Studies in the History of Kano

edited by

BAWURO M. BARKINDO



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Bawuro M. Barkindo

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*as at the time of the conference

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FOREWORD

It gives me great pleasure to introduce to the general public this special publication of the proceedings of the first conference to be concerned with the Kano region, *Kasar Kano*. Many conferences have been held here at the University or at various locations within the boundaries of the state and some of their proceedings published but not one of them has taken Kano as its subject matter.

Our knowledge of this land, its past, its present, its resources – animal, vegetable and mineral – have been revolutionized in recent years. It gives me great pleasure, as Vice-Chancellor of this University, to note that much of the new information has been brought to light by members of this University. I both hope and anticipate that this state of affairs will continue and that our various specialists will contribute to the growth and development of Kano State. We are a developing University; as new Departments, and new Faculties are established, so will new specialists become available and our impact upon the community increase.

This intellectual influence is nothing new to this Ancient City. Kano has for long been the resort of scholars from abroad, a centre where men of learning from other lands have mingled and interchanged ideas with the citizens Kano has given and received knowledge. We in this University are heirs to that tradition. Science and Medicine were among the subjects taught and discussed.

As a long established centre of industry, Kano has a strong technological tradition, a tradition onto which our modern technology, and in particular our Faculty of Technology, can be grafted. The art and science of history, taking its subjects matter from all fields of human activity, has also for long been an interest of the scholarly community in Kano. This conference is the first to concern itself specifically with the History of Kano, and this is a significant milestone in the long story of intellectual life in this land.

Professor Ibrahim H. Umar
Vice Chancellor
Bayero University, Kano

INTRODUCTION

This publication is made up of all the eleven papers presented at the Kano International Seminar held in Kano from the 6 to 11 September, 1981. The Seminar was organized by the Department of History, Bayero University, Kano.

This is not the first history seminar that has taken place here, in Kano, or in which the Bayero University Department of History has participated. Since 1972 there has been series of annual seminars jointly organized by the Departments of History, A.B.U. Zaria, and B.U. Kano, the Centre for Nigerian Cultural Studies, A.B.U. Zaria and (in 1979) the *Centre des Recherche en Science Humaines, Université de Niamey,* Niger Republic. These previous seminars include the ones on the History of Borno (1972), the Niger-Benue Confluence (1973), the Sokoto Caliphate (1975), the Economic History of West African Savanna (1976), the Cultural History of West Africa (1977) and History of Central Sudan before 1804 (1979). These seminars provided a forum in which important historical issues were discussed by scholars engaged in active research. The papers presented at the seminar on the Sokoto Caliphate have already been published and those on the Economic History are with the publishers.

After the cancellation of a proposed joint seminar on Urbanization in West Africa, the Department of History, A.B.U. Zaria, indicated its desire to break the tradition of joint conferences when it said that henceforth it will organize its seminars alone. We in Kano, therefore, had no alternative but to follow suit.

We decided to start our seminars with an international seminar on the history of Kano. Kano is one of the most historical areas of West Africa. It has also been part of the international scene since at least the early 15th century A.D. In addition, we know of many scholars, both within and outside Nigeria, who have worked and are still working on various aspects of the history of Kano. We do not however, have their works in any collected and accessible form at the moment. It became imperative, therefore, that we invite all the known scholars, both within and outside the country, to come together, present and discuss some of their more exciting findings, and proceed to publish the result.

Due to various problems, however, many of those invited could not attend the seminar. This means that some aspects, like archaeology, have not yet been presented. Preparations are now going on to host, hopefully, another, even more comprehensive international seminar on the history of Kano where it is hoped that some of the other aspects not adequately covered here would be taken up, and the proceedings will also be published.

Despite some of the shortcomings mentioned, we still feel that this volume is unique in that it is the first published book by a collection of scholars on the history of Kano. Others have presented the views of a single author on a single topic, but this volume for the first time brings together scholars with very different interests and from different schools of intellectual thought who here treat a broad variety of topics, but all dealing with Kano. Those looking for a potted history of Kano or for easy generalizations about the history of this complex area are bound to be disappointed, for this collection demonstrates clearly the great diversity of thought and study among scholars involved in the study of the history of Kano.

This seminar, therefore, produced no comfortable conclusions, but rather we saw – and with this publication others are invited to see – that there is much room for healthy intellectual debate and discussion about many of the central issues in Kano history – from the development of its political, religions and economic institutions, through its trade and production patterns right to the development of modern industries. Considerable discussion was also devoted to the uses which can be made of various sources of Kano history – such as the *Kano Chronicle* itself, oral data, the physical remains of ancient structures and even statistical data gathered through modern survey techniques. Those of us who participated in the seminar enjoyed the lively debates which were stimulated by these papers and we hope that with this publication these debates will now be opened to a larger public.

Our profound thanks go to the Vice-Chancellor, Bayero University Kano, Professor Ibrahim H. Umar, for his moral support and for approving a substantial grant towards organizing the seminar and publishing the proceedings.

We are equally grateful to the Governor of Kano State, Alhaji Muhammadu Abubakar Rimi, under whose personal direction a generous grant was made to the seminar by the Kano State Government.

Our deepest gratitude and appreciation are due to four leading Kano Businessmen who, between them, contributed more than half of the total amount received for the organization of the seminar and for the publication of its proceedings. They are: Alhaji Aminu Dantata, Alhaji Isyaku Rabiu, Alhaji Sani Marshall and Alhaji Sanusi Dantata.

Dr. Ibrahim Yaro Yahya needs special mention for his help throughout the seminar. Dr. Hassan Gwarzo, the Grand Khadi of Kano State, who acted as our Chairman during the formal opening of the seminar, gave us useful

advice throughout the Seminar. Alhaji Saidu Gwarzo, the Head of Service, Kano State Government, was invited to be our guest speaker, less than one week to the seminar, we are not only grateful to him for accepting the invitation but also for his useful speech which we include in this publication. We also register our thanks to Malam Y.A. Ibrahim and Dr. Kabiru Galadanchi for their help and support. Our thanks also go to Mr. J.F. Antwi of the Department of Geography, Bayero University for drawing the maps. The Department of History, Bayero University, Kano, the 'Author' of this book gratefully acknowledges Kenting Africa Resource Services Limited, as the source of the photograph on the cover.

Finally, I must thank the members of the Organizing Committee, John E. Lavers, Isa A. Abba and Philip J. Shea, who in addition to being contributors also assisted towards this publication.

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

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Kano City

THE GATES OF KANO CITY

A Historical Survey

by

BAWURO M. BARKINDO

The Gates of Kano City have been receiving the attention of travellers to the area since at least the early sixteenth century. References to them could be read in many travellers' reports and journals, administrators' reports and romantic memoirs written by wives of colonial administrators. However, except for the commendable attempts by Moody, we are yet to read any comprehensive study on these fortifications of one of the historic cities of the world.

This paper is an attempt to follow the footsteps of Moody in trying to make us aware of the importance of undertaking such a study. Many of the conclusions presented here are, of course, mostly speculative and, I am afraid, these may remain so until extensive archaeological work is carried out on some of the sites in Kano and until extensive work is carried out on the gates of some cities in the neighbouring states like Borno, Zazzau, and Katsina.

The Historical Development of the Gates

It was only at the beginning of the nineteenth century that we started to have some detailed descriptions of the gates of Kano City. Although our data are still fragmentary, we must assume that it had taken several centuries of construction, re-modelling and expansion before the gates took their nineteenth century form.

It is possible to identify about four major phases in the developments of the gates, each corresponding to a phase in the history of Kano.

The First Phase: 12th to 14th. Century

Sarki Gijimasu (c. 1095–1134 A.D.) is reputed to have been the one who

started to build the walls and gates of "Kano"[1], and it is alleged that the first phase was completed by Tsaraki (*c.* 1136–94). Gijimasu is said to have started the building after he had succeeded in dominating the "earlier inhabitants"[2]:

> "They began the wall from Karia ... They continued the work to the gate of Mazugi, and from there to the water-gate and on to the gate of Adama, and the gate of Gudan; then past the gates of Waika, Kansakali and Kawungari, as far as the gate of Tuji."[3]

If this tradition is accepted, then it means that the first phase of building fortifications around Dala Hill took place in the twelfth century. Although this claim is still favoured by some historians of Kano, it appears to me that there is evidence to suggest that the building of the fortifications was not started by Gijimasu but by Tsaraki towards the end of the twelfth century, and that this first phase was not completed till the rule of Usman Zamnagawa (*c.* 1343–49).

Gijimasu is said to have been the first ruler in the Bagauda house to have moved from Sheme to the vicinity of Dala Hill. Whether Gijimasu actually moved or whether this only symbolizes the emergence of a new dynasty, it was clear that he was not accepted by all the people in the area as is claimed by the *Kano Chronicle*. Mazuda, the chief of the earlier inhabitants, is said to have been prevented from giving his daughter as a wife to Gijimasu, which contradicts the earlier claim in the *Chronicle* that he "dominated" them. It was also Tsaraki, not Gijimasu, who first attempted to undertake the conquest of some of the neighbouring peoples. Since we are further informed that shields (*garkuwa*) were first used in battles during the reign of Tsaraki, might it not have been also the time when stockades or hedges (*kaguwa*) were first built around dwellings? The fact that they had started attacking other peoples would mean that they might have also started thinking about retaliations, hence the shield and so why not the "wall"? *Kaguwa* and *garkuwa* appear to have some similarities at least in the sound, although I could not say whether they were once related or whether they may have had a common origin. *Kaguwa* is further explained below.

One of the warriors of Tsaraki was named Tuje, which was also the name of one of the earliest gates as we have seen. It is possible that the gate was named in his honour as was the later gate at the same place named in honour of, first *Dagachi*, and later still, Wambai Giwa. As is suggested by Murray Last, in switching the wall-building to Gijimasu, the author of the *Kano Chronicle* has also left Tsaraki's hero, Tuje, "stranded without 'his' own gate.[4]" Finally, even the author of the *Chronicle* appears to have favoured the traditions that placed the honour of starting the erections of the fortifications in the reign of Tsaraki, but for some reasons not yet completely explained he still placed the event in that of Gijimasu:

> "Some, however, say that it was his son Tsaraki who came to his place and built a city. The latter is a better version."[5]

As was rightly suggested by Abdullahi Smith, the process of developing a *birni* (i.e. city), as a centre of government which could have succeeded in overriding previously held loyalties, must have been essentially a lengthy one with many false starts and failures before the new sovereign could be imposed.[6] In Kano, as he further noted, there is a documentary evidence to suggest that it took several centuries of intermittent conflicts between the Bagauda dynasty and the other powers near Dala Hill before the former finally emerged as the accepted rulers in the area.[7] This final phase must have been in the reign of Zamnagawa when the "Maguzawa", whose stockade (*kaguwa*) was attacked and finally destroyed during the earlier reign, are said to have left the city. This appears to me the only time when a "wall" enclosing the whole area could have been completed.

It is, however, difficult to reconstruct the plan of the fortifications, which sections were first built, towards which direction did they follow, and which section of the city was the last to be fortified. This is because it seems that it might not have been as systematic as the *Chronicle* would like us to believe. Support for this is found in the different ways in which the sources describe the orientation of the earliest gates and the directions which the building took. The *Chronicle* lists the gates anti-clockwise from Raria (possibly in the whereabouts of the present Kofar Jakara) in the east to Kofar Tuji. In *Labarun Hausawa da Makwabtansu*[8] the building is said to have started at Kofar Mazugal – that is further north of Raria – and followed the same direction as in the *Chronicle* but after Kofar Adama misses both Gudan and Waika only to bring the Kofar Gadon Kaya (which was clearly a later gate) a gate much to the south of Kansakali before the latter and finally ending, as the *Chronicle*, said, at Kofar Tuji. In addition to this, the tradition also listed only seven gates – or more correctly six since Kofar Gadon Kaya was a seventeenth century gate – although it claimed that there were eight of them. In the *Kano ta Dabo Cigari* of Abubakar Dokaji two different traditions are given. The first not only listed the gates clock-wise but gave a different orientation of the gates from those in the *Chronicle* and in the *Labarun Hausawa*:

> "He (i.e. Tsaraki) started from Raria (between Kofar Dan Agundi and Kofar Naisa) and continued westwards to Kofar Adama up to a certain gate called Tuji in the vicinity of the present Kofar Kansakali."[9]

First of all, Raria is shifted to the southern part of the city as opposed to the eastern part as claimed by the *Chronicle* and the *Labarun Hausawa*. Raria in this context simply means a hole in the wall for drainage and so we could not say this description is wrong since there may have been several rarias. Secondly, Kofar Tuji has been placed in the western part of the City while in the other sources we have seen that it has been placed in the east. Here too we have little chance of knowing the true facts since Tuji no longer exists and it has not been recorded by most of our documented later sources.

Thirdly, this source could tell us only three of the gates in the early period, one in the south, one in the west, and one in the north, clearly silent on the eastern side of the city. The second tradition given in *Kano ta Dabo Cigari* is claimed to be part of a children's song that listed the gates of Kano:

> "And Kansakali, and Kabuga
> Gadan Kaya, Dukawuya,
> Adama, Kofar Ruwa
> Mazugal, Wamban Kano"[10]

It is not the intention of this article to analyze the various sources on the history of Kano but what these variations may mean for our subject is that the version in the *Kano Chronicle* is an edition of several traditions dealing with the subject and those which we have quoted in East and Dokaji are some of the variants.

It is doubtful if in the absence of an archaeological excavation we would ever have the correct picture of this earliest period. It is, however, possible to suggest that at first each of the different peoples built a *kaguwa* or stockade around its settlement and that it was the Bagauda dynasty which embarked on the destruction of the mini-stockades and at the same time built a larger one that could enclose the whole area. This must have taken a very long time with successes and set backs and must have been completed only in the fourteenth century.

The Second Phase: 15th Century

The century preceeding the rule of Rumfa (c. 1463–99) appears to have been one of the most important in the history of Kano. From the rule of Yaji (c. 1349–85) we are told of the coming of various immigrant scholars, merchants and craftsmen to Kano. These included the Wangara, Bornoans, Arabs, Tuaregs, Nupe and Kwararafa. The effects of the coming of these immigrants on the history of Kano has luckily received the attention of many scholars of the history of Kano and so only aspects relevant to our study will be repeated here. These were: an increase in the knowledge of warfare and a population increase in Kano and its environs which called not only for an extension of the walls and the gates but also for the strengthening of these defences.

From the period of Yaji's rule we are told of the use of horses in battles and by the time of Sarki Kanajeji (c. 1390–1410) quilted armour for horses (*lifidi*) iron helment (*kwalkwali*) and suits of chain armour (*sulke*) were being used in warfare. These no doubt contributed in subduing recalcitrant neighbours like Santolo[11] and in the undertaking of expeditions to distant areas like "Zukzuk" and Kwararafa. Since the knowledge of the improved war technology was not limited to Kano, and since reprisals must have been expected, it would follow that more improved defences had to be thought of for the City. This became increasingly more urgent as the long expeditions

started to become more frequent, thus leaving the City vulnerable to attack when the best part of its defenders was away. The second factor was population increase due to voluntary immigration and the forced settlement of slaves. There was also the additional fact that the coming of the immigrants must have improved their knowledge of constructing fortifications.

Already by the time of Dauda (c. 1421–1438) the rulers of Kano were aware of the necessity of extending the City. When *Dagachi*, leading a large retinue, came from Borno, Dauda is said to have been at a loss of where to settle them:

> "Where can he stay here with his army – Kano is full of men – unless we increase the size of the town?"[12]

Dagachi, we are informed, was settled first at Bompai and later at Dorayi, both outside the City but closely connected to it.

During the rule of Dauda's successor we are told of the founding of several slave settlements near the City.[13] Since the economic activities of these settlements and others were vital to the city, it followed that any improvements to the defences of the city must have taken these villages into consideration.[14] Finally, by the time Rumfa became *Sarki* the rulers were not only rich and powerful enough to undertake this gigantic task of extending the walls and the gates, but also the personal household of the rulers had grown to such an extent that the former palace was found to have been grossly inadequate.[15] This and the fact that Rumfa might have been determined to build a mosque away from the former "pagan religious centre" which continued to pollute the new religion may have contributed to the building of his palace, *Gidan Rumfa* (House of Rumfa) outside the former city "wall". It therefore became even more urgent to build another wall which would also enclose the new palace and the mosque. The above and many other reasons must have contributed to the extension of the walls and the gates by Rumfa:

> "He extended the walls towards Kofan Mata from the Kofan Dagachi and continued to work to Kofan Gertawasa and Kofan Kawayi and from Kofan Naisa to the Kofan Kansakali."[16]

As will be examined further below, this appears to be the time when clay must have been used in building the fortifications, though we are not yet in a position to say whether the cube-like gate houses were also built during this period or later.

The Third Phase: The 16th Century

The period c. 1570–1650 is said to have been a turbulent one in the history of Kano. There were strained relations between the state and some of her neighbouring powers especially Katsina, Kwararafa and Borno. The City of Kano is said to have been attacked several times. At one time during the rule of Abubakar Kado (c. 1565–73) Katsina is said to have defeated Kano at

the very gates of the City and it is also said that there was so much devestation that the people found safety only within the walls of the City or in those of other walled towns and rocky areas.[17] A few years later, the Kwararafa are said to have also attacked Kano; so much insecurity did the attack and presence of the Kwararafa present that the Sarkin Kano and many of his followers are said to have fled to Daura, returning only after some time.[18]

While agreeing with all those[19] who feel that these battles have been exaggerated and that even if they took place they were sandwiched by periods of peace and prosperity, nevertheless, I still believe that this period may have been one of great anxiety to the rulers and citizens of Kano. The fact that attacks were directed against the City means that efforts must be been made to further strengthen its defences. Unfortunately, there are no direct references in our major sources which indicate that there was any extension of the City's defences in the sixteenth century. Nevertheless, it appears that a further extension of the walls and gates was undertaken during this period.

During the regin of Kutumbi (c. 1623–48), or that of his predecessor, a certain Turaki kuka Allandayi is said to have been removed from office. He is alleged to have been the *Mai Anguwa* (ward head) of Kofar Kabuga, and great was his wrath at the loss of this office since it had paid him well. He is said to have accumulated a great amount of wealth.[20] This may mean that Kofar Kabuga was existing before the rule of Kutumbi or even that of Nazaki (c. 1618–23) during whose rule it is said to have been built. Moreover, there are traditions which claim that Kofar Kabuga was originally well inside the City and that it was transferred to its present location at a later period when the walls were extended.[21]

The claim in *Asl al-wangariyyin*[22] (the origin of the Wangarawa ...) that the first Wangarawa to come to Kano entered the City through the Kofar Kabuga must be rejected, for, as Moody rightly asked, "how could they enter the city by a gate which was to be constructed only some ... years later?"[23] However, could it not mean that this gate was very important at this period when the *Als* was written? Perhaps there were two Kabugas and one had to pass through one before reaching the entrance to the second, and so perhaps one of them had considerable antiquity? This feeling still lingers in the minds of the people, for example, when I started this research many people to whom I talked – with the exception of the other gate keepers – used to say that "*Sarkin Kofar Kabuga shi ne babbansu duka*", i.e. The Gate Keeper of Kabuga is senior to all the gate keepers.[24] In 1851, Barth, during his first visit to Kano, noted:

> "It is curious to observe that there are evident traces of a more ancient wall on the south side, which ... did not describe so wide a circumference, particularly towards the south-west where the great projection angle seems to have been added in later times for merely strategical purpose."[25]

This obsolete section ran from Kofar Kansakali southwards towards Kofar Gadonkaya but about 500 yards short of it turned sharply to the east where it joined the old fifteenth century wall.[26] One could thus say that there was an extension of the wall in the sixteenth century although it was only to further strengthen the former fortifications against the constant attacks from Katsina and Kwararafa. The only gate which might have been added in this period seems to be that of Kabuga.

The Fourth Phase: The 17th Century

As we have noted above, the intermittent strained relations between Kano and some of her neighbours stretched from about 1570 to 1650. We have also noted that may be towards the end of the sixteenth century an extension was carried out in the south-western section of the City. By the rule of Muhammadu Nazaki (c. 1618–23) the latest extensions were already found to have been inadequate in withstanding attacks. His predecessor, we have noted, could not even find security within the city walls, and he had to seek refuge for some time in Daura.

When he became Sarki, Nazaki may have been determined to undertake a further extension of the walls and gates. This could have been one of the reasons why he tried to make peace with Katsina – in order to give him time to effect his intentions. When Katsina refused his peace overtures, rather than wait for an attack, Nazaki immediately launched an offensive. He, however, left Wambai Giwa, one of his officers, to carry out the extensions. The seventeenth century extension was not simply an attempt by the Wambai to please his sovereign but a royal commission. This is borne out by the fact that both wealth and energy were not spared in carrying out the work. Not only was the work carried out with despatch and a huge amount of wealth spent on it but it was a duty in which "every man in Kano" is said to have participated.[27] This was more than what an official would be able to enforce without royal consent. Thus, when Nazaki returned from one of his wars, he found that an extension had already been erected:

> "From the Kofan Dogo to the Kofan Gadonkaya, and from the Kofan Dukawuyia to the Kofan Kabuga and to the Kofan Kansakali."[28]

The Later Developments

The extension carried out by Wambai Giwa appears to have been the last major one. From that time onwards efforts were only made to maintain the existing structures and only to effect minor changes where necessary. There is only one source which mentions another major improvement after the seventeenth century. In the *Wakar Bagauda* (The Song of Bagauda) we are informed that when Sharefa (c. 1703–31) became the Sarki:

> "The walled town was not big: it was he who extended it."[29]

This might have been puzzling but for the fact that we are informed in the *Chronicle* that Sharefa was a builder of walls around may of the towns of *kasar* Kano. He ordered walls to be built around Gaya, Takai, Tsokuwa, Rano, Dawaki (ta Kudu?) and many others[30] – most of them found in what Mortimore would call the "Kano close-settled zone."[31] This may suggest that after the seventeenth century, the rulers of Kano were becoming more and more concerned with the security of a wider Kano upon whose welfare and prosperity they largely depended, and so the security formerly enjoyed only in the City and a few other towns was also extended to many other towns. This trend was inherited and further expanded by the Fulani rulers of nineteenth century Kano.[32]

The Construction and Maintenance of the Gates

The Gates, as we have seen, were built at different periods and they must have undergone several modifications if not total restructuring before their present final form. As Moody noted:

> "We are bound to infer that no two gates were ever quite identical, they no doubt refelected different local situations and perhaps different conceptions in the mind of the master-builder (Sarkin Gini) of each construction team."[33]

We do not have enough evidence to say what the Gates looked like in the pre-fifteenth century period, but my guess is that they may not have been much more than simple passage ways or gaps left in the hedge. One suspects, as has already been indicated, that the "walls' were of living plants, possibly *kaguwa* or "*Euphorbia Sepium*", a plant which is a member of the cactus family and which Dalziel describes as:

> "a variety of 'milky hedge', a shrub with a milky juice, planted as a hedge very common in the North."[34]

Up to the fourteenth century, at least, the word *kaguwa* was used in Kano to refer to a hedged settlement. When *Sarki* Tsamiya decided to destroy the fortified settlement of the Mazadawa who were still causing trouble to the Bagauda dynasty, he is said to have sent them a message saying:

> "Tell them that on Thursday I am coming to their kaguwa if Allah wills, that I may enter and see what is inside."[35]

It is also possible that at this period *gumagumai* (logs) or thorns were used in closing the passage ways. According to the present *Sarkin* Kofas, before the use of *kyaure* (doors), many things were used in closing the *kofa*: logs, thorns, pieces of calabash and skins. These were said to have been ingeniously arranged that as soon as a gate was touched things fell on each other thereby making a loud noice to attract the attention of the people.

By the fifteenth century clay must have been used in building both the walls and the gates. Certainly by the beginning of the sixteenth century the walls and gates of Kano City were strong enough to withstand a long siege

from Songhay which was one of the strongest powers in the Sudan at that period.[36]

When were the gate-houses as distinct from the passage ways constructed? May be short of extensive archaeological work in Kano City we may never know for certain. It is, however, possible to suggest that by the seventeenth century the Gate Houses were already built. The various attacks on Kano from different areas may have forced the rulers and people of Kano to think up better ways of defending the City. No doubt the increase in the coming of immigrants both from the Sudan and outside it may have contributed to the improvement of the fortifications of the City. This is because fresh ideas may have been floating around and were picked as the need arose.[37] After the restoration of Kukuna in c. 1662 he was said to have:

> "found that the Kwararafa had battered the Kofan Kawayi . . he built it up."[38]

This may indicate that by this time of Kukuna the gates were really elaborate structures since "battered down" suggests more than breaking through a mere passage way.

We are equally not in a position to say when the *kyaure* (doors), as seen and described to us in the nineteenth century, came into being. For example, Clapperton during his visit to Kano in 1824 informed us that:

> "The gates are of wood covered with sheets of iron".[39]

But, according to traditions collected by Bargery, it appears that the word *kyaure* pre-dated the wooden door now permanently fixed in our minds. This is because he explains *kyaure* as

> "a door made of wood, corn-sticks, palm stems or iron."[40]

This supports the claim of the Sarkin Kofas that before the introduction of the wooden door logs and other things were used in closing the gate. Moody is of the opinion that:

> "*kyaure* was constructed rather as if by analogy with the traditional lengths of locally woven cloth, made up from narrow strips sewn together, by strongly riveting many strips of iron beaten into about three feet length on to a framework of deleb-palm wood."[41]

It would have been in the period before the fifteenth century when the kyaure was made of palm-stems or corn-stalks, but it is difficult to say when the idea of a wooden door and later wood covered with iron was evolved. All we can say with any certainty is that the wooden *kyaure* must have been already in use before the nineteenth century. The gates have been elaborately described to us by many nineteenth century travellers[42], but Lugard, at the time when the British stormed the Gates and captured Kano, not only described the gates elaborately but pointed out their protective functions:—

> "The gates themselves were flimsy structures of cow hide, but the massive entrance tower in which they were fixed was generally about fifty feet long and tortuous so that they were impenetrable to shell fire. Some of them were most cleverly designed in re-entrant angle so that access to them was enfiladed by fire from the

> walls on either side, ... Had all the gates been thus constructed, Kano would have been practically impregnable to direct assault . . . . . Fortunately, however, the gates were not all so built, and after a fruitless attempt at the Zaria gate, Colonel Morland effected a small breach at the next, which was then stormed by a party under Lieutenant Dyer."[44]

How were these gates constructed? Who constructed them? For the earlier period it is difficult to say but in the seventeenth century, as we have already seen, it was undertaken by royal commissions and huge amounts of wealth were spent on the work. We have also seen that it was a duty in which various peoples participated. In fact it was a communal work in which people both in the city and those in the immediate countryside participated. It is therefore high time that we throw away the popular belief that the work was formerly done mostly by slaves. Those who supplied specialized services like *Sarkin* Gini (master builder) and scholars were actually paid while all other workmen were expected to be fed throughout the duration of the work. It is, however, true that the people supplied the materials needed for the work, materials like calabashes, earthen pots and other containers for carrying food, water and earth as well as grass, wood and hoes.[45]

The *Sarkin Gini* in consultation with the special scholar assigned to the particular work chose the time when the work would start and it was also the *Sarkin Gini* who decided what type of structure was to be built – surely one of the reasons why the gates (and the walls) were never uniform. The scholar (*Mallam*) would bury charms at particulars sites and would at every stage of the work recite some verses from the Quran, invoking God, the Prophet, and the particular angels for maintaining the gate in its defensive role.[46] One such charm was not buried in the ground but was punched on a metal plate and fixed to the *kyaure* of Kofar Waika. The writing was surely in Arabic characters, and the traditional Muslim invocation, *Bismillahi, arrahmani, arrahimi* is there. But no one has been able to make out what it means and, according to traditions collected from scholars in Kano by Moody, it is *surkulle* which means:

> "a collection of mostly meaningless and jumbled words from various sources, supposed to have magical powers to ward off evil."[47]

On the suggestion of the present Sarkin Kofa of Waika, in 1965 the *kyaure* and its curious Arabic writing were removed to Kano Gidan Makama Museum for safekeeping. It is still there awaiting some scholar who can solve this mystery for us. As far as the Sarkin Kofa of Waika is concerned, the name of the Mallam who wrote the charm, the date when it was written and what the writing was supposed to serve are all to be found in the writing.[48]

Moody has elaborately described a typical gate and so there is no need to repeat the information here since no additional information has been found on that aspect.[49] In the pre-nineteenth century period the maintenance of the gates and walls is said to have been so important that many of the pre-Fulani rulers periodically inspected the fortifications themselves. This was called *"kewayar Garu"*[50] when all defects were identified and repairs arranged. The assignment to supervise the work was usually given to any high

ranking official although often it was assigned to *Dan Rimi*, one of the leading slave officials of the pre-Fulani period.[51] During the administrative re-organization in the Fulani period the supervision of the walls was permanently assigned to whoever was the administrator (*Hakimi*, or District Head) of the City.

After the conquest of Kano, Lugard at first prohibited the periodical repairs of the walls and gates, but very soon he relented, reporting that:

> "I withdrew the prohibition to the restoration of the city walls, promising that in future the customary labour of the peasantry on this work should be devoted to this work and to road-making in alternate years."[52]

May be Lugard had regained confidence in the British might and considered the walls and the gates no longer a threat to the British presence or alternatively he was trying to appease the Emir and so win his confidence for the effective running of British colonial rule. Whatever the motives of Lugard, Emir Abbas (1903-11) was very happy to see that the walls and gates of the City were repaired. He later informed Morel that the matter of repairing the walls and the gates was of great importance both to the rulers and to the people.[53]

The gates, unlike the walls, have been given periodical face-lifts since the beginning of this century, although it is only those on the south-eastern section which are meant to retain their "traditional" characters – the Kofar "Middle", Kofar Dan Agundi and Kofar Naisa. Those in the busiest part of the City, like Nassarawa, Mata and Mazugal, were demolished in order to allow the passage of motor cars and in their places new ornamental structures have been built. The other gates in the south-east and west have been unfortunately neglected in this exercise and many of them are on the verge of total collapse. At the time of writing this paper (1981) the Federal Department of Antiquities, under whose jurisdiction the gates belong, are undertaking another renovation of the south-eastern gates. It means therefore that unlike the walls which may disappear with time there is an effort to retain some of the gates for posterity.

Administration of the Gates[54]

Each of the existing pre-colonial gates has a *Sarkin Kofa* (lit. Chief of the Gate) or the Master Gate keeper. He was the immediate administrator of his own gate. His house must be in the vicinity of the gate and most of his time was spent in the gate-house where he also had a room.

In normal times it was the duty of the Sarkin Kofa to open the gate every morning and close it every evening after which it was never opened for anyone except the Sarkin Kano himself gave the order. It was the duty of the Sarkin Kofa to scrutinize all who passed through his gate so as to make sure that as much as possible *mugayen mutane* (lit. bad people), like thieves and robbers, were not allowed into the *birni*. The gate keeper and many of his relations were always on the look out for such men. They were also the

scouts who always watched the approaches of the gate for any impending danger.

In times of insecurity when the Sarkin Kano ordered the gate to be closed it was the duty of the Sarkin Kofa to see to it that it was not re-opened unless the ruler himself gave the order. It was equally the duty of the Sarkin Kofa to inspect his gate every day to make sure that it was in order. Any defect was reported directly to the ruler.

As we have have seen above, the overall supervisor of the gates was the Sarkin Kano himself although the work was often delegated to the *Dan Rimi* or other officer of the State. But it was the Sarkin who made any major decision concerning the gates and the walls.

According to the *Chronicle*, the first Sarkin Kofa was appointed in the fifteenth century. He is said to have been one of the eunuchs who were first given offices of state by Rumfa.[55] It is, however, not clear whether that Sarkin Kofa was for the city gates or only for the palace.

Almost all the gate-keepers claim that the title was hereditary and that it was never changed from the family of the first gate keeper. A closer examination, however, seems to indicate that the claim may not be true. We have already noted that it is possible that the earliest gate-keepers were eunuchs. Secondly, one gate keeper, at least, disclosed that when Alu (c. 1894-1903) came to power he removed all the gate keepers and put his own slaves in their places.[56] This is supported in *Kano ta Dabo Cigari* which says that when Alu became the Emir he fulfilled his earlier promise to his supporters during the Civil War by giving many of them offices of the state.[57] This is further supported by the fact that many of the gate keepers claim that their kofa was "built" during the rule of Alu. If it happened during the rule of Alu, could it not have happened before? Surely if Soyaki (c. 1652) had managed to retain his sarauta, the Sarkin Kofa of Kawayi who was instructed to close the gate on Kukuna (c. 1652-60) but failed to do so might not have retained his office.

Function of the Gates

The primary function of the gates was to allow the movement of people in and out of the City. This is quite obvious since the City was surrounded by a strong wall, and the only normal approaches were the gates. As we have noted, the gates were regularly opened at sunrise and closed at sunset.

The gates were also used to check unwanted elements, like known thieves or robbers and spies. In 1885 Staudinger met strong opposition from the gate keepers since his curiosity to inspect the gates and the walls aroused their suspicion that he was a spy:

> "Two gate keepers with a lot of shouting threw themselves upon me and would not allow me to proceed . . . . . they insisted that it was not permitted to ride along the wall: that would give me an opportunity to spy out the weakest places, and they supposed that I would soon call an army to capture the town" [58]

The Sarkin Kofa and all his helpers was always on the lookout for runaway slaves, stolen animals and kidnapped children. Anyone leading a lonely camel

or horse was stopped and closely interrogated by the Sarkin Kofa. This was also the same with any unknown face leading a small child or a lonely woman. If the Sarkin Kofa was not satisfied the suspect was stopped, arrested and taken to the palace where proper investigations were conducted.[59]

One of the most important functions of the gates was defence. It was usually through the gates that an invading force may like to break into the City. As far as the history of Kano is concerned the gates of the City seem to have performed their defensive role very well. This is because although there have been many attacks on Kano, between the rule of Kukuna and that of Alu – a period of some two and a half centuries – we are told of only four times when an invading force actually succeeded in making a breach through the gates and entered the City.

The first time when an invading army broke through a gate and entered Kano was during the civil war between Kukuna and Soyaki which we have already referred to above. The second time was during the rule of Sarki Dadi (c. 1670-3) when the Kwararafa are said to have broken into Kano through the Kofar Gadon Kaya.[60] The next time when a similar episode happened was during another civil war, this time in the Fulani period, when the followers of Yusufu gained entry into the City through Kofan Mata.[61] The final one was the British invasion of Kano in early February 1903.[62]

It is of interest to note that contrary to earlier beliefs, the gates were never used for the collection of *kurdin kofa* (i.e. tolls). The gate keepers of course received *alheri* ("gifts") from the users of the gates, especially those taking things into the City to sell and it is true that often this *alheri* was enforced and at times may have been fixed. But whatever was collected was for the exclusive benefit of the Sarkin Kofa and those who assisted him in his multi-purpose duties. Nothing was ever taken to the rulers or any other body.[63] What was received from those using the gates varied from individual to individual depending on so many factors. One measure or two from a corn seller, some milk or butter from a Fulani woman, some piece of clothing from the cloth merchant and a few cowries from another and so on. On the whole one could say that if traders and travellers were taxed in Kano it must have been at the market and not at the gates.[64]

Finally the gates (and the walls) were among the most important criteria for differentiating a *birni* (city) from the *kauye* (village). The former was the seat of a mighty ruler who was not only powerful enough to subdue smaller areas with his forces but was also capable of providing protection to those who submitted to him. The latter was a smaller unprotected locality which must seek protection or association from the ruler of the *birni*. It was also to the *birni* that one went for anything considered new or modern. The gate decided whether you are in the *birni* or outside.

According to Sarkin Kofa of Waika, in the olden days whenever a bride was being brought from the *kauye* into the *birni* she was usually blessed and congratulated by the onlookers at the gate: that she was lucky to have left the village with its insecurity, poverty, and ignorance and to have come into

the *birni* where there was affluence, security, and where she would benefit from the blessings (*albarka*) of the saints both living and dead.

The idea is still fixed in the mind of the people that all approaches to the *birni* must be through the gates. All other routes which do not follow the gates into the city are referred to as *haure* meaning to jump or climb (over the wall) – indicating that it is not proper – even if the wall had virtually disappeared.

Conclusion

There appear to have been four major phases in the development of the gates. The first phase appears to have been the longest, stretching from about the mid-twelfth to mid-fourteenth century. This period corresponded with the process of developing the *birni* as a central government. In this phase the "walls" seem to have been made of strong hedges and the "gates" simply gaps in the walls. The second phase seems to have started with the rule of Yaji (c. 1349-85) and ended with that of Rumfa (c.1463-99) when there was not only population increase but also the introduction of new ideas. This may have been the time when earthen walls were erected and defensive passageways built although we are not sure whether gate houses were also built in this period. The two latter phases – the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries – appear to have aimed at further strengthening the defences of the City in the period of increasing attacks. It appears that the gate houses and probably the wooden *kyaure* were already in use by this period.

Secondly, we have to modify the popular view that the walls and the gates were built by slave labour. As we have seen, the building and maintenance of these structures were done through communal labour and those who supplied skilled labour like the *Sarkin Gini* were actually paid by the rulers. Equally the idea that the gates were built in order to collect *kurdin kofa* appears to be also wrong. The gates were more for defensive and political uses and their economic uses were only indirect.

Finally, I sincerely hope that the assumptions given in this paper will stimulate discussions on the subject and lead to further research so that we may come to know more about this interesting but neglected aspect of Kano history.

APPENDIX A

Profile on the Gates

An attempt will be made here to discuss each of the gates separately, arranged in their various phases. It is, however, not going to be a duplication of Moody's work, and so the descriptions of the various gates, their measurements and some of their suggested etymologies are not going to be repeated. What is intended here is to give the names of the present gate-

keepers and their fore-bearers if known. An attempt will also be made to see whether other possible meanings could be suggested by examing the linguistic aspects of the names of the gates. Thirdly, an attempt will also be made to find whether the gate is associated with some historic event or person. Finally, an effort will be made to see if the gate had any particular function other than the general one.

12th. Century – 14th. Century Gates

Mazugal

The present Sarkin Kofa is Hamza who claims to have been appointed five years ago. As far as he knows, the "first" gate-keeper was named Dan Mitsili – i.e. the tiny or small (man). Hamza claims that the office of Sarkin Kofa is hereditary but fails to name his connection with the said Dan Mitsili.

There are two interesting slight variations in the spelling of the name of this gate.

Mazugi (KC) in 1908 JRAI: Bazuger
Mazuger (Barth, 1851)
Mazuger (Lugard 1904)
Mazugal (East 1934 and all other later sources)

The pre-1934 rendering of the name may have been the correct one although the present name of the gate agrees with the later sources. If we assume that the *Bazuger* in the Journal to have been a mis-spelling of *Mazuger* (as in Barth), then all the pre-1934 mentions could be reduced to one *Mazugi*, and its plural *Mazuga*.

Among the occupation heads which the "sons of Bagauda" are said to have "found" near Dala was one *Maguji* who was the miner and smelter (of iron) and who "begot" the *Maguzawa*. The latter are said to have been the last opposing pre-Birni inhabitants who left the city during the rule of Zamnagawa (c.1243-49). It may also be of interest to note that one of the meanings of *Zuga* is "blow up fire with bellows" (Abraham, p.978); from this we have *zugazugi*, meaning a pair of bellows. *Mazugi* then, in this context, should mean "he who bellows", and *mazuga* could mean either a place where bellowing (i.e. smelting) takes place or the plural form of *mazugi*.

Had this gate or area near it some relationship to the mining industry in the early settlement of Dala? What we need is a more professional linguistic analysis which will accompany an archaeological excavation of the site around the gate.

According to the Sarkin Kofa Hamza, the gate used to open on to the main route to Daura, Kazaure and Damagaram, but most of those who used the gate daily where the people from the nearby villages who came into the City to either buy or sell.

The "ornamental gate" described by Moody has been demolished to give room for further "modernization" of the road.

Kofar Ruwa

As the name implies, this was a water gate: an opening through the wall

from which surplus water would drain away. It has never had any Sarkin Kofa and it was permanently shut.

The north-eastern part of the city where the gate is situated is said to have been lowlying and formed a natural basin for water to collect. It is said that various attempts were made by the inhabitants of Kano to conserve this water inside the wall since it could have become handy in times of a siege.

It is claimed (J.H. Carron, 20-10-31 in File 16070 in National Archives, Kaduna) that it was the coming of the Kwararafa that added the knowledge of damming which eventually led to the filling up of the gap in the wall.

We are told that not only was the damming done with the greatest difficulty but rumour had it that a virgin was bricked up in the wall above. This may not be true, but certainly there appears to have been a connection between some sort of sacrifice and this area, but whether it was for defence is not clear. When Tsamia (c. 1307-1343) captured or established the "Tsibiri" it is claimed (KC) that the "man .... holding a red snake" ran and made for the water-gate where he plunged into the water and disappeared or escaped. He later turned out at the village of Dankwoi. Hence it is claimed that any warrior who drinks the water of Dankwoi does not prevail in a battle. Again, when Kanajeji (c.1390-1410) "re-established the god of Tsibiri" he was said to have thrown some of the instruments of the worship into the waters of Dankwoi. Thus it appears there must have been some connection between the worship of Tsibiri and this gate, may be in order to safeguard this weak area against invasion.

This gate, which may have been filled up in the fourteenth century, is said to have continued to be a source of anxiety to the City. At least it is said to have burst out twice, once in 1888 and the second time in 1931. There may have been other occasions as well. It is of interest to note that in latest burst up many crocodiles were found.

Lunkui

The name of the present Sarkin Kofa is not known, or more correctly, people are reluctant to mention his name since he was among the followers of *Maitatsine,* the fanatic who led the 1980 religious distrubance in Kano. My informant was Mallam Muhammadu, about 47 years old, born at Kofar Lunkui, and associated with the gate. He claims that the first gate keeper was known as "Shu'aibu", but does not know anything about him.

There are two variations of the name

Adama (KC)

Adama (Barth)

Adama (Lugard)

Lunkwi (East, and most of the later sources)

In addition, this gate is also referred to as *Kofar Ruwa,* like the previous gate which we examined and which it neighbours.

It is not possible to say which of the names is correct. Was the name originally "Adama Lunkui"?, i.e. Adama lying quietly. May be the gate had some connection with the water gate. The gate opened on the road to

Damagaram and other areas around the present Dambatta. Most users were the villagers around.

Dawanau

The gate keeper is Adamu Ibrahim, about 50 years old, who had been Sarkin Kofa since 1964. He does not claim to know either the name of the first gate keeper or the period during which it was established. He, however, claims that the office is hereditary from father to son. He gave his ancestors who had been gate keepers as follows: Dan Iya, Tanko, Musa, Adamu, Muhammad, Ibrahim, and himself (Adamu).

The *Chronicle* and Barth gave the name of the gate as *Gudan* and *Gudau* respectively, while Lugard and most of the later sources have variations of the present name, *Dawanau*. It appears *Gudau* refers to the earlier name which was changed to *Dawanau* after the village of that name, to which the gate directly opened, was established or had become important. That may also be the time when the stream which lies some 15 kilometres from Kano on the road to Katsina got its name (*Dawanau*).

Gudan or *Gudau* depicts "running away" and *Dawanau* seems to have come from "*dawa*" meaning "bush". Both names appear to show that *Dawanau* was one of the remotest gates, may be through which slaves usually attempted to make their escape.

