as to 30 per cent. for tone, discipline, organisation and moral instruction, as to 20 per cent. for adequacy and efficiency of staff, as to 40 per cent. on the result of periodical examinations and general progress, and as to 10 per cent. for buildings, equipment and sanitation. Special grants are made for the teaching staff, for training institutes, and for residential pupils; the different grades of masters and teachers are defined in regard to their qualifications; the minimum requirements of staff in proportion to pupils are laid down; the subjects for instruction (with a new syllabus) are prescribed; and the grant of scholarships organised. The Ordinance anticipated the British Education Act in providing that every manager of a non-Government school must submit certain particulars annually to Government, and power to close a school in certain circumstances was added later.

In defending my proposal to introduce moral instruction, I wrote: 'I conceive that if a short period daily be devoted to placing before children in an attractive way, the social and other incentives to gentlemanly conduct, the success which rewards self-control and industry, with similar lessons by the aid of illustration and anecdotal biography, it would form a valuable adjunct to the inculcation of the same ideals of right living as enforced by religious precept and sanction.' Moral instruction forms an item in the ordinary curriculum and demonstrates the necessity of moral standards in social intercourse, and for success in secular affairs.

The draft Bill and Regulations were submitted to the criticism of managers of assisted schools, whose suggestions were as far as possible accepted, and the new code met with an almost unanimous approval.

168. *Three types of Education required*

It was, of course, most desirable that Government should take the lead in the application of these principles to the education provided under its direct control. A clear distinction must, in the first place, be drawn between the three objects for which educational agencies are employed, viz., the literary training required for appointments in which a good knowledge of English and arithmetic is required; the technical and manual training of mechanics, and other workshop hands; and the teaching of crafts, and the very elementary schooling, suitable to those who purpose to live their own village life.

169. (a) *Provincial Schools*

For the benefit of the first-class, from which the almost unlimited demand for teachers, clerks, accountants, &c., &c., must be met, it was proposed to set up at the capital of every province, a Government school, comprising in the Southern Provinces, and later on in the Northern Provinces, all the 'standards' of the code, with the object of not only increasing the output greatly, but of serving as a model. They would include an industrial class for the training of teachers for 'rural schools' (*vide infra*). The ordinary curriculum of these schools would be reinforced by continuation and evening classes, in which more advanced teaching in school subjects would be given to pupils who had attained the highest standards. The instruction would include such special subjects as are not comprised in the curriculum of the school, and for which a sufficient number of candidates are forthcoming to form a class, such as agriculture, forestry, survey, &c., and in particular they would provide a 'normal class' for the training of teachers in school method, and the imparting of knowledge.

In order that these schools should subserve the primary object of training character, and inculcating discipline, it is an essential feature of the new organisation that each should be under the continuous control of a British master, that the pupils should, as far as possible, be boarders, and that the school should be situated at some distance from the native town, so as to detach the boys from undesirable influences, and in order that the force of example and influence should be exerted in social intercourse and recreation, no less than in the class-room. Games are encouraged as conducive to health and manliness and ideas of fair play. The time of the pupils would not be wasted in manual or industrial training, which would be of no use to boys whose sole aim is a clerical or 'literary' appointment. There would be an age

limit, and a considerable number of free scholarships would be offered.

170. (b) *Rural Schools*

For the third-class—the peasantry who do not seek either a literary education to qualify as clerks, &c., or a technical training for power-driven workshops, 'rural schools' are provided. The pupils in these will not be boarders, and the head will be a native schoolmaster, but they will be affiliated to the central provincial school, which will supply the teaching staff and exercise such control as may be possible, in addition to the supervision of the Administrative staff, and the Inspectors of the Education Department. The number of these schools in a province is not limited. The education afforded will be restricted to the teaching of native arts and crafts, practical agriculture (and the marketing of produce), carpentry and black-smithing, with elementary hygiene and local geography, colloquial English, and the rudiments of arithmetic, and in the Northern Provinces colloquial Hausa. Their object is to train character and promote habits of discipline, industry and truthfulness by moral and religious instruction (whether Christian or Moslem), and to fit the pupils for life in their own villages, and the improvement of the standard of that life. Promising pupils may obtain scholarships to the provincial school, or may, if they so desire, be indentured as apprentices.

171. (c) *Technical Education*

The second-class, to which I have referred, includes those who seek a technical or manual training. Most of the openings for such boys are in the Railway, Marine, Public Works or Printing Departments, where machinery driven by steam or electricity is used. Carpenters, no doubt, can earn a good living without a knowledge of power-driven lathes, but it is only in the large workshops that the making of high-class furniture and house-building can be efficiently taught. I have already said that the Government shops have long afforded very efficient instruction for apprentices, but many of these being illiterate could never make first-class workmen. Others had wasted several years in a manual training in schools which was adapted rather to village life, than as a serious preliminary to the education of a skilled mechanic.

The object in view is to improve the apprentice system. Boys who have passed the fourth or fifth standard in a provincial (or in a non-Government) school, will be accepted as apprentices, and trained in batches, their pay rising with each completed year of service, if passed as efficient. Instructors are provided in the shops, whose sole duty it is to train these apprentices. They will no longer be left to the casual attention of fellow workers. Opportunities will be afforded for their attendance at continuation classes, where they may improve their 'literary' education, and also learn something of the theory of their profession and how to draw and work to scale plans. It is the desire of the Government to improve the status of the apprentice and artisan so that he may be recognised as being on the same social level as the clerk.

172. *Application of the new principles in Southern Provinces*

The new system of inspection and award of grants to assisted schools has been in operation for two years with success. There were 32 new applications from mission schools which formerly preferred to forgo the grant rather than

submit to the code, and I know of none which dissents from them. The Ordinance and Regulations have required practically no alteration since their publication, except to strengthen the control of Government over non-assisted schools.

King's College, Lagos, with its staff of three British masters, and the *esprit de corps* which animates the school, already conforms to the main principles, except that the pupils should be boarders, and it should have lower classes to feed its upper forms.

Unfortunately the demand made by the War for every available man who was not essential to the carrying on of the machinery of Government, has rendered it impossible to obtain the masters for the new provincial schools. The schools at Bonny and Warri will alone of existing schools become 'Provincial Schools', the former being moved to the headquarters at Owerri, where, under the Resident's eye, it will be removed from the harmful influences of the past. The three Moslem schools in the Colony proper do not exactly fit into either of the designations. They may, later, be incorporated in one school with the characteristics of a provincial school, and the native staff improved by better teachers from the North. Many Moslem youths attend the Christian schools.

The remaining 46 Government schools are classed as 'Rural'. Their native teaching staff requires to be enlarged and improved. Under the supervision of the Inspectorate and of Residents, they will gradually conform to the new policy and system. Their number may be substantially reduced in view of mission activity, and the creation of the provincial schools. The improvements proposed in regard to apprentices will be gradually introduced. The new carpentry shop at Lagos has, under Mr. Peet, Director of Public Works, been an entire success. Furniture is made from local timber sawn in the Government mills for the whole of the Government requirements of Nigeria, and some very handsome articles have been produced from English designs, the workmanship of which rivals that of a first-class cabinet maker in England. The lathes are driven by electricity, and the apprentices are taught to undertake house construction, so that when they have served their articles they will be fully qualified in all branches. Admission to the school is eagerly sought.

The immediate needs are an increase of nine masters (including reliefs) for the provincial schools, and three more Inspectors for the increased work caused by the addition of many schools to the Assisted List, the more frequent inspection under the new system, and the reorganisation of the Government schools. These with the native staff and other expenses may add £8,000 to the cost of the Education Department of the South, a sum which is negligible in comparison to the importance of the object in view.

173. *Application in Northern Provinces*

The British staff, numbering 26 in the Northern Provinces, is adequate for the provincial schools, but requires one or two Inspectors for the mission schools. The great difficulty here is to train native teachers, for it is of essential importance that these should be drawn from the local population, and that in the Moslem Provinces they should be Mohammedans. This task must take precedence of the training of clerks and others—urgently as these latter also are needed—for the Northern Province does not at present supply a single

179. *Departmental Schools.*

Either in the North or South, or in both, classes have been formed by the head of the department concerned—outside the purview of the Education Department—for instruction in survey, agriculture, forestry and veterinary work. The object is to train youths in these special subjects for service under the Native Administrations, and to select the more capable, should they desire it, for service in the department. Outside the Colony they will be affiliated to the provincial school of the province in which they are situated, so that they may prosecute their ordinary studies simultaneously with their special technical training. The survey schools, both in North and South, have done admirable work.

180. *Cost of Education*

The net cost of education in Nigeria in 1916 was about 1.6 per cent. of the total ordinary revenue of the country, and 1.5 per cent. of the expenditure. If this were doubled it would still be an inadequate ratio, but the increase I propose would not bring the percentage up to 2 per cent. Looked at from no higher standpoint than the material requirements of Government, reform is called for by the imperious demands created by the expansion of the railways alone. The matter is of great urgency for there is no outside source from which the men required can be drawn. 'In my judgment (I wrote) no efforts and no cost can be too great to introduce reforms, which shall have the result of producing a set of Government servants with high standards and with self-control, loyalty and integrity, and in producing a number sufficient to meet the demands of a rapidly growing country.'

The cost per pupil in the Northern Provinces reached at the end of 1913 the abnormally high figure of £20. This will be steadily reduced as the schools fill up. The Native Treasuries now pay the native staff and the cost of school apparatus and buildings, and the school fees are credited to them. In 1916 the total expenditure on education in the Northern Provinces was £12,443 from revenue, and £5,325 by Native Administrations.

181. *Effect of the War*

The demands of the War have fallen heavily upon the Education Department and a large proportion of the staff, especially in the Northern Provinces, have been continuously on active service. This has arrested progress, but the framework is now clearly laid down, and with the cessation of the War, and the provision of the staff required in the Southern Provinces, I trust that rapid progress will be made. Much progress can indeed be claimed even under these adverse circumstances, especially in the Northern Provinces.

MISSIONS

182. *Influence of Missions*

A review of the Administration would be incomplete without a reference to Christian missions, which, in the South, have exercised so great an influence on the development of the country, and borne so predominant a part in educational progress. No doubt their influence has been much weakened, as elsewhere in Africa, by the more effective administration of the country, and

the advent of Europeans of all types since 1895. In the South they preceded, and the North for the most part followed the establishment of administrative control.

As I have pointed out in the section on education, the Southern Provinces owe a great debt to the missions, but there has been, I venture to think, an insufficient degree of co-operation between them and the Government, for which both are probably responsible. The new Education Ordinance and Regulations are cordially welcomed by the missions, and will I trust lead to a greater effort in educational matters.

183. *Effects of uncontrolled propaganda in Southern Provinces*

Occasional disturbances have taken place in the Southern Provinces between bands of persons calling themselves Christians and their Pagan neighbours, in which it would appear that the Christians have been the aggressors by interfering with festivals, or mocking at forms of Pagan worship, and in one case at least, there was some loss of life in the resulting fray. The heads of the missions did not in this case deny the culpability of the Christians, and stated that the movement to embrace nominal Christianity among certain Pagan tribes was so widespread, that they were unable to control or supervise it with the available staff. The establishment of bogus schools of no educational value by irresponsible mission-trained youths, is another unwelcome development. It would not, however, be just to hold the leading missions responsible in such cases, the more so in view of the fact that some communities have seceded from the parent mission and set up native 'churches', one at least of which is polygamous. The Roman Catholics have, I think, been singularly free from these undesirable developments.

184. *Converts amenable to Native Authority*

There has been a not unnatural tendency on the part of mission 'converts' to repudiate the authority of their chiefs, and to ignore and flout native customary law. Complaints have been made that in some cases missionaries have sympathised with this attitude. It has now been laid down in unmistakable terms, both in the North and in the South, that the profession of any particular creed (whether Christian or Mohammedan), does not absolve its adherents from the authority of their chiefs, or from the native law and custom prevalent in their district, provided that they are not compelled to do anything which is repugnant to their religious beliefs. The conditions under which churches, schools, and residences for alien teachers may be erected, even when no right or interest in the land is claimed by the mission, have been regulated.

185. *Christ's Army revival*

Early in 1914, a somewhat notable religious revival commenced among the Pagan tribes of the eastern part of the Niger Delta and Bonny River, under a native named Braid, who declared himself to be the Second Elijah. Religion was not unmingled with political propaganda, and Braid declared himself hostile to all exotic influence, whether European or native. The drinking of spirits was prohibited probably with the object of dealing a blow to European trade, and there was great hostility to the Niger Delta Mission of the Church

Missionary Society. Braid, an illiterate native, was convicted of extortion and sedition, but the movement continued under other leadership, and developed into a schism which called itself 'Christ's Army', and later assumed the title of the 'Delta Church'.

155. *Missions in Northern Provinces*

In the Northern Provinces there has been a considerable extension of mission work in Pagan areas, and the number of stations has increased from 38 in 1913 to 60 in 1917. The Church Missionary Society Mission to the Mohammedans, with its headquarters at Zaria, has been a source of some controversy and difficulty.

At the time of the conquest of the Mohammedan Emirates in 1903, I declared that the British Government would not interfere with the religion of the people, and 'every man should be free to worship God as he chose'. The Emirs, though they have not been very consistent in the matter, no doubt view with dislike and distrust the efforts of Europeans to convert their people to Christianity, the more so that the administrative and judicial systems, and the social life of the people is to such a large extent based on the teaching of the Koran, and so intimately associated with religion, that the Emirs not unnaturally fear a weakening of their authority and a break-up of the social system if their religion is undermined. The Government, in these circumstances, has considered it right to be guided by the wishes of the Emirs and their councillors, who have given such abundant and striking proofs of their loyalty during the War, in which their co-religionist, Turkey, is opposed to us. While cordially recognising mission activity in Pagan areas, the Government has desired to discourage propaganda in Moslem districts.

157. *Difficulty in Moslem States*

The difficulty lies in the fact that, if the advent of missions is authorised by the Government, it is extremely difficult to avoid the conclusion in the minds of the people that they are under the special aegis of Government. The missions would not withdraw at the behest of the paramount chief, as they would have been compelled to do before the advent of the British Administration, and would look to the Government for protection. In a country where it is of vital importance to maintain the prestige of Europeans, insults to missionaries must of necessity be resented by Government.

It was urged by the Church Missionary Society that Government showed an unfair discrimination, in that Moslem teachers could preach their religion where they chose, while Christian missionaries were denied access to Moslem centres. This charge seems to be sufficiently replied to by Archdeacon Melville-Jones, who writes: 'Traders and others who have had a Christian education travel all through the country now, and settle in the outlying villages and districts of the hinterland. Wherever they go, as do the Mohammedans, they carry their religion and teaching with them. The result is the springing up of small churches all through the interior, and it is beyond our present powers to cope with the movement.' This was written primarily, I think, in reference to the Yoruba country, but there is no restriction on Christian traders in the Moslem States, and, as a matter of fact, very large numbers of mission-educated traders have been attracted by the prospects of profit at Kano.

TOWNSHIPS AND SEGREGATION

188. *Devolution of Responsibility*

Devolution of responsibility, and the management of their own affairs, has been described as the dominant principle of the Government policy in regard to Native Administration. The Townships Ordinance of 1917 carried this policy into a different sphere of Administration. Its main purpose was to establish the broad principle of municipal responsibility, graduated according to the importance of the community, and the measure of its ability to accept and discharge satisfactorily the conduct of its own affairs. The principle was by no means new, though except in Lagos it had been applied chiefly to sanitation. It was now extended and applied consistently throughout Nigeria.

189. *First-class Townships*

Townships are graded in three classes according to the degree of control and responsibility vested in the governing authority, and they include practically all centres where Europeans reside. Lagos alone, whose locally-born inhabitants enjoy the status of British subjects, many of whom are educated native gentlemen, able and willing to take part in the development of their city, is at present of the first-class, in which the 'Local Authority' consists of a Town Council of not more than twelve members. It employs a secretary, municipal engineers, and various native officials. It raises its own revenue by rates, and licences, assisted by a grant from Government. It administers certain specified laws applicable to a township (especially the 'Public Health' and 'Township' Ordinances), and appropriates the fines imposed for their contravention. It legislates by way of by-laws for the enforcement in detail of these laws, and prepares an Annual Budget, both subject to the final approval of the Governor. The Council consists of official and unofficial members, in such proportion as the Governor may determine. Of the latter three are at present elected, and the remainder nominated by the Government. In practice, with a view to avoid any friction, the unofficial members of the Town Council are identical with the members of the Legislative Council. As the Council proves its ability, and as the township becomes independent of a grant, the unofficial membership of its Council may equal, or even exceed, the official members, and may be selected by election.

Prior to Amalgamation, the revenues, derived mainly from the peoples of the interior, had been spent somewhat freely in schemes for the improvement of Lagos—waterworks, electric lighting, reclamation, streets, sanitation, &c. Up to 1915 there was no municipal rate at all. In that year, on the completion of costly waterworks, a small water-rate was imposed, and gave rise to agitation and even to a riot. In 1918 an 'improvement rate' was introduced for portions of the town at the instance of the Council. As long ago as 1913, Honourable Mr. Sapara Williams, Senior Native Member of Council, had strongly advocated a substantial rate to meet all liabilities.

190. *Second and Third-class Townships*

The Local Authority in a township of the second-class is the Station Magistrate, or other officer, assisted by an Advisory Board of officials and

unofficials appointed by the Governor. He relieves the political staff (whose duties are confined to Native Administration) of work connected with the European community, with trade, land leases, housing, railway questions, sanitation, and the care of roads and streets, and of the township generally, and deals directly with the Secretariat. Rules made by the Governor take the place of the Town Council's By-laws. They may be of general application, or particular to any township at the instance of the Local Authority or Advisory Board.

A second-class township possesses a 'township fund', and levies rates in the Northern Provinces, but not in the South at present. It presents annual estimates, but looks to the Public Works Department to supplement the construction and maintenance of the roads or other works. The Medical Officer of Health is primarily responsible in all townships for sanitation, and matters relating to the public health.

The third-class includes places where the European residents are very few. Here the Local Authority is usually the District Officer, without an Advisory Board or township fund.

Townships are usually excluded from the jurisdiction of the Native Courts, and the law administered is primarily British law. Second (and, of course, first) class townships, are usually within the local limits of the Supreme Court, of which the Station Magistrate is a Commissioner. If the court work is exceptionally heavy a Police Magistrate may be appointed to discharge it. The Local Authority submits a half-yearly report, by which the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor are kept in close touch with the affairs of the township, and can promote uniformity of policy.

191. *Segregation of Europeans and Natives*

All townships are divided into a European and a native quarter, separated by a non-residential area of a quarter of a mile in breadth, which extends round the former. This belt is kept clear of undergrowth, and may be used for recreation, and parade grounds, and even for garden allotments, in which high-growing crops are not allowed. Non-residential buildings may be erected upon it, such as churches, court-houses, stores, &c., provided they do not impair its utility as a fire-break, on the side of the native quarter. Europeans may not reside in the close vicinity of a township, but must live in the European reservation, where the amenities of a pure water supply, and police protection are as far as possible available.

In the long-established towns on the coast, where the dwellings of Europeans and natives are hopelessly intermingled, this principle of segregation cannot be at once applied, but the reservations have none the less been marked out and the policy will become operative as leases fall in, or as merchants, in the interests of their employees (who face risks, on their behalf), are content to utilise their existing leaseholds solely as non-residential premises. Without their co-operation it is difficult to enforce it even on newcomers, who would thus be placed at a great disadvantage in trade. Simultaneous action by all is therefore necessary. It may be possible for Government in some cases to offer leases of land in the European reservation in exchange for those outside it. Provisions are made in the new Police Ordinance for the provision of special police paid by the employer, to guard premises in the absence of a European resident. The Liverpool Chamber of Commerce

replied in very cordial terms to a letter I addressed to them on this subject and promised their co-operation.

192. *Reasons for Segregation*

Not only is it to the mutual convenience and comfort alike of Europeans and of natives, that this system of segregation should be enforced, but since medical science has now established the endemicity of yellow fever, and shown that natives (especially children) are 'Hosts' from which mosquitoes become infected with its germ, and that of malaria, it has become a matter of the first importance. 'Sections 59-61 of the Ordinance' (writes the Director of the Medical Services) 'will revolutionise the social life of Europeans residing in Nigeria. They will live healthier lives, be more comfortable, and not tend to degenerate into mere machines.' There is a moral obligation upon firms to provide their employees with dwellings where the risk to health is minimised. I learn that of the three firms in the Muri Province, all of whose employees reside on the river bank, one of each died in the nine months preceding the report. There are, of course, exceptions to the rigid application of this rule, when the duties of an officer, e.g., the headmaster of a boarding school or the keeper of a prison, necessitate residence in close proximity to his charge.

193. *Restriction on Native Residents in a Township*

The native quarter of a township, especially in the North, is reserved as far as possible for natives alien to the local population, whose business or employment is closely associated with Europeans. It is not desired that local natives, even though employed as carriers or labourers by Europeans, should be allowed to withdraw from the control of their own Native Administration and Native Courts by residing in a township.

On the other hand, natives resident in a township are encouraged to take their petty cases—matrimonial disputes, debts and the like—to the nearest Native Court for settlement in accordance with native law and custom.

PRINCIPAL PROJECTS OF DEVELOPMENT

194. *Railways*

I have already briefly described the development of railways in Nigeria. The very costly error in the location of the great bridge over the Niger, and other unnecessary expenditure was, in my judgement, due to the system of construction by Consulting Engineers, adopted on the southern section, the cost of which contrasted very unfavourably with the Northern Baro-Kano Section undertaken under local supervision.

In spite, however, of such mistakes and the extravagance which Major Waghorn criticised so adversely, the railways, as a whole, are now paying all maintenance and debt charges on capital account. Projects for the future have already been suggested. (*See also Appendix VIII.*)

195. *Harbour Works at Lagos*

A sum of £1,297,000 was provided under the loan Ordinances for harbour works (£897,000), and for dredging, reclamation, and wharves at Lagos (£400,000). Of this a sum of £1,008,438 had been spent to the end of 1917,

leaving a sum of £288,562 for further expenditure, of which it was estimated that £130,000 would be spent in 1918.

The principal project was to deepen the entrance to the harbour, which was obstructed by a 'Bar', to a depth of 27 feet at high water. The work was entrusted to Messrs. Coode Son & Matthews, who designed two moles, each about one and a half miles in length, together with a 'training bank'. Large masses of stone are quarried near Ao, about 60 miles up the line, and railed to the mole-head, where they are dumped into the sea. Work was commenced in April, 1908, and at the end of 1918 the East Mole had been completed for a length of 7,777 feet, and work was concentrated on the West Mole and training bank, with which great progress had been made. Three large and very costly suction dredgers were purchased, and assisted in dredging the bar and deepening the channels in the harbour under the direction of the Marine Department. The cost of two of the dredgers and all their working expenses have been met from Revenue.

The work has been attended with unqualified and progressive success. Before its inauguration the depth of water on the bar was about eleven feet, and all cargo inwards and outwards had to be converted to Forcados, 160 miles distant by sea, and thence transhipped into or from 'Branch Boats', whose draught could negotiate the Lagos Bar. In 1917, for the first time, the official draught was continuously maintained at 20 feet—latterly increased to 20 feet 6 inches and to 21 feet in November, 1918. Branch boats have for some time ceased to ply, and the mainline steamers now enter the harbour, and unload at the Customs Wharf, to which the channel has been deepened, and which has been extended to a total length of 1,180 feet, as a charge against Revenue.

The cost inwards and outwards under the branch boat system was calculated to be not less than 10s. per ton. This is now replaced by harbour dues calculated on the basis of 4s. a ton (weight or measurement) which, with berthage dues, cover the debt charges on the capital expenditure from Loan Funds, and some part of the annual expenditure incurred by the Marine Department. The benefit to trade has been enormous, not merely in diminution of shipping costs, but also in saving of time, breakages, and losses in transshipment, &c. There is still a substantial margin for increase in harbour dues should this be necessary, but it is sound policy to keep them (and also berthage dues) as low as possible, and to look to the increase of trade and Customs duties for revenue returns.

196. *Apapa Wharves and Terminal*

The Harbour Works Loan will not suffice for the works in progress, and it will be necessary to raise a further sum for the completion of the harbour works (including the enlargement of the deep-water basin), and for the construction of the railway terminal and the wharves at Apapa. This latter project—which is still under consideration—may be described as follows:

While the extended Customs wharf, assisted to some extent by the wharf at Iddo (*see* plan Appendix V), might be expected to meet the demands of shipping for a reasonable period, so far as the 'Lagoon trade' (*see* paragraph 71) is concerned, the problem of the rapidly expanding rail-borne trade, with its immense potential development, remained for solution.

It had been proposed that a great wharf scheme should be carried out in the

neighbourhood of Wilmot Point, on the eastern side of the harbour and near its entrance. I examined this project on my arrival in Nigeria, and it appeared to be unsuitable for the following reasons:

- (a) It was not possible, except at the cost of unjustifiable and colossal expenditure, to bring the railway to this site. Two new bridges over the Lagoon connecting Iddo Island with the mainland and with Lagos Island would be necessary, at a cost of probably not less than a quarter of a million sterling, and possibly nearly double that sum. The main line could not traverse the densely congested town, which, even if feasible, would have cost a sum impossible to calculate, and have caused great resentment. A route along the sea bed to the North was found impracticable, and expert opinion declared that even if the railway reached the site, it would be very costly to construct a large terminal upon it.
- (b) Most of the area of the proposed site is at present bottomless swamp. Its reclamation may for other purposes have to be undertaken in the future at great cost, but it would have delayed the provision of the wharves—most urgently needed—for a number of years.

I need refer to no minor objections, for these were conclusive, and it was decided to transfer the terminal and wharves to Apapa on the western side of the Lagoon, to which the railway already has access. The scheme has the merit of meeting the existing congestion within a reasonable time. The wharves which have already been constructed there must be extended, the single railway line must be doubled and strengthened, an adequate shunting yard and terminal must be laid out, Customs sheds and goods warehouses must be erected, but as each item is completed it will come into immediate use, and begin to yield returns on the outlay and assist in the expansion of trade.

197. *Wharves, &c., at Port Harcourt*

The construction of a permanent quay-wall at Port Harcourt, 500 feet in length, has been in progress for some time, and is now well advanced. The removal of the toe of land in front of it has proved a more difficult operation than was expected, and has necessitated the purchase of a bucket dredger (second-hand), which will be of great value for other works. This permanent wharf must be extended to replace the new temporary wharf. The coal-tips for directing bunkering of vessels, are now nearly complete. The Marine Wharf and the Petroleum Wharf have still to be built. The basin requires dredging and probably enlarging; running sand has been encountered and further investigation is necessary. The bar at Bonny may also require some dredging to allow of the deepest draught vessels ascending the creek. Careful statistics of currents, &c., have been collected for a period of upwards of four years, and the advice of consulting engineers should now be taken on the whole project, and its development put in hand with the least possible delay to meet the rapid and certain expansion of trade and of the colliery. (*See paragraphs 126 and 137.*)

198. *Water-works*

The Lagos water-works were completed in 1916 at a cost of £310,400. The maximum output is about 250 million gallons per annum. The filter-beds have worked excellently, and a perfectly pure water-supply is assured for Lagos, and for sale to shipping. The present demand is about half a million gallons per diem, and the storage tanks provide about ten days' supply in reserve. Practically all the wells in Lagos were very polluted, and those belonging to the municipality and many private ones have now been filled in. These measures, combined with great sanitary activity, have resulted in a wonderful decrease in the mosquito index with a corresponding decrease in malaria.

Water-works, though on a much less expensive scale, will be required in the near future, both at the new capital at Kaduna and at Port Harcourt. A project for the supply of water to Kano Township and to the native city has been in abeyance in consequence of the War. It is proposed to dam the Challowa River, where the railway crosses it, and to create a large reservoir. from which the water will be piped to Kano (about 12 miles). The cost is estimated at about £140,000, to which the Native Administration would gladly contribute largely from its accumulated reserve funds, but since the township and the Railway will also be supplied, the cost should not be wholly met from that source. I can imagine no work which would be a greater boon to the people, or bring home to them more vividly the benefits which they derive from British rule.

199. *Irrigation and Artesian Boring*

The underlying granite in the Kano Province offers no hope for artesian boring, but it is replaced by shales in Sokoto, where the experiment would afford a fair prospect of success. This will be undertaken at once; the boring plant is already ordered. Irrigation from perennial streams, or from artesian water, would, in the parched districts of the North, be an incalculable boon alike to the agriculturists and the pastorals, and would very greatly increase the output of exportable produce and the wealth of the country. This is a project upon which the Native Administration funds can most usefully be expended, and it should be taken into consideration at the earliest possible moment.

FORESTRY, AGRICULTURE, AND VETERINARY

200. *Forestry in the Southern Provinces*

Very tangible progress has been made in the matter of forestry. At the time of Amalgamation the Director of Forests reported that the valuable forests of Southern Nigeria were in process of rapid extinction, owing primarily to the thriftless system of 'shifting cultivation', by which the agricultural population were constantly burning the forest in order to obtain virgin soil. A serious danger threatened, lest by the destruction of forests around the sources of the rivers, the rainfall, no longer conserved by them, would run off rapidly, denuding the country, turning the streams into temporary torrents, defertilising the fields by deposits of sand, and dissipating a source of wealth which, properly exploited, would last for ever. The existing Forestry Ordinance provided for the creation of reserves, but in the hinterland of

Lagos, where some of the finest forests existed, nothing could be done except with the concurrence of the Native Councils. Ignorant of the possibilities of scientific conservation, and careless of posterity, it was not surprising that they opposed any control of the forests and resented any encroachments on their absolute right to destroy them.

The Ordinance of 1917 for the first time empowered the Government to create forest reserves wherever the circumstances showed it to be clearly for the ultimate benefit of the country. The rights of the natives who claimed communal ownership, to obtain all the timber and forest produce which they required, were safeguarded. The forest law was at the same time clarified and full and clear regulations were enacted. Efforts, which I believe to have been attended by a large measure of success, were made to associate the new 'Native Administrations' in the control of the forests, and to give them an intelligent interest in their protection and development. Progress was, of course, hampered by the depletion of the staff by the War, but much has been done to select the areas for reservation, and to place them in the hands of the Settlement Officer, whose duty it is to enquire into and satisfy every possible native claim. The Forestry Officer has now a well-defined task in which he can count on the support of Government.

201. *Forestry in the Northern Provinces*

In the North no forestry department existed. The problem here was largely one of afforestation, especially in the extreme North. The new department was first employed in thoroughly studying the conditions of the country. Extensive reserves were then declared, and the co-operation of the Native Administrations ensured. This was especially the case in Sokoto, where such belts of forest as existed were rapidly dying off, and desert conditions gaining ground. Afforestation will be a matter of many years' expenditure and constant labour, but the interest of the Sultan and his Council was keenly aroused, and in connection with the boring operations and the flooding of parched areas, to which I have elsewhere alluded (paragraph 199), eventual success is I hope assured. A hard experience has already taught the people of these regions to adopt an intensive form of agriculture, and the paucity of the rainfall has brought its own lessons in conservation and utilization.

201A. *Agriculture*

In the Northern Provinces improved types of cotton, maize, tobacco, and sugar-cane (*inter alia*) and many varieties of fruit (including mangoes) have been introduced, while indigenous foodstuffs, 'Guinea-corn' (*Sorghum Vulgare*), yams, and ground-nuts have been improved by selection and plant-breeding. The native, who was accustomed to sell his best produce, and reserve his worst for seed, has, where opportunity has been afforded, been quick to recognise the greatly increased value of his crop which can be effected by these means, and to select his samples from the Government gardens. The new varieties offer great prospects. Allen's cotton, the new sugar-cane at Zaria, 'Hickory King' (maize), and the imported tobacco seed at Illorin, are eagerly sought after and are rapidly superseding the indigenous crops. 'Hickory King' is recognised as more palatable, more satisfying, and more prolific than the ordinary maize.

In the Southern Provinces, also, good results have been achieved in various

similar efforts. Great pains have been taken to teach the natives improved methods of cocoa cultivation and its preparation for the market. Experiments are being made to produce an oil-palm with a soft-shelled fruit, and the investigation of the bud-rot disease of the coco-nut palm (shown by Mr. Farquharson to be due to *B. Coli*) has been of special value. Nurseries are maintained for distribution of a very large number of plants and seeds, and model plots are kept up throughout the Southern Provinces.

202. *Veterinary, Horses and Cattle*

In view of the fact that it is estimated that there are upwards of three million cattle in the North, and nearly 10 million of stock of all kinds, and that epizootic diseases are of frequent occurrence and Rinderpest is enzootic, it is eminently desirable that the veterinary staff should be increased. A well-equipped laboratory is urgently needed, and a stud farm should be established with imported bulls to improve the strain. The number of horses is becoming very seriously depleted, and the matter is causing some anxiety to the native Emirs and also to Government, since horses are essential to the work of the Administrative Staff. The Government might with advantage start breeding operations and import a few stallions, which would be at the service of mares of a sufficiently high standard without fees. Barbs or 'Gulf Arabs' would make good sires, and also the sturdy English cob of not more than 14 hands. An annual horse show with prizes and bonuses would stimulate horse-breeders and be very popular. No doubt the most efficacious way of improving the quality of the horses of the country would be to institute a tax on entire males, from which those passed by a veterinary officer as up to breeding standard would be exempt.

CAMEROONS

203. *Physical Characteristics*

The Administration of that portion of the Cameroons which is in British military occupation, viz., about 31,000 out of the total area of 295,000 square miles, was assumed by the Nigerian Government on April 1st, 1916. Shortly afterwards I visited the headquarters at Buea and made arrangements for the Civil Administration.

The area from the sea (latitude 4°) to Kentu (latitude 7°) was formed into the 'Cameroon Province' under a Resident and the normal staff, and was attached to the Southern Provinces. Its area is about 18,700 square miles, with a population estimated at 570,000. North of Kentu the sparsely populated district of British Banyo (9,350 square miles) was attached to the Yola Province, while the small area around Dikwa (German Bornu, 3,030 square miles) was added to the Bornu Province.

In the southern division of the Cameroon Province the rainfall is heavy, varying from 150" to 400", and all tropical products—coffee, cocoa, rubber, and tobacco—grow luxuriantly. Its area is 5,200 square miles, with a population of about 126,000; there is much forest, and the port of Victoria and the Cameroon Mountain (13,000 feet), on which the German capital at Buea (3,000 feet) is situated, are included in it. The Rio-del-Rey district naturally belongs to the Calabar system, and should be included in that province. The Bamenda and Chang divisions (8,900 square miles, population 394,000)

consist of open grass lands over 4,000 feet in altitude, with hills rising to 7,000 feet or 8,000 feet, and are separated from the southern and western (Ossidingi) divisions by a steep escarpment. The climate is delightful, rainfall about 70", and English fruit and vegetables, wheat, oats and barley can be grown. Horses do well and cattle-breeding would offer every prospect of success on the rich pasturage. The people are of fine physique, consisting of six main tribes under influential chiefs. The western division consists of wooded hills rising to 5,000 feet, intersected with streams, combining to form the Cross River, which for a month or two is navigable as far as Ossidingi. Area 4,600 square miles, population sparse.

204. *Method of Administration*

The province, being occupied territory, has been administered under German law. Communications are difficult, and it was necessary to construct a telegraph at once from Buea, *via* Tinto to Ossidingi, to connect with the Nigerian system at Ikom. The main road from Victoria to Tinto, with branches to Chang, Bamenda and Ossidingi, is being gradually improved. Financially, the province has been treated as a separate unit, with a Budget of its own. At the end of 1917 there was a deficit of £14,600, due to the devastation caused by the War, and to the fact that the Germans had collected the tax in advance and seized the cattle. It is anticipated that this will be reduced to £12,800 by the end of 1919. The Budget balanced at £54,500, the chief source of revenue being the Poll Tax (£36,000), which has been collected without friction, and 'there is a marked increase in general prosperity and contentment'.

The capital expenditure, in view of the uncertain future, has naturally been small since the British Administration. A considerable outlay is required in residential houses (many of which were destroyed during the War), in public buildings, such as sanitary prisons and quarters for police and troops, in telegraphs, and especially in roads. The valuable forests, the agricultural resources, and the Government plantations and farms (in which timber, wheat, oats and barley, and imported livestock had been maintained), should be developed.

The Germans maintained a very large staff of European officers, and their stockaded forts and military garrisons evidence the constant fear in which they lived of native risings. The mistrust of the natives is, I am assured, 'rapidly disappearing, and being replaced by confidence and friendliness on the part of the chiefs and people'. In Chang alone there is hesitation, and three tribes have refused to 'come in', fearing German revenge. This is not unnatural, since the withdrawal of General Dobell's troops, after occupying this area, resulted in the hanging of four chiefs who had assisted the British, and the shooting of 'innumerable natives'. The people are very eager to be assured of the continuance of British rule.

Law and order have been satisfactorily maintained. A number of Native Courts have been instituted, and a Native Administration, with a total revenue of £9,300, inaugurated. It is at present administered in four 'Treasuries', corresponding to the four divisions of the province. Later, if the country is incorporated in Nigeria, these will be organised as tribal units, in accordance with the Nigerian model. A more adequate staff is very urgently needed. Education, owing to the exigencies of war, has been neglected. There

were formerly about 10,000 pupils attending mission schools, and the people are eager for instruction. The missions have left, and Government has only been able so far to maintain four schools.

205. *Trade and Currency*

Trade has been disorganised, and indeed almost killed, in the interior by the War. Prospects are good, and from the Ossidingi district transport is available by the Cross River for three months in the year. There are considerable openings to replace the former German firms, and a large amount of the usual West African produce is available for export. There is also said to be an attractive opening in the growing of potatoes and other temperate and sub-tropical produce, which would find a ready sale in Nigeria and other West African Colonies.

It is probable that the bulk of the imports and exports to and from interior districts will go to the French port at Dualla, to which the railway—100 miles long—running nearly parallel to the present Anglo-French frontier, gives cheap access. An arrangement with the French for transit privileges similar to those accorded by Nigeria to the much more important imports *via* Lagos to Dahomey and by the Nigerian Railway (paragraph 129) should present no difficulty, with the object of avoiding the cost and friction of inland Customs stations and preventive services, which would eat up all the receipts.

The existence of a dual currency in British sterling and German marks has been a source of much trouble. The value of the mark at one time fell to 3*d.* in the North, while it was accepted as equivalent to a shilling elsewhere. The official rate has now been fixed at 7*d.* It should, as soon as possible, cease to be legal tender, and, since its fineness is approximately the same as British silver, it may be called in and re-minted.

206. *The Plantation Estates*

In addition to the Administration of the Cameroons, the Nigerian Government was called upon to assume responsibility for the privately-owned plantations on or near the slopes of the Cameroon Mountain. Their total area is 246,181 acres, of which 49,900 are under cultivation. There are twenty-one separate estates, of which one has been leased (1,153 acres), and the remainder are supervised by the Plantation Staff. This staff numbers under a score, including mechanics in charge of light railways, sawmills and other machinery, and was in part lent by the Nigerian Government, in part specially recruited. The Germans employed over 100 Europeans. The average number of labourers engaged has averaged 8,500. Under German rule these were recruited by forced levies, and the German district officers continually protested that the country was becoming depopulated and villages were migrating over the Nigerian border. The detestation in which service in the plantations was held by the natives and the circumscribed area from which labour can now be drawn—the Germans recruited from as far east as Jaunde, now in French territory—combined to render the provision of an adequate labour supply a matter of the greatest difficulty. This has to a great extent already been overcome, and I anticipate that in future no great difficulty will be experienced in maintaining the present number of purely voluntary labourers. The annual receipts of the plantations, even under these very disadvantageous circumstances, are stated to be considerably in excess of the receipts by the German

owners, while the expenditure has greatly decreased. The yield in 1916 was—cocoa, 3,278 tons; kernels, 48 tons; palm-oil, 48½ tons; rubber, 2 tons.


The future of these estates is a matter of interest and importance in connection with the disposal of the Cameroons. The Nigerian Government hopes to be able to hand them over at the end of the war in a fair state of preservation. If they are then sold to British purchasers, it is probable, as I have said, that a limited supply of labour will be attracted by regular pay and sympathetic treatment. But the available labour supply will not suffice for their rapid development, and if they are maintained in European ownership some system of imported labour will, no doubt, have to be considered.

I am inclined to suggest that three or four, whose aggregate requirements would not exceed 6,000 to 8,000 labourers, should be sold for development by British owners, and that the Government should acquire the remainder (possibly in part payment of the cost of the Cameroon campaign, leaving Germany to recoup the owners). These might be leased in small lots to native cultivators (who would find their own labour), on terms which would secure to them undisturbed possession. As far back as 1912 the Germans, profoundly impressed by the success of the native cocoa industry on the Gold Coast in contrast with their own, had, it would seem, decided on a radical change of policy in the direction of encouraging native cultivation in lieu of European plantations. Cocoa inspectors were to be appointed and millions of seedlings of cocoa, rubber and palm, grown in Government nurseries, were to be distributed free.

F. D. LUGARD
Governor-General

April 9th, 1919

N.B.—This report has been written in England, where access to local records is not of course possible. It has, however, been transmitted to Nigeria for verification, and corrections have been incorporated.



APPENDIX II

ABROGATION OF THE TREATY OF EGBALAND

WHEREAS a Treaty dated the eighteenth day of January, One thousand eight hundred and ninety-three, known as the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, was made at Abeokuta between His Excellency Gilbert Thomas Carter, Companion of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony of Lagos, for and on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, &c., Her Heirs and Successors, on the one part and the King (Alaki) and Authorities of Abeokuta representing the Egba Kingdom, for and on behalf of their Heirs and Successors, on the other part:

AND WHEREAS the Colony of Lagos has merged in His Majesty the King of Great Britain's Colony of Nigeria:

AND WHEREAS the King (Alaki) and Authorities of Abeokuta desire the assistance of the Government of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria to maintain law and order in the Egba Kingdom and that the said Treaty of the eighteenth day of January, One thousand eight hundred and ninety-three, be annulled and that a new Agreement be entered into between themselves and the Governor of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, annulling the said Treaty and placing the Egba Kingdom unreservedly under the Government of the Protectorate of Nigeria:

NOW, THEREFORE, this Agreement made this sixteenth day of September, One thousand nine hundred and fourteen between His Excellency Sir Frederick John Dealtry Lugard, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Companion of the Distinguished Service Order, Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, for and on behalf of His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland, Emperor of India, &c., His Heirs and Successors on the one part, and the undersigned King (Alaki) and Authorities of Abeokuta representing the Egba Kingdom for and on behalf of themselves, their Heirs and Successors on the other part: Witnesseth

- (1) That the said Treaty of the eighteenth day of January, One thousand eight hundred and ninety-three, is hereby annulled.
- (2) That the Agreement of the thirteenth day of January, One thousand nine hundred and four, made between Sir William McGregor, Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Governor of the Colony of Lagos, on behalf of His Majesty King Edward the Seventh and the Alaki and Authorities of the Egba Kingdom, whereby certain Powers and Jurisdiction were granted by the Alaki and Authorities of the Egba Kingdom to His Majesty the King of Great Britain, is hereby annulled.
- (3) That the whole of the Egba Kingdom and all persons resident therein be

- placed under, and subject to, the Jurisdiction of the Courts of the Protectorate of Nigeria in all matters Criminal and Civil, and shall be subject to the Laws of the said Protectorate.
- (4) That no Legislative Measures shall in future be enacted by the Alaki and his Council without the express sanction and approval of the Governor of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. But that all Legislative Measures heretofore enacted by the said Alaki and his Council and now in force, shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with the Laws of the Protectorate or repugnant to natural justice and humanity, remain in force unless and until cancelled by order of the Governor.
 - (5) That the Alaki and his Successors shall be the recognised Head of the Egba people, and shall continue with the approved Chiefs of Egbaland to carry on the Native Administration of Egbaland, subject to the control of the Governor of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria.
 - (6) That the Governor of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria hereby undertakes to be responsible for the maintenance of law and order in Egbaland equally with any other part of the Protectorate, and to maintain such troops and police therein as may in his discretion be necessary for the purpose.

IN WITNESS whereof the said parties have hereunto set their hands and seals this sixteenth day of September, One thousand nine hundred and fourteen.

(Signed) F. D. LUGARD,
Governor-General.

Witness: A. G. BOYLE,
Lieutenant-Governor.

(Signed) By the Alaki and fourteen Principal Chiefs.

Witness: A. EDUN,
Egba Government Secretary.

P. V. YOUNG
Commissioner.

and by SOLANKE
Interpreter.

APPENDIX III

MEMORANDUM as to Proposal to Establish Provincial and Native Courts.
By A. WILLOUGHBY OSBORNE, *Chief Justice, Southern Nigeria*,
December 12th, 1912

1. In my opinion the Supreme Court is not the most suitable form of tribunal for territories in the opening stages of civilisation, and the extension of its jurisdiction to districts recently brought under British rule is a matter which requires very serious consideration. It is not so much the establishment of the tribunal itself which is unsuitable, as its inevitable consequences, viz., the influx of alien legal practitioners. In the Central and Eastern Provinces the Bar consists of some of the younger Lagos practitioners, who are unable to cope with the competition here, and Gold Coast and Sierra Leone lawyers, whose sole object is to make as much money as they can out of the country as quickly as possible and return to their own homes. Most of these gentlemen, who practise locally as barristers and solicitors, are members of the English Bar, but I regret to say that I do not think that they are actuated to the extent that they should be by the honourable traditions of that profession.

There is only too much reason to suppose that they employ touts who deliberately stir up strife, particularly in land questions.

2. The policy hitherto has been to apply the Supreme Court Ordinance to districts which have been only just opened up, and which, in my judgment, are certainly not ready for it in its entirety. In such districts it would be far better if the jurisdiction were limited at first to criminal cases only, as can be done under Section 20 of the Supreme Court Ordinance, and not until the inhabitants are thoroughly familiarised with British methods and amenable to British rule should the civil jurisdiction be added, and then, in my opinion, only if the tribal and communal boundaries of land have been politically settled, and, if necessary, validated by Ordinance in such a manner that they cannot form the subject of litigation.

3. It is these tribal and communal land disputes which attract the lawyers and provide the fat fees, and cause the most trouble politically. Steps have recently been taken to remedy this mischief to some extent. By Order No. 12 of 1911 the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in respect of causes and matters between natives of the Central and Eastern Provinces relating to ownership or user of lands is taken away (except in cases where a writ had been previously issued) from all districts and places other than those specified in the Schedule. These latter include the districts of Calabar, Bonny, Brass, Forcados, Warri and Sapele, parts of the Opobo and Degema districts, and areas within a radius of two miles from Onitsha, Asaba, Idah, Abo, and Itu. This arrangement has not been in force long enough for me to say whether it provides a sufficient check on the abuse to which I have alluded, but it is certainly a step in the right direction.

4. In places where Supreme Court jurisdiction does not extend, Courts of the nature of Provincial Courts seem to me to afford an excellent machinery

for administering justice. The same remark applies to places where the Supreme Court has only partial jurisdiction, so far as relates to causes and matters outside that jurisdiction.

5. I fully agree with His Excellency's opinion that there should be no overlapping of jurisdiction between the Provincial and Supreme Courts, though I certainly advocate an appeal in civil cases involving a certain pecuniary value, say £50 or £100, from a Provincial Court to the Supreme Court, with such further appeal as would lie if the case originated in the Supreme Court.*

6. In no circumstances whatever should legal practitioners of the Supreme Court be allowed to appear as such in Provincial Courts, which form no part of the Supreme Court and, as President of the latter Court, I should have the strongest possible objection to their so doing, as they would not be sufficiently under the observation of the Judges. Personally, I do not think that they should ever be allowed to appear in appeals from Provincial Courts, except where both parties are literate.

7. It may be urged as a matter of detail that the present Central and Eastern Provinces are too large to enable the Provincial Commissioners to get through the necessary judicial work in addition to their administrative duties, but this is not an insuperable difficulty, and might be got over by a change of nomenclature.

If the present provinces were abolished or styled anything but provinces they would be sub-divided into groups of districts styled provinces, or some other title could be substituted for that of Provincial Courts.

8. Incidentally, I may observe that the present territorial division of the Colony and Protectorate appears to me to proceed on a wrong basis. Provinces, districts, and so forth, should first be fixed for administrative purposes (by Ordinance if considered necessary) and the judicial divisions should follow them.

At present the provinces and districts are, strictly speaking, judicial divisions appointed under the Supreme Court Ordinance wherein the Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction, and not administrative divisions.

9. I observe that the Provincial Courts Bill has been made applicable to the entire Protectorate, which appears to be contrary to His Excellency's ruling in the extract from the memorandum of the 24th September, 1912, supplied to me (*see* paragraph 8 thereof). The Lagos hinterland is part of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. The Colony itself consists of certain ceded territories, the limits of which are ill-defined and often exceedingly difficult to ascertain. To show how acutely this difficulty is felt, I may mention that the Acting Chief Justice recently held that there was not sufficient proof that the land whereon Lagos Lighthouse stands was ceded territory, though the full Court has now ruled otherwise. As I suggested to His Excellency at a recent interview on the subject-matter of these papers, it would be advisable, when the new Letters Patent are passed on the amalgamation of the two Nigerias, for the limits of the Colony to be geographically defined, and all territories within those limits to be formally annexed.

The operation of the Bill should be limited to those parts of the Central and Eastern Provinces where the Supreme Court does not possess full jurisdiction.

* *I.e.* to the Privy Council only when the claim involves £500 or over, or raises a question of general public importance.—A.W.O.

10. I think the form of the Bill might be considerably simplified, and with all deference to His Excellency's opinion expressed in paragraph 11 (a) of the memorandum, I would suggest leaving intact the main provisions of the Supreme Court Ordinance and the procedure thereunder, with which the Commissioners are familiar. Speaking with sixteen years and a half experience of the Supreme Court Ordinance and its procedure on the Gold Coast and here, I have no hesitation in saying that it is admirably adapted to the needs of litigants in person, and that the delay and expense only come in with the employment of legal practitioners. I would suggest a Bill modelled more on the lines of the Ashanti Administration Ordinance, 1902, whereby a Court of Record was established for Ashanti. During the five years and a half that I was Attorney-General on the Gold Coast there was never a hitch in the working of the Ashanti Courts. Its main provisions, if applied *mutatis mutandis* to the present Bill, would be on the following lines:

- (i) The establishment in each province of a Court of Record, to be styled the Provincial Court of the province.
- (ii) The Court to be presided over by the Provincial Commissioner, who, as such President, would have as full powers and jurisdiction as a Judge of the Supreme Court sitting in a Divisional Court (*i.e.*, unlimited civil and criminal jurisdiction).
- (iii) The Provincial Courts and their branches to be governed by the law in force in the Colony as set forth in Section 14 of the Supreme Court Ordinance, as modified by Sections 16 (a), 17, 18 and 19 of that Ordinance. (Of these, Section 14 is re-enacted in Clause 9 of the Bill, in a vague way, but Sections 17 and 19 were omitted altogether. Section 19 is re-enacted in Section 10 (i). There certainly should be a uniform law administered by British Courts, and, as drafted, the Bill gives far too great powers to Provincial Courts to say whether or no a given law is 'applicable' or not).
- (iv) The procedure in the Provincial Courts, civil and criminal, to be the same as that in the Supreme Court, provided that (a) all causes shall be heard summarily; (b) in no cause or matter, civil or criminal, shall the employment of a barrister or solicitor be allowed.

The insertion of analogous provisions in the Bill would relieve it of its Schedule and shorten and simplify the Bill itself.

11. I do not consider that the merger of judicial and executive functions in the same officer works badly in West Africa, and it is inevitable in the present condition of the country. But when an officer who does not possess legal qualifications is confronted by an English barrister, he is placed in a position of difficulty, and apt to give too great weight to the legal arguments addressed to him.

For this reason, more than any other, I think that the establishment of tribunals which are not part of the Supreme Court will prove a benefit in outlying portions of the Protectorate.

12. With reference to the Native Courts Bill, I feel that I have not the necessary local knowledge of the old Southern Nigerian Protectorate to enable me to speak authoritatively, but so far as my experience goes, I am of opinion that the natives of the Central and Eastern Provinces have not got

to that stage where they should be entrusted with powers of life and death. I am inclined to think that the present system of native courts goes far enough, and that in the more important cases native tribunals require the guiding influence and impartial judgment of a European officer.

The worst evil attendant on the native court system is not touched by the Bill, and will flourish under it just as badly as it does now. I refer to the dishonesty of the native court clerks, who are responsible for keeping the Court Records. Despite this, the present native courts seem to be a popular form of tribunal, judging from the number of cases tried. I take the following figures from the Annual Report for the Eastern Province in 1911:

CASES DEALT WITH BY NATIVE COURTS IN EASTERN PROVINCE				
	1909	1910	1911	
Civil	35,783	47,832	47,696 (Incomplete Record)	
Criminal	17,215	32,866	18,159	do. do.

14. In my judgment it would be better to leave untouched these courts, which have been in existence for ten years and are known to the people, rather than establish a new system giving an extension of power. The Native Courts Ordinance (C. 123 of the Laws) will require amendment in certain details, if and when the Provincial Courts are established, but otherwise will suffice for present needs, and in some ways it seems even preferable to the Bill. The latter, I may observe in conclusion, does not attempt to define the term 'native', and without some definition its jurisdiction is vague in the extreme.

The remainder of the memorandum deals with the Bills in a detailed criticism.

A. W. OSBORNE,
Chief Justice.

REPLY TO MR. OSBORNE'S MEMORANDUM BY SIR E. SPEED
Chief Justice, Northern Nigeria,
February 3rd, 1913

HIS EXCELLENCY,

I HAVE read Mr. Osborne's memorandum, and am glad to find that he is in the main in agreement with the proposals which have been incorporated in my drafts. His criticisms deal mainly with matters of drafting. It is quite possible that, upon a revision of the laws after the amalgamation, improvements might be made in the drafting of both Ordinances, but I still think that my proposals to amend the Supreme Court Ordinance (Southern Nigeria) are necessary, and are as simple as possible.

I do not agree as to the advisability of retaining the Supreme Court procedure and practice throughout. In the Northern Nigeria Statute Book the Supreme Court rules occupy sixty pages, the Provincial Court rules twelve.

I think the right of appeal given in my draft is sufficient, and should not be

enlarged. I see no adequate reason why counsel should be debarred from appearing in the Supreme Court on appeals from the Provincial Courts, if the right of appeal be limited as proposed.

I do not agree that there is any anomaly in giving both the Governor and the Chief Justice a right of transfer. The Chief Justice's right of transfer only extends to cases which are originally within his jurisdiction, and it may very well be the *only* means by which he can exercise this jurisdiction. A recent incident will illustrate my meaning to Your Excellency; I very strongly advise that this right of transfer be retained.

With the greatest respect, I am still of opinion that the drafts submitted are adequate, and will not be improved by Mr. Osborne's proposed amendments.

It is, as I understand, probable that the system will be introduced, at all events at first, only in the Central and Eastern Provinces of Southern Nigeria.

The object is to introduce, as far as possible, a uniform system throughout.

Our proposal is, in effect, to apply a system which is already in force and has worked admirably for some years in five-sixths of the area to the remaining one-sixth—the conditions being similar, and as to certain portions of the larger area almost identical.

As to the native courts, the main and, to my mind, insuperable objection to the Southern Nigeria native courts is that they are not native courts at all.

E. A. SPEED,
Chief Justice.

February 3rd, 1913.

MEMORANDUM on Provincial Courts by Sir E. SPEED,
Chief Justice, Nigeria
February 11th, 1914

1. The Supreme Court system has been tried in the Southern Nigeria Protectorate, and has, in my opinion, proved a failure.

2. If the 'bringing to the African of English justice is one of the most valuable assets to him', then the system stands condemned, for that is exactly what it has failed to do.

3. It is impossible without a very large addition to the judicial establishment to hold assizes in more than a limited number of places, which involves the hearing of cases at long distances from the scene of action and at infrequent intervals.

4. The result is that not only are prisoners kept for long periods awaiting trial, but that cases frequently break down owing to the absence of witnesses: indeed, in some localities it is almost impossible to secure the attendance of witnesses unless they are kept under observation until the day for trial arrives, which means in practice that they are treated almost as prisoners themselves.

5. A considerable proportion of crime thus goes unpunished, and a further considerable proportion is inadequately punished in order to avoid committal for trial, or remitted to native courts and tried without much reference to the principles of English justice.

6. The Provincial Court system brings English justice practically to the door of every one, and it must not be forgotten that in the Provincial Courts the same law is administered by the same men as in the Supreme Court, the only difference being that the procedure is summary throughout in the Provincial Courts and that no cases come automatically before the Judges of the Supreme Court, instead of the limited number which are tried at assizes under the present system.

7. It is true that the Provincial Court judges are not trained lawyers, but neither are the District Commissioners under the present system; and experience in Northern Nigeria has demonstrated conclusively that trials are conducted by the Residents with scrupulous fairness and generally in a manner which commands confidence; added to which they are surrounded by safeguards which practically prevent the chance of any serious miscarriage of justice.

8. It must be remembered that only the senior and experienced officers have an unlimited jurisdiction, and their sentences are all subject to review.

9. Against this lack of legal training must be set knowledge of the locality, knowledge of the people and, above all, knowledge of the language (in many cases and, I venture to hope, before long, in practically all). I confess I have little doubt that the balance is in favour of the Provincial Courts.

10. The greatest enemy to an efficient administration of the criminal law is delay, and delay is inherent in the Supreme Court system.

11. Again, the power of transfer must not be ignored. It is likely to be exercised freely for many years; and, indeed I have little hesitation in saying that the Supreme Court judges will try at least as many criminal cases in the future as they have done in the past, but their energies will be utilised in trying cases ripe for trial rather than frittered away in dealing with cases which fail from formal defects or want of prosecution.

12. Nor must it be forgotten that the system provides a simple and easy method for the extension of the Supreme Court jurisdiction which there is no reason to suppose will not be progressive and commensurate with the needs of the community.

13. As to the right to be represented by counsel, it is a significant fact that every single officer, political and judicial, who has had any experience of districts recently brought under control, has pronounced emphatically against it, but it is a still more significant fact that when the Judicial Agreements with the Egbas, Ibadan and Oyo native authorities were being negotiated, the said authorities, one and all, and of their own accord, insisted on inserting a clause to the effect that they desired that lawyers should not have audience in the Courts established within their territories.

14. In criminal cases, however, it is urged that the right to be defended by counsel has been universally conceded, and is much valued by the community.

15. In the Supreme Court I quite agree; and I welcome the appearance of counsel as frequently as possible, but it must be remembered that in the Supreme Court they are under the eye and subject to the control of judges of the highest tribunal in the country.

16. In Provincial Courts the position is entirely different.

17. The prosecution is not represented by a lawyer, and trials are conducted without any avoidable formality, and it is the business of the judge not only to hold the balance between the contending parties, who are responsible for the

conduct of the case, but to endeavour by all legitimate means to come to the truth of the matter.

18. If he is to be continually bullied (I am not using the word offensively) by counsel raising objections on technical points with the bearing of which he is but imperfectly acquainted, his usefulness is likely to be considerably impaired, and his activities circumscribed in a manner which will not tend to the benefit of the community.

19. Moreover, having regard to the fact that the judges of the Provincial Courts are mostly not professional men, the presence of counsel taking part in the proceedings having higher professional qualifications than the Bench is not fair to the latter as tending to impair its authority and destroy public confidence in its decisions.

20. I am a lawyer myself and practically my whole life has been spent in the study, the practice and the administration of the law of England.

21. No one can have a keener appreciation of, or a more ardent admiration for, its principles and the incalculable benefits which it has conferred on humanity.

22. If I considered that those principles were being ignored, or that those benefits were being denied to any section, however humble, of His Majesty's subjects, nothing would induce me to endorse the proposals which were designed or calculated to effect such purposes.

23. In this case I say with all the emphasis at my command that there is no reason to suppose that any such result will follow the adoption of these measures. On the contrary, I have every confidence that they will secure a more efficient administration from a judicial as well as from an executive point of view.

E. A. SPEED,
Chief Justice.

11th February, 1914

EXTRACTS from a Report by Sir E. SPEED,
Chief Justice, on the Working of the Provincial and Native Courts in Southern
Provinces,
October 23rd, 1917

'The conditions obtaining at the time of the constitution of the Colony and Protectorate in its present form were briefly as follows:

'(1) Within the Colony of Southern Nigeria, the boundaries of which, though ill-defined, were practically identical with those recently fixed for the Colony of Nigeria, the Supreme Court was the only Court exercising any recognised jurisdiction.

'(2) In Northern Nigeria a system in its main features identical with that which has been adopted for the whole of the Protectorate had been in existence practically from the commencement of its history.

'(3) In the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria very different conditions prevailed.

'(a) In the Western Province (*i.e.*, the old Lagos Protectorate) for a distance of 100 yards on each side of the railway, and upon certain lands leased

for the purposes of the Government, a practically complete jurisdiction had been ceded by the native authorities, together with a right of arrest, outside the limits of the jurisdiction, of persons charged with offences committed within those limits; and in certain districts a very limited jurisdiction had been ceded by treaty and was exercised in accordance with local Ordinances, the earliest of which was enacted in 1904. These jurisdictions were exercised by the Supreme Court of the Colony.

'The rest of the province was, however, not subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme or any other British Court, no provision having been made for the exercise of any jurisdiction which His Majesty might have acquired by any of the ordinary methods. To say that the Yoruba people, other than the inhabitants of the Colony, had in 1913, or ever had had, a traditional or any other than a limited and very recently conferred right of resort to the Supreme Court for the settlement of their disputes, is to say what is manifestly untrue.

'(b) In the Central and Eastern Provinces the Supreme Court of the Colony was the Supreme judicial authority, and its activities were circumscribed only by the fact that its organisation was faulty, it was never adequately manned, and its jurisdiction was exercised concurrently with that of so-called native courts created by Ordinance and invested with very considerable powers.

'It must be remembered that the greater portion of the territory comprised in these provinces had only recently, if at all, been brought under control, large tracts were practically in military occupation, and means of communication were deficient to the verge of non-existence. The assumption of a complete jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters by the Supreme Court had followed as a matter of course from the constitution of the Protectorate, and no adequate attempt had been made to provide the Court with the necessary equipment to enable it to perform the duties nominally imposed upon it by law.

'The staff of the Court was so small and its organisation so rudimentary that in effect, outside the trading centres and coast towns, even its criminal jurisdiction was only exercised at infrequent intervals and had to be supplemented by a liberal use of the special courts sanctioned by Section 76 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, while its civil jurisdiction was only invoked for the purpose of adjudicating upon disputes as to land boundaries, originated and fostered by natives of the coast towns or legal practitioners, not one of whom had any interest in, or any acquaintance with, the customs, the laws, or even the language of the people among whom they had temporarily settled for the purpose of professional gain. So much was this the case that in 1911 an Order in Council was passed depriving the Court of a large part of its jurisdiction in matters relating to land. This Order was, however, ignored by the judges for some reason which is not clear on the face of it, but which it is not necessary to discuss. The native courts, upon which a great deal of the legal business devolved, were "native" only in name, and their procedure lent itself to so many and such grievous abuses that no one can pretend to regret their demise. It was impossible for the political staff adequately to supervise them and the returns furnished to the judges, while making a considerable demand on their time, only afforded an opportunity of remedying an injustice or illegality patent on the face of the return.'

The following were the considerations which presented themselves to him in making his recommendations:

'(1) The Colony was in possession of a judicial system which was properly

organised, had for many years proved adequate to the needs of the community and had earned and commanded the respect and confidence of all. No one with any local knowledge would have thought of disturbing it.

'(2) The functions of the Supreme Court of Northern Nigeria could easily be performed by the Supreme Court of the Colony without any considerable strain on its resources beyond a small increase of staff.

'(3) The Provincial Courts system had been in operation for over ten years in Northern Nigeria, for five of which I had been personally responsible for the confirmation of sentences and the revision of the returns. It had, in my opinion, proved an unqualified success. From a purely judicial point of view it would have been to the last degree inadvisable to import a larger measure of Supreme Court control without making adequate provision for its proper exercise, and such provision it was beyond the resources of the Government to supply.

'The political advantages of the system were beyond dispute, and though it involved certain anomalies more apparent than real, which it was easy to point out and difficult from a purely technical point of view to defend, it was, in my opinion, the best available.

'My reasons for this opinion were fully given in a memorandum which I had the honour to address to your Excellency on the 11th February, 1914, which was published in the Government Gazette (*vide supra*), and I may say at once that subsequent consideration and subsequent experience has not caused me to modify in any material particular any of the views therein expressed.

'(4) The condition of affairs in the Southern Nigerian Protectorate was admittedly and, in my opinion, glaringly unsatisfactory, and for several years drastic alterations in the judicial system had been under the consideration of the Government.'

Referring to the work of the Provincial Courts, he proceeds: 'Hardly an instance has come before me in which, judging from the report furnished, I have not been satisfied that the case has been carefully investigated and a fair judgment given; and I am clearly of opinion that by reason of the simplicity of its procedure and the celerity with which it is put in motion the Provincial Court is, as the ordinary tribunal to which the people resort, adequate to the needs of the community, and efficient as an engine of Government. Had this been otherwise it is certain that there would have been a larger number of applications for transfer to the Supreme Court. As a matter of fact, very few such applications have been made and orders of transfer have in most cases been made at the instance of the Provincial Court itself.

'As to the civil business of the Courts, I have had less opportunity of forming an opinion; but here, again, the applications for transfer have been surprisingly few and the number of appeals to the Supreme Court quite insignificant.

'In this connection, I may state that as it appeared possible that the somewhat complicated procedure preliminary to an appeal acted as a deterrent to the exercise of the right, at the suggestion of one of the Residents, I recently made an Order under which an intending appellant has only to make an application and pay a small fee, all other proceedings connected with the presentation of the case to the Appeal Court being imposed upon the Court itself.

'On the other hand, the business of the Supreme Court has considerably increased, as my annual reports thereon will show, in spite of the limitation of its jurisdiction and the absence of the class of cases connected with land boundaries to which I have referred above; and the Court has dealt with this increase of business without any outside assistance and without any delay, though the number of judges composing the Court is not greater than that of the judges of the old Supreme Courts of Northern and Southern Nigeria.

'As above stated, the powers vested in the Governor under Part 3 of the Provincial Courts Ordinance, formerly delegated to the Lieutenant Governors, have, so far as the Southern Provinces are concerned, been delegated to the Chief Justice. I have always been of opinion that this is the better course and I hope it will be adopted in the Northern Provinces also, not because I have any reason to suppose that the action taken in the large majority of cases by the Chief Justice would be different from that taken by the Lieutenant-Governor acting on the advice of one of the legal advisers, but because it is better that the Courts should be subject to some purely judicial control. The great danger to the proper working of the Provincial Courts is the possibility that the political officers who preside over them should regard them more as an arm of the executive than as the chief, and perhaps the only, tribunal to which British subjects and those under the protection of British law look for the redress of their wrongs and the maintenance of their liberties. Had this course been adopted *ab initio* it seems to me that much of the criticism which has been directed at the system would have been disarmed.

'I cannot say that I have much confidence in the Native Courts except, perhaps, the higher tribunals in the Northern Emirates. They do, and will for many years, require a very careful supervision, and at the best may be considered as a necessary evil, necessary because the political staff is obviously far too small to provide Courts for the settlement of petty disputes, and the investigation of petty delinquencies, and also because some beginning must be made in training these people in habits of thought and action which may ultimately qualify them for a part in the government of the country, to which in accordance with the principles of British administration throughout the world they would appear to be entitled.

'My conclusion then is that the judicial system which was organised in 1914 has justified the hopes that were entertained of it; that the Northern Provinces which retained their old system have benefited by intercourse with the Southern, which has given, and will give, to their Administrators a wider outlook and larger opportunities of acquiring experience of conditions other than those obtaining in their own immediate surroundings; that in the Southern Provinces the Yoruba-speaking peoples have acquired a settled system which gives them access to a British Court where they had none before, and enables the Government of the Protectorate to effect by law what could before only be done by the exercise of political pressure, while in the other districts, inhabited for the most part by very primitive people, the machinery of Government has been much improved and a system introduced which is understood of the people and sufficient for their needs; that resort to the Supreme Court has been secured to all who had any traditional right to it, and to all others to whom it is essential for the conduct of their affairs, and has been refused to none who can give any valid reason for assuming that the other tribunals are insufficiently equipped to deal with their disputes, or are

likely to be prejudiced in the investigation of the misdemeanours alleged against them; and that the necessary safeguards against oppression and corruption in the Native Courts have been maintained and strengthened.'

APPENDIX IV

CRITICISMS, ANSWERS AND REPORTS ON THE NEW JUDICIAL SYSTEM

(a) Hardship on the legal profession who had incurred expenditure in an expensive training.

There is abundant evidence, which was not disputed by the native barristers who were Members of Council when the Bill was passed, that the native bar had misused its opportunities to foment litigation chiefly about land and native rights among ignorant tribes, among whom they had got a footing under the protection of the British Government, and to exact very large fees for their services in getting these disputes brought before the Courts. The Chief Justice points out that the work of the Supreme Court has not, in fact, decreased, so that their complaint is in any case groundless. A large number of barristers practising in Nigeria are aliens from other Colonies.

(b) Hardship on native litigants in not being represented by Counsel.

I have already quoted the case of the Egbas and Yorubas, the two most advanced tribes of the Southern Province, who stipulated that no legal practitioners should appear in their Courts. Residents unanimously report that the Provincial Courts are popular. The Chief Justice informs me that it is very exceptional for any prisoner among the ordinary natives to be defended in the Supreme Court, except on a capital charge, when Counsel is assigned and paid by Government. Counsel appear almost exclusively in civil cases, and rarely attend Criminal Assizes, which are not remunerative. 'To say (he adds) that the ordinary natives of the districts east of the Niger attach any importance to their presence, or any value to their services, is to say what is ridiculously untrue, and I assert without hesitation that they would prefer to deal direct with Europeans, and not through the intervention of a man who has nothing in common with them, and of whose existence they have only become aware during the last ten years.' He points out that in those provinces 'the local bar consists entirely of perfect strangers to the communities for whose interests they profess such regard . . . their object is to make as much money as they can and take it back to their own country.' Mr. Justice Ross has described their methods in scathing terms, which Sir Edwin Speed fully endorses, and expresses the opinion that one of the greatest advantages of the new system is that it curtails the activities of these gentlemen.

(c) The assumption of judicial powers by officers not professionally qualified.

The principle is accepted in India and many other Colonies. It has always been in operation in Nigeria. Many political officers are qualified barristers, all must pass an examination in law. Only those who show qualifications can exercise the wider powers. 'The best training is experience on the Bench.' The

law administered is simple and consists largely of native law and custom best known to political officers. Cases presenting difficulty can be, and are, transferred to the Supreme Court, which, moreover, has jurisdiction over all non-natives. All cases are revised by competent lawyers. The complete severance of the judicial and executive would be wholly impossible in a country such as this—and, if possible, would be most inadvisable. All the objections as to lack of legal training, status, as executive officers, and the Judge being also prosecutor, apply equally to the Commissioners of the Supreme Court.