Waika

The name of the Sarkin Kofa is Alhaji Abdullahi, who is about 60 years old, and he claims that the office of Sarkin Kofa is hereditary, but could "not remember" his ancestors.

The name is consistent among all our major sources. Could there be a relationship between *Gudau* and *Waika? Waika* is suggested to be a shortened form of *walkiya* – lightning. May be someone who ran, or who could run like lightning?

During the Civil War, Emir Tukur (1892-4) is said to have passed through this gate, and he never returned; he was soon defeated at Tafashiya, where, shortly after, he died, From then on no *Emir* of Kano ever used that gate again.

It was on the *kyaure* of this kofa that the curious Arabic characters that nobody could understand were found. It is now in safe-keeping at the Gidan Makama Museum, Kano.

The kofa opens on to a road that leads to Dawakin Tofa.

Kansakali

The Sarkin Kofa is Alhaji Bala, born at the same place about 55 years ago. he claims to have been the gate keeper for the past twenty-four years. He says his kofa was "established" some one hundred and fifty years ago. He could not remember the "first" gate keeper, but says that the office is hereditary in his family. His grandfather Ibrahim and his father Umaru were both gate keepers of *Kansakali*.

According to Alhaji Bala, the gate was called *Kansakali* because it was here that Emirs "ascend their horses and directed warfare in Sokoto", whatever that means. We are told that Tukur, before he became Emir, once fought for Sokoto in its conflict with Argungu and he showed much bravery (Dokaji, p.33).

Kansakali, according to Bargery, means "sword". Separated, the word means "the head of a good-for-nothing fellow". May be the name was some humorous reference to the sword which may no longer be current, like "something to take the head of a wastrel" or the like. There are so many such references to the sword, e.g. *"Gaya wa jini na wuce"* i.e. lit: tell the blood I have passed, meaning it was so sharp and the user such an expert that the head (of the executed) was cut before blood started to ooze out.

When was the sword introduced in this area? According to traditions collected by Mischlisch von Adams (*Uber die kulturen in Mittel-Sudan,* Berlin, 1942, p.170) the sword, although being used by the Hausa is not their traditional weapon. They preferred bows and arrows and it is said that very few could fight with the sword although they carried it as a mark of honour. Swords, he said, were brought to Hausaland from Azbin, Ghadames, Tripoli, Chad, etc. Were swords first brought to Kano by the Wangara who came towards the end of the fourteenth century? Was it in this area of the gate where people were beheaded? It appears as if this gate was established towards the end of the fourteenth century.

Kawungari

This was the most southern of the gates in the first phase. It was rendered redundant, together with that section of the wall, in a later extension of the City.

Tuji (now Wambai)

The gate keeper is Abdullahi Yusufu who was born here about 48 years ago. The gate, he claims, was "established" by Emir Alu "one hundred and fifty years" ago. The work of the gate-keeper is hereditary but he could not remember the names of past gate keepers.

Tuji, as we said before, was one of the warriors of Sarki Tsaraki (c. 1136-94) in whose honour the gate may have been named.

By the fifteenth century it had become known as *Kofar Dagachi* no doubt in honour of the person carrying that title at the time. But who was he? The first *Dagachi* is said to have come from Borno during the rule of Dauda (c.1421-38) and he was so much respected by the Sarki that when he went to fight war with Zaria, Dauda is said to have left Dagachi in charge of the town. That Dagachi (or his descendant) is said to have grown so powerful and influential and that it was only in the rule of Abdullahi (c.1499-1509) that he was turned out and a slave given that office. Since it was in the fifteen century extension that the gate is mentioned under the name, then we should assume that it was the first Dagachi who was meant.

In the seventeenth century the name of the gate is said to have been changed again, this time in honour of Wambai Giwa, although the extensions which he carried out seem to have had nothing to do with this gate.

This gate, like the neighbouring gates (*Mazugal* and *Kofar Mata*) has been demolished for further developments. With the increasing costs it is doubtful whether even the "ornamental" structure which was there could be rebuilt. Each of the gates: *Sabuwar Kofar* (Middle), *Dan Agundi* and *Naisa,* is costing the Federal Department of antiquities ₦20,000 to renovate.

When Barth visited Kano it was "the widest of the gates of the town", which means even in the former times it was an important gate. It was a gate which opened on to the road to Kazaure, Hadejia and beyond.

15th Century Gates

Kofar Mata

The gate keeper is Jibrin Muhammad, about 60 years old. The "first" gate keeper was Gerama and he was succeeded by his descendants ever since: Gerama, Lafau, Shehu, Jibrin, Muhammada and Jibrin.

There are no variants on this name. According to Sarkin Kofa Jibrin this was the gate through which followed the *Matan Fada* (i.e. palace women) who accompanied the Sarki either to war or to any of his palaces, especially Fanisau. The Sarki is said to have left by *Kofar Wombai. Mata,* of course, means 'women', hence "Women's Gate". During *Id* prayers, also, women are said to have used this gate.

This *kofa* has definite association with the rule of Rumfa (c.1463-99) who was not only the Sarki who is said to have started the *Id* prayers outside the City, but also the one who started purdah or *kulle.* Jibrin claims that in former times whenever the *matan fada* were passing no man was allowed to loiter around.

This was the main gate which opened to nearby villages such as Jogana, Dan Zaki, and to further towns like Gumel. It also opened on the route to Gaya and to Borno.

As we have mentioned earlier, the ornamental structure of the European period has itself been demolished.

Nassarawa

The Sarkin Kofa here is Ahmadu who is about 60 years old. He was born in the present Kofar Nassarawa area. He succeeded his father Mohammadu who in turn succeeded his father Abdullahi. Ahmadu also traces the establishment of his family to Emir Alu's reign.

There are two main variations in the name of the gate:

Gertawasa (KC)
Gyarta-wasa (East)
Nassarawa (Barth)

Gerta-wasa means prepare for games, and *nassara* means victory. It appears as if the two words were meant to convey the same expression. It is claimed

that whenever the Sarki wanted to go out to battle he used to come here and pray for victory. He also came back through this gate when he was victorious in war. Was that also the time when there would have been plays and other marks of jubilation to mark the occasion?

Certainly, it was never meant to refer to the European quarters (Nassarawa) which was established to the east of the gate. It was so named before the Europeans had established their power in Kano. The gate also opened on to the main route to Borno.

Dan Agundi

The Sarkin Kofa is Yakubu Suleiman who is about 60 years old, 40 of which he spent as the Sarki of the present Kofa. He claims that the post has been hereditary in his family. He claims also that he could remember six names of his ancestors who succeeded each other father to son: Babare, Unma, Sulaimanu, Mohammadu Mai Kofa, Yahaya, Sulaimanu, Yakubu.

There are several variations of the name:

Kawayi (KC)
Kura (Barth)
Garaku (Lugard)
Kawaye (East)
Dan Agundi – all sources as from 1950.

Kura is a town towards which this gate opens; and *Guraku* may mean, as Moody suggests on the authority of Bargery, a flock of cattle – although *guraku* could also mean the plural of *guraka*, that is, a gourd.

Kawayi may come from *Kawai* meaning keeping silence. May be this was the gate through which the army re-entered the city when it was defeated. That is the opposite to *Nassara* or Gertawasa, it was a sign that everyone should be quiet and mourn the losses. Certainly it was through this gate that the Madawaki Kukuna re-entered the city after those loyal to Soyaki (c.1652) were defeated by those of Kukuna (c.1652-1660).

Yakubu Suleimanu gave an interesting story – which unfortunately shattered his earlier claim – that all the gate keepers were changed when Alu came to power and that *Dan Agundi* was the name of one of his slaves which he made the Sarkin Kofa.

As has been mentioned earlier this is one of the three gates which is meant to retain the "traditional" character of the former gates.

Other than to Kura, the gate also opened on routes to Dawakin Kudu, Garko and Kumbotso.

Naisa

The present gate keeper is named Usman Dan Audu who is 47 years claiming that he has been Sarkin Kofa for 32 years. His family also seems to have come to the office in the beginning of the present century. The first Sarkin Kofa (in his family?) is said to be one Dan Gwari (compare with Dan Agundi) and since then he has been succeeded by members of his family up to the present Sarkin Kofa. Here are some of his ancestors: Audu, Muhammad,

Ibrahim, Baba, and Shua'ibu. There are variations in the name of this gate: *Dogo* and *Naisa*. It is, however, difficult to say which was earlier.

The story in *Kano ta Dabo Cigari* (p.58) is that the gate was changed from *Dogo* to *Naisa* during the period of Fulani rule in the nineteenth century. However, according to Yakubu, Sarkin Kofar Dan Agundi, Naisa, like the latter, was also a slave of Sarki Alu.

It is one of the gates currently being renovated.

The gate opened to many towns, villages and farms, like Tudun Wada, Rano and Kura.

16th. Century Gate

This extension, as we said, appears to have had only one gate — Kofar Kabuga, but since it disappeared and was re-established again in another extension in the seventeenth century, we shall treat it below.

17th. Century Gates

Kabuga

The present Sarkin Kofa is Yakubu, a very young man, but it was his father, Yahya, who has been interviewed. The latter is about 66 years old, and had served as Sarkin Kofa for about 15 years before he retired and handed over to his son. He said that the gate was originally well inside, but due to a later extension it was transferred to its present site. There used to a time when there were two Kabugas, one opening into an inner one, he claims. Some of his ancestors who were gate keepers were: Ibrahim, Sallau, Hashiru, Yahya (Himeself) and Yakubu. *Kabuga* means 'beating', and like *Gadonkaya* and *Dukawuya* it appears to have been associated with battles.

It also used to open on to the route to Karaye and to Zaria. In fact, many caravans from Gonja were also said to have used this gate. The Sarkin Kofa of Kabuga is said to have always been the richest among the gate keepers.

Gadon Kaya

The present gate keeper is Alhaji Isa Idi, about 35 years old. He does not know when the gate was established, but he heard it said that the first gate keeper was Dan Tsoho.

There is no variation in the name of the gate. It means a bed made of thorns. It is said to refer to a certain Sarkin Kofa who used to make his bed out of thorns — which are said to have been abundant in the area, and he then sat on it to do his duty. The name depicts bravery of which the correct episode may have been forgotten. By the 17th century extensions were solely for the purpose of defence and many battles may have taken place here and the other neighbouring gates. The Kwarafa are said to have broken through this gate into the *birni* in Dadi's reign (c.1670-1703 .)

This gate has now been "suspended" by the new "gate" jokingly called "Kofar Taylor Woodrow", which has been opened just some few yards east of it. The gate is now rarely used.

It used to open on the routes to the surrounding villages and also to Kura.

Dukawuya

The Sarkin Kofa is Yusufu Ahmad, born at Dukawuya some 45 years ago, and he has been the Sarkin Kofa for the past 22 years. He claims that his gate was established about 500 years ago. Some of his forebears (father to son) are: Maitama, Babande, Yusuf, Ahmadu, and Yusuf. This is the gate used by the *Emir* and his retinue to pass to his Dorayi farm palace during the *Id-el-fitr* celebrations.



Like *Dukawuya* it appears to be associated with some battle or defeat. Duka means beat, and *wuya* means either neck or difficulty.

The *kyaure* of this kofa has been removed to Jos, where it now forms the door of the gate in the reproduction of the Kano Wall in the Museum of Traditional Nigeran Architecture, Jos

The gate used to lead to many of the surrounding villages and to Gwarzo. It also used to open on the way that led to Zaria.

20th Century Gates

Sabuwar Kofa or Kofar Middle

Situated between *Kofar Dan Agundi* and *Nassarawa.* It is one of the ornamental gates now being continually renovated together with *Dan Agundi* and *Naisa.* It has no gatehouse but only an ornamental gateway which allows for the passage of cars in the middle and foot paths in the wings.

Others are Kofar *Pampo* between the *Kofar Kabuga* and *Kofar Dukawuya* which was made in 1931 in order to carry the main pipeline from Chalawa to Goron Dutse reserve, and the larger *Kofar Jakara* through the City wall. It is situated between *Kofar Mazugal* and *Wambai.*

One of the Gates of Kano at the time of the British Conquest



Various Gates of Kano City in their late 19th & early 20th century form





Some Gates of Kano City in their late 19th and early 20th century form.

Various Gates of Kano City in their present form.





Kofar dan Agundi



Sabuwar Kofa



One of the Modern Gates of Kano City

NOTES

I wish to thank Dr. Philip Shea who read this article in draft and gave me not only additional information but also many suggestions on how to improve the paper. I should also like to thank Malam Abdurrahman Jibir Daura who acted as my research assistant on this project, and all the Sarkin Kofas for their co-operation.

1. Many scholars suggest that in the earlier period the area where Kano now stands was known as the stockade of Dala, or simply the Dala Settlement. For the latest works, see Last, M. "Early Kano: The Santolo-Fangwai Settlement System" in *Kano Studies*, NS 1,4,1979, pp.7-23; and Lavers, J.E. "A Note on the terms Hausa and Afuno", in *Kano Studies*, NS, 2,1,1980.
2. The Chronicle is not very clear about these early inhabitants, and their relations to each other. See: Last, M. "Historical Metaphors in the Intellectual History of Kano Before 1800", Conference on the History of the Central Sudan Before 1804, Zaria January 1979.
3. *Kano Chronicle* (KC) in Palmer, H.R. *Sudanese Memoirs*, 3 volumes in one, 1928, New Impression, 1967, Vol. 3, p.100.
4. Last, "Historical Metaphors", p.10.
5. KC, p. 100
6. Smith, A. "Some Considerations relating to the formation of states in Hausaland", in JHSN, 3, 1971, p.339.
7. *ibid.*
8. East, R.M. *Labarun Hausawa da Makwabtansu*, Zaria, 1953, reprinted, 1971.
9. Dokaji, A.A. *Kano ta Dabo Cigari*, NNPC, Zaria, 1958, reprinted 1978, p.13..
10. *ibid.*
11. On the importance of Santolo see: Last, "Early Kano"; The Santolo-Fangwai Settlement System."

12. KC, p.109.
13. *ibid.*, p.110.
14. *ibid.*, p.112. For example, Rumfa is said to have had a thousand wives.
15. That must have been one of the reasons that the walls were made to enclose a larger space than was needed for dwelling purposes. It was not only to produce enough food during a siege but also to allow for the refuge of the inhabitants of the surrounding villages (and their livestock) in times of insecurity.
16. KC, p.112.
17. *ibid.*, p. 114.
18. *ibid.*, p.116; Dokaji, *Kano ta Dabo Cigari*, p. 26.
19. See Usman, Y.B. "The External Relations of Katsina Before 1804", in *Savanna, 1,2, 1972*, pp.117-80; Shea, P.J. *The Development of an export oriented dyed cloth industry in the nineteenth century*, Ph.D., Univ. of Wisconsin, 1975, pp,29-49.
20. *KC*, p. 116.
21. Alhaji Abdullahi, Sarkin Kofar Kabuga, interviewd 27th July 1981
22. The *Asl al Wangariyin* was translated by Muhammad al-Hajj, as "A Seventeenth Century Chronicle on the Origins and Missionary Activities of the Wangara", in *Kano Studies*, 1, 3, 1968, pp. 7-42; since then at least two more scholars to my knowledge have made attempts to re-examine the document: Lovejoy, P., "Notes on the 'Asl al-Wangarin", in *Kano Studies, NS, 1, 3, 1979*, pp. 46-52; Sa'ad, E.N., "Islamization in Kano: Sequence and Chronology", in *Kano Studies*, NS, 1, 4, 1979, pp.52-66.
23. Moody, H.L.B. *The Walls and Gates of Kano City*, Dept. of Antiquities, Fed. Govt. of Nigeria, Lagos. 1971, p.56.
24. Field interviews in Kano, July-August, 1981.
25. Barth, H. *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa . . in the years 1849-55.* Centenary Edition, London, 1965, Vol. II, p.506.
26. See Moody, *The Walls and Gates of Kano City*, p.42. Although it must have been Kofar Gadon Kaya he meant when he says Kofar Kabuga. See also Hallam, W.K.R., "An Introduction to the History of Hausaland", in *The Nigerian Field, xxxi, 4, 1966*, particularly the map which entirely agrees with the "Kano City and township map" prepared by Northern Nigeria Survey in Jan. 1966. I am grateful to my colleague Philip Shea for lending me the Survey Map.
27. This aspect has been examined further below under that section that deals with construction and maintenance of the gates.
28. *Kc*, p.117
29. *Wakar Bagauda*, NNPC, Zaria, 1969, 1972, p.8.
30. *KC*, p.123.
31. Mortimore, M.J. and Wilson, J. *"Land and People in the Kano Close-Settled Zone*, A.B.U., Zaria, 1965.
32. Fika, A.M. *The Kano Civil War and British Over-Rule, 1882-1940. O.U.P.*, Ibadan, 1978, p.10.
33. Moody, *The Walls and Gates*, p.54.
34. Dalziel, J.M. *A Hausa Botanical Dictionary*, London, 1916, p.54.
35. KC, p.103.
36. Leo Africanus, *Description de l'Afrique*, A. Epaulard, Paris, 1956, II.
37. Shea, *The Development of an export oriented* . . . . . pp. 31-33.
38. KC, p.121.
39. Denham, *et. al., Narratives of Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa in the years 1822, 1823 and 1824* . . . . . London 1826, vol. 2, p.35.
40. Bargery, Rev. G.P. *A Hausa-English Dictionary and English Hausa Vocabulary*, O.U.P., 1934, p.704.
41. Moody, H.I.B., "A Kano Mystery: The Waika Tablet", in *Nigeria Magazine*, 97, 1968, p.63.

42. *Denham et al., Narratives of Travels and Discoveries* London, 1826. Staudinger, *Im Herzen der Haussalander.*
43. According to Yakubu Sulaiman, Sarkin Kofar Dan Agundi, during a period of great insecurity all the *Kyaure* of the gates were covered by *kirgi*, i.e. cow hide in order to give additional strength. Interview, 27.7.81.
44. *Annual Colonial Reports: Northern Nigeria*, 1902, p.86-7. Zaria Gate is the present Kofar Dukawuya, which used to be the gate which opened directly on the main route to Zaria. The breach was made on Kofar Kabuga.
45. Unanimous traditions from all the gate keepers.
46. *ibid.* Refer to various references in the *Chronicle* where malams made charms for the rulers.
47. Moody, "A Kano Mystery" . . . . . p.64.
48. Sarkin Kofar Waika Alhaji Abdullahi, interview 28 August 1981.
49. Moody, Walls and Gates, p.55.
50. Unanimous traditions from the gate keepers. In the *Chronicle* "kewayar garu" is said to have been started by Sarki Muhammadu Kukuna (c. 1652-1660).
51. Unanimous traditions from the gate keepers.
52. *Annual Colonial Reports: Northern Nigeria, 1904.*
53. Morel, E.D. *Nigeria: Its People and Its Problems*, London, 1911, p.133.
54. This re-construction unless otherwise stated is based on the information obtained from most of the gate keeprs.
55. KC, p. 112.
56. Yakubu Sarkin Kofar Dan Agundi, interview, 28 July 1981.
57. Dokaji, *Kano ta Dabo Cigari*, pp. 55-6; see also Fika, *The Kano Civil War, p. 74.*
58. Staudinger, *Im Herzem der Haussalander*
59. Unanimous traditions from the gate keepers.
60. KC, p.120.
61. Dokaji, p.54.
62. Fika, 1978, p.93.
63. Unanimous traditions from the gate keepers.
64. In his thesis, Philip Shea has argued that the taxation in nineteenth century Kano was the lowest compared to the other neighbouring Hausa states. *The Development of an expont oriented dyed cloth industry.* . . . . . pp. 22-49.

THE KANO CHRONICLE AS HISTORY

by

M.G. SMITH

I

The *Kano Chronicle,* published first in an English translation by Sir H. Richmond Palmer[1] and nearly twenty-five years later in a Hausa translation by Dr. Rupert East and his colleagues[2] is unique among indigenous contemporary documents on Hausa history before the Fulani jihad of 1804-1810. There are a number of king-lists for Zaria[3], Katsina[4], Kebbi[5], and so forth, but these rarely report events for the reigns they list, and even fewer report any development during those reigns. Such king-lists are invaluable in the absence of any other data; but they often present more puzzles than answers, more questions than information.

The *Kano Chronicle* differs from these royal skeletons in summarizing for each of the reigns that it reports a varying collection of pertinent incidents and information. It is preceded by an introductory and speculative sketch of the culture and composition of the autochthonous population before the advent of an immigrant group led by a legendary hero, Bagauda, who is generally believed to have been the grandson of Bayajidda, the mythical founder of the seven Hausa states, who came from the east to Daura, where he married the queen, or Magajiya, and shared her rule.[6] On this view, Bagauda came with his host from Daura to Kano, or rather to Sheme, where he died, some nine years after the chiefs of Gano, Dab and Debbi.[7] A generation earlier Barbushe, the priest of Tchunburburai, who lived on Dala, had foretold the arrival of strangers who would subjugate the land and its people, the clans that clustered around the rock and worshipped Tsumburburai.

From these beginnings the *Chronicle* traces the emergence and evolution of the chiefdom of Kano until its conquest by the followers of Shehu Usuman dan Fodio in 1807 after a long contest with the last Hausa chief, Muhammad Alwali II (1781-1807).

In the absence of any comparable history of a pre-jihadic Hausa state, the *Kano Chronicle* is of special interest, since it records the contexts and processes by which the polity of Kano emerged, and situates its development neatly within its wider geo-historical milieu. As Kano and Katsina occupy

the most favourable geographical positions for external trade and contacts of all Hausa populations, there histories and development are of particular significance for an understanding of the cultural evolution of Hausa peoples as a whole, since the latter often learn from Kano and reap the costs or benefits of Kano's experience at some later date. Undoubtedly the pre-jihadic pre-Fulani history of Hausaland, as well as Kano, is bound up with our assessment of the historicity of the *Kano Chronicle,* that is, its validity and reliability as an account of the development and composition of the Kano people during the centuries between Bagauda's arrival and the Fulani conquest of 1807.

There are those who would prefer that the official Fulani version of Hausa history and ethnography should be the only one on the market. They should naturally try to deny or denigrate in one way or another the historicity of the *Kano Chronicle,* since this document relates the development of Hausa Kano before the Fulani jihad without reference to that event and its consequences. Others who prefer to see the Fulani jihad and caliphate in this region as phases of the cultural and social evolution of this section of the central Sudan, may wish to know as much as possible about the pre-jihadic organization and culture of the peoples of this area. They should therefore greet with enthusiasm the prospect of illumination by the *Kano Chronicle* and any others that may be found in Hausaland.

However the problem of historicity is crucial. We have to ask, to what degree do these or similar documents accurately and objectively report events and developments among these peoples before the jihad launched by Shehu Usman dan Fodio in 1804 A.D.? Understandably, given its context, the historicity of accounts relating the pre-jihadic development of the conquered Hausa people is a matter of keen political interest to them and their rulers, especially since the Shehu Usman had condemned Hausa governments as unjust and non-Islamic and the people as syncretists, to justify his jihad.[8] It is a matter of record that the Shehu's followers destroyed and scattered many books or texts belonging to the Hausa people during this struggle,[9] and perhaps selectively, since numerous pre-jihadic texts on religion and law were preserved, while hardly any documents on the history of the conquered peoples escaped. The conquerors were therefore free to fill this historical vacuum with their own accounts of the peoples they had conquered, as Muhammadu Bello did early in his *Infaqu'ul Maisur*[10] and 'Abd Al Qadir b. al-Mustafa in the *Raudat al-Afkar.*[11] In assessing the historicity of the *Kano Chronicle* we cannot ignore the political interest that attaches to the evaluation of this document. However, as scholars we are concerned exclusively with the historical value of the *Chronicle* as an account of the development of Kano society, culture and polity between Bagauda's coming and the Fulani jihad. We should therefore begin with the text of the document itself.

II

Besides Arabic manuscripts of the *Chronicle*, we have the two translations by Palmer and East into English and Hausa respecitvely. The Arabic texts translated by Palmer and East differ very little in organization and context, but mainly in spelling and one or two marginal notes. For example, while Palmer's text contains a note linking Bagauda to Bayajidda as the latter's grandson, East's does not.[12] Likewise, East's translation lacks Palmer's footnote on the praise-names of the Madawaki, Gwoji and Kosa in Yaji's reign (1349-85A.D.), and another on the first Fulani Emir, Suleimanu (1807-19 A.D.)[13]

Palmer contrasts the text he used, which was found at Sabon Gari near Katsina, with another which Lady Lugard says was found at Kano,[14] claiming that the latter manuscript was "not complete, since only 42 kings are mentioned" while that found at Katsina "goes down to, and breaks off in, the time of Mohammed Bello, the 48th king."[15] East, using a text owned by Zubairu, the son of Sarkin Kano Dabo (1819-1846 A.D.) and grand-uncle of the late Emir Abdullahi Bayero, who loaned it to him, notes that that text was written (*rubuta*) in the reign of the Fulani Emir Muhammad Bello (1883-1892), who had the *Chronicle* copied and extended up to his reign.[16] In like fashion in his Hausa translation East extended the *Chronicle* beyond the accession of Abdullahi Bayero (1926-1953). Evidently these successive extensions by Muhammad Bello and Rupert East illustrate the way in which the *Chronicle* may have grown, for until Muhammad Bello directed that it should be brought up to date, the text had ceased with the reign of Muhammad Alwali, the 43rd and last Hausa chief listed in the manuscript which Bello extended. Thus the text to which Lady Lugard refers ceased with Muhammad Alwali but omits one of the reigns recorded in Palmer's text. Writing around 1867, the Alkalin Kano Muhammadu Zangi comments briefly on a copy of the *Chronicle* which he had studied, which did not then extend Alwali's reign.[17] In short, besides, copyists' errors, Arabic texts of the *Kano Chronicle* may differ in marginalia, in the number of Hausa chiefs they record, to a limited degree in their contents, and in their extension beyond 1807. It is tempting to project this scholastic pattern of growth backwards into the past and to assume that the *Chronicle* was brought up to date at irregular intervals from time to time, particularly when the reigning chief so wished.

In a note on the only three Arabic texts of the *Chronicle* that he could find, Mervyn Hiskett remarks that all three were traced to a single Kano mallam whose father, "Idris, was tutor to the royal family of Kano."[18] East's report that the Emir Abdullahi Bayero instructed his grand-uncle, Zubairu, the son of Ibrahim Dabo, to lend East his copy of the *Chronicle*, confirms the known scarcity of copies of the Arabic text.[19] When Hiskett

tried to borrow manuscripts to study, all three copies that were located came from the same son of Idris, from whom Palmer got the copy he translated. It is evident, then, that Arabic texts of the *Chronicle* do not circulate freely in Kano, for which reason Rupert East's Hausa translation published in 1933 was greatly appreciated.

Given the close connection of Zubairu, Idris, and the Emir Abdullahi's Alkalin Kano Muhammadu Zangi to the Fulani rulers, and the *Chronicle's* successive extensions at the requests of Mamman Bello and Abdullahi Bayero, it seems probable that at least under Fulani rule the circulation of the *Kano Chronicle* was rather restricted. Probably when the first Basuleibe Emir, Ibrahim Dabo, seeking to consolidate and extend his authority during the revolts that greeted his appointment, obtained the approval of Sarkin Musulmi Muhammadu Bello to revive some of the critical institutions of the Hausa state, he had already studied a copy of the *Kano Chronicle* as a guide.[20] Perhaps in this way the manuscript first came to the notice of a Fulani Emir, and was therefore preserved for its patent political utility. Thereafter it seems that few copies of the Arabic text continued to circulate among commoners in Kano or elsewhere. For example, as shown below, Mallam Adamu Muhammad el-Arabi, who completed the first draft of his unpblished history of Kano, *Al-ilan bi tarikh Kano*, in 1344 A.H. (1925-6 A.D.) and its revision in 1352 A.H. (1933 A.D.) on the eve of the publication of East's Hausa version, evidently had no idea of the *Chronicle's* existence.[21]

While the authorship of the *Chronicle* remains unknown, even for those additions made in the 1880s at Muhammadu Bello's direction, Hiskett, following Palmer, believes that the author may have been a 'Fezzani Arab' who may have written in a Maghribi rather than Ajami script.[21] If so then none of the texts so far identified can be the original. Moreover, since the entire *Chronicle* appears to be written in an easy and fluent "Tripoli and Ghadamis Arabic" [22] which differs sharply from that of Nigerian authors, it seems likely that at least in its present form, from the beginning the *Chronicle* was written in Arabic by native Arabic speakers. Given the intimate knowledge of Kano language, society and history the text displays, its author or authors must have lived long in Kano. It is thus possible that initially and in its periodic extensions the *Chronicle* was drafted by scholars from the small community of Ghadames Arabs who first settled in Kano under Yakubu (A.D. 1452-1463).[24] But however plausible, this is mere speculation. We neither know who the original author or authors of the *Chronicle* were, nor when he or they compiled the basic trunk of the present text, nor can we identify subsequent contributors or date their contributions precisely before the time of Muhammadu Bello, though clearly such data are relevant to any assessment of the document's historical validity.

III

Remarking the "almost complete absence of bias or partisanship" in the *Chronicle's* account of the Hausa chiefs of Kano, and its author's deep knowledge of the Hausa spoken at Kano, Palmer suggested that "the original may perhaps have been written by some stranger from the north who settled in Kano, and collected the stories of former kings handed down by oral tradition,"[25] but says nothing about the likely date. Writing later as if the entire text had been put together in Muhammadu Bello's reign, Rupert East says, "We do not know who wrote this book in the reign of Muhammadu Bello, but we think that the author did not create it entirely himself. Surely he followed other and older books which we no longer have ... The reason we say this is because we know that Wangarawa mallams began to come to Kano in the reign of the chief Yaji (around A.D. 1380); they brought Islam and knowledge (but Islam had already come to Katsina some sixty years earlier.) Given this, surely we could expect to find some mallams in each country recording the histories of their chiefs."[26] Thus East suggests that its original author collected information from several texts in preparing the earliest version of the *Chronicle*, in much the same way that later contributors, including himself, prepared their additions. In his view the first written records of Kano traditions and history probably dated back to the late 14th or early 15th century, following the arrival of Wangarawa (Mandinka) scholars and Islamic missionaries at Kano, some sixty years after Islam was believed to have reached Katsina.[27]

However, since East wrote both dates and events have been challenged, though on differing grounds. Reckoning backward with the aid of the Katsina king list compiled by Landeroin, H.F.C. Smith dates the reign of the Sarkin Katsina Muhammad Korau, who is widely regarded as the first Muslim king of Katsina, at 1492/3-1541/2 A.D. instead of 1320-1353 A.D., as Palmer had reckoned.[28] However, Smith's new chronology leaves an unnecessary and unacceptable gap of c.40 years between the death of Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (d.1505 A.D.) and his dates for the reign of Ibrahim Sura (1541/2-1543/4), wo whom al-Suyuti addressed his *Risalat al-Muluk*.[29] Yet even if we adjust the chronology he suggests to account for this discrepancy, then Muhammad Korau could have ruled Katsina between 1452/3 and 1501/2, which is still much later than East had assumed for the effective introduction of Islam at Katsina. We shall have to reconsider this proposed Katsina chronology later on other grounds; but it is clearly of little relevance to the *Chronicle's* report of Wangarawa first coming to Kano in the reign of Yaji (1349-1385 A.D.).

The *Chronicle* reports that this Wangarawa mission was led by Abdurrahman Zaite and lists several of his companions by name.[30] However we now know that the mission led by Abd al-Rahman Zagaiti or Zaite arrived at

Kano during the reign of Muhammad Rumfa, which Palmer reckoned as [illegible] A.D.[31] According to the *Chronicle*, "in his time the [illegible] came to Kano. They were Abdu Rahaman and his people . . . . . Abdu Rahaman lived in Kano and established Islam. He brought with him many books."[32] At the same time Kano received an even more distinguished [illegible], the Sheikh Muhammad bin Abd al-Karim al-Maghili of Tlemsen, who evidently arrived at Kano only three days before Zagaite and his large following.[33] An interesting slip in the text of the *Chronicle*, which does not report his arrival, nearly confirms Maghili's presence with the remark that "When he had established the Faith of Islam and learned men had grown numerous in Kano, and all the country had accepted the Faith, Abdu Karim (i.e. al-Maghili) returned to Masar (Egypt), leaving Sidi Fari as his deputy to carry on his work."[34] Commenting on this history of Habe (Hausa) Kano in his *Taqyid al-Akbar*, the Alkalin Kano Muhammadu Zangi says "There are many errors in the names of the chiefs from Bagauda to Rumfa who was reigning when the Shehu Maghili established Islam in this country [illegible] Maghili left three sons at Kano, Muhammadu Mukhtari, Muhammadu [illegible] and Sidi Fari. Their descendants are even now among us; and the descendants of Sidi Fari hold the office of Sarkin Sharifai at Kano until this day. It is said that Maghili first brought dates to Kano."[35]

On leaving Kano El Maghili visited Katsina and then proceeded to Gao, the capital of the Askia al-Hajj Muhammad (1494-1528) whom he had [illegible] in Cairo. From Gao he returned to Tuwat where he died in [illegible], according to Ahmed Baba, who adds that "in response to a request from the ruler of Kano he wrote a treatise on government," the [illegible] *Obligations of Princes* [illegible] Rumfa or for his son and immediate successor [illegible] we cannot tell.[36]

[illegible]

[illegible]

its accounts of preceeding reigns as well with caution. Set beside its externally confirmed report of the visits of al-Maghili and Zagaiti during the reign of Muhammad Rumfa, this detailed but misleading tale of the battle for Santolo indicates firstly, that the original text of the *Chronicle* was not written before Zagaite's arrival in Rumfa's reign; secondly, that it was not written by any member of Zagaiti's or al-Maghili's parties or their descendants; and thirdly, that the first version was probably drafted not along after Rumfa's death, which following Palmer's chronology, East sets in 904 A.H. or 1499 A.D.[42] By then Kano had long known Islam and long been a vassal of the muslim state of Kanem/Borno.

According to the *Chronicle*, the second chief to bear an Islamic name was Usumanu Zamnagawa, the son of Shekarau, who reigned briefly from 1343 to 1349 after killing his brother Tsamiya, the ninth chief, who ruled from 1307 to 1343 A.D. Having slain Tsamiya, Zamnagawa shut himself in the palace with the corpse for seven days, thereby provoking this nickname ('the one who sits with the corpse'). The *Chronicle* says "it is not known how Tsamiya was made away with; whether Zamnagawa ate him or buried him, no one knows."[43] During his reign the *Chronicle* says the Maguzawa or pagan Hausa left the city for Fongui (Fankui), following which Zamnagawa appointed his son as chief of the 'Rumawa', another native community of Kano, at their request. Such Islamic labels and events neatly indicate that the *Chronicle* regards Zamnagawa as a Muslim on the basis of local tradition. An independent account by Mallam Adamu Muhammad el-Arabi in his history of Kano reads that Zamnagawa "killed many men as chief During his reign Islam came to Kano, brought by 'ulama who taught him to say his prayers. This was the reason for his death."[44] The story, though well known[45] may of course be untrue; but as Palmer noted, at that period the missionary impulse of the Mandinka state of Mali was probably at its height, and it seems quite likely that Muslim missionaries from Mali then visited Kano and Katsina with success.[46]

At Kano, according to the *Chronicle*, the immigrants led by Bagauda had been forbidden connubium and participation in their rituals by the autochthonous people whom they strove to dominate through their superior political organization.[47] While the *Chronicle* records many improbable details and events of this contest, the structure and character of this struggle between the immigrants under a co-ordinating central chiefship and the divided natives in and around Kano City seems clear and sound. Santolo, then perhaps as large or larger than Kano in population, may have developed some central organization to co-ordinate its resistance to the aggressive Gaudawa immigrants. Under such circumstances, the immigrant chiefs were quite likely to accept Islam for the ritual, military and political resources it promised to add to their power. This is certainly the impression conveyed by the *Chronicle's* narrative of the continuing struggle of the immigrants for domination from Gijimasu's day (1095-1134 A.D.) until Yaji's (1349-1385

A.D.). While the *Chronicle's* details of this account are probably spurious, it seems unlikely that the protracted and bitter conflict it reports between the immigrants and the autochthonous people, at both ritual and secular levels, did not occur.

Bugaya, whose name indicates that he was a posthumous son, followed his full brother Yaji to the throne in 1385. According to the *Chronicle,* he dispersed the Maguzawa from the rock at Fungui, scattered them, and placed them in the hands of his Galadima. A devout Muslim, he was "the first Sarkin Kano who was buried at Madatai by his own request, having previously instructed the Liman Madatai ..... to pray over his body and Lawal to wash it and Turbana, Jigawa and Kusuba to help him."[48] The *Asl al Wanqariyin* refers to Madatai as a place where the Sheikh Zagaiti was buried[49] shortly before the 'sultan' Muhammad Rumfa; but with Bugaya, Madatai became the burial place of those Hausa chiefs of Kano who died in the *City,* all being Muslims. On this basis among others we must recognize the Islamic status of the chiefship at Kano before the end of the 14th century. By Rumfa's reign some decades later, not only had the last centre of indigenous resistance at Santolo been eliminated, but Kano, then a vassal state of Muslim Borno, was firmly linked to the Muslim world of the Central and Western Sudan by trade, cultural and political ties of diverse kinds.

IV

Such interpretations of course presuppose the general validity and relevance of the *Chronicle,* despite our recognition that its chronology and narrative of the early reigns and centuries are not reliable in detail. The questions that arise because of this are, at what point in time does the record in the *Chronicle* achieve validity of detail and chronology as well as structure? When was the initial document compiled and how? Given the narrative's unreliability for earlier reigns, is that uniform for all the subjects it then treats, and if not, in what areas can we place confidence? How far and in what respects is its account of later reigns superior and more reliable? Another set of questions relate to the organization and chronology of the *Chronicle* as a continuous account of a succession of chiefly reigns. Should these reigns be listed out of order, or should the *Chronicle's* series contain errors of omission or commission, then its relative as well as absolute chronology will be correspondingly compromised. I cannot hope to deal adequately with all these issues in this essay. Nonetheless in assessing the historicity of the *Chronicle,* they have a central place.

Anticipating some of these questions, Palmer back-dated the reigns of Hausa chiefs from the terminal point in September 1807 (1222 A.H.) when the Fulani are beleived to have entered Kano after Alwali's defeat and flight.[50] He then checked the reports of various reigns against external information where possible, as, for example, the visit of Al-Maghili to Kano in Rumfa's reign, the arrival at Kano of Othman Kalnama, a deposed ruler of

Borno, in Daudu's reign (1421-1438 A.D.)[51], and references to Kano's conflicts with Katsina, the Jukun (Kwararafa), Gobir, Zamfara and Borno. Altogether the *Chronicle* passes these tests with high credit. Nonetheless certain puzzles remain. For example as H.F.C. Smith points out, while Palmer dates the death of Muhammad Alwali I (also known as el-Kutumbi) in Katsina to 1648,[52] according to his own king-list of Katsina, Kutumbi and his successor Alhaji died during the reign of the Sarkin Katsina Ubanyari (Muhammad dan Wari). On Smith's reading of the Katsina kinglist, Ubanyari reigned between 1704/5 and 1706/7 A.D.[53]

According to Palmer's Katsina text, Ubanyari died on a "Monday 1018 A.H.",[54] a date which Smith prefers to read as 1118 A.H. or 1706/7 A.D.[55] However, according to the *Kitab ila Ma'arifat Umara Katsina,* Ubanyari died on the 10th night of Jumada al-Aula in 1082 A.H., that is on August 17th, 1671 A.D. Since Ubanyari had ruled Katsina for "31 years 5 months and 7 days" according to that text,[56] it is thus quite likely that the date assigned by Palmer for Kutumbi's death, 1648 A.D., is correct. Moreover, Palmer's Katsina king-list says that Kutumbi's successor, Sarkin Kano Alhaji, also died in the struggle against Ubanyari and Katsina. The *Kitab ila Ma'arifat Umara Katsina,* on the other hand, having mentioned the deaths of the Treasurer of Kano and the Emir Kutumbi in Ubanyari's reign, only records the "capture of his successor Alhaji."[57] As regards Alhaji's end in 1649 A.D., in the *Kano Chronicle* we read that he "ruled Kano eight months and 24 days, then he was deposed – the reason I do not remember. He went into the country to live at a place called Dan Zaki."[58] This follows an equally perplexing report on Kutumbi's death. "As regards Sarkin Kano (Kutumbi) some people say he was killed in Katsina, others say that he died at Kano. The latter is the better account. In any case he died within three days of the battle."[59] In short, the author of these entries in the *Chronicle* wished to register his uncertainty about Kutumbi's death and the end of Alhaji's reign. It seems evident then that these entries were recorded many years after these events, and therefore that the document to which they were added had been drafted at the latest before or shortly after Kutumbi's accession in 1623 A.D. If so, then the first version of the *Chronicle* was probably drafted in the 16th century during or after the reign of Muhammad Kisoke (1509-1565 A.D.) Internal evidence relating to the reigns of Muhammadu Shashere (1573-1582) and his successor Muhammadu Zaki (1582-16-18) suggests that the account was probably brought up to date during or shortly after the reign of Muhammadu Nazaki (1618-1623), Kutumbi's predecessor.[60]

In his brief comment on the *Chronicle* the Alkali Muhammadu Zangi notes cryptically that *"it is said* that the interval between Rumfa and Alwali (II) is 348 (Moslem) years."[61] Alwali succeeded in 1195 A.H. (1781 A.D.) and ceased to rule in 1222 A.H. (1807 A.D.), while Muhammad Rumfa

reigned between 867-904 A.H. (1463-1499)[62] Thus the interval between the accessions of Rumfa and Alwali on Palmer's reckoning is 328 years against 348 that Zangi presumably refers to. At most then, beginning with Muhamad Rumfa, Palmer's dates should be spread over another twenty Muslim years to meet Zangi's reservation. However, Zangi himself seems rather uncertain on this point. While such a change could place Rumfa's reign between 847 A.H. and 884 (1443/4-1479/80 A.D.), those dates would not square with what we know of al-Maghili's movements, and, as we have seen, Kutumbi's death could not be back-dated correspondingly without parallel adjustments in the Katsina dynastic chronology derived from *Kitab ila Ma'arafat*, at least as regards the dates of Ubanyari's regin. However, among the external evidence provided by Kano's relations with Borno, Katsina, Zamfara and Gobir, the reign-dates Palmer assigned to rulers from Dauda (824-841 A.H.; 1421-1438 A.D.), and perhaps from Usumanu Zamnagawa (1343-1349 A.D.)[63], until Alwali seem sufficiently near the mark to merit acceptance as historical unless convincingly shown to be wrong. It follows then that at least a far back as Dauda's reign we can accept the absolute chronology of the *Chronicle* as historically adequate. Before that date, for reasons indicated above, it could be argued that the dates assigned to the resigns of Usmanu Zamnagawa (1343-1349 A.D.), Yaji (1349-1385 A.D.), Bugaya (1385-1390 A.D.), Kanajeji (1390-1410 A.D.) and Umaru son of Kanajeiji (1414-1421 A.D.)[64] also merit acceptance, despite insufficient external tests to validate them.