(d) It is pointed out that certain European practitioners who have supported the agitation against this reform have no experience at all outside the Supreme Court local limits and the Colony, and no knowledge of the working of either the Provincial or Native Courts Ordinances, and that the dislike to these Ordinances is limited to the Coast natives and has been brought about solely by interested motives.

At Calabar, for instance, the only means at the disposal of such a person for ascertaining the views of the natives of the interior would, the Chief Justice observes, be '(1) from the educated natives of the Coast towns, who dare not travel more than a few miles outside the limits of those towns without protection, and who have certainly no authority to speak for the population of the vast tracts of hinterland, however anxious they may be to exploit them for their own advantage, and (2) from the native members of his own profession, who are all aliens, and whose oldest experience of Southern Nigeria dates back exactly as far as the year 1906, before which no lawyer practised in any Court of the Southern Nigeria Protectorate.'

(e) Inferiority of the Provincial Court as a means of dispensing justice.

The Chief Justice writes (November 6th, 1917): 'Before 1914 only a fraction of the legal business in Southern Nigeria was conducted in the Supreme Court and only a fraction of that before the Judges of the Court. The bulk of the Supreme Court business came before the Commissioners of the Court, who were the same officers administering the same law with the same procedure (in criminal cases) as now in the Provincial Courts. A further portion, including many murder cases, was remitted to Special Courts, consisting of a political officer and a few native Chiefs, a class of tribunal which cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered more efficient than, or in any way superior to, a Provincial Court as at present constituted. But the bulk of the judicial work was performed by the native Courts, for which no one to my knowledge ever has said, or could say, a good word. . . . The Supreme Court is a higher development and is available where non-natives are concerned, because it is possible to work its more complicated and elaborate machinery where usually interests governed by English law alone are at stake, and where the interpreter can, to a large extent be dispensed with. The Provincial Court is better for the undeveloped and imperfectly organised provinces, in other words, for the ordinary inhabitants of nine-tenths at least of the Protectorate. There is no question of one Court being "*good enough*" or the other too good for one class or another class: the sole question is which is more suitable for the present condition and needs of the people.'

(f) That the real obstacle to the extension of the Supreme Court jurisdiction throughout the Protectorate is because of the great expense which would thereby be incurred.

The reply is contained in the answer to the last objection. Expense must, of course, be a matter for consideration, but as Sir Edwin Speed observes, it is not the primary factor 'any more than it is the fact that it prevents the establishment of a system of representative Government similar to that of the United Kingdom or United States of America'. The apparent 'profit made in the administration of justice' is largely due to the fact that the expenditure does not, to a large extent, appear under the judicial head.

(g) Sir W. Geary, who practised in Southern Nigeria from time to time, supported his native colleagues of the Bar in a letter to the 'Morning Post' (8.4.14) on the grounds that the new system constituted 'a colour bar against access to the Supreme Court'. He appears to be unaware, or at least does not mention the fact, that non-natives are amenable to a Provincial Court equally with a native, and that both alike can make application for transfer to the Supreme Court—which so far as I am aware has rarely been exercised. The reasons for the changes (which I have described) he characterises as 'so baseless as to drive one to pre-suppose some unavowed motive'. I will not here reply to his statements regarding vacation, &c., which are founded on a misconception of the facts.

OPINION OF THE ACTING LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR
as to the working of the Provincial Courts in Southern Provinces

The Acting Lieutenant-Governor, Southern Provinces (Colonel Moorhouse), in a tour through a number of provinces early in December, 1917, took occasion to make careful enquiries both from the Residents and from the Native Chiefs, many of the latter of whom he had known personally for many years and could be confident that they would speak quite freely to him. He writes: 'As regards the Provincial Courts Ordinance, the Residents and District Officers were unanimous that the objects of the Ordinance, which were to bring a cheap and efficient form of justice untrammelled by all the formalities of the Supreme Court to the doors of the people, had been attained and that they had seen no signs that the Courts did not enjoy the full confidence of the people. The attitude of the Chiefs was generally one of gratitude that cases were dealt with in places easily accessible to the principals and witnesses concerned; they welcomed the new "white man's law" as suiting them better than the old and accordingly accepted it willingly, but I doubt if they have any realisation of the constitutional change involved. I could trace no wish to return to the old system or any hankering after a desire for legal representation.'

OPINIONS OF RESIDENTS of Southern Provinces
on the Provincial Courts and the attitude of the people towards them

Owerri

Dr. Maxwell, C.M.G., in February, 1916, reports that the Provincial Courts have worked smoothly, expeditiously, and with a minimum of errors. Commissioners had exercised their powers efficiently and with discretion. Formerly a delay of six months after committal before trial at Assizes was not

uncommon, now it is exceptional to wait three months. Great advantage was evident from the trial of cases at the locus of the crime—this was practically never the case formerly. 'It may be said with confidence that the natives are satisfied with the administration of justice in the Provincial Courts, and realise that whether they are the accusers or accused they will have very opportunity of putting forward their cases and every help the Court can give them.' He points out that 'whereas formerly an Assistant District Officer, no matter how inexperienced he might be, could sit in a Native Court and pass sentences of two years' imprisonment and fine of £100, under the new system only the four officers in charge of divisions have such powers, subject to confirmation—the remainder have power up to three months only, unless exceptionally authorised for special qualification. In civil cases no district officer has the power formerly possessed by the most junior. That the present is a better system and less likely to lead to abuses needs no demonstration. There is less chance of injustice being done by junior officers and a certainty that any injustice will be more speedily remedied. The class which made a living by fomenting disputes has entirely disappeared.' A year later he reports in a similar sense, and adds that Native Chiefs sit as assessors in all cases, and are frequently of considerable service to the Court.

Calabar

Mr. Bedwell, C.M.G., reports (early 1917) that the Provincial Courts are overcoming earlier prejudices rapidly.

Onitsha

Mr. Hargrove (September, 1915) states that these Courts are appreciated by the natives.

Benin

Mr. Watt (January, 1916) emphasises the reduction of delays, the advantages of trial *in situ* instead of 100 miles away, so that a case can be adjourned for further evidence. He attributes an increase in murder cases to the fact that the people had become disheartened by the number of cases in which a *nolle prosequi* or a verdict of non-guilty was entered by the Supreme Court though the guilt was well known, and therefore ceased to arrest the murderer.

Oyo

Captain Ross (early 1917) reports that the Provincial Courts have done much to stop abuses, especially extortion, and to suppress crime generally. The Courts, he says, are very popular, and the people have no longer to pay thousands of pounds to lawyers' touts. They have also put an end to Lagos land speculators. Suborning of witnesses is very prevalent in Yoruba-land, and this can be more easily detected by the Provincial Court, with its local knowledge, than by the Supreme Court, which even to-day (he says) cannot get evidence in a serious case.

Abeokuta

Mr. Syer (early 1917) states that the Provincial Courts have continued to work with the utmost smoothness, and the people are greatly pleased at the absence of delays in hearing their cases.

General Summary

These reports of Residents are the more satisfactory in view of the serious depletion of the Provincial Staff in 1916 and 1917, which might naturally have been expected to cause delays in the Provincial Courts and inadequate supervision in the Native Courts.

OPINION of the ACTING LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR
on the working of the Native Courts in Southern Provinces

'As far as the Native Courts are concerned' (says Colonel Moorhouse), 'the opinion of the Residents and District Officers was that, with some inevitable exceptions, the Courts had worked without any European sitting better than they had anticipated, and that the steady increase in the number of cases heard showed that any set-back that the change may have caused has been more than made good, and that in most Courts there has been real progress, and that there is growing confidence in the Courts among the people they serve. Most of the Chiefs I spoke to realise the extra responsibility placed on them by the change and are prepared to shoulder it, but they all complain of the limited jurisdiction, more particularly in the case of theft. I took every opportunity to explain not only to individual Chiefs but collectively that Government was only too ready to grant enhanced powers to Courts who showed themselves fitted to exercise them, but that in the first instance it was necessary to ascertain if a Court was fit to walk alone before it was given permission to run. There is no question that the power to recommend the reduction in grade of a Court is a very powerful lever in the hands of the Residents if judiciously used. From my enquiries and from what I saw I came to the conclusion that the introduction of the new Courts has been, generally speaking, a success, and that where there have been failures they have been due more to the individual than to the system. This is more remarkable especially in the Native Courts, as owing to shortage of staff the supervision has not been as close as could be wished. It is therefore satisfactory that appeals and 'reviews' are as few as they are and that the original judgments are so seldom upset.'

OPINIONS of RESIDENTS on the working
of the Native Courts, Southern Provinces

Owerri

Dr. Maxwell points out that only the lists of cases were formerly submitted, even if a sentence exceeded six months, unless the Puisne Judge called for a copy of the case. Now full minutes must be submitted in every case exceeding six months and the only Native Court which retains powers in excess of six months is one in the Supreme Court area. The new system 'safeguards the interests of every accused person as completely as in the past and without any doubt safeguards the interests of the more ignorant natives more completely than in the past', since they did not know how to apply for revision. In a later report he says, 'On the whole the Courts have worked efficiently. The amount of work they get through is enough to prove that they fill a place in

native life and give on the whole satisfaction to the people. A real attempt is made to get the evidence. The majority of district officers report a general improvement and few decisions require to be altered.' Others report less favourably and Dr. Maxwell observes that these are invariably the officers who have exercised least supervision and toured least. The clerks have done fairly well. 'Where supervision has been wisely and tactfully exercised the results are good both as regards the Chiefs and the Staff.'

Calabar


Mr. Bedwell says that the Native Courts have done good work. Investigation of petitions generally shows that the Chiefs were correct in their judgments.


Benin

Mr. Watt states that the people are increasingly satisfied with the Native Courts, as shown by the increase of cases tried. Their decisions have been on the whole sound.

Oyo

Captain Ross writes that the Native Courts have carried out their work very satisfactorily and they are popular with the people, who have thus been relieved of many impositions. The Oyo Court has been a great success and the Chiefs have done surprisingly well. He attributes the disturbances at Iseyin to the action of Chiefs who resented the stopping of bribing in the hearing of cases. It is not improbable that the recent trouble in Egbaland (which adjoins Oyo) was in part due to the same cause.





1:250,000

APPENDIX VI

SOME DATA *re* COST OF LOCAL TIMBER,
LIME AND TILES AND NATIVE LABOUR*Timber*

The Forestry Department has undertaken the felling of logs from a large forest bordering the Lagos lagoon. These are floated down to the saw mills at Apapa, a process not without difficulty since the hardwoods do not float and must be buoyed up with 'floaters' and drums. The Statistical Abstract shows that before the War (1912 and 1913) six and a quarter million super. feet of timber were imported at a value of 2½ per super. foot. This in 1917 had fallen to half a million at 4½*d.* per super. foot.

The cost of logs landed at the saw mills is calculated to be 1*s.* 3*d.* per cubic foot, and the cost of sawing including royalties, supervision, depreciation of plant and waste, &c., to be 1*s.* 6*d.* a cube, so that the total cost of the sawn timber is about 2*s.* 9*d.* a cubic foot. The selling price is 3*s.*, which allows a good profit to Revenue. On the above figures the pre-War price per cube may be taken at 2*s.* 6*d.* and the present price (which is unlikely to fall rapidly) at 9*s.* The Government price therefore (which shows a considerable saving as well as profit to Revenue) can be maintained, and the profit will be increased as the cost diminishes when the native staff becomes more efficient and the output increases. The Director of Works expects to turn out 450,000 cubic feet this year which is probably some 70,000 cubic feet less than the pre-War demand, and will leave scope to private mills which I hope will in due course meet the whole of the demand other than that of Government.

Lime

According to the Statistical Abstract the pre-War value of imported cement (average 1912 and 1913) was £1 15*s.* 2½*d.* a ton, which increased to £6 5*s.* 8½*d.* in 1917, viz., more than three and a half times. This increase was further enhanced by rise in freights. Owing to this prohibitive price it would have been practically impossible to continue many works had it not been for the discovery and use of local lime. The figures at my disposal do not enable me to give accurate data for comparison. The result of an actual test showed a saving in the building of the Kaduna Hospital by the use of lime instead of cement of £8 per rod of plain brickwork or nearly 50 per cent. on present price of imported cement, and the Director of Public Works considers that, with cement at half the price at the coast, the cost would be about equal. These figures are, however, vitiated by an apparently excessive charge for coal (about half a ton is required for each ton of lime), and excessive railway freights (which was accidental and has been rectified), and also by the fact that all development charges (kiln building, &c.) have been charged to the cost of the lime. One fifteenth less lime was used than cement. The present cost of the kiln is put at about £3 10*s.* per ton at Elebu. This should be reduced to £3 at reasonable rates for coal and freight. Two quarries are used by the

Northern Provinces. That at Etobi on the Niger is 'fat' lime excellent for plastering, but inferior to the Elebu stone (on the Western Railway near Illorin) for brickwork. The latter is abundant extending over three square miles, the former is limited and precarious. The development of local lime was only commenced in July, 1918, and in the present year it is anticipated that all requirements will be met.

The lime stone near Enugu coalfield can of course be worked at much less cost, for expenditure on fuel (which at Elebu is shown at £2 6s. per ton of lime) is practically negligible. The cost is put at 24s. a cubic yard which will be reduced by 10s. 6d., and will represent cement at 3s. 6d. a cask, when the railway reaches the quarry, and still further as local labour is trained.

Tiles (roofing)

Tile roofing though much more durable and cooler than corrugated iron was impracticable owing to the much greater cost of imported tiles, but the local production of tiles has now made this possible. Prices at Lagos compare as follows:—

	<i>Imported pre-war</i>	<i>Imported present prices</i>	<i>Locally made</i>
Per Square, viz., 10×10 ft.			
Tiles	99s. 0d.	126s. 0d.	77s. 0d.*
Sheet Iron	73s. 0d.	137s. 0d.	—

* Includes the supply and fixing of timber.

Tiles per 1,000 cost from 70s. to £5. Per square 16s. 6d. to 25s. Inclusive of timber and cost of erection 68s. 6d. to 77s. The present cost therefore compares favourably with pre-war rates for corrugated iron. The cost of a medium sized house roof, before the war, in iron was £117 4s. at present £160 14s. If made with local tiles £121 1s. 6d. In the Northern Provinces the cost is given as 55s. 6d. to 70s. per 1,000, and since they are made on the spot the railway freight on imported iron sheets is saved—a very large item. Corrugated iron must be painted triennially at a cost of £16, which is saved by tiles.

(Flooring)

The comparative cost of tiles and concrete flooring is as follows (Lagos):

	<i>Pre-war</i>	<i>Present</i>
	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>
Concrete 4" thick (per super yard) ..	4 5	6 9
Local tiles on local lime mortar bed ..		4 0
" " cement concrete bed ..		6 3
" " local lime concrete bed		6 0

Floor tiles are also being made in the Northern Provinces and set in local lime.

Cost of Local Labour

Mr. Peet, Director of Public Works, estimates that the output of work by carpenters in Nigeria is from one-fourth to one-fifth that of an English carpenter, viz., that the output of one European equals that of four to five natives. Writing before the increase in wages and reduction of hours which has recently taken place in England (wages have risen also in Nigeria) he estimated that the wage of one Englishman per diem was equal to that of two natives. Taking count of unskilled assistance, number of hours worked, &c., he arrived at the conclusion that native skilled labour is double the cost of British labour in England measured in terms of work done. This calculation does not, however, take account of the cost of European supervision, 'which is considerable when employing native skilled labour in order to obtain even a fair return'. I may add that native workmen are extremely wasteful of material and the quantity of nails, screws, nuts, &c., which may be found lying on the ground around a completed building is shocking. The observations apply to carpenters, bricklayers, painters, plumbers, plasterers, and other artisans. Mr. Scott-Evans arrives at the same ratio as regards the lower grades of the Clerical Staff, viz., that for same money outlay double the work will be done in England.

Unskilled labour, exclusive of supervision, Mr. Peet considers, will compare well with English standards, 'but supervision is undoubtedly an expensive item, without which the return of work done would be very small, and much material would be spoiled. . . . The best and most economical results are obtained where the entire gang is more or less under the eyes of the foreman.' The percentage of cost of supervision varies both with the magnitude of the work and its class.

APPENDIX VII

METHODS AND COST OF TRANSPORT

Head Carriage

The archaic system of transporting goods on men's heads still prevails largely in Nigeria as elsewhere in Africa. By such a system a large number of able-bodied men are withdrawn from productive labour, though it is true that, in so far as the transport of produce to market is concerned, the carriers are generally the producers themselves. Apart from the cost in wages of carriers, head carriage involves the packing of merchandise or produce in parcels of 60 to 65 lbs. weight (which, of course, adds to the cost), as well as much breakage, damage (from weather and rough handling), and occasional theft in transit. Heavy or bulky articles (such as indivisible parts of machinery, girders, &c.), which must be slung on poles and carried by many men, can only be transported at more than double the ordinary cost, and by very slow stages. If the goods are of such a kind that they cannot be handed over to be carried at an agreed price, and supervision is necessary, the cost is much increased. Carriers at all times are difficult to get, and in parts of the Southern Provinces are practically unobtainable.

If a native carrier were to transport a load of 70 lbs. for a day's march at a

wage of 9*d.* per diem, it is obvious that it would take him 32 days, continuously without a rest, to transport a ton, at a cost of 24*s.* If the day's march be put at 16 miles the cost would thus be 1*s.* 6*d.* per ton mile, and the formula would be: 'With a load of 70 lbs., distance carried 16 miles per day, the rate per ton mile equals double the daily carrier wage.'

If the load be assumed at 64 lbs., and one day in eight be given as a rest, it would take forty days, and the cost would be 30*s.* If the day's march be reduced to twelve miles, the cost per ton mile is 2*s.* 6*d.*, and the formula becomes: 'With a load of 64 lbs., distance carried per day twelve miles, the rate per ton mile equals (practically) treble the daily carrier wage.'

The first formula is below the actual possibilities even if the load has only to be carried for a single march, and if carriers are hired by the day and not paid except for the working day. The second formula is applicable to long distance contracts (as from Kano to Maidugari), and if the wages of a headman be added, and subsistence money for the return journey, it will be found, I think, to work out tolerably accurately in practice. The carrier's pay varies from 6*d.* to 1*s.*, but the usual rate may be taken at 9*d.* It may thus be assumed that the cost of head carriage in Nigeria is from 2*s.* to 2*s.* 6*d.* per ton mile.

Animal Transport

I regret I have no figures available for calculation of cost of animal transport. I believe that the contract price for a camel load from Maidugeri to Kano is 40*s.* If the camel carries two cwt. this would be at the rate of 1*s.* 2½*d.* a mile. If three cwt., at 10¾*d.* a ton mile. A pack-ox carries 120 to 140 lbs., a donkey, 100 lbs. Pack transport, I believe, cost about 9*d.* a ton mile. The Association of West African Merchants describes it as 'very efficient'. It is estimated that there over three million cattle, 176,000 donkeys, 113,000 horses and 4,000 camels in the Northern Provinces.

The use of carts would, of course, greatly reduce transport costs, especially if oxen—the supply of which is unlimited in the Northern Provinces—were used, for an ox will draw at least four times as much as he can carry. I have elsewhere spoken of the urgent need of making suitable country-carts, and importing wheels. The light American buck board, with wheels of over three feet in diameter, and a spider frame will, I think, be found the most serviceable; or the Indian Army transport cart with wire spokes. There are now roads in every direction fit for carts in the dry season, and it is of the highest possible importance for the development of the resources of the country that road construction should be pushed on as rapidly as possible. The surface is of little consequence, and severe gradients can be tolerated. The main desideratum is culverts and bridges, the rest can follow at leisure. Wheels will travel excellently on the hard surface, and metalling is a later process which will convert a road usable for eight months into a twelve months' road, and can well be deferred.

Motor Transport

The cost of transport by motor vehicles increases out of all proportion for long distances, when petrol and spares must be carried, and when a breakdown may involve the use of a second vehicle to tow the disabled one a very long distance to the base where repairs can be effected.

For short distances (up to 40 miles) when the van can reach its destination

and return to its base the same day, the cost per ton mile may be put at 1s. if the van can obtain a load both ways, if not, the cost is double. I will not devote space to giving details of this calculation, since we have the recorded statistics of the railway motor service.* The service is run under the most favourable conditions possible. It has the assistance of the railway workshops and organisation, it is run on excellent metalled roads, and in the General Manager's calculation nothing is allowed for the upkeep of these or for motor licences. It carries passengers as well as goods, and can depend on a freight both outwards and homewards. The cost given in the Railway Annual Report for 1916 was 18.66*d.* per van mile. On rough unmetalled roads, it is observed, the cost would be higher. The average carrying capacity of a van is nearly two tons, so the rate per ton mile was 9½*d.* The railway charge is 1s. a ton mile, and if licences and all other contingent charges were included, I doubt if a private firm could do it at that figure. Mr. Hutton, Chairman of the Cotton Growing Association, writes: 'Motor transport in West Africa is most expensive and cannot possibly pay except for the conveyance of most valuable articles like gold, precious stones or possibly india-rubber.'

Mr. Grant, Acting General Manager, writes (in December, 1917) that 'the only conditions under which motor transport can compete with head or animal transport is when the factor of time enters into the question.' A van lent to the Cotton Association to bring cotton from Maska to Zaria, a distance of thirty miles only, and charged at 1s. per ton-mile, made a loss of £3 16s. on each trip having no outward load.

In illustration of the costs of long-distance transport by motor, the following calculation made after a trip by motor from Kano to Bornu (330 miles) may be of interest. We will assume that petrol at Kano is 5s. a gallon; that tyres would last for 4,000 miles; that a light lorry is used costing £180 with a life of three years, and a saleable value of £60 at the end of that time. Lubricating oil 10s. for the round trip. Spares, 20s. Wages of driver, £5 p.m. Lorry load, 10 cwt. Weight of petrol, 8 lbs. per gallon. 12 miles run to the gallon.

On the up journey the lorry starts with 10 gallons in her tank. She requires 60 gallons for the trip and carries 50 gallons dead weight, reducing her up load to 720 lbs. Assuming a rate of 2s. a ton mile, the upward cargo would earn 212s. With 10 gallons in her tank, there is 20 gallons, viz., 160 lbs., to carry, reducing the down load to 960 lbs. The cost of this is 254s. on the following calculation:

60 gallons petrol at 5s. gallon	300s.
Tyres at £31 16s. a set, for the trip	53s.
Cost of lorry, less sale price, 2 trips p.m.	33s.
Driver at £5 p.m., 2 trips p.m.	33s.
Spares, 20s.; lubricating oil, 10s.	30s.
	<hr/>
	446s.
Deduct earnings on up trip at 2s. ton mile	212s.
	<hr/>
	254s.
	<hr/>

* The General Manager thinks this rate might be somewhat reduced with one-ton (light) lorries.

This works out at 1s. 10d. a ton mile, or taking petrol at 3s. a gallon, and up-trip earnings at 1s. 6d. ton mile, at 1s. 4d. ton mile.

But this allows nothing for upkeep of repair shops and garage, for motor licences, or for bad breakdowns, when another van must be used to tow the disabled one back—a double loss. For long distances, therefore, a rate of at least 2s. 6d. a ton mile may, I think, be considered as not excessive; and it increases with the distance. This is greater than the cost of head carriage and (as will be seen) much more than animal transport. But in large districts in the South animals will not live and carriers are almost unprocurable. There are 2,666 miles of roads in the South fit for motors, except in the rains. Where rapidity is a matter of importance, as in the case of mails, or of an officer's baggage who is travelling by motor car, or even in the case of very valuable goods, e.g., tin ore, where it is of importance to realise the capital value, motor transport will, of course, pay.

The use of locally-distilled alcohol as a propellant force would, of course, greatly reduce costs, and if denatured it could not be used by the natives as an intoxicant. But I fear the introduction of distilleries, for if once the natives learn the process of distillation, they will distil for themselves.

We must not lose sight of the fact that, apart from the heavy capital outlay involved by the construction of metalled roads, the expenditure on maintenance is very heavy, especially in districts where the rainfall is excessive, and wash-outs occur.

Light Tramways

When the traffic is sufficient to warrant the use of light hand-propelled tramway trucks, a portable two-foot Decauville track can with advantage be laid on one side of a properly bridged and culverted road. The use of this means of transport, however, presents its own difficulties. In the first place, it cannot be adopted until a suitable road has been completed, and the gradients must be less than for ordinary vehicular traffic—which involves additional expenditure. The trucks are of small carrying capacity, and the rough handling to which natives subject them involves supervision and considerable cost in repairs. They will usually have a load only one way. The system cannot, in fact, be inaugurated until a well-graded road has been completed. There is then, a strong pressure to substitute a better class of track and truck, and to provide mechanical traction, in short, to equip a light 'feeder' line. This can only be remunerative where the traffic is very heavy, and grades and curves must be still further improved. It is then urged that bridges and culverts should be widened and strengthened, so that 'eventually' the light railway may be converted to the standard gauge, and in effect the Administration finds itself committed to the construction of a railway in all but the cost of the standard gauge permanent-way material, and if funds are not available, or more important lines claim priority, the project is eventually shelved. This has been the experience of the past. I much doubt whether a Decauville tram would successfully compete with animal transport to which the Northern peoples are accustomed (though the trucks might be hauled by donkeys), but in the South it might prove useful. The track might be laid by Government, each village purchasing and retaining its own trucks.

Water Transport

It is, I believe, an axiom that no form of transport, not even excluding railways, can compete against water transport under favourable conditions, but the conditions in Nigeria are not, generally speaking, favourable. The Niger is navigable at high water as far as Badjibo (26 miles above Jebba), where navigation is stopped by rapids for about 450 miles. The Benue up to and beyond the frontier 450-500 miles from Lokoja; and the other main tributaries of the Niger—the Kaduna, Gongola, Donga, Taraba, &c.—for varying distances. The Cross River can be navigated to the Cameroon frontier, and the tidal creeks, which form a network like the veins of a leaf, are deep and excellent waterways, but very tortuous and liable to be choked with sudd.

Except at high-water, a period of some three months on the Niger and little more than three weeks on the upper Benue and tributaries, navigation is precarious, even for shallow draught vessels, and is impeded by shallows (locally termed 'crossings') which require the skill of an experienced pilot. Though the channels have been greatly improved of late years by the removal of snags and rocks, steamers frequently run aground and occasionally cannot be got off till the next annual rise. The cost of repairs is very heavy and necessitates the maintenance of large and very costly workshops. Wood fuel is used and is moderately cheap, but constant 'wooding' causes delay, and the logs occupy much cargo space. Both steamer and cargo are much damaged by wood sparks. The Niger Company's freight rate (when obtainable) is about 6*d.* a ton mile from Yola to Lokoja at high water.

Canoe transport is the salvation of the South, and is cheap. On the Niger, Mr. Duff estimates its cost at 4*d.* a ton mile. Goods are, however, liable to be much damaged by water.

Ped-Rail Transport

(a) *Tractor and Trailers.*—Since animals do not survive in the South, and carriers are difficult to get, it is especially important, as regards this part of Nigeria, to determine the best form of mechanical transport, when produce cannot be conveyed by canoe. The ped-rail system of transport appears to me to offer the best solution of this problem, not only for the South, but in competition with any other form of road transport. These vehicles are without wheels and would be capable of negotiating without difficulty the heavy loose sand which is encountered in the dry season over large areas in the North. Special dust covers are provided inside as well as outside to protect the machinery from sand and dust. During the 'Hamattan' season when constantly running over loose sand no doubt the ped rail will require constant cleaning, but labour for such purposes is cheap, and I believe that the safeguards were found effective when similar vehicles were used in the war in the Sudan desert.

It can equally well negotiate swamp land, and those treacherous spots, such as occur on the Bornu road, where in the rains a motor suddenly sinks up to its axles in thick mud. It requires only a cleared track, improves instead of destroying the roadway and, as I have seen, can ride over rough rocks without difficulty.

The ped-rail tractor drawing two trailers, and carrying 20 tons, is fitted with an engine of 105 brake horse power and has a road speed of eight miles an hour, but as this power is not being used all the time, it may be assumed

that an average of 60 brake horse power will be required with an average of six miles an hour. This is probably a low estimate for the flat roads of Nigeria, but a fair one on the plateau. The oil consumption will be one gallon of petrol and one pint of lubricating oil per mile. Assuming, as in the formal calculation, that petrol costs 5s. a gallon and lubricating oil 10d. a pint, the cost becomes $3\frac{1}{2}d.$ per ton mile.

The cost of a 'ped-rail train' (tractor and two trailers) landed in Nigeria would be about £9,000. Its 'life' like that of a railway locomotive is indefinite, but I am informed that for £2,000 per annum, as an outside price, every moving part of the train could be renewed every eighteen months. Assuming the train to run 50 miles per day for 250 days in the year (*viz.*, 250,000 ton miles), the cost of replacements and repairs at £2,000 would give approximately a charge of 2d. a ton mile. If we allow £250 per annum for wages of driver, &c., this will constitute an additional $\frac{1}{2}d.$ a ton mile, making a total of 6d. a ton mile. These are outside figures, and if petrol be assumed at 3s. a gallon and lubricating oil at 8d. a pint, the cost would be $4\frac{7}{16}d.$ per ton mile. A ped-rail train should, however, be run on the same system as a railway travelling almost continuously with reliefs of drivers, &c., and covering, say, 150 miles in the day. This would very greatly decrease the cost.

Taking the former illustration of a trip to Bornu, the figures are:

	£	s.	d.
660 gallons petrol at 5s. = £165, 660 pints oil at 10d. = £27 10s	192	10	0
Repairs, spares, &c., at £2,000 p.a., 2 trips p.m.	83	6	8
Wages, guards, &c., at £520 p.a., 2 trips p.m.	21	13	4
	<hr/>		
	£297	10	0
Weight of petrol and oil (less 20 gallons of each in tractor tank)			
5,620 lbs. up-load, 39,180 lbs., at 6d. ton mile	144	6	0
	<hr/>		
	£153	4	0
	<hr/>		

Where roads have not been bridged and culverted, ramps must be cut. If these are graded to one in ten the tractor could negotiate them, and there is no difficulty in doing so on any road in which such a train would be used. In emergency, however, the tractor can negotiate a grade of one in two, and haul up each trailer by a rope. The calculated speed of the train is $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles on slight slopes, 3 miles on steeper slopes, and $1\frac{1}{2}$ on gradients of one in four (25 per cent.).

(b) *Hand-propelled Trailers*.—These are supplied of two types. The small one-ton trailer replaces the Decauville tram, but requires no track and can be propelled over rough ground by six men with ease. The cost with open body, powerful hand brake, and fitted for a pole or shaft for a donkey (but without the pole) is £212, with $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. extra for crating for shipment, delivery within four weeks.

The second is a two-ton trailer. The chassis of this type is mounted on two ped-rails side by side instead of one. This gives great stability, and the vehicle, even when piled high with the bulkiest loads, will negotiate the roughest country without fear of capsizing. The pressure per square inch (like the one ton) is so low that it will pass over the softest ground without leaving a mark

or breaking the surface. It can be propelled by twelve men. The cost is £426, same conditions as the one ton, but delivery in six weeks. The brakes fitted to these vehicles are very effective and simple and preclude the possibility of the vehicle breaking away and running down-hill. With a life of five years, the calculation for the two-ton trailer (requiring twelve men, at three miles an hour, eight hours per day), would be as follows: Twelve men at 9d. = 9s.; ped rail landed cost £445 = 5s. per day (including scrap value), oil, spares, repairs, &c., say, 6d. per day, total, 14s. 6d. per day hauling two tons for 24 miles, viz., 3½d. ton mile.

The two ton would on account of its great stability be particularly well suited for bulky loads of seed cotton. It could be pushed across country from field to field. I have seen the one-ton ped-rail on a rough field of grass, and when loaded it did not even damage the daisies, which rose again after it had passed over them. I have obtained these full particulars regarding this system of transport, since it seems to me by far the best adapted to the requirements. Actual experience will prove whether it fulfils all that is claimed for it. The figures I have taken have all been 'outside' ones, and it is probable that the cost per ton mile of the 'train' will be nearer to 4d. than 6d.

Summary

The comparative cost of the various forms of transport may be tabulated as below, they are, of course, mere approximations. The figures are based on the assumption that a full load is carried both outwards to the point of destination and back again. If a load is carried only one way at least 50 per cent. must be added to the cost per ton mile.

Class of Transport	Long distance (say 320 miles)			Short distance (say 40 miles)		
	Cost per ton mile	Time taken	Remarks	Cost per ton mile	Time taken	Remarks
Human carriers	2s.	2 mos.	includes rest	1s. 8d.	7 days	includes return journey
Animal pack	10d.	"	"	9d.	"	" "
Animal draught	8d.	"	"	7d.	"	" "
Motor lorries	2s. 6d.	½ mo.	includes loading and unloading	1s.	1 day	excludes time for loading and unloading
Ped-rail train	6d.	"	"	5½d.	"	" "
Ped-rail hand propelled	3½d.	2 mos.	"	3½d.	7 days	includes loading and unloading

Approximately £20,000 a year is spent on new road construction, and an equal sum on maintenance. Carts can be made locally, but axles and preferably wheels and special parts must be imported. The extended use of carts or mechanical transport will set free carriers and decrease the activities of the middlemen.

APPENDIX VIII

NEW RAILWAY PROJECTS

Kano-Zinder

Apart from the carriage of French goods, to which I have referred in paragraph 129 of the Report, it is probable that an extension of the main line to the frontier would rapidly develop a commercial traffic. At present the caravan trade is estimated at 1,000 tons per mensem. The line would traverse a well-populated country, and would probably attract to the Nigerian Railway the produce of all the neighbouring French territory, which (pending the building of a Trans-Saharan line to the Mediterranean) has no outlet to the sea, especially hides and skins, of which the output must be very great, with corresponding imports (probably of French origin). Assuming maintenance charges at £460 a mile (the average cost for 1915/16), and a construction expenditure of £400,000 (including rolling stock), the earnings must reach £58,000 per annum to cover debt charges and running costs if this section were considered as a separate unit. But since the traffic would for the most part traverse the whole of the remaining 700 miles to or from the seaport, it would be entitled to 'taper-rates', which would probably reduce the freight charges by nearly half. The data are at present so vague that I refrain from any more precise estimate. An initial charge of £2 a ton (6*d.* a ton mile) would halve the present cost to the French, and could later be reduced.

The (metre) gauge of the French railways differs from ours (3' 6"), but it is probable that they would carry the line on to Zinder (and, perhaps, further) on the Nigerian gauge, for conversion later when linked up with their own system. The Union Coloniale Française points out that metre gauge and 3' 6" gauge can be worked with the same rolling stock with 'differential axles'. The frontier is exactly half way between Kano and Zinder. A working agreement, therefore, on the basis of a division of net profits or losses on the section Kano-Zinder, or the acquisition of running powers over the French portion (as might be preferred), would be matters which should present no difficulties in negotiation, or possibly the French might prefer that we should construct and operate the line right up to Zinder, charging an agreed tariff.

It would be no small gain to get rid of the Customs station at Kano, which would result in all the eastern traffic to Maidugeri and Fort Lamy being conveyed to the French frontier. Dutiable French goods would then pay customs at the coast, with a refund (wholly or in part) for goods which cross the frontier, or would be conveyed in transit, free or at reduced Customs duties, as may be found just and convenient. It will, of course, be necessary to see that they do not pay a lower duty (whether to the British or French Government) than is levied on British goods, so that they may not re-enter Nigeria from the North and under-sell British imports.

It remains to consider whether such a railway would (as has been suggested) prove disadvantageous to British interests and trade, from a standpoint other than that of mere railway freights. With the British terminal at the frontier or at Zinder, it is possible that the French might build a line thence to Lake

Chad. If this line were constructed on the French metre gauge, rolling stock would not be interchangeable. The Nigerian line would carry the construction material (*up-freights* are especially valuable), and would acquire the additional traffic inward and outward developed by this branch line until, if ever, it is linked up with the French system.

There remains the question (if the Nigerian Railway were thus extended), would Kano cease to be the distributing centre of the trade of the Sahara and Chad basin, and would Zinder take its place? It has been argued on the one hand that it would be very disadvantageous to British trade 'to damage Kano as a distributing centre, and help French competition to establish itself by means of our own railway, with which, doubtless, they would form a junction of their own'. To avoid this it is suggested that the main line should not proceed beyond Kano, and that a branch should be constructed thence due east to Maidugari, which should tap all the camel caravans from the Central and Eastern Sudan. I do not think that such a policy, even if feasible, would in the long run be advantageous to ourselves. No doubt Zinder would become a collecting centre of produce from the north, and merchants would be eager to establish themselves there. But the trade from east, west, north-east and north-west would still flow to Kano. Its situation, its dense population, its food supplies, &c., have constituted it the trade centre for the past 1,000 years. This pre-eminence was in the past based on the Trans-Sahara-Tripoli caravan trade (a part of which passed through Zinder). That trade has been killed by the Lagos-Kano Railway, yet never in its history has Kano enjoyed such prosperity as to-day. If by the construction of new lines it should lose something of its importance as a distributing centre, it would be futile to attempt to preserve it by retarding modern development. Its own natural resources, and industrious population of over three million, will assure to it a prosperous trade, and it is manifest that the territories to the north must find an outlet for their produce. It might, perhaps, be stipulated that the French should not impose any differential tariff on their frontier. Such a line would be infinitely preferable to one based on the Benue at Garua (to which point the French can convey goods in transit free of duty), involving much irksome work on the Nigerian Government.

Railways to Bornu

I have in paragraph 130 discussed very briefly the three routes which present themselves for railway connection with Bornu. No surveys of these routes have been made, and I can only offer a few general remarks on them.

(i) *Kano-Maidugari*.—There are only two important rivers to cross, the Challowa and the Jemari. The former is a formidable stream, some three-quarters of a mile wide in the rains. It could probably be avoided by making the junction with the main line below the point at which it crosses this river. The Jemari, though a big river in the rains, is contained in a well-defined channel, and should present no great difficulty. For the rest the route is mostly flat and singularly free from water-courses. I imagine that the actual construction length would be not more than 6 per cent. over the scaled distance. There is a considerable traffic (estimated at present at 20,000 tons per annum), which would grow very rapidly, since the people of Bornu are continually shifting their towns, and would no doubt settle along the line. Throughout the Kano Province the population is dense. The chief drawback

to this line is the great distance over which produce must be hauled. (Maidugari-Lagos, 1,060 miles). At an average rate of 1½*d.* ton mile this would be £6 12*s.* from terminal to terminal. Imports compared with existing costs could no doubt stand a heavy freight rate and so reduce the rate on exports. A considerable part of the latter would, of course, consist of goods which already reach the railway at Kano.

(ii) *Port Harcourt-Maidugari via Bukuru.*—This would be 100 miles shorter (allowing 12 per cent. increase on the direct distance), a saving of 12*s.* 6*d.* a ton from terminal to terminal at the assumed rate. The length of new construction would be only some twenty miles more. This route would greatly benefit the tin mines to which it would bring the cheap food and labour from Bornu, and the extension from Bukuru would carry Udi coal and machinery from the coast to the eastern part of the mine-field.


(iii) *The third route* from the coal-field direct to Yola would be 265 miles shorter than the Kano route, and 155 less than the Bukuru route; but double the length of new construction. It would be of great administrative value, and would open up an entirely new and promising part of Nigeria, rich in products, well populated, and probably mineralised. (Lead has been found at Abakaliki and silver at Orofu.) It would probably capture the trade of the Western Cameroons. It would, no doubt, be more costly to construct, since it would cross the various rivers which run into the Benue from the south, and that river itself near Yola, where, however, it is not so formidable an obstacle. I do not think that a branch line running, north of the Benue from the bridge-head *via* Tsendam and Song would offer the same prospects, and its construction would probably be extremely difficult.

Jebba-Sokoto

The advantage claimed by General Manse for this line is that it would anticipate the Dahomey-Gaya Railway and capture the trade which passes through Borgu and French territory. A disadvantage is that if it could be contended that it was constructed to obviate the innavigability of the Niger (or of that section of it to which it runs parallel) it would under the Berlin Act be subject to the same conditions as the Niger navigation, which would thus be re-opened to the French without the obstacle of the rapids. With a break of bulk at Sekachi it could not compete with the direct French line from Gaya.

APPENDIX IX

CHART SHEWING THE AMOUNT OF CUSTOMS DUTIES DERIVED FROM SPIRITS AND OTHER IMPORTS FOR THE TEN YEARS 1908 TO 1917 (FROM STATISTICAL ABSTRACT)



NOTE I. TABLE SHEWING THE YEARLY VALUE OF SPIRITS IMPORTED, AND VALUE OF COMMERCIAL GOVERNMENT AND SPECIE IMPORTS

	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917
Spirits	£ 333,000	£ 309,000	£ 456,000	£ 443,000	£ 444,000	£ 456,000	£ 351,000	£ 277,000	£ 228,000	£ 78,000
Commercial	3,056,000	3,205,000	4,123,000	4,282,000	5,026,000	5,246,000	4,704,000	4,027,000	4,486,000	5,517,000
Government	658,000	1,016,000	513,000	510,000	482,000	630,000	1,222,000	680,000	460,000	214,000
Specie	238,000	433,000	735,000	446,000	479,000	870,000	624,000	33,000	606,000	1,724,000

NOTE II. THE FIGURES FOR THE YEARS 1908 AND 1909 HAVE BEEN TAKEN FROM THE RETURN OF THE STRENGTH OF SPIRITS REDUCED TO 50° TRALLES

	Gallons	Gallons	Gallons	Gallons	Gallons	Gallons	Gallons	Gallons	Gallons	Spirits* Gallons at 50° Tralles
Spirits*	Gallons	Gallons	Gallons	Gallons	Gallons	Gallons	Gallons	Gallons	Gallons	Gallons
Gallons at 50° Tralles	3,156,000	2,730,000	3,948,000	3,680,000	3,582,000	3,616,000	2,854,000	1,536,000	788,000	188,000

* Consumption.

FOUR YEARS PRIOR TO 1913

Year	Actual Gallonage	Gallons at 50° Tralles	(b)		(a)		Percentage for Spirits	Total Trade	Value Native produce, excluding Tin and Gold	Remarks
			Revenue from Spirits	£	Total ordinary Revenue	£				
1909	2,978,863	2,730,000	639,000	1,645,000	1,645,000	38.8	9,132,000	3,787,174	Highest import and percentage, 1910	
1910	4,778,972	3,948,000	1,000,000	2,278,000	2,278,000	43.9	11,162,000	4,886,439		
1911	4,769,105	3,680,000	976,000	2,571,000	2,571,000	38	11,072,000	4,890,659		
1912	4,490,558	3,582,000	1,015,000	2,764,000	2,764,000	36.7	12,520,000	5,140,413		
Aver.	4,254,374	3,485,000	907,500	2,314,500	2,314,500	39.3	10,971,500	4,676,171		
	4,638,025	3,616,000	1,140,000	3,327,000	3,327,000	34.3	14,554,000	6,211,246	Highest Revenue from Spirits	
FOUR YEARS SUBSEQUENT TO 1913										
1914	3,511,359	2,854,000	924,000	2,948,000	2,948,000	31.3	13,511,000	5,413,715	Lowest imports of Spirits, 1917.	
1915	1,972,940	1,536,000	648,000	2,603,000	2,603,000	24.9	10,678,000	4,145,174		
1916	1,036,112	788,000	373,000	2,843,000	2,843,000	13.1	11,877,000	5,016,451		
1917	159,364	188,000	89,000	3,418,000	3,418,000	2.6	16,261,000	6,984,920	Highest ordinary Revenue and Trade, 1917.	
Aver.	1,669,694	1,346,500	508,500	2,953,000	2,953,000	17.97	13,081,750	5,397,565		

(a) Includes Revenue from Northern Nigeria to compare with years after 1913. [When it is not possible to give Southern Nigeria separately.]
 (b) Includes Spirits consumed by Europeans. Duty about £20,000.

T. F. BURROWES, Comptroller.

DOCUMENTS

DOCUMENT I

EXTRACT FROM SIR FREDERICK LUGARD'S 'STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL' MEMORANDUM ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF NIGERIA SUBMITTED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, MAY 1905

DETAILS OF AMALGAMATION

(a) *Adm. units*

It is premature for me to offer any observations on the detail of a scheme of effective amalgamation. Were I entrusted with the task, it would be necessary for me to study the requirements and the conditions in detail of the Southern territories before I could usefully formulate any well-considered plan, which would in fact be the first budget. Speaking broadly, however, I would observe that owing to the enormous size of the country, and its present imperfect communications, the question of the *superficial area* of each of the Units, into which the whole country may be divided for purposes of administrative control is perhaps the most important consideration at present in determining those Units, since the territory assigned to each Administrator must be such as it is possible for him to traverse and maintain touch with. Mr Egerton proposes to divide S. Nigeria into two provinces, and to treat Lagos as a third. The average area of each of these would be 25,500 sq. miles,— though a large portion of the S. Nigeria provinces is as yet unexplored, or is impenetrable forest and swamp. N. Nigeria would divide up into eight provinces, each half as large again as these. I am already in fact forming eight 'double provinces' out of the original 17. This would give a total of eleven Administrative Units, to which I am inclined to add a twelfth, consisting of the *Colony* of Lagos (area 3,420 sq. miles), which with its Legislative Council &c. would require a somewhat different method of administration to the others.

(b) *Staff*

To each of the eleven provinces I would propose to assign an Administrator (who might bear the title of Resident) at a salary of say £1,000 and £200 Duty pay, with perhaps two second-class (£800 + £100), two third-class (£450 + £50) and ten assistants at £350 including provision for leaves. The Staff would vary according to the size, population and special work of each province, but the numbers given would probably form an approximate average. Assuming all to draw local allowance and setting aside £800 per province for Native Staff, the total would amount to about £100,000 p.a. Over these eleven Residents it would be necessary to have to Lieut. Governors, at say £1,400 + £400 Duty pay = a total for the two of £3,600 p.a. Each Executive Department (and also the troops) would be organised under a single head. To facilitate the prompt rendering of accounts, and to obviate the necessity of sending back incorrect papers to distant districts, the country would be divided into four Accounting *Circles*, each under a sub-treasurer, charged with the submission of documents in a complete form to the Central Treasury. In a similar way the Public Works, Transport and perhaps the Medical Departments, would be decentralised by the appointment of Officers in

executive charge of Circles, each responsible to his Departmental Chief at Headquarters. The centres of these departmental Circles might be placed, perhaps, at Kano (for Hausaland and the North), Amar for the Benue and East, Ibadan for the S.W. provinces and a fourth in as central a position as possible for the S.E. provinces east of the Niger. These changes would probably effect some reduction in cost and would increase efficiency. For the present the two Lieut. Governors would have their headquarters at Zungeru and Lagos. To each would be assigned a Secretarial Staff, and the charge of the provinces would be divided between them. The headquarters of the Governor General when in Africa should, I think, at present be at Zungeru on account of its central position, but he would be constantly moving about. During his half yearly absence in England the two Lieut. Governors would continue to discharge their functions independently, referring all matters of great importance to him at home, or awaiting his return. All matters for the Colonial Office, would be addressed to him and submitted from his office.* The Chief Secretary would deal with the ordinary correspondence of the Governor General and when work becomes fully decentralised, this Department need not be appreciably larger, than either of the two Sub-Secretariats attached to each Lieut. Governor. In addition the Governor General would require a personal Staff to deal with large political questions and with confidential matters, &c. It should consist of a Political Assistant ranking with a first-class Resident, and an office assistant, both of whom would remain permanently attached to him whether in Africa or England. While in Africa he would attach two or more Officers, and such native Clerks as may be necessary, to his office from the local Secretariat, and in England he would engage similar clerical assistance.

(c) *Lieut. Governors*

The initiation of all legislation; the framing of the Annual Budget and assignment of funds and of Staff to the different administrative Units; the inauguration of policy as regards the natives, and the mode of collecting the Revenue; and the sanction for Military operations would remain in the hands of the Governor General. Each Lieut. Governor would accord sanction for expenditure, within the limits of the votes assigned to his administration. Capital expenditure on Public Works and Vessels would be decided by the Governor General in consultation with Lieut. Governors and Heads of Departments concerned. The exact measure of financial responsibility assigned to Lieut. Governors or others would however be a matter of practical detail to be decided by experience and practice.

(d) *Revenue and Taxes*

On amalgamation a considerable modification of the present system of taxation would probably be advisable. Since the Southern territories pay no direct taxes, the indirect taxation might I think—looking to the rates prevalent in other countries—be considerably increased. This could best be done by imposing export duties on palm oil and kernels (products of the Southern Zone) and by raising the import duty on trade gin and perhaps on

* With the sanction of the Sec. of State, routine papers such as leave certificates, notifications of departures from England, office references on accounting matters &c. might be addressed to the Under Secy by Lieut. Governors, and by him to them or to the Treasurer &c. direct in order to save time.

salt and other staples. N. Nigeria, on the other hand, will be assessed in a popular (income) tax which is not feasible or desirable in the South at present. In return for this direct taxation I would propose to grant a rebate on the imports into the Hinterland, with a view to counter-balancing the extra cost of transport, and placing the expenses and risks of trade on a more equal footing with those of the Southern territories.* This system would be susceptible of extension with I think a corresponding impetus to development. Salt, for instance, is at present taxed at £1 per ton on the coast, and at £2 in N. Nigeria. Under the scheme suggested it would be taxed at (say) £2 on the Coast, with a rebate of (say) 15/- at Lokoja, and a further 15/- at Yola or at any place distant 100 miles from a navigable waterway. This would afford a strong inducement to traders to develop the Hinterland, and to establish at such centres as Kano, with the result that new industries such as the export of cotton and ground nuts &c., would be developed, and the difficulty of disposing of produce received as taxes would disappear. The taxes on trade, which like the extra duty on salt, have been imposed in N. Nigeria under the compelling necessity to raise a revenue, would be abolished; except that on *local* trade (viz: on articles not imported or for export) in the hands of the natives. These taxes are in my opinion unsound in principle, for the further into the Interior an enterprising trader penetrates, the greater the expenses and risks, to compensate for which he should find a system of rebates, cheap land leases &c. rather than incur additional taxation. In order further to encourage development of the Northern country, I would propose to establish a transport service on the Niger and other arteries with store depots at the coast ports. This would enable competing firms to obtain access to the country, and break down the existing monopoly. This when the territories are amalgamated would offer no serious difficulties.

(e) *Expenditure*

A reorganization of the estimates should, I think, result a very considerable decrease in the expenditure of the Southern territories. The expenditure of Lagos is estimated at £409,397 [exclusive apparently of certain Municipal outgoings, e.g., £8,332, at Ibadan from which a 'spacious Town Hall, Courts of Justice and a concrete pavement' are to be provided]. Yet Lagos in area is not nearly equal to the average size of one of the eight provinces of N. Nigeria, and it has not the same costly river transport to provide, or one-sixth of the Military expenditure. The capital expenditure on works and vessels amounts to over £70,000 besides an 'ordinary' or recurrent expenditure on these items of £47,683; while N. Nigeria with its European Staff still partially unhoused, with ten times the area, and with enhanced charges for transport of material is restricted to £48,674 for capital expenditure on buildings, roads, vessels, &c. There would appear to be a possibility of considerable saving in these figures, as well as of a more equal distribution according to the comparative urgency of the requirements of each district, when Nigeria is dealt with as a single entity,—nor should the Imperial Exchequer be called upon to pay the deficit on one part of the country while another part spends surplus revenue on works of no very immediate urgency. . . .

* The cost and difficulty of land transport, and the ease with which the traffic on the great waterways can be controlled, would render it difficult for any trader to re-export to the South goods on which rebate had been granted, and the system would not, I think, be easily misused.

DOCUMENT II

C. L. TEMPLE'S 'CONFIDENTIAL MINUTE' ON HIS SCHEME FOR
THE AMALGAMATION OF NIGERIA, FEBRUARY 1913

HIS EXCELLENCY:
Submitted

1. The more I think of the scheme for the amalgamation, the more I am inclined very respectfully to urge the expediency of dividing the whole territory into six or seven administrative commands under Chief Commissioners, rather than into two or three commands under Lieutenant Governors. I would beg leave to explain my reasons for adopting this view, and to deal first of all with matters relating to Northern Nigeria.

2. This Protectorate has been since its inception under a very highly centralized system of government, in theory. In practice, in early days, the centralization was not so complete or effective as it has since become, owing to the great distances at which administrative officers were residing from headquarters. As means of communication have improved, the centralizing process has steadily continued.

3. However advisable or necessary it may have been in early days for the Governor himself to control the administrative machinery as far as possible in every detail, owing to the inexperience of the administrative officers, none of whom were in the first place selected from amongst officials who had administrative experience, this necessity has, in my humble opinion, not only disappeared, but matters have so changed that the excessive centralization which at present exists is a real disadvantage.

4. To consider, first of all, the European staff. It is impossible, I submit that an officer occupying the position of a Resident in charge of a Province, however zealous hardworking and anxious to advance his Province he may be, should be able to acquire the character and qualities necessary to enable him to effect the development and advance of the population which he controls, unless he be stimulated by the consciousness that he bears the weight of great responsibility. When it is made necessary for him to refer matters to Headquarters which as a matter of fact he is able to determine by the exercise of his own judgment, it follows as an unavoidable result, I submit, that his powers of initiative must suffer a lack in development even should they not atrophy.

5. With regard to the junior administrative officers, it is, I submit, not good for their training that they should rarely, if ever, come into immediate contact with an officer actually bearing high responsibilities as is the case at present. The Governor is not able to form the character of the junior officers himself, and the Resident, even though not entirely unable to do so, is yet seriously handicapped at present by the fact that he exercises a very restricted responsibility and that this is fully realised by the members of his staff.

6. In a similar manner, a large number of junior officers belonging to the Departments (amongst these I include the Military) are to a great extent cut off from those influences the operation of which is quite essential for the creation of a smoothly working system of government, as they seldom in the course of their work come into personal contact with officers bearing high

responsibilities. As a result the European administration of this country as it becomes more and more centralized is becoming more and more mechanical, and the personal element is disappearing owing to the fact that responsibility is almost entirely centralized in the hands of the Governor. In addition to the above considerations a great deal of work is now being done by the Governor which could, I submit, be done quite as well as by the senior political officers, and thereby a great deal of the former's time which is, at present, spent on duties of an almost routine description is wasted. That time might well be employed in considering questions of policy which have a wide embrace and a far-reaching importance.

7. To consider, in the second place, the native population. Here again it is, I think, most important that the Emirs and Chiefs, their subordinate officials, and the native population generally should recognise that an officer whom they frequently see, and who is something more to them than an abstraction, is entrusted with powers of the most important description. At present, the very rare glimpses which they obtain of the Governor, are sufficient only to weaken their respect for the authority of the local administrator, and the personal influence of the latter, the principal factor, I submit, in the successful administration of natives, is thereby lessened.

8. Granted that an administrative staff of sufficient experience is available, I submit, therefore, that the time has now come when greater powers should be delegated by the Governor to the heads of the administrative units.

9. At the present moment, the Protectorate is divided up into thirteen such units. This, in my opinion, is too large a number for present needs. The ideal and most economic organization to be aimed at is, I submit, the creation of units of area and population of sizes which are the greatest that can be effectively administered by one officer. When I say effectively administered by one officer, I mean that the population and area of a unit should be as numerous and as extensive as is compatible with a personal control being exercised over all administrative details connected with it by an experienced and energetic administrative officer.

10. Another reason why I think that thirteen is too great a number of units is that when powers and high responsibilities are delegated, the officer who wields them must be paid on a scale commensurate with the responsibilities which he is expected to bear. It is evident that the Protectorate could not afford to pay the administrator of each of the thirteen Provinces on such a scale.

11. Having these two objects in view, that is to say, the reduction of the officers carrying high responsibilities to the lowest possible, and the establishment of units of areas and population each not greater than one experienced officer can himself be expected to control with a full knowledge of all details connected with it, I would recommend the division of the Protectorate into three commands having Headquarters at Kano, Lokoja and Maiduguri respectively. These might be called the Hausa States, Benue Provinces, and the Chad Territories. The area and population in each of these would be approximately as below: (see next page and cf. pp 11-12).

12. To the Chief Commissioner in each of these units I recommend that large executive powers should be delegated. The guiding principle to be kept in view in the delegation of these powers should be, I submit, that the delegate be permitted, and called upon, to perform without reference to Headquarters all those duties which he can effectively and efficiently execute without

	<i>Area</i>	<i>Population</i>
(1) Hausa States	98,347	5,810,000
(2) Benue Provinces	108,253	2,419,000
(3) Chad Territories	49,100	1,040,000
Grand Total	<u>255,700</u>	<u>9,269,000</u>

assistance, and that in matters relating to broad lines of policy and guiding principles of administration, he should act strictly in accordance with instructions issued by the Governor for his guidance.

13. A few concrete examples will perhaps serve to make clear the group of subjects which should, I submit, be dealt with by the Governor and by the Chief Commissioner respectively. For instance, regarding the relationship of the European and Native Executive. The Governor should, I think, lay down the policy of each Province (and possibly for each unit of a Province), whether the trend of policy to be pursued is the education of the native officials in order that in due course it may be possible for them to do the work of the European Officials or whether advantage should be taken of whatever power or capacity the former possess *pro tem* only, because it is intended finally to substitute a European Executive for the Native where the latter exists in a concrete form, and to establish such an Executive where no clearly defined native authority exists.

14. The principle having been clearly defined and explained by the Governor, I suggest that the method of arriving at the desired end should be left to the Chief Commissioner subject of course to his dispositions being such as to secure the fulfilment of the policy.

15. In the first case he would establish Native District Heads, a Native central controlling staff etc., he would instruct his European staff to avoid personal exercise of executive action as far as possible, and to conceal carefully from the mass of the population the extent to which they personally influence the native authorities. In the second case it would be necessary for him to eliminate, gradually and tactfully, the power and influence of the native Chiefs where such power was exerted and to prevent such power being acquired where it did not exist.

16. A question, to take one example, which would at once arise in this connexion would be whether a political officer should reside permanently at a place other than the headquarters of an Emirate. His doing so would contravene the first named policy and be in accord with the second.

17. To take as another example the matter of taxation. General principles, such as whether the taxes should take the form of rent chargeable for the use of land, a charge on property or incomes, or a capitation tax should, I submit, be laid down by the Governor for each unit (and possibly for each division); but as regards the time, mode and machinery of collection, the incidence of taxation, and other such important details, these should be decided by the Chief Commissioner.

Again; with regard to the Courts of Justice, I think the policy should be laid down by the Governor. For instance, whether it is intended that the Native Courts shall gradually replace the European Courts or vice versa. But

the personnel of the Native Judges, the areas of their jurisdiction and all such matters should, I think, be left to the Chief Commissioner.

18. To return to the question of the delegation of authority to the Chief Commissioner. With regard to judicial powers, I think that a Chief Commissioner should not hold these, but that he should be empowered to confirm sentences up to ten years imprisonment. Sentences of greater duration than this should, I think, be referred to the Chief Justice of the whole territory, and death sentences referred to the Governor through the Chief Justice.

19. Financial control is dealt with in a later paragraph, but there is one phase of financial administration, which has a bearing on general administration, which is independent of accounting, and I think, may therefore well be considered here.

20. In Northern Nigeria a large revenue is collected from direct taxation, consisting partly of a charge made by Government for the use of land, and partly of a contribution levied on the income or property of the individual; also partly of payments made by natives for special specific services rendered by the administration. An instance of the latter would be court and administration fees.

21. I understand that the first two charges are not made at present in Southern Nigeria to any appreciable extent. The third charge, however, I believe yields a large revenue.

22. In Northern Nigeria the Native Administrations are entitled by the Native Revenue Proclamation to one-half of the Jangali (Cattle tax) and to one-half or less ('or other such proportion as the Governor may direct') of the 'Tribute'.

23. In practice about one-half of the direct contribution paid by the native population has been handed to the Native Administrations.

24. It was understood that the principal reason for doing this was that the recognised guiding principle of the Protectorate policy was gradually to strengthen and educate such Native Administrations as already existed, and to create Native Administrations where none existed, so that in course of time those Administrations might stand on a firm basis and be able to administer effectively with a minimum of advice or assistance from aliens. Further it was understood that this policy had been adopted for the reason that this form of administration is the least costly, that it is the most acceptable to the people and that it is therefore the policy best suited to ensure the economic prosperity of the individual native, which is the sole *raison d'être* of the British occupation of these territories.

25. In pursuance of this policy the Residents have undertaken of late a very close supervision of Native Administration funds, commonly called *Beit-el-Mal* funds, in order the better to educate the native rulers in respect to that portion of their administrative work which most interests them. In doing this they have not been rigidly controlled from Headquarters and although called upon to report and obtain prior sanction from the Governor for all expenditure their suggestions have been, generally speaking, always accepted. In the Treasury the *Beit-el-Mal* Funds have been dealt with only in lump sums for each Province under the Head 'Native Affairs'.

26. The results of this have been, I submit, wholly good, and great strides both in economic development and in efficiency of administration may be traced principally to the freedom of action granted to Residents in this

respect. I think that all Political Officers of experience will agree that the interest of the Native Rulers have been awakened, and their initiative stimulated to a remarkable degree by the knowledge that they and the European Officers with whom they are in daily contact, and whose councils they share, together control, and are jointly responsible for, the proper use of these funds; and, further, that the native population has been inclined to pay taxes the more readily because the individual has been able to realise that at all events a certain portion is expended for his immediate good.

27. I would go so far as to say that the stimulating effect of this responsibility has been very great on the European staff also, and as there is no case which I can call to mind where on examination it has been found that Beit-el-Mal funds have been rashly or unprofitably expended, I should regard a restriction placed on the action of administrative officers in respect to these funds with great regret.

28. It is perhaps hard to demonstrate, but it is in practice a fact by no means to be overlooked, that any great delay between the planning and the execution of a work or a reform has a most paralysing effect on the individual initiative. In this Protectorate a very usual delay between the preparation of an estimate and the action taken after that estimate has been approved in the ordinary way is fifteen months. An estimate prepared in August does not generally receive approval until the following dry season has passed, and the execution of works sanctioned has to be delayed until the following dry season.

29. In view of the considerations stated above I strongly recommend on purely administrative grounds that a certain proportion of the revenue raised by direct taxation of natives be earmarked for use in the particular district where it is collected, that it should be shown in a lump sum in the printed estimates under some distinctive designation ('Beit-el-Mal Revenue and expenditure' is a suitable name in the Northern States) and that details of Expenditure under this head should be sanctioned by the Chief Commissioner acting in the main on his untrammelled initiative.

30. With reference to Southern Nigeria, I write on the foregoing question with greater diffidence as I am not familiar with the particular circumstances of the Provinces. I am aware that the system of decentralization has, to a certain extent, been introduced into those territories and that it has been a great deal criticised, possibly, with justice. But I submit that the very important matter of distinguishing between technical departments which need centralization, and departments which require decentralization, a subject to which I shall refer later, has been overlooked. It appears to me, however, that the arguments which I have used in favour of a decentralized administration in Northern Nigeria, and which I have sketched above, must apply equally and in every particular, to Southern Nigeria also. It appears to me also that the three Provinces already established would be suitable units, and Lagos Colony a fourth. Possibly, it might be advisable to divide the Eastern Province into two.

31. Assuming that the territory has been divided into seven Commissionariats, I would recommend that the work of all should be supervised by one Governor aided, should it be necessary for the Governor himself to spend six months in England, by one Lieutenant Governor and by a Colonial Secretary's department.

32. The technical departments of Northern and Southern Nigeria, I recommend should, with certain exceptions which I shall explain later, be amalgamated and centralized at Headquarters and deal with the Governor through the Colonial Secretary, as is the ordinary procedure. I would make one exception only, i.e. the Railway department, and would recommend that the Governor should be advised on Railway matters by an expert.

33. I do not think that these departments would be unwieldy or too large. The Marine Customs and Railway are already necessarily amalgamated. These control Revenue, Expenditure and Staff approximately as follows:

	COMBINED DEPARTMENTS		
	<i>Revenue</i>	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Staff (European)</i>
	£	£	
Customs	1,547,200	47,030	27
Marine	34,570	237,083	103
Railway	543,500	824,641	246

34. To consider the Treasury, Post and Telegraphs, Agricultural, Forestry and Public Works Departments and Public Works Recurrent. (The latter as I shall proceed to show, is susceptible of sub-division.) The Revenue and Staff of these if amalgamated would be approximately as follows:

		<i>Revenue</i>	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Staff</i>
		£	£	
Treasury	{ Southern Nigeria	—	16,653	12
	{ Northern Nigeria	—	7,362	9
	Total if amalgamated		24,015	21
Posts and Telegraphs	{ Southern Nigeria Posts & Telegraphs	23,880	40,072	29
	{ Northern Nigeria Posts & Telegraphs	10,585	26,511	19
	Total if amalgamated	34,465	66,583	48
P.W. Recurrent	Southern Nigeria		40,910	82
P.W. Department	Southern Nigeria		58,933	
P.W. Recurrent	Northern Nigeria		18,008	24
P.W. Department	Northern Nigeria		14,498	
	Total if amalgamated		132,349	106
Agriculture	{ Southern Nigeria		14,725	14
	{ Northern Nigeria		6,250	5
	Total if amalgamated		20,975	19

		<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Staff</i>
Forestry	{ Southern Nigeria	20,896	15
	{ Northern Nigeria	1,711	2
	Total if amalgamated	22,607	17

It will be seen that these departments do not equal in size those which have already been amalgamated.

35. There remain the

Medical Department
 Mines "
 Survey "
 Police "
 Prisons "
 Public Works Department
 Education Department
 Judicial "
 Political "

36. The Medical Department is already practically centralized in London, and the work connected with the Leave, Promotions and Postings of all the Medical Officers in both Protectorates should easily be managed by one Principal Medical Officer with perhaps two Staff Officers.

37. With regard to the Mines Department, I recommend that there should be two distinct sections in that department. (1) An administrative section which would deal with the actual granting of Licences and Leases and with disputes and with all the records. This section to be established as part of the Secretariat at Headquarters. (2) An executive section which would undertake the inspecting work in the field and not be burdened with clerical records. That is to say, I recommend that the present Government Inspector of Mines and his Staff should inspect, and the work which is now performed by the Secretariat and the Advisory Committee, that is to say enquiries into disputes and equities and the keeping of records, should be performed by a separate section of the Mines Department at headquarters as stated above.

38. With regard to the Survey Department, I think that one section of this department should deal with surveys of mining areas and Certificates of Occupancy, and another section with the topography of these territories) the two to be combined under one head and completely centralized, as in the case of the technical sections of the Public Works Department (*vide* paragraph 41).

39. The Police Department, in my opinion, should be decentralized. Police work in these territories, except in Cantonments and large European stations, differs in many ways from ordinary police work; it is rather political work and requires local knowledge on the part of the constables and their officers. An individual is never arrested by a Policeman—except in Cantonments, European stations, or on the Railway—but by the Village Heads. I believe this to be true in Southern as well as in Northern Nigeria. In large towns such as Lagos and along the Railway, police work of the ordinary description is, no doubt, required, but local knowledge is always necessary, and I think that the Police in each Province should be recruited, promoted and dismissed by the

Provincial authorities. It has already been found necessary to decentralize the Police in Northern Nigeria. I recommend that there should be an Inspector, holding no executive powers, for the whole territory, attached to the Governor's staff.

40. The Prisons Department too, I think, should be completely decentralized. Each province should be responsible for the proper safeguarding and utilization of the work of the prisoners in the jails of the Province. The Inspector of Police mentioned in paragraph 39 might inspect jails also.

41. With regard to the Public Works Department and Public Works Extraordinary: Public Works should, I think, be divided under three heads. (a) Extra-ordinary Public works of great magnitude generally paid for out of Loan Funds. Each of these would constitute a unit. (b) Public works which require for their execution a skilled technical staff. (c) Public works which do not require for their execution any great technical knowledge other than that possessed by men of the foreman class.

42. The group (a) would, of course, be centralized at Headquarters. The group (b) Extraordinary and Recurrent to be centralized under a Director of Public Works. Group (c) should in my opinion, be entirely decentralized, and each Chief Commissioner should control the execution of the works under this heading in his province.

43. It is hardly possible I think to lay down a hard and fast line of division between groups (b) and (c) which would be of universal application, and it would be necessary to consider in each case whether a work was sufficiently intricate to require the supervision of the Director of Public Works or not.

44. Speaking generally it would however be safe to say that all clay buildings, clearing of roads, construction of unmetalled roads or even of roads metalled so as to bear light motor traffic, should fall into group (c). I am inclined to think that the erection of ordinary stone and mortar houses, with one or two rooms, could be quite well undertaken by foremen acting under the orders of the administrative staff. Simple bridge work would fall into the same category.

45. The principle to be kept in view should be, I think, that all works which can be executed by foremen working directly under the supervision of administrative officers should be undertaken locally. The advantage I claim for this system is that the supervision would be closer, and the interest taken in rapid and economic construction would be greater if such work were decentralized.

46. To summarise; group (a), works of great magnitude, would fall within the purview of the Headquarters staff only and would not appear in the Provincial estimates. Group (b), works of lesser importance, but executed by the Public Works Department would also not appear in the provincial estimates. Group (c) would appear in the estimates under two heads:

(1) *Public Works to be executed locally.*

(Schedule of details).

(2) *Provincial Minor Works (Beit-el-Mal Funds).*

No details shown in estimates but those left to the decision of the Chief Commissioner as necessity may arise.

47. The Chief Commissioner would engage the personnel through the Public Works Department required for works under (1 & 2), and he would

indent on Public Works 'Unallocated Stores' for any material required for their construction.

48. The Education Department should, I recommend, be centralized under one head for purposes of purely departmental control, but in respect of the actual work of education be divided into two sections. One of these to have its headquarters at Kano or at some station in Hausa States, and deal with Mohammedan pupils, and one in some other suitable locality for educating pagan pupils.

49. The Departments of the Forestry and Agriculture should, I think, be centralized but also be divided into sections, in a manner similar to the Education Department, to deal with the diverse conditions of soil and climate existing in these territories.

50. I recommend that the Northern Nigeria Regiment should be brigaded with the Southern Nigeria Regiment.

51. The Legal and Judicial Departments I recommend should be centralized, the Judges and Attorney-General travelling to the headquarters of the various Provinces, when their presence is required.

52. The Political Department I recommend should be decentralized, each Chief Commissioner furnishing a statement of staff required by him. The grades to be common to all Provinces however, and Political Officers being liable for service in any Province.

53. Having regard to the facts that Political Officers are also Judicial Officers I would be inclined to recommend the absorption of all existing Police Officers and, possibly, Police Magistrates into the Political and Administrative Department.

54. The financial organization of the seven Provincial units each under a Chief Commissioner would present, I submit, little difficulty owing to the effective control of the revenue instituted by Your Excellency by which the revenues earned by the Customs, Railway and Marine Departments are placed as a common fund at the disposal of the Governor for the service of the Administration generally. Without going into details here I would add that I believe the cost would be less than that of any other organization which can be suggested.

55. I would recommend that each Chief Commissioner should prepare a budget giving an estimate of Revenue collected locally, an estimate of Expenditure to be incurred on the local service—both estimates to exclude expenditure and revenue of departments which have been centralized, and showing either a deficit to be made up from the common funds or a surplus to be credited to that fund.

56. As estimate of revenue and expenditure of the combined departments, showing also amounts required for the service of loans, to be prepared by the Secretariat; from which funds available for distribution amongst the Provinces and for addition to the Reserve could be seen.