The claim that resign lengths and dates in the *Chronicle* from Usuman Zamnagawa forward are reliable rests partly on the presumption that the initial text was drafted during the 16th century in or shortly after the reign of Muhammadu Kisoke, who died in 1565. From my experience, even without any historical texts, it is not difficult to develop tests and adjust such chronology for such major events as the accessions and deaths or depositions of chiefs for the preceeding 200 to 250 years. from oral sources. Inevitably, in such a process much detail of developments in these reigns will be forgotten, garbled, or sometimes misplaced. Whether and to what degree the contents of the *Chronicle's* reports on these reigns from Usuman Zamnagawa forward to Rumfa represent actual historical events and experiences of Kano is thus another question. Certainly insofar as they are confirmed by such external checks as the Borno records of Othman Kalnama's deposition and departure for Kano in 1425 A.D., we must accept their validity. The problem is that most of the developments reported in the reigns under consideration lack such certifiable external checks. Some such as Yaji's eviction of the Sarkin Rano From Zamnagawa,[65] though readily confirmed from Rano traditions, cannot be dated firmly by invoking external checks. Many more, which narrate events or identify particular officials by title and name, are now obviously beyond verification.

V

In a brilliant recent discussion of the *Chronicle,* Murray Last obliquely suggests that it is best regarded as a rather free compilation of local legends and traditions drafted in the mid-seventeenth century by a humorous Muslim rationalist who almost seems to have studied under Levi-Strauss.[66] There are a number of cross-cutting binary sets in the "analogical geographies" the *Chronicle* apparently reveals, but more triangles with oppositions and mediators a la Levi-Strauss. Yet surely even if structuralism describes the universally valid pattern of human thought, this would not dispense with the ordinary criteria and aims of historicity. Though Last does not conclude that the *Chronicle* is poor history, many might readily assume that this is implied, from the style and organization of his discourse. His paper itself does not support such a view, however, despite its analysis of the differing traditions recorded in the first ten reigns of the *Chronicle,* during which the immigrants led by Bagauda struggled to dominate and destroy the native community of Kano. All this is of the greatest value. Together those reigns cover the period from 389 A.H. or 999 A.D. to 743 A.H. and 1343 A.D. – that is, the legendary first three and a half centuries of Kano's history, following the arrival of Bagauda and his 'host'. While the events and symbols recorded in the *Chronicle* to express the opposition of immigrants and natives are all probably in some sense 'untrue', the nature and intensity of that opposition cannot be gainsaid *a priori* or on available records. The immigrants were determined to conquer and rule the acephalous peoples of Kano, just as the latter, called Abagiyawa, were determined to resist as best they could. It might of course be argued that there was no such invasion of Kano by 'Bagauda' or others at this period; but there is sufficient evidence of cumulative population movements within and around this region between the 7th and 11th centuries A.D. to suggest that such a flat, fertile and attractive country as Kano would be very likely to receive substantial immigration from the north and east.

Concluding that the original draft of the *Chronicle* was made not long after 1650 A.D., Murray Last distinguishes three preceding periods in its account of Kano history that differ significantly in the sources, status and reliability of the data on which they are based. For the period before 1450 A.D. he has little confidence in the *Chronicle's* historicity; and he questions its accuracy for the following century, 1450-1550 A.D. From 1550 onwards, despite reservations, he has increasing confidence in the document's validity; and from 1650 A.D. he is satisfied.[67]

Last supports this evaluation of the *Chronicle* by comparing the numbers of rulers and lengths of reigns it records with similar data from the *Song of Bagauda* and Dr. Baikie's king list for the periods before 1430 (i.e. before Dawuda), between 1430 and Soyaki's accession in 1652, and since then.

Finding a "near-total consistency in rulers and reign lengths. . . . . after 1652" between these three sources, Last regards this as strong evidence in support of his principal thesis;[68] and interprets the remark that Alhaji the son of Kutumbi was removed "'for a reason I forget' as internal evidence . . . which can surely only imply the author was writing some 10 to 20 years later."[69]

These arguments are hardly persuasive; for first, if the chronicler had really forgotten why or how Alhaji lost the throne ten to twenty years earlier, he could surely have found that out by asking surviving officials who either took part in the event or had some direct knowledge of it. It would be curious for such a diligent researcher as the chronicler appears to have been to have failed to follow this up. It is in truth far more likely that the writer did not know how or why Alhaji lost the throne in the first place, and could not find out; for since Alhaji's capture by the Katsina army[70] was unprecedented in Kano history and transparently implied the treachery of his senior officials, free and slave, the state councillors, instead of announcing his capture and thus compromising themselves, simply declared that he had been deposed and sent to live away from Kano, but gave no reason for his deposition, as they dared not reaveal the truth. Moreover, by thus 'deposing' Alhaji and appointing Shekarau, the state councillors simultaneously precluded Alhaji's return to the chiefship, and put themselves in a position to make a peace with Katsina, while appearing to disassociate themselves from warmaking policies of Kumbari and Alhaji.

As regards Murray Last's claim to find a 'near-total consistency of rulers and reign lengths . after 1652'[71] between the *Kano Chronicle,* Baikie's king list and the *Song of Bagauada,* my study of these three lists yields different conclusions. For example, for the period stretching from Soyaki (1062 A.H.; 1652 A.D.) to Alwali's death in 1222 A.H.; 1807 A.D., the *Chronicle* list 11 rulers inclusive, whose reigns together total 160 Moslem years or 157 Christians ones. As printed, Dr. Baikie lists 10 rulers between Soyaki and Alwali but places Kukuna (Kakana) ahead of Soyaki, omits Dauda Abasama (1776-1781), Alwali's predecessor, credits Baba Zaki with 78 years on the throne instead of 8 as given in the *Chronicle,* and names Taukari instead of Alhaji Kaboe (1743-1753 A.D.) as Kumbari's immediate successor.[72] Altogether Baikie's list for this period, including the reigns of Kukuna and Alwali, gives a total of 203 Moslem years and 10 months as against the *Chronicle's* 160. The *Song of Bagauda* differs even more widely from the *Chronicle* for this period. Though agreeing fully with the *Chronicle's* list of rulers, the *Song* credits them with a total of 313 Moslem years as against the Chronicle's 160. Evidently, whether sung or unsung, local king lists may differ as widely in deail after 1652 as before.

We are particularly fortunate in being able to check these conflicting interpretations of reign lengths in the *Chronicle,* the *Song* and Baikie's list

against the rich and directly relevant data to be found in the *Al-ilan bi tarikh* Kano of Mallam Adamu Muhammadu el-Arabi. Mallam Adamu completed the first draft of his history of Kano in 1344 A.H. (1925-6 A.D.) and its revision in 1352 A.H. (1933 A.D.) shortly before the publication of East's Hausa translation of the *Chronicle*[74] In his attempt to reconstruct the history of Hausa Kano, as well shall see, Mallam Adamu collated information from five different king lists which did not include the *Kano Chronicle*, the Song of Bagauda or Baikie's king list. For each ruler mallam Adamu reports the agreements or disagreements of the various king lists on the length of his reign details the ruler's parentage on both sides, and often gives a brief character sketch and notes on outstanding events in the reign. As regards the order and lengths of reigns from Soyaki to Alwali inclusive, the five king lists consulted by Mallamu Adamu differ as follows:

Soyaki:	2 lists give 2 months 6 days
	1 list gives 66 years
	1 list gives 15 years
	1 list gives 6 years
M. Kukuna:	2 lists give 8 months
	2 lists give 30 years
	1 list gives 7 years 20 days
Bawa	4 lists give 11 years
	1 list gives 30 years
M. Dadi	3 lists give 33 years
	1 list gives 9 years
M. Sharefa	3 lists give 30 years
	1 list gives 40 years
M. Kumbari	All lists give 10 years
M. Kabe	All lists give 9 years 9 months
Yayi	All list give 3 years
Baba Zaki	3 lists give 9 years
	2 lists give 20 years
Dawud	2 lists give 1 year
	1 list gives 5 years
	2 lists give 9 years
Alwali II	All lists give 27 years

Thus as regards the reign lengths of the last 11 Hausa chiefs, including Alwali, the five king lists consulted by Mallam Adamu disagree seven times on the lengths of their reign.[74] For three of these seven reigns, the five king lists offer three or more alternatives, for the remainder only two. Compared with the *Chronicle*, Dr. Baikie's king list, which Last consulted, disagrees equally for these reigns. As against this, the *Song* of Bagauda cannot be said to agree with the lengths assigned by the *Chronicle* more than twice for these reigns – namely for Alhaji Kabe, whom the *Song* lists as Muhammad Kubari, and

for Alwali II. Such data do not illustrate the "near-total consistency in rulers and reign lengths" of these various king lists which Last leads us to expect after 1652, and on which most of his critical comments on the *Chronicle* depend. Moreover it is clear from the details of these last 11 Hausa reigns that five king lists consulted by Mallam Adamu did not include either the *Kano Chronicle*, Baikie's king list or the *Song of Bagauda*. In effect the diversity of opinion about the lengths of the various reigns. from Soyaki to Muhammadu Alwali II is even greater than we would suspect, had we restricted our attention to Baikie's list, the *Kano Chronicle* and the *Song of Bagauda*. Detailed comparison of the rulers listed, the order in which they are listed, and the lengths of their respective reigns as given in the *Chronicle*, in Baike's list in the *Song of Bagauda* and in Mallam Adamu's unpublished collation for the first 15 reigns from Bagauda to and including Dauda (1421-1437) yields an equivalent level of disagreement as to the reign lengths, compounded by certain differences in the names and order of the chiefs listed in the various texts. Evidently there are at least two distinct traditions and lists of Kano chiefs before the reign of Yaji(1349-13385 A.D.).

In Mallam Adamu's history of Yaji's precessor Zamnagawa (1343-1349 A.D.) is said to be the son of Randamasu (Tsamiya) and Kumaimaya. His nickname was 'Gafe-Gakuma', who is listed in the *Song of Bagauda* as the 19th chief who reigned for 60 years.[76] According to Mallam Adamu, Zamnagawa as chief killed many men; presumably this, rather than the story related in the *Chronicle*, led to his nickname. Between Yaji who followed Zamnagawa and Soyaki, i.e. from c.1349 A.D. to 1652, the *Chronicle lists* 22 reigns of Dakauta and Atuma in 1452 A.D. and conflates the two reigns of Mallam Kukuna which the Chronicle correctly separates, as Soyaki ruled for three months between them. According to the *Chronicle* the interval between Yaji's accession and Soyaki's is 303 Muslim years. On Mallam Adamu's reckoning it is either 316 or 326, since his sources credit Kutumbi's son Alhaji with either 10 or 20 years on the throne, presumably due to an error in copying; or it might be 356 or 366, if Da'ud, listed in some texts as reigning 40 years, is included, despite Mallam Adamu's decision not to do so. Notably Mallam Adamu's account indicates no disagreements between the five king lists he consulted for any reigns between Zamnagawa and Sheshere. Different estimates of reign length are first reported for Muhamman Zaki and then for Alhaji, the son of Kutumbi. Beyond Soyaki's reign the incidence of such disagreements increases sharply, as noted above. In other words, Mallam Adamu's collation supports the view that from Yaji to Abubakar Kado (1565-1572 A.D.) there is far greater agreement on the sequence and reign lengths of Hausa chiefs of Kano than before or after, until 1807. Despite its omission of Dakauta and Atuma, and its displacement of Yakubu and Dauda Abasama, Mallam Adamu's account agrees with the *Chronicle* that the reigns from Yaji to Abubakar Kao total 228 Muslim

years.[77] This tends to support the view that the original *Chronicle* was compiled in the mid-sixteenth century from various documents and oral sources having special knowledge of the chiefdom's history. Thereafter, on my reading in relation to other histories and king lists of Kano, the *Chronicle* was periodically updated at irregular intervals of between fifty and a hundred or more years, sufficient to ensure comparable degrees of inaccuracy, incompleteness and unreliability in the earlier reigns of each new section, from Yaji's time onwards.

VI

Murray Last correctly identifies a number of anachronisms and hesitations in the *Chronicle's* account of developments at Kano before 1450 A.D., attributing these to 17th century writers. Some are rather superficial, for example reference to guns (*bindiga*) in Dauda's reign (1421-1427 A.D.).[78] Likewise, "In the days of Yaji, it is said, Sarkin Debbi, Sarkin Dabà and Sarkin Gano brought horses to Kano, but this story is not worthy of credence."[79] Nonetheless its account of the siege and seizure of Santolo makes frequent reference to horses. Though clearly such titles as Madawaki and Dawaki (i.e. commanders of calvary) in the reign of Warisi, Bagauda's son (1063-1095 A.D.) are anachronistic, so too are the titles of Galadima, Barawa, Magayaki, Makama, Jarumai, Barde in that reign.[80] Such titular anachronisms provide no firm basis for the conclusion that horses were not known in Kano. The Bayajidda legend tells of his coming to Daura on a horse and seeking to water his horse before killing the dreaded snake.[81] In the passage just cited, the chiefs of Debbi, Dab and Gano, who according to the *Chronicle* arrived in Kano country nine years before Bagauda,[82] are said to have brought horses during Yaji's reign, perhaps from Borno. There are other questionable attributions, such as Gijimasu's wall-building and slaughter of a hundred cattle on the first day.[83]

Murray Last performs a valuable service in drawing attention to the many anachronisms, uncertainties and errors in the *Kano Chronicle*, and especially for the first 400 years of its record, which suggests that the document was originally drafted in the 16th century. He also identifies various omissions or failures in the record; but such omissions are not confined to the earlier centuries, they apply equally well to the last two hundred years of Hausa rule at Kano. Altogether his analysis of the historicity of the *Chronicle* for the period of Hausa rule at Kano is a contribution of permanent value to historical studies of this region, however, the limitations of this critique, which are sometimes expressed but more often assumed by its author, should not be ignored. What Murray Last argues is that the current version of the *Chronicle*, whether in Arabic, English or Hausa, basically dates from

the mid-17th century, and conveys as faithful an account of the history of Kano till then as its author or authors could provide, using conventional Muslim canons of scholarship and modes of thought. Against this I have argued that the initial draft of the *Kano Chronicle* was probably made a century earlier, and that the text was thereafter subject to periodic revisions and updatings at irregular intervals, as illustrated in its latest extentions by Rupert East in 1933, and in 1882-1893. If I am correct, then even without political bias, such periodic additions should concentrate hesitation, omissions and errors of reporting unequally in the earlier reigns of successive sections, thereby ensuring an erratic distribution of error throughout the entire text. On Murray Last's analysis, omissions, anachronisms and other errors should predominate over historically valid information in the first six or seven centuries of the *Chronicle,* while from 1652 to 1807 and more so from 1807 onwards the reverse should obtain. Thus these alternatives deliver quite different assessments of the *Chronicle's* historicity.

There is no question that the first three centuries of the *Chronicle* deal mainly in legend and not history. The central questions then are, why do they deal as they do, when, how, and for what audience? If the *Chronicle* was first recorded in the latter half of the 17th century, then presumably it was written by and addressed to the political elite at that time, namely in the period following Kumbari's defeat and death in the war with Katsina, Alhaji's disappearrance (by deposition and exile according to the *Chronicle*), and the instability at the throne represented by the swift successions of Shekarau (1649-1651), Kukuna son of Alhaji (1651-52), Soyaki (3 months in 1652), and by Kukuna's restoration in 1652. This was surely a period when the prestige of the dynasty and the throne was at a low ebb by contrast with the relative grandeur of the regime at Kano during the reign of Muhamman Kisoke (1509-1565 A.D.) when, besides resuming its independence, a number of Muslim clerics came to Kano from Borno, from Tunis, from Zaria and elsewhere.[84]

Anachronisms in the *Chronicle* cluster in its earlier reigns and centuries. Why such anachronisms were committed is another question but it seems likely that they were present in the earliest texts and traditions even before the first draft of the *Chronicle* was written in the mid or late 16th century. As regards omissions, these occur at all levels and stages of the pre-Fulani history of Kano. For example, we know from Leo Africanus that Askia Muhammad el-Hajj of Songhay (1493-1528) "waged war against the king of Kano, whom after a long seige he took and compelled him to marry one of his daughters, restoring him again to his kingdom, conditionally that he should pay unto Kano the third part of all his tribute; and the said king of Tombukto hath some of his courtiers perpetually residing at Rano, for the receipt thereof"[85]

Following the Askia we know that Kano, having formerly been subject to Borno,[86] fell under the domination of Kebbi, which under Kanta first threw off Songhai's yoke in 1516 A.D. and then rapidly established its dominion over western Hausaland, namely Gobir, Katsina, Yauri, Zamfara, Zazzau and Kano.[87] Nowhere does the *Chronicle* mention this, though the extraordinary singing which Muhammadu Kisoke launched on the walls of Kano following the withdrawal of the king of Borno celebrates Kano's independence from them both.[88] Neither does it record any famine from Barbushe's day to Alwali's (1781-1807), who is the first ruler reported to have experienced famine. Nor does it mention the plague (*waba*) that swept Kano for four years on the death of Kisoke (1565 A.D), and took his successors Yakubu and Dauda Abasama in less than a year.[89]

However, parallel omissions also occur in the *Chronicle's* account of 18th century Kano. For example, was are told there that in Kumbari's time (1731-1743 A.D.) the 'Mai Ali' of Borno came to Kano to war. "He encamped at Faggi (Fage) for three nights without a battle being fought, since Shehu Ahiru and Shehu Bunduu prevented it. He returned to Borno."[90] We are not told that Kano then lost its independence and became for a second time a vassal state of Borno, and remained thus until the Fulani jihad.[91] Thus at least the *Chronicle's* omissions are not restricted to any period. It says far less about Baba Zaki (1768 1776) than Mallam Adamu does, and gives an extraordinarily terse account of the Fulani jihad at Kano. "In Alwali's time the Fulani conquered the seven Hausa states on the plea of reviving the Islamic religion. The Fulani attacked Alwali and drove him from Kano, whence he fled to Zaria."[92] No briefer history of the jihad exists.

As for later errors and omissions, to substantiate my interpretation, Muhammadu Bello's extension to the *Chronicle* says that Alwali's sucessor, the first Fulani Emir Suleiman, went to ask the Shehu Usman dan Fodio's permission to occupy the Hausa palace.[93] Palmer's text corrects this in a footnote – "He did not go to Sokoto but sent a message."[94] As for omissions, Bello's extension totally omits the major attack on Kano in 1826 by the Shehu El Kanemi of Borno which threw the caliphate into great fear.[95] It omits any mention of the treachery of the Sarkin Filani Dambarta Dan Tunku and of Alwali's Ciroma Dan Nama, which ensured his defeat at the final battle of Dan Yayya.[96]

At the other extreme, the *Chronicle* illustrates the Muslim identity and bias of its authors. At its very beginning we are told that "Barbushe never descended from Dalla except on the two days of Idi when he would normally sacrifice either black dogs, fowls or he-goats at popular request."[97] In effect the *Chronicle* reinterprets the history of Kano in Muslim terms to conform with Islamic models of heathenism and reform in religion and government. Prematurely from Yaji's day and more securely from Muham-

mad Rumfa's, the arrival at Kano of learned Muslims is recorded in the *Chronicle*, together with their appointments to office or their interventions in political affairs, normally at the request of the ruling chief.

At the same time the *Chronicle* is sometimes inaccurate in its references to developments in nearby states such as Zaria and Gobir. For example, it reports the conquests of Queen Amina of Zaria during the reign of Dauda (1421-1438 A.D.), whereas these are normally placed in the 16th century.[98] In short, we may expect the *Chronicle* to omit certain important developments altogether, while misplacing others, to indulge anachronisms in the earlier reigns, and to impose Islamic concepts and categories on events and organization in pre-Islamic Kano, thus displaying Murray Last's 'historical metaphors' and 'geographical analogies' by labelling ethnic groups as Maguzawa, Gazazawa, Rumawa etc. on the one hand, and by dividing the territory to correspond on the other. However, such divisions could hardly have been initiated by the chronicler. They first had to be present or instituted by the political leaders of the emerging state. Gazarzawa, for example, is the name of a place and not a ethnic group.[99] Nonetheless we should recognize that the *Chronicle* is neither a transparent nor a fully complete and realiable account of Kano history under the Fulani or the Hausa, both as regards its chronology, its ideology, its Islamic interpretations of non-Islamic peoples and events, its anachronisms, its religious, ethnic and political biases, and otherwise. The questions that emerges from such a critique is simply, what historical value, if any, does the document have, given its various defects?

The answer is very brief, the more so, surely, because of the historical naivete illustrated above. Altogether the *Chronicle* of Hausa Kano provides the richest and most authentic account of the political organization of the Hausa chiefdom available to us; given the circumstances, the most illuminating and comprehensive account we could hope to have. There are of course a sufficient number of external checks on the validity of reports in the *Chronicle* concerning Kano's relations with such nearby polities as Asben, Borno, Katsina, Gobir, Zaria or the Jukun to accredit the document generally. As regards its data on the composition and development of the Kano polity itself, one critical test is the fit between the *Chronicle's* account of Kano under Alwali and the fullest account we can muster from other sources of the state and its organization at that time.

VII

In 1959 attempting to reconstruct the social and political organization of Kano on the eve of the Fulani jihad, I relied primarily on documents and

oral data available at Kano, together with reports of explorers, and such gleanings from the jihadic literature of the conquering Khadiriya as I could find. This done, my problem was to check the validity of this reconstruction, to identify its omissions, false reports, anachronisms and other limitations. and perhaps to enrich its scope and detail, while correcting its errors by reference to an independent authentic body of precise information with which these comparisons could be systematically made. Whereas elsewhere independent successor-states of former Hausa chiefdoms overun by the Shehu's jihad, such as Zango in Daura, Maradi, or Abuja had supplied information of this kind to control my reconstruction of their pre-jihadic regimes and allow direct comparison with the 19th century Fulani states, for Kano I lacked such resources, since the defeated dynasty was never able to establish a successor-state. Indeed, when I visited the Hausa Sarkin Kano in January 1959 at Maradi, he was unable to distinguish the traditions of Kano from those of Hausa Katsina, that still flourished in Maradi. Fortunately, together with certain other texts, old and new, the Chronicle offered an independent check on the validity and completeness of my tentative reconstruction of Kano under Alwali that had emerged from the oral and documentary studies. Being by far the richest continuous account of Hausa Kano, it was central to this corpus of materials. Naturally to amplify my account of Kano and to strengthen it, I took note of every credible source of information on the political history and organization of Hausa Kano available to me. That done, the significance and distinctions of much detailed documentation of official personnel and family lines remained obscure. For clarification and verification the best and often the only available resource was the *Kano Chronicle*. This document, though often anachronistic, illuminated some of our central puzzles, and especially those that concerned the relative status and significance of titled offices of different kings present in Alwali's and earlier reigns.

Nonetheless we should ask why, in every moderately long reign, does the *Chronicle* list by name and title so many contemporary officials, warriors and assistants of the chief? Clearly, given its limited public circulation, such detail had greater significance than public exposure. From its beginnings the *Chronicle* dwells particularly and in detail on the identities and titles of individuals who figured prominently in the reigns of successive chiefs. Indeed the *Chronicle* overwhelms one with such details, which are often juxtaposed in odd relations. In evaluating the document it is important to consider what function or purpose its detailed listing of individuals, places, titles, and the like fulfilled. Palpably these titles, persons and places could not be fictitious without placing the chronicler at risk of exposure as a fraudulent historian. While none of these lists pretends to be complete, many are rather extensive. The structure and content of such catalogues are of special significance, given the political status and character of this document, and indicate

some of the principal interests that created and shaped the *Chronicle*. It assigns such offices as Galadima, Barwa, Madawaki, Magayaki, Makama, Barde, Jarumai and Dawaki to the very earliest reigns, when clearly those offices did not then exist.[100] Of Gijimasu (1095-1134) we are told that "He ruled all the country as far as the lands of Sarkin Gano, Sarkin Dab, Sarkin Debbi, Sarkin Ringim, Dan Bakonyaki. Santolo alone stood out against him, for his people were many and pagans. No one was able to rule over them. The Sarkis (chiefs) of Gano, Dab and Debbi came to Hausaland (sic) nine years before Bagauda. But Buram, Isa, Baba, Kududufi, Alhassan and others of the Kano chiefs, men of the princely clan came with Bagauda." The footnote reads, "For this reason all their descendants were called after these, their forefathers, and the names have remained as titles of princes to this day. Such titles as Dan Buram, Dan Isa or Dan Baba, Dan Akasan, Dan Kududufi and others like Dan Dermai and Dan Goriba."[101]

Detailed comparison of the information on Hausa Kano in the *Chronicle* with the fullest reconstruction I was able to achieve on the basis of the available oral and written information for Kano in Alwali's day showed first that the *Chronicle* contains within it more information essential for the accurate reconstruction and valid understanding of the Hausa chiefdom in its final phases than we can expect to find elsewhere; and secondly, that it neatly and convincingly relates the processes through which the Hausa state and government emerged and developed, territorially and structurally. Though the *Chronicle* is incomplete and erratic in its coverage, it seems less so than alternative sources for that period. Anachronisms such as those noted above are rather innocent and easy to identify and correct. What is really irreplaceable if lost or abandoned is the *Chronicle's* oblique but sustained account of the evolution of the political structure of Kano from its earliest beginnings in the conflict between the immigrants under Bagauda and the autochthonous people who rejected them as ritual or social equals, thereby defining the terms and outcomes of this basically ethnic conflict, to the centuries that followed the arrival of Islam and Kano's successive subjugations to Borno, Songhai and Kebbi, with their curious, unacknowledged consequences for the throne, illustrated perhaps by the brief anomalous reigns of Dakauta (1 day) and Atuma his son (7 days) in 1452 A.D., immediately after Kano accepted Borno's suzerainty under Abdullahi Burja (1438-1452), eleven years before the accession of Muhammad Rumfa.

The *Chronicle* also shows how the Hausa chiefdom survived two civil wars over the succession in 1565 and 1652, both fortunately brief and restricted in scale, together with a number of revolts, beginning with the Sarkin Gaya Farin Dutse in the reign of Muhammadu Dadi (1670-1703) and continuing thereafter with revolts at Kiru, Dutse and elsewhere,[102] some of which, such as the revolt of Ada Gwauro, the Fulani Sarkin Ringim during the reign of Muhamman Kumbari,[103] are omitted from the record, much as later

accounts of the reigns of the Fulani emirs who followed Alwali make little reference to the rebellions and revolts they had to deal with.

In short, the *Chronicle* by itself is neither a fully reliable nor a comprehensive guide to the history of Kano under its Hausa or Fulani chiefs. Fortunately it is now no longer the only source; and we should therefore exploit it with all others available to us, such as the *Asl al Wanqariyin*, the *Al-ilan bi tarikh Kano*, *Kano ta Dabo Cigari*, Alkali Zangi's *Taqyid al-Akbar*, and any others, local or 'foreign', which can check, enrich or shed light on these dark centuries of Kano and Hausa history. It would of course be quite absurd to treat any single document as the sole and authentic account of French or British history before or after the Roman withdrawal. Yet if so, why then, and for how much longer, will we discuss the *Chronicle* as though it is the sole document or source of information on Kano's history before the Fulani conquest?

The *Chronicle* does to an extraordinary degree document the historical derivation of various hereditary offices (*sarautu*) which together provided the administrative framework of the chiefdom, distinguishing those of royal rank from others of clerical, noble, commoner, slave or eunuch rank, and distinguishing women's titles from others. It documents their emergence, status and roles, noting the various lapsed offices that formed part of the Hausa officialdom in Alwali's day and in previous reigns. The *Chronicle* by no means supplies a comprehensive account of the Hausa polity at Kano. As noted, it says very little about Baba Zaki's fundamental reorganization of the officialdom and its communication structure, though fortunately Mallam Adamu records this, and in 1959 details could still be recovered from oral accounts.

Alone, the *Chronicle* can neither fully and accurately report the political history of Hausa Kano nor its political ethnography at Alwali's day. However, for any understanding of the development and vicissitudes of the Hausa chiefdom or its organization on the eve of the Fulani jihand, it is not merely indispensable but irreplaceable. Without it, allowing for all the other available documents and sources of information, we should not have sufficient data to check externally the validity of any reconstruction we might make of the Hausa polity at Kano on the eve of its conquest and replacement. Neither would we be able to trace the processes of its evolution as a formation developed over several centuries to resolve struggles between an aggressive patrimonial chiefship and the oligarchies of competing aristocrats and slaves on which its rule was based, and with which the chiefship was closely associated. In the absence of a successor-state to Kano, the *Chronicle* still provides the finest and fullest independent check on the validity of historical reconstruction derived from inquiries within the contemporary state that scholars could ever hope for or expect. Moreover, as mentioned above, the *Chronicle* nicely documents the rebellions, revolts, civil wars and

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other conflicts through which this political pattern emerged, perhaps because these were among the principal foci of interest for the authors, audience and communities to that document. So whatever its chronological inaccuracies, Islamic anachronisms, historical metaphors, geographical analogies and other intellectual defects, this *Chronicle*, like all other histories, not only represents the disorientations of its author, but conveys, initially in broad outlines and later more specifically, the evolution of the Hausa polity at Kano over a period of several hundred years, not all of which were fully independent, though the *Chronicle* almost ignores the difference between vassalage and sovereignty.

Several cultural developments recorded in the *Chronicle* more or less accurately refer clearly to other Hausa states as well as Kano; for example, the opening of the caravan routes from Borno to Gonja and beyond in the 15th century A.D., as well as those running north to south; the arrival of Islam in the 14th century, with all that that implied; and its successive phases of consolidation under and after the Askia Mohammed throughout this area, until the jihad of the Shehu Usman dan Fodio. It records the engagement of Hausa states and economies in the southern-oriented trade of slaves for guns and cowries initiated at Kano under Sharefa (1703-1731), the continuous risk of dynastic conflicts, of civil war, rebellion, internal revolt and the like, given the oppresive nature of traditional Hausa regimes, based as they were on ideologies of descent, religious and ethnic difference. The radical distinction Islam enjoins between 'believer' and 'heathen' pervades the *Chronicle* retrospectively, re-interpreting much of the early experience of Kano Hausa in categories far removed from their and our consciousness. Nonetheless, some of these categories, according to the record, were imposed on the subjugated peoples, for example their classifications as Maguzawa, Rumawa, Rumfawa and Gazarawa. Later under the leadership of the Shehu Usman dan Fodio, the Fulani promulgated and imposed another classification on Kano as a syncretistic or heathen state to be overrun, destroyed and done away with. Muhammad Alwali II (1781-1807 A.D.) was appointed by fate to deal with this challenge. The *Chronicle* does less than justice to his indecisions and his efforts, but merely reports his defeat. To improve our understanding of this event, and many others reported in the *Chronicle*, we have to look elsewhere for information and illumination. But does this differ in any material respect from the ordinary practice of historians in other countries?

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39. *Ibid.* p.8.
40. Ibid. p.12.
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42. H.R. Palmer 1908 *op. cit.*, 77.
R.M. East 1933 *op. cit.*, 37.
43. H.R. Palmer 1908 *op. cit.*, 70.
R.M. East 1933 *op. cit.*, 28.
44. Adamu Muhammadu El Arabi 1933 *op. cit.*,
45. The 'Song of Bagauda' lists Zamnagawa by another nickname as Gakin-Gakuma and records that he 'reigned for sixty years. When he prayed this became the cause of his death." v. Mervyn Hiskett, 1965, The 'Song of Bagauda': a Hausa king list and himly in verse, II. Bulltein of the School of Oriental and African studies, 28, p.116.
46. H.R. Palmer 1908 *op. cit.*, 59.
Idem 1928 *op. cit.*, p. 79 fn., 85.
47. H.R. Palmer 1908 *op. cit.*, 66
R.M. East 1933 *op. cit.*, 23.
48. H.R. Palmer 1908 *op. cit.*, 73
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49. M. Al-Hajj 1961 *op. cit.*, 14.
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52. H.F.C. Smith 1961 *op. cit.*, 6.
H.R. Palmer 1908 *op. cit.*, 84-85.
R.M. East 1933 *op. cit.*, 46-8.
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63. H.R. Palmer 1908 *op. cit.*, 70, 74.
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74. Adamu Muhammdu el-Arabi 1933 *op. cit.*
75 *Ibid.*
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R.M. East 1933 *op. cit., 28.*
M. Hiskett 1965 *op. cit.*, 365. However, given the statement: "Abashe (1903-1919) who ruled justly. And with mercy in his heart, and leniency, Was in his fourteenth year when we composed this song, It is God Most High who knows the time of completion". (v. M. Hiskett, 1965 *op. cit.*, p. 119), despite Hiskett's views on the antiquity of the song (*ibid.*, pp. 364-5), I do not regard it as a suitable check on the Chronicle's reliability, since as a source of Kano history it is neither sufficiently old nor reliable.
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R.M. East 1933 *op. cit.*, 28.
78. H.R. Palmer 1908 *op. cit.*, 74
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79. H.R. Palmer 1908 *op. cit.*, 71-2
R.M. East 1933 *op. cit.,29-131.*
80. H.R. Palmer 1908 *op. cit.*, 65
R.M. East 1933 *op. cit.*, 22.
81. M.G. Smith 1978 *op. cit.*, 52-4.
82. H.R. Palmer 1908 *op. cit.*, 66
R.M. East 1944 *op. cit.*, 23.
83. H.R. Palmer 1908 *op. cit.*, 66
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THE PLACE OF MOSQUES IN THE HISTORY OF KANO

By

Muhammad Sani Zahradeen

This is a brief report on a research that I have been conducting on the mosques of Kano City and their significance in the life of the Kano community.

The mosque has always been the central meeting place of Muslims. The first mosque built by Muhammad in Madinah served as the first school, community hall, and court of law. Mosques have therefore a social and political importance in Islamic societies wherever they are located.

Kano history may be divided into five periods: The early period that deals with the founding of the City and the rule established by Bagauda up to 1500 AD; the second period is that of the Rumfa House or dynasty (from Rumfa's rule up to that of Muhammad (Na-Zaki); the third period is that of the Kutumbawa (begining with Alwali the Great to 1806); the fourth period is that of the Jihadists (1807–1903); and the fifth period is that of the twentieth century from the British colonial period to the present.

The early settlers of Kano were traditional animists (maguzawa) and they centred their lives around the shrine of *Tsumburbura.* The chief priest Barbushe was reported to have prophesied in one of his annual messages to the people of Kano that "a day will come in their own time or that of their children in which a certain group of people (*allummah*) will come, rule over Kano and build mosques."[1] Time passed and Bagauda came and took control of Kano. Although Bagauda's ancestors were said to have come from the east, from all indications he was not a Muslim and as such he did not build any mosques. In fact, since that very early reference to mosques by Barbushe we do not hear of any other mention of Islam or its places of worship except during the reign of the ninth *Sarki* (ruler) of the Bagauda dynasty. *Sarki* Tsamiya was reported to have destroyed the shrine of *Tsumburbura.* The people worshipping *Tsumburbura* fled to the surrounding villages except, Gare and Dungazu, whom the *Sarki* gave titles as a reward for the information they supplied to him on *Tsumburbura.* The destruction of *Tsumburbura* did not indicate the establishment of a mosque in its place. The sources do not tell

us that Tsamiya was even a Muslim. What obviously happened was that just as he exterminated the Maguzawa, he also wanted to exterminate their religious centre on which they based their political hegemony. From then on no priest or guardian of *Tsumburbura* was to control his movements and actions by pronouncing prophesies and omens. Hence his praise singers told him to "sit well" i.e. "have no fear" and that Kano was his domain. There is no indication that Tsamiya accepted Islam. All he did was that he paved the way for the introduction of the religion in Kano. During the reign of *Sarki* Yaji (1359–1385), the Wangarawa were reported to have come to Kano bringing with them Islam from Mali. Included among their leaders were Abdurrahman Zaite and Mandawari. Yaji was, therefore, the first *Sarki* of Kano to have accepted Islam. He gave instructions that people should pray and build mosques. In fact, Mandawari was appointed the first Chief Imam of Kano. Other Imams in the Wangarawa group were the Imams of Jujin Yallabu and Madatai. Shaykh (Shaikh) Abdurrahman Zaite became the first judge (*Qadi*).[2] The experiment with Islam was thrown out by Kanajeji (c. 1390–1410) who reverted to *Tsumburbura* worship and re-established its shrine. Here again our sources are not quite clear. What happened to the mosques built by the Wangarawa? We know of the Madabo Mosque which they established and which still exists but was it destroyed in Kanajeji's time and rebuilt later on?

After Kanajeji we have a number of his successors who bore Muslim names. The *Wakar Bagauda* tells us that one *Sarki* named Umaru, was a *mallam* indicating that he was an upright Muslim.[3] He was followed by Dauda, nicknamed *Bakin Damisa*, Abdullahi Burja, and Yakubu who was succeeded by Muhammad Rumfa (1463–1499).

The second phase of Kano history is known for its consolidation of Islam as a state "policy" even if not as the state religion. Muhammad Rumfa welcomed the celebrated scholar, Abu Abdullah Muhammad ibn 'Abdulkarim al-Maghili, of Tlemcen, to Kano towards the end of the 15th century. Al-Maghili had earlier been in Songhay where he was a close adviser to its great ruler, Askia Muhammad Toure. He was also in Katsina around 1488, where he was said to have converted the ruler, Ibrahim Maje, to Islam, and to have established the *Shari'a* on a sound footing.[4] While in Kano, Al-Maghili was said to have written a document on politics for the guidance of Muhammad Rumfa. He also built the Sharifai Mosque and his descendants are still the custodians of the Mosque. Rumfa was also said to have built a central (*masjid Jami'*) mosque[5], beside building a central palace. As has been said earlier on, the Rumfa dynasty consolidated Islam, and all the nine *Sarki* who came from this group had Muslim names (with five who bore the name of the Prophet (Muhammad). One would expect the sources to say more on the establishment of schools and mosques in this period. Instead we have only political history.

In the third period of Kano history known as the Kutumbawa period i.e., between the reign of Kutumbi known as Alwali the Great (*Alwali al-Kabir*), and that of Muhammad Alwali (*Alwali al-Saghir*) we learn nothing of the establishment of new mosques in Kano. When *Sarki* Kukuna returned to the throne, after he had been deposed by Madaki Koma, the Imam of Yandoya mosque played a very important role in helping to make the *Sarki* firmly established on his throne. The majority of the *Sarki* from the Kutumbawa dynasty bore names which do not seem to have any Islamic significance. Out of fourteen Sarkis from the Kutumbi 'house' only five names are specifically Islamic. The period immediately preceding the Jihad, that is the third period, is usually painted badly by both the written and oral sources. The Kutumbawa period in contrast to the Rumfawa period that preceded it is shown to be less Islam-oriented and more worldly. Even the mallams who are mentioned are depicted as sorcerers and not as men of religion.

The fourth period of Kano history is the Jihad period popularly known as the Fulani period. A number of Fulani scholars in Kano had common aspirations and goals with 'Uthman ibn Fodio and his supporters. It was not therefore surprising that they rallied behind him and fought the Kutumbawa under ibn Fodio's banner. One of the principal reasons of the Jihad was to reactivate Islam in Hausaland. The Shaykh Uthman ibn Fodio preached and wrote treaties emphasizing those areas that needed the immediate attention of all the rulers of Hausaland. Many of the Shaykh's lieutenants also wrote on similar subjects. Among them was his brother and first *wazir*, Mallam Abdullahi ibn Fodio of Gwandu. Among the books of Abdullahi was a political tract, *Diya al-Hukkam fi ma lahum wa alaihim min al-ahkam*, which he wrote in 1221/1806. Tradition asserts that the book was written specifically for the guidance of the Kano Community during Abdullahi's sojourn there. Abdullahi depicted the importance of electing a well-qualified *Amir al-mu'minin* (Commander of the Faithful) in every Muslim. community. The *Amir al-muminins* duties included, among other things, the instruction of all his followers in Islam, appointing itinerant teachers to spread the teachings of Islam throughout his domain, and building and maintenance of mosques.[6] The Fulani leaders had mosques built as a central meeting ground for their various groups. The Yolawa Fulani under M. Jibril, used the Yola Mosque situated opposite the Madaki's house. The Wudilawa Mosque, which was said to have been built in Rumfa's time, served the Jobawa, under their leader, Mallam Bakatsine. It was situated opposite the residence of the Makama. The Indabawa Mosque (probably maintained if not built by Dan Lawan Yusufu), in Indabawa quarters, was surrounded by the houses of the Sullubawa from the children of Dabo and Mallam Jamo. There was also the Dambazau Mosque, around the residence of the Sarkin Bai whose first Imam was said to be Dabon Dambazau. Ibrahim Dabo (2nd Fulani Emir) was the first Imam of the Galadanci Mosque which faces the house of the *Galadima*.

Traditions differ as to who built it. Some say that *Galadima* Tahir, a senior brother to Dabo, built it while others maintain that Dabo himself built the mosque. Another Fulani mosque was built in Alfindiki Quarters (near the present Children's Clinic) by Mallam Ishaq, the first *Sarkin* Dawakin Tsakar Gida, under the Fulani regime. In Yakasai, Muhammad Jalli is reported to have built the Jalli Mosque. Jalli was a cousin to Mamman Zara. Both Jalli and Zara were Fullata Borno, and after the Jihad they settled in Kano. Jalli became the Emir's envoy (*Jakada*) to Sokoto, while Mamman Zara became the Imam of Kano, after Sulaiman became Emir. It is often reported that Jalli built the Mosque in order to ease the difficulty his cousin Mamman Zara was encountering by walking daily from Yakasai to Yola to perform his prayers at the Yolawa Mosque. Other traditions say that Jalli asked Uthman dan Fodio to pray for him so that his name would be known for ever, and the Shaykh told him to build a mosque. Jalli built the Mosque which to this day is known by his name. Muhammad Jalli was distinguished as a scholar and was an outspoken man.[7] The first Imam of the Jalli Mosque was Mamman Zara. Among his descendants only Alkali Aminu, son of Imam Umaru, was at one time the Imam of the Mosque. The Jalli Mosque served as a religious and social centre for the Kano royal and aristocratic persons who lived in Yakasai. Frequent worshippers at different periods included Dankadai Mai Bindiga, Turaki Abubakar, son of Ayuba, son of Abdullahi Maje Karofi. Turaki Abubakar even used to serve as the *muezzin*.

Among the Hijrah mosques (as these 'Fulani' mosques were called) is also the Hausa Mosque reported to have been built by Magajin mallam. This is not a Fulani mosque but Hausa because Magajin malam and his followers accepted the hegemony of Sokoto and the supremacy of the Jihadists.[8]

Although Shaykh Uthman ibn Fodio condemned in his *Ihya' al-Sunnah wa Ikhmad al-Bidah* the custom of proliferating mosques in Muslim communities and sought to discourage the custom, local Kano traditions assert that these 'clan' mosques, as well as the Jumm'ah Central Mosque were approved by Mallam Abdullahi, when he visted Kano. He is also said to have readjusted the *qiblah* of these mosques, hence they became known as *hijrah* mosques. It is very significant that Abdullahi and the local jihad leaders in Kano should have paid great attention to the establishment and maintenace of mosques. Prayer in Islam, which is best performed in mosques, has been described by the Prophet as the support (*imad*) of religion. It has been observed that prayer (*salat*) has not only got its social and spiritual value, but has a political value as well. As Joachim Wach mentioned:

> a group of people who pray together becomes unified even if composed of socially, intellectually, or otherwise heterogenous elements, at least for the time the devotion lasts. A group of people who pray and worship together regularly become, at least temporarily, brethren and sisters in a more than metaphorical sense.[9]

At one time the Jihadists in Kano were divided as to who should be the leader of the community. If the leaders could be persuaded to elect an Imam

perhaps the disciplinary values of prayer would help them forge ahead in unity. It was also from the mosque that ideas in politics and religion were disseminated. Even today the quickest way of communicating with the community is through the mosque. So Abdullahi and his Jihadi colleagues in Kano accepted the idea and developed those mosques. There were other mosques built later but their historical significance has not yet been determined.