57. The General Warrant signed by the Governor I recommend should cover all personal emoluments (other than those paid from Beit-el-Mal funds).

58. Financial Requisitions against 'Other Charges' in the case of all centralized departments to be signed by the Governor or his deputy.

59. Financial Requisitions against 'Other Charges' and Beit-el-Mal funds appearing in the Provincial estimates approved by the Governor to be signed by the Chief Commissioner.

60. Leave and Pay Certificates to be signed in the Secretariat for officers of all departments.

61. Regarding the scheme of dividing the territory into say two or three units under Lieutenant Governors overlooked by one Governor-General I would submit the following considerations. In the first place it appears to me that one of two things may easily happen should this organization be introduced. The Governor-General may either do the work of the Lieutenant Governors and thereby render them unnecessary (possibly a difficult situation might be created), or the work would be practically left in the hands of the latter. It would be hard, I think, to strike the happy mean, as the position is further complicated by the unavoidable necessity, partly financial, which exists for the amalgamation of the Customs Railway and Marine Departments.

62. In the first contingency the drawbacks of excessive centralization which I have attempted to demonstrate in the first portion of this memorandum would be increased as a result of the Amalgamation. In the second contingency the drawbacks already existing would not be removed, with the result that the *status quo* would remain unaltered and at an increased cost.

63. Further, the fact of certain departments being amalgamated and certain departments not amalgamated, with the unavoidable necessity of creating a Secretariat to deal with questions relating to the former departments and affairs connected with the territory as a whole only, would render the conduct of correspondence and the filing of records a matter of immediate difficulty. The inter-relations of combined departments and uncombined departments, and three or four Secretariats, would be, I submit, complicated in the last degree.

64. By the alternative organization which I have been so bold as to suggest above, I feel convinced that the vitality of the administration would be immensely stimulated, and that a generous rivalry would be engendered between the Staffs of the various Provinces, which would cause the greatest efforts to be made to secure financial equilibrium in each Province and the economic prosperity of the individual native.

65. I trust that in respectfully submitting this somewhat lengthy memorandum for Your Excellency's consideration I may not be committing a solecism; my reason for doing so being the very absorbing interest which I feel in the affairs of these territories and the fact that Your Excellency did me the honour of asking me to submit suggestions on this subject for Your Excellency's perusal.

(Sgd) C. L. TEMPLE
1st February, 1913.

DOCUMENT III

SIR FREDERICK LUGARD'S 'CONFIDENTIAL' PROPOSALS ON THE
AMALGAMATION OF NIGERIA SUBMITTED TO THE COLONIAL
OFFICE, MAY 1913

INTRODUCTION

1. *Résumé of Administrative Changes.*—Nigeria, which it is now proposed to amalgamate, consisted prior to 1900 of three separate Administrations—

- (a) The Niger Coast Protectorate, which had been controlled by the Foreign Office;
- (b) The Niger Territories, under the Royal Niger Company;
- (c) The Lagos Crown Colony and Protectorate, under the Colonial Office.

In 1900 the territories of the Royal Niger Company were taken over by His Majesty's Government, and all the area lying south of $7^{\circ} 10'$ was incorporated with the Niger Coast Protectorate under the name of Southern Nigeria and transferred to the Colonial Office, while the northern portion also came under the same control, with the name of Northern Nigeria.

The Northern Administration contained an area of 256,000 square miles, with a population of nine or ten millions, and included the Hausa Emirates and the Kingdom of Bornu. The former, though nominally in treaty with the Royal Niger Company, were, as yet, unconquered, and maintained armies which had laid waste the whole country in their annual raids for slaves. They had defied the Company, and occasionally threatened its existence. The latter—Bornu—was in the hands of the army of Rabeh.

Southern Nigeria was almost wholly unexplored. Its area, including the Colony of Lagos, was 79,880 square miles, and its population was estimated at about 7,000,000. The pagan tribes which inhabited it were (with the exception of the Yorubas in the hinterland of Lagos) of a low and degraded type. It included the powerful kingdom of Benin, and the widespread domination of the barbarous cult of Fetish, which practised human sacrifice, of which the headquarters were at Aro.

In 1906 a further step in amalgamation was decided on, and Southern Nigeria and Lagos became one Administration, under the title of the Colony of Southern Nigeria.

2. *The Policies and Progress of the two Governments.*—The policies of the two Administrations of Northern and Southern Nigeria differed in essentials. In Northern Nigeria each Emirate was conquered in turn, and the ideal aimed at was to rule through the native chiefs, and enlist in matters of administration the energies which they had formerly devoted solely to war and sensuous luxury. This policy was the more possible, because the ruling classes, though degenerate, offered promising material, and a highly organised, though very corrupt, system of native administration and taxation existed in the country. This was carefully studied and upon it was subsequently built up a system of native courts and of direct taxation—shared by the native admini-

strations and collected through their agency—which was extended to the pagan and wholly uncivilised areas that formed about half of the Protectorate. The whole machinery was under the control of the Central Government; the laws of the Protectorate applied to the whole country, and there was a single budget for the whole Protectorate. Progress, however, was difficult and success was only achieved by incessant work, owing to the extreme paucity of British officers. This was due to the fact that Northern Nigeria had practically no revenue except a very insufficient grant-in-aid, a great part of which was necessarily devoted to maintaining the garrison for the defence of the country. Even such revenue as has lately accrued from the development of minerals is equally shared by the Niger Company, in accordance with the terms of transfer, while all expenses fall on the Government.

Southern Nigeria was, in this respect, more fortunate, for it enjoyed a large revenue from Customs on the coast, especially on spirits (which were prohibited in Northern Nigeria). Its hinterland was gradually opened up, and its material resources rapidly developed by a policy of making roads and clearing the water-ways of vegetation. No form of taxation was instituted. Native courts (presided over by British officers) were set up, and in the absence of the Northern Nigerian system of provincial courts, the Supreme Court gradually extended its jurisdiction throughout the interior. The material progress achieved was astonishing; Lagos, from being an almost bankrupt little Colony, became one of the wealthiest. A railway, costing some £5,000,000 sterling, was completed to join the Northern Nigerian line to Kano. Harbour works and waterworks, costing close on one and a quarter million, were undertaken, and extensive wharves, with a railway connecting them with the main line, were projected at a cost of more than another million. In the hinterland of Lagos the 'United Egba State' maintained an independent government, while in Oyo, Ibadan, and others the laws of the Colony were only partially operative, and the authority of the Colonial Government was very ill-defined.

From this brief summary it will be seen that the policy of the two Administrations was widely divergent. That of Northern Nigeria may be described as a native policy whose aim was primarily administrative, while that of Southern Nigeria was commercial, and directed primarily to the development of natural resources and trade. Unlike East Africa and Uganda, there were no common laws and Gazette, and the two Administrations were little in sympathy with each other. Since Southern Nigeria embraced the whole of the coastal area, its hinterland, Northern Nigeria, was deprived of the source of revenue, viz., Customs, from which practically all Colonies draw the bulk of their resources—though it is true that Southern Nigeria, with frequent protests, contributed £70,000 (about 4 per cent. or 5 per cent. only of the total). The Northern Administration was therefore starved, and the anomaly was presented of a territory, undivided by any natural boundaries, of which one portion was wealthy and able to spend large sums on developments not of paramount urgency, while the remaining portion, even with the aid of direct taxation, could not balance its budget, and the British taxpayer was called upon to pay the larger part of its bare necessities of administration. The two Administrations differed also in their railway policy, with the result that the section which had its outlet at Baro, on the Niger, was in competition with that which had its outlet at Lagos, though there was room for any number

of independent railways in so vast a country. It seems difficult to imagine circumstances which could offer more cogent arguments for amalgamation.

3. *Financial position, 1913.*—Before discussing the form which amalgamation should take, it may be well to glance at the present financial position, which must largely guide the decision. The financial position to-day, though it hardly justifies the glowing terms which have been employed regarding it, is not unsatisfactory. The public debt of the two Nigerias stands in round figures at eight and a half millions, equal to about three years' combined revenue, a proportion which is only exceeded among Crown Colonies by the Straits and Jamaica. Of this loan, over five and a half millions (with an additional half million from revenue and reserves) have been expended on railway construction, for which there is not an adequate result in railway mileage. The railway is now more than paying its working expenses from net earnings, apart from services to Government, and it is hoped that before long it will be able to pay interest and sinking fund on the capital cost. Southern Nigeria is committed to large harbour and water works, and the available balance of about a million (when these are completed) will be barely sufficient to complete the new wharves and connecting railway as at present proposed. The Colonial reserves at the end of 1912 stood at over a million sterling, and the revenue, which is steadily increasing, is close on three millions. Fully half of this is derived from Customs on the sea-board.

The trade of Southern Nigeria present two unsatisfactory features. First, nearly two-thirds of the Customs duties are collected on trade spirits—an import which it is very desirable to decrease. Second, the exports are not sufficiently diversified—the staple of palm oil and kernels accounting for the bulk of the exports. This constitutes a danger, for if any disease were to attack the oil palm, the prosperity of Southern Nigeria would entirely collapse. On the whole, however, the financial outlook of the territories taken together is satisfactory, more especially in the prospect of mineral development; and the budget, with the aid of the Imperial grant of £100,000 for four more years, should be made to balance.

Including this promised grant, the total assistance given to Northern Nigeria will have amounted to about four and a quarter millions from January 1st, 1900, when the Administration was taken over by the Crown. A great part of this sum was transmitted to Nigeria in silver coin, most of which has remained in the country. The profit to the Mint on this silver is estimated as being over 50 per cent. If this profit be deducted from the grants-in-aid, and the sum paid for the expropriation of the Royal Niger Company (£865,000) be added, it will be seen that the total cost to the Imperial Exchequer has probably been about four and a half millions. For this comparatively small sum—less than was paid for the Uganda Railway alone—the British Empire has secured a country one-third the size of British India, or equal in size to the German Empire, Italy, and Holland, which, by the time the grants are exhausted, will be entirely self-supporting, and is affording a vast and increasing market for British industries and commerce. The main need of the country is an extension of its railway system, and there are areas so rich in undeveloped produce as to ensure remunerative returns from the very outset on an economically constructed line. (See Appendix I, [omitted from this edition.])

REPORT

The Governor-General.—The Secretary of State has decided that the combined territories of Northern and Southern Nigeria, divided into two or more subsidiary Administrations, shall be placed under the control of a single Governor-General, and that in order to maintain continuity he shall remain in actual control even when absent from Africa, and working (not on leave, but on duty) at the Colonial Office. While in England he will at present continue to receive and despatch all communications with the Secretary of State. The chief object to be obtained by this arrangement—which I have found to be warmly approved by senior officers who have experience of African Administration—is that the Governor will be in continual and unbroken touch with Nigeria, and so will not on the one hand have to waste time by reading up arrears on his return, and on the other hand will be able very effectively to promote the interests of the country, and save much delay and work in correspondence, by being in close touch with the Colonial Office and all commercial, mining, and other interests, while in England. In present circumstances it will probably be in England that he will be able to get through the bulk of the work of the revision of the laws and regulations, and the re-drafting of the General Orders, and the 'Instructions' to Government officers (which lay down the policy in native affairs), since while in Africa he has little time to do more than make notes for later incorporation. As he is actually discharging the duties of his post, he will require no substitute in Africa, except for matters of routine, and Lieutenant-Governors will carry on the detailed work of administration, referring to him by letter (or if the matter is urgent, by telegram), just as they would do if he were absent from either headquarters, though actually in Africa. It may be remembered that when travelling in Nigeria itself it is quite possible that the Governor-General may, in point of time, though not of actual distance, be as far from a local headquarters as when in England. When absent from Africa the Governor-General will appoint one or other of the Lieutenant-Governors to deal with routine matters. The Governor-General directs the policy in regard to native administration, and undertakes the legislation and the issue of all Regulations and General Orders, but Lieutenant-Governors will submit to him a draft of any law they propose for enactment. He remains continuously responsible to the Secretary of State for the administration of Nigeria.

2. *Lieutenant-Governors and Division of Country.*—The first question to decide in regard to amalgamation is: into how many subordinate administrations should the territories be divided, and how should their Governments be organised? I recommend that the administrative areas of Northern and Southern Nigeria shall for the present remain practically as they are, under two Lieutenant-Governors, each with a Secretariat and fully organised departments, certain of which should have a common head, while two or three, whose functions are common to Nigeria as a whole, and cannot be easily divided, should be centralised under the Governor-General. The Crown Colony of Lagos will form a separate Administration, under an 'Administrator', but sharing the departmental staff of Southern Nigeria. My reasons for this conclusion are as follows:

- (a) I have found no adequate reason for creating a third Lieutenant-Governorship, since the work which has hitherto devolved upon the Governors of Northern and Southern Nigeria will be considerably decreased in that they will be relieved of a great part of the duties and responsibilities connected with larger questions of policy, with legislation, Regulations, General Orders, &c., which will be undertaken by the Governor-General and a small central staff, together with the work of the combined Departments (Railway, Marine, and Customs), to which I shall presently refer. If and when it may become necessary to form a third Administration it can be properly organised without difficulty or undue haste.
- (b) This proposal does not prejudice any adjustment of boundaries which, after careful consideration, it may be found advisable to make; nor does it preclude the reorganisation of provinces, and the creation of new and larger units, under officers with extended powers of financial control *vis à vis* the native Administrations, should that course appear desirable.
- (c) It will not dislocate the existing machinery of government, which can be gradually and carefully adapted to the new system before any large new departure is undertaken. The inauguration of this system, as I shall show later on, involves some radical changes, and a good deal of reorganisation, and it would, in my judgment, be a particularly unfortunate moment to select for a territorial re-division, which would involve the creation of a number of new subordinate Governments.
- (d) Each of the two territories referred to is under a separate and distinct body of laws, regulations and general orders. It will take some time to embody these in a revised form applicable to all Nigeria (with such territorial exclusions and exceptions as may be specified in each law or regulation). Meanwhile, each will remain under its own laws, until they are repealed one by one and replaced by a Consolidated Nigerian Ordinance. A territorial re-division, which transferred portions of one Administration to the other, or included portions of each in a new Government (as in the schemes reviewed in Appendix II of this Report, [omitted from this edition]), would create difficulty in view of the great divergence in matters of taxation, land, and other important questions, and this at a moment when the whole machinery was dislocated. Later, with a unified Code-book and General Orders common to all Nigeria, there would be no difficulty.

3. *Alternative Division.*—If an alternative proposal were desired, I should recommend that the former Lagos Protectorate should be included with the Crown Colony, thus reverting to the position prior to the amalgamation of 1906. This would probably be more popular with the Europeanised section of the natives of Lagos, but in my opinion there are serious objections to it. It would, moreover, involve the reaction of a new Government with all the consequent cost of duplicating departments, &c.

4. *'Nigeria.'*—The territorial areas embraced in the two Lieutenant-Governorships may, if it be desired to make the new *régime*, be known by new names, such as the 'Northern Territories' and 'the Southern Territories' of Nigeria, or as the 'Niger Sudan' and 'Niger Coast'. They would have a

common 'Official Gazette' published by the Central Secretariat, and I shall later submit designs for a common flag and seal. Officers of the Nigerian Staff would be appointed to one or other Administration, but would be interchangeable at the discretion of the Governor-General. They would look for promotion primarily to their own Administration, but would be selected for promotion or transfer to the other.

5. *Lieutenant-Governors and Administrator.*—Lieutenant-Governors will be under the control and authority of the Governor-General. They are not superseded by his presence within the area of their jurisdiction. They will submit to him their Annual Budgets of Revenue and Expenditure for approval and incorporation in the general Budget. (Paragraph 33.) Each Lieutenant-Governor will be provided with a private secretary. A third officer will be continuously required to act for the Administrator when he is on leave or acting for the Lieutenant-Governor. He will be drawn, like the Acting Lieutenant-Governor in Northern Nigeria, from among the first-class Commissioners (Political Department).

6. *Other schemes.*—Various other schemes have been put forward, a brief summary of which is contained in Appendix II of this report [omitted from this edition]. They are all based on the principle of dividing the territory into a number of large units—from four to seven—each under the control of a high official responsible to the Governor-General, who, when absent from Africa, would have a substitute to replace him. The Niger, flowing north and south from Lokoja, with its great westerly bend at that point, and the Benue from the east, which joins it there, are utilised as dividing lines. These schemes appear at first sight attractive, but present many serious practical difficulties a brief examination of which will serve to explain the reasons which have led me to an opposite conclusion.

7. *Departmental centralisation.*—No one, I think, would be found to advocate that each of four to seven Administrations should have a separate secretariat and a completely organised system of departments of its own, for this would be exceedingly costly, and necessitate duplication of work and an immense amount of unnecessary correspondence, nor would there be sufficient work for so many governments. If, on the other hand, all departmental work were concentrated in a single large secretariat, there must necessarily be a great delay in communication with it, however centrally situated, in a country of such great distances. The place where the railway crosses the Kaduna, near Zaria, would be geographically central, and would be distant about 450 miles from the district bordering on Lake Chad, and 400 miles in a straight line from Calabar and the sea coast between it and Lagos. But direct communications do not exist, and the most expeditious way of sending papers from the Central Secretariat to Calabar would probably be by rail to Lagos (560 miles) and thence 450 miles by sea! Such a delay would obviously be most detrimental to public business.

If, again, departments of these various units were placed under local heads or deputies, dealing with the Central Secretariat direct, or through the local Administration, the control of the departmental head would be nullified, and it would be almost impossible for him to supervise the expenditure of the votes assigned to his department and great delay would, as I have shown, be inevitable. The different Lieutenant-Governors (or 'Commissioners') would need to have some control over these provincial branches of departments,

necessitating secretarial assistance. The system would in fact amount to an extension of the Provincial system of Southern Nigeria, which, as I shall presently show (paragraph 42), does not appear to have been a success, though in Southern Nigeria alone it had not to contend with the same difficulties of communications. When means of rapid communication have grown up with the progress of time, and, more especially, when a railway connecting the eastern Provinces with the central capital has been built, it may perhaps be found advisable to adopt a centralised system of this kind, but, until then, it seems to me unworkable.

8. *Other difficulties.*—Another disadvantage of this method would be that the Governor-General would be tied to headquarters and the executive management of a large Secretariat. He would be precluded from visiting various parts of the territory (unless the Chief Secretary were vested with powers amounting to those of a Deputy Governor-General), and would have little or not time to attend to the larger questions of policy and administration, with, I fear, a consequential absence of control and direction of policy.

Again, it must be borne in mind that, owing to the system of leave in West Africa, the large powers delegated to the Lieutenant-Governors or Commissioners and Chief Secretary would constantly devolve upon subordinates, and the Administration would, therefore, require a very large number of men (about fifteen under the seven Commissioners scheme) with the requisite experience and qualifications to exercise high office. It would, moreover, be necessary to appoint a substitute for the Governor-General, thereby abandoning the idea of continuous responsibility and control vested in one head, which all Senior Officers with whom I have spoken regard as a reform of vital importance if it can be attained.

9. A further drawback to these proposals lies in the fact that it would be a matter of great practical difficulty to create simultaneously from four to seven new Governments, to distribute from existing Secretariats the records belonging to each, and to adjust the laws applicable to each from two different Statute Books. No offices or dwelling-houses exist at any one centre for the Central Secretariat and heads of all departments, and they would take a year or two to build, with, meantime, a very considerable disorganisation of the machinery of Government. Such a method, even if otherwise ideal, would necessarily postpone effective amalgamation for some years, while a less heroic project would allow time in which to judge of its advisability, and to inaugurate it gradually if that advisability were proved.

Summary of objections.—The difficulties it presents are briefly these:

- (a) How to decentralise departments without impairing the financial and executive control of the head.
- (b) How to focus the work of all in a central office, and yet to avoid the cost and duplication of records involved by a series of subordinate secretariats, or the delay due to distance and the congestion of an over-centralised office.

Even if these difficulties were solved by extended means of communication, there remains the problem of how to control the central office and deal with the correspondence from all local Governments in the absence of the Governor-General.

The primary object of decentralisation is not to confer larger powers on

subordinate officers, in order to enhance their prestige with native rulers. Its object is rather to relieve congestion and overwork in the office of the head of the Government, and I have already pointed out that the work of the two Lieutenant-Governors will be greatly decreased from what formerly devolved on the Governors of Northern and Southern Nigeria. In these circumstances Mr. Boyle maintains that there would not at present be work for more than two Lieutenant-Governors.

10. *Staff of Governor-General.*—A Political Secretary is attached to the personal staff of the Governor-General, and an extra junior officer is provided in the Secretariat to act as Private Secretary when the Governor is in Africa, and similarly an extra subaltern is provided in the West African Frontier Force to act as aide-de-camp. Accommodation will be required at the Colonial Office for the Governor and Political Secretary, and a confidential (typing) clerk.

11. *'Central Departments.'*—The object in view is to delegate to Lieutenant-Governors the largest possible amount of control over the ordinary administrative machinery, so as to relieve the Governor-General from routine work, for which he has not time, while maintaining his supervision and sole responsibility for the conduct of the Government. Each Administration has, therefore, an adequate Secretariat and Treasury, and each is complete in itself in all the departments of government. It is, however, unavoidable that there should be one or two departments whose operations are concerned with Nigeria as a whole, and which are not susceptible of division into parallel branches. The most important of these is the Railway, and the other two are the Marine and the Customs.

Railways.—The Director of Railways and Works, who has already been appointed, is the adviser of the Governor-General in all matters concerning railways and the larger public works, and exercises wide powers. He supervises open lines, and corresponds with the Governor on the larger questions, such as changes in rates, new capital works and non-recurrent expenditure, housing of staff, &c. He is personally in general control of all new construction and of railway surveys, and also of large works constructed from loans, such as the harbour and waterworks. He presents the annual estimates of the railway and of the 'Public Works Extraordinary' of both Administrations, and advises as to the comparative need and urgency of the capital works proposed.

Customs.—The Customs Department is concerned with the land frontiers of Northern Nigeria as well as with the coast of Southern Nigeria. It is difficult to say how much of the Customs dues collected on the coast accrue on imports whose ultimate destination is Northern Nigeria, and how much on those for Southern Nigeria. To avoid the controversies of the past, and to provide a sum to meet the debt charges (which are also included under central control) and for other purposes, it is advisable to include the Customs as a 'Central Department'. Lord Selborne's Committee in 1898 said that 'the Customs receipts must be divided according to the Budget requirements of the Provinces', but this has not hitherto been done.

Marine.—The Marine controls all water transport in both Administrations, alike on the sea-coast and on the Niger and Benue.

General.—Executive control and discipline over the subordinates of these three departments, who may be located in one or other of the three Admini-

strations, will be exercised by Lieutenant-Governors in the absence of the head, or in any case requiring immediate action, a report being made to the Central Secretariat. Heads of these departments will correspond with Local Secretariats on purely local matters, otherwise their channel of correspondence will be a Central Secretariat.

12. *Departments with Common Head.*—There are also two or three departments which can advantageously have a common head, to co-ordinate the branches in each Administration, and to advise the Governor on matters of general policy, though the departments will be completely controlled in all ordinary routine by their respective chiefs under each Administration. Such are the Medical, Post and Telegraphs,* the West African Frontier Force, and (for the present) the Surveys, while the Director of Railways and Works acts in the same capacity for the Public Works Department of both Administrations. The cost of these heads will be shared and shown in the Budgets of both. They will advise the Governor-General on the larger questions connected with these departments, and will constantly be on tour exercising a general control. No substitutes will be required for the Director of Railways and Works, the Director, Medical Service, or the Director of Posts and Telegraphs,* while they are absent from Africa.

13. *Central Secretariat.*—To deal with the routine work of the combined departments, and with the whole of the Governor-General's correspondence, a small but very efficient Central Secretariat must be provided. It will be under a Secretary of equal rank with those of the two Administrations, and it will be associated with one or other of them, which it will assist at such times as the pressure of work admits, especially during the absence of the Governor-General in England. The Central Secretary will be under the direct orders of the Governor, and in his absence, of the Lieutenant-Governor whom he has selected to act as his deputy in matters of routine in connection with the Central Departments. All correspondence addressed to the Governor will pass through the Central Secretariat for register. Similarly the Treasury of one of the two Administrations will deal with Central Departments (the railway being self-contained under its own Chief Accountant), and will have a special officer selected for this work. It is not anticipated that it will occupy much of his time.

I have already tested this organisation, and have laid down rules for the guidance alike of the heads of Central Departments and for the Central Secretariat and Treasury.

14. The proposed changes in all Departments which have a common head, as well as the organisation of the Central Departments and Secretariat, are dealt with in detail in Appendix III [included in Document IV of this edition], but I would observe that any department of either Administration, or its head, may at any time be called upon to do work for the Central or for the other Administration. Thus the Printing Department of Southern Nigeria will be maintained at sufficient strength to print the Gazette and Ordinances, and to do other work for both, while the Chief Forestry Officer of Southern Nigeria (for example) would, if the Governor desired, furnish a report on Northern Nigeria.

* See note on paragraph 8, Appendix III [included on Document IV of this edition]. It may be preferable to make this a 'Central Department'. [See also Appendix VI included in Document IV of this edition. Ed. 1968.]

15. *Public Debt*.—The public debts of both Administrations will be amalgamated and will become a central charge. The reserve funds are also merged into one, and the financial year will close on December 31st, for both. These changes have already been made with the sanction of the Secretary of State, in anticipation of amalgamation, so that complete amalgamation may be introduced on the 1st January, 1914, if so desired.

16. *Judicial*.—Sir E. A. Speed, Chief Justice of Northern Nigeria, has addressed a Memorandum to me (see Appendix IV of this Report, [included in Document IV of this Edition]), recommending that the establishment of Judges after amalgamation should be reduced to one Chief Justice and three Puisne Judges. This proposal is dependent on the introduction of the system of Provincial Courts in Southern Nigeria (to which I shall presently refer), and the consequent curtailment of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. He also strongly recommends that the Judges should take vacation annually during the rains leaving one Vacation Judge in Africa. I have considered these proposals, and relying (as to the adequacy of the Judicial staff) on his experience in both Southern and Northern Nigeria, I am prepared to recommend them with some small modifications. I would, in the first place, abolish the Vacation Judge, without reducing the establishment. In practice it would be impossible to give effect to his scheme unless one Judge entirely foregoes his leave and does not subsequently make it good. With the Provincial Courts, and the Police Magistrates as Commissioners of the Supreme Court, no difficulty in minor cases should arise, and serious cases can be held over for Assize, or, if considered advisable by the Governor, may be transferred during vacation for trial in a Provincial Court. The Judges should serve eight and a half months in Africa, and the remaining three and a half months' vacation should suffice for leave and passages.

17. I propose that the Police Magistrates in Southern Nigeria, and the Cantonment Magistrates in Northern Nigeria, should all alike be called 'Station Magistrates', and where possible they will combine other duties with their magisterial functions, as they always have done in Northern Nigeria. They will, of course, be Commissioners of the Supreme Court. They will be required at Lagos, Calabar, Warri, Lokoja, and Zungeru, viz., five in the country, a total of eight on the establishment.

18. *Legal*.—There will, for some time to come, be considerable work in revising and amalgamating the existing laws and editing the Regulations under them. I strongly recommend, therefore, that the Chief Legal Adviser should be primarily a legal draftsman, and should be relieved of the duty of appearing in Court on behalf of the Crown in ordinary cases. He should always be in Africa when the Governor-General is there, and his assistance will often be required in England by the Governor. I propose, therefore, that he should take the same vacation leave as the Judges, modified from time to time as the Governor may find necessary and convenient.

19. To represent the Crown in the Supreme Court, I recommend that there should be two Crown Prosecutors (replacing the two Crown Solicitors), and they will also take the vacation leave of the Courts. The Lieutenant-Governors of Northern and Southern Nigeria will each need a 'Legal Adviser', making three with a relief.

20. *Leave conditions of Certain Heads*.—I have said in a former paragraph that the Director of Railways and Works, the Director of Medical Service,

and the Director of Posts and Telegraphs, will require no substitute when absent from Africa. I am of opinion that in the case of the two former the public service will benefit by their being placed on the same leave conditions as I have recommended for the Judges. Their short absence will not break continuity, but preserve it. Their work necessitates constantly moving about the country, which cannot conveniently be done during the rains, and involves extra cost in carriers due to delays, and extra risk of health. Under the ordinary leave conditions they are absent from Africa every alternate dry season, when their presence is most urgently required. They deal with the larger questions of policy, which makes their presence in England necessary at more frequent intervals. Thus the Director of Railways and Works needs to be in close touch with the Crown Agents. There are at the present moment questions relating to the supply of rolling stock for the main line, and of material for the Bauchi extension which need his presence, as well as larger questions of railway policy, to which I am alluding in Appendix I [omitted from this edition]. Had the rolling stock ordered been supplied in reasonable time, it is estimated that the earnings of the line might have been increased by £50,000 this year. In the case of the Director of Medical Service, it is important that he should be able, personally, to submit the Annual Report, and his more frequent presence in England would bring him into closer touch with the Advisory Medical Committee. Of the three officers who control 'Central' Departments, and the four whom I propose to place in supreme control of supreme departments which are fully organised under local heads, there remain the Marine, Customs, Post and Telegraphs, Surveys, and West African Frontier Force.

Marine, Customs, and Posts and Telegraphs.—The Marine is, next to the Railway, the largest spending department in Nigeria, and for that reason it might seem desirable that the Director of Marine should always be in Africa when the Estimates are prepared in October, but his work is not affected by the rainy season, and I do not therefore propose that his leave conditions should be altered. He and the Comptroller of Customs and the Director of Post and Telegraphs will either prepare their estimates for the coming year before leaving Africa, or, if their departure on leave is too early in the year to render this possible, they will do so in England in direct communication with the Governor-General.

Survey.—The great part of the Survey Department is already under the short tour conditions of service, since it is recognised (as in India and the Straits, &c.) that eight months in the field is the maximum during which any man can do efficient work, and the rains form a serious obstacle for the remaining four (except in Northern Nigeria, where the Harmattan haze forms an even greater obstacle in the dry season). It would probably, therefore, be advisable for the Surveyor-General to be on the same conditions, since during the rains the work shifts from the field to the draughtsman's office in London.

West African Frontier Force.—The Commandant is replaced by the Assistant Commandant, and some of the most cogent reasons which apply to the three departments already named do not apply to him; but his work, like that of the Director of Medical Service, consists in continual travel and inspection, which can best, and more cheaply and rapidly, be carried out in the dry season. I recommend therefore that in any case the Director of Rail-

ways and Works, and perhaps also the Director of Medical Service, the Commandant, and the Surveyor-General, should be placed on the eight and half months' tour.

21. These proposals, taken in conjunction with my recommendations in regard to the leave conditions of the Judges, constitute a considerable departure from the practice which has hitherto obtained, and since I have always myself been an advocate of extending rather than of shortening the term of residential service (a system which I introduced in Northern Nigeria with the sanction of the Secretary of State), it is not without very careful consideration that I have been induced to so far modify my views. But the new problems to which the amalgamation of so vast a country gives rise accentuate the necessity for facing the difficulties which have always presented themselves in connection with the question of leave in Nigeria. It is manifestly a costly and wasteful system which allows the absence of very senior officers, whose work is of a nature which can best—and in some cases only—be performed during the dry season, to be absent every alternate year during that season, and present when their presence is of little value. It is also disadvantageous that annual reports, and the yearly estimates of the most important departments, should never be prepared for two consecutive years by the responsible head. The Governor-General will invariably be present in Africa to prepare the Annual Budget, and it would be desirable that some at least of these heads who control departments in both Administrations should be in Africa to advise him when he is there.

22. The main drawback is said to be the cost of passages. The annual leave requires a total of six passages instead of four in three years, viz., an extra £20 only per annum. In return for the personal advantage of less prolonged absence from England a slight diminution of leave would no doubt be gladly accepted, and I propose eight and half months' residence and three and half months for leave and passages. Allowing 16 days each way for the latter, there would remain 74 days in England instead of 85, the days lost being spent on board on the extra passage, when the official would be relieved of work. Possibly the steamship company would be willing to make some concession also in view of the extra profits accruing to them. In any case, I am wholly convinced that the public service will gain by the change.*

23. On the other hand I see no reason why an officer who is quartered on a healthy plateau, such as the Bauchi uplands, should be entitled to the same leave conditions as a colleague whose residential service is spent in the vicinity of pestilential mud-flats in the coast delta, and I would suggest that some distinction should be later introduced in the leave conditions which apply to different parts of Nigeria. The question is one of such vital importance that I have not hesitated to devote considerable space to its discussion.

West African Frontier Force.—The headquarters of the military force will be at the new capital (if approved, *vide infra*). This is central to the whole country, and an expeditionary force, in case of emergency, could be rapidly despatched to any place. The Kaduna Bridge is moreover a point of strategic importance. I propose that the whole of the troops should be placed under

* Commercial firms used to retain their employees on the Coast for two or three years, but I was recently informed by the Chairman of the British Cotton Growing Association that he had come to the conclusion that, even in the case of junior officers, it was actually cheaper to bring them home on short leave every year.

one commandant, and that the sum now spent on the Southern Nigeria Volunteers should be devoted to this and other changes which are detailed in Appendix IV [included in Document IV of this edition]. In my opinion measures should be taken without delay for the defence of the ports of Lagos and Forcados, and I also consider that the proportion of British non-commissioned officers to natives, which has been gradually decreased, should be increased. These, however, are matters on which I am reporting separately.

The West African Frontier Force may, in a certain degree, be regarded as an Imperial asset. It saved the despatch of British troops to Ashanti in 1900, when the Empire could ill afford to spare them, and it has on more than one occasion repeated the service. Its maintenance in a high state of efficiency may therefore perhaps be regarded as a set-off against the grant-in-aid of £100,000 per annum which the Imperial Government has promised to Nigeria for a period of five years. Its total cost should not exceed (£277,000, which would be less than 10 per cent. of revenue, and 44·3 per cent. of the 'margin'. (See Section 6, Appendix III of this Report, [included in Document IV of this edition.]

24. *Legislation.*—I have considered the question of creating a Legislative Council for Nigeria, but the difficulties appear to me to be insuperable in regard to unofficial representation.

British.—First in regard to European Members. Some of the more important heads of firms reside, I believe, at Calabar, and could not attend any Central Council, while the head of the Niger Company resides at Forcados. Judging from the remarks of Mr. George Moore published in the report on African Currency,* it would appear, moreover, somewhat doubtful whether the heads of firms, either at Lagos or Calabar or intermediate ports, can be taken as truly representative of the commercial interests of Liverpool. Mr. Moore asked Sir G. Fiddes whether he knew of any other Colony 'where the merchants who do the business of the Colony reside entirely in England or Europe, as is the fact in the case of West Africa, where the whole of the business on the other side is carried on by paid agents or clerks', and he went on to emphasise the fact that West Africa was unique in that no partner of any firm resided there. The merchant class would, therefore, it appears, regard with but moderate enthusiasm a scheme which left their interests to be represented by 'paid agents or clerks'. I have myself found that in any important matter the local heads of firms desire to consult their principals before giving a reply. Add to this the difficulty and loss of time involved in attending meetings of Council by any except those on the railway, and the difficulty of obtaining a true representation is evident. Incidentally I may observe that these conditions supply an additional reason for the residence of the Governor-General in England for some part of the year.