The fifth period of Kano history, which began with the British occupation of Hausaland, and extends to the present, also witnessed the establishment of certain mosques associated with either rulers or ethnic groups in and around the City. We have already seen that Muhammad Rumfa built the Central Mosque. This was revived and relocated at its present site, north of the Emir's Palace, after the Jihad. The former Rumfan (or Habe) Jumm'ah Mosque was situated in between Kofar Nassarawa and the present Kano Urban Water Supply Section of Water Resources Engineering and Construction Agency (WRECA). The Mosque is said to have been sited where the the house of the late Ibrahim Gashash now stands. No reason is given for the relocation of the Mosque, but perhaps this was done to bring the Mosque closer to the Emir, who was also the political and spiritual leader of the Muslim community, or perhaps to have a definite break from 'Habe' period and all its institutions. This latter assumption is weakened by the fact that a number of the Fulani aristocracy adopted titles which were of the so called 'Habe' origin, such as *Madaki, Galadima, Dan Iya and Sarkin Dawakin Tsakar Gida,* inspite *of* the Shaykh's rejection of such titles in a pure Islamic administration based on the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* in his *Kitab al-Farq*.

The first major development in mosque histories in Kano during the twentieth century is the rebuilding and extension of the Central Mosque during the reign of Abdullahi Bayero. The present stonebuilt Mosque replaced the old one built of mud. The Emir, the Kano community, as well as the Colonial Government contributed generously to the building.

The North African Arab community that lived around the Kurmi Market also established mosques of their own in which they conducted the five daily prayers, as well as 'Id prayers. These include the Halla Halla Mosque (from the sufi litany: *La ilaha illalla-Allah-Allah!)* founded by Sidi Sa'ad who came from Morocco, and the mosque of Bashir. In both these mosques Qadiriyah *Tariqah* litanies are sung and *bandir* drums are used.

Outside the City, there are five main mosques, in the Fagge and Sabon Gari quarters. The first one is the Yoruba Mosque located at 39, Church Road, Sabon Gari. It was built between 1919 and 1920 by the Yoruba community who resided in Sabon Gari.[10] The mosque serves as a centre of unity for the Muslim Yoruba of Kano with the exception of those who profess the *Ahmadiyyah* faith among them. There is also another Sabon Gari mosque that caters for all other ethnic groups, Yoruba, Nupe, Igala, Igbirra, etc. who

reside in Sabon Gari. The Ahmadiyyah Movement in Islam has a separate mosque. In Fagge the mosque built by Mallam Haido is of special significance since it serves not only a religious purpose but also serves as an educational centre for the young and old.

In the modern period, with the tremendous increase in the population of Kano and its environs owing to the establishment of industries and allied institutions that attract people from rural areas, people began to demand for the establishment of a second *Jumm'a* mosque. The Maliki School of Law insists that Friday mosques should not be proliferated and in the event of a city or town having many mosques then the Friday worship must take place in the oldest mosque.[11] The present *Emir* constulted a council of *Ulama'* who finally gave a *fatwa* approving the establishment of a second Jumm'ah Mosque to be known as Abdullahi Bayero Mosque. The Mosque was built in 1970 and Mallam Muhammad Dan Amu, the present *Imam* of Kano, was appointed its Imam. Other mosques in which the *Emir* has sanctioned the Friday worship are the Bayero University Mosque (built through Communal contribution), the Kumar Asabe Mosque, (built by a Kano business man, Alhaji Sani Marshall), the Murtala Muhammad Mosque (built through communal contribution, and another one behind the Federal Government College, along Zaria Road. Alhaji Ishaq Rabiu is building a new Jumm'ah Mosque a little north of Gwauron Dutse on the Katsina by pass.

Functions of the Mosques

As mentioned earlier, the primary function of any mosque is the maintenance of the institution of the five daily Muslim prayers. It also serves as a school for the community that surrounds it. In recent times *tafsir* sessions are held during the month of *Ramadan* in some of these mosques. The birthday of the Prophet is also celebrated in some of them. *Sufi* litanies are recited in some of the mosques as well. I have observed that even in the *Hijra* mosques *sufi* litanies of the *Tijjaniya* brotherhood are recited. One interesting development is that although the jihadists were solidly *Qadiri*, these mosques are now solidly Tijjani. It is often reported that among the Jihadists, Muhammad Bello was said to have joined the *Tijjaniya*. It is not quite clear, however, whether he did so or not. Professor Paden supports this view and said "on the basis of existing evidence, it is clear that Bello was sympathetic to *Tijjaniya*. Yet it is unlikely (nor is there real evidence) that he would have "changed his Shaykn' on his death bed"[12] More recently Shaykh Abubakar Gummi, as a fundementalist, suggests that all the Jihad leaders left *tariqah* and its litanies *in toto* before each one of them died.[13] Be that as it may, we now find *Tijaniya* litanies in the Indabawa Mosque (introduced recently), the Jalli Mosque (this was introduced some years ago by the Imam Tafida) the Galadanci Mosque (where Shaykh Maihula used to deliver his *tafsir* in Tamadan) and the Yolawa Mosque. In the Alfindiki and

'Arab' mosques the *Qadiriya* litanies are recited with the accompaniment of Bandir drums.

Appointment of the Imams

With the exception of the Jummah Central Mosque, and that of Waje, whose *Imam* the *Emir* appoints directly, all the *Imams* of the mosques are elected by the memebers of their respective congregations, and approved by the

Name of Imam	*Clan Affiliation*	*Emir under whom he served*
1. Suleiman	Mundubawa	Suleiman
2. Mamman Zara	Fulata Barno	Dano and Uthman Maje Ringinm
3. Abdullahi	Sources silent	Uthman
4. Hamman Zara (died at Sokoto)	Fulata Barno	Abdullahi ibn Dabo Maje Karofi
5. Abdulkadir	Mundubawa	–do–
6. Sule Kwatakwalloji	–do–	–do–
7. Muhammad Sulaiman	–do–	–do–
8. Umaru Zara	Fulata Barno	Bello ibn Dabo
9. Dikko Zara Later Alkali in Abbas reign	Fulata Barno	Bello/Tukur
10. Ismala	Bagyane	Alu
11. Ahmadu Abdulkadiri	Mundubawa	Alu
12. Atiku	Bagyane	Alu
13. Ahmadu (Senior brother to Wazir Gidado	Fulata	Alu?
14. Usman Umaru Zara	Fulata Borno	Uthman ibn Abdullahi
15. Sani	Mundubawa	Bayero
16. Dalhatu	–do–	Sanusi/Inuwa/Ado.
17. Muhammad dan Amu	Bayane	Ado

Emir. The *Emir* would then send to the new *Imam* a gown (*babbar riga*), a cloak (*alkyabba*), and a turban (*rawani*). The *Emir* also sends the same set of gifts to the *Imams* every *Id dl-Fitr* and sends each one a ram during *Id al-Adha.*[14]

Imamship is not hereditary within any family in Kano but is given to a person whose qualification is recognized by the *Emir* and the community. However, in Kano two groups the Mundubawa and the Zarawa (descendants of Mamman Zara), appear to have dominated the office of the *Imam*. On page 63 is a list of the *Imams* who were in office from the Jihad to the present.

Conclusion

From the foregoing, we can se that the establishment and maintenace of mosques has great significance within the religious, social and political life of the Kanawa since the first phase of Kano history. What remains to be done is to determine the architectural development of these mosques, their economic importance, and the numerical strength of the faithful who turn up for worship there every day. But this is a topic for another report.



The Old Mud Kano Central Mosque which was demolished during the rule of Abdullahi Bayero (1926-52).



The New Kano Central Mosque built during the rule of Abdullahi Bayero (1926-52).

NOTES

1. Alhaji Abubakar Dokaji Kano; *Kano Ta Dabo Cigari,* The Northern Nigerian Publishing Co. Ltd., Zaria, new edition, 1978, p.8.
2. Ibid., p. 15. See also M. A. Al-Hajj, "A Seveneteenth Century Chronicle on the Origins and Missionary Activities of the Wangarawa" in *Kano Studies.*, 1, 4 (1968) pp. 7-16.
3. *Wakar Bagauda Ta Kano,* NNPC, Zaria, new edition 1972, p.6.
4. See Ibn maryam *Al-Bustan fi dhikr al-awliya wa al-ulama' bi' Tilimsan* (Algiers: Tha'alibiyah Press, 1908), pp. 254-5; Ahmad Baba al-Timbukti; *Nayl al-ibiti-haj bi tatriz al-dibaj al-mudhahhab* (Cairo: Ma'ahid Press, 1351 A.H.), pp. 330-331; ᶜAbd al-Aziz Batran: "A contribution to the Biography of Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim ibn Muhammad al-Maghili" in *Journal of African History,* XIV, No. 3 (1973) pp. 381-394. H.I. Gwarzo: *The Life and Teachings of Al-Maghili* (Unpublished doctoral thesis; University of London, 1972).
5. J.N. Paden, Religion and Political Culture in Kano; (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 4-7.
6. Abdullahi ibn Fodio, *Diya al-Hukkam.*
7. Oral tradition: Interview Yakasai Quarters – April, 1975. It is also mentioned that Abdullahi ibn Dabo (Maje Karofi) was never at ease in his court until after the deaths of Jalli and Madaki Hadiri ibn Jibril. These two always criticised the emir openly whenever he did something outside the *Shari'ah.* Among Jalli's descendants are Alhaji Aminu Katsina a noted broadcaster whose parents are judges in Katsina and Alhaji Turaki of Darma quarters who is a businessman.

8. See Mallam Adamu Na-Ma'aji; *Al-Athar al-Kanawiyah*, manuscript in my possession compare also J.N. Paden – *Religion and Political Culture in Kano*, pp. 50-51.
9. Joachim Wach, *Sociology of Relgion* (Chicao: Chicago University Press, Phoenix Books, 1944), p. 371. Humprehy Fisher suggested that prayer (*salat*) has intrumental, ceremonial and disciplinary functions in West Africa. See his article: "Prayer and Military Activity in the History of Muslim Africa South of the Sahara", *Journal of African History*, XII, No. 3 (1971), pp. 392-393.
10. R.F.O. Arilesire, *The Religious Institutions of the Yoruba Muslims in Kano* final year B.A. Dissertation in Islamic Studies, A.B.U., Kano, June, 1972, p.9.
11. For more details on this point see *Mukhtasar* Sidi Khalil ibn Ishaq especially the chapter dealing with *Salat al-Jumm'ah.*
12. J.N. Paden, *Religon and Political Culture;* p. 82.
13. Abubakar Gummi: Annual Tafsir lessons in Kaduna.
14. It is reported that Sanusi the ex-Emir of Kano 1954-1963 used to send to each of these imams a sack of guinea-corn (*buhun dawa*) and some money every month

FROM SULTANATE TO CALIPHATE: KANO, 1450 – 1800 A.D.

by
Murray Last

This essay is part of a project to edit, re-translate and annotate the *Kano Chronicle.* Previous papers of mine have concentrated on the early parts of the history of Kano and its *Chronicle,* and in a chapter (a draft of which is submitted along with this essay) on the early kingdoms of the Nigerian savanna I have put forward a general framework in which to understand the history of Kano and other states of the region. This paper, then, is a continuation of this re-analysis of the history of Hausaland and takes for granted the assumptions already made in the earlier papers. I intend here to focus on the period 1450 to 1800, the period of the two 'dynasties' – the Gidan Rumfa and the Gidan Kutumbi. I am concerned primarily with three problems:

1. the historiographical definition of a 'dynasty' in Kano histories;
2. the politics that gave rise to the two 'coups', if such they were;
3. the formation of the concept of the 'Hausa Bakwai' and the introduction of rural government in Kano.

Out of this arises a suggestion that Kano under the Rumfa 'dynasty' was a Sultanate centred on Dalla, whereas under the Kutumbi 'dynasty' an attempt was made to create a Kano Caliphate over a much wider area – hence the Hausa 7. I am concerned here too with the material expression of these political changes, particularly the buildings, in order to prompt, I hope, proper archaeological research in the area.

The terms 'Gidan Rumfa', 'Gidan Kutumbi' used here are borrowed from the late alhaji Abubakar Dokaji's *Kano ta Dabo Cigari* where he uses them to denote the two main dynastic houses of pre-jihad Kano. The distinction however is not made explicitly in the *Kano Chronicle,* nor does it occur in this form in the Song of Bagauda or in other extant lists of Kano kings. It is of course a question not so much of right or wrong as of differing perceptions of the past and of what was thought to be significant. The Kano *Chronicler* made mistakes, he also omitted many othings recorded both in other contemporary documents and in oral tradition – but he records, too, cases where he knew of differing traditions. Nonetheless it is possible largely

from his account to reconstruct the basis for the tradition of the two 'dynasties' – and this is what I propose to do here. I am taking for granted what I tried to prove elsewhere, that the first edition of the *Kano Chronicle* was written ca. 1675 by collating the oral and documentary evidence available at the time – and was updated several times subsequently. The original process of collecting the data was probably spread over several years, and the text may not even have been written actually in Kano City. We do not know. But it is clear that the chronicler did not have access to the equally anonymous *Asl al-Wangariyin* written in 1651 – most probably because the author of the *Asl* left Kano soon after as we know did other descendants of Shaikh Abd al-Rahman al-Zaiti.[5] Furthermore we know that the Kano Chronicler was more at home in Hausa than in Arabic, a fact which suggests he was not himself part of that professional scholar community. But I am assuming that the chronicler is recording faithfully the various traditions he heard – and that his evidence is valid, if not as 'fact', at least what he and others understood to be 'fact'.

I. Gidan Rumfa and the Kano Sultanate at Jakara or Dalla, ca.1560-ca.1620

Rumfa is celebrated by the Chronicler as an innovator – as the ruler who created a totally new kind of state in Kano. In material terms he built the 'Dar Rumfa' – a palace or 'castle' (or *casbah*) with a new curtain wall built as an extension to the existing town defences. Though the town's walls then consisted of a ditch, rampart and wooden stockade, it seems that Rumfa's *casbah* was made of stone and brick and in its use of materials was itself an innovation.[6] He also established the new main market in the town's centre where the new mosque was built. John Lavers has suggested that al-Maghili may have advised in the design of the layout. Certainly such a plan – castle, bailey and attached walled town with its mosque opening onto the market place – was the lay-out standard at this time in north Africa (at Tunis for example) and Europe, and demonstrates the way Kano was very much part of the international world. Indeed in the mid-16th century Kano was described as being one of the three main towns in Africa, on a par with Fez and Cairo.[7] Other fortified mansions ('castles'?) were built at the same time by Rumfa's chief councillors, and subsequently by his widow. Though the fashion was started in Kano apparently by a 'sultan from the south of Borno' before Rumfa came to power, the 'birni' (as a *casbah* came to be called) was equally a part of Songhay language and culture.[8]

Rumfa's other (earlier?) innovations are well known. He introduced the symbols of monarchy – trumpets, ostrich feather fans and sandals, a huge harem kept in seclusion, supplied by a levy of virgins from the royal estates, staffed by eunuchs. Eunuchs were also now to be employed in the new bureaucracy. Indeed so many eunuchs were available that Rumfa's widow

later established a eunuch market just west of the palace; other medical innovations mentioned in the manuscripts included the use of newly imported medicines as well as such procedures as clitoridectomy.[9] Associated also with his name is the introduction of prostrating and throwing dust on one's head when saluting the Sultan. As a further mark of majesty, special reserve horses were now taken on campaign for the Sultan's use: for in the new system the Sultan was no longer a mere war captain but a sovereign whose safety was paramount – though one who, as was to happen later, could not always count on his army not deserting him. Finally, Rumfa instituted the famous Council of Nine.

It is tempting to understand Rumfa's various policies as occurring in two distinct phases – an early phase in which he tried to create a monarchy in the manner of his contemporary Sonni Ali, and a later phase in which the monarchy was converted into a Muslim Sultanate. For towards the end of Rumfa's reign (perhaps as a final Malian move against Sonni Ali) al-Maghili was called (or sent) in to advise Rumfa on how to run a proper Islamic state.[10] But the pomp, for which some traditions criticise him as being un-Islamic, was common enough in the Hafsid Tunis or the Mamluk Cairo of the period. Nonetheless Rumfa earned himself the nickname 'the Arab king' (Balaraben Saraki), perhaps in recognition of those models.

If we assume Leo Africanus' informants were almost correct, the most important influence on Rumfa had earlier been Sonni Ali the Great who as the new ruler of Songhay was at this time gradually breaking the Mali empire's political and commercial grip on the region. But then the Askia Muhammad inspired counter-coups through Hausaland and Ahir; in Kano however only a Songhay official was installed at Rumfa's court (alongside the existing Borno official)and a daughter of the Askia was apparently married to the Kano Sultan.[11] If this is true, the obvious candidate in the extant Kano record is Rumfa's wife Auwa who as Mai Daki exercised considerable authority long after both her husband and father had died. Her brother Koli (a common royal Mande clan name) was also powerful in Kano – so much so that the nickname for a court official become Na-Koli[12]. Auwa's praise-song implies she was originally a stranger, and had to have her own bodyguard: 'Mama, Kano is your land, Kano is your town; right-ancient lady, dame of government, dame with the bodyguard'.

To the *Kano Chronicler* then, Rumfa's reign represented a break with tradition – the start of a new kind of state. But what was Rumfa's background, that he should do this? First, his nicknames. Rumfa or Rimfa is most probably the name the Wangara merchants and scholars gave him – meaning 'father (or master) of the rum'; *rum* or *rim* is a lance – and in Borno it was a particularly fearsome two-pronged weapon[13]. Alternatively he may have been the leader of the 'Rumawa' – a group in Kano for whom Rumfa's son had to build a mosque on the order of Shaikh al-Tunisi. In

Tunis itself at this time Rumi soldiers were employed as mercenaries, and such terms as Rumawa, Arma, Armi all occur in connection with a professional military group. It is possible then that Rumfa had been employed for example as part of an escort for caravans (which would explain al-Tunisi's concern for them). Rumfa is said to have come to Kano from Daura, by way of Gaya; he was not a native of Kano. It is possible he had Berber or Taureg links – not necessarily by birth but by employment – or was generally of Asben origin. Certainly this kind of background seems to have been true of his contemporary at Katsina, Ibrahim Sura (whose nickname does indicate he was a Beber), and perhaps his successor Ali Murabit, whose nickname would also fit a Tunisian-stytle mercenary origin. It was Ali who built the *qasr* or casbah at Katsina. Some Katsina traditions maintain that Durbawa and 'Larabawa' shared power at this time – and 'Larabawa' could mean Bebers or merely North Africans. Thus Rumfa's nickname 'balaraben Saraki' might be more than a mere metaphor. Claims to Arab origins were frequently being made at this time – not only did the Saifawa of Borno boast of Yemenite ancestry, but so had the Za kings of Songhay; so too, later did Daura's kings, through Bayajida. Whatever the truth of these claims, they did set a certain style for the royalty of the period. Interestingly Rumfa shares still another nickname, 'Katambokari', with his formidable, non-Muslim predecessor Kanajeji – a nickname which, if correct, derives perhaps from his earlier monarchical phase (or at least from people's idea about it).

A close scrutiny of the *Kano Chronicle* and other sources throws more light on his antecedents – or rather, again, on what the Chronicler's source took them to be. Broadly speaking there were two factions in pre-Rumfa Kano. The first, associated with Yaji, the Wangara and their joint sack of Santolo, was based on Dalla and was Muslim, though they retained their Mbau connections – west To Pauwa (in Katsina; also Muslim at this time) and south to Zaria. The second, associated with Kanajeji and his 'heirs', was based in eastern and southern Kano (possibly at Gaya and Rano) where they had moved after they had been forced to leave Santolo after its sack; they had Warjawa and Kudawa links as well as connection to Tuareg, Koyam and Sao groups further north and east.

The Tuareg or Asben connections of the eastern faction are illustrated by Burja's mother whose name, Tekidda, is common among Taureg women and by Burja being the first ruler to own camels, though he himself was a Warja.[20] This too is the period when Asbenawa start to frequent Hausaland to sell salt. Indeed Burja's 'son' welcomes Agalfati (another Tuareg name from Machina; Agalfati and his brothers are then given the governorships of Gaya, Hadejia, Dala and Gayam. The eastern faction was further supported by a network of marriages to the ruling houses of Dutse, Shira and Rano and to the powerful Galadima of Kano who held the southern front

(against Mbau). Furthermore the mother of king Dauda Bakon Damisa was called Mandara, a significant point perhaps since the first ruler of Mandara was himself called Gaya.[22] The title 'Bakon Damisa' ('Lord of the Leopard') is reminiscent of Jan Damisa, the title of the original Rumawa chief at Magwam in Kano: the leopard is the totemic animal of such sacred hills as Shike (near Rano) and may reflect a southern (Mbau) rather than an eastern (Warja) connection.[23]

The main towns of eastern Kano were: north of the Hadejia river valley, Karmashe (which had just conquered Miga situated in the valley), Dirani the original Burum ta Gabas near Garki which Bagauda was supposed to have visited en route to Sheme, and Dabi on the river near Ringim. The region was called Tokawa, but if this is a mis-spelling (in the arabic) of Tokarawa, the Asben connection is still clearer. South of the Hadejia valley was Birnin Gija whose nickname Garin Jaluta (Goliath's Town) indicates a Taureg presence; Gija extended as far as the old market of Abalago in the Katagum River valley and southwards apparently included Dutse – unless 'dutsen gija' is a mis-spelling of Dutsen Gijip (which is the old name of Shira)[24]. Gaya, in the region called Gaude, was not yet an important town: it was not a 'birni', though as a *hisn* it had probably a rampart as well as a stockade.[25]

It is of course not necessary for a kingdom to have a single formal capital, and from the account of royal movements given in the Kano Chronicle, the early kings were thought to have spent little time in any one place. There is no evidence they regarded Dalla as their capital. Rumfa's building of a 'castle' of his own near Dalla was, and was seen to be, a significant, almost radical step, anchoring the new Sultanate to a particular site – and in the eyes of the eastern faction, to a site on its western edge. It seems, indeed, like a move *back* to the area of Santolo by a group who now felt strong enough to leave the safety of their eastern refuge. Why they should be able to do this is not clear, unless it was a consequence both of Zaria dominance to the south and of the evident reluctance of the newly Muslim rulers at Dalla to participate in government. At least that is the impression the Kano Chronicler conveys: 'this high estate is a trap for the erring: I wash my hands of it', he makes Umar, a scholar and traditionally the first Muslim ruler of Kano, say to the assembled Kanawa. After Umar, Dauda Bakon Damisa became king, one immediate consequence of which was that a 'Sultan from south of Borno' (i.e. Mandara?) arrived wanting to settle in Kano, in effect with his son-in-law since Dauda's mother was 'Mandara'. Kano was becoming a place of refuge from Borno, and so not surprisingly the next king initiated the practice of sending gifts to the prestigious Saifawa dynasty to Borno, 'for baraka's sake'. Once a Borno official had formally built a castle of his own and established a market nearby, not far from Dalla, it was clearly necessary for whoever was to be really king of Kano to have his own casbah, and market, firmly attached to Dalla town. Rumfa did exactly that.

Rumfa's antecedents, I suggest, imply that he was trying to re-establish on a new site and in a modern style, the ancient kingdom of Santolo but to do so was adding some of the symbolism and technology current in Borno, Songhay and North Africa. Though Rumfa may have been originally employed by the eastern faction or its allies, he was as a Muslim presumably acceptable to the existing Muslim faction. Indeed he seems to have been a 'new man', not strictly identifiable with any particular role or group. But there is a clue to his political preferences in his launching for the first time in Kano history an attack on Katsina, then an Mbau and Wangara stronghold to the west where the Sarkin Pauwa, or at least some of his family, had been converted to Islam, a little earlier than Dalla.[28] Whether the attack on Katsina was part of Sonni Ali's general assault on the Mali Empire (in which the Wangara were a crucial element) or was done at the behest of Borno is not clear, but it is possible that the attacks of Rumfa and after him Abdullah brought about Ibrahim Sura and Ali Murabit (with their Berber connections?) being called in to share power in Katsina and later to build a casbah – after which Kano's attacks on Katsina ceased until a new, Wangara 'dynasty' took over control there.

A major problem for the Rumfa dynasty was to preserve its independence vis a vis Borno. The influx of scholars from Borno – both from the royal Maghumi clan and from the Kotoko (or Sao) region of Logone – was matched by the influx of scholars from the west; even-handedly, the dynasty married daughters of such scholars as Shaikh al-Tunisi, and Tamma from Kotoko as well as a Bornoan entitled Gumsu (Queen)[29]. But there was also serious if symbolic skirmishing – the most famous being the campaign called "say why" (Agaya dom me) in which the Kano Sultan, Kisoki, entered the Borno town of Nguru and seized not captives but only people's clothes and horses before fading away into the bush. The Sultan of Borno sent the message "say why", to which Kisoki replied, "it is the will of Allah"; subsequently the Borno sultan invaded Kano but then retired. The point is made clear by the song sung triumphantly in Kano about the episode: 'Kisoki – naked; Kisoki – Borno; Kisoki – the cure for nakedness' (i.e. clothes). Since the Borno term for the Kano people was Afnu, 'the arse-cloth people', the insult was suitably avenged by showing how easily even Borno people could be made to be 'naked' and the point made that it was Allah's will whether one was a poor 'thief' who fades into the bush or a rich man in the town. Nonetheless in the eyes of Borno officials the Kanawa were still bandits from the bush.[30]

The diplomatic exchange underlines the enormous contrast between town and countryside. For Kano was at this time a very prosperous town indeed, as D'Anania's description shows:

> Kano is one of three towns in Africa – the others being Fez and Cairo – of which the Berbers say that there is nothing in the world that you cannot find there. It forms a

> triangle with Fez and Cairo, being equidistant from both, two months' journey separating each of them. It is a larger city than Nineveh was (according to merchants who travel to Algiers), and it has a large trade in pepper, ivory and gold. It is the only one of black towns to be walled, with even the largest stones so that there are none left at all in the neighbourhood . . . . . ,

But to Borno, law and order on its Kano frontier were being threatened by the Kanawa putting up, for the first time, stockades around innumerable settlements between Nguru and Kano, since for a settlement to have such defences meant it must be intended as a den of thieves. And indeed there is contemporary evidence that banditry against caravans was a problem – all of which suggests that there now was a rift between the urban and rural economies which was breeding resentment. In the event the Sultan of Borno, Idris Alooma, simply marched through the area ca.1570, dismantling and destroying the defences of more than nine such settlements one by one, and finally attacked Gaya, cutting down all its trees (in the stockade and surrounding defences?)[32] The operation would not have been possible without the gunmen whose shots could penetrate the screening 'walls' of thorn and trees that served as otherwise effective barriers to cavalry. But against Gaya, with its rampart, Alooma was as unsuccessful in penetrating its defences as he had been against the stockaded parts of Dalla's defences. But the original problem, rural poverty and alienation from the political economy of the town remainded unsolved.

What broke the Rumfa dynasty was not so much Borno's interference as the military effectiveness of Katsina under the new Wangara dyansty of Ibrahim Maje, which had come to power in Zaye (or Zaghai, as Birnin Katsina was originally called) with the revival of Wangara fortunes and Kebbi's dominance in the region: for it seems that Songhai's persistent invasions of Katsina were attempts to oust the Sura 'dynasty'[33]. Ibrahim Maji was a compromise acceptable to both Kebbi and Songhay, and his armies now turned their attention on a Kano which was still free of Wangara control. The Sultans of Kano after c.1565 were now more inclined to scholarship and piety (as befits grandchildren of notable scholars) than to military leadership, so that the first four Sultans after Kisoki had each to be deposed in turn – two of them settling with their families in the north east where they served as village heads: it was probably their presence that led to the stockading of all the north eastern settlements destroyed by Alooma. Furthermore, as a consequence of the spate of depositions, still more eunuchs were appointed to positions of power; at the same time, individuals in Kano had accumulated considerable wealth as offices had become opportunities for profit – all to the detriment of the state's military effectiveness. Lastly, in the 1580's, the country was wracked by an epidemic followed by a prolonged eleven-year famine.[34] The Kwararafa added to the misery, scouring the countryside – perhaps at Kebbi's or Katsina's prompting – but the city survived thanks to its scholars.

Indeed the scholars were the Sultan's only resource now, not as combatants but as men of prayer and influence. A specially sacred Koran

('Dirki') and an 'ark of the covenant' (Sukana) were installed at the behest of the Kotoko scholars (who were in the ascendant through their link with Sultan Zaki's mother); in this, Kano was following Borno practice, and later both Katsina and Zaria were to have such shrines. The Kano Chronicler implied however that the charm sold to the Sultan by Shaikh Abu Bakr al-Maghribi was more effective, if drastic: the Sultan died without returning home.

The chief area of contention was south western Kano and southern Katsina – a potentially prosperous region once dominated by the old kingdom of Pauwa and its Mbau allies (at Maska, for example, under its Bakwom). Both Kano and Katsina tended to claim it, as later did Zamfara[35]. It was partly the failure of the last Gidan Rumfa Sultans to control this disputed region that led to the Kutumbawa dynasty replacing them; partly too the collapse of Songhay and the commercial network associated with it, thus affecting royal finances and the Sultans' ability to reward loyalty or mount expeditions. Perhaps most important of all was the inability of the Sultans and their scholar advisers to command a personal loyalty: for the dynasty, at least in the west, had no traditional power base of its own – yet it was in the west, where the scholars had their estates, that the battles had to be fought.[36] The wars had proved that scholars with their tradition of non-combatancy even when they were well endowed with estates, could not now defend territory. In the past money could hire armed jarumai ('knights'; rumawa) who in small groups could ride rough-shod through the countryside; but, as twenty-four such knights from Songhay found near Pauwa 1553/4, they were not a match for the local armies of massed light cavalry that now dominated the military scene.[37] In short a particular military era had passed, an era of such 'knights' as are celebrated in Arab romances like the *Sirat Antar*, some of whose exploits are set south and west of Lake Chad.[38] In Borno the Saifawa government survived despite these changes, in part perhaps because of the dynasty's long association with the area and its more recent expulsion of the Sao, in part too because of its trade and diplomatic links with the Ottoman regimes to the north.[39] The Askias and their heavy calvary in Songhay were less fortunate, falling to the Moroccan Rumi gunmen (the ('Arma) in 1591. In Kano the era of Gidan Rumfa disappeared less violently ca. 1623, and with it disappeared an urban political economy apparently estranged from the traditional countryside and neglectful of rural government.

II. Gidan Kutumbi and the Kano Caliphate, ca. 1620-ca.1806

The advent of a new a style of politics and military organisation under the Gidan Kutumbi Sultans is marked by the Kano Chronicler in much the same way as he marked the accession of the Gidan Rumfa – not by naming the new dynasty 'Kutumbawa' but by recording first all the dismissals the new

Sultan Mohammad Alwali Kutumbi made and then by specifying his administrative innovations: new taxes on the pastoral Fulani, new officials, and especially the re-introduction or elaboration of Rumfa's military ceremonial and displays of wealth. Like Rumfa he also built new 'castles' – in this case forts or armouries sited in the countryside in places where the increasing numbers of horses could be watered and fed all together at the start and end of a campaign: for mustering the new-style large 'National' armies took time. In creating a special corps of young non-Muslim slaves Kutumbi was merely following latest Borno practice, and indeed Borno terminology in calling them Kirdi; but interestingly Kutumbi did not, or could not, imitate Borno in creating corps of gunmen.[40] In a rich, old-style state like Saifawa Borno, gunmen filled the gap left by the obsolescence of the 'knight'; in Kano, at the nadir of its fortunes, that option either was impossible, or was too dangerous – since it could have led to private armies for the rich, a development the new Gidan Kutumbi quickly scotched. For the last years of Gidan Rumfa and the early years of Kutumbi's reign were plagued by war captains operating on the margins of Kano territory almost independently of the Sultan. At least four such armies are recognisable, ca.1620: those of Dawaki Karshi (or 'Koshi'), Sarkin Dawaki Magara (operating in Bauchi), Bako (a son of the Sultan) with 90 knights and 600 horses, and Wombai Giwa with 100 knights and 1000 horses.[41] These were considerable forces compared with Soghay's expedition of 24 knights mentioned earlier, and represented means of amassing very considerable wealth, enough to outbid the Sultan.

Whether Kutumbi himself had been a war captain and his son's army merely represented part of Kutumbi's old force, is not clear; where soldiers are slaves or freed slaves, they tended to be passed on as private property to the heirs who no doubt had got their military training alongside these same soldiers. But clues to Kutumbi's early life are rare. Kutumbi's real name was Muhammad Alwali. It is probable that his nickname conceals both an old title and a group name. His name is sometimes written in manuscripts as ba-Kutumbi, that is a man of the Kutumbawa; but 'Kutumbawa' itself, as a group name, derives from a title, perhaps Kutum Mbau. Kutu appears to be the title 'mai gida' (Ku – lord; to – house) or magaji – and occurs in such names as Koton Koro, Koton Karfi, Kotorkoshi. 'Tunbi' however occurs in the Song of Bagauda, as the name of an early war captain marauding in Kano in alliance with 'Washa', and both Tunbi and Washa are places in the Sosebaki area; it would be tempting then to assume there was once a title, 'Ku Tubi'. But what is the significance of 'Tunbi' and 'Washa' being linked in the Song of Bagauda like this, as partners in war and ancestors of the Kanawa? The answer, I suggest, is that they refer simply to the names of two constituent groups known to have been in Kano – the Mbau and Warjawa; in which case 'Kutum Mbau' was the original title of the leader of the Mbau 'to' (or 'clan'?), a title which appears perhaps also in the royal praise-

name 'Katambo kare'. This particular segment of the Mbau in Dalla became known then as 'Kutumbawa' and gave their name to the pre-Rumfa kings generally in later historical writings, particularly after Muhammad Alwali 'Kutumbi' revived the name. The Kutumbawa today recognise the ancestral origin of their name, but it is usually assumed unquestioningly that the only ancestor they had in mind was Muhammad Alwali. Modern Kutumbawa are but one section of the Kano Maguzawa, with their own distinctive face marks to set them slightly apart from their kin the Kanawa Maguzawa, who occupied the lands west and south west of Dalla.[42] In the past, the implication is that the Kutumbawa were one of the Mbau groups who identified with the Kano Sultanate and accepted Islam; and that it was they who were sent to Fangwai to occupy the land evacuated by their kinsmen after the sack of Santolo. If so, for Muhammad Alwali to take the name of 'Kutumbi' would be an acceptable compromise, acceptable to the Muslim community since it was associated with one of their Muslim 'client' peoples and yet appealing to the support of the 'Kanawa' of south western Kano where the main military problems had lain. Whether Muhammad Alwali actually was a ba-Kutumbi – it was after all merely a nickname, or perhaps, as 'Kutumbi', just a title – is not certain. Nonetheless by using the nickname oral tradition is emphasising apparently Muhammad Alwali's appeal to traditional values rather than to modern Islamic ones – as evidenced by the existence of a Rimin Kutumbi within Kano's walls at which clearly traditional sacrifices were made. Yet it is clear that Kutumbi maintained his links to the scholar community, favouring particularly the Wangara community at the expense of the Borno scholars patronised by the Gidan Rumfa. Kutumbi married off, it seems, one of his sons, Alhaji Bawa, to a daughter of the Maghili (Sidi Fari) family, while Kutumbi's most trusted councillor was the Qadi (or Wakili) Atuma, the form of whose name (Uthman) is distinctively western. Oral traditions confirm that Kutumbi also had links to wealthy merchants with estates west of Kano.[43]

The delicate balancing act required of Kutumbi to combine both communities, Muslim and merchants on one hand and the military and non-Muslim farmers on the other, is underlined by the crisis over the activities of his other son, Bako, (the traditional title of Bakwon among Mbau), who successfully sacked the important trading (Wangara?) town of Kurmin Dan Ranko on the disputed Kano – southern Katsina border. The action, the Chronicler records, was enough to give rise to fears of a civil war, but the Bako died, significantly as a result of prayers directed against him.

Another famous incident shows how justified these fears of civil war were, in this case not simply between merchant and military, but between two military groups – though the dispute was still expressed in religious terms. The Gwandara, so the tradition goes, decided to emigrate from Kano under the leadership of Madawaki Karshi rather than pray behind Sidi Fari, the

Imam and head of the Maghili family.[44] A song about him implicitly confirms this, as it appears to be blasphemous: it starts, 'here's your Prophet, you kings ...', and goes on to mention 'Black Dog', a pun on a place name and the particular sacrificial animal of pagans. But the background to the affair is more complex. The Madawaki had been a protege of Kutumbi's councillor Atuma, while his (adopted?) father was Allah Daya (or Allah Masoyi) who as Turaki Kuka, a palace office normally filled by eunuchs, had accummulated enormous wealth. He was the richest man in Kano, and even had his own quarter around which a special wall had been built by the Wombai in order to incorporate it within the safety of the city walls. The Wombai himself was extremely rich, and had built the extension out of his own pocket as well as contributing handsomely to the finances of the last Rumfa Sultan. Kutumbi on his accession dismissed both Wombai and Turaki Kuka from their posts and expropriated their property. Turaki Kuka's heir, Karshi, tried to start a counter-revolution and as Madawaki attracted many to his side, but he was talked out of it by Kutumbi – whereupon Karshi led the Gwandara out south to Zaria, where they are still living today.

The name Gwandara suggests a link to Borno and Mandara (whose people are 'Wandala': both groups speak a Chadic language), and it is true that under the Kutumbi regime the Kotoko scholars (from Mandara) and their followers fade out of the limelight.[45] The two scholars who do stay have later to leave the city for their towns of Getso and Godiya as soon as the Sidi Fari faction get the upper hand, under their kinsman the Sultan Shekarau. The implication is that the Gwandara had been a (military?) wing of the wider Borno party in pre-Kutumbi Kano. Whatever the case their peaceful departure represented a political triumph for Kutumbi and demonstrated that he had found the solution to the problem of private armies and rich ambitious officials – emigration southwards to areas where they could set up states of their own, a solution that was to recur frequently in the 19th century too.[46] In this 17th century case, it may have given rise to that traditional identification which the states of the southern savanna have for long had with Borno.

In short, Kutumbi's period as Sultan did, I suggest, witness a revolution in military structure, political organisation and above all in personnel. It witnessed too a re-alignment with Wangara rather than with Borno factions, but this re-alighment I think was more to cancel out old rivalries in order the better to preserve Kano's autonomy. For the Wangara, after the collapse of Songhay, cannot have been much of a threat to anyone at this time. Indeed the last Wangara state, Katsina, itself became the victim of a coup, ca.1641, when the local Dakakeri party under Uban Yari took over the Sultanate there[47]. It may have been a misguided attempt to restore the Wangara dynasty at Katsina on behalf of his kinsmen by marriage, the Sidi Fari clan, that led to Kutumbi being killed and to his son Alhaji Bawa being captured in

a disastrous attack, in 1648, on the new ('Upstart'?) leaders in Katsina. If the campaign was fought on behalf of the Wangara and their friends, it perhaps explains the dismal performance of the new-style Kano army for whom the merchant-scholars of the city were not worth dying for in a battle against their own Mbau/Dakakeri kinsmen, – who, after all, had only done what Kutumbi himself had done some twenty-five years earlier.

The result of this disaster in the long term was to distance the Sultans still further from the scholar-merchant community, and particularly from the Sidi Fari party backed by the Madawaki Kuma (who may have had Asben connections)[48]. In the short term, the scholars negotiated the release of Alhaji Bawa if only temporarily (he died in exile in Katsina) and later brought about peace between Kano and Katsina, where the new dynasty was evidently well established. It was in this context that one of the Wangara scholars decided to put on record the history of the Zaiti group in Kano, their genealogy and a list of their kin: *Asl al-Wangariyin.*[49] As he said, it was important for a family to hold together, and these were difficult times. The Zaiti family was to encounter further hostility and finally left Kano, though the reasons are not known. Scholars consistently resented paying taxes even on their often considerable landed property, and in the relative austerity of post-16th century Kano (as later in 19th century Kano) scholars sometimes preferred emigration to taxation.

Another immediate result of this disaster was that a brief civil war did finally erupt in 1650 with the scholars' candidate and his supporters pitted against the incumbent Muhammad Ku Kona. His nickname indicates one source of his support – the Kona (or Kororofa) who had considerable influence in Zaria at this time. His mother was from Zaria, and it was to Zaria that he fled when the rebellion broke out.[50] Another nickname sometimes given, Gakin Gakuma, confirms this Zaria connection. Interestingly, Zaria itself had witnessed a coup, or at least a change of dynasty, either c.1640 (contemporarily, then, with Katsina's coup) or ca.1650, when Muhammad Rabbau (Rabb Mbau, 'Lord of Mbau'?) took charge. The details are obscure. Muhammad Ku Kona's father was Muhammad Zaki, who presumably is the last but one of the Rumfa Sultans: had Zaki bought off the Zaria Kororofa who invaded Kano in his time by marrying a Kororofa 'princess'?[51] Did the Gwandara, now in Zaria after leaving Kano, insist on her son, Muhammad Ku Kona, returning from Zaria to Kano to regain his position there? And had the Gwandara been in any way involved in the coup in Zaria? I put forward one solution to these problems below, but what we do know is that Muhammad Ku Kona was restored, not by any obvious help from Zaria, the Gwandara or the Kororofa, but from Gaya and the other incumbent officials in Kano (or so at least the Kano Chronicler wants us to believe). The price Muhammad Ku Kona paid was an invasion by the Kororofa, though for the duration of the attack (two months) he prudently moved out to eastern

Kano. It is possible he was deliberately using the Kororofa to devastate his opponents' estate. Subsequently, to confirm where his alliances really lay, he called in the Maguzawa (Kutumbawa or Kanawa?) and gave them presents to ensure his survival as Sultan. Even handedly, he also singled out the Imam of Yandoya ward (the Sidi Fari quarter in Kano) and gave him gold and silver in return for a supply of charms for the same purpose. His actions, then, seem designed to distance himself publicly from the Rumfa Sultanate, and to affirm his links with those groups who had established the Kutumbi regime. His own Zaria background gave his policies added credibility.

Interestingly, however, Ku Kona was also given by his contemporaries the title 'Amir al mu'minin'[52]. Though it may have been meant as compliment to win his favour, it could also be significiant as a gesture of independence not only from Borno (where the Mai was also Amir al-mu'minin and Caliph) but also from any other international authority – while asserting the Islamic nature of the Sultanate. If Ku Kona was not the first to claim the title, the most likely candidate to have done so was Kutumbi when he re-aligned Kano with the Wangara and with Sidi Fari: in their eyes the Askia had been officially appointed Amir almu'minin, and with his demise at the hands of the Moroccan army, the Wangara may have encouraged the new Sultan of Kano to claim the title. In which case we should perhaps speak of the Kano Caliphate under the Gidan Kutumbi, in contrast to the Kano Sultanate at Dalla under the Gidan Rumfa. As for Rumfa, we know at least that he was styled by his contemporaries 'Sultan Kano', in contrast to his contemporary Ibrahim in Katsina who was simply 'Sahib Katsina', Master of Katsina – the 'Sultan Pauwa' being at that time the official Sultan in the area.[53]

'Caliphate' is perhaps rather grand for Kano at this period (though I discuss this further below), and the title 'Amir almu'minin' should be seen in the context of other west African users of the title, such as the Sultans of Agades. Nonetheless it does emphasise an important point: that Kano under the Kutumbawa was still a Muslim state and its rulers were the recognised leaders of the Muslim community. For we should not confuse the original Kutumbawa kings of the pre-Rumfa period with the post-Rumfa Kutumbawa despite the obvious symbolic significance of the revival of that name to describe Muhammad Alwali and his 'dynasty'.