25. *Natives.*—Secondly, in regard to native members the difficulties are even greater. The intelligent emirs of Northern Nigeria, whose voices would rightly carry weight in the Council, cannot in any single case speak English, nor could they leave their emirates (where they are engaged in actual administration) in order to attend meetings of Council. The natives of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria would find equal difficulty in representation. The able and intelligent group of educated natives at Calabar, and other coast towns (except Lagos), would have such great distances to travel that the cost,

* Cmd. 6427, October, 1912: Question No. 99.

and the time taken on journeys, would prove an insuperable bar to attendance. The educated natives of Lagos have long held seats on the Legislative Council of Lagos, and can continue to do so, but they are in no sense representative of the tribes of the interior, and probably only to a small degree do they represent the interests even of their own class in Calabar and other coast towns, which most of them have never seen. At a meeting of the 'Lagos Central Native Council', consisting of the leading native chiefs and Moslem traders, they complained to me that, though they represented the bulk of the population of Lagos, they had no voice in affairs. The Native Members of Council, I am informed, devote their undoubted debating abilities largely to opposing each other's views in Council. The Estimates for the current year involved many very far-reaching changes, but not a word of intelligent criticism or comment on the principles involved was offered in debate.

26. *General.*—It is a cardinal principle of British Colonial policy that the interests of a large native population shall not be subject to the will either of a small European merchant class, or of a small minority of educated and Europeanised natives, who have nothing in common with them, and whose interests are often opposed to theirs. Thus, in India the Governor-General legislates without reference to his Council for 'scheduled', *i.e.*, backward or primitive districts, and for native states. In Natal the Governor has a commission as 'Paramount Chief' for the control of extra-Colonial natives, and the Legislative Council cannot interfere with this jurisdiction. At the Cape the High Commissioner governed the Protectorates, and legislated for them, in a separate capacity from that in which he presided as 'Governor' in the Cape Legislature. A Council in such circumstances (as Sir C. Dilke observed in Parliament) 'is not a liberal institution, but a veiled oligarchy of the worst description', and autocracy is preferable. The point is of special importance in regard to Northern Nigeria, where the intelligent emirs are in acute divergence in religion and in social status from the natives of the coast.

27. *Laws to be Gazetted.*—The best alternatives that I can suggest, in order to invite an expression of public opinion and afford the public an opportunity of criticism and suggestion, are as follows: (a) That every law, unless of special urgency or unless for any reason such publication were inexpedient, which directly affects the interests of trade or mining shall be published in, say, three issues of the 'Gazette' before enactment, together with a full statement of its objects and reasons, so as to afford time for study and suggestion. Any serious objection which has not been accepted will be submitted to the Secretary of State, and enactment would usually be deferred. The Estimates will be fully explained in a minute published in the 'Gazette' with the draft of the Appropriation Ordinance.

28. (b) *Nigerian Council.*—I also propose that there should be a 'Nigerian Council' consisting of the two Lieutenant-Governors and the Administrator of Lagos, together with the substantive holders of the following posts: the three Secretaries and the Political Secretary, the Director of Railways and Works, the Attorney-General, the Director of the Medical Service, all first-class Residents or Commissioners, and the two Treasurers, under the Presidency of the Governor-General; one unofficial Member to be nominated by the Lagos Chamber of Commerce, one by the Calabar Chamber (if and when formed), and one by the Chamber of Mines, together with eight others (not less than four of whom would be natives) nominated by the Governor; the

Europeans being representative of shipping, commerce, mining, and banking, and the natives of the native populations both of the coast and of the interior. This would probably give an available number of officials of about twelve, with a possible fifteen unofficials, the Governor in his discretion to be empowered to call in an officer acting in any of the above posts, if the substantive holder is absent from Nigeria. The Council would meet once a year, like the General Council of the French West African Colonies, and the Governor would lay before them a statement, dealing with the legislation of the past year and with proposed future legislation. He would review the policy, finance, and progress of the country, and inform the Council of the salient changes in the Estimates, of any projected loans, and of any public works of magnitude which it was proposed to undertake. Generally speaking, he would endeavour to lay before the Council a full statement of all matters of interest, which it would not be to the disadvantage of the public service to disclose. Procedure would be by way of resolution, and a full opportunity would thus be offered to the unofficial Members to criticise the legislation of the past year and propose any amendments; to offer suggestions on the legislation proposed; to propose new legislation; and to discuss any other matters they desire. The sitting would not be prolonged beyond three days, and would be held at one or other Capital. A record of the proceedings would be sent to the Secretary of State. All members of the General Council would have the courtesy title of 'Honourable'.

29. (c) Finally, I propose that the Legislative Council of Lagos shall continue. Its functions will consist in the passing of such laws as are applicable to the Colony and are introduced by the Administrator. Proposed amendments will be submitted to the Governor before the third reading. The Estimates of the Colony will be passed by the Legislative Council, after approval by the Governor, for incorporation in the General Budget.

30. *Executive Council.*—I propose that the Governor-General should have an Executive Council, consisting of the two Lieutenant-Governors and the Administrator of Lagos, the Attorney-General, the Director of Railways and Works, the Commandant, and the Director of Medical Service, any of whom he could summon when available. Two would form a quorum, and he would consult this Council on all proposed legislation. If no members are available, the Governor-General, as in India, would exercise the powers of Governor-in-Council. (In India the Governors of Madras and Bombay had two officials as Executive Council; the Lieutenant-Governors of Bengal, &c., had none.)

31. *Laws to be operative.*—With these precautions against hasty or ill-advised legislation, I recommend that the Governor-General be empowered to enact and assent to laws which would forthwith become operative, subject to disallowance by His Majesty. In East Africa it would seem from Order in Council of 11th August, 1902, that the Governor was allowed to exercise this power without these checks, and the Governor-General of Nigeria will probably always be an officer of experience. Much delay will thereby be saved.

32. *Laws, general.*—Nigerian laws should be called 'Ordinances' and applied to all Nigeria, with the exception of such districts as may be exempted from the operation of the law by a special clause in the law itself. The existing body of laws (applicable to each Administration) will continue in force until repealed in turn by Consolidating Ordinances. Regulations made under

laws will be made in the same way, but would not need to be previously promulgated.

33. *Annual Budget.*—The annual Estimates of revenue and expenditure will be submitted to the Secretary of State by the Governor. This may be done in either of two ways:

- (a) The Estimates of each Administration as provisionally approved may be incorporated in a single Budget for Nigeria, the expenditure and revenue of each Administration being shown in columns on the right-hand side of the page, as was formerly done with the three Provinces of Southern Nigeria. Each Lieutenant-Governor would retain his own approved draft as his authority for expenditure. The advantage would be that such a Budget would present the whole as one single Administration indissolubly united.
- (b) Or the Estimates of each Administration, when provisionally approved by the Governor-General, would be separately printed, together with those of the central Departments (prepared by the central Secretary under the Governor-General's supervision), and the whole three submitted to the Secretary of State in the form adopted during the current year. On the whole I prefer this method, but either is equally easy in practice.

34. *The Northern Nigerian Capital.*—I turn now to the question of the seat of Government for each of the territories, and for the central Administration. The Capital of Northern Nigeria is at present at Zungeru, to which place it was transferred from Jebba in 1902. Jebba had been selected by me in 1898 purely as a strategic military camp during the crisis with France. Zungeru was the most central place to which it was at that time possible (by the Kaduna River and a 22-mile light line) to gain access. It has served its purpose well, and has proved healthy, but it is excessively hot, owing to the large amount of surface rock in the vicinity, which also precludes the laying-out of gardens and avenues that do so much to add to the amenities of a tropical station. The temporary wooden bungalows—the materials for which, even before erection, had been much damaged by exposure—are now worn out. For some years past the necessary repairs have not been executed, in anticipation of a move elsewhere, and new houses, urgently required to accommodate the staff, have been deferred and cannot longer be delayed. The moment, therefore, is opportune if a new Capital is to be selected. The obvious place is where the railway again crosses the Kaduna, affording an abundant water supply on the main artery of communication; and I appointed a Committee to examine various sites in this neighbourhood. I am submitting a detailed report, with plans, and will only here mention the fact that, in my opinion, an excellent site has been found. It is central to the whole of Nigeria, at an altitude of 2,000 feet, with a climate incomparably superior to Zungeru and the Niger and lower Kaduna valleys. Officers could bring their wives there with every hope that they would retain their health. The soil is good, and gardens for both flowers and vegetables can be made, and it is within 50 miles of the great trade centre of Zaria—an ideal distance. I propose that the central workshops of the railway shall be located near the Kaduna Bridge, about a mile from the Capital (for the river makes a right-angled bend here). The advantages of having the railway centre within a short distance of the Capital

are obvious, and no better place could be selected for the purpose, owing to the abundant and excellent water supply and the bracing climate. It will, moreover, be the junction of the two main trunk lines to the Eastern and Western Ports (see Appendix I and map, of this Report, [omitted from this edition]). I have transferred the headquarters of the West African Frontier Force to the site, that they may thoroughly test it during the coming rains.

35. *Southern Nigeria Capital.*—The Southern Nigeria Capital is at Lagos, the terminus of the railway, and the greatest commercial port of Nigeria. The Island of Lagos, is, however, for many reasons, a bad place for a Capital. Its climate is enervating and trying. The damp winds from the sea are oppressive, and it is congested with a densely-packed native population of 73,000. It is surrounded on every side by fetid swamps, full of mosquitoes and badly smelling, the reclamation of which is an impossibility. Segregation is practically not feasible, and though the bulk of the bungalows of European officials are grouped round the racecourse towards the south of the island, they are interspersed with squalid native quarters. Government House is a large and fine building, but inconveniently situated and badly designed. It is much in need of repair. There are large public offices only recently completed, but a new European hospital is much needed.

36. In these circumstances I have considered whether any change is possible. Following the railway the mainland gradually ascends after Yaba is passed, and at the seventh mile from Lagos Post Office there is a fine level piece of country, at present covered with forest and scrub, which, in the opinion of the Principal Medical Officer, would form an excellent site. Morning and evening trains would convey officials to and from their work in Lagos so long as the public offices remain in the island. The atmosphere is very different from Lagos, and the soil appears rich instead of being merely sea sand, in part dredged from the lagoon, and in part pre-existing and saturated with sewage, as in the island. A town could be laid out here on thoroughly sanitary lines, and segregation could be effectively carried out. The water-pipes from the filter-beds at Iju pass close to the site. A detailed examination would, of course, be required, if it were proposed to utilise it for the Capital. It seems possible that Government might be able to dispose of its present houses at Lagos at a good price, for they lie in the direction of the proposed new wharves, and would be well adapted for merchants and their agents, should they prefer to live near their warehouses on the island. They would be a great improvement on their present houses, which are in the heart of the native quarter. Government House itself would make an admirable hotel, with good grounds and a jetty of its own.

37. *Central Capital.*—The Governor-General will spend his time chiefly at one or other of the two Capitals, and will require a residence at each; but in view of the better climate and more central position of the northern site, it would be advisable to place the Central Secretariat here, and certain of the heads of departments who are in general control of departments in both Protectorates, e.g., the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General, the Director of Railways and Works (the General Manager remaining at Lagos), the Commandant, the Director of Medical Service, and the Director of Posts and Telegraphs. Pending provision of quarters, they will be located in Lagos, where the Marine and Customs would permanently remain.

38. These projects are costly, but sooner or later the Government must

face this question in a rapidly-expanding country, and it would be better to meet the cost at once than to spend large sums on buildings which may eventually have to be abandoned. I think that no better way could be found of employing a portion of the large reserve funds than by laying out two model Capitals, which will promote the health and add to the amenities of life of the officials and of all others who desire to live in them. The decision must be taken at once, for new buildings are urgently required both at Lagos and Zungeru, and on the decision also depends a large number of subsidiary questions, some of which are urgent; but the actual building can be spread over two or three years.

39. *Administrative changes in Northern and Southern Nigeria.*—I have dealt with the larger and more important changes which I recommend as a consequence of amalgamation, and in Appendix III [included in Document IV of this edition], will be found a detailed examination of the changes in each department, and the increase or decrease in cost which they involve. I now submit a brief sketch of the present position in each of the Administrations, with some explanation of how the proposed changes will affect the existing method of dealing with native affairs in Southern Nigeria, both executively and judicially.

40. *Northern Territory.*—The Northern Territory, or Niger Sudan, is estimated to contain a population of from nine to ten millions with an area of 256,000 square miles, divided into thirteen 'Provinces' of very unequal size and population. Sokoto is the largest in area (35,500 square miles) and Bornu the next (32,800 square miles). Either of these is considerably larger than the four Provinces of Zaria, Bassa, Kabba, and Illorin put together. In population, Kano (three millions), is much more than double the next largest, Sokoto (1,300,000). The five most important, Sokoto, Kano, Bornu, Bauchi, and 'Niger', with an average area of 28,000 square miles and one and a quarter million people, and earning an average revenue of £61,800 each, are under '1st Class Residents'. A revenue of over half a million, shared with the native Administration, is raised without difficulty by direct taxes on property or income, and the system of education in the vernacular, adapted to Moslem prejudices, is popular and producing good results. The native courts in Mahometan districts are very efficient, and undertake the bulk of the judicial work.

The question of delegating larger powers to First-Class Residents in native affairs, of no longer requiring them to exercise judicial powers, and of empowering them to confirm sentences up to a specified limit, together with the question of re-adjusting the areas of Provinces, are all matters which need early consideration. The former are dealt with in paragraph 49, which refers to native courts.

41. *Southern Territory.*—The Southern or Coast Territory, or 'Niger Coast', has a population estimated at seven and three-quarters millions, with an area, exclusive of the Crown Colony, of 73,844 square miles. It consists of the former Administrations of Southern Nigeria and Lagos, which in 1906 were amalgamated by Mr. (now Sir) W. Egerton, somewhat, I believe, on the model of the Straits and Federated Malay States, from which he had recently come. It was divided into three Provinces, the Eastern, Central, and Western, with Capitals at Calabar, Warri, and Lagos respectively.

42. *The 'Provincial System.'*—Each was under a Provincial Commissioner

(though the Western was, in practice, largely administered from headquarters). Under their direct control were Provincial representatives of each department. Separate accounts of revenue and expenditure were to be kept, and they have been separately shown in the Colonial Budget. Heads of departments complain that the system is fatal to departmental control. A medical officer, for instance, must ask sanction from the Provincial Commissioner to exceed a departmental vote. The Provincial Commissioner refers it to the Colonial Secretary, who in turn refers it to the Principal Medical Officer, to enquire whether savings in other directions will admit of the expenditure, and a similar circumlocution is carried through in reply. Stores are requisitioned from England direct by Provincial authorities, with a result of extra cost and accumulations of unused stores. Extra cost is also involved by the creation of these Provincial deputies. Such, at least, is the opinion I have gathered from the Colonial Secretary and Senior Officers of Departments in Southern Nigeria. Delegation of powers should, in my opinion, be departmental, and not through a series of non-departmental channels.

Nor does the system appear to have produced good results in the political or administrative branch, though these are no doubt due to other causes also. I find the Central Administration completely out of touch with District Officers, who in some cases have inaugurated policies of their own, and pledged the Government in excess of their powers. In other cases they have been content to do little. In either case their reply is that they had no indication of the policy of the Government to guide them. The Provincial Commissioner has a large amount of departmental work to do, with no adequate Secretariat to assist him, and can devote only a comparatively small part of his time to the close supervision of his district officers. Land leases were granted on no settled principles, and subject to inordinate delays. Colonel Moorhouse, himself a most efficient Provincial Commissioner, states that he has but little time to attend to native affairs, and Mr. James, who has the longest experience in the Protectorate, says that the Provinces are so large that one man cannot properly supervise them. A recent case may be taken in illustration where it was found by the Police that an 'epidemic' of sass-wood poisoning, estimated to have cost 774 lives, had been going on for three or four years without the knowledge of the district officers. Not only is it desirable that the Governor should be in closer touch with district officers, but also that they should be in closer touch with the natives. Hitherto it would seem that the chief points of contact have been the native courts, and the supervision of forced labour for road-making, &c., so that the people learn to regard the British officer rather as a judge or a taxmaster than as a sympathetic adviser.

43. The Provinces are divided up into a large number of districts in charge of Senior District Commissioners or District Commissioners of the 1st or 2nd Grade, and I am informed that no distinction in responsibility has been made between the three grades. No regular reports are furnished by district officers, who take their instructions from the Provincial Commissioner. The fines and fees of 'native' courts (presided over by British officers) form a large separate fund, which has been nowhere properly brought to account, and was expended in part on 'Sitting fees' to native Judges or Assessors, in part as salaries of local chiefs, and in part on roads and buildings, at the

discretion of the Provincial Commissioner. There is no direct taxation, and the native chiefs take no effective part in the administration. In some parts of the Western Province the Ordinances of the Colony do not operate and the jurisdiction of the Crown is very ill-defined.

44. *New Organisation.*—There appears to be some need for reorganisation in the administration of native affairs, and I propose to divide up the territory into nine Provinces, with an average area of 8,200 square miles, as against an average of 20,000 square miles in Northern Nigeria, but with an average population practically identical, viz., three-quarters of a million. Later, when fully organised, these can be reduced in number, as in Northern Nigeria, and double Provinces placed under selected men.

These proposed Provinces have been very fully discussed with the Colonial Secretary and the Provincial Commissioners, and are shown on the attached map.* They follow tribal limits as far as possible, and later experience has indicated the readjustment of some of the existing districts to effect this object.

45. *Political Staff.*—This change will vest a direct responsibility in the officers in charge of the nine Provinces, and will, I anticipate, create among district officers the same emulation and keen interest in their work, and in the development of their Province, as has resulted in Northern Nigeria. They will submit regular reports to headquarters, so that the Governor may be able to form his own opinion of the work and ability of each, and guide their actions. They will be charged with judicial, as well as executive duties under the new scheme of Provincial and native courts which I shall later refer to. They will no longer control or interfere with departmental officers, who will remain under the sole control of the heads of their departments, except in so far as the Commissioner of a Province is the senior representative of Government in his Province, and is charged with the responsibility of seeing that there is no dereliction of duty on the part of any Government officer—departmental or other.

46. The staff required for these Provinces is discussed later in my notes on the Political Department; (Appendix III of this Report, [included in Document IV of this edition]). Though the population is denser in Southern Nigeria, the distances to be traversed are much less than in Northern Nigeria, and it is due to the keen personal interest taken in this matter by Sir W. Egerton, that Southern Nigeria possesses an excellent system of roads, connecting most of the principal stations. In the absence of direct taxation, the revenue collected by district officers in Southern Nigeria is negligible in comparison with Northern Nigeria, where practically the whole revenue is collected by the Political Staff, and in this direction there is less work in Southern Nigeria. I propose, however, that the Political Staff in the Southern Territories shall consist of 120 officers (13 per Province), as against 132 (10 per Province) in Northern Nigeria, for the present, for owing to the absence of any centralised native administration, and of chiefs who can be trusted to exercise control over their people, such as now exist in Northern Nigeria, there must, of necessity, be a more direct British supervision until capable rulers have been found and trained—nor are the officers themselves as yet trained to the new system.

47. *Southern Nigerian Courts.*—As soon as the new Provinces are made it

* Not reproduced (Ed. 1968).

will be possible to reorganise the Courts of Southern Nigeria. This question forms the subject of a separate report, and therefore I will only deal very briefly with it here. The existing 'native courts' (so-called) are presided over by a district officer, and therefore hardly deserve the name, any more than the Supreme Court itself when sitting with native Assessors. Since the district officer has hitherto generally been ignorant of the local language, the native Court Clerk and Interpreter exercised great powers, which, as experience has proved, have not infrequently been grossly abused. The fines inflicted in many cases are the perquisite of the native chiefs—than which it is difficult to find a more pernicious system, and one more likely to lead to a travesty of justice. Every district officer is also a Commissioner of the Supreme Court, and in that capacity holds 'district courts', in which legal practitioners can appear. His powers are very limited, and the Supreme Court Judges tour the hinterland. The result, I am told, is that litigation is fomented by those who are interested, with disastrous results to the natives, especially in land cases; and both Chief Justices concur in the advisability of restricting the sphere of the Supreme Court jurisdiction. One Puisne Judge informed me that though the natives have confidence in the British Judges, they have none in the native Assessors, who are often bribed. The process of law in the Supreme Court is too costly and too rigid for application to uncivilised areas.

48. *New Courts.* I propose to set up purely native courts, with small powers at first. These have proved a success, even among primitive tribes in Northern Nigeria. Supreme Court jurisdiction will, I propose, be limited to coast towns, where there is a considerable number of Europeans and native foreigners. In the interior it will be replaced by Provincial courts, with which it will have concurrent jurisdiction over aliens. Any case may be transferred to the Supreme Court from a Provincial court at any stage, or a retrial may be ordered by the Governor. Cause lists operate as appeal on behalf of the accused, and all sentences over six months require confirmation. Legal practitioners may not appear in a Provincial court. Police Magistrates remain, of course, Commissioners of the Supreme Court.

49. At present, in Northern Nigeria the examination of the 'Provincial Courts' Cause Lists (which operate as appeals on behalf of the accused), and the confirmation of sentences of over six months imprisonment, is vested in the Governor, and delegated by him to the Chief Justice. This system has very obvious defects, and has tended to confuse the exercise of the Royal Prerogative. It is, moreover, doubtful whether, under the system now proposed for the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice will have time to undertake this work for both Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria, and, in any case, he will be absent from the country for three and a half months each year. I propose, therefore, that in Northern Nigeria powers of confirmation up to two years shall be vested in substantive First-Class Residents, who are now trained officers. There are, moreover, now in every Province so many junior officers with legal qualifications, that a Resident can always obtain a legal opinion if he desires it. He will forward all cases in which he has exercised his powers to the Legal Adviser, who, if necessary, can draw the attention of the Lieutenant-Governor to any case in which he may consider that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, or for other reasons. Cases of two years' imprisonment and over—which are rare—will be reserved for the Lieutenant-Governor, who will send any case of ten years and over, and all death sentences, to

the Governor-General when he is in Africa. A First-Class Resident will, at the same time, cease to exercise judicial powers himself.

50. This system would, I fear, be premature in Southern Nigeria, where the officers will all be new to the work; and for the time being, I see no alternative to adopting the existing Northern Nigeria system in Southern Nigeria. It will be seen from Sir E. Speed's Memorandum (Appendix IV of this Report, [included in Document IV of this Edition]), that he anticipates no difficulty on the part of the Chief Justice in continuing to carry on these functions. I would, prefer, however, if possible, that the Lieutenant-Governor should review and confirm the cases with the assistance of his Legal Adviser, as I did myself in the early days in Northern Nigeria. In the absence of the Chief Justice he must in any case undertake them.

51. *Administration of Lagos.*—The third subordinate Administration which I propose consists of the Crown Colony of Lagos under an 'Administrator'. The boundaries of the Colony are at present very ill-defined, and the Chief Justice tells me that great difficulty has resulted in the courts. In a separate report I am suggesting words to define the existing boundary accurately, and to create it where it does not exist. When approved, I suggest that the boundary should be promulgated in letters patent.

52. *Legislative Council.*—The Colony possesses Legislative and Executive Councils, and also a Municipal Board of Health. Under the new conditions the Executive Council will no longer be needed. The Administrator will preside at the Legislative Council (unless on occasions when the Governor-General may consider it desirable to be present). The members would be: The Secretary of Southern Nigeria, the Police Magistrate, the Commissioner of Lands, the Senior Sanitary Officer, the District Officer, and the Commercial Intelligence Officer, with the present unofficial representatives. This number might, I suggest, as vacancies occur, be reduced by two Europeans and two natives. The District Officer and Commercial Intelligence Officer would then vacate their seats. The term of office should be two years. The functions and powers of the Legislative Council have already been described in paragraph 29.

53. *Board of Health.*—The Board of Health, which consists of ten members (five official and five unofficial) under the Presidency of an official appointed by the Governor, could, as vacancies occur, also be somewhat reduced in numbers. The members might be the Medical Officer for Health, the Municipal Engineer, and the Commissioner of Lands (?), with three unofficials, under the Presidency of the Inspector-General of Police. A permanent Secretary will no longer be required. His duties will be discharged by an officer of the Lagos Secretariat. The Administrator of Lagos should correspond with the Governor-General, and be on the same footing as Lieutenant-Governors, but junior to them. There is ample work for a Senior Officer to accomplish in Lagos. Questions of water-rating and land titles have to be solved in the near future. Its schools and other institutions offer scope for much effort, and it is permissible to hope that, with a sympathetic and strong Administrator, its Press may assume a less carping and more helpful tone.

54. It is, I think, in every way desirable that the Crown Colony should be detached from the Administration of the Protectorate. Its locally-born inhabitants enjoy the status of British subjects, and many of them are educated gentlemen of great ability, able and willing to take their part in the

advancement of a progressive community. On the other hand, it is undeniable that the fact that the seat of Government was located in Lagos has caused the needs of Lagos to loom somewhat largely in the perspective of the requirements of the territory as a whole. The revenues, derived mainly from the peoples of the interior, have been freely spent on schemes of water supply and reclamation.

55. *Staff.*—The Administrator will need a small secretariat staff, the constitution of which I shall deal with when discussing the Departments of all Administrations (Appendix III, of this Report, included in Document IV of this edition).* There will, however, be no separate departmental staff, and he will obtain his requirements from the Lieutenant-Governor of the Southern Territory, in whose Estimates provision will be made.

F. D. LUGARD.

* Besides a number of special reports, such as those on the Supreme Court, Railway and Harbour development, and the Posts and Telegraph Department, Lugard also submitted draft Ordinances for establishing Provincial Courts and Native Courts.

DOCUMENT IV

FINANCIAL AND STAFF PROPOSALS FOR THE FIRST UNIFIED ESTIMATES OF NIGERIA, 1913

APPENDIX III

PROPOSED CHANGES IN DEPARTMENTS AND COST

Lieutenant-Governors.—I suggest that the salaries of the two Lieutenant-Governors should be at the rate of £2,000 per annum, with a duty pay for Southern Nigeria of £600, and Northern Nigeria of £400, the salary of the Administrator of Lagos being £1,500, with duty pay, £300. During the Governor's absence in England an extra duty pay of £30 per mensem in Southern Nigeria, and of £20 in Northern Nigeria, should be allowed. The mean cost of this establishment, as compared with the provision in the current Estimates is as follows:

Governor-General, plus actual duty pay	£6,857	
2 Lieutenant-Governors at £2,000	4,000	
" " duty pay at £600 and £400	1,000	
Allowance when Governor-General in England at £30 and £20 per mensem	250	
1 Administrator, Lagos, £1,500, duty pay, £300	1,800	
1 Political Secretary, mean pay plus duty pay	943	
2 Private Secretaries for Lieutenant-Governors at £300	600	
1 Confidential Clerk to Governor-General, £300-£500 (mean)	400	
		£15,850
Provision in Estimates:		
Northern Nigeria	£4,632	
Southern Nigeria—		
£4,632 plus £1,000 for Lieutenant-Governor for		
3 months = £4,000 per annum	£8,632	13,264
		£2,586*
Increase		

2. *Secretariat.*—I recommend that the heads of the 'Central' and Southern Nigeria Secretariats should be on the scale of £800 × £25—£1,100, and the Secretary, Northern Nigeria, on £700 × £25—£900, with the staff shown in the following table:

	Central Nigeria	Southern Nigeria	Northern Nigeria	Lagos
2 Secretaries at £800 × £25—£1,000, duty pay £160	1	1	—	—
1 Secretary at £700 × £25—£900, duty pay £140	—	—	1	—
5 First Assistants at £500 × £20—£600, duty pay £100	1	2	2	—
8 Second Assistants at £400 × £20—£500, duty pay £80	1	3	3	1
12 Junior Assistants at £300 × £15—£400	2+1*	4	3	2†
2 Confidential Clerks at £250 × £15—£400	—	1	1	—
Secretariat Allowances at Lagos for 14 at £60	(4)	(8)	—	(2)
Totals	5+1	11	10	3
* To act as Private Secretary.	† Replaces Secretary to Board of Health.			

* There will be a decrease in the Native Establishment.

The mean cost of these salaries, viz., supposing that every officer had earned increments half way between his minimum and maximum, is as follows:

2 Secretaries at £1,060, including duty pay	£2,120
1 Secretary at £940, including duty pay	1,880
5 Assistants at £650, including duty pay	1,300
8 Assistants at £530, including duty pay	4,240
12 Juniors at £350	4,260
2 Clerks at £325	650
Allowances, 14 at £60	840
	£15,290

Provision in the Estimates is as follows:

Southern Nigeria: £7,405—£450 'Central' for 3 months =	£1,800	£9,205
Northern Nigeria: £6,325—£300 'Central' for 3 months =	£1,200	7,525
		£16,730
Add pay of Secretary, Board of Health, Lagos (p. 198 of Estimates)		395
		£17,125

Saving £1,835.

The practice which has hitherto obtained of borrowing several officers from the Political Department should absolutely cease in the future, and the staff now allowed should be sufficient. The Intelligence Officer and the Commercial Intelligence Officer will both be attached to the Central Secretariat.

3. *Political*.—In the Political Department I strongly recommend uniform rates of pay for both Protectorates, and I propose the following grading and rates of pay:

<i>Title</i>	<i>Pay</i>	<i>Duty Pay</i>	<i>Northern Nigeria</i>	<i>Southern Nigeria</i>
1st Class Resident or Commissioner	£800—£25—£1,000	£160	5	3
2nd Class Resident or Commissioner	£600—£25— £700	£120	15	12
1st Class District Officer	£500—£20— £600	£100	16	15
2nd Class District Officer	£400—£20— £500	£80	32	30
Assistant District Officer	£300—£15— £400	—	64	60
Total			132	120
Supervisors of Native Revenue (Central) £700—£25—£800.			2	
Duty Pay £140				

I have very carefully considered this scale. It will be seen that it follows the recommendations of the Colonial Office Committee that the number of officers in the three grades of salary below £600 should be in the proportion of 1 : 2 : 4. The officers above that rate are in charge of Provinces, and the number of these is calculated so as to provide sufficient without drawing

on the District Officers. Thus, Northern Nigeria, with 13 Provinces, has 20 of the two higher grades which normally means 14 in Africa, one extra being allowed for the replacement of the Lieutenant-Governor when on leave. Southern Nigeria, with 9 (proposed) Provinces, has 15, which provides 10 actually in the country, one being required to replace the Administrator of Lagos when on leave or acting for the Lieutenant-Governor. The two Supervisors of Revenue are selected officers, specially conversant with the native policy, modes of assessment, and the system of native courts, who will be continually touring from Province to Province, seeing that a uniform method is carried out, and that all instructions are being observed. They will be common to both Protectorates, acting directly under the orders of the Governor-General. One at least will always be present in Africa.

The mean cost of this establishment is £127,367, as shown in the following table. The provision made in the current Estimates (which were intended to prepare for this scale) has not, in the case of Southern Nigeria, met with approval, as I trust it may yet do with this fuller explanation. It stands at £129,209, and a saving of £1,842 is effected. The number of officers provided for in Southern Nigeria in the present year is 126; the number proposed is 121 (including one Supervisor), a reduction of 5. These, as I shall presently explain, will be absorbed, and an equal number of additional officers appointed to the Treasury. The number in Northern Nigeria is increased by one. Apart from the Supervisors of Revenue, who do not belong to the ordinary provincial staff, Northern Nigeria, will have 88 officers in Africa, and Southern Nigerian 80.

The proposed grading should ensure a reasonable rate of promotion, and put an end to discontent on these grounds. The pay of a first-class Resident is by no means too liberal, and may require to be increased. Paragraph 40 gives some statistics of the average area, population, and revenue collected in a first-class Province in Northern Nigeria, from which the importance of the post of First-Class Resident may be gauged. I propose that the titles of 'Resident' and 'Commissioner' should denote an identical grade. Properly speaking, an officer appointed to a Province under control of a Paramount Chief would be a 'Resident', while one posted to a Province containing a congeries of tribes under no central native Administration would have the title of 'Commissioner'.

4. *Judicial*.—The salary of the Chief Justice of Southern Nigeria is £1,500 with duty pay £300, and of Northern Nigeria £1,000 × £50—£1,200, duty pay £200, while the Puisne Judges of Southern Nigeria receive £1,000 and £200 duty pay, and in Northern Nigeria £600 × £25—£700, duty pay £120. I recommend that the Chief Justice of Nigeria should receive £1,600, duty pay £320, and that the £1,000 rate should be maintained for the Puisne Judges. The Police Magistrates of Southern Nigeria and the 'Cantonment' Magistrates of Northern Nigeria are included as 'Station' Magistrates. The proposed establishment and rates of pay are as follows:

	S.N.	N.N.
Chief Justice, £1,600, duty pay 8½ ms., £227	1	
Puisne Judges, £1,000, duty pay 8½ ms., £141	2	1
Station Magistrates, 1st Grade, £500 × £20—£600, duty pay £100	2	—
Station Magistrates, 2nd Grade, £400 × £20—£500, duty pay £80	3	3

	Southern Nigeria			Northern Nigeria				
	No.	Minimum	Mean	Maximum	No.	Minimum	Mean	Maximum
1st Class Resident or Commissioner, £800—£25—£1,000. Duty £160	3	2,400	2,700	3,000	5	4,000	4,500	5,000
2nd Class Resident or Commissioner, £600—£25—£700. Duty £120	—	480	480	480	—	800	800	800
1st Class District Officer, £500—£20—£600. Duty £100	12	7,200	7,800	8,400	15	9,000	9,750	10,500
2nd Class District Officer, £400—£20—£500. Duty £80	—	1,440	1,440	1,440	—	1,800	1,800	1,800
Assistant District Officer, £300—£15—£400.	15	7,500	8,250	9,000	16	8,000	8,800	9,600
	—	1,500	1,500	1,500	—	1,600	1,600	1,600
	30	12,000	13,500	15,000	32	12,800	14,400	16,000
	—	2,400	2,400	2,400	—	2,560	2,560	2,560
	60	18,000	21,000	24,000	64	19,200	22,400	25,600
Totals	120	52,920	59,070	65,220	132	59,760	66,610	73,460
Northern Nigeria	£66,610—for 132			<i>Estimates, 1913</i>				
Southern Nigeria	59,070—for 120							
	£125,680—for 252			Southern Nigeria		£63,639—for 126		
	1,678—for 2			Northern Nigeria		65,570—for 132		
Central	£127,367—for 254			Total		£129,209—for 258		

The mean cost of this staff is £9,730. The provision made in the current Estimates is £10,442. A saving is thus shown of £712, to which may be added the saving consequent on a reduction in the native staff. On the other hand, there will be a small recurrent increase of £80 per annum in passages.

5. *Legal.*—The salary of the Attorney-General of Southern Nigeria is £1,100, duty pay £220, and of Northern Nigeria £600 × £25—£700, duty pay £120. The Solicitor-General of Southern Nigeria receives £700 × £25—£900, duty pay £140, and the two Crown Solicitors £500 × £20—£600, duty pay £100. The Attorney-General of Nigeria should be a man of wide experience and high qualifications, and I propose a salary of £1,400, duty pay £280. The proposed establishment would be as follows:

	Central	Southern Nigeria	Northern Nigeria
Attorney-General £1,400 duty pay, actual, £187	1	—	—
Legal Advisers £600 × 25—£700, duty pay, £120	—	1½	1½
Crown Prosecutors £500 × 20—£600, duty pay, actual, £78	—	1	1
Total	1	2½	2½

The mean cost of this establishment is £5,139, while the provision for legal officers in the current Estimates is £4,197, showing an increase of £942, to which must be added £60 for extra passages.

6. *West African Frontier Force.*—The cost of the West African Frontier Force for 1913 is £273,154. This is, of course, exclusive of medical and other services, and is about 9 per cent. of the gross revenue, or 43.8 per cent. of the margin or difference between ordinary revenue and ordinary expenditure (see Note).* This is not an unduly heavy expenditure on defence. There is, in

* NOTE explaining method of calculating 'margin' or difference between Ordinary Revenue and Ordinary Expenditure:

	£	
Southern Nigeria Revenue, less Land Sales	107,731	
Northern Nigeria Revenue, less Land Sales	569,539	
Central Departments Revenue	2,160,510	
Total Ordinary Revenue	2,837,810	
	£	£
Southern Nigeria Expenditure, less 'Special'	858,137	
Deduct—West African Frontier Force	120,919	737,218
Northern Nigeria Expenditure, less 'Special'	615,851	
Deduct—West African Frontier Force	154,315	497,536
Central Expenditure, less 'Special'		979,076
Total Ordinary Expenditure, less West African Frontier Force		2,213,830
Difference or margin		623,980
Cost of West African Frontier Force		273,154

viz., 43.8 per cent. (nearly).