In the next (18th) century the new-style Kutumbawa Sultans were to try to integrate the urban and rural economies and create a united and more centrally controlled state. The changes in the economic foundation of the Sultanate necessistated this. With Kano no longer such a centre of international trade (compared, say to Borno), with the Wangara commercial network in disarray after Songhay's collapse, with royal profits from military campaigns seemingly uncertain but clearly insufficient to compensate for the loss of merchant revenue, state financing increasingly depended on rural

production of crops and craftwork – notably in the form of cotton, indigo and finished cloth. Thus even in this rather reduced sense, Kano did become a sort of 'caliphate' – though technically under the Borno Caliph: for whereas the Rumfa Sultans had governed urban Kano, with its hinterland and a network of subordinate yet semi-autonomous local allies, the new 'caliph' sought to administer the wider Kano region in its entirety, through his own nominees who were now posted out to a series of specially constructed or re-organised towns. The initial intention, however, may well have been to create a larger Caliphate than this, and it is to this question we now turn.

III. The Hausa Bakwai and Rural Government in 18th century Kano

A. The Hausa 7 and the proposed 'Caliphate'

I will be suggesting in this section that there are two phases in the history of the concept 'Hausa 7', giving rise to an early, 17th century version and then a revised 18th century version. The information available in manuscripts is so scanty that much of the argument must depend on inference. But taken all together, the data are very suggestive, and I therefore submit the following conclusions for discussion.

The term 'Hausa Bakwai' first appears in the 17th century, after the series of coups just discussed, when local leadership came to control first Kano and then Katsina and Zaria.[54] The change in government brought these three major states closer to the other less commercially important towns of the region like Rano or Daura; closer, too, to kingdoms like Kebbi or the new Gobir and Zamfara as well as to Kano's old north eastern neighbours like Auyo and Burum ta Gabas. Out of these arose a political unit distinct both from Borno in the east and from largely non-Muslim states of the south – namely, the Hausa Bakwai. Another political unit, the so-called Banza Bakwai mainly consisted of the non-Hausa-speaking states west and south of the Hausa Bakwai. I suspect that the term 'Banza Bakwai' is a pun on the proper name for a grouping of non-Hausa speakers whose language was generically called Bassa; and that the two groups, the Hausa Bakwai and the Bassa Bakwai, formerly constituted a single large cultural unit, the two segments being linked by traditions of joking and wife-giving between them – and no doubt there were other ties now forgotten. Later, Muhammad Bello, in *Infaq al-maisur*, implies there was also a 'Gwari Bakwai' west of the 'Bassa Bakwai'; these were to be Katsina's dependent other 'half'. A comparable federation of this sort, though composed of some 20 groups, was coming into existence at this time as the Kororofa or 'Jukun Empire'.[55]

It is possible that the real significance of Muhammad Alwali's revival of the name 'Kutumbi' was to signify his claim to lead both these segments, under the old title Kutum Mbau: for the whole southern region is still

known today as 'Kasar Bauchi' in Hausa. He would, then, be forming a Caliphal state to rival not only Borno but also the nascent Jukun (hence the interest of the Jukun Sarki Adashu to scotch the project). Some confirmation of this comes from a contemporary source quoted by Celebi, who speaks of only one of the Hausa 7 being Muslim – meaning perhaps that only one state was claiming the Islamic leadership of Hausa area. For Katsina at this time was also plainly Muslim, with two famous scholars in Dan Marina and Dan Masani, and had become a leading power under the founder of its new 'dynasty'.

If there was a proposed Kano Caliphate, was Sultan Zaki's installation of Dirki and Sukana as symbols of Caliphal authority the first stage? Was Kutumbi then elected to the Sultan-ship in order to carry through the project and give it credibility? In which case were the Gwandara persuaded to leave Kano only because their leader was to be the new 'Gakin Gakuma' ('the lord of Kongoma') and to rule the south under the new 'Caliph'? Were the coups in Zaria and Katsina part of the same plan for a Caliphate, though in Katsina's case the coup backfired somewhat when the Sultan of Katsina sought to set up his own caliphate, independent of Kano yet caliming the alleigiance of the neighbouring southern territories of the 'Gwari Bakwai'? Finally were the later Kororofa invasions a successful move to kill any further attempts by Ku Kona and his successors to revive the Caliphate after the initial set-back caused by Kutumbi's unexpected defeat and death; and was the crisis over Muhammad Ku Kona due to a split between on the one hand those who thought the Caliphate could only be revived by stressing its Islamic basis, and on the other hand those who thought success lay with a more expansionist policy and with continuing to appeal to 'Kumbawa' traditions?

Whatever the case, by the late 18th century the division between Hausa Bakwai and Banza Bakwai (as it now was) took on greater importance than any earlier unity, and divided the states of the region on a different basis – allegiance to Borno. Similarly the new, 18th century symbolic genealogy of the Hausa Bakwai establishes them as the only Mbau kingdoms (*Yayan* Bauwo),[56] thought it pairs six of them precisely in layers according to their linguistic and historic antecidents; Kano and Daura because of their common 'Habasha' traditions; Zaria and Gobir because of their original location as neighbouring states at Kangoma and south of Kebbi (Domawa); Katsina and Rano because of their common Mbau origin. Who was the final seventh is not agreed – the initial six were the important ones, and a seventh was needed only when the symbolism of the number seven became important. Suffice it to say that Kano people, for example, were apt to exclude Zaria and add Biram and Auyo in its place, while other lists omit these two and include Kebbi and Zamfara instead. The list of Banza states varies too,[57] depending on whether the viewpoint is fundamentally Bornoan or reflects

more local interests. The Borno-oriented list, unlike the earlier Bassa Bakwai and Gwari Bakwai lists, is concerned only with large units such as Kororofa to Kebbi thus changing both the scale and the significance of the category, now called 'Banza'.

Within this later 'Hausa Bakwai', Kano's role is reduced to one among many and is even subordinate to Daura, where admittedly the Sultans of Kano had twice sought shelter, beyond the barrier of the Gari river valley. For in the new Hausa 7 Daura was the 'kofa' for the 7, and as Borno's agents was to be the titular head of the group.[58]

In this context, then, it is possible that the first 'edition' of the Kano Chronicle was written (ca.1675) to promote Kano as the leader of both the Hausa 7 and the 'Bassa 7' by demonstrating a historical continuity which stretched quite as far back as anything the Saifawa could claim, yet rooted Kano's origins, and the Kutumbawa Sultans, firmly in the indigenous traditions of the region. Not for them a Yemenite ancestry! The striking omission of the Bawo genealogy from the Kano Chronicle's first edition – and its subsequent addition as a footnote – confirms this: for the genealogy introduces a particular alien element in the form of Bayajidda and his links to Borno and Baghdad; and it reduces the Mbau factor to merely a product of an Arab and 'Habasha' marriage, – none of which is consistent with the perspective given the *Kano Chronicle*. But this later concept of the *Yanyan* Bawo had become current at least by 1800 AD.[59] and represents, I believe, the transformation of an originally 17th century claim to a Caliphate, with leadership of at least Hausa states, into a historical myth which recognises the primacy of the Borno Caliphate over the region.

The failure of Kutumbi's Kano Caliphate, if such it was, to become a reality meant that Kano had to look to its own territories as a source of financing the state rather than weld the 'Hausa' and 'Bassa' into an economic and political unity. Though the attempts to form a Caliphate and the experience of two or more centuries of intensive international trade had evidently helped to bring about a greater cultural homogeneity and had caused the Hausa language to become a lingua franca, nonetheless large areas of the countryside had yet to be integrated into this new Hausa society. The policies adopted to speed up that integration are the subject of the next section.

B. Policies for a new rural government, ca. 1700-1750 A.D.

In ca. 1672 the Kororofa once more invaded Kano and Katsina, puncturing any grandiose ambitions the two Sultans might have had, since both of them had only just come to the throne. In Kano the palace was captured and the Sultan forced to flee, leaving 87 leading officials dead along with most of his bodyguard of 200. The authority of Kano over the outlying towns was

at low ebb: the king of Gaya for three years failed to pay his taxes, no doubt taking advantage of the fact that his daughter was married to the Sultan. The Sultan however quelled the revolt by murdering his father-in-law, and as he expected the other important towns of the area – Miga, Dutse, Aujera – to revolt too if Gaya again revolted, he sent out one of his officials to take over Aujera. The nature and location of the revolt underlines two problems: first that of financing the Sultanate from taxes after the devastation caused by the Kororofa, and second, that of defending the exposed eastern frontier which faced the Kororofa. However, further disaffection in the area stopped when the men of Gaya virtually took over the Sultanate as soon as their kinsman, Sharifa, came to the throne.

It was presumably the Gaya influence over policy that resulted not only in the re-building of Gaya's walls but also in the construction of new walls around several eastern towns – Takai, Tsokuwa, Rano, Dawakin Kudu and many others. The programme was, in effect, one of building ribats, of closing the frontier in the classical Islamic manner.[60] But the work was more than mere walling round old settlements. A preliminary survey suggests the new towns were laid out to a regular rectangular pattern and conformed to a basic common street plan; that they were oriented to a set direction 15° north of east – that is, to the exact direction of Mecca – and built in one of two standard sizes – either approximately 550 yards by 750 yards, or 1000 yards by 1200 yards. (I must emphasise that this is a preliminary survey; considerably more research is required but I believe that these interim conclusions are sufficiently interesting to mention here.) In the case of Gaya, the oval shape of whose settlement reflects its growth as an early trading centre on the Borno road, only the street pattern appears to have been modified within the older pattern set by the original walls.[61]

The standard form of defence was a wall with two external ditches, usually containing thorns. The 'wall' of smaller settlements was in fact only a stockade of posts or of living (and therefore leafy and fire-proof) trees interspersed with thorns, while the new type of walls in country towns had at best a foundation of rocks and a mud core faced with brick (tubali) and plastered over. The siting of completely new towns also seems to have followed a definite policy. The new towns were often built in the open plain within a few miles of an ancient hill settlement and so controlled both the hillsmen and the access to the main river nearby – a good example of such a site is Barkum. In some other cases, such as Dala, the new retangular town was built within the hills yet in a more open space away from the earlier settlement. Some of the new towns were sited at strategic points, to cover river crossings for example. One such town is Sheme, which guards the road to Katsina, covers the ancient hill settlement at Gabosani nearby, and controls a major crossing point across the river Gari, whose swampy valley

further downstream was evidently a major obstacle in the past and formed a natural frontier for the north of Kano.

As a corollary of this systematic town-building, officials of the Sultan were sent out in large numbers, especially in Kumbari's time, to take charge of the new settlements,[62] and it is no doubt they who actually supervised the laying out of the towns – which in part explains the uniformity. But the degree to which the local population ever moved into the new towns is not clear; in areas such as Rano, the traditional pattern of dispersed settlement has survived till today. Elsewhere, for example in Eastern Kano, small hamlets were commonplace, while in western Kano there tended to be old walled towns which served as places of refuge (along with rocky hills) when attacks threatened. The distribution, however of such preferred refugesis not entirely regular, partly because walled towns varied widely in their reputations as safe places. Equally a dispersed settlement pattern was not necessarily a disadvantage in withstanding attack – individually farm-houses were well-fortified structures – and provided advance warning of an approaching enemy.

The new towns, then, were not so much centres of population as administrative centres, collecting taxes and organising cheap manpower for the army or for public works. The financial problems of the Sultanate had already caused Sharifa to impose seven new kinds of taxes, including one on the market. His successor, Kumbari, increased the market taxes and extended them to all citizens of the city including scholars. As a result, says the Chronicler, the Sultan Kumbari was loved by his officials but hated by the populace (including the Arabs, who left). Obviously to a peasantry unused to such close supervision, the reforms were oppressive; to the bureaucracy given powers, it was an opportunity for enrichment. In consequence, the Sultan Baba Zaki decided he had to clamp down hard on his officials, confiscating their property and forcing them to do military service. Not surprisingly he was the first Sultan to establish a personal bodyguard armed with guns, which presumably over-awed any dissent in the army or in the bureaucracy.

Such tight control over government officials was presumably unusual – with the result that when the jihad came, after some fifty years of peace, the Kutumbawa government in Kano could still not muster enough support to oppose the movement for any length of time. As it happened, the last of the Kutumbawa (or 'Habe') Sultans was himself involved in reforming local Islamic practice and was undecided whether he should accept the authority of Shaikh Uthman dan Fodio, as the Sultan of Zaria Ishaq had done. But his indecision was irrelevant: the countryside especially in eastern Kano was indifferent to his fate, if not actually hostile, and he died a refugee in the old Mbau area of Burumburum in southern Kano. While some of his Kutumbawa kinsmen stayed on in Kano and one of them was even given

place on the new post-jihad Council,[63] in the countryside almost every town and village was given a new government official appointed by the Emir or his deputies. The new administration was thus able to take over an already existing structure of rural government in Kano, and this in part explains the ease with which the change-over took place. But it is important to recognise that it was, ca.1800, still a relatively new system for large parts of the Emirate and in some areas had yet to prove acceptable to the local population. Rural integration, then, proved to be a slow process. Though the first concerted efforts to achieve it on a large scale apparently date back to the early 18th century, the economic success of these policies did not become clear until well into the 19th century, too late to help the Gidan Kutumbi survive. But not even the Saifawa were to survive the jihad, despite some eight centuries of uninterrupted power. By comparison, the Kutumbawa 'Caliphate' proved to be merely a project, albeit a bold one.

Conclusion

It must have struck the reader as surprising that in an essay on 'dynasties' no mention has yet been made of kinship. The reason is simple: the Kano Chronicle, which is the main source for putative kinship links between rulers, is unreliable on this point. In one particular instance it is probably wrong. Most extant kinglists do not mention the father's name[64] and it is clear that the Kano Chronicle was sometimes faced with sources of this kind. Where the father's name was missing a guess was apparently made, but only in some texts has this been done consistently. The various underlying assumptions that dictated what that guess should be is still not clear to me – nor is the rationale for what may be merely varying literary conventions. Kano's especial concern for mothers' names suggests it was a phenomenon of eastern Kano society, and perhaps influenced by a similar practice in Borno: it does not necessarily mean that matrilateral inheritance of kingship was current in the pre-Islamic period.

Another compelling reason for ignoring kinship is that if the Kano Chronicle was composed in part to promote the concept of a Kano Caliphate which would match that existing in Borno, then the Kano Caliphs had to have as impeccably unbroken a line of descent as that claimed by the Saifawa. Thus the division of the Kano Chronicle into 'dynasties' would have run counter to the underlying philosophy of the project. In the Chronicler's mind all the kings had to be 'Kutumbawa', whether they were Muslims or not; for otherwise the appeal that lay behind Muhammad Alwali's revival of the name 'Kutumbi' was valueless. Even Rumfa was provided with a possible local ancestry in the early 'Rumawa'. We have ourselves been committing an equally unhistorical solecism in continuing to label all the pre-jihad Sultans as Habe, a broad categorical term that answered the particular needs of a particular period. But as I have tried to show here, the 'seamless cloth' of

the 'Kutumbawa Kings' is instead a cloth of many pieces, equisitely sewn together. I gladly acknowledge my debt to Alhaji Abubakar Dokaji, Wazirin Kano, for pointing out the 'stitching'.

The problem of what exactly historians mean here by the terms 'dynasty' or *gida* is therefore unresolved. Its basis simply in kingship, as formal lineage or descent group is, I think, questionable. A broader definition in political terms might be more suitable, for example as a faction allied by common interests and ties of patron-clientage as well as marriage and kinship. I have emphasised here also a possible ideological basis, with gida implying a school of thought or party with a particular programme. Lastly, one should not ignore gida as a historiographical unit like a 'period'; but in this case like a mathematical or market 'set', *gida* represents a 'set' of rulers. Such a cluster of meanings and metaphor should not, I suggest, be abandoned austerely in favour of a single definition – at least not until we know much more of the details of Kano history.

In this re-construction of the politics that gave rise to these coups or shifts in policy, a central theme has been the creative tension between the scholars and the military – a theme that may tell us as much perhaps about Hausa historical literature as about political 'reality'. For the Mallam, no less than the Jarumi or the King, is a stock figure in Hausa fiction; so too is the 'city slicker' and the hard-done-by farmer. The chronicler must have had his difficulties in sorting 'events' out of the mass of anecdotes available – and no doubt the resulting Chronicle reflects the political assumptions and prejudices of his sources, stressing, unduly perhaps, conflicts between town and country, between soldiers and scholars.

Finally, the literary culture from which the Chronicle sprang may be responsible too for the implicit symetry of events – an example of which is the underlying contrast between Rumfa's re-creation of the Santolo kingdom in the Sultanate of Kano and Kutumbi's Caliphate which was to replicate Yaji's wide 'empire'. Teased, then, like this out of the literary record and men's memories, these kingdoms and caliphates can only have a somewhat shadowy existence. Whether archaeology can give them some material substance remains to be seen.

This is Santolo Hill said to have been one of the earliest settlements in Kasar Kano.



Old Kano and her Neighbours

NOTES

1. Most of the research for this paper was done at Bayero University, Kano, when I was Professor of History in 1978-80. I am very grateful to John Lavers and my other colleagues for their help, and to the University authorities for their facilities. The other papers are 'Historical Metaphors in the Kano Chronicle' (*History in Africa*, 7, 1980, pp. 161-178); 'Early Kano: the Santolo-Fangwai Settlement System' (*Kano Studies*, 1.4., 1979, pp. 7-23); 'Before Zaria: Evidence for Kankuma (Kagoma) and its Successor States' (for *Essays in Honour of Prof. Abdullahi Smith*, forthcoming).
2. Althaji Abubakar Dokaji, *Kano ta Dabo Cigari*, 1st edn. 1958, pp. 29-45; 2nd end. 1978, pp.20-32.
3. Song of Bagauda, translated by M. Hiskett, *Bulletin of S.O.A.S.*, xxviii, 1965, pp.112-135. Other kinglists are preserved in the National Archives, Kaduna, and in the Jos Museum (Palmer's papers); an early kinglist is in Baikie's notes published in the *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, 1867, p.102.
4. 'Historical Metaphors . . . ', p.162
5. *Als al-Wanqariyin*, translated by M.A. al-Hajj, *Kano Studies*, 1.4, 1968, pp.7-42.
6. That Dalla's defences consisted of a stockade in ca. 1570 is shown by Ibn Fartuwa: *First Twelve Years* (Palmer's translation, pp.11, 31), and this is confirmed by Leo, on the basis of information ca. 1510, who specifically says they were made of wood and mud (al-Hasan b. Muhammad al-Wazzan al-Zayyati, alias Jean-Leon L'African: Description de l'Afrique, translated by A. Epaulard, Paris, 1956, vol.2, p.476). The use of stone is more problematic; it is perhaps implied by Anania's account – see below, page 8.
7. Anania, pp. 338-9; for the text, see below, page 64.
8. Note that the house is said to have been built (by the Galadima?) *for* the Borno visitors (*Kano Chronicle*, Palmer's translation, pp.109-112). For Songhair and its casbahs, see J.Rouch, *Contribution a l'Historie des Songhay*, Dakar, 1953, pp.154-5
9. The eunuch market; a variant textual reading found in R.M. East (ed.) *Labarun Hausawa* (1971 edn.) vol. 2, p.39. The medicines were olive oil, cinnabar, the bdellium (or cumin?): *Kano Chronicle* (Palmer's translation), p.113, where the text is corrupt. Clitoridectomy: *Labarin Hausawa* (ed. Rattray), Hausa Foklore and Customs, vol. 1, pp. 23-4).
10. Al-Maghili visited Hausaland ca. 1493, leaving for Songhay later. A new translation of al-Maghili's advice for Rumfa. *Taj al-Din*, by K.I. Bedri and P.E. Staratt, *is in Kano Studies*, 1.2, 1974-7, pp.15-28. On contemporary Tunis, see Leo Africanus: *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp.378-388.
11. Leo Africanus, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 463, 472-8; as Leo clearly says these coups occured before Askia's pilgrimage ca. 1497-8, Dr. H. Fisher's arguments against using Leo (in 'Leo Africanus and the Songhay conquest of Hausaland', *I.J.A.H.S.*, xi.1, 1978, pp. 86-112) are irrelevant here.
12. *Kano Chronicle* (Palmer's translation), p.113. A famous contemporary 'Koli' was Koli Tenguela.
13. From the Arabic *rumh* (plural: *rimah*), meaning a lance or javelin. I am grateful to John Lavers for drawing my attention to the Borno 'rum'. A single-bladed *rum* carried by a mounted District Head as an emblem of rank, is illustrated in Palmer's *Borno Sahara and Sudan* (London, 1936), plate xix, facing page 176; earlier, S.W. Koelle (*African Native Literature*, London, 1854, p.391) speaks of a *rum* as a special spear restricted to certain soldiery.
14. Alhaji Abubakar Dokaji, *Kano ta Dabo Cigari*, 1st edn., p.29; 2nd edn., p.20
15. Sura ('White') refers especially to Mauretanians (M. Delafosse, *La Langue Mandingue*, Paris, 1955, vol. 2, p.700); 'sure', however means stranger, or person without family'.

16. For Katsina kinglists, see Y.B. Usman's appendix to his thesis which is published in *Bulletin de l'I.F.A.N.*, t.40, ser. B., no.2, 1978, pp. 396-414. For Ali as builder of the *qasr, ibid.*, p.404.
17. F. de F. Daniel, *History of Katsina*, p.1 (unpublished)
18. *Kano Chronicle* (Palmer's translation, p.108): the text is corrupt here. A kinglist in the National Archives appears to be calling Rumfa 'Katambokari', possible in error of course!
19. The two factions may possibly have continued fighting after the sack of Santolo-Yaji against the Warjawa, and Kanajeji against the Umbutawa, according to the Kano Chronicler's informants, if so.
20. I am grateful to H.T. Norris for pointing out to me the significance of the name Tekidda. 'Burja' is a mis-transliteration of the a jami 'ba-Warja'.
21. *Kano Chronicle* (Palmer's translation), pp.110-1
22. 'Mandara' is the name given her in one kinglist in NAK; the Chronicler calls her Auta. I am indebted to Dr. Bawuro Barkindo for information on Mandara.
23. Shike hill is mentioned in connection with Santolo in the *Kano Chronicle* (Palmer's translation, p.99); the hill is the highest inselberg in Kano, and seemingly devoid of occupation material on its summit — a walled village is, however, at its base.
24. Information on Birnin Gija and Dirani was collected on brief visits in 1979 and 1980; subsequently, Sabo Albasu when a student tried to collect more data on Birnin Gija for his BA History dissertation (B.U.K., 1980), but the site requires proper archaeological investigation, as does Garun Gabas, the presumed site of Dirani, near Garki.
25. Gaya as a *hisn:* Ibn Fartuwa, *First Twelve Years* (Palmer's translation), p.30.
26. *Kano Chronicle* Palmer's translation), p.108
27. *Kano Chronicle* Palmer's translation), p.109. That the Saifawa were making much of their claim to Yemenite ancestry at this time is shown by their letter to the Mamluk Sultan of Egypt, quoted by al-Qalqashandj; but their baraka came from their claim to be Quraish *(Nigerian Perspectives*, 2nd end. p.103).
28. 'Sultan Pauwa': *Kano Chronicle* Palmer's translation) p.103. That it is Pauwa and not Pawa ('butchery', as P. Lovejoy, for example, believed — *Kano Studies*, 1.3, 1978, p.46) is proved by the use of 'sultan' and not 'sarki', since the Chronicler does not mix up his languages in this way in titles.
29. 'Kartukawa' in Palmer's translation of the *Kano Chronicle* is a mistake for 'Kotokawa', the appropriate term for emigrants from Logone or Baghirmi. 'Kotoko' occurs in other contemporary documents — e.g. Ibn Fartuwa, *First Twelve Years* (Palmer's translation, p.45). 'Gumsu' is given in kinglist for Nazaki's mother, whereas the Chronicler has Kursu: Kursu, at this time, was the name of the Wazir in Borno (Ibn Fartuwa: ibid., p.37) and so the two variants are consistent in their general reference to a Borno connection. I am assuming that the mother of Yakubu referred to as Tunis is the daughter of al-Tunisi, just as later I assume that the woman referred to as Fari is from the Sidi Fari family. Although these are major assumptions, my reasoning is that in the Rumfa sultanate, mothers' actual names were less important (and less frequently known) than their political connections: yet since the traditional format of Kano kinglists from early times had been to include mothers' names, the tradition was perpetuated into the Muslim period, albeit in a modified form.
30. The story is from the *Kano Chronicle* (Palmer's translation, p.113) but both Palmer and East's translator have misunderstood the story. For Kanawa as bandits, see Ibn Fartuwa, *First Twelve Years* (Palmer's translation), pp.11, 30. The insult inherent in the name 'Afnu' may have been replicated in the names Kudawa/Birnin Kudu/Nguderi for Chadic-speakers south of the Hadejia valley, since kudu, like afnu, means loincloth. The more obvious meaning is, of course, 'southerners', and herein lies the pun.
31. Anania: D. Lange, S. Berthoud, 'L'Interieur de l'Afrique Occidentale d'apres

Giovanni Lorenzo Anania (xvie siecle)', *Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale.* xiv, 2, 1972, pp.299-351. The Kano passage occurs on pp.338-9.

32. Ibn Fartuwa, *op. cit.*, p.31.
33. For the new 'dynasty' of Ibrahim Maje, see Barth's anonymous informant (possibly Abd al-Qadir b. al-Mustafa?) in Barth, *Travels,* vol. 1, pp. 474-5. In a forthcoming essay on the Mbau kingdoms I argue that Katsina is the site of Leo's Wangara but under its old name of Zaye or Zaghai (as Ibn Batuta spells it), and that Pauwa is the kingdom described by Leo's informants as 'Katsina'. That Zay was the old name of Katsina is a point made by Imam Umar al-Salagawi (Mss. 1907, p.162).
34. Famine: *Kano Chronicle* (Palmer's translation) p.116. Epidemic: *Song of Bagauda* (Hiskett's translation), p.117.
35. I am grateful to J. Bivins for showing me his transcription of a Maska kinglist.
36. P. Lovejoy, in *Kano Studies,* 1.3, 1978, p.48, points out that the Zaiti lands were in Gwarzo and Karaye districts.
37. The Songhai raid: al-Sa'di, *Tarikh al-Sudan* (Paris, 1900) pp.168-9, and quoted in *Nigerian Perspectives* (2nd end), p.134.
38. *Sirat Antar:* see H.R. Norris, *The Adventures of Antar,* Warminster, 1980.
39. For Ottoman links, see the documents quoted in *Nigerian Perspectives* (2nd edn), pp.180-181.
40. Borno's use of Kirdi: Ibn Fartuwa, *First Twelve Years* (Palmer's translation), p.22.
41. *Kano Chronicle* (Palmer's translation), pp.117-8. I am assuming that 'Koshi' in Palmer's translation is an error in the ajami for 'Karchi', who is known in oral tradition as a notable Madawaki under Alwali.
42. Cf. J.H. Greenberg, *Influence of Islam on a Sudanese Religon* New York, 1946, pp.12-3; and my own fieldwork among Maguzawa, 1969-71.
43. I am grateful to Alhaji Garba Said for this point.
44. Some Gwandara traditions are summarised by Mahdi Adamu, in *The Hausa Factor in West African History,* Zaria, 1978, pp.27-9; cf. O & C.L. Temple *Notes on the Tribes of Northern Nigeria,* 2nd edn., 1922, pp. 118-120. I made a brief trip there in 1971, to compare their culture with that of the Maguzawa.
45. Whether the Gwandara when in Kano were speaking Hausa or their own dialect (or both!) is not known; if they were still speaking their own dialect, then one might expect to find in modern Gwandara evidence of links with other southern Borno Chadic languages like Kotoko. But it is probable that the 'Gwandara' were a group of migrants drawn from different sections of the Kano community under 'Gwandara' leadership – and their lingua franca may well have been Hausa, albeit modified.
46. For example, Ibrahim Nagwamatse at Kontagora.
47. Y.B. Usman, 'Dynastic chronologies of 3 polities of Katsina' Bull IFAN 40,B.2, 1978, pp.396-414. There is some confusion in the kinglist manuscripts at this point, but it does seem that Uban Yari's father or uncle was thought to be from the people labelled locally as Dakakeri – as his nickname, ba-Dankari/ba-Dakari, shows. Ba-Dankari is the name of a notable Zamfara 'iska'; the Bangawa segment of the so-called Dakakeri lived just west of Pauwa around Banaga. The 'Habe' rulers are usually dated from Uban Yari: cf. H. Barth, *Travels* (1965 edn), vol. 1, 474-5.
48. 'Kuma' is much more common a name in Abzen than in Hausaland; and Abzenawa were famous cavalrymen – and later as mercenaries in Katsina.
49. *Asl:* translated by M.A. Al-Hajj, *Kano Studies,* 1.4, 1968, pp.7-42; cf. P.Lovejoy, 'Notes on the Als al-Wangariyin', *Kano Studies,* 1.3, 1978, pp.46-52.
50. The texts of the kinglists are rather muddled and inconsistent here: one of the sultans had a Zaria mother, and the assumption, it seems, was that it was Ku Kona. I render Kukana 'Ku Kona' as a plausible if unproven explanation of his nickname. For my analysis of the Zaria kinglists and the 'coup', see the paper 'Before Zaria' 'Rabbau' is evidently a significant title occuring outside Zaria – e.g. perhaps in an early Nupe context as Rabbuma (al-Maqrizi), or in Katsina as Ramba? I am not confident that 'Rabb' (Lord) is etymologically correct here.

51. The Kano Chronicler is wrong in stating that Alhaji Bawa was Ku Kona's father. The *Asl* written under Ku Kona, states that his father was Muhammad Zaki (p.42).
52. *Asl al-Wangariyin*, in M.A. al-Hajj, 'A seventeenth century chronicle on the origins and missionary activities of the Wangarawa', Kano Studies, I.4, 1968, p.42.
53. The titles occur in (1) al-Maghili's letter to Rumfa, and (2) in al-Suyuti's letter to Ibrahim (Sura?); both are printed in *Nigerian Perspectives*, 2nd end., pp. 116-7 and 118-9. Note, however, that in the letter to Ibrahim, the same style is given to the ruler of Agades. From the curious way Ibrahim's name is tacked on at the end, one should not rule out that it is a spurious addition. 'Sultan Pauwa': *Kano Chronicle*, p.104; 'Katsina' would include both Zay and Pauwa, presumably – at least in al-Suyuti's mind – and as a similar dual political system was to be found in Agades, the terminology in both cases may have been chosen with care and great precision.
54. E. Celebi, quoted in *Nigerian Perspectives*, 2nd edn., p.185.
55. Muhammad Bello, *Infaq al-maisur* (ed. Whitting, London, 1957), pp.17-21. According to Imam Umar al-Salagawi, Bassanci was the language of 'women', whereas Hausa was the language of 'men' – this is the context of Hausa origins (MSOS, 1907, pp.163-4).
56. Abd al-Qadir b. al-Mustafa: *Raudat al-Afkar* (translated in *Labarun Hausawa*, ed. East, 1970 edn., pp.7-8).
57. Imam Umar al-Salagawi, MSOS 1907, pp. 178, 181. Auyo was important as the reputed source of the Warjawa.
58. Refugees in Daura: *Kano Chronicle* (Palmer's translation), pp.116, 112. Daura as 'kofa': Abd al-Qadir b. al-Mustafa *Raudat al-Afkar* (ibid.)
59. E.g. in the *Kano Chronicle* (Palmer's translation), p.126.
60. In the time of the Prophet fortification of towns in Arabia was rare; the Prophet by putting a ditch around Madina in 5 AH was being innovatory – and Madina was not walled till 63 AH. Although al-Mansur built the great round city of Baghdad, most Muslim fortified palaces and towns tend to be rectangular as were the Roman frontier forts which the Muslims took over. The policy of building ribats, then, extended well-established policies for both defence and government by an imperial power in new territories.
61. I am grateful to John Lavers for his encouragement in pursuing the subject of the shapes of towns. We await with interest the publication of Dr. Zofia Holowinska's dissertation on Hausa towns, particularly those in Katsina and Daura. She agrees with the suggestion that most of the existing town walls date to the 18th century. The Federal Dept. of Antiquities (for whom Dr. Holowinska worked) might continue the projected 'Atlas of Ancient Hausa Towns'?
62. Cf. Labarin Ada, (ed. H. Solken), MSOS, 1937, p.156.
63. Alhaji Abubakar Dokaji, Kano ta Dabo Cigari, 1st edn. p.45; 2nd edn. p.31. Note that the Council in question was a *legal* council, not the Council of Nine, and his role was passive rather than active.
64. The case of Ku Kona's father – see page 70 and note 51.

APPROACHING THE STUDY OF PRODUCTION IN RURAL KANO

by

Philip J. Shea

"Kano was the great entrepot of the Central Sudan"
"Kano was the mercantile centre of Hausaland"
"Kano was the major terminus of the trans-Saharan trade"
"Kano was the great trading centre of the Caliphate"
. . . . . and so forth . . . . . .

Certainly if one were to look up references to Kano in the standard textbooks of West African or Nigerian History, one would find statements like the above – and very little else about the history of Kano. Explanations of exactly *why* Kano was such an important trading centre are few and far between, and even when they are found they are seldom more sophisticated than to suggest that the people of Kano were "industrious", or the land of Kano "fertile", or that other savanna towns such as Katsina were unable to hold on to their control of trade routes. All of these were certainly true, and I would not wish to deny the importance of long distance trade, even though it does seem to me that disproportionate attention has been paid to long distance trade in Kano's history. The reasons for this great interest in Kano's long distance trade are obvious – certainly it was this trade that first attracted the attention of outsiders, and largely for this reason this is one of the best documented aspects of Kano's history. Perhaps this very abundance of resources for trade history has encouraged researchers to follow the path of least resistance and to re-evaluate and re-shift old sources of information about patterns of long distance trade rather than to break out and conduct new research and look for new sources about the causes of trade and the pattern of economic development in Kano. Unfortunately this imbalance in the study of the history of the Kano economy is not limited to the standard textbooks but is also common in more academic studies of Kano's economy.

This distortion in research and writing, it seems to me, has led to some very peculiar conclusions about the structure of Kano's economy, and of the wider West African economic system as a whole. If we are ever to understand

some of the present problems which Nigeria faces in terms of production an underemployment, we must attempt to discover the historical bases o production. It is essential that historians begin to concern themselves wit who produced what, when they produced things, why they produced them and for whom they produced these things. Trade and production are ob viously interrelated, but I would argue that production must receive priorit attention. Too frequently historians have looked at trade in West Africa an tried to guess from the results of trade what the system of production wa like. Hopkins once noted Kano's prominence in the textile trade in Wes Africa, and he assumed that this was due to external economies (such as a efficient trading system) because of "the absence of cost-reducing technic innovations."[1] I have demonstrated elsewhere that there were very real cos reducing technical innovations in Kano's textile industry, particularly i respect of large scale indigo dyeing[2], but what I think is really importan for us to realize is that what has been all too absent is research into th techniques of production in various areas of West Africa. In addition t examining the technology and processes of production, we must also loo closely at the set of relations which existed between and among the variou direct producers, those who organised and controlled production, and th ultimate consumers.

There is every reason to believe that there were technical reasons fo Kano's prominence in certain branches of textile production in West Africa There is also every reason to assume that there were competitors (at variou periods and in various places) in producing different kinds of cloth (Kano' most important manufactured export), although it would seem that at leas occassionally some of the competitors were Kano (or at least Hausa) peopl who changed their location of operations.[3] Thus, Bravmann has suggeste that "Muslim" (specifically identified as Hausa and Dyula) dyers moved int the Bondoukou area of the Ivory Coast as early as the beginning of th eighteenth century and continued to exercise dominance in that craft i that area up till the present.[4]

Unfortunately it is common that many who have considered the econo mic history of West Africa (or of Africa as a whole) have assumed tha technology was uniform and remained basically unchanging, at least ove long periods of time and over wide expanses of territory. It is often for gotten that even if identical technologies are available (i.e. known) i different communities, they may not always be employed in the same way or at the same time, or in the same combinations with certain other tech nologies. Thus, a statement like Hopkins' that "Kano producers used th same narrow loom as was found in other parts of West Africa"[5] is not only not wholly accurate (in Kano there are, at least in some areas, looms much narrower than elsewhere), but is also misleading in that there are many othe aspects to the production of textiles than simply the loom – for example

supplying raw materials, spinning the thread, sewing together the strips, dyeing, beating, coordinating all of these and so forth.

It is certainly not true that technology in pre-colonial Africa (or even West Africa, or even Hausaland, or even Kano) was uniform. There were significant differences in technology as well as in other aspects of production (availability of raw materials, expertise available, systems of labour organization, density of population, etc.) in various areas of West Africa, sometimes even over rather small distances. In addition, different technologies have competed with one another not only between areas, but in the same area over time, and even in the same time and place between different labour groups. To take dyeing as an example, it is clear that some areas did their indigo dyeing in pots and some in deep pits, and frequently the products of these differing technologies competed in the same markets (as is currently true of dyeing in Borno and Hausaland). In Kano there was a shift away from large fired clay pots toward the use of deep *laso* lined pits; and in Bida men used deep pits at the same time as women used clay pots. Changes in technology are not necessarily just in one direction either. Although in Kano there was a permanent shift away from large fired clay pots towards the use of deep *laso* pits, perhaps this was achieved only after earlier alterations and/or periods when the two technologies existed side by side. It seems that in Bida in the 1960's and 1970's – with a reduced demand for indigo dyed cloth in the area – there developed significant diseconomies of scale, and production in deep pits became relatively less important than production in clay pots. Thus, it would seem to me that one of the most important aspects of technology that must be considered is not simply the availability of a technology but also the ability to use a particular technology at a particular time and to be able to shift production in response to various changing conditions (e.g. weather, politics, demand, supply of raw materials, labour organisation, changing styles, etc.).

What we really have to consider, then, is not just technology (as important as that is, and as under studied as it is) but also configurations of production (how different technologies can be combined, how different industries can interconnect, etc.) and the ability of different systems (or areas or polities) to adjust and adapt their configurations over time. Thus, although there definitely were certain advantages for Kano producers in using large dyeing pits, these economies of scale are not sufficient alone to explain Kano's prominence in the production of indigo dyed cloth. This can only be understood when one considers the entire configuration of the productive process: the spinners, the organisers of the whole process (whether capitalists or slave owners or cooperative groups) and their relations to labour, as well as the ways in which the finished product ultimately reached the consumers.

One of the major problems of nineteenth century Kano history is to explain why Kano was as successful economically as it was. I feel very

strongly that single factor explanations simply will not assist us in explaining Kano's relative affluence. Politico-military explanations have traditionally been given, such as the idea that Kano's emergence as the major trading centre in the area in the 19th. century was a consequence of the decline of Katsina as a result of the *jihad.* However, if Kano was not able to take advantage of a *number* of changing factors (and not simply Katsina's inability to stabilize her northern border) then she could not have enjoyed the prosperity she did in the nineteenth century. Trade routes cannot afford to ignore centres of production, and no single factor can explain Kano's increase in prosperity in the nineteenth century. One might as well say that Kano's increased prosperity was a direct result of being in a position to take advantage of the increased supply of slave labour from Zaria's military actions towards the south – a statement which would be true, but again insufficient alone to explain Kano's prosperity.

One major question that must be asked is: what in Kano's history and society enabled her to take advantage of situations which were not wholly unlike those elsewhere in Hausaland, and of an ecological and technological base similar to that of elsewhere, and yet create a system which was more productive than others apparently equally endowed? There is no simple answer. It is certainly not to be found in this paper, and I believe that only gradually over the years, after much probing and research, will we be able to identify the combination of factors and the ways in which they intertwined which led to these developments.

Before making suggestions about how we can begin to examine how Kano's productive forces were harnessed to take advantage of changes in the 19th. century, we must look at what the nature of some of those changes were. Many have suggested that Kano's position in the 19th. century somehow simply replaced Katsina's position in the 18th. century, and there seems to be the general assumption that wealth remained constant but that it changed from the hands of the Katsina controllers of trade routes to the hands of the Kano controllers of trade routes. This view is supported by the widely held belief that the major effects of the jihad of Usman dan Fodio were largely political, military and religious, and that the economic impact of the jihad was almost neutral (except to shift the *centres* of trade). Thus, one writer has said that the "economic effects (of Sokoto's political control over Kano) seem to have been largely confined to the collection of taxes."[6] It seems to me that there are good reasons to believe that shifts in the centres of trade (e.g. from Katsina to Kano) were in no small way influenced by shifts in the centres of production, by increases in total production, and by dramatic increases in marketable production. While it is, of course, probable that the *jihad* itself was partly the result of prior shifts of this type, my concern here is with the 19th. century. It would seem to me that in the Caliphate there was a general increase in prosperity and in the demand

for goods – in particular for military goods, for cloth, and for prestige textiles such as dyed gowns and turbans, some of these needs being newly created by the new social-religious-political and economic order which was created.

These were, it would seem, fairly generalised results in central Hausaland, and what really has to be examined further was Kano's unique ability to benefit from these conditions and to increase her production and trade, both relatively and absolutely. That Kano's productive capacities were increasing is suggested by the fact that a large proportion of the slaves brought to Kano were retained for productive purposes – suggesting that many Kano purchasers of slaves felt that they could make more gain out of utilizing the labour of slaves than from selling them out. This suggestion that labour could be more productive in Kano in the nineteenth century than elsewhere is supported by the fact that simultaneously with the influx of slave labour there was considerable inward free migration into Kano. Even more commonly than with slaves, these free immigrants often came with useful skills and knowledge (such as sword making with the Tuareg immigrants, and weaving with the Nupe immigrants, and cattle rearing with Kanuri and Fulani immigrants); they also frequently brought considerable amounts of capital (usually in the form of goods – such as horses, cattle, clothing, swords, slaves) which could increase their own (and thus Kano's) productive capacity; and they also frequently came with considerable commercial expertise. Frequently these immigrants set themselves up as "landlords" (or *fatoma* – a Hausa word which has, significantly, been borrowed from Kanuri) and thus attracted other periodic (and sometimes permanent) visitors from their home regions. These free and slave immigrants to Kano, must have contributed towards increasing the productive capacity of Kano, but they were attracted (or in the case of slaves brought) because they could be more productive in this region than elsewhere.

The Development of Craft Linkages

There are doubtless many reasons why Kano was so productive. The soils and the water table are among them, but these will not help us understand why Kano's productivity increased in the nineteenth century. The agricultural system was basic to any increase in the productivity of Kano (and there is some research going on into this), but my main concern here will be with craft production. In particular I would like to look at how some of the linkages between different villages have contributed to the overall production of manufactured goods in Kano.

By "linkages" here I mean that there were a number of ways in which different elements in the productive process (whether land, labour, technology, capital or what not) were drawn together and interconnected so that there was a general configuration and the various production processes

formed a whole. There were, of course, also commercial links which were important, but it is not my intention here to elaborate on these.

I would like to demonstrate that there were numerous significant linkages between villages, between crafts and craft centres, and between different social and economic systems, and that these linkages help to explain regional specialisation within the Kano region because they increased the flexibility of the overall configuration of producers and traders within Kano – increasing their ability to adapt to various conditions. As far as I know, none of these kinds of links is totally peculiar to Kano, and in fact many are familiar in many similar regions. I would like, however, to suggest that in Kano they have worked together in a unique combination to take advantage of some opportunities that did not exist elsewhere.