In this calculation the interest, &c., on Public Debt, and the gross Railway Expenditure are included as Ordinary Expenditure. The Imperial Grant-in-Aid is excluded.

addition, an expenditure of £3,480 on the Southern Nigeria Volunteers. I have found a consensus of opinion that this force cannot be considered as an effective branch of the Colonial defences, and should be abolished. The Inspector-General has expressed himself strongly in this sense, and the Commandant in Southern Nigeria and the Adjutants of both Volunteer Battalions concur. I have already reported* fully on this subject.

The Inspector-General has submitted to me proposals for a large increase in Headquarter Staff on amalgamation, approximating, I believe, to a Divisional Staff, and more than doubling the present expenditure (£7,344, as compared with £3,046). Against this increase he proposed certain reductions. I do not myself see the need for this large increase in the Staff, and I consider that the reductions in the personnel of the battalions would decrease efficiency, and should not be effected. I agree with him that there should be a Commandant of the whole of the forces in Nigeria, with an Assistant Commandant to take his place when on leave, and I propose that his staff should be increased by one officer. At the Inspector-General's request I consulted the Commandants of both the Northern and Southern Nigeria Regiments, and they both strongly concur with me. They state that they have found no difficulty in replacing staff officers when on leave by regimental officers, to whom the training is of great advantage, and they consider that in the circumstances of Nigeria, a staff for manoeuvres (which have never taken place) and for preparing schemes of defence is not required. Colonel Strickland observes that the staff of the Egyptian Army consists of eight for a force of 13,000 strong. The Nigerian Regiments have, at present, a staff of four to a force of 5,390, and I propose to raise this to six: a much larger proportion than the Egyptian Army. If the proposed rates of pay are accepted the increase will be as follows:

	£
Commandant at £1,100 duty pay, £220	1,320
Assistant Commandant at £800, duty pay, £160	960
General Staff Officer, £450, duty pay, £90	540
	<hr/>
	£2,820
Deduct pay of Commandant, Northern Nigeria	1,192
	<hr/>
Increase	£1,628
	<hr/>

I also concur with the Inspector-General, and the Commandant, Southern Nigeria Regiment, that the 14 companies of the Southern Nigeria Regiment should be organised as two battalions of seven companies each (as they formerly were) under Lieutenant-Colonels, with the same battalion staff as the Northern Nigeria Regiment. Since the battalions will be smaller than those of the Northern Nigeria Regiment (one of which has nine and the other eight companies), I have assigned a pay of £650 instead of £700 to the Lieutenant-Colonels commanding. The change would, apparently, be as below:

The work of the Station Staff Officer, Calabar, will be done by the Adjutant. The Station Staff Officers' allowance should also be abolished in Northern Nigeria, (they date from a period when the Station Staff Officer performed

* 11740, 12: not printed.

<i>Present</i>		<i>Proposed</i>	
	£		£
1 Commandant, Southern Nigeria Regiment, £900, duty pay, £156	1,056	2 Lieutenant-Colonels at £650, duty pay, £130	1,560
1 Regimental Adjutant, £400, duty pay, £132	532	£80	960
1 Assistant Adjutant, £350, duty pay, £96	446	2 Adjutants at £400, duty pay, £80	960
Station Staff Officer, Calabar, duty pay, £60	60	2 Quartermasters at £340, duty pay, £68	816
1 Paymaster and Quartermaster, £400, duty pay, £80	480		
4 Total	<u>£2,574</u>	6 Total	<u>£3,336</u>
	Increase, 762		

certain civil duties), saving £96. I would also propose to convert the existing heterogeneous scales of officers' duty pay into a uniform rate, as in the Civil Service, of one-fifth of initial salary for all new appointments. This will involve no increase. An extra subaltern will be required to furnish an Aide-de-Camp to the Governor when in Africa.

The total increases are as follows:

Headquarter Staff	£1,628
Reorganisation, Southern Nigeria Regiment	762
Extra Subaltern	370
	<u>£2,760</u>
Deduct pay for Station Staff Officer	96
Total	<u>£2,664</u>

To this must be added the cost of extra passages for the additional officers (£100) horse allowances, &c. There remains a balance of £816 from the retrenchment on the Volunteers to meet these charges.

7. *Treasury*.—The Treasury of Southern Nigeria must undertake the work connected with the Marine and Customs (both Central Departments), and it is, therefore, advisable that it should also be responsible for other Central work in connection with the railway and public debt. I recommend that both Treasurers should be on the scale of £700 × £25—£800, duty pay, £140, but that the Treasurer of Southern Nigeria should receive £200 per annum for the work and responsibility of the Central accounts. The present 'Financial Commissioner' will, of course, continue to draw his salary of £1,100, with duty pay of £220, while he remains.

I am informed that there are five Assistant District Officers (including reliefs) employed wholly on Treasury work at the coast ports. These in future will be required for their proper duties, and the Financial Commissioner asks for five officers (including reliefs) to replace them. Local Treasuries will check all vouchers, and the Central Treasury will deal with accounting only. A separate report* has been submitted on this matter.

*10628: not printed.

The Treasury Staff would thus stand as follows:

	<i>Southern Nigeria</i>	<i>Northern Nigeria</i>
Treasurer, £700 × £25-£800, duty pay £140, plus special to Treasurer, Southern Nigeria, charged to Central, £200	1	1
Chief Assistant, £500 × £20-£600, duty pay £100	1	1
Assistant, £400 × £20-£500, duty pay £80	2	1
Junior Assistant, £300 × £15-£400, duty pay	13	6
Total	17	9

The mean cost of this Establishment is £11,520, as against £11,232, shown in the current Estimates—an increase of £228. Five Assistant District Commissioners can be dispensed with at a mean cost of £1,750, as shown under 'Political'.

8. *Post and Telegraphs*.—The Postal and Telegraph Departments are combined in Northern Nigeria, as in almost every important Colony, and in the United Kingdom, with increasing efficiency and much greater economy. These results may be looked for especially in a country like Nigeria, since there is an indefinite number of small out-stations, where a clerk can be employed in the dual capacity of Postmaster and Telegraphist. I propose to combine them in Southern Nigeria next year. I have recommended that on amalgamation there should be a common head to these departments, and I suggest a salary of £700 × £25-£900, duty pay, £140. There will also be a small central Accounting Department. This will not be a 'Central Department' in the sense in which the Railway, Marine, and Customs are, and the head and his Accounting Staff will be charged equally to both Administrations, each maintaining its separate department, as is done with success in East Africa and Uganda. I regret that I have not, as yet, accurate figures in regard to this department.*

The cost of the combined services in Northern Nigeria, with over 4,000 miles of telegraph wires, and an area to serve in postal delivery three times that of Southern Nigeria, is £23,511, while in Southern Nigeria, with 3,286 miles of wires, the cost of the two departments is £49,072. I hope to effect a reduction of these figures on amalgamation.

9. *Audit*.—The Audit Department of Southern Nigeria will audit the Central accounts, and also those of the Lagos Administration, charging any extra staff for the purpose to the Central Budget. All railway Auditors have already been transferred to Southern Nigeria, and there appears to be no need for any further change at present.

10. *Printing Office*.—The Printing Department in Southern Nigeria is very costly (£12,298), but on amalgamation it will be charged with the 'Central' work, including the Gazette and Ordinances, and also forms common to both Administrations. Like the Audit, it will charge an agreed proportion to the Central Budget as a 'book transaction'. I anticipate, therefore, practically no

* Since this Appendix was written I have received the report of a Joint Committee of the Heads of the Postal and Telegraph Departments of Northern and Southern Nigeria, under the chairmanship of Mr. Boyle (Colonial Secretary). Their proposals are that the departments should be centralised. The report with estimates, &c., will follow as Appendix 6.

change consequent on amalgamation, except perhaps a small reduction in the cost of the department in Northern Nigeria, which, however, is at present only about the same as the Railway Printing Office.

11. *Police and Prisons*.—These departments remain under their respective Administrations, and though the relations between the Political Department and the police in Northern Nigeria, may be a matter for consideration later, there is no immediate change consequent on amalgamation. The effective strength of the Southern Nigeria police is about 75 per cent. greater than that of Northern Nigeria, while its cost is about 82 per cent. greater. There is, however, a much more striking difference in the cost of prison establishments, which, in Southern Nigeria, are about four and half times the cost in Northern Nigeria. This is largely due to the much greater price of food in Southern Nigeria; but the whole matter, as well as that of prison accommodation, demands a fuller investigation than I have as yet been able to give it, and this is now being conducted.

12. *Forestry and Agriculture*.—In the Forestry and Agricultural Departments I propose no change at present. Both departments are in their infancy in Northern Nigeria. The forestry question in Southern Nigeria is one which is intimately bound up with larger questions of jurisdiction and Crown rights, on which I am submitting a separate report.*

13. *Medical*.—I recommend that there should be a Director of the Medical Service of Nigeria, who will act as adviser to the Governor, and will control and co-ordinate the departments in both Administrations. I do not propose that any other officer should act as his substitute, except in mere routine when he is absent from Africa, in order that continuity of policy and control may not be broken. His pay—which I suggest should be at the rate of £1,200, with duty pay of £240—will be equally charged to both. The Principal Medical Officer of each Administration should be on the £900 × £25—£1,000 scale, and, with the new organization, the 'Provincial' Medical Officers in Southern Nigeria will disappear. The Deputy Principal Medical Officer should be on £700 × £25—£800, and Senior Medical Officers on £600 × £25—£800. I am, however, averse to the appointment of a 'Deputy' as a substantive grade in any department. Not only is it an anomaly to have an 'Acting Deputy' when the holder is on leave, but I think it is advantageous that the Director and his Principal Medical Officers should be free to select any one of the Senior Medical Officers to act as substitute for the Principal Medical Officer, so as to test his qualifications for that appointment. This is especially desirable in the Medical Department, where the administrative duties of the Principal Medical Officer differ so widely from the professional duties of a Medical Officer. A man may have high qualifications as a doctor, but when promoted to be deputy he cannot be replaced, if he happens not to possess administrative qualities, without being superseded. I would therefore suggest the abolition of the grade of 'Deputy Principal Medical Officer.' I see no need for a personal assistant to the Principal Medical Officer, and he can be replaced by a medical officer on the £500—£600 grade.

The provision made for these grades in the current Estimates is £12,337, showing an increase of £313, which is largely due to the fact that most of the Senior Officers have recently been promoted, and have not as yet earned many increments.

* No. 6.

	£
1 Director Medical Service, £1,200, duty pay (actual) £170	1,370
2 Principal Medical Officers at £900 × £25—£1,000, duty pay £180	2,260
11 Senior Medical Officers at £600 × £25—£700, duty pay £120	8,470
1 Medical officer at £500 × £20—£600 (in lieu of present assistant)	550
	<hr/> £12,650 <hr/>

14. *Sanitary*.—If private practice is abolished (as I have elsewhere urged) the Senior Sanitary Officer should be on the scale £600 × £25—£800, and rank as a Senior Medical Officer with an extra duty pay of £100 as head of a sub-department, while 'Sanitary Officers' should be on the pay of the higher grade of medical officers at £500 × £20—£600. The result would be a saving of £351 on existing provision.

15. *Education*.—No changes are necessary in consequence of amalgamation. The heads of the department in both Administrations should be on the same salary, viz., £600 × £25—£800, and the Director of Education in Northern Nigeria should definitely sever his connection with the Political Department.

16. *Surveys*.—Southern Nigeria is fortunate in having at the head of the Survey Department a highly skilled officer—just as it has in forestry. It is probable that later on there may be no need to have a common head—the two departments working together, and the Governor, if need be, calling upon either of them to furnish any special report which may be required. For the present, however, I recommend that they should be associated under a single head, under the title of Surveyor-General, on a salary of £900 × £25—£1,000. The Survey Department of Northern Nigeria is hardly as yet created, and the Survey School has not taken shape. Southern Nigeria possesses a well-organized though somewhat costly system, and can afford much assistance to Northern Nigeria, while the necessity of measuring bases for a common map, and of uniformity in all details in both Protectorates, is of paramount necessity. The pay of the Surveyor-General and the cost of the London Office will be shared by the two Administrations, as in similar cases. Increase £50 (+ £20 for passages).

17. *Mines*.—The Mines Department of Southern Nigeria does not yet exist, but must soon be created. The 'Mineral Survey' will form a branch of this department. There is no need for a common head, and uniformity of procedure will be assured by identical laws and regulations, and the supervision of the Governor and his Central Staff.

18. *Lands*.—There is no Lands Department in Northern Nigeria, though it may before long be necessary to create one.

19. *Transport*.—The Department has been abolished in Southern Nigeria, and unless animal transport is re-introduced in Northern Nigeria it should be abolished there also, the clerical and accounting work in connection with passage warrants being undertaken by the Treasury.

20. *Public Works*.—The two departments have already been placed under a common head—the Director of Railways and Works—with satisfactory result. The Director of Public Works of Southern Nigeria should be on a salary of £900 × £25—£1,000, duty pay £180, and the Deputy Director abolished, saving £1,390. This must, of course, be deferred until vacancies

occur. The grades and pay in both departments have already been assimilated. There appears to be room for some retrenchment in the staff of Southern Nigeria.

21. *Customs*.—The two departments have already been combined for reasons I have given in a previous paragraph. The Comptroller of Customs occupies a very important post, being responsible for the collection of one and a half million of revenue. His salary should be raised from £800 × £25—£1,000 to £900 × £25—£1,100.

22. *Marine*.—The amalgamation of the two Marine Departments, being a matter of urgency, has already, with the sanction of the Secretary of State, been carried out. The approved Estimates for the current year show the reorganization under a single head, with a considerable reduction of cost on the Niger service. One main feature of the amalgamation is that Forcados now becomes the centre of all repair work, and the small dock and workshops belonging to Northern Nigeria are now transferred there.

Burutu, on the other hand, is included in Southern Nigeria, and becomes the Transport and Customs Station, for which it is well adapted, being well protected from tornadoes and heavy seas, with a deep-water frontage and ample land available. Forcados is unsuitable for transshipment of cargo and passengers between ocean and river boats, owing to its exposure to tornadoes from the north-east, from which the costly jetties recommended by Major Waghorn would not afford adequate protection. River boats cannot lie alongside in the choppy seas, and mail boats have to be dealt with in haste and worked on both sides at once. The depth of water is also insufficient, and there would be great congestion unless a very large and recurrent expenditure were incurred by dredging, apart from the heavy capital expenditure on building a sea wall, and a large extension of the wharf, with protecting jetties for river boats. Practically no transshipment takes place even now at Forcados, except the Lagos cargo, which is transferred to ocean-going branch boats; and if the transshipment work were nominally transferred from Burutu, as recommended by Major Waghorn, 90 per cent. would still remain there, since it is the location of the Niger Company. I find that there is a consensus of opinion, with which I, myself, concur, against Major Waghorn's proposals in this regard. Practically no expenditure will be incurred by the change, though additional wharfage to meet the expansion of trade would be required, whether the transport station was at Forcados or Burutu.

It is not proposed at present to add to the Government fleet on the Niger, but since the principal vessels are in a deplorable state of disrepair, one or two being reported actually unsafe, their complete overhaul in the large and well-equipped shops at Forcados is being undertaken, and already good progress has been made. The weekly mail service to Lokoja will be maintained, and the Government fleet, when in good repair, will be able to offer to small traders an alternative to the Niger Company's monopoly, and, in conjunction with the railway, to keep down river rates. A tariff has been published (based on high-water Niger rates), by which the cost of conveying goods from any station beyond the junction of the railways at Minna to the sea to Forcados or at Lagos is equalised. Negotiations with the Niger Company to enter into a contract to convey goods beyond the capacity of the Government fleet at fixed rates between river ports and between the railway terminus at Baro and the port of Forcados are in progress.

The net result of the amalgamation of the Marine will, I anticipate, be a considerable increase in efficiency, with a decrease in cost, and enhanced facilities for working in co-operation with the Railway on the one hand, and the Customs Department on the other. These three Departments are intimately connected, and have all become 'Central Departments' under the direct control of the Central Administration. (See paragraph 11.)

The Marine Department of Southern Nigeria has a very varied sphere of activities, including the charge of the cold storage at Lagos, and of a variety of mail and transport services on the Cross River, and between coast ports through the creeks. I have come to the conclusion that the majority, if not all, of these services can be advantageously undertaken by private enterprise, and I have found that no difficulty exists in so transferring them, with, I hope, a considerable decrease in the cost of the Department. Proposals to this effect will be submitted without delay. At present the Marine Department is, next to the Railway, the largest Civil Department in Nigeria, with a staff of 108 Europeans and 1,283 natives, and it is much more centralised under its single head. The salary of the Director of the Combined Department should be £1,000 × £50—£1,200, duty pay £200 (instead of £1,000 fixed), and I recommend that Lieutenant Child, in view of his long service, should be placed on the maximum. The grades of Deputy and of Marine Superintendent should be abolished, and two Assistant Directors on £700 × £25—£800, duty pay £140, should be substituted, involving an increase of £220 on present provision.

23. *Railways*.—These have been already amalgamated, and need no special comment here. The traffic is developing at an enormous rate, but the staff is, I hope, adequate, and will not need to be increased at present. It is essential that there should be only one time kept on the railway, and it will be convenient for other reasons. I propose that $7\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ meridian should be taken as the mean time for Nigeria, or, say, 30 minutes of time fast of Greenwich. Office hours in different places can be fixed to suit the hours of daylight.

24. *Financial result*.—The net result of these proposals shows a saving of £1,370, as follows:

Department	Saving	Excess
	£	£
Governors and Lieutenant-Governors	—	2,586
Secretariats	1,835	—
Political	1,842	—
Judicial	632	—
Legal	—	1,002
Treasuries	—	288
Medical	—	314
Sanitary	351	—
Education	—	100
Survey	—	70
Public Works	1,390	—
Customs	—	100
Marine	—	220
Total	£6,050	£4,680

The West African Frontier Force are not included, as the increases will balance against the saving effected by the abolition of the volunteers. The saving will be increased by the changes in the Post and Telegraphs, for which I have not at present accurate figures. There will be about 16 officers added to the staff, costing £640 in passages. Allowing for this and other contingent increases, it may be assumed that the changes proposed will involve no appreciable increase or decrease on the expenditure contemplated in the current Estimates.

F.D.L.

APPENDIX IV

MEMORANDUM ON THE ORGANISATION OF THE SUPREME COURT BY SIR E. SPEED, CHIEF JUSTICE, NORTHERN NIGERIA

After the institution of the Provincial Courts, the major portion of the business of the Supreme Court will be confined to Lagos and the Western Province (Southern Nigeria).

In the Central and Eastern Provinces the criminal business will be cut down to very narrow limits, comprising only those cases which arise within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, *i.e.*, the immediate neighbourhood of the larger trading settlements, with the addition of a certain number of cases in which non-natives or Government servants are concerned, a number which is not likely to be at any time within the near future other than inconsiderable.

Similarly the civil business will be confined to the same limits. It is likely to increase by reason, not only of the normal increase of trading transactions within those limits, but also of the extension of the business of the European firms beyond them. In addition to this there will be a certain number of cases, involving considerable sums of money or important rights and interests, transferred from the Provincial Courts, and also appeals from those courts. This class of business is also likely to increase.

I speak with deference, not having had any personal experience of the Eastern Province, and only a very limited one of the Central; but, from my knowledge of the conditions existing prior to the amalgamation of 1906, together with my experience of the Western Province, and the working of the Provincial Courts in Northern Nigeria, and especially of the conditions now existing in Lokoja, which has throughout had a judicial organisation identical with that which it is proposed to set up in these two Provinces, I have little hesitation in saying that for some years to come the work is not likely to prove excessive for the staff of Judges organised in accordance with the proposals which I am about to submit.

In the Western Province (Southern Nigeria) there is probably enough civil business to keep one Judge constantly employed, if my proposals as to vacation are adopted, and there are also the quarterly criminal assizes at Lagos, which deal with the crime of the whole Colony, and the assizes in the Yoruba Provinces, which often occupy a good deal of time.

As to Northern Nigeria there is not as yet, nor is it probable that for some time there will be, more business than can be dealt with at Assizes regularly held at Lokoja and at Zungeru, or some other central place. There remains the business of the full court, which I propose shall sit in Lagos only, not more than twice a year, for which sittings I think it will not be difficult to make

provision without dislocating the circuit arrangements, especially as assistance is, or may be, available from the Gold Coast in case of emergency.

While on the subject of the full court I should like to mention what I consider to be an anomaly in the present system, which will practically disappear if my proposals be adopted.

At present a large number of the appeals to the full court are appeals from decisions of the Chief Justice, sitting as a court of first instance, and the Chief Justice is *ex officio* President of the Court of Appeal, which cannot be constituted without him.

Moreover, the Court of Appeal is properly constituted if it consists of the Chief Justice and one other Judge. Owing to the number of acting appointments this procedure is not in practice as anomalous as it appears, but I submit that it is undesirable that it should continue.

My proposals are as follows:

1. There should be a three months' vacation. That is, I consider, desirable for several reasons. It would be fixed for the three rainy months (June, July, and August) during which travelling is unpleasant, if not dangerous, and it is extremely difficult to secure the attendance of witnesses, and therefore litigants are averse to entering causes for trial. As a matter of fact, experience shows that the business of the courts is much less heavy during the rainy season. I do not think that it would create any serious inconvenience to the public, as, of course, there would always be one vacation Judge available for matters of urgency, and it would give the members of the legal profession a welcome interlude, during which they could pay much closer attention to business other than litigation. It would further, as I submit, result in a very large saving of judicial time, as it would be possible, generally speaking, for all the Judges except one to take the greater part of their leave during the vacation, whereas at present only two-thirds of the time of each Judge is available for judicial duty.

2. One Judge should be stationed at Lagos for the trial of civil actions. He would at times perhaps be available for other work, *e.g.*, the Lagos or Yoruba Province Assizes, but he would ordinarily be employed on civil business only.

This would release the Chief Justice from the necessity of trying ordinary civil cases, and accordingly get rid of the difficulty of his dual position as a Divisional Court and as President of the Full Court.

3. The Chief Justice should be stationed ordinarily either at Lagos or at the headquarters of the Administration. He would take the Lagos and Yoruba Province Assizes, including Zungeru (or other Northern Nigeria centre), and he would also sit in the Full Court and continue, if Your Excellency desires it, either wholly or in part, the revision of the Provincial Court returns. He would at times, be available for other business, and he would, of course, have a general control of the sittings of the Court, and be able to make the necessary arrangements in case of emergency.

4. The whole territory should be divided for purposes of jurisdiction into two divisions or provinces:

- (a) The Western Province of Southern Nigeria and the whole of Northern Nigeria, except the Kabba Province and the country east of the Niger and south of the Benue;

- (b) The Central and Eastern Provinces of Southern Nigeria and that part of Northern Nigeria not included in (a).

5. Assizes should be held thrice yearly, and the circuits would be as follows:

- (a) Lagos, Abeokuta, Ibadan, Oyo, Zungeru (or other Northern Nigeria centre). This, as already stated, would generally be undertaken by the Chief Justice.
- (b) Calabar, Bonny, Degema, Opobo, Warri, Sapele, Onitsha, Lokoja. This circuit would require one Judge, but at times two might be available. The Assizes would commence on the 1st March, September, and December respectively, and the Judge of Assize would fix the dates for the various places immediately before the commencement of each circuit, having reference to the amount of work and the travelling facilities.

From the information which I have been able to obtain, I consider that three months is sufficient, though not excessive, for this circuit, having regard to the possibility of heavy cause lists and to the difficulty of arranging transport, but, should difficulties arise, it would probably be possible to give assistance; and it could generally be arranged that cases of great importance, or great length, should be heard by special courts, or in vacation time by the Vacation Judge, and not in the ordinary course of the assize work.

6. These arrangements will probably require the full available time of three Judges.

One additional Judge should be sufficient to provide for absence on leave, illness, the time required for sittings of the full Court and other eventualities, without except in entirely unforeseen circumstances, rendering necessary the appointment of an acting Judge, which it is, in my opinion, from every point of view, most desirable to avoid.

7. Whether or no this provision will suffice will depend largely upon the extent of the demands which will be made upon the time of the Supreme Court to assist or supplement the work of the Provincial Courts, which, again, will depend upon the degree to which litigation in which non-natives are concerned expands. Further provision can, however, be made at any time without interfering with the working of the system.

8. The present Judicial Staff of the Colony and two Protectorates consists of seven Judges (two Chief Justices and five Puisne Judges).

Under the system proposed, I am of opinion that a commencement can certainly be made with four, and that it will be a considerable time before the work will require a greater number than five.

I submit these proposals as the best method of securing—

- (1) the regular administration of justice throughout the jurisdiction;
- (2) the smallest possible judicial staff consistent with efficiency;
- (3) the greatest possible employment of judicial time available; and
- (4) the reduction to its smallest limits of the inconvenience resulting from the dual position of the Chief Justice as a Court of first instance and the only possible president of the Court of Appeal, and the consequent increased efficiency of the full Court.

Zungeru, 10th January, 1913.

E. A. SPEED,
Chief Justice.

APPENDIX V

LIST OF PRINCIPAL OFFICES, ACCORDING TO INITIAL RATES OF SALARY

<i>Office</i>	<i>Proposed Salary</i>	<i>Duty Pay</i>
2 Lieutenant-Governors	£2,000	£600 & £400
1 Administrator of Lagos	£1,500	£300
1 Chief Justice	£1,600	£320
1 Director of Railways and Works	£1,500 × 50–£1,800	£300
1 Attorney-General	£1,400	£280
1 Commandant	£1,200	£240
1 Director of Medical Service	£1,200	Ditto
1 General Manager, Nigeria Railway	£1,100 × 50–£1,300	£220
1 Director of Marine	£1,000 × 50–£1,200	£200
4 Puisne Judges	£1,000	Ditto
1 Chief Conservator of Forests	£1,000	Ditto
1 Comptroller of Customs	£900 × 25–£1,100	£180
1 Director, Public Works, Southern Nigeria	£900 × 25–£1,000	Ditto
1 Surveyor-General	Ditto	Ditto
2 Principal Medical Officers	Ditto	Ditto
2 Secretaries (Southern Nigeria and Central)	£800 × 25–£1,000	£160
8 1st Class Residents	Ditto	Ditto
1 Director, Public Works, Northern Nigeria	Ditto	Ditto
1 Chief Accountant, Nigeria Railway	Ditto	Ditto
1 Chief Engineer, Ditto	Ditto	Ditto
1 Locomotive Superintendent, Nigeria Railway	Ditto	Ditto
1 Political Secretary	£800 × 25–£900	Ditto
1 Assistant Commandant	£800	Ditto
1 Director, Research Institute	Ditto	—
1 Secretary, Northern Nigeria	£700 × 25–£900	£140
1 Postmaster-General in Chief	Ditto	Ditto
1 Inspector-General of Police, Southern Nigeria	Ditto	Ditto
1 Traffic Superintendent, Nigeria Railway	Ditto	Ditto
1 Treasurer, Southern Nigeria	£700 × 25–£800	Ditto
1 Treasurer, Northern Nigeria	Ditto	Ditto
2 Assistant Directors of Marine	Ditto	Ditto
1 Deputy Chief Conservator of Forests	Ditto	Ditto
2 Supervisors, Native Revenue	Ditto	Ditto
1 Principal Mineral Surveyor	£700	—
2 Lieutenant-Colonels of Battalions	Ditto	£140
2 Lieutenant-Colonels of Battalions	£650	£130
2 Senior Sanitary Officers	£600	£120

APPENDIX VI

SPECIAL REPORT ON POSTS AND TELEGRAPHS

Before leaving Nigeria I had received lengthy reports from the head of the combined Post and Telegraph Department of Northern Nigeria and separate

reports from the heads of the Postal and of the Telegraph Departments of Southern Nigeria, detailing their views as to the best method of dealing with these Departments on amalgamation.

Since their recommendations were somewhat conflicting and technical, I appointed a Committee, consisting of these three heads, under the chairmanship of Mr. Boyle, Colonial Secretary, to draw up a scheme, and I have lately received their report.

'There appear' (they say) 'to be three methods by which the objects in view might be accomplished:

'1. Two Postmaster-General with self-contained divisions as at present, corresponding with the Lieutenant-Governors only.

'2. A Director of Posts and Telegraphs with a Postmaster-General of each Division, no headquarter staff being allowed for, and each division being self-contained, the Director of Posts and Telegraphs being an inspecting and advising officer only.

'3. A joint Postmaster-General and Deputy Postmaster-General as working Heads of both Southern and Northern Nigeria with a headquarter staff, whose pay would be divided between the two divisions, correspondence being conducted with the Lieutenant-Governors by the Postmaster-General, or with the Secretary of the Central Department in questions concerning the Posts and Telegraphs as a whole but after the opinions of the Lieutenant-Governors had been obtained.

'The Committee then considered these proposals.

'It was unanimously decided that No. 3 would give the greatest efficiency and uniformity combined with economy.

'Number 1 appeared to lack the necessary head to enable uniformity, elasticity of staff, economy of stores, workshops, &c., and was therefore discarded. In the case of Number 2 the Committee, Mr. Lawson differing, considered that such a scheme would not lead to greater efficiency and would only lead to additional expense, inasmuch as it would create an office requiring a higher scale of salary than is at present existent, while no reduction not otherwise possible could be made owing to such an appointment. Mr. Lawson prefers suggestion 3, but differs with the other members of the Committee as to suggestion No. 2 on the ground that by the appointment of one of the Postmasters-General or Director of Telegraphs as the common head, there would be a distinct advantage in thereby securing uniformity, especially in the Telegraph Departments.

'There remained therefore suggestion 3, which the Committee unanimously agreed would be the best, and the Committee therefore proceed to discuss the Establishment necessary for it.'

Summarising their proposals, they are briefly as follows:

- (a) A Central Department consisting of a Director or Postmaster-General and Assistant, and a Chief Engineer with three Accountants and 37 Native Clerks, at a mean cost of £6,937.
- (b) A staff of 40 Europeans and 313 Native Clerks and Telegraphists at a total cost of £43,554, to be divided between the two Administrations.

The total cost of the personal emoluments, therefore, would stand at £50,491.

This compares with the existing staff as below.

A decrease of £6,683 is thus shown on the expenditure at present incurred, with an increase of 12 Native Clerks and a decrease of two Europeans (involving a further decrease in passages, &c.). The subordinate native staff other than Clerks, together with all 'Other charge' votes, are excluded for

		£				
Southern Nigeria Personal Emoluments	Postal Department	10,536	Europeans	6	Native Clerks, &c.	80
	Telegraph Department	25,725	Do.	23	Native Clerks, &c.	130
Northern Nigeria Personal Emolument	Post and Telegraphs	20,913	Do.	19	Native Clerks, &c.	127
		57,174	..	48	..	337
New Proposals	—	50,491	..	46	..	349
		-6,683	..	-2	..	+12

purposes of comparison. It is probable that some further savings can be effected later on. If the recommendations of the Committee are accepted the Postal and Telegraphs Departments of Northern and Southern Nigeria will be amalgamated as a 'Central Department' under a single Head (like the Marine and Customs) who, when on leave, will be replaced by the Assistant Postmaster-General. He would have the ordinary leave conditions like the Heads of the Departments named.

F. D. LUGARD.

DOCUMENT V

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S SPEECH AND HIS MAJESTY'S
TELEGRAM, AMALGAMATION DAY, 1 JANUARY 1914

A SPEECH BY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL (SIR F. LUGARD) ON THE OCCASION OF THE DECLARATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COLONY AND PROTECTORATE OF NIGERIA, JANUARY 1st, 1914

You are all aware that His Majesty's Government, after long and mature consideration, arrived some time ago at the conclusion that it would be to the great advantage of the countries known as Southern and Northern Nigeria that they should be amalgamated into one Government, conforming to one policy and mutually co-operating for the moral and material advancement of Nigeria as a whole.

This policy had been strongly advocated by Sir William Macgregor as Governor of Lagos, by Sir Ralph Moore as High Commissioner of Southern Nigeria, and by myself as High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria about ten years ago. It has continued to be advocated by Sir Walter Egerton and my successors in Northern Nigeria.

The construction of rival railways in Northern and Southern Nigeria accentuated the necessity of having a single railway policy, with a single administration, and over a year ago the Secretary of State decided that the time had come to give effect to the scheme of constituting a single Government for Nigeria.

Mr. Harcourt was pleased to select me to carry out this difficult task, and he appointed me in the first instance as Governor separately of the two distinct Governments of Northern and Southern Nigeria, with a view to informing myself of local conditions and submitting to him my proposals for Amalgamation.

I had the honour to submit those proposals for his consideration on May 9th last. They were accepted in all essentials, and to-day they are to take effect. I desire therefore as briefly as possible to describe to you, and through you to the official and unofficial community of Nigeria the basis on which this Amalgamation is to be carried out, and the principal changes which will result.

The Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria will be placed under the control of a single officer upon whom His Majesty has been pleased to confer the title of Governor-General, thus indicating the importance of this country among the Crown Colonies and Protectorates of the Empire. That portion which has hitherto been Northern Nigeria will be known in future as the Northern Provinces, while the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria will be known as the Southern Provinces of Nigeria; each will be under the immediate control of a Lieutenant-Governor responsible to the Governor-General. The Colony in view of its separate status and traditions will preserve a separate identity, under an Administrator of its own dealing direct with the Governor-General. For the present, the Central Headquarters will remain at

Lagos, and the Governor-General will divide his time between the Headquarter Stations of the Northern and the Southern Provinces.

His Majesty, through the Secretary of State, has been pleased to confer on me the high honour of appointment as Governor-General, and I humbly hope that I may be enabled to discharge the functions of this office, the great responsibilities of which I deeply appreciate, in such a manner as to deserve His Majesty's approval, and to the satisfaction and contentment of His Majesty's loyal subjects and of all the people of Nigeria. To succeed in such a task would be impossible unless I have the goodwill and co-operation of all classes, Official and Unofficial, irrespective of race or creed, and I take this opportunity of earnestly asking for that co-operation and loyal assistance, assuring you at the same time that, so far as in me lies, I shall not spare myself nor find any work too hard or arduous, if I can thereby advance the true interests of this country and of each individual person in it, whatever his race or creed, or however humble his rank.

For the high and responsible posts of Lieutenant-Governors of the Southern and Northern Provinces His Majesty has selected Mr. A. G. Boyle, C.M.G. and Mr. C. L. Temple, C.M.G., officers in whose loyalty and ability he has the highest confidence, and in whose hands the welfare of the Protectorate is assured. As Administrator of the Colony the Secretary of State has selected Mr. F. S. James, C.M.G., whose long experience in the South mark him out as the most fitting officer for the post. I may be permitted to offer to these officers my congratulations, and to express my deep satisfaction that I am privileged to work with them as my colleagues.

Various schemes for the dividing of Nigeria into many administrations have been put forward in the Press and elsewhere, but it has been considered advisable to retain the old and well-known boundaries, at any rate for the present and until circumstances demand a change, more especially because the Northern and Southern Provinces are at present under two different sets of laws, the unification of which must necessarily be a task of magnitude which will take time to effect.