In particular, I would like to look at how some of the linkages between different villages have contributed to the overall production of manufactured goods in Kano. By far the greatest production in Kano (both agricultural and craft production) was in the villages and in the dispersed settlements scattered throughout the Emirate. On the whole these settlements did not conform to the stereotype of isolated, self-contained communities which engaged in 'subsistence agriculture", perhaps assisted by "subsistence-oriented trade" which could not lead to innovation and production for the market.[7] If this were true, then certain conclusions would naturally have followed: factors of production would be generally immobile in the countryside – and labour, semi-finished products, raw materials and capital would remain in one place; land would not become commercialised (and acquire market value) because of the relatively few ways in which its use could become specialised. Similarly, technological expertise would remain at a generally constant (low) level and would tend to be uniform over very large areas. Largely for these reasons, innovations would be unlikely to be developed, and even where innovations did occur in one area they would not likely spread easily or quickly to other areas. With resources and abilities equal over large areas there would be practically no regional specialisation within a single ecological area. This is most definitely *not* what Kano was like in the nineteenth century!

In discussing how various linkages have assisted the development of production in Kano, I will look at several different kinds of linkage systems as well as at several villages and crafts which have developed different kinds of linkages which have proved important in determining how, and for whom, craftsmen have produced different kinds of goods. This brief survey is not intended to be comprehensive – indeed if it were, I believe that we would have most of the basis for a comprehensive economic history of Kano.

Rather, I hope to show some of the ties between different groups and communities which are known to have existed, and to suggest that further research and investigation along these lines is likely to be productive of information as to the basis of Kano's economic success in the nineteenth century. I hope that this discussion will encourage others to look at familiar institutions and customs in a new way – that is to see how they link up with the productive system.

Institutions and Linkages

First of all I intend to look at several different kinds of institutions which existed in Kano in the nineteenth century and to show that they often performed functions different from those intended or normally expected, functions which assisted the development of production. The institutions I would like to survey are: the political system, slavery, institutionalised migration, religious education, and marriage. I will show that various aspects of these institutions increased the efficiency of production and linked up production processes to form a whole system which was basic to Kano's economic prosperity. Subsequently I shall look at several villages and crafts to see how important linkages developed and how these also contributed to the productive capacity of Kano. Inevitably there will be a great deal of overlap between the different categories which I have tried to isolate. An individual by moving from one village to another may be reflecting religious and political and family interests as well as responding to craft opportunities and still be re-enforcing ties developed through the slave system. Nonetheless, I believe that if we look at different kinds of linkages individually and see how each kind can contribute to the development of productive possibilities, it will be clear that the re-enforcement of such linkages by overlapping ties and responsibilities will make such effects even greater and more important.

In looking at several kinds of institutions I would like first of all to look at some which involved involuntary or forced relationships between groups of people and then look at some more voluntary kinds of relationships which have developed. I hope to show that both forced and voluntary relationships (and sometimes the distinction is difficult to make) – particularly when regularised and made periodic and involving people in different geographic regions – can create opportunities for learning about new innovations and techniques in production, new kinds of demands, new sources of raw materials and new connections for obtaining both skilled and unskilled labour, and for learning about new merchandising possibilities. I imagine the possibility of these opportunities developing will be conceded by most, but I intend to go a little further to demonstrate that there are known areas where they did develop and where they did in fact contribute to the overall productive system of the Kano region. If I am successful in this, then it is

my hope that other researchers will assume that there are even more con nections and relationships not yet discovered or studied which will shed further light on the development of the Kano economic system and that they will follow this up with further research.

The Political System

One of the most important and all-encompassing institutions in the nine teenth century in Kano was the state itself. We will never be able to under stand production in Kano until more thought and research is done on th relationship between the state (and those who controlled the state) and pro duction. In the past it has vaguely been assumed that there was no connec tion between the state and production and that the state simply skimme something off the top of the productive system (by taxing farmers o making demands in kind) and of the commercial system (again by exaction and tolls). The very size, importance, power and pervasive nature of the stat should encourage us to assume that this was not so, and that the state ver much influenced production – both in conscious and unconscious ways

In general, it seems that the state took no direct part in production (wit the obvious exception of the production by state owned slaves – discusse below), but there were still many ways in which the state affected produc tion. One of the most important ways in which the state affected productio was in its role as a consumer or purchaser of craft production. With the sol exception of smithing (to be discussed later) there never seem to have bee any exactions in kind made on craftsmen in 19th. century Kano. While the were labour requirements for some (e.g. helping to repair the city walls), an food might have been required for a royal house or to entertain a nobl visitor to a village, and while taxes were collected on certain crops and o dyepits, I have never seen (or heard) any evidence at all that craft productio (with the exception of the product of smiths) was taken without paymen And of course the state itself, and its representatives, were among the mo important purchasers of craft goods. Textiles, Kano's prime manufacture export, were purchased by the state and its agents for use and also for o ward transmission as presents (or tribute) to other rulers and other state They were, it seems, usually purchased by government officials, (most oft slave officials) through "landlords" who handled certain kinds of goods from craft production centres themselves. The urban based slave offici purchasers and the landlords (only some of whom were based in the cit who dealt in particular goods all had connections, of course, in the vario villages where the production took place. Sales were not, however, com pletely passive, and producers of goods in turn visited the various lan lord wholesalers and slave official purchasers to demonstrate their ware Inevitably they met other village producers from other districts who ha come to the city for the same purchase. They saw each others goods ar

heard about each other's problems. They developed friendships; sometimes they went to work in each other's villages during the dry season; and they frequently married into each other's families.

Another way in which the state contributed to the mobility of the population in general (and craftsmen in particular) was in the ways in which Kano defended herself and also contributed to the overall defence of the Caliphate. In an attempt to stabilize her borders and insure security for the state, a number of new border towns (sometimes called *ribats*) were established in the nineteenth century, including Gwarzo, Babura, Danbatta, Gwaram, and Gezewa[8]. While no detailed study has been made of this, one assumes that a number of craftsmen were moved (at least temprarily) to these sites to contribute to their establishment, and that whether the craftsmen (slaves or free) remained or returned to their original homes, they came into contact with craftsmen from a number of different areas and made at least some long lasting relationships (including marriages) with families of craftsmen from various areas. Similarly, those who accompanied military expeditions to Sokoto or to other areas on behalf of Sokoto also had their horizons broadened. Almost inevitably a smith (or a dyer or builder or weaver or potter) in visiting another region will almost immediately familiarise himself with the nature of his craft specialty in that region – the techniques, the problems, the advantages and so forth. Even so, sometimes it was not the craftsmen but rather the rulers who benefited from the broadening experiences of travel and contact with visitors from other regions, and so it is not surprising that occasionally the Emir of Kano sent for craftsmen from other areas (the rulers seem to have been particularly interested in Nupe weavers and Tuareg smiths) and occasionally sent Kano craftsmen to other regions as well.[9]

While only some felt the coercive power of the state as slaves or as recruits for military actions or for building towns and city walls, the power of the state to tax was felt by virtually every producer. Inevitably taxation influences both production and trade. While it may or may not be true that heavy taxes nearly killed trade in 18th century Kano the fact remains that this idea was written down in a late nineteenth century redaction of the Kano Chronicle, demonstrating that the relationship between taxation and trade was in the minds of the Kano intelligentsia at the time.[10] It seems that the state itself was also aware of the possible negative effects of heavy taxation, and there are reasons to believe that Kano had (next to Sokoto, the capital of the Caliphate) the lowest rate of craft taxation in the Caliphate. There were *no* direct taxes on most craft production, the only exceptions of which I am aware are indigo dyeing and smithing, both of which I would like to look at briefly.

The direct tax on indigo dyeing (700 cowries per pit in use per year) seems never to have been onerous, and its impact was eroded by inflation

as the nineteenth century wore on.[11] This tax was collected annually (after the harvest) by slave officials who travelled around the Emirate visiting the various dyeing centres. While this tax could never have been a mainstay of the finance of the Emirate, its collection certainly would have helped to keep the Emirate officials informed about the yearly developments in the various dyeing centres. In individual dyeing centres (although not all by any means) the collection of this tax seems to have acted as a stimulant to creating a loose form of craft organisation and selecting a leader, or *Sarkin Karofi*. This leader almost never had any real power, and in any event he was usually simply the eldest and most respected of the craftsmen in a particular centre, but he occasionally did help the centre in negotiating the taxes, in dealing with potential customers, in making arrangements with suppliers of raw materials (e.g. indigo, undyed thread from weavers, etc.) and in arranging for certain cooperative activities (e.g. burning sediment to make alkali, repairing a well, etc.), and in holding discussions with other craft centres about matters of mutual interest. Thus, it seems that a light tax, annually collected from centres throughout the Emirate, might have helped to create avenues of information and organisations for communication which ultimately benefitted the industry. It is certainly at least possible that it was through such means that "representations" were made to the Emir Abdullahi (1855-1882) that led to the abolition of the tax on cotton cultivation alluded to in some of the earliest colonial assessment reports:

> " . . on representation to the then Emir (Abdullahi) that there was a great scarcity of cloth and that in consequence many dye-pits had fallen into disuse, the tax on cotton was abolished and has never been re-imposed."[12]

One might well ask, however, if the Emirate government was so solicitous towards various crafts in its taxation policies, why smithing was left out. Smithing clearly was taxed, and unlike other crafts this tax was collected in kind.[13] Also, it is extremely unlikely that these taxes were nominal, and in fact the government seems to have taken a keen interest in their collection. The smithing craft was the only craft to have a highly organised hierarchy, with senior officials appointed by the Emir. Each year the Chief Smith (*Sarkin Makera*) or his representatives went around the Emirate collecting a certain number of implements from each smithing centre. This system of collection served two main purposes -- the Emirate had direct access to required implements (both for military and for productive agricultural purposes) and the Emirate officials were informed of the conditions of the various smithing centres. Here, again, however, there seems to have been a certain fear on the part of the Emirate officials that they would kill the goose that laid the golden eggs, and although the Emirate was not willing to forgo its supply of iron implements, it was willing to assist the smiths by helping to shift the ultimate burden of taxation away from the smiths onto the shoulders of the non-smithing agriculturalists. This was done

in several ways. First of all, at least some of the smiths were exempted from paying agricultural taxes.[14] Secondly, the Chief Smith was assigned an estate in one of the most productive areas very close to Kano City, an estate which was farmed principally by slaves (made available by the state?).[15] Thus, the burden of the smith tax as well as the cost of its collection were partially shifted away from the smith onto the agriculturalists. Once again there seems to have been a conscious effort to use the power of taxation in a way which would not discourage craft producers and yet assure that the state had access to information, goods it required, and necessary finance. If this was the intention, then it certainly seems that the policy was sucessful.

Slavery

In discussing involuntary relationships in 19th. century Kano, slavery is the most obvious institution. The slave owners themselves benefitted considerably from this institution. The very fact that there were free farmers who owned slaves indicates that the system allowed greater freedom of movement to the slave owners than might have been true of cultivators elsewhere in West Africa at the time. These slave owners not only had the time to travel and to engage themselves in other activities (whether trading, scholarship or craft work), but they had the resources with which to finance such interests. Certainly, in some cases the fact of slave ownership enabled an owner to continue with a business that might have otherwise have had to be abandoned – for example there were women in Dawakin Kudu towards the end of the century who were widowed but still able to carry on with their husbands' indigo dyeing business, using slaves, sons and hired workers as workers and dyers.[16]

Despite the fact that slavery is a system which necessarily involves forcing people to do work they would not otherwise do in places where they would not otherwise choose to do it, there can still be considerable mobility and flexibility in the system – and in 19th. century Kano there certainly was. While slaves primarily did agricultural work, it is obvious that some slaves performed important tasks involved with craft work and even with long distance trading. It is likely, as often claimed, that only slaves born into slavery would be trusted on a long distance trading expedition, but certainly some people who are captured and enslaved already had useful skills other than farming – and wise owners took advantage of this. Even so, it certainly seems that many newly enslaved people learned crafts not long after their enslavement. Former slaves returning from Kano to Namu District (Plateau State) in the beginning of the present century (with the abolition of slavery) brought the knowledge of weaving and of certain kinds of Hausa clothing to their home area.[17] They must, therefore, have learned these skills within a single generation, otherwise they would not have been able to return home

after emancipation. In fact, it seems that there was frequently considerable specialisation within slave communities in Kano, and perhaps even between different slave communities. It is apparent that one of the main purposes of the Gandun Sarki (Gandun Nassarawa) slave estate near Kano City was to provide the palace with milk and dairy products – and in fact the slave head of this estate was known as "Mai Shannu" (The Keeper of the Cows).[11] Further research may yet show that there was specialisation elsewhere among slave estates, for another of the regular tasks performed by the slave residents of Gandun Sarki that could not have been performed by more distant slave estates was the re-thatching of the roofs of the buildings in the palace in the dry season. Perhaps other slave estates performed other somewhat specialised functions (e.g. breeding horses, weaving cloth, growing wheat and other special crops, etc)?

Another aspect of the slave institution as practised in 19th. century Kano which increased the productive capacity of the area was the practice known as *murgu*. Most commentators mention *murgu* in an attempt to demonstrate that slavery in Islamic societies like Kano was not as oppressive as in some other non-Muslim societies. *Murgu* is the practice whereby a slave is allowed to go about his own business and is permitted to seek for personal gain as long as he pays a regular (stipulated) amount to his owner *in lieu* of the services which he might otherwise have performed. What is apparently often overlooked is that in a society where there was not a fully developed wage labour market, the ordinary slave could not take advantage of such "leniency".

I would like to suggest that the slaves who were involved in making *murgu* payments were more skilled than ordinary agriculturalists (free *or* slave) and that their owners for one reason or another (e.g. insufficient capital, low or irregular volume of business, poor supply of raw materials, etc.) were not in a position to take advantage themselves of this skill. Thus, for example if a man owned a highly skilled slave who was a dyer he might not be able to use all of the slave's professional skills (perhaps he had only one dyepit or didn't have a regular supply of cotton cloth or indigio) and he could benefit more by permitting the slave to work occassionally for other dyers who were a little short of skilled help than by sending the slave out to do menial labour on the farm. Thus, perhaps the *murgu* system helped to introduce a measure of flexibility (and even marketability) into the labour supply system, at least as it affected skilled slaves. The result, of course, would be greater overall production in the community and greater efficiency (both for the slave owner and for the employer of *murgu* labour; and one should also assume that a *murgu* slave would have been more contented and productive, since he also got a share of his earnings, than he might have been if not allowed any choice about his occupation at all and not permitted to benefit from his skills). *Murgu* thus is not only a reflection of certain moral standards in the society, but perhaps much more importantly it seems to have

been a rational response to market and production demands for skilled labour.

Concubinage

Concubinage is one aspect of the slave system which contributed very markedly to mobility among slaves. Discussions of the slave institution frequently mention that concubines who bore children to free masters not only earned their own freedom (ultimately, on the death of the master) but also their children were born free. What is sometimes neglected is the other side: and that is that as a result of this practice a large number of slaves were related to free persons. Slaves were not so restricted in their movement that they were not allowed to visit their relatives who may be living with (as concubines or children) distant rulers or wealthy freemen, and free relatives of slaves were not so heartless that they didn't try and help their slave relatives get a better living and enjoy some of the perquisites of having well-placed relations. Concubines were not, of course, always of slave descent, and this also meant that the son of one concubine might be the (maternal) grandson of a slave, while his brother (the son of another concubine) might be the grandson of a craftsman or free farmer. Such relationships are not merely "theoretical" – they in fact did develop, and one can readily imagine that a clever slave related to wealthy and highly placed freemen would utilize every possible occasion to re-inforce his connections and ultimately to use these to his personal advantage. The dyeing centre *Karofin Wanka da Shuni* (lit: washing with indigo, dyeing centre) is said to have got its name through a joke played between some of the dyers and some of the women in the palace whom they were related to.[19] This relationship led to the palace regularly patronizing this dyeing centre. Concubinage is not stated as the connection between the palace "women" and this centre, but it is certainly one possible explanation. A more explicit connection between production and concubinage is claimed by the Bambadawa of Kano (described below) who claim that a concubine was given to them who was a trained potter and thenceforth their women have practiced pottery making in the various areas where they went as praise singers for Fulani rulers.[20] Thus concubines themselves were frequently directly involved in production and sometimes with specialised kinds of production. Very little research has been done on this topic, but it would seem to me that concubinage, which obviously provided both physical and social mobility for many slaves (concubines and their relatives), must have contributed towards giving certain individuals the opportunities for learning about skills and opportunities for bettering themselves and thus for becoming more productive members of society.

In general, therefore, one can say that the slaves of Kano were not a homogenous group of unskilled agriculturalists fixed to one small geogra-

phical area. In many ways they were in fact more mobile (both in terms of social position and physical location) than many freemen. Some of them had skills and crafts before their enslavement, but others learned them in Kano as slaves. Certainly, in business dealings as in matters of state, an individual frequently felt that he could rely upon and trust a slave more than a relative. The condition of skilled slaves varied considerably according to the character of their masters (and also presumably the ability of the masters fully to take advantage of the skills of a slave) — this point has been made to me a number of times in interviews. Nevertheless, some of the skilled slaves were able to work for a number of different individuals for payment under the *murgu* system, and this mobility of the slaves themselves also meant that the productive system itself became just that much more flexible. In addition, slaves were frequently the officials, agents, concubines, and relatives of rulers and wealthy individuals and in these capacities they travelled around the Emirate (and even beyond) and must have acted as conduits of information to their slave relations as well as to their powerful masters.

Institutionalised Migration

Another factor which led to increased mobility in 19th. century Hausaland, and in particular Kano, was institutionalised migration. In other societies, such as 19th. century central Tanzania among the Nyamwezi, institutionalized migration (in their case in the form of porterage in long distance caravans) has been attributed as being the major factor in bringing about social, economic and political change.[22] Hausa society, however, seems to have developed a phenomenal number of different kinds of migration, ranging from plain moving from one place to another (*kaura*), to seasonal migration (*cin rani*), through long distance trade (*fatauci*), including peripatetic scholarship (*almajiranci*) and pilgrimage (*haji*) and even including flight for personal (and sometimes questionable) motives (*dandi*). In fact, all of these kinds of migration have contributed towards widening Hausa commercial contacts, and as a result Hausa society has some of the most far-flung branches of any West African society. Hausa communities throughout much of West Africa (and these are frequently dominated by Kanawa, if for no other reason than the simple demographic one of the relative size of Kano) are known not only for their commercial interests, but for several other trades which they practice (e.g. butchering, dyeing, embroidery, barbering, etc.). In almost all instances, these various kinds of movement do not result in a loss to the community, but rather in an extension in terms of an expansion of the network of relationships outside the community itself. It seems that these kinds of behaviour are part of a larger cultural pattern which has permitted individuals to extricate themselves from a particular uncomfortable social position while not abandoning the larger society altogether. Thus, while one might move (*kaura*) because of insufficient land in an area, the

motive might equally well be because of a quarrel with relatives over inheritance or a wife. While some go on seasonal migration (*cin rani*) simply to augment their income, others do it because they feel restricted and frustrated by the communal rainy season system of *gandu* which makes personal accumulation very difficult.

Hausa society is unusual among African societies in permitting even some of the most deviant individuals to relocate themselves within the culture, although not usually in their home communities.[22] This accommodating aspect of Hausa society – and again it seems to be particularly true of Kano – has contributed to the ability of the society to accommodate and absorb immigrants as well. In both rural and urban Kano one finds many many communities (as well as individuals) from distant areas which settled successfully while still retaining some ties with their homeland. The immigrants, emigrants and migrants of Hausaland and of Kano obviously contributed enormously to a cultural pattern whereby personal and cultural ties are far flung and experiences are shared over a vast distance.

Although the benefits of such contacts and movements for commerce and even for production should be obvious, I would like here to stress that these ties mean that certain flows of goods and information took place automatically and regardless of whether or not they were profitable to the bearer. Those transfers of goods and information which proved profitable were repeated more frequently, but even then the cost and inconvenience of transport were not central as the trips probably would have taken place anyway. In the nineteenth century someone going on a trip was very unlikely to go wtih money (the bulky cowrie currency did not encourage this); they were most likely to go with high value manufactured or processed goods (such as dyed cloth or locust bean cakes or cooked indigo lumps) which could be sold or exchanged along the way for support. Such exchanges were not always 'profitable' (in that the cost of transport and the transporters' time were not necessarily recompensed) but sometimes an individual would find that certain kinds of goods brought very good prices in a certain area, and then he would be encouraged to repeat the trip on a commercial basis. Information on conditions, techniques, prices, styles and so forth also travelled in this way.

Religious Education

The system of religious education, in some ways, operated like other pattens of institutionalised migration, except that the decision makers were the teachers and scholars (*mallamai*) who were among the most learned and knowledgeable members of society and who had regular contacts with people over a broad area – contacts which could even be reinforced through written messages. It has evidently long been the custom for religious teachers to travel around from village to village in the dry season, the very time when

most craft work is done. Frequently they began these travels shortly after the harvest, when farmers traditionally donated their tithe (*zakkat*) to support religious causes. These teachers were usually accompanied by a number of youths who followed the teachers to learn about Arabic and Islam, and in the various villages visited others may have joined the small peripatetic schools. Such teachers with their students had to be careful not to wear out their welcome in any village, and so if they saw that a village was poor and had limited resources they would move on so as not to inconvenience their hosts. In more prosperous communities the school would linger, and again so as not to wear out their welcome the young scholars would be encouraged by their master to do small tasks and odd jobs in the community to help the school.

Some of these young scholars already had skills which they had learned in their home village and so they might go to the craft centre in their host village and work at their own craft. Any differences between the craft in their home village and the host village would be obvious and probably would be extensively discussed. Other youths might be encouraged to learn a craft, and since textile ~~work~~ was considered particularly appropriate for scholarly individuals they might soon find themselves weaving or sewing or embroidering or dyeing clothing. Even those who didn't have the time (or ability or inclination) to learn a craft would frequently find that they could assist various craftsmen in some of their more menial jobs (carrying water for dyers, stirring dye pits, carrying charcoal for smiths, and handling the bellows, digging out dirt or clay for builders or potters and so forth). Also, when the school moved from one village or city to another they would travel with some of the finished goods which they would later exchange or sell to support themselves along the way.

Some of the religious teachers were very concerned about youths wandering about looking for employment, and about scholars working in different areas. In at least one area (Karofin Sudawa in Kano City) it is said that a religious teacher himself established a dyeing centre in order to provide for the regular employment of his students.[2 3] It may be that this direct involvement of the teachers and of the educational system in establishing a centre of craft production was unusual, but I would prefer to think that it was only one of many ways in which the peripatetic schools acted as a kind of floating labour pool, attracted to the areas and professions which were the most successful at a given period. Migratory youths are usually willing to work for less than settled family men, and these able and relatively cheap labourers and craftsmen were directed (in terms of both village and profession) by their knowledgeable teachers who heard in many ways about commercial and craft conditions throughout a broad area.

Marriage

The last 'system' that I would like to look at, if we may call it a system, is marriage and the family. It is, however, difficult to examine marriage and the family separately as marriage was (and still is) very frequently the cement which fixed and regularised contacts and relationships formed in other contexts. An itinerant religious teacher may be given a wife in a village he visits, and this establishes a regular relationship between his home village and that of his wife, and he and his wife and his children will periodically make visits back and forth between the two villages. Similarly, craftsmen from different villages who meet at the home of a *fatoma* (landlord/wholesaler) may give each other their daughters in marriage. Once such marriage ties are established they tend to be reinforced over the generations, and descending generations of cousins will frequently be married to each other (*auren zumunta*).

These marriage relations meant that there were regular movements of people back and forth between various villages creating networks of communication and travel which were ultimately useful to the people in terms of organising their business lives. If an individual felt frustrated in his own village, or if he felt that the economic opportunties in another village were better than at home, he was able to move to that other village with no social dislocation and with practically no expense (i.e. he was already assured of loding and of assistance in his new home). And with extensive ties, a particular individual might have a choice of five or more villages to choose from for his new residence. Once again, of course, these movements of people meant not only that information was being transmitted, but actual goods as well for people invariably went along with goods which they felt would be useful along the way or at their ultimate destination. Sometimes they went along with agricultural goods (such as grain or dried indigo or cotton or sugar cane) but because of the transport costs they would have often gone with processed goods (such as *fura*, or cooked millet balls; *shuni* or processed indigo; woven and dyed cloth; or *mazakwaila*, a sugar cane sweet).

The marriage ties between village producers were very real, and they affected the kind of craft work done in various areas, the direction of seasonal migration work (*cin rani*) and sometimes the actual relocation of some producers. In 1971 when I saw a Hausa cloth beater in Jankara Market in Lagos, he was only partially surprised when I told him about the other branches of his family (all cloth beaters) in Kano City (Karofin Zage), Jos and Bebeji, because it is not surpirsing for someone who knows part of the family to know about the rest. A Hausa dyer in Bunkure told me that he travelled regularly to Dawakin Kudu to work (both as a dyer and farmer) so that the people and authorities in Dawakin Kudu wouldn't later question the right of his branch of the family to inherit and own property in Dawakin

Kudu. Families of potters in Wudil, Kano City (Jingau), Shanono, Lambu (20 km. on Gwarzo Rd.) and Zaria are all related, visit each other regularly, and produce similar kinds of pottery.[24]

It has long been accepted that long-distance *traders* have formed marriage relations in various areas, but I would like to stress that the kinds of marriage relations I think need to be further investigated now are those among producing craftsmen. I suspect that marriage relations between various centres of craft production, once researched, shall shed a lot of light upon how certain kinds of decisions about technology, levels and kind of production and the utilisation of labour were made.

Village Links

So far I have discussed a number of institutions which have helped to create linkages between various communities within Kano (and sometimes, of course, outside Kano as well). Many of these linkages were personal or involved one or several families, but other linkages involved entire villages. I was once puzzled by the fact that a village to the west of Kano should specialise in producing cloth for export to the east (Borno), while another village to the south of Kano should specialise in producing for export to the far north (Agades), and yet another village far to the south near Zaria should produce for export to the north-west (Sokoto). The answer is clearly not linked to geographical proximity or to trades routes, and neither is the answer to be found in any inherent difference in the raw materials or technology available in these towns. Sometimes villages very close to one another (e.g. Bunkure and Dawakin Kudu) would specialise in producing cloth for sale in quite different directions (e.g. Bunkure for Borno and Dawakin Kudu for Agades). The answer is, I believe, to be found in linkages between these villages and the market for which they produce.

Very frequently one will find that a significant number of craftsmen in a centre producing for export to a particular area will in fact be descendants from that other area. Thus in Kura there were some descendants of Tuaregs producing dyed cloth for export to Agades; in Bunkure there were a number of descendants of Kanuri producing for export to Borno, and so forth. Frequently this happened when resident landlords (*fatoma*) from the importing area set up some of their relatives in production to assure a regular supply of produce for their export business. Having a base in several different societies a *fatoma* can make production and commercial decisions based on information from both societies; and he can use family, credit, commercial and other ties to take advantage of productive *or* commercial opportunities (or both) in one of another of these societies at a given time. Frequently the productive system in Kano accommodated immigrants who were able to combine the available raw materials, technology, and labour to produce high quality goods for export to a particular market, but these

immigrants usually intermarried with the local residents and helped to guide them towards producing for a special market. The collectors and processors of silk at Mile 9 (just outside Kano on the Katsina Rd.) many of whom originally came from Katsina, seem as well to have capitalised on their specialised knowledge of the Katsina countryside (one of the sources of silk) and then to have expanded their business to include the forests of the Gongola Valley.[25] Their proximity to Kano City was and is useful to them for marketing their silk, but since they had a near monopoly of the collection of silk and became the major processors of silk, it wasn't necessary for them to move into the city. I believe that in the nineteenth century (and still today, though to a lesser extent) there was much more diversity and specialisation among the various villages in Kano than has been revealed so far in the literature. What is really needed is a fairly comprehensive survey of villages including information about what was produced, how and by whom it was produced, and for what market(s) it was produced.

Pottery, Migration, and Clan Organization

Finally, I would like to point out that while many of the kinds of linkages mentioned and discussed above are common to a number of different crafts, there are still certain kinds of linkages which seem to be particular to certain crafts. Certainly in Kano the kind of tax-related organisation found among the blacksmiths is unique, and smithing has distinctly different kinds of linkages than do other crafts. Pottery making in Kano also seems to have developed some kinds of organisation distinctly differently than that of other kinds in Kano, although there was never any kind of organisation that even approached universal application as was the case with the smiths.

Pottery was given by Hopkins as a good example of craft for which there was little reason for specialization,[26] Although he might have been correct for most areas of West Africa, Kano seems to be an exception. Within Kano there are significant differences between different pottery centres, with at least one centre (Dawakin Tofa) having developed a kind of Kiln for firing the pots.[27] While it is true that it was particularly difficult to transport pottery one solution was developed by Kano potters – the migration (sometimes seasonally, sometimes permanently) of skilled potters. That this was important to pottery in Kano is suggested by the fact that a large number of pottery centres are dominated by (or at least include) Bambadawa potters. The Bambadawa are unusual in Hausa society in that they are a clan that traditionally specialise in praise-singing and in pottery making. That they constitute a clan may be a result of their (claimed?) Fulani origin; in any event they usually sing praises in Fulfulde and they probably became widely dispersed after the *jihad* of Usman dan Fodio and the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate. Their role as praise singers has facilitated their movement around the Caliphate and between different regions within parti-

cular emirates. In Kano there are Bambadawa potters in Kano City (Jingau –the home of *Sarkin Bambadawa*, the Chief for Kano), Wudil, Lambu, and Shanono – and probably a number of other places as well, as these are related to others elsewhere – including Zaria City. They frequently intermarry and they often meet each other, especially when they lodge to market pots or for other purposes.[28]

In trying to explain why immigrant Kano potters dominated the craft in Zaria City, Leoni and Pritchett decided that 'Kano is unique in Nigeria" in that there are established male potters who had "the liberty to migrate and establish new households".[29] It has also been pointed out that there are different ways of making pots and that Hausa pottery is not only distinct but is also believed by some to be stronger than those produced by other methods.[30]

That an efficient system of producing pottery was developed, and that migration is part of the overall system are strongly suggested by the fact that at the present time all the potters in Zaria City are either descendants of "Kano potters" or are "Bambadawa" (who are, in any event, also related to Kano Bambadawa, even if they claim descent ultimately from Katsina and Sokoto.).

Tentative Conclusion

I do not claim to be in a position to fully explain Kano's success relative to other areas within Hausaland and West Africa. Unfortunately, very little research has been done into patterns of production in Kano, or elsewhere. This lack of information, however, has not always prompted scholars to conduct serious research even when they have the opportunity. Lamb and Holmes, in considering Kano's production of *turkudi* cloth, pondered over "why manufacture so narrow a strip ..... when a wider strip would do as well?"[31] This question, by positing an incorrect statement, led them far a field in claiming that "the answer here must lie in standards of value, taste and tradition, rather than in practical considerations of a technical nature." Having removed the whole process of production one step away from the rational, they then puzzled over "why did not other weaving groups along the desert fringes of the Western Sudan, in Mali for instance, compete ...?" Why not indeed? Rather than examine their assumptions, or the processes of production they have found it convenient to hide behind the vague and immeasureable concepts of "value, taste and tradition" and assume that the reason was because *turkudi* cloth was a form of money in and around Hausaland. While I do not wish to deny that "value, taste, and tradition" are important elements of Hausa society (as indeed of all societies), I find it extremely unfortunate that researchers who are unfamiliar with the society which they are describing use these concepts to disguise the fact that they simply have not examined the processes and techniques of production and the

set of relations which existed between the direct producers and those who organised and controlled production and the ultimate consumers of these textiles.

We really need a revolution in our thinking about production in Kano. We can no longer assume that because nothing is known about differences that everything was uniform. We can no longer assume that because we can't rationalise something with the information we have that the explanation must be on the level of emotion (value, taste and tradition). We can no longer assume that the major institutions of the society and the vast historical movements and processes which affected that society so greatly in so many ways had no impact on the basic processes of production within Kano.

I have tried to explore in a limited way some of the information already available about how different patterns of production in Kano linked up and helped to make the entire economy flexible and adaptive and responsive to change. One of the most obvious factors creating linkages in Kano is the mobility of the people, and here the fact that Kano has some of the most densely populated areas in the savanna regions of West Africa has obviously been a contributing factor. Similarly, the importance of trade in stimulating contact over long distances should not be ignored. Long distance traders (*fatake*) and landlords (*fatoma*) were obviously involved intimately with production and frequently were the financiers and organisers of actual production, and more research has to be made into their ties with the producers (especially with regards to credit, availability of capital, etc.).

Regrettably, too much of the research into craft production in Kano and Hausaland (and other areas of West Africa) has been left in the hands of "arts and crafts" people, frequently dilletantes and collectors, whose main interest is simply with the finished product rather than with the productive process and the links between producers, traders, and consumers and with changes over time. I believe that it is important that serious research into craft production be conducted by historians and social scientists into the historical patterns of production in Kano, and that such studies should reflect the scope and complexityof Kano's society and economy. Large scale projects are not always possible, but I hope that even projects such as 'dyeing in Kura" or "weaving in Minijibir" or "smithing in Tanburawa" or "pottery making in Dawakin Tofa" can be very useful if the researchers are conscious of the possibilities of their particular crafts and villages and craft families ultimately linking up with a number of larger systems which make up a more complex economy.

No one yet really knows the reasons why Kano was so relatively wealthy and successful in the nineteenth century. However, we will never know the answers if we continue to look only at trade. We will never really understand the reasons for and the implications of the breaking down of patterns of village production in rural Kano until we understand the historical basis for

that production in the first place. We are still wandering around in the da and the starkest evidence of this is that almost every undergraduate resea paper on rural or craft production sheds new and exciting light onto th vital aspects of Kano's history. There is much to be done.

Notes

1. A.G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa,* Longman, London, 19 p. 50.
2. P.J. Shea, "Economies of scale and the dyeing industry of pre-colonial Kan *Kano Studies,* N.S., Vol. I, No.2, 1974/1977, pp. 55-61.
3. Lamb and Holmes have assumed that there were no competitors. Venice Lamb Judy Holmes, *Nigerian Weaving,* The Shell Petrol. Dev. Co., Lagos, 1980, p.
4. Rene A. Bravmann, *Islam and Tribal Art in West Africa,* Cambridge Univ. Pre London, 1974, p.11. Mahdi Adamu has also mentioned the importance of Hau "weavers and dyers" outside Hausaland, but neither Bravmann nor Adamu has g into the reasons for this dispersal of Hausa producers. Both of them are mo interested in the "cultural" effects of this dispersal, rather than the economic cau and the end results. Mahdi Adamu, "The spread of Hausa culture in West Africa *Savanna,* Vol. 5, No. 1, June 1976, pp. 3-13, esp. p.10.
5. Hopkins, *op. cit.,* p.50.
6. Marion Johnson, "Periphery and Centre: The Nineteenth Century Trade of Kan paper given in this volume, p.128. I would like to stress that this is a standard e planation and is by no means peculiar to Ms. Johnson's work.
7. There is a discussion about "subsistence-oriented trade" and "subsistence agric ture" in: R.Gray and D. Birmingham (eds)., *Pre-Colonial African Trade:* Ess on Trade in Central and Eastern Africa before 1900, O.U.P., London, 1970, Ch I.
8. A.M. Fika, *The Kano Civil War and British Over-Rule,* O.U.P., Ibadan, 1978, p.
9. On how Emir Abdullahi brought smiths from Agades to Kano, on Alu's relati with regards to craftsmen from Nupe, and on how Alu sent craftsmen to Wad see: P.J. Shea, *The Development of an Export Oriented Dyed Cloth Industry Kano Emirate,* Univ. of Wisconsin, Ph.D., 1975, pp. 41-42.
   Also, it seems that Emir Abbas brought together some Arab immigrants and so Bambadawa Kano potters with the result that Kano potters began to produc kind of oven (*kusha*) for baking bread (*gurasa*). Although this was in the begin of the 20th. cent., it was reproducing an earlier pattern of behaviour. Interv with Alh. Muhammad Ali (ca. 80 yrs old), Dandalin Turawa, Kano City, 1 Aug 1980; text in Isyaku Ahmed, *Potting Industry in Kano City and Wudil To* B.A. dissertation (History), Bayero Univ., Kano, 1981, pp.101-6
10. This was allegged to have taken place during the reign of Sarkin Kano Kumb dan Sharefa, ca. 1731-1743 H.R. Palmer, "The Kano Chronicle,", *J.R.A.I.,* 19 Vol. xxxviii, p.90.
11. I have discussed craft taxation in my Ph.D dissertation, and so for a fuller expla tion see: P.J. Shea, *The Development* . . . . . pp.43-5.
12. NAK SNP 7: 1187/1908: Provincial Assessments, Kano Province; also in N SNP 7: 5570/1909: Kano Provincial Assessment, 1909-10, Assessing Report, Su Dawaki Tsakkar Gidda District.
13. Most of this discussion is based on P.J. Jaggar, "Kano City blacksmiths: pre-colo distribution, structure and organisation", *Savanna,* June 1973, Vol. 2., n pp. 11-25.
14. Jaggar, *op. cit.,* p.21 claims that 'the rulers clearly favoured the city blacksmith exempting them from payment of tribute which was levied on those of the villag

15. Polly Hill stated that the slave-estate owned by the Chief Blacksmith in Dorayi (near Bayero University, along the Challawa Rd.) now accommodates as many as 20 adult men (all descendents of a slave) and that the estate pertained to the continuing *office* and was not personal property. Polly Hill, *Population, Prosperity and Poverty:* Rural Kano, 1900 and 1970. Cambridge UP. P., 1977 p.215.
16. Interview with M. Isa Mai Bugu, Kofar Gabas, Dawakin Kudu, 27 October 1971.
17 Naanshep F. Dagum *The Development of the People of Namu (NJAK) with refrence to migration and intergroup relations,* B.A. dissertation, Univ. of Jos, 1980, p.167. Interview with Bikwal Davugun, Shindai, 30 July 1979. He claims that kinds of clothing introduced are what they call *"bante"*, *"shata"*, and *"ngodo"*, all identifiable kinds of Hausa cloth ("ngodo is clearly "gwado").
18. Information drawn from Sa'idu Abdulrazak Giginyu, *History of a Slave Village in Kano: Gandun Nassarawa,* B.A. disseratation Bayero Uni., Kano. 1981.
19. see P.J. Shea, *The Development* . . . . . pp. 123ff.
20. Various interviews quoted in I. Ahmed, *Potting Industry* . . . . . appendix.
21. "The single most important characteristics of the Nyamwezi as far as the transformation of their traditional society was concerned was their propensity for travel far beyond their tribal frontiers." Norman R. Bennett, *Mirambo of Tanzania, ca. 1840-1884,* O.U.P., N.Y., 1971, p.10.
22. Even "reformed" witches, it seems, can be accommodated within Hausa society under the guise of *"Sarkin Mayu"* – i.e. Chief of the Witches, an individual who is defined as having reached his "limit" of consuming ninety-nine souls and now functions as a purveyor of medicine and protection *against* witches. Even sexual deviants (such as *yan daudu* – transvestites) find economic opportunities away from their towns as food sellers, pimps, and purveyors of beer. I want to stress that these are *not* individuals who are "welcomed" in Hausa society, but the very fact that they are (reluctantly) tolerated makes Hausa society very different from many other societies.
23. P.J. Shea, *The Development,* . . . . . *pp.116ff.*
24. *I.* Ahmed, *Potting Industry* . . . . . *passim.*
25. P.J. Shea, "Kano and the Silk Trade", *Kano Studies.* 1981
26. A.G. Hopkins, *An Economic History, p.50.*
27. I. Ahmed, *Potting Industry* . . . . . *p. 22.*
28. *ibid., passim.*
29. Diana Leoni and Jack Pritchett, "Traditional Hausa pottery in Zaria City, *Savanna* Vol. 7, No. 1, June 1978, pp.3-17.
30. *ibid.,* p.6
31 Lamb and Holmes, *Nigerian Weaving,* p.95. The following quotations are all on the same page.

NOTES ON TAXATION AS A POLITICAL ISSUE IN THE 19th CENTURY KANO

Halil I. Said

Pre-Jihad Period

Before the beginning of the 19th century, Kano had been an important commercial city state with a fairly stable and flourishing economy. The Kurmi market, at the turn of the century, had become not only a centre of trade and industry but also a rendezvous where cultural ideas were exchanged between the North African merchants and the local traders of Kano. The ancient walls had provided the security of life and property which the merchants both local and foreign needed for the smooth running of their enterprises.

Taxation: There were various forms of taxation imposed by the Hausa rulers that were recorded in the *Kano Chronicle* particularly in the reign of the *Sarki*, Muhammad Sharefa (1703-31). Such taxes included the *Kudin kasa, kudin aure, kudin kasuwa* and many others.[1]

We do not have enough data to determine the system of collection in those days, nor do we know the rates imposed or the amount that the Hausa rulers used to collect as taxes annually. We however know of the existence of Korama, a woman official in the Hausa administration who was in charge of the sale and price control of various types of grains brought to the markets. There are speculations that such office holders used to collect taxes, on behalf of the authorities, on grains sold in the markets. Furthermore, it is plausible to suggest that substantial revenue used to be collected as taxes during the Hausa administration. The flamboyancy that characterized the Hausa court system could suggest substantial revenue accruing from taxes.

Jihad Period

The Fulani had inherited a rather stable economy and an established system of taxation even if un-Islamic. The sporadic and unco-ordinated manner in which the jihad was fought in Kano could not have adversely affected the economic life especially in the *Kurmi* market.

Regrettably, the early Fulani administration did not take advantage this stable economy which they could have improved to suit their philosophy. Instead they contented themselves with the approved Isla system of taxation. i.e. *kharaj, zakat, jizya* and the jihad (war) booty.

In the early years of the Fulani rule, the administration was not as c plex as it was during their Hausa predecessors. Only four government dep ments were sanctioned by the Shehu and these were the vizierate, judici police and finance.[3] Thus the meagre revenue accrued from the Isla taxes was enough to support the administration.

From theocracy to Kingship: The second Fulani ruler, Ibrahim Dabo (1 46) introduced many changes such as the titled slave officials and c court paraphernalia. He also re-introduced such titles like the Ma Makam, Sarkin Bai, Sarkin Dawaki Mai Tuta and the Mai Unguwar Mu bawa and assigned them to the Fulani clan heads in his bid to establ dynasty. The *Tara ta Kano* was also reintroduced in his time.

Dabo's early years of reign were characterized by punitive wars to blish his authority and also full-scale wars against Dan Tunku of Kazaure Umaru Dan Mari of Maradi. He fortified the towns of Dambatta and K to defend his territory against the aggressions of Dan Tunku and Dan

No doubt, the more complex the administration became, the revenue would be needed by the government in order to maintain it. had succeeded in his administrative reforms without necessarily introd new taxes because in his time there were still pockets of resistance to F rule and hence the jihad was in progress thus bringing in war booty *jizya* to sustain his elaborate administrative reforms.

Introduction of New Taxes

Dabo bequeathed to his son and successor, Usman (1846-55) a well grated administration which could only be maintained with adc revenue coming into the treasury. Unfortunately for Usman, the app Islamic taxes could not support the numerous officials and the extra life of the princes left behind by his father. In addition there were financial problems which Usman's administration had to contend wit example, with the consolidation of the Fulani rule, there developed number of *Mallam* class who were exempted from paying any taxes. h they expected the government to support them with the revenue col as *zakat.*

By that time also, the *jizya* that used to be collected from the non-m communities who enjoyed the administration's protection, was not coming. It should be observed that Kano was not one of those emir the Sokoto Caliphate that benefited from large war booty and subs revenue from *jizya* because of their nearness to large areas of non-M enclaves. Zaria, in particular, was a typical example of an emirat

enjoyed enormous income from its southern non-Muslim region. Reportedly, the Katab, one of the non-Muslim tribes of southern Zaria, used to pay an annual tribute of one hundred slaves and one hundred bags of cowries, each containing twenty thousand shells, to the Fulani rulers of Zaria.[4] Kano's source of war booty and *jizya* also lay in its southern region in the territory of the Butawa and Warjawa non-Muslim tribes. This region, apart from being far away from Kano metropolis, is both marshy and mountainous. Until later in the century when enough horses and firearms were acquired by the Kano army, expeditions into such areas were risky and certainly unproductive.

Thus, by the end of the third decade of the century, Kano could hardly send the required *khums* to the central government of the Caliphate. Unfortunately, this period coincided with the time when Sokoto's need for revenue was escalating. The two Caliphs who reigned after Muhammad Bello, Abubakar Atiku (1837-42) and Aliyu Babba (1842-59) had to confront numerous rebellions in the Birnin Kebbi and Zamfara regions. They also had to send expeditions against the Gobir and Katsina Hausa successor states who, by then, had begun to threaten the Fulani Empire. Aliyu Babba, in particular, had spent much of his reign fighitng wars against the Birnin Kebbi, Zamfara and Gobir diehards.[5] Presumably because of these wars which were not always successful, Sokoto's financial needs increased to the extent that the Caliph ordered a general increase in taxes in the emirates.[6] It is also possible that from this time onwards, tributes other than the prescribed Islamic *khums* began to be sent to Sokoto from the emirates. Heinrich Barth, who was in Kano at this time, reports that the Emir was in the habit of sending ten thousand cowries to the Caliph daily.[7] Although Barth's figures seem exaggerated, they, no doubt, indicate that about this time Sokoto had begun to receive cash tributes from the emirates.

Evidently, the Caliph's order for a tax increase was a welcome idea in Kano. Already the government was almost in a state of bankruptcy. Dabo's expansion of the administration and his years of punitive expeditions to consolidate his power had exhausted what little could be collected from the *kharaj* and *jizya*. Again, by the 1840's towards the end of Dabo's reign, Kano was being harassed by the Hausa successor state of Maradi. It was necessary, therefore, to intensify the defence of the emirate, particularly the vulnerable Karaye and Gwarzo towns which the Maradi forces were fond of raiding. On the northern frontier, the town of Dambatta was founded as a fortress (*ribat*) to protect Kano from Dan Tunku's further acts of aggression.[8] All these were expenses which the Kano government had to face by the beginning of the 1840's.

In addition to that, the devaluation of the cowrie currency that began after the 1840's naturally had a gradual devastating effect on the economy of not only Kano but also that of the entire region of West Africa. The

beginning of the so-called "legitimate trade" in vegetable oils and other pa produce of the Niger delta brought about a dire need for human labour the area. However, the four centuries of slave trade had depopulated coastal area of West Africa by taking away the able-bodied men and wom of bearing age.[9] It became necessary, therefore, to transport slaves from hinterland (Sokoto Caliphate) to the coastal regions in order to provide labour force required to work in the palm oil plantations. Since the price a slave was anywhere between forty and sixty thousand cowries, it is evid that at this time there was an unusual flow of cowrie shells into the te tories of the Caliphate.[10] This brought about a gradual inflation a devaluation of the cowrie currency.

The north to south slave-trading opportunities came at a time when ancient trans-Saharan trade was in decline owing to the unsafety of routes. Because of this, Kano's trading interests were gradually shifted the south during the second half of the nineteenth century. Although Ka did not benefit directly from the sale of slaves to the palm oil producers the coast, it was, nonetheless, affected by the inflationary repercussi brought about by the devaluation of the cowries currency. Thus prices slaves and horses which the Kano ruling aristocracy acquired from the sl market in Zaria reached a record high. Dr. W.B. Baikie who visited b Kano and Zaria in 1862, secured the freedom of a slave woman for the s of ninety thousand cowries.[11] He also mentions that a young horse was s for thirty thousand cowries.

The foregoing indicates that by the reign of Emir Usman, the K government was hard-pressed for financial resources. An increase in existing taxes and introduction of some new ones was therefore imperat

Our source of information regarding taxation in Kano during the n nineteenth century is based primarily on the account of Heinrich Barth Barth reports that *kharaj,* which he translates as "ground rent," was p by every head of family at the rate of two thousand five hundred cow per annum. Other forms of taxation which he reports included the ka *karofi* (tax on dye pits), *kudin fito* (import and export duties) and ka *rafi* (tax on vegetable produce).

Under his new tax reform, Usman decided to tax the Islamic scholar *mallams* although it was not customary in Kano to impose tax on them. practice of exempting the mallams from taxes had been in effect since late fifteenth century when Muhammad Rumfa's charity towards Isla religious leaders brought many of them into Kano from all parts of Ha land.[13] Despite the religious laxity in the centuries following the reig Muhammad Rumfa, the *mallam* class retained its identity as a non-p organization and a repository of religious knowledge, its culture and t tion. Although some of the *mallams* might have been engaged in crafts s as tailoring and sales of talisman, this specialized group of individuals

always been exempted from tax assessment. Any ruler of Kano who tried to impose taxes on them was bound to encounter opposition not only from the *mallams* themselves but also from their numerous disciplines. It should pointed out that king Kumbari (1731-43) had faced serious problems when he attempted to tax the *mallams*. As a result of his action, Kano was almost deserted and Kumbari had to abandon his new tax reform before he could get the people to return.

When the Fulani came to power in Kano in 1807, the policy of exempting the malams from taxation was continued at least for a while. Not only that, the new Islamic government provided a new source of assured income for the *mallams* whose number must have grown after the jihad. Those of them who acquired reputation through learning and scholarship were patronized by the upper classes. Others with less reputation engaged themselves in the sales of talisman and in "other magical practices through which they exercised great influence on the illiterate."[14] The sale of talisman especially to merchants who needed some protection against the hazards of the roads, became a very lucrative business for those *mallams* who were not patronized by the aristocracy. In addition to this, the *mallams* acquired further income through the institution of the *zakat*. According to Islam, the revenue from the *zakat* should be distributed to the poor and needy and as the *mallams* were generally considered to be poor they became the leading recipients of the zakat.

This preferential treatment accorded the *mallams* provided opportunity for some of them to become very wealthy. A typical example was Mallam Hamza, a Hausa *mallam* who lived at Tsakuwa in the *Galadima* fief of Dawakin Kudu. It is said that Malam Hamza was able to maintain a dyeing industry and a large farm which was worked by his slaves and his large body of students. Yet in spite of all his economic activities, Mallam Hamza was not taxed because of his privileged status of being a *mallam*. In the early years of the Fulani administration such a situation could be tolerated if not encouraged. By then the government's financial needs did not exceed its income because the rulers had kept to the low profile required of them by the Shehu. Suleiman, as we all know, had supported himself from what little he could earn from his gardening. Other clan leaders who worked with him also did some weaving or tailoring as a means of sustenance.[15] The change came in the reign of Ibrahim Dabo when the palace life and expenses were elaborated. By late 1840's, as we have shown, the devaluation of the cowry currency and Sokoto's need for cash tributes had necessitated the expansion of the Kano government's sources of revenue. The occupational taxes that were introduced at that time were some of the measures which the government took to alleviate its acute shortage of financial resources. It was also at this time that the policy of exempting the *mallams* from payment of taxes was reviewed. Thus, after his accession, Emir Usman (1846-55) decided to

impose taxes on those *mallams* who engaged in gainful activities other than the normal life of scholarship known to have been the pre-occupation of the *mallams*. The new tax decree, therefore, did not affect those *mallams* who were patronized by the upper classes since they were those who would not normally engage in any gainful activities. The *sadaqat* (alms) and charity they received from the aristocracy and the well-to-do, was substantial enought to support them and their families. Those type of *malams* were mostly Fulani since they were more learned and certainly more acceptable to the ruling classes.[16] The Hausa *mallams* were relatively independent of the authorities and they would undoubtedly be the type who would have to engage in farming and other crafts in order to support themselves.

Emir Usman's decree, therefore, was more or less directed against the Hausa *mallams*. Before the jihad, the Hausa *mallams* had enjoyed a very prestigious position. They were partronized by the then rulers as well as by the wealthy people. After the jihad, however, the Fulani *mallams* took over this privileged position pushing their Hausa counterparts to the villages where, through magical practices, they could live on the charity of the illiterates. Mallam Hamza, the business tycoon of Tsakuwa, was one of those affected by the new tax decree. Hamza was a renowned scholar and a great magician who had established himself at Tsakuwa long before the jihad.[17] He had a large following of students and a substantial number of slaves who worked his farm and manned his dyeing industry. His school specialized in Quranic education among other branches of Islamic scholarship and had attracted many scholars from far and near. Hamza's village was situated near the river Chalawa and on the important Kano-Bauchi trade route. He was thus at a very strategic location to benefit materially from the merchants who needed the prayers and good will of the *mallams* as a means of success in their enterprise.

No doubt Hamza's multiple economic activities were bound to attract the attention of the authorities in Kano. He was therefore assessed for *karaj*, and a *jakada* was sent to collect it from him. But Hamza was not ready to pay any land tax because, to him, land was the property of Allah and therefore free for everyone to use. When confronted to pay the *kharaj*, therefore, Hamza decided to display his alleged magical power (*sihr*). He thew his *buzu* (skin of sheep used as mat) into the air and it remained suspended. Then Mallam Hamza climbed on top of the *buzu* and asked the *jakada* to scrape off the land on which the authorities levied the taxes and leave Allah's land that was free for everybody.[18] The *jakada* was frightened by Hamza's magical show and so he left without further question.

We do not know why Hamza refused to pay the *kharaj* that all other land owners were paying. Being a learned man specialized in Quranic exegesis, however, Hamza must have been aware of the fact that *kharaj*, unlike the *jiya* and *zakat* is not specifically mentioned in the Qur'an. It is a tax imposed

on the analogy (qiyas) of the rulers.[19] Hamza might also have refused to pay the *kharaj* on the grounds that it was the first time a *mallam* was asked to pay any tax in Kano. Finally, since not all the *mallams* were affected by the new tax decree, Hamza may have interpreted the decree as a calculated attempt to segregate and undermine the Hausa *mallams* who were not patronized by the Fulani aristocracy.

Whatever his excuses were, Hamza's refusal to comply with the authorities opened a new chapter in the history of Kano, and indeed, of the Fulani empire at large. When the news of Hamza's disobedience reached Emir Usman, he decided to get rid of Hamza in a quiet manner by simply asking him to leave Kano territory. Hamza complied and left Kano in the company of his leading disciples and, after stopping at a number of places, finally came to Duwa, a small village in Bauchi emirate.[20]

Gradually, Hamza acquired prominence as a divine leader among the non-Muslim Butawa who, although they were not conquered and Islamized by the Fulani jihadists, had signed a pact with the emirates of Kano and Bauchi and were therefore subject to the payment of *jizya* for enjoying the protection of Muslim states.[21] Through his *sihr* therefore, Hamza was able to convince those non-Muslim tribes that if they rallied behind him they could be free from paying the *jizya* to the Fulani rulers. These acts of rebellion raised a lot of concern among Kano and Bauchi rulers to the extent that the two joined forces fought and killed Hamza at a town called Duwa in 1855.

The death of Hamza did not destroy the organization he created. For a while his supporters suffered his loss but soon they recovered from it and reorganized themselves to become more formidable. They continued to be a threat to the security of the three emirates of Kano, Bauchi and Zaria throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. Under their ruler, Abubakar Dan Maje (c. 1855-70), the dissident Hausa *malams* moved into the mountain areas of Ningi and established their capital at Lungu. It was here that they joined the non-Muslim tribes of Ningi hills and from that time on they came to be known as the Ningawa or tribes of Ningi.

Once they consolidated their position in the mountains, the Ningawa began to send sporadic raids into the emirates of Kano, Bauchi and Zaria. In about 1855, despite the combined force of the emirates, the Ningawa were able to extend their raids up to within twenty miles of Kano. They were only turned back by the vassal chief of Rano who intercepted and defeated them at the battle of Tugugu near Bunkure.[22] Thus, throughout the remaining years of the century, and until the British occupation, the threat of Ningi became a matter of great concern among its nearby Fulani emirates.

The narrative of the wars between the Ningawa and the Fulani emirates has adequately been discussed by A. Patton among others.[23] What we need to emphasize here is the economic impact the wars had on Kano. Mention

has already been made of the *jizya* which Kano used to collect from the Butawa and Warji tribes. During the first half of the century, these two tribes were the main source of Kano's slaves especially because payment of the *jizya* by the Butawa and Warji tribes was often made in kind, usually in slaves. Annual jihad campaigns into the non-Muslim areas also provided another means of obtaining the much desired slaves. For this reason, the unification of the non-Muslim tribes under the dissident Hausa *mallams* was a serious economic setback for Kano; Mallam Hamza's propaganda had succeeded in disuading the tribes from paying the *jizya*. Furthermore, the decade of wars between the mountain diehards and the emirates had adversely affected the security of the ancient Kano-Bauchi trade route. From their central location, the Ningawa could and did in fact disrupt communication, both economic and otherwise, between the emirates of Kano, Bauchi, Zaria, Adamawa, Katagum and Misau. In addition to that, their existence in a central location made it possible for them to engage nearly the whole of the eastern emirates of the Caliphate in a protracted war for over half a century. The emirates' forces who, apparently, had no prior experience in mountain warfare, found it impossible to subdue the Ningi diehards. The Emir of Kano Abdullahi b. Ibrahim Dabo (1855-82) spent a number of years in the *ribat* (war camp) fighting the stubborn Ningi forces. Dr. W.B. Baikie who visited Kano in 1862 had to go the *ribat* in order to meet with the Emir.[24]

The Fulani jihad in Kano did not face any serious or formidable resistance. This was partly because the jihad leaders had condemned the Hausa system of taxation and presented themselves as "saviours" of the masses. At first they were able to support their administration with the little that could be collected from the Islamic canonical taxes and so there was no resistance or open rebellion against their rule particularly from the Hausa peasantry. Later on however, they had to face an organized rebellion led by a Hausa *malam* in protest against Emir Usman's tax degree. This revolt, as shown above, had shaken the entire eastern emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate and continued to have devastating economic effects on Kano throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. Apart from making the trade routes unsafe, Malam Hamza's rebellion had completely denied Kano of the *jizya* which it used to collect from its south-eastern non-Muslim tribes.

Notes

1. "Kano Chronicle" in H.R. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs*, 3 vols, in one, London Frank Cass, 1967. p.123.
2. See for example Sarki Kutumbi's army whenever he went on war. *Kano Chronicle* p.119.
3. Usman dan Fodio, *Kitab al-Farq*. Edited and translated by M. Hisket in the SOAS Bulletin vo. 23, (1960) p.570. See also: Abdullahi b. Fodio, Diya al-hukkam (MS) p.20.

4. E.J. Arnett *Gazetteer of Zaria Province*, London, Waterlow & Sons, 1920. p.16.
5. Hajj Sa'id "Ta'rikh Sokoto" in *Tedzkiret en-nisian fi akhbar moulouk es-soudan.* Edited by O. Houdas, Paris, Ernest Leroux, 1899. pp.189-219.
6. M.G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau, 1800-1950.* London, OUP, 1960. Reprint ed. 1970, p.157.
7. H. Barth "Progress of the African Mission". *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London*, Vol. 21 (1851) p. 192.
8. Ungoggo and Dambatta District Notebooks.
9. G.N. Uzoigwe, "The Slave Trade and African Societies". *Transactions of the Historical* Society of Ghana. vol. 14 (1973) pp. 187-212.
10. P.E. Lovejoy, "Interregional Monetary Flows in the Pre-colonial Trade of Nigeria". *Journal of African History*. Vol. 15 (1974) pp. 574-75.
11. W.A. Baikie, "Notes of the journey from Bida in Nupe to Kano in Hausa performed in 1862". *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London.* Vol. 37, (1967) p.95.
12. H. Barth; *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa.* 5 vols. London, Frank Cass, 1965. Vol.1, pp.523-24.
13. For Rumfa's charity towards the *mallams*, see M. Hiskett. "The Songs of Bagauda, "SOAS Bulletin, Vol. 28 (1965) p.116.
14. M.A. Al-Hajj. "The Mahdist Tradition in Northern Nigeria" Ph.D. thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1973 p.94.
15. A.A. Dokaji, *Kano to Dabo Cigari*, Zaria Gaskiya Corporation, 1958. p.50.
16. J.N. Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano.* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973. p.57.
17. R.M. East, *Labarun Hausawa da Makwabtansu.* (2 vols) Zaria, Translation Bureau, 1932. vol. 1. p.52.
18. A.A. Dokaji, *Kano ta Dabo Cigari*, p.57. For details on *kharaj* and *jizya* in Islam see:
19. Ali b. Muhammad al-Mawardi, *Al-ahkam al-sultaniyah wa il-wilayat al-diniyah*, Cairo Matba'at Mustapha al-Babi, 1960. pp.142-56.
20. Muhammad b. Salih, Taqyid al akhbar *(MS) P.52*
21. H. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa*, Vol.1, P.619.
22. J.N. Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano*, p.243 footnote 63.
23. A. Patton Jr. "The Ningi Chiefdom and the African Frontier: Mountaineers and Resistance to Sokoto Caliphate, ca. 1800-1908". Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1975.
24. W.B. Baikie, "Notes on the Journey from Bida in Nupe to Kano in Hausa performed in 1862" *JRGS* vol. 37 pp.97-98.

PERIPHERY AND CENTRE – THE NINETEENTH CENTURY TRADE OF KANO

by

Marion Johnson

The City and Emirate of Kano in the nineteenth century was deeply involved in trade of many kinds, from the purely local trade in foodstuffs and other necessities, to long distance trade which extended over a great area of West Africa, the Sahara, and beyond. It thus depended for its prosperity on markets and supplies of raw material far beyond its direct control. Dependency on the economic situation in places so remote from its control is the lot of any trading centre, and, indeed, of any economy which has escaped from the stagnation of total self-subsistence. Since such dependency is necessarily a two-way affair, buyers being as much dependent on remote sellers as sellers on remote buyers , it is hard to follow the argument that such dependency is necessarily harmful in itself; the more important issue is the terms on which trade takes place – who gets the best of the bargain.

Unless there is actual compulsion to trade – which was certainly not the case in nineteenth century Kano – it can be taken that each side expects to gain by trade (though those who buy for resale may well be disappointed in the end); otherwise they would simply stop trading. If there is a gap between the lowest price the seller is prepared to accept, and the highest price the buyer is prepared to give (both of which will depend on the available alternatives), the actual price fixed is a matter of bargaining between them and must depend to a large extent on the relative strength of their positions – and on sheer bluff. If the gap is large, there is obvious scope for competitors, unless one side is able to establish and maintain a monopoly (perhaps by political or military means). Competitors will, if given the chance, bargain the price up, or down, to what is just profitable (or, on occasion, beyond); they will also attempt to form 'buying agreements' or sellers rings to maintain profits.

This, at least, is how the classical economists saw the matter; for them, "unfair" trading was trading in which prices were kept down, or up, by monopoly in one form or another; trading under competitive conditions was 'fair'. Some have argued that the precious metals were inherently more

'noble' than the iron, cloth, or beads they were exchanged for, thus enshrining a wholly irrational valuation of gold and silver. Some have expressed surprise and disapproval that such goods as cheap European cloth, at the end of a long and difficult trade route, should be able to purchase goods such as ivory which, on return along the same route, is of much higher exchange value – comparison, in modern terms, of the f.o.b. value of the original exports with the c.i.f. value of the return freight; the longer and more expensive and more dangerous the journey, the greater the difference, quite apart from any profits that may be made.

Marxists see the value of any commodity as determined by the labour-time enshrined in its production. The products of European factory industry are likely to enshrine fewer labour hours than the products of unmechanised agriculture or handicraft production – that was, after all, the principal purpose of mechanising production – so that trade between industrial and pre-industrial societies was almost always 'unequal' (unless, indeed, it could be argued that the labour time spent in unmechanised production was no longer 'socially necessary'). In addition, many Marxists have taken a narrow view of production, failing to count the labour time of the merchant and porters in bringing goods to market as part of the 'socially necessary labour time' which gave goods their value. Asben salt brought to Kano, for example, enshrined not only the time occupied in actual salt production, but also the very considerable time and labour involved in the salt caravan which brought the salt across the Tenere desert, including, presumably, the labour cost of breeding the necessary camels.

Whatever measures are used, it remains true that merchants succeeded in extracting some profit from their activities, or at least expected to do so. Profits were most easily made in a new trade with people who did not yet know the valuation put on their commodities by the visiting strangers. By the nineteenth century, Kano merchants had centuries of experience in the desert trade and in bargaining with Northern traders; in the far south, sellers of slaves and ivory soon learnt to bargain with Hausa traders.

It is widely held that in such bargaining, the advantage is necessarily with the richer and more powerful partner. Where the rich and powerful partner has taken over political control, trading advantages may indeed accrue – as witness, for example, Lugard's manipulation of the Caravan tax[1] or some of the activities of governments in granting export licences and monopoly buying powers. In nineteenth century Kano, however, the only outside political control was that of the caliphate of Sokoto, and its economic effects seem to have been largely confined to the collection of taxes (though Kano's emergence, or re-emergence, as the major trading centre of the region was a consequence of the decline of Katsina as a result of the jihad).

It is thus possible to distinguish the effects of being economically peripheral or central from the consequences of economic colonialism. In the

absence of political control, a wealthy merchant or merchant group may be able to buy valuable political support from the local authorities; but the advantage here will tend to be with the 'man on the spot' – the firm with a local agent or family representative, rather than with a richer one with only long-distance connections. One French writer believed that it was by their political influence on Kano that 'Arab' traders succeeded in excluding traders from the south; and it is true that the 'Tripoli merchants' lost no time in contacting the new rulers after the British conquest. Subsequent history suggests, however, that they enjoyed real economic advantages which were only undermined by the transport revolution in Nigeria.[2]

In the absence of political advantages, the richer trader may indeed enjoy certain advantages over the poorer; he can afford to wait longer for payment; he is more able to bear temporary losses (though the poorer trader, if he is also a farmer, is more likely to have alternative sources of income). The rich man's credit is usually better, and indeed he may be able to entangle the poorer in permanent debt, or involve him in permanent clientage relationships. On the other hand, the long-distance trader at the far end of his trade route can often be in a very vulnerable position, at the mercy of unsympathetic rulers whom he dare not antagonise, and who are restrained by fear of killing the goose that lays the golden eggs. Time may be important to him; he may need to depart before it becomes too hot, or too wet and malarial, and be forced to accept a poor bargain rather than delay. 'Landlords' of his own people reduce this kind of dependency, but can only establish themselves in relatively stable conditions such as North Africans enjoyed in Kano, and Kano merchants along the older trade-routes of the Hausa diaspora.

Long-distance trade requires the investment of considerable capital, especially where large caravans are necessary for safety. Unless the backer expects a good return on his capital, he will prefer to invest elsewhere, and no trade will take place. The more risky the trade, the higher returns he will require; a period of disaster, whether from human predators, climatic hazards, or a slump in prices, not only ruins many of the smaller investors, but makes the others less willing to invest. Merchants at the other end of the route are thus dependent not only on economic conditions over which they have no control, but also on the climate of commercial opinion in another centre. This very dependency can sometimes give rise to a very flexible approach to trade on the part of the resident traders of the periphery, such as that shown by the North Africans in Kano, and the Hausa traders along the kola routes.

Behind all the other factors determining the terms of trade lie the conditions of supply and demand. Nineteenth century European production was able to enjoy very considerable economies of scale; few African products were so blessed (though Phil Shea has shown that there were such economies to be reaped in the dyeing industry by the use of larger dyepits);[3] such

products as ivory and ostrich feathers were liable to large and permanent diseconomies as the more accessible elephants and ostriches were destroyed. On the demand side, few of the products were in the category of necessities with an inelastic demand; calico, once it was cheap enough to compete with local products, was nearly in this position where religion and climate combined to make cotton cloth a necessity. Salt, and to a less extent kola was not only virtually essential, salt for physiological reasons, kola in the absence of other stimulants and as a conventional social necessity; both formed a small proportion of total consumption, but both were so expensive that the lowest section of the population could scarcely afford them; and the demand was therefore much more sensitive to price that might have been expected. In both cases considerable monopoly profits appear to have been reaped.

Most of the goods exported from Kano, until the beginning of the groundnut trade in 1912, were luxuries, peripheral to European and Near Eastern needs; even the slaves were in demand considerably as domestic servants and concubines (as is shown by the predominance of women in trans-Saharan exports, despite the severity of the desert journey). Ostrich feathers suffered the further disadvantage of being subject to the whims of fashion; indeed, they hardly entered into Kano trade except during periods when they were in high fashion in Europe. Dyed cottons, tanned dyed goatskins, and leather goods were rarely essentials (with the possible exception of leather sandals, made, if Barth is correct, by North Africans in Kano, and exported in mid-century to North Africa to the quantity of at least 50,000 a year)[4]. Few of the goods fell into the extreme range of the luxury class, where the prestige attached to possession of a particular article increases with its price, so that, given sufficient rich customers, demand may actually rise with rising prices. Over time, however, the increasing number of relatively well-to-do people in Europe who aspired to the possession of what had previously been upper-class luxuries steadily increased the demand for such products as ivory; similar social changes may well have been taking place in Egypt and Turkey, and perhaps also in the towns along the kola routes.

Taken overall, however, the main characteristics of the nineteenth century long-distance trade of Kano was the instability of the routes along which it passed. The desert routes became impassable at times, and the civil wars which racked Nupe, Yorubaland and Borgu, as well as the extensive wars which accompanied the expansion of the Caliphate and its defence against revolt and external attack, make it remarkable that Kano was able to flourish as a trading town. There was civil war in 1893;[5] Barth in 1851 noted that thieves infested the whole neighbourhood of this great market-town, and Hartert noted the consequences of the raiding of a 'robber-baron' 'many ruins and half-burnt villages and half-eaten mummified corpses' when he travelled to Kano in the 1880s;[6] local conditions were evidently not always

very propitious for trade. The various trades continued nevertheless; the profits were high enough to balance the risks.

Each branch of the trade was differently organised; in some branches, Kano stood at the centre, with Kano caravans carrying Kano-made goods; in others, Kano was at the periphery, trading with visiting merchants who were in turn belonging to an economy peripheral to that of industrializing western Europe or pre-industrial Middle East.

The trans-Saharan trade

The trans-Saharan trade is the best-known of the various trades in which Kano was involved; in 1891, when it was still prosperous, P.V. Monteil estimated that it accounted for only one-fifth of the total trade of Kano.[7] The proportion was probably higher during the feather boom, but it was probably never as important as Kano's West African trade. Moreover, the Saharan trade was in the hands of North African merchants, who shared the profits with the Saharan caravan leaders. The Kano end of the trade was handled by their resident agents, most of whom intended to repatriate their profits in the long run. The profit to Kano consisted in such taxes as could be collected (including 'gifts' from visit merchants) and the profits on goods sold to the North Africans.

Profits on the desert trade seem to have been estimated at some 200% to 300%; they might be divided equally between the merchant who put up the capital and the caravaneer, or the merchant might ensure a 100% return by invoicing the goods at double their cost price, the caravan leader gaining whatever profit he could after this had been paid. The trade to Borno is described by Denham in the 1820s, and appears to have been about as profitable; a camel-load of merchandise would be bought in Tripoli for 150$ ('about 250% above prime cost'), and brought in a return of 500$ after paying expenses; one man was put in charge of three camel loads, who received one third of the profits remaining.[8] This was, of course, if all went well—a 'capacity' estimate. To some extent these apparently high profits may have resulted from the monopoly over the desert trade which the Ghadamsi and other North African merchants and their Tuareg allies were able to maintain; but the fact that many other merchants were able to enter the trade during the feather boom suggests that it was only when profits were even higher that they did much more than cover the risks of the trade. It is curious that the Kano merchants, so active in other trading spheres, do not seem to have made any attempt to break into the Saharan trade.

North Africa contributed more to the Saharan trade than capital and enterprise. Waste silk from the Mediterranean silk mills was dyed there to colours unobtainable in West Africa, particularly magenta (from madder, which does not grow in West Africa); North African garments (haiks, burnouses, etc) were an important item in Kano imports; originally these were

made in North Africa, often by Jewish tailors; in later years they were imitated in France.[9] The initial processing of ostrich feathers – removal from the skins, and preliminary sorting, was done in North Africa (apparently another Jewish trade).[10] When the feather trade was eventually diverted from the feather route, in the first decades of the present century, it became necessary to send the feathers from Britain to North Africa since this expertise did not exist in Britain. Noth Africa also provided the ultimate market for some of the slaves exported across the Sahara, both for agricultural and irrigation work in desert-edge areas, and as domestic servants in the towns. In this trade, as in others, however, North African towns served principally as entrepots – so far as the slave trade was concerned, for re-export to Turkey and Egypt. Nevertheless, Robinson was able to find several hundred Hausa speakers in Tripoli in 1894 among its 30,000 population,[11] and Barth was inspired to undertake his journeys partly by a Hausa slave he met in Tunisia.[12]

The goods imported into Kano by the trans-Saharan caravans remained fairly constant throughout the century – textiles of various kinds; North African garments; raw silk, dyed in Tripoli; a little hardware and cutlery; needles; and tea, sugar, coffee, spices and perfumes for the use of resident North Africans. Machine-woven cottons increased greatly after mid-century; Barth reported only some 40 million cowries' worth of Manchester goods (calicoes and prints) and a similar amount for muslins – some 16,000$ worth of each.

> "Calico certainly is not the thing most wanted in a country where home-made cloth is produced at so cheap a rate, and of so excellent a quality; indeed the unbleached calico has a very poor chance in Kano, while the bleached calico and the cambric attract the wealthier people on account of their nobler appearance"[13]

By the 1890s, the quantities were much larger; one consular estimate put them at 70% of £100,000; a detailed estimate in 1897 was lower, but still amount to some £28,000.[14] Moreover, unbleached calico was now selling at about 3d a yard, as against twice that in the 1860s, and could compete with the local product. (English cottons were not yet reaching Kano from the south in any quantity). Prices in Tripoli were approximately half the Kano prices (at current rates of exchange in the 1860s) and only a little below half of the much lower prices in the 1890s[15]. Unless costs of desert transport had also fallen in the interval, (or been brought down by increased competition), the Tripoli traders were making much less profit per piece on the trade in calico, though they were now trading many more pieces. In 1908, when prices had recovered from the low figure of the 1890s, the Kano price seems again to have been about double that in Tripoli;[16] it seems that goods were being sold at the 100% mark-up price, larger profits being made on the return cargoes.

On the lower Niger, large price changes were recorded, as goods previously imported by the desert route were now brought by the coastal

route – the 'watershed' between northern and southern trade had moved northwards.[17] Despite this curtailment of the southern end of its market, Kano imports were much larger in the 1890s than before the feather boom. Moreover, though calico was now able to offer higher prices for raw cotton than the English firms well into the twentieth century.[18] Evidently the Kano economy was expanding rapidly enough to absorb the increased imports without any decline in local production.

The North African clothing imported across the desert was clearly a luxury import for the wealthy; in the Hiskett inventory imported gowns, and gowns of expensive imported cloth, are found side by side with gowns of the more expensive local weaves.[19] Dyed silk, though destined ultimately to form part of the luxury gowns, was in the first place a raw material for the local weaving industry, and it was also re-exported on a considerable scale. Barth estimated the import at some 70 million cowries worth – 28,000$, and possibly much more. Most of this remained in the Kano area, used not only in weaving but also in embroidery on cloth and leather; it was also exported as far as Ilorin, known for its silk weaving.[20] Some was obtained at Egga on the Niger in 1842 by the disastrous British expedition of that year.[21]

Other imports, much smaller in quantity, included beads (some of which were re-exported to Bida, where they formed part of the raw material of the glass ring industry[22]) and paper, some of which was used for wrapping the better quality cloth exported from Kano[23].

Merchants appear to have reckoned on at least 100% profit (i.e. more than 100% mark-up) on goods exported across the desert from Kano; in some cases (probably to take into account the higher risks, the expected profit was higher. Very important exports were slaves, probably the principal item in the first half of the century, declining to an uncertain extent in the latter part (though Lugard claimed that the profits of the slave trade were still a factor in the competitiviness of the desert trade, even in the first decade of the present century[24]); ivory, from 1850, when Hausa traders began to penetrate beyond Adamawa, creating a new trading network which did not yet have permanently resident traders at the southern ivory markets[25]; ostrich feathers, rather intermittently important in Kano, mainly during the minor boom of the 1820s and the great boom of the 1860s to the 1880s, but continuing on a smaller scale in the twentieth century[26]; tanned and dyed goatskins, a long-standing export much increased after the collapse of feather prices, and becoming really important only in the 1890s[27]; and the famous dyed and beaten indigo cloth, which, like the tanned and dyed goatskins, was a product of the Kano area, exported across the Sahara as well as to a wide area in West Africa and the Central Sudan, reported to be found in markets as remote as Alexandria in the East and Arguin in the west, carried to Timbuktu by a circuitous route through the desert markets,

forming a sort of currency as far west as the Hodh and on the salt route from Taodeni, as it did also in Bornu[28]

If cloth and goatskins were produced in the Kano area, slaves and ivory were brought to Kano by other branches of the long-distance trade; ostrich feathers came in, at least in part, as a by-product of the Air salt trade. The desert trade was thus interconnected with other branches of Kano's external trade, some of them operated by Kano merchants, who seem to have made little or no attempt to break into the desert trade, even at its most profitable at the height of ostrich-feather boom. There seems to have been remarkably little competition between the North African merchants, (who occupied their own quarter of Kano and remained largely unassimilated, despite marrying Kano wives) and the Kano merchants who operated on the West African routes. A few 'Arabs' are reported as travelling along the more northerly of these routes, but these were evidently mainly pedlars working on a small scale.[29]

The Saharan slave trade

No very good estimates exist for the numbers of slaves exported from Kano; such North African figures as exist include those coming from Bornu and elsewhere. Barth, in mid-century, reckoned that the total export from Kano was not more than 5000 a year, of whom half were sent to Nupe and Bornu.[30] The price was about 12-16 dollars each in Kano in mid-century, rising to around 20 dollars by the 1860s; in North Africa they fetched something of the order of 100 dollars.[31]

A first sight, this suggests enormous profits for the merchants; the caravans in Clapperton's time would transport slaves across the desert for 25$ a head, their cost being some 12½ dollars at Katsina.[32] If all went well, the merchant would clear over 60$ per head. But slaves were even more vulnerable than other 'goods' transported across the desert; to the usual hazards of the desert crossing, from climate and human predators, were added the risks of the slaves dying en route; to judge from the horrific accounts of the trail of human bones along the routes, the risk was a serious one (though these were the accumulation of centuries). Ralph Austin accepts an estimate of 20%, originally derived by Boahen from Tripoli figures.[33] This represents a terrible total of suffering and agony; many of the victims were women and children, often quite young children. From the merchants' point of view, it also represented the risk of very heavy loss. At least one merchant, having lost an entire slave cargo, decided never again to trade in slaves across the desert (whether from motives of humanity, or commercial caution, or a combination of the two, is not certain). In 1870, Nachtigal reckoned that the profit on slaves exported from Bornu represented three to four times the purchase price, and was high enough to keep the trade in being, despite prohibitions and risk of confiscation in Tripoli.[34] His estimate was that of

cargo of 1400 slaves, one third would go to Ghat, one third to Egypt, and the remaining third would be sold in Tripolitania.[35]

The slave trade would appear to have been the most profitable, and also the most risky part of the Saharan trade. A prudent merchant would also carry a proportion of less persihable commodities – ivory and ostrich feathers while the fashion lasted, or goatskins. Ralph Austin estimates that the trade did not fall off significantly until the 1890s; but he does not attempt to distinguish the Kano trade from that of Borno.[36]

Ivory

Kano's ivory trade does not appear to have been on any considerable scale before 1850[37]; the story has been told elsewhere of the struggle during the second half of the century between the northwards trade by way of Kano and the desert, and the southwards trade by way of the Benue and the Niger and ultimately by way of the Cameroun ports.

The value of ivory in Europe varied considerably according to the size and condition of the tusk, but seems to have averaged around $35 to $40 per cwt in the second half of the nineteenth century, rising to boom prices in 1890, and falling off thereafter. Prices in Kano were around 40$ in the 1850s, and about 120$ on the North African coast; the 200% mark-up was not all profit, since a camel was needed for each four cwt., apart from general overhead expenses of the caravan, and the risks inherent in the Saharan caravans.[38] The trade was less profitable, but also less risky, than that in slaves. Its final decline after 1894 appears to have been due to the killing of elephants, and the final diversion of the trade from the far south, rather than to the effects of the British occupation of Northern Nigeria, though Lugard's attempt to impose the export tax was believed at the time to have driven away much of the Borno ivory trade.[39]

Ostrich feathers

Ostrich feathers were traded from Kano in the 1820s, during the minor boom which gave rise to some remarkable fashions in Europe;[40] In mid-century, Barth makes no mention of feathers in his very full account of Kano trade, but they were back again in the great boom of the second half of the century. Large profits were made while European prices were high, and many newcomers were attracted to the Saharan trade, including many less efficient operators who were the first to suffer when prices collapsed.[41] Despite lower prices, Kano merchants continued to trade in ostrich feathers into the present century, making use of the parcel post when it became available – by that time the cost of sending them to Tripoli was 130 francs plus 4½ francs customs at Ghat for a 62½ kilo load; parcels post cost 100/- (125 francs) for 50 kilos, and was much safer.[42] The mark-up on ostrich feathers was enormous in good times; in the 1820s a skin was selling for 3-4

dollars in Borno (and probably much the same in Kano); the Tripoli price was 50-60 dollars. In the 1860s the Tripoli price was up to about 90 dollars; there are no Kano prices at this date; in Borno, the skin was worth some 20 dollars.[43] Trading in ostrich feathers was risky, however, on account of the fickleness of the European fashion demand; prices fluctuated wildly, and the merchant had no means of knowing what they would be when he brought his cargo home to North Africa. Ostrich feathers were also not very plentiful (if they had been, they would not have fetched such high prices), so that feathers usually formed only a part of the load of a caravan. The Kano merchants gained some 12 to 16 dollars per skin on the increase in prices in boom times; North African merchants some 40 to 50 dollars; but it was they who carried the risks, and many of them failed when the boom collapsed. The Kano merchants set about building up a new export – in tanned goatskins.

Tanned goatskins

The collapse of the feather and ivory trade might well have spelt grave depression in Kano; the enterprising Tripoli merchants found in tanned and dyed goatskins, which had long been a traditional export, a real growth potential. In mid-century, Barth estimated the total export at only some five million cowries (2000$), as against 150 to 200 million cowries for the slave trade.[44] The skin trade began to expand in the 1880s, and by the 1890s the consuls in Tripoli were estimating a Sudan trade of £40,000 to £50,000, reaching an estimated maximum of £65,000 in 1898; of the £48,000 estimated for 1897, £42,000 worth was believed to have come from Kano.[45]

After the turn of the century, tanned skins were the largest item in the Kano trans-Saharan trade; unlike ostrich feathers, they could not profitably be sent via Lagos and the parcel post – the climate was against it. They ultimately declined principally because of technical change in their principal market, for ladies' boots in America, which adopted the chrome tanning process and preferred untanned skins – the disadvantage of being peripheral.

Tanned skins were also used in local industry in Kano, which exported a variety of leather goods; Barth estimated the export of sandals (at only 200 cowries or less a pair) at a total of some ten million cowries, double the value of the tanned goatskins.[46] He believed that they were made in Kano by Arab shoemakers, and attributed much of the decorated Kano leatherwork also to Arab workmen.

The salt trade

The salt trade of Bilma always seems to have been separate from the trans-Saharan trade; it was almost entirely in the hands of the Kel Geres and Kel Owi Tuareg, who were able to exercise an almost 'Colonial' control over the Tubu and Borno people of the oasis, forbidding them to produce grain, and thus securing their own control of the salt trade.[47]

In mid century, caravans from Aïr took grain supplies to exchange for salt at Bilma, then carried the salt to Kano where it was sold largely for dyed cloth, with which they returned to Aïr. The salt could be bought at Bilma at a 40 lb kantu for grain, worth, at Agades, about 33 cowries (about 1/76 of a dollar) it sold in Kano for about 2 – 3 dollars. Profits were not quite as large as this suggests; one eighth of the salt was paid as tax to the Serkin-Turawa, who was sent by the Sultan of Agades to protect the caravan,[48] while Nachtigal in 1870 estimated that one third of the proceeds went in expenses – camels, provisions, etc. In Nachtigal's time, the grain was bought in Dameghu, with Kano manufactures brought from the previous trip. He estimated that the selling price of that salt was some 30 times the cost of the grain – a much smaller margin than in Barth's time (if both observers reported correctly), but still allowing very substantial profits.[49] Conditions in Air were not quite so disturbed as in Barth's time, but Bilma was still 'the first objective of every predatory excursion' where it was hoped to steal the camels of the Tuareg caravan, or carry off property from the town.[50] Another 20 years later, Monteil writes of a caravan of 3 – 4000 camels from Air and Asben loaded with cereals and dates, going to Bilma for salt, returning first to Tintellust and thence to Zinder and Kano, where they bought ostrich feathers, a little ivory and 'morocco leather' to be sent to Ghadames.[52]

It is impossible to fit this trade into a Centre/Periphery analysis. Air, from which the Airi or salt caravan set out, cannot really be regarded as a 'Centre' to which Kano was peripheral; nor can it be said that the richer party – Kano – was able to impose favourable trade terms on the poorer – the Air Tuareg. Bilma, the salt-producing centre, does appear to have come off worst, owing to its very vulnerable situation. The Tuareg owed their continuing monopoly to their ability to cross the Tenere desert.

Natron ('potash')

While about a third of the salt of the caravan was believed to be used in Kano province, Barth believed that most of the natron brought from Bornu was sent on to Nupe. This may be an exaggeration, as some was probably used in the Kano dyeing industry. Barth put the total at no less than 20,000 loads a year, and estimated the proceeds, from 'passage money" of no more than 500 cowries a load, at some ten million cowries (4000 dollars).[53] At this time, the principal supply appears to have been drawn from Lake Chad, though much of the 'salt' of Bilma was in fact at least mixed with carbonates, giving it the bitter taste frequently referred to.

By the time of the British conquest, 'potash' was coming mainly from Air, brought by the Tuareg, who also brought livestock. They sold in Kano to Hausa merchants in return for kolas, black cloths, British cottons and hardware. The trade in 'postash' was described by Lugard as 'by far the most

important trade of Northern Nigeria in 1902 (he included also the livestock trade). It was traded southwards as far as Lagos, where its price was a little more than double the Kano price. [54] This appears to be a new trade, so far as its southern extension is concerned; but early in the century a Hausa trader was trading natron for kola at Gonja and Zoogoo (Djougou). The account of this trade is unfortunately somewhat garbled, but there seems no reason to doubt the trade connection with Ashanti kola sellers.[55]

The natron trade from Lake Chad seems to have been partly in Borno hands, but in Barth's time they did not carry it further than Gummel, some 80 miles north-east of Kano.[56] This trade, again, cannot be fitted into any Centre/Periphery analysis; though much of it was in the hands of Kano traders, it was in no real sense centred in Kano; indeed, in Barth's time, Gummel seems to have been as much a centre of the trade as Kano itself. It was one of the wide-ranging trades which was carried on, in part, on the relay system from market to market, though some truely long-distance caravan trade did develop. Such relay trade is analogous to the tramp-steamer trade from port to port which always formed a considerable part of seaborne trade in the nineteenth century.