I had hoped to be able to recommend to the Secretary of State some scheme for a Legislative Council of Nigeria, but at present and until communications by railway are greatly extended the proposition is physically impossible. The Legislative Council of Nigeria, if it is to represent the public opinion of Nigeria, must draw its Unofficial Members alike from Calabar and Lagos in the South, and from the Minefields and Kano in the North. To no place, however central, could the busy merchants and others find time to come in order to attend the Council's Meetings. It would be manifestly unjust to place the Mohammedan Emirates of the North and the Mining interests on the Bauchi plateau under a Council sitting on the Coast, in which they could have no representation. The only alternative is that of the Legislative Council of the Colony.

And let me here remind you of the enormous extent of Nigeria. Its area comprises over 330,000 square miles—more than 5 times the size of England and Scotland, or one-third the size of British India. The European population is scattered over this area. The largest community is probably at the Minefields in the Bauchi Province, the next largest at Lagos nearly 1,000 miles distant. There are other centres widely separated from each other at Calabar and other Coast towns, at Zungeru and at Kano, while the Niger Company

which has the largest capital of any single firm, has its headquarters at Burutu.

Other means than a single Legislative Council must therefore be sought by which, on the one hand, not only local public opinion but also the opinion of the Principals of the Commercial and Mining Firms, and of other Institutions, which have interests in this country, may be given an opportunity of expressing itself, and, on the other hand, that the officers of the ripest experience and the most proved ability may be consulted regarding proposed Legislation and on affairs of moment. To effect these objects the Secretary of State has approved *firstly* of an Executive Council for Nigeria which shall consist of the senior officers of the whole Administration, *secondly* of a deliberative and advisory Council, to be called the Nigerian Council, which shall meet not less often than once a year, and *thirdly* that all proposed Ordinances with a few necessary exceptions shall be published in the Gazette for two months prior to enactment, so that opinion may be freely expressed before a law is enacted.

The Members of the Executive Council named in the Royal Instructions are:

The Lieutenant-Governors of the Southern and Northern Provinces, the Administrator of the Colony, the Attorney-General, the Director of Railways and Works, the Commandant of the Troops, the Director of Medical Services, the Treasurer, the Director of Marine and the Comptroller of Customs.

The Official Members of the Nigerian Council will include the Members of the Executive Council and all 1st Class Residents or Commissioners, the Central Secretary, the Secretaries in the Northern and Southern Provinces and the Political Secretary. The Unofficial Members will include a member of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce and of any Chamber of Commerce which may be established in Calabar, and a Member of the Local Chamber of Mines—all resident in Nigeria and to be nominated by those bodies together with four additional Europeans and six Native gentlemen nominated by the Governor-General. The former to be representative of Commerce, Shipping, Mining and Banking, the latter to be representative of the Native population both of the Coast and of the Interior.

The Official Membership of the Legislative Council of the Colony has been somewhat altered by the new Royal Instructions, in order that those officers whose work is especially concerned with the Colony may take part in its deliberations. They will for the present be the Administrator, the Legal Adviser, the Municipal Engineer, the Senior Municipality Sanitary Officer, the Assistant Treasurer, the Harbour Master, the Commissioner of Lands and the Commercial Intelligence Officer.

The Unofficial Members of the old Council have been re-appointed by His Majesty to the new Council with the exception of Mr. Miller and Dr. Johnson who have resigned, and whose places have not yet been filled.

All three Councils will be presided over by the Governor-General.

Southern Nigeria was, as you know, divided into three provinces, the Eastern, Central and Western, each under a Provincial Commissioner. In future the Southern Provinces will be nine in number, each of the old Provinces being divided into three. Each Province will be under a Commissioner or Resident assisted by an adequate staff. Departmental officers will be directly under the Head of their own Department.

I come now to the Judiciary, concerning which there has, I think, been some misapprehension. It was recognised alike by my predecessor and by the Chief Justice that the extension of Supreme Court jurisdiction into the Interior was inadvisable, and, before I came to Nigeria, steps had already been taken to curtail its jurisdiction. Schemes were already under consideration for the creation of separate Courts in the Interior districts. These schemes have now matured.

It is obvious that there can only be one Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, and for this high office the Secretary of State has selected Sir Edwin Speed, who has experience in both Northern and Southern Nigeria and has been much longer in Nigeria than his colleague Mr. Willoughby Osborne, It gives me great regret that, by force of circumstances, the country will lose the valuable services and ripe experience of Mr. Willoughby Osborne, and I am aware of the high estimation in which his services are held both here and at home. In saying good-bye to Nigeria he will have the satisfaction of feeling that he has discharged the functions of his high office with distinguished success. To His Honour Chief Justice Sir Edwin Speed I tender my congratulations on his appointment and I am confident that, while he holds his high office, the proud traditions of British Justice will ever be worthily maintained.

The curtailment of the territorial jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the creation of Provincial Courts necessitates some changes in the existing law, and I am indebted to Sir Edwin Speed for the drafts of the new Ordinances which, with slight and unimportant alterations, will be enacted to give effect to his proposals. They will involve for the present some diminution in the powers of the Native Courts, but it is my earnest desire to see those Courts advance in ability and to maintain their prestige under purely Native Judges guided and supervised by the Commissioners of Provinces.

The scheme of Assizes and the method of conducting the business of the Supreme Court are in accordance with the proposals of the new Chief Justice. In future there will be a Court vacation for four months during the rains, and for the remainder of the year the Court will be in Session with its full complement of one Chief Justice and three or more Puisne Judges. The powers of the Provincial Courts are strictly limited, and no sentence of over six months' imprisonment is operative until it has been confirmed. A Magistracy, whose officers are Commissioners of the Supreme Court, is set up for the Northern and Southern Provinces.

In the sphere of Departmental Administration there are some changes of interest. The Railway, Marine and Customs Departments have already, as you are aware, been centralised as common to both Southern and Northern Nigeria. They remain outside the local administration of the Northern and Southern Provinces. In addition to these three departments the Judicial, the Military, the Treasury and the 'Posts and Telegraphs' become Central Departments. The Military Forces are organised into one Regiment with five Battalions and two Batteries under Colonel Carter, C.B., C.M.G., as Commandant, with Lieut.-Colonel Cunliffe as Assistant Commandant. Mr. Dale takes charge of the Treasury, and Mr. Somerville of the Posts and Telegraphs. A Director of the Medical Service and an Attorney General will act as Advisers to the Governor-General in their respective Departments. In the former case the Medical Departments of the Northern and Southern Provinces will remain distinct, while two legal Advisers will assist the Lieutenant-Governors

who, with the Administrator of the Colony, will have separate Secretariats for the discharge of local business. Mr. Cameron becomes the Secretary for the Central Administration, Major Moorhouse for the Southern and Mr. Matthews for the Northern Provinces.

His Majesty the King has been pleased to approve of a new Badge for the flag of United Nigeria and of a new Seal. In future there will be only one Official Gazette.

This, in brief outline, is the scheme of Amalgamation which takes effect to-day. The Gazette Extraordinary published this afternoon will to a large extent fill in the details. It is impossible that any scheme which could have been devised should satisfy all the conflicting theories which have been propounded. The proposals I have made have the merit of simplicity. They cause no great dislocation, which would have been most disadvantageous at a moment of transition when divergent policies and methods have to be reconciled.

I take this opportunity of publicly informing you that the Secretary of State has approved the construction of a new railway, which, starting from the head of the Bonny estuary, will run northwards across the Benue river and join the Lagos Kano Railway where it crosses the Kaduna river some 50 miles south of Zaria. This important work will, I am convinced, enormously add to the wealth and prosperity of Nigeria.

Already the benefits of the partial Amalgamation, which has been in operation for the past year, have resulted in increased prosperity. The estimated Revenue of 1914 is almost exactly a million sterling greater than the estimated Revenue for 1912. When my predecessor from this chair in 1906 announced the Amalgamation of Southern Nigeria and Lagos he stated that the Revenue of Southern Nigeria was just over a million. The estimated Revenue of Nigeria this year stands at $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions, and Trade has increased from 5 millions to nearly 15 millions in this period of under 8 years.

If we remember that it is only fourteen years to-day since the King's Government assumed control of the greater part of the Interior from the Royal Niger Company, the progress which has been made is astonishing.

In maintaining and increasing that progress I look to the co-operation of the European and Native races, who must work together for the good of the country. It is and always has been my policy to support the Native Chiefs, and to work through them. I have not invited any of them from the Interior to be present here because the announcement of the new changes which take place to-day is being made in the capitals of the various Provinces throughout Nigeria.

To-day Nigeria enters on a new stage of its progress, and we all join in the earnest hope that the era now inaugurated will prove, not only a new departure in material prosperity, but also that the coming years will increase the individual happiness and freedom from oppression and raise the standard of civilisation and of comfort of the many millions who inhabit this large country. To these sole ends the efforts of my colleagues and myself, with God's help, will be devoted.

F. D. LUGARD.

UNITED NIGERIA
HIS MAJESTY'S TELEGRAM TO THE GOVERNOR

OFFICIAL TELEGRAMS

His Majesty the King on December 30 sent the following message, through the Colonial Office, to Sir Frederick Lugard, Governor-General of Nigeria:

On the occasion of the formal amalgamation of the two Nigerias I wish you to convey to the emirs, chiefs, and all the inhabitants of the new Protectorate and the Colony my best wishes for their future happiness. Pray assure them of the great interest I take in all that concerns their welfare and express my earnest hope that great prosperity may be in store for them.—GEORGE R.I.

The following reply from Sir Frederick Lugard was received by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on January 1:

'On behalf of his Majesty's most loyal devoted subjects within the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria and all the inhabitants of Nigeria who live under his Majesty's protection, to all of whom I have taken steps to convey his Majesty's most gracious message, I humbly offer my own and their most heartfelt thanks for his Majesty's wishes for their future happiness and his interest in their welfare and hopes for their prosperity. We all feel deeply this new evidence of his Majesty's ceaseless thought for his peoples and his oversea possessions, and I pray you to assure his Majesty of our abiding loyalty to his Throne and person and of our deep gratitude for his most gracious message on the occasion of the formal amalgamation of the two Nigerias.'

Mr. Harcourt also sent the following telegram:

'I offer you my congratulations on the completion of your arduous task of uniting Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria in a common form of government, and I trust that the new Administration now established may actively promote the well-being of all classes of the inhabitants of Nigeria and the development of its great resources.'

To this Sir Frederick Lugard replied:

'I have caused your message conveying your hope that amalgamation Nigeria will be for the well-being of all classes and the development of its resources to be promulgated throughout Nigeria. It will give utmost satisfaction pleasure on behalf of the inhabitants of the country respectfully tender our most sincere thanks. I am deeply sensible of your kind congratulations to be personally.*'

* Reprinted by permission of *The Times*, 3 January, 1914.

DOCUMENT VI

THE NIGERIAN PRESS AND AMALGAMATION, 1919

The Lagos Weekly Record

Lagos, February 1-22, 1919

THE RETIREMENT OF SIR FREDERICK LUGARD

THE news of the retirement of Sir Frederick Lugard from the Governor-Generalship of Nigeria, which was flashed down by Reuters during the latter part of January, has been received with great joy and gladness by the loyal natives of Nigeria. So overwhelming is the people's emotion that almost in every nook and corner but chiefly in the inmost recesses of their hearts they have offered and continue to offer day by day some silent prayer to the God of the Negro for his tender mercies in delivering his dusky children from the baneful effects of an inglorious administration which constitutes not only a standing disgrace to the cherished traditions of British colonial policy in West Africa but is also a positive libel upon the accepted principles of British culture.

Sir Frederick has earned the notorious distinction of being the originator of a system of government—the product of his exuberant imagination—entitled the *Nigerian System*. That system has in the pregnant words of ex-Judge Stocker been described as 'a set back to a condition of things resembling the barbarous ages'.

To the natives of Nigeria in particular and of West Africa in general the 'Nigerian System' is the most infernal system that has even been devised since the days of the Spanish Inquisition for the express purpose of humiliating and depressing the units of any loyal and progressive community. Its nefarious laws and ordinances read like the weird contents of some musty-fusty documents unearthed in far off Cathay.

Its 25 lashes, its public floggings of general offenders stripped naked in the public markets, its maintenance of so called 'white prestige' at all costs, its subjection of the Judiciary to the Executive, and its obnoxious Criminal Code bespeak an administrative system which is the exact prototype of German Kultur in Africa and is in diametrical opposition to the traditionary principles of British justice and fairplay.

Its abhorrence of legal practitioners and denial to natives of the principles and procedure of British Courts of Justice; its judicial folly in investing District Commissioners—whose innocence of English law and practice has been officially and naively admitted in an apologetic memorandum by the retired Chief Justice of Nigeria—with powers of life and death in the provinces over natives of whatever standing without any trial by jury or the right of retaining counsel—powers that are denied even to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria; its detestation of educated natives as the *bete*

noire that haunts its political and autocratic dreams *per diem et per noctem* and their shabby treatment as the convenient scapegoats of official blunders and misrule, and its manifestly provocative and harsh rules and regulations breathe undeniably the spirit and atmosphere of the barrack rooms.

There can be no question that as the conquering hero of punitive expeditions, the widener of imperial outposts by means of the sword, and as the High Commissioner of newly conquered territories subject to military control, Sir Frederick has had a distinguished career and has been amply decorated by the Imperial Government. But on the other hand as the administrator of progressive African communities, we regret we cannot help but write Sir Frederick down as a Huge Failure. Judged by the light of the modern conscience in its treatment of subject races, Sir Frederick is a hopeless anachronism; so hopeless indeed that as the product of a bygone age, cast upon a time that would not understand him, yet he persisted in his fitful attempts to force the new wine of the law of social expansion for subject races—the inspiring ideals of twentieth century civilisation—into the old bottles of military subjugation, domination and terrorism, with the result that the old bottles have invariably been burst and riots and massacres have become rampant. Thus it is that Hong Kong in China and Lagos in Nigeria—centres of light and leading amongst their respective native communities—have proved, one after the other, the effective graves of his autocratic and militarist ambitions.

The victim of exaggerated personality, induced by the autocratic power conferred upon him through the indiscretion of a Lewis Harcourt—the highest constitutional power ever wielded in the British Empire by a single Executive Officer, denied almost to the King Emperor and unparalleled since the days of the Sullanian constitution—Sir Frederick lived in a world by himself. So high was he in the clouds that he saw very little of the people he was called upon to govern; and divorced as he was from their local sympathies and liberal aspirations, Sir Frederick, as far as the people were concerned, might as well have been in Kamchatka or the South Pole save that his undesirable presence in Nigeria was invariably heralded by those harsh and repressive laws whereby he sought to misgovern the people and wherein they were able to discern the peculiar workings of his mind. Even to the Civil Staff—both European and Native—that rendered yeoman service during the critical period of the Empire's existence, Sir Frederick endeavoured to invest himself with the sanctity and aloofness of a *Mahatma*. Opinionated, unswerving from a purpose if even it be irrational when it was once formed, and brooking no interference with his imperious will—for, like a true autocrat, his will was his law—Sir Frederick flagrantly disregarded the sage advice of those who were in sympathetic touch with the natives and paid the greatest courtesy to those satellites who to gain their own insidious ends, flattered his reactionary schemes and wild ambitions, with the result that he found himself enmeshed in a series of blunders and violent misrule which constitute the indelible stains of his inglorious administration; and yet it is this loyal band of officials who have prevented the framework of his administration from tumbling down like a pack of cards; who by their sympathetic treatment of the natives have reflected the best traditions of British imperial rule and have remained a pillar of hope and tower of strength to the natives, encouraging them in their unswerving devotion to the King-Emperor and to the Empire in general; and who by their personality and exemplary sacrifice—which seemed to have met

with scant reward from Sir Frederick—have prevented the red flag of rebellion from being waved throughout the length and breadth of Nigeria as a protest against the barbarous rule of the Nigerian system, and have witnessed with meek submission the constructive work of previous administrations dashed to the ground by the infatuation and impetuosity of the Head of the Executive. Need there be any wonder, if Dame Rumour be true, that the Nigerian Civil Service has been and is at present the most dissatisfied of the West African Services? To that silent band of officials who in the inmost recesses of their hearts and in the secluded atmosphere of their offices have conscientiously discharged their imperial duties in consonance with the traditionary principles of British justice and fairplay we tender our congratulations and best wishes for the advent of a more liberal administrator who would be able to utilise to the full their undoubted abilities and manifold experience.

Obsessed by two manias—the segregation fad and the *furor faciendi leges*—Sir Frederick, by means of the one, consciously or unconsciously endeavoured to intensify in the Colony and Southern Provinces racial antipathies between Blacks and Whites which had never been suspected nor dreamt of during the palmy days of the old Colony of Lagos and subsequently of the Colony of Southern Nigeria, especially as both sections of the community had formerly lived and traded together under the best terms of friendship and mutual comradeship; whilst by means of the other, a multiplicity of laws which may be classified as bad and indifferent and are distinguished more for their repressiveness and brutality rather than for their juridical lore and enlightened statesmanship and the absurdity of which has earned the derision and contempt of enlightened humanity. Sir Frederick has also won for Nigeria the unenviable distinction of being the greatest Ordinance-ridden Colony within the British Empire. So bewildering and amazing are the laws that it is almost impossible for even the law officers to know at any particular moment the exact law on any particular point; for at that very moment the Head of the Executive may be passing an amending Order in Council of that particular law in sweet forgetfulness of the Legislative Council. The constant tinkering with and almost daily amendments of the Nigerian laws prove the inherent defect of the system. Judged by its hapless record in the Colony and Provinces, the Nigerian System may be described as a perfect crime of clumsiness reflecting a pitiful aspect of woe.

The three basic principles necessary for the successful working of the Nigerian System are Ignorance, Fear and Military terrorism; that is to say, the perpetuation of the natives in a state of idolised ignorance, the impregnation of their minds with an instinctive dread of the White man and reverential awe for the fetish of *white prestige* and the paralysation of their wills by the spectacle of Military terrorism hanging over their heads like a sword of Damocles. The crass ignorance prevailing in the Northern Provinces; the farcical show and studied mockery of the much-vaunted Nassarawa Schools which constitute a libel upon and a shocking disgrace to any decent educational or technical system; the ghostly respect paid to the ordinary *bature* (whiteman)—much more to talk of the *baban bature*—and exacted by *zarkings** and compulsory salutations; the summary jurisdiction of the Provincial

* A misrendering of *zāki*, 'lion' a popular form of salutation in the Hausa-speaking areas.—(Ed. 1968).

Courts even in capital offences without the right of defence by counsel and trial by Jury—all these eloquently bespeak the methods of German Kultur in Africa and of the barrack-room. Living in constant dread of a *jehad*, or holy war, Sir Frederick in order to restrain the cupidity of the Emirs, and curb their restless spirit or love of adventure from breaking forth into rapine and plunder, practically charmed them into submission with the sop of princely salaries and with the allocation of 50% of the native treasury funds—derived chiefly from direct taxation—in such a manner as to create a distinction without a difference between their private and public funds; whilst he humoured their vanity and love of display by the plausible fiction of Indirect Rule since the real authority lay in the hands of the British Residents. The gaiety and external splendour of the regal courts of the Emirs, though superimposed upon a social stratum of abject woe and misery among the masses, fired Sir Frederick's oriental imagination, exalted as he was to the position of a demi-god by the zarkings of the Emirs to him in public. But Sir Frederick forgot that by postulating the success of his system upon the demonstration of Force, the instillation of Fear and the fascination of a mercenary bait, he was practically leaning upon a broken reed; for already the schoolmaster is abroad and the rapidity and subtlety with which liberal influences are absorbed by any given community through contact not only baffle research but also escape detection. For the communication of thought, New York is nearer to Lagos today than Lagos was to Ibadan some 20 years ago; whilst the daily occurrences in such remote places as Japan and Australia are discussed with accuracy and ease the following morning in West Africa, simply because the world is linked together by thought, and distances have been annihilated. When in the fulness of time the natives of the Northern Provinces, in spite of Sir Frederick's preventive policy, shall taste of the fruit of the tree of knowledge and, as the wisdom of the serpent hath represented, they shall be 'as gods knowing good and evil' (*Sicut dii scientes bona et mala*); when the bogey or fetish of white prestige shall with increased knowledge among the masses die a natural death, then shall it be a sorry day for Sir Frederick's repressive policy, and the very evil which he has so long dreaded shall be reduced to a political certainty by those very methods which he had devised for its prevention. Let us hope that in the interim wiser and more liberal policies shall intervene to prevent the occurrence of such a huge catastrophe as the volcanic eruption of a *Jehad* or holy war in the Northern Provinces.

In the light of the foregoing, it was quite natural that Sir Frederick's policy should meet with such lamentable and disastrous failure in the Colony and Southern Provinces; for through the liberal and sympathetic policy of previous administrations the darkness of ignorance had been dispelled by the erection of secondary schools as centres for the dissemination of knowledge; and their wonderful product—the Educated native—had been evolved in the normal course of events as the repository of the liberal and national aspirations of the people and the doughty champion of Right, Liberty and Justice. Through his mighty exertions, the Native Press—that struggling institution in West Africa—was called into existence as the vehicle of thought for giving articulate expression to the sentiments of the people and for ventilating their grievances under the Crown Colony system of government.

True to his disposition, Sir Frederick loathed the Educated Native and lived

in constant dread of the Native Press, which at every turn foreshadowed his sinister movements, and he seemed to be blinded and confused by the intense glare of its searchlight criticisms invariably supported by a logic which is equally pitiless and irrefragible. The contests between Sir Frederick, the Educated Native and the Native Press over his manifold administrative schemes were intellectual contests, pure and simple; and in every such encounter the honours remained with the Educated Native and the Native Press; for Sir Frederick was hopelessly out of date, and it was quite easy to knock the bottom out of any political or administrative scheme deriving its solitary sanction from the dictum of *my will is my law* and the autocratic power conferred by the indiscretion of a Secretary of State for the Colonies. Again the bogey of *white prestige* had been given a decent burial ever since the early days of the old Colony and Protectorate of Lagos and any latent or induced fear of the whiteman was confined only to babes and sucklings. To crown it all, the people had for over sixty years been reared under the traditional principles of British Justice and fairplay, and had been living as respectable members of a decent and well ordered community with all the external indications and paraphernalia of modern progress. The wealth, intelligence and social independence of the educated natives galled Sir Frederick to the very bone. The very atmosphere proved uncongenial to his autocratic bearings and the flights of his oriental imagination. To descend from the intoxicating air of a demi-god in the Northern Provinces to the level of *the first member in the community* in the Colony and Southern Provinces was more than enough for Sir Frederick's kidney and he therefore determined upon a drastic change of affairs.

In order to wreak his vengeance upon the educated native, Sir Frederick began to set back the hand of the clock of progress by lowering the standard of education in the colony. King's College, which was founded by Sir Walter Egerton with the ambitious intention of preparing its students for complete graduation in London University, degenerated into a secondary school of the old regime. So deplorable was the state of affairs that many capable teachers of the old regime threw up their appointments in the Assisted Schools and started private schools of their own merely for the express purpose of maintaining the efficiency of the old regime. It is a sad commentary upon Sir Frederick's educational system that it has not been able to produce one capable native either in the Civil Service or elsewhere. All the prominent and distinguished natives in the service or elsewhere were products of the old regime.

Next, Sir Frederick introduced his revolutionary changes in the Judicial System which has been bitterly criticised on all sides, and with the Provincial Courts Ordinance, the Criminal Code and the Newspaper Ordinance, he attempted to break the backs of the educated natives and muzzle up the Native Press. But the educated natives, fighting for their very existence in defence of their sacred rights and privileges and in defence of their country and people, cheerfully entered the lists against Sir Frederick. Being adepts in organised publicity, they brought home to the conscience of the British Nation the dangers that would arise out of the successful prosecution of Sir Frederick's policy, since it would entail not only the social and economic enslavement of the natives but also the legal swindling and confiscation of their inherent and inalienable rights to their ancestral lands. Such gross injustice

and un-British principles could have but one natural result and that is the gradual weaning away of the hearts and affections of the natives from the folds of the British Empire. The conscience of the British Nation, always alive to its vital interests, caught up the plaintive cry of the educated natives and looked with great disfavour upon Sir Frederick's reactionary schemes who, unable to cope with the trenchant arguments of the educated natives, merely poured the vials of his wrath upon their heads and represented them as the scapegoats of official blunders and misrule. They, on the other hand, took up the gauntlet and directly challenged Sir Frederick to substantiate an iota of the charges levelled against them but Sir Frederick failed to satisfy even this one request; just as the insistent demands of the educated natives for the publication of the Report of the Commissioners over the Ijemo and Itori massacres have also remained unsatisfied. Sir Frederick in order to complete his nefarious schemes whittled down the area of the Colony to its most insignificant limits so that with the consequential widening of the area of the Protectorate he might be able to legislate solely and singly without the advice and consent of the Legislative Council and administrate without the paraphernalia of British Courts of Justice so that in the end the militaristic principles of the Provincial system may enjoy undisputed sway. Sir Frederick has indeed performed a miraculous achievement; for within the short space of 4 years he has transformed the proverbial loyalty of a liberty-loving people into a hot-bed of disaffection and has been responsible for more massacres and riots than those of previous administrations.

Our distinguished contemporary, *West Africa*, discussing the retirement of Sir Frederick, ominously observed in its issue of January 18, that as regards 'a communique issued by the Colonial Office to the London Press, various comments were made. That none are worth reproducing, because none has the least justice either to the man or the country.' This naive admission testifies to the efficacy of the propaganda of the organised forces of publicity in West African affairs and proves conclusively that the conscience of the British Nation—the greatest asset of the subject races of the Empire—has been roused to its keen sense of justice and to the assertion of those principles of political righteousness by which the Empire has attained to its present limits. But the organised forces of publicity in West African affairs are not going to rest merely at this point but intend to impart a world-wide character to their propaganda in order that it may serve as a warning-note to the custodians of the arcanum of British imperial policy.

Today on the chessboard of imperial politics the question of questions with all loyal natives is whether Great Britain is definitely pledged to the maintenance of her former humanitarian and sympathetic policy in West Africa, or whether her future policy is to derive its sanction from the Nigerian System. If the former, she can, to her heart's content, count upon the well-tryed loyalty of her African subjects but if the latter, then the natives will be compelled to claim the right of self-determination before the League of Nations. We for our own part know for certain that the British public will not tolerate for a second the muddled state of affairs in Nigeria as soon as 'the whole truth and nothing but the truth' is placed before them.

Lastly, as far as the natives of Nigeria are concerned and the Mercantile community whose hostility Sir Frederick has unduly and most unwisely excited; yea moreover, as far as even the Civil Service—both Europeans and

Natives— is concerned, Sir Frederick departs from the stage of West African activities 'unwept, unhonoured and unsung'. Let us hope he will be the last of military governors to disgrace the annals of British Colonial history in West Africa. His name will undoubtedly be handed down to posterity not with such cheerfulness as the memory of a John Glover, Gilbert Carter, William Macgregor or Hugh Clifford, to mention a few random names, but with the bitterness of a Samuel Rowe, Frederick Cardew, Macallum, Hodgson, or Sir Merryweather; and bitterer than any of these as the man who came within an ace of weaning the affections of the natives away from the folds of the British Empire; for had Armageddon been postponed for another five years and Sir Frederick's scheme given full and unrestricted play it would have been difficult to predict the same degree of loyalty manifested by the natives during the most critical period of the Empire's existence.

In conclusion, let us hope that with the departure of Sir Frederick, the *Nigerian System*—the product of his exuberant imagination—will be consigned to the limbo of oblivion where embedded in the historical strata of British imperial colonisation it will exist as the fossilated remains of an administrative experimental failure. *Dii nostras preces secudent!*

The Lagos Weekly Record

Lagos, June 14, 1919

THE NEW GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF NIGERIA

THE official announcement of the appointment of Sir Hugh Clifford to the governor-generalship of Nigeria has *pro tempore* given immense satisfaction to the teeming millions of Nigeria. We say *pro tempore* advisedly; for anything which will afford any degree of relief—however brief or temporary—from the blighting effects of Sir Frederick Lugard's nefarious administration will be gladly welcomed by all loyal Nigerians, a salient fact which bears eloquent testimony to the feeling of abhorrence generated in the minds of the people against Sir Frederick's mischievous rule.

Rightly or wrongly, Lagos has always enjoyed the proud distinction of being 'the storm-centre of administrative politics and the grave of reputations'; and it is simply because we do not wish Sir Hugh Clifford to tarnish his already golden reputation in his new sphere of administration that we have thought it fit to sound the warning note against the manifold dangers that may be lurking in his pathway, for 'to be forewarned is to be forearmed'.

It is satisfactory to observe that Sir Hugh Clifford's fame has preceded his arrival on these shores and that the brilliant record he has been able to achieve on the Gold Coast—a golden record in Crown Colony administration—has not only won our admiration and respect but has also, through an irresistible charm, compelled us to give a wide-spread publicity thereto, partly in our own columns and partly in a section of the London Press.

As a matter of fact we have practically sighed and prayed for his advent in Nigeria in order to cleanse the Augean stable of Sir Frederick Lugard's policy of mess and muddle; and as that earnest prayer is about to be answered by Sir Hugh Clifford's appointment to the governor-generalship of Nigeria we are on the tiptoe of expectation as to what will be the main lines of his policy. We may assure him that the greatest stumbling block to his liberal policy and the *bete noire* of his political dreams will be that mischievous and dangerous legacy known as the *Nigerian System* and bequeathed by Sir Frederick's woeful administration. We may say, frankly, that upon Sir Hugh Clifford's attitude towards the Nigerian system will depend his future success or failure in Nigeria. If he elects to scrap the Nigerian system and start upon a clean sheet so as to give full play to his liberal policy he may count upon our unqualified support and that of all loyal natives in Nigeria, for, during last month, we have had the opportunity of paying a flying visit to the Gold Coast and have been able to witness the good works of his constructive policy and we are confident that he can obtain better and greater results in Nigeria if only he does start on a clean slate.

If, on the other hand, he decides to perpetuate the evils of the Nigerian system, then he will excite the determined opposition of the people which will

be more vehement than under Sir Frederick's regime; because while it may be argued that Sir Frederick was toying with a dangerous experiment, in Sir Hugh Clifford's case, it may be urged that he has before him indelible records of such a disastrous policy which has proved not only the grave of Sir Frederick's reputation in Nigeria but has sent a wave of protests throughout all West Africa and has almost weaned the affections of the natives away from the folds of the British Empire; and in the constitutional warfare that shall be waged against the Nigerian System we shall not hesitate to fire the first skirmishing shots in the organs of publicity both of West Africa and London; for against that infernal system, we have, like Hamilcar Barca, sworn eternal hatred on the smoking altars of our ancestral gods.

With us, there can be no two opinions as regards the unspeakable barbarities of the Nigerian System. It is not a theory to be discussed but a concrete evil to be eradicated. It should be fought, tooth and nail, as one of the forces of darkness; for it is a sort of Bolshie menace to good Government, having been responsible for more massacres and riots than any other system in Nigeria during the last 30 years and since it has a peculiar tendency of inciting loyal and respectable citizens to a committal of a breach of the peace.

Therefore every constitutional effort directed against the nullification of the Nigerian System is a consecrated duty, a moral duty and a national duty. The thoughts, deeds and words of every loyal native should, with a sort of Catonian acerbity, be coloured by a single idea, namely, that of *Delenda est Nigeriana Systema*. For Herbert Spencer has long demonstrated that resistance to oppression is not only justifiable but necessary; and that non-resistance is not only immoral but also inimical to altruism.

Political and constitutional writers have also reminded us that 'legislation must always aim at the attainment of at least two different ends, which though both of importance, are entirely distinct from one another. One of these ends is the passing or the maintaining of good or wise laws, that is laws which if carried out would really promote the happiness or welfare of a given country and therefore which are desirable in themselves and are in conformity with the nature of things. The second of these two different ends is to ensure that no law shall be passed or maintained in a given country which is condemned by the public opinion of the people'; and furthermore that 'a law utterly opposed to the wishes and feelings entertained by the inhabitants of a country, a rule which every one dislikes and no one will obey, is a nullity, or in truth no law at all; and, even in cases where, owing to the power of the monarch who enacts a law opposed to the wishes of his subjects, such a law can to a certain extent be enforced, the evils of the enforcement may far overbalance the good effects of legislation in itself wise.'

Having exposed the dangers inherent in the Nigerian System and having vividly portrayed the degree of abhorrence it has induced in the minds of the natives, we feel justified in initiating a righteous and holy crusade in favour of its immediate abolition and final effacement from the historical and political annals of Nigeria as a standing disgrace to British ideas of culture and a gross libel upon the traditionary principles of British justice and fairplay; and in order to win the hearts and confidence of the people of Nigeria, whose loyalty—particularly those of the Southern Provinces—has always been proverbial, the first constitutional acts of Sir Hugh Clifford must necessarily

comprise the following important changes which are impatient of immediate introduction:

(1) The removal of the Judiciary from the control of the Executive.

(2) The complete jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the Colony and provinces with the rights of automatic appeal in civil and criminal cases from all the courts provincial or otherwise.

(3) The admission of barristers and legal practitioners to all the courts of the Colony and Province in civil and criminal cases.

(4) The decent burial of the Criminal Code and the immediate return to the principles and practice of the Criminal Law of England.

(5) The rehabilitation of the right of the Legislative Council to legislate for Colony and Protectorate and to the control of Estimates and Expenditure with the consequent re-organisation of the present Council which is nothing short of a glorified municipal board and a recording machine of the governor's sweet will.

(6) An increase in the number of native unofficial members and the introduction of a liberal constitution with a view to gradual representation.

(7) The extinction of the Nigerian Council which is as useless as the fifth wheel of a coach.

(8) The sweeping away of the Provincial System whereby a District Officer wields in the Provinces the power of life and death over any native whatever his education or standing without any trial by jury or without the right of direct appeal to the Supreme Court, a power denied to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; and the abolition of the reign of terrorism at Ibadan, Iseyin, Oyo and other parts of Yorubaland which has been in vogue ever since the days of the Lugard regime.

(9) The rectification and scientific adjustment of provincial boundaries in consonance with the wishes and historical traditions of the communities affected which have proved a fertile source of discontent and tribal outbreaks.

(10) The abolition in the Southern provinces of the Northern Nigerian method of direct taxation which has been found to be so distasteful to the people of Yorubaland and the cause of many riots and massacres.

(11) The clearing up of the Abeokuta muddle, the publication of the Reports of the Commissioners on both the Ijemo massacres and Itori riots, and the permanent removal of Mr. Edun, apparently disliked by the Egbas, from every phase of Egba politics whether as a service man, adviser or what not.

(12) The re-grading of the Civil Service of Nigeria—both European and Native; the concession of liberal emoluments based upon the present high cost of living; the institution of a policy of promotion by merit and not necessarily by favouritism; the admission of natives to the higher plums of the service and the removal by retirement or transfer to other colonies of political officers who are wedded to the Nigerian System and who will still continue to inject the poison of that system into Civil Service regulations and administrative methods and thus ensure the fatal collapse of Sir Hugh Clifford's policy of liberalism.

(13) The neutralisation of the nefarious principle derived from the gross fiction of 'legalising the rights of the natives to the occupancy of the soil' by which natives are being swindled out of their immemorial rights to their ancestral lands, and by which any native who happens to be born in one district is regarded as a foreigner in another district and is in consequence thereof precluded from owning land in that particular district simply because he was not born there; that is to say, a Liverpool man cannot own land in London nor a Manchester man in Liverpool nor a Leyton man in Bayswater.

(14) A network of Motor Roads to the principal agricultural and industrial towns as on the Gold Coast and which will act as important feeders to the railway by relieving congestion and speeding up trade.

There can be no question that these fourteen points constitute a mine of inspiration for Sir Hugh Clifford's administrative policy and by their adoption and practical materialisation his administration will not only be regarded as blessed but his name will be handed down to posterity with many cheerful memories like unto those of the late Sir John Glover. *Verbum Sat Sapientil*