The southern trades

All the branches of trade discussed so far were at least partly in non-Kano hands. By contrast, the trade to the south, whether in ivory and slaves for the Saharan trade, or in kola for local use (and some transit trade) was carried on almost entirely by Kano merchants, and was to a very large extent paid for with products of the Kano area, cloth in particular.

The trade in slaves and ivory

Slaves came to nineteenth century Kano from a variety of sources – from the continuing wars, offensive and defensive, of the Sokoto Caliphate; from the Yoruba civil wars; and from the far south beyond Adamawa in connection with the ivory trade. The story of the expansion into southern Cameroun of the Hausa ivory traders, and of the struggle between Kano and the Europeans on the Benue and the Niger for the ivory exports, has been told elsehwere.[57]

The operations of Hausa traders who went to the far south were in a real sense, peripheral to the ultimate markets for ivory in Western Europe, whether the ivory reached there by way of the desert or by the river and ocean route. There was also some Middle Eastern market, to which the desert route contributed, but there is no indication of the size of this market, or the extent to which it was, in turn, peripheral to the Indian demand for ivory.

In another sense, however, Kano was very much the centre of the trade. Most of the trade goods carried south were of Kano origin, and an unknown

proportion of the slaves were destined to remain in the Kano area. The initiative and the capital for the trade remained in Kano hands; Kano merchants carried losses and reaped the profits (though a very few seem to have operated as agents for North Africans). Their position was in some ways parallel to that of the North African merchants in the Saharan trade; but they do not seem ever to have formed permanent diaspora communities in the market towns they visited in the south. They sometimes remained there, perforce, for a year or more attempting to collect payments for the goods brought; far from their base, and at the mercy of local chiefs, they had sometimes to accept less than they had been promised (as North African merchants sometimes had to do south of the Sahara). If there were incidents on the journey, they had to accept the authority of local chiefs and pay the fines imposed; at most, they could refuse to return. Nevertheless, the Hausa traders could reap very considerable profits. It was said in Ngilla, inland from Douala, that a Hausa merchant had only to visit it once in his lifetime to become rich; Tibati, further north and earlier exploited, had to be visited five times, while back in Hausaland one had to work all one's life to earn a living.[58] The first arrivals opening up a new trade had what amounted to a monopoly; Flegel's guide and friend, Muhamman of the moustaches, told how at various places in the Adamawa forests one could buy a large elephant tusk for two to four hundred cowries, and a slave for a string of beads, 'in the time of Muhammed Lowell (1847-72)'. The more experienced traders undoubtedly enjoyed an advantage in such new trade, since the local people had not yet learned how much the strangers could be persuaded to pay. As more and more traders found their way to the south – there were over 100 at Ngilla in the 1890s – so the profits were eroded, and the less one-sided the advantages of the trade. In the same way, competition among buyers put up prices, and amalgamations and price-rings kept them down – as was seen on the Niger and Benue, where the Hausa traders found themselves peripheral to the European Guinea coast trade system.

The trading advantage of experienced traders pioneering a new trade is real while it lasts; the possibility that it may be prolonged by political or military control is one of the more obvious causes of colonialism and similar activities.

Kola

Kola from Gonja (ultimately from Ashanti) was an important import into Hausaland, both for local consumption and for re-export; Barth estimated the quantity at 500 donkey-loads of a year, amounting to 80 to 100 million carries worth (some 32,000 dollars), about half of which, he reckoned, was profit.[59] Most of the people employed in the trade were Kano people, though, as Lovejoy has shown, many of them were long-standing immigrants;[60] (in this Kano did not differ from other trading centres – the 'Tri-

poli merchants' included Maltese, Italian and Levantine traders; Manchester firms exporting to Tripoli included such names as Effraim Nahum, Reiss Brothers, and Vassil, Vultechoff)[61].

The price of kola nuts varied according to the season; they were also expensive to transport, and perishable, requiring repacking every few days en route. In the later part of the nineteenth century, prices are reported of 3 to 10 cowries a piece in Salaga (or whatever market took its place); in Kano they could be 15 to 20 times as much.[62] The trade was profitable, but not quite as profitable as the figures suggest; in the 1890s, Monteil estimated that the caravans gained about twice the value they put in while Barth estimated that about half of the total value would be profit.[63] The older route through Djougou and Kiama had become very unsafe, and the Hausa traders generally took a more northerly route through Say and Gurma, though this route also had its dangers.

Before the collapse of Ashanti power in 1874, the transport of kola from the Ashanti forests where it was grown to Salaga was kept in Ashanti hands, and the early kola was a royal and chiefly monopoly, which fetched high prices.[64] Here the visiting Hausa traders met experienced and well-organised sellers, (by contrast with the situation in the remoter parts of Cameroun), who saw to it that the visiting traders did not reap the whole of the profits. There are no reliable figures for the period when Ashanti control was effective; Rattray's informant gave a figure which corresponds to 3 – 6 cowries a piece at Salaga;[64] Barth's figures suggest a Kano value of 33-40 (and post cowrie-inflation) figures.[65] By the 1890s, the Ashanti seem to have succeeded in re-establishing the industry, so that it could be described as the most important article of commerce in the Kano market, on the supply of which the prosperity of the town to a large degree depended.[66]

Cloth

Ivory, slaves and kola, and also the Bilma salt, were largely paid for with cloth; in mid-century this was, in Barth's view, far the largest item in Kano's trade. Kano cloth, and particularly the dyed and beaten cloth, was famous throughout a very large region, extending north to the Mediterranean, throughout the Central and Eastern Sahara, east to Borno, Baghirmi and Wadai, west To Timbuctu and beyond, south-west to Gonja and Kong, south east to Adamawa 'limited only by the nakedness of the pagan *sans-culottes*, who do not wear clothing';[67] in the later part of the century it was also to be found in Lagos and elsewhere on the coast.[68] So much prized was it at Timbuctu that it reached there, despite the insecurity of the direct route, by a four-months' detour around the desert markets of Ghat and Tuat, serving on the way to lubricate the desert-Timbuctu salt trade.[69] In the Hodh it replaced the French *guinee* as a currency; in Borno it was as acceptable as the Maria Theresa dollar. As late as the 1890s, 'Kano clothes two

thirds of the Soudan and almost all the central and eastern Sahara' according ing to Monteil,[70] while Robinson, a little more modestly, says that Kano clothed more than half the population of the central Sudan and that any European traveller who took the trouble to ask for it would find no difficulty in purchasing Kano-made cloth at Alexandria, Tripoli, Tunis or Lagos.[71] Barth, in mid-century, had added Arguin, on the Atlantic coast, to the list of consumers.[72]

Some of the best beaten turban-cloth was made at Kura (where it is still made though the dyeing is now done at Bunkure); Flegel (or his Hausa informant) says that Dan Kura cloth was so highly regarded on account of the quality of the dyeing 'that it places the Kano industry before that of all other towns and naturally it commands the highest price'.[73] Polly Hill rightly notes that this and much of the other cloth was made and dyed not in Kano city itself, but in the surrounding area,[74] though Kano city was reported to have 2000 dyepits, and no doubt did a considerable amount of dyeing.[75] Spinning and weaving was mostly done in the countryside, and much of the cotton was brought from the Zaria area, which is climatically more suitable. Indigo, on the other hand, was used fresh, and was grown close to the dyeing centres.[76]

Barth estimated the total quantity of Kano cloth exported in mid-century at 300 million cowries worth (120,000 dollars) 'at the very least', some 1500 camel loads of three to four hundredweight each, two to three thousand tons a year! As Barth remarked 'there is really something grand in this kind of industry'.[77]

In the 1820s, Clapperton estimated the cost of dyeing a *riga* to the darkest blue as 3000 cowries, the total value of the *riga* being 5000; a *turkedi*, or women's wrapper, he valued at 2000 to 3000 cowries.[78] There were several qualities of *turkedi*, the dearest worth two or three times as much as the cheapest, so that it is hard to compare prices in different places and at different times. The few prices we have in cowries suggest that profits on Hausa cloth and gowns were not normally large: an ordinary *turkedi* was about 1800 cowries in Kano in 1850s, 2000 (or perhaps more) in Agades, 2500 to 3000 at Dore, 4000 at Timbuctu (reached by the very roundabout route through the desert markets); at Say, Barth had been fortunate on his first visit to sell turkedi for 4000 cowries;[79] on his second visit prices were much lower; for a *riga* ('shirt') for which he would have paid about 4000 cowries in Kano, he was able to obtain only 2000.[80] A Hausa gown worth £1 in Kano in 1909 were worth 25/- in Lagos, the shippers paying the expenses on the way.[81] Profits, as in the desert trade, must have been mainly on the return freight.

Despite the fact that Kano was a major manufacturing centre for cloth, Kano market also handled a considerable quantity of cloth manufactured elsewhere, and handled a large entrepot trade in cloth, especially from Nupe.

Nupe cloth had a high reputation, and in the 1820s Nupe slaves were valued for their ability to produce it. By the end of the century, several Nupe specialities, particularly the 'guinea-fowl' cloth, were being made in Kano; they were worth some 15,000 cowries (6 dollars) in the 1850s. Another Nupe specialty was the 'elephant' gown of deepest indigo, glazed, apparently so named from its dimensions.[82]

Local trade

In addition to its extensive long-distance trade, Kano was also a trade centre for the very populous district now known as the close-settled zone, which was already fairly densely populated by the 1850s. It is clear that at that date, and probably as late as the 1890s, the area was a net exporter of grain, though by the later date is seems that the grain for the salt caravans was coming mainly from Damerghu.[83] There was also a large local trade in cloth of the cheaper varieties. Polly Hill makes the point that the rural population must have been much more prosperous when it was producing most of the very large export of textiles;[84] it must also have been, relatively to the size of the population, considerably more productive than it is today in grain and other foodstuffs; it was already an importer of cotton. Foodstuffs were cheap in Kano: a whole family could live at ease, including every expense, including clothing, for 50,000 to 60,000 cowries, 20 to 24 dollars, a year, according to Barth, who described it as 'one of the most fertile spots on earth".[85] Few observers would so describe it today.

Who got the best of the bargain?

Everyone, except those unwilling victims, the slaves, may be assumed to have gained something, or at least to have expected to gain something, from Kano's trade. Who gained most?

Not, it would seem, the producers of the kola, the ivory, the salt, (or even the unbleached calico – poverty in Lancashire was probably greater, taking the climate into account, than in any part of nineteenth century West Africa). The Kano weavers did rather better, the dyers and particularly the very skilled cloth beaters better still; they were probably able to 'live at ease' on their earnings. They paid the inevitable price for becoming dependent on external trade, that of redundancy when the trade declined. Many of them were employees, clients, slaves of capitalist masters who exploited them (in the technical Marxist sense), provided the cotton for weaving and the cloth for dyeing and beating, and expected to draw profits in return; an estimate of costs and profits survives, not for Kano but for Sokoto in 1911, showing that the capitalist made 2000 cowries profit on the weaving of cloth sold for 4000 cowries, while the profits of dyeing were rather larger, 2250 per cloth bought for 4000 and sold for 7000 cowries.[86] How well the capitalist could live would depend on the scale on which he could operate.

The merchants ranged from very small-scale operators in the local trade to the very prosperous long-distance traders, Hausa and North African, the richest of whom maintained considerable households, owned house property in Kano, had built up a network of clientships among compatriots and others. It would be wrong to regard these relationships as purely economic, but they did also serve an economic purpose, as did their marriages. The various groups of merchants, whether originally local or expatriate, seem to have been of comparable economic status, whether operating centrally or peripherally; some of them became rich, many failed sooner or later. So far as the Kano trade was concerned, they had the advantage of being on the spot, able to obtain privileges and take advantage of new opportunities. The Tripoli merchants who financed the Saharan caravans could hope for large profits if all went well; but the risks were great, and many failed when the feather boom collapsed. The Tuareg, who had a virtual monopoly of the desert transport, and considerable military power as well, were able to have a fair share of the profits of the desert trade, and the whole of the salt trade profits, until they met a competitor able to outdo them at their own game, and challenge their control of the desert.

Other gainers were the various regimes able to impose tolls and taxes: the various 'presents' needed in Kano itself; the taxes on the Saharan trade – four dollars a load at Agades; 12% in Murzuk (though ivory paid only 3%, and slaves about three dollars a head); a further 12% in Tripoli (10% on slaves). On the West African trades there were various tolls, also: so many that in the 1850s it paid to buy donkeys in Salaga at three times the price, rather than bring them from Hausaland and pay tolls on them on the way. The ivory traders paid a small tax at Ngaundere, and doubtless others further south[87]

The Tripoli traders, who might in one sense seem to have been peripheral both to the Kano system and to the economies of Western Europe and of the Middle East, seem in many ways to have come off best; they had agents in Kano, (and in many other places); and by the early twentieth century some of them had agents in Manchester also. Given sufficient capital, they could remain in safety and relative comfort in North Africa, tolerably assured of a considerable profit. That they did so well was at least partly due to their ability to adapt to new opportunities when changes took place over which they had no possible control. The poor trader on the periphery is at the mercy of the winds of change; the rich trader can make use of them to alter course.

More remarkable, perhaps, is the ability shown by the traders of Kano when that city suddenly ceased to be centre, and became part of the periphery of the Western trading system; they stopped trading in ivory and slaves and kola, and began trading in groundnuts.

Good business sense and adaptability evidently count for more than centrality, even under a colonial system.

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83. P-L Monteil *op cit* p.290.
84. Hill, Polly, *op cit* 12-13, 159.
85. Barth *op cit* I 512.
86 Kaduna archieves, report by Gowers on Katsina, 1911
87. Agades, Barth in *Journal of the Royal Georgraphical Society*, 1851, p.151; Murzuk/Tripoli Vogel in *Petermanns Mitteilungen* (, p. 252; to Salaga, Barth, Travels and *Discoveries* III, p.364; to south, Flegel/Duffill.

INDUSTRIAL LABOR IN KANO: HISTORICAL ORIGINS, SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND SOURCES OF DIFFERENTIATION

by
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Objectives and Theoretical Orientation

Kano is unique among the leading industrial centres of Nigeria in that industrialization emerged from within an urban society with a comparatively advanced pre-colonial handicraft and mercantile, capitalist tradition. Historically, the advanced pre-colonial economy encouraged dense peasant settlements in the peri-urban areas surrounding the city. Both of these factors, an advanced pre-colonial economy and dense peasant settlements, continue to exert influence on the structure, consciouness and action of Kano's fledgling industrial working class. For this reason one of the principal objectives of this essay is to illustrate how rural-urban origins, or what I have termed *Urban Status* of industrial workers shapes the structure, consciousness and overall development of this class fraction of a larger wage earning class whose self identification is that of the *leburori*. In accomplishing this task, I intend to situate industrial workers within the historical development of laboring groups in Kano during the pre-colonial and colonial era. At the same time, I shall analyze the geographical and social origins of industrial laborers with great empirical detail through the use of a survey that I conducted in 1971/72; a period when the composition of the industrial working class had recently undergone a quantitative expansion and a qualitative change in the direction of more local recruitment. And finally, I shall comment on the evolution of the industrial *leburori* from the onset of the Nigerian Civil War until the return of civilian rule.

Historical Origins and Social Identity: Talakawa, Kodago and Leburori

One of the interesting and relatively understudied aspects of the social and economic history of pre-colonial Kano concerns the degree to which wage labor was used in the production of commodities. Several researchers have noted the use wage laborers who were paid either for their labor by a daily rate or by task accomplished.[1] This appears to be especially common in the leather and indigo dying textile industries. Of course, *aikin kodago*, as wage

labor was called, existed alongside of family, slave, client and independent labor, so that it never became the dominant social form of production during the pre-colonial period. Yet, it did exist and one would like to know more about the role of wage labor both in Kano's agricultural and handicraft industries.

Colonial rule brought a seasonal demand for wage labor in the groundnut trade, as well as a comparatively large number of state employed wage earners. Because of the absence of plantations or of large scale mining, the colonial firms did not employ large numbers of wage earners on a permanent basis. Rather a casual labor market developed in Kano, composed of the urban lower class and a larger proportion of dry season laborers. Clearly, the largest employer of wage labor was the colonial state in providing state services, especially in the areas of police and army, sanitation, health, porterage and public works. Thus the first wage workers tended to develop a paternalistic orientation toward their employers: the Native Authority and the Northern Nigerian Government.

As an emerging urban social class, the wage earners took on the label and identity of *lebura,* from the English word laborer. At the same time, the pre-colonial, class-like political status group the *talakawa,* was becoming differentiated so that the merchant and commercial groups emerged in wealth and political influence, thus forming a social class during the colonial period. What is of interest to the contemporary structure and consciousness of Kano's urban *leburori* is the manner in which the political status-group identity, that of *talaka,* related to the new urban class identity, *lebura.* From the earlier period, according to my informants, workers maintained the identity of both *lebura* and *talakawa*. Thus, a new economically determined social class identity, that of wage earners, also had the political identity of *talaka* imprinted upon it. As this wage earning class matured in numbers and self-confidence, the political status identity arising from membership in the urban *talakawa,* came to inform economic grievances of the *leburori* such that this relatively new and small class possess a much more advanced political consciousness as well as a sense of social solidarity that derived initially from common membership in the *talakawa.* Similarly, as a class that was differentiating itself from an occupationally diverse, pre-capitalist status group, the *talakawa,* the urban *leburori* has come to view itself as sharing common economic, social and political interests with other urban *talakawa* craft and trading groups that possess neither wealth nor modern education. Hence, as the process of capital accumulation advanced during the period of the petroleum boom, where capital and economic opportunity became increasingly concentrated in the hands of those with access to state patronage, modern education and merchant's capital, smaller scale yet independent craft and trading groups came to see themselves as falling into the same economic situation as the urban *leburori.*

It is crucial for the understanding of the social identity of Kano's industrial workers to note that they distinguish between wage labor in an agrarian situation for a Nigerian farmer, termed *aikin kodago,* from modern sector employment in a large factory, which they term *aikin bature* (literally: working for Europeans). Yet, formally, the wage relationship between buyers and sellers of labor power remains the same in both instances. To engage in wage labor in the modern industrial sector therefore is associated with the *national* identity of the group who introduced industrial technology and social organization; an alien system that, as we all know, was violently introduced into Kano society. Thus, there is a *nationalist* content that encourages resistance to the degradation of *aikin bature* which, in turn, informs the consciouness of the industrial *leburori.* The social identity of the industrial *leburori,* therefore, reflects the historical processess that, over the long term, have structured industrial capitalism in Kano.

Towards Semi-Industrial Capitalism: Industrial Labor Since 1966

The period of military rule witnessed a fundamental transformation of Nigerian society, a process whose ultimate outcome is unknown because we are still in the throes of the transformation. At the political level, the political crisis, the civil war, and the petroleum boom combined to generate an unprecedented state centralization of power at the federal level and at the same time witnessed, the entry of the state into the accumulation of capital and the production of commodities. For Kano's relationship to the world economy, the period marked the end of the groundnut economy which was superseded by petroleum revenues mediated through the direct and indirect (i.e., federal contracts, expenditures and development projects) transfers of the central government. In turn, the political crisis, the civil war and the reorganization of the structure and function of the federal state, combined with an increase in demand for consumer goods generated by petroleum revenues, stimulated the expansion of industrial investment at Kano. As compared to the pre-war period, when most firms engaged in production were owned by Asian, Levantine or Nigerian merchant-industrial capitalists, the period of the petroleum boom witnessed the entry of multinational firms into the production of commodities for the regional market (i.e., Fiat, Union Carbide, C.F.A.O., etc.). The expansion of industrial labor is evident when one compares the levels of industrial employment in Kano State over the period of interest; 1966 – 7,659, 1969 – 11,141,[2] and 1976/77 – 32,992.[3] (Moreover, my own research and the opinion of the official responsible for the last industrial survey suggest strongly that the industrial employment figure is an underestimate of 10-20 percent.) With regard to the problem of periodization of Kano's labor history, therefore, I would argue that the period of military rule marks the beginning of a period of semi-industrial

capitalism as opposed to an earlier period characterized by the dominance of the groundnut trade and mercantile capitalism.

Semi-industrial capitalism refers to a more generalized process where capital accumulation, wage labor and commodity production have, at the expense of pre-capitalist and household forms of production, extended and deepened their role in the production of goods and services in the economy of urban Kano; which, at the same time, remains dependent upon *external* sources for technology, managerial expertise and most industrial inputs. Besides industrial expansion and, to a limited degree, the internationalization of industrial production, wage labor has expanded through federal and state employment, construction of modern office, residential and industrial buildings, the extension of transportation and communication services and the creation of low wage employment in the informal and small scale industrial sector. While each sector is distinct and while workers value the state sector's relative security of employment as compared to the insecurity and low wages offered in the informal sector, all fractions of the urban *leburori* state, construction, transportation, industrial, informal sector and casual – share a common social identity as urban wage workers. That is to say, sectoral location may determine a better wage rate or a higher level of security but, the social processess of a semi-industrial capitalist city exert a homogenizing influence on the solidarity of the urban *leburori*.

Yet, despite the growth of industrial investment, state services and capital accumulation by the local bourgeoisie, Kano's industrial sector is notable for its concentration of light and consumer-oriented industries, its low technical and engineering component and with the exception of the Fiat plant, its lack of intermediate industries (i.e., iron and steel, refineries and petrochemicals, fertilizers, smelters and transportation or engineering equipment. This feature contrasts sharply with Kaduna State which possess a fertilizer industry, a petrochemical and refinery complex, a steel mill and an automobile assembly plant. Kano's industrial future, then, appears to be oriented toward serving as an agro-processing center and a producer of light consumer goods for the regional market whose distribution network is controlled by Kano's merchant class. As a consequence, the labor force will probably neither develop technocratic elements nor a highly skilled component.

The transition to semi-industrial capitalism and the subsequent expansion of industrial employment, due in large part to the stimulation of the civil war at first and later from the petroleum boom, brought *qualitative* changes in the social composition of the industrial labor force. With the return home of workers from the southern states at the onset of the civil war, a more northern Muslim and Hausa-speaking industrial labor force began to emerge during the civil war and the first years of the decade of the seventies. The industrial sruvey that I conducted in 1971/72 reflects these changes and, in the absence of a census, constitutes one of the few reliable and represent-

tive sources of statistical information on Kano's labor force. (See appendix I for an explanation of the research design and methodology of the industrial survey and the selected depth interviews with industrial workers.)[4] For this reason, I shall present the results of the survey in detail.

Industrial Labor: Geographical Origins and Socio-Demographic Characteristics

Because we lack any reliable census material describing the migration patterns underlying Kano's high growth rate, the following industrial survey constitutes the best available estimate and thus may be employed in lieu of census material in order to assess Kano's patterns of labor migration. The survey was conducted during the summer of 1971. After reviewing the number and distribution of industrial establishments, I conducted a total demographic survey of Kano's five largest employers of industrial labor. At that time, neither the Sharada or the Challawa industrial estates had factories in operation. There were three industrial areas in urban Kano: the old city-Fagge area, where several large factories operated together with many smaller industrial firms and workshops; the Township industrial estate, where colonial-origin factories of medium size processed groundnuts and produced consumer goods, and the Bompai industrial estate, where the majority of the largest and most advanced industrial producers were located. Three firms enumerated in the industrial labor survey were located on the Bompai estate; one firm produced kitchen utensils and the remaining two produced textiles. A fourth firm, located on the township estate, processed groundnuts into oil and cake, and the fifth firm, located in the old city (Birni) area, produced textiles and was unique in that it was managed and owned by indigenous capitalists from Kano Sate. While the survey is not a random sample of all industrial workers, it is spatially representative of the three industrial locations in Kano. Hence, because firms from the three areas of the city are represented in approximate proportion to the number of industrial workers employed in each area, no unique feature of an area went undetected. Again, despite these obvious limitations, in the absence of reliable census material the industrial survey provides the best estimate of labor migration patterns and social characteristics of the overwhelming majority of migrants to urban Kano. Note that the survey explicitly ignores middle and upper class occupational groups. Further, because of the high degree of labor circulation between the formal wage labor sector and the informal craft and small scale industrial sectors, I have found the industrial survey to be a reasonable estimate of the social characteristics of workers and producers in the informal sector.

The first two tables, 1 and 2, present selected social characteristics of the industrial labor force by state of origin (i.e., birth). State of origin refers to the twelve state system which existed in Nigeria from 1968-1976. Table 1,

Table 1

Social Characteristics of Industrial Labor by State of Birth

Characteritstic	Survey Total	Kano	North-East	North-Central	North-West	Benue-Plateau	Kwara	Western	Mid-West	Rivers	East-Central	Lagos	South-East
1. Distribution by State	100* (3036)	43.9 (1334)	19.5 (591)	6.9 (210)	2.8 (84)	6.7 (202)	8.0 (244)	3.2 (97)	5.0 (152)	0.1 (2)	0.8 (24)	0.4 (12)	2.8 (84)
1. Age – mean Years	26.5	28.6	24.9	27.1	27.5	22.9	22.3	26.9	26.6	27.5	25.8	26.4	23.2
3. % Born in Rural Villages	71.6 (2090)	75.9 (1012)	78.4 (44)	69.3 (140)	62.2 (51)	75.1 (145)	80.8 (185)	4.6 (4)	57.9 (73)	No Data	17.6 (3)	0.0 0.0	45.8 (33)
4. % Born in Towns	10.9 (318)	0.6 (8)	21.2 (120)	15.3 (31)	32.9 (27)	17.1 (33)	12.7 (29)	17.2 (15)	21.4 (27)	No Data	47.1 (8)	8.5 (1)	26.4 (19)
5. % Born in Cities	17.5 (512)	23.5 (314)	0.4 (2)	15.3 (31)	4.9 (4)	7.8 (15)	6.6 (15)	78.2 (68)	20.6 (26)	No Data	35.3 (6)	91.7 (11)	27.8 (20)
Migrants' Years 6. at Kano - mean median	5.5 3.2	9.8 7.4	5.0 3.3	7.4 5.7	6.3 4.8	3.2 2.2	3.0 2.3	4.8 3.1	4.0 2.8	1.5 1.5	1.7 1.1	6.6 4.0	2.5 1.5
6. Religion – (% Muslim	65.6 (1987)	99.6 (1329)	46.3 (272)	52.4 (110)	97.6 (82)	22.4 (45)	35.2 (86)	38.1 (37)	12.5 (19)	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	58.3 (7)	0.0 0.0
7. Muslims – % with Koranic Schooling	84.6 (1669)	95.5 (1261)	59.8 (162)	96.3 (105)	81.3 (65)	46.5 (20)	39.5 (34)	32.4 (12)	36.8 (7)	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	42.9 (3)	0.0 0.0
Muslims – Years of Koranic 8. Schooling – mean	5.8	6.1	4.7	6.1	5.2	4.5	4.7	4.9	5.3	0.0	0.0	4.3	0.0
9. Family: (a) Unmarried	27.9 (847)	14.6 (195)	32.3 (191)	31.4 (66)	29.8 (25)	53.0 (107)	52.0 (127)	33.0 (32)	34.9 (53)	50.0 (1)	41.7 (10)	25.0 (3)	44.0 (37)
(b) Single Wife	55.1 (1672)	57.0 (760)	58.5 (346)	54.8 (115)	51.2 (43)	43.1 (87)	45.5 (111)	56.7 (55)	56.6 (86)	50.0 (1)	58.3 (14)	66.7 (8)	54.8 (46)
(c) Polygamous	17.0 (517)	28.4 (379)	9.1 (54)	13.8 (29)	19.0 (16)	4.0 (6)	2.5 (6)	10.3 (10)	8.6 (13)	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	8.3 (1)	1.2 (1)
10. Number of Dependents – mean	4.8	6.5	4.0	4.0	4.0	2.7	2.3	4.0	3.9	2.0	3.5	4.5	2.8

* The original survey total is 3,075. We have eliminated all non-Nigerians (those born in Chad, Niger, etc.) who number 19; there are 20 missing cases in this table.

row 1 presents the distribution of industrial labor by state of origin. Kano State contributes nearly half the labor force. Most factory workers are young with the average age of 26.5 years, a figure that varies little by state, apart from Kano where it rises to 28.6 years. It is a rural born work force with nearly three out of four workers born in a rural village. Most workers born in the states of the former Northern Region are rural-born, while the proportion of urban-born workers increases among those from Kano, Mid-West, East Central, Lagos and Western. Note that workers from the Western states are from urban centers. Migrants from Kano State and adjacent northern states, as one would expect, have lived in urban Kano for much longer periods than southern migrants.

Regarding religious affiliation, approximately two-thirds of the sample are Muslim and the remaining third profess to be Christian. The data also suggest that within the northern states, such as North-Central (Kaduna), which are predominantly Muslim, a higher than expected proportion of migrants to Kano are Christian. Among Muslims from the northern and Hausa-speaking states, especially Kano, a much greater percentage of respondents have attended Quranic school. This difference may indicate that Muslims from southern states converted to Islam or that their attendance at western school competed with Quranic education. The figures illustrate the near universality of Quranic education among northern and usually Hausa-speaking Muslims.

Marital status and dependency burdens show greater variation according to the state of origin. Kano State's statistics show higher rates of polygamy and higher dependency burdens in part because of the employment of rural resident peasants (commuters) from the peri-urban area. I shall deal with this problem below when I examine the effect of urban status. Yet, even allowing for the higher rate of polygamy among commuters from the peri-urban area, polygamy is practiced only by a minority of workers.

The next table, 2, examines the distribution of educational and occupational characteristics by state of origin. By far those least exposed to western education, indigenes from Kano State, are at an enormous disadvantage in acquiring skilled labor positions. Similarly, while 11.9 percent from Kano State attended western schooling, only 4.1 percent were able to pass a literacy test using articles from either local Hausa or English language newspapers. Wtihin the former Northern Region, workers from Benue-Plateau and Kwara States possess greater opportunities to attend primary school; thus they appear to be responding to the shortage of skilled labor in Kano. But when secondary schooling is examined, the southern states show far greater levels of participation. Not surprisingly, this statistics correlates with the high proportion of urban-born migrants, (e.g., Table 1, row 5) and the high proportion of skilled workers (row 11 below) originating from Western, Mid-West and Lagos States. Hence, the inability of Kano and other northern

Table 2

Occupational and Educational Characteristics of Industrial Labour by State of Birth

Characteristics	*Sample Total*	*Kano Kano*	*North-East*	*North-Central*	*North-West*	*Benue-Plateau*	*Kwara*	*Western*	*Mid-West*	*Rivers*	*East-Central*	*Lagos*	*South-East*
1. Western Education % None	58.0 (1760)	88.1 (1175)	57.0 (337)	47.6 (110)	60.7 (51)	22.8 (46)	10.8 (26)	8.2 (8)	6.6 (10)	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	8.3 (1)	7.1 (6)
2. % Literate (Western)	28.9 (876)	4.1 (55)	21.4 (126)	32.5 (68)	16.7 (14)	59.9 (121)	78.5 (190)	82.5 (80)	83.4 (126)	50.0 (1)	100 (24)	83.3 (10)	72.6 (61)
3. % Attending Primary School	32.2 (977)	11.2 (150)	41.1 (243)	48.6 (102)	35.7 (30)	65.3 (132)	71.0 (171)	39.2 (38)	41.4 (63)	50.0 (1)	25.0 (6)	50.0 (6)	41.7 (35)
4. % Secondary School or above	9.8 (296)	0.7 (9)	1.9 (11)	3.8 (8)	3.6 (3)	11.9 (24)	18.3 (44)	52.6 (51)	52.0 (79)	50.0 (1)	75.0 (18)	41.7 (5)	51.2 (43)
Year of Western 5. Education – mean 6. median	6.6 6.9	4.9 4.8	5.2 6.5	5.9 6.7	5.6 6.7	6.8 7.0	7.3 7.1	8.5 8.2	8.4 8.2	6.0 6.0	8.9 8.2	8.8 7.4	7.3 7.7
Years in Present 7. Job – mean 8. – median	3.3 2.0	4.3 2.7	3.2 2.2	3.9 2.3	3.1 2.0	1.5 0.9	1.4 1.0	1.8 1.7	1.7 1.4	0.5 0.5	0.4 0.1	3.3 1.5	1.1 0.7
9. % Upper Level Supervisors	0.9 (26)	1.3 (17)	0.5 (3)	1.9 (4)	1.2 (1)	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	8.3 (1)	0.0 0.0
10. % Lower Level Superrvisors	6.1 (185)	4.9 (65)	4.2 (25)	9.5 (20)	7.1 (6)	4.5 (9)	7.4 (18)	21.6 (21)	11.2 (17)	0.0 0.0	4.2 (1)	0.0 0.0	3.6 (3)
11. % Skilled	8.2 (249)	5.5 (73)	4.4 (26)	12.9 (27)	3.6 (3)	7.4 (15)	11.9 (29)	22.7 (22)	29.6 (45)	0.0 0.0	2.2 (1)	33.3 (4)	4.8 (4)
12. % Semiskilled	24.5 (744)	20.9 (279)	23.2 (137)	29.5 (62)	31.0 (26)	42.1 (85)	30.7 (75)	7.2 (7)	20.4 (31)	50.0 (1)	33.3 (8)	16.7 (2)	36.9 (31)
13. % Unskilled	60.3 (1832)	67.5 (900)	67.7 (400)	46.2 (97)	57.1 (48)	46.0 (93)	50.0 (122)	(48.5) (47)	38.8 (59)	50.0 (1)	58.3 (14)	41.7 (5)	54.8 (46)

states to supply educated and skilled labor encourages the migration of urban-born educated workers from southern states.

When we examine skill levels and length of time at present job, it is clear that many workers of southern origin had only been employed for less than two years. This is due to the political crisis and civil war that preceded the industrial survey (1971). Workers of northern origin and especially those from Kano State, in contrast, are associated with longer employment figures, though, given the difference between mean and medians, there is wide variation among them. Regarding supervisors, there is a clear preference for northern upper level supervisors as there are almost no upper level supervisors from southern states. Among lower level supervisors, a much greater than proportional number originate from Western and Mid-West states. As the education statistics suggests, the greater proportion of workers originating from the northern states are engaged in semi-skilled and unskilled occupations. A far greater proportion of skilled workers originate from Mid-west, western, Lagos and Kwara States.

Now let us examine selected demographic features of Kano's industrial labor force. The statistics are self-explanatory so I shall not belabor the reader. Table 3 presents the distribution of ethnic groups from the survey. Workers of Hausa and Fulani ethnic origin make up fifty percent of the sample; of these about 18 percent report Fulani ethnicity. The clustering of ethnic groups into major categories is somewhat arbitrary and is used here for simplicity of presentation. Individual ethnic groups within the clusters are also available but cumbersome to present.

Table 3

ETHNICITY

Hausa-Fulani	1551	50%
Plateau-Tiv Cluster	286	9%
Yoruba group	187	6%
Babur-Bura	246	8%
Ibibio	79	3%
Idoma-Nupe group	315	10%
Ibo	32	1%
Edo group	137	4%
Kanuri group	53	2%
Kilba & related	143	5%
Residual	27	1%
Non-Nigerian	19	1%
Total	3075	100%

Let us examine the age and industrial experience of the labor force. Table 4 presents the distribution of workers by age categories. It is a young industrial labor force in that over 73 percent of the sample reported ages below thirty. Similarly, as Table 5 indicates, the majority of workers have only been employed in their present jobs for less than two years, 58 percent to be exact. This figures reflects the expansion of industrial employment during this period. caused mostly by the demand for goods during the civil war period.

Tables 6 and 7 concern workers' duration and residence in urban Kano. The most surprising finding here was the proportion of workers who remained in villages and who commuted to industrial labor while residing in a peasant household. According to Table 6, 21 percent of the total sample and about 42 percent of the Hausa-Fulani resided in villages while working in a factory. Allow me to postpone the implications of this finding until the section dealing with urban status. Table 7 presents the workers' area of local

Table 4

	Age	
15 to 19	519	17%
20 to 24	899	29%
25 to 29	835	27%
30 to 34	299	10%
35 to 39	266	9%
40 to 44	82	3%
45 to 49	82	3%
Over 50	83	3%
Total	3065	100%

Missing cases = 10

Table 5

YEARS AT PRESENT JOB

Less than one year	525	17%
1 to 2 years	1259	41%
3 to 4 years	582	19%
5 to 9 years	478	15%
More than 10	230	8%
Total	3074	100%

Missing cases = 1

Table 6

YEARS IN KANO

Still rural	653	21%
1 year	395	13%
2 years	405	13%
3 years	320	10%
4 to 5 years	316	10%
6 to 10 years	382	13%
11 to 20 years	262	9%
More than 20	334	11%
Total	3067	100%

Missing cases = 8

Table 7

LOCAL RESIDENCE IN KANO

Old City	525	17%
Fagge	95	3%
Sabon Gari	539	18%
Gwagwarwa	884	29%
Tudun Wada	288	8%
Dakata	100	3%
Villages	642	21%
Total	3073	100%

Missing cases = 2

residence. (Note that the difference between "still rural" in Table 6 and "villages" of Table 7 arises from the fact that eleven residents of Dakata resided in their peasant household of origin, so that they could be coded both "still rural" and "residents of Dakata.")

Table 8, the final table in this section, presents the reasons given for emigrating to Kano. Not surprisingly, over half cite economic motivations for leaving their emigrating. One interesting finding was the "religious (Islamic) education" response. Though only 3 percent of the total sample gave this response to an openended question,when I examined the Hausa Fulani sub-sample, the percentage citing Islamic education rose to 13.8 percent. In constrast to western modernization theory's expectations, one finds a system of education, whose original purpose was oriented toward strengthen-

Table 8

REASON FOR COMING TO KANO

Kano born	737	24%
Economic opportunity	1649	54%
Western education	22	1%
Religious education	100	3%
"Push," conflict	123	4%
"Pull," – affective ties, family	303	10%
"Pull," urban opportunities	97	3%
Total	3031	100%

Missing cases = 44

ing the pre-colonial Muslim state and Islamic society, that acts to integrate workers into the urban labor market and the industrial labor force. Let us now turn to the workers from Kano State.

Urban Status and Social Differentiation among Industrial Workers from Kano State

If sectoral differences within the urban working classes are muted by *talakawa* status, social ties and market forces, then we must look elsewhere for the source of heterogeneity and uneven development within this stratum. Kano is an anomaly when compared to the typical peripheral urban center undergoing the transition to semi-industrial capitalist production. Pre-capitalist urban development bequeathed both an urban lower class identity, the *talakawa*, and a densely settled peasantry in the peri-urban areas that has produced for and related to the urban economy during the pre-capitalist and capitalist eras. As I have argued earlier, the combination of pre-capitalist, colonial and international industrial capitalist patterns of urban domination and exploitation of the countryside have generated significant degrees of inequality that are rooted in the division of labor between city and country, but are experienced in everyday life as *urban* status differences. To a great degree, therefore, urban status corresponds to one's occupational and class location within the urban working classes. Lifelong urban dwellers of the Birni, for example, not only have better trading networks and opportunities to acquire new skills than village-born migrants or commuters from the peri-urban area, but their political consciousness and sense of self-esteem are shaped by participation in a peripheral capitalist urban center. Compared to

the other two, urbans are significantly more integrated into peripheral capitalist social relations and have been shaped by these forces since birth.

Informal field data suggested that *urban status* is a significant source of differentiation, and thus uneven development, within the industrial proletariat. But it was not until the industrial labor survey data was analyzed for Kano State that *urban* status differences within the industrial proletariat were so forcefully demonstrated and objectified empirically. Tables 9 and 10 present social and occupational characteristics and the social origins of industrial workers from Kano State who account for approximately 44 percent of those enumerated in the industrial survey. In these tables workers originating from Kano State are compared across three urban status dimensions. The criteria employed for designating urban status categories were: 1) *urbans* — workers born and continueing to reside in urban Kano; 2)

Table 9
Kano State — Social Origins of Industrial Labor by Urban Status

Sector of Father's Primary Occupation	*Survey Total*	*Urbans*	*Migrants*	*Commuters*
1. Agriculture	55.6	16.6	63.6	70.3
	(717)	(51)	(224)	(442)
2. Manufacturing	7.5	10.4	6.8	6.5
	(97)	(32)	(24)	(41)
3. Commercial Service	11.9	35.7	5.7	3.7
	(153)	(110)	(20)	(23)
4. Public Service	3.0	5.5	3.1	1.7
	(39)	(17)	(11)	(11)
5. Religious Service	8.5	13.3	10.2	5.2
	(110)	(41)	(36)	(33)
6. Labor Service	13.4	18.5	10.5	12.6
	(173)	(57)	(37)	(79)
7. Totals	100	23.9	27.3	28.8
	(1289)	(308)	(352)	(629)
% with Father Having:				
8. Religious Secondary Occupation*	15.7	18.7	15.9	14.7
	(81)	(14)	(29)	(38)
9. Western Education	1.8	3.5	2.2	0.8
	(24)	(11)	(8)	(5)
10. Traditional Office	3.7	2.8	7.2	2.2
	(49)	(9)	(26)	(14)

* % is figured from those reporting father's secondary occupation

migrants – workers born in rural areas and towns, who had migrated to urban Kano and 3) *commuters* – workers born and continue to live in the peri-urban area of Kano, who commute to factories daily.[5]

One surprising finding was the great number of commuters found working in factories. There are nearly twice as many commuters as urbans engaged in industrial labor. Further, as Table 10 indicates, commuters are much more likely to have more than one wife and their dependency burden is higher than either migrants or urbans, all of which are characteristics of a peasant

Table 10

Kano State: Social Characteristics of Industrial Labor by Urban Status

	Survey Totals	*Urbans*	*Migrants*	*Commuters*
1. Distribution by Urban Status	100 (1331)	24.4 (325)	27.6 (367)	48.0 (639)
2. % Unmarried	14.4 (194)	19.4 (63)	15.3 (56)	11.7 (75)
3. % Single Wife	56.9 (758)	61.5 (200)	61.6 (226)	52.0 (332)
4. & Polygamous	28.5 (379)	19.1 (62)	23.2 (85)	36.3 (232)
5. Number of Dependents – mean	6.5	6.1	5.5	7.2
Muslims – Years of Koranic Schooling				
6. mean	6.1	6.8	6.1	5.6
7. median	4.9	6.2	4.9	4.2
8. % Literate (Western)	4.1 (55)	10.2 (33)	5.2 (19)	0.5 (3)
9. % Attending a Western School	11.9 (158)	26.8 (87)	13.6 (50)	3.3 (21)
10. % Upper Level Supervisors	1.3 (17)	3.1 (10)	1.1 (4)	0.5 (3)
11. % Lower Level Supervisors	4.9 (65)	8.6 (28)	5.4 (20)	2.7 (17)
12. % Skilled	5.5 (73)	7.7 (25)	6.5 (24)	3.8 (24)
13. % Semi-skilled	21.0 (279)	32.0 (104)	22.3 (82)	14.6 (93)
14. % Unskilled	67.4 (879)	48.6 (158)	64.6 (237)	78.6 (502)
15. Years at Present Job – mean	4.3	4.9	4.3	4.0

household as contrasted with urban workers' family patterns. While the findings of the industrial survey were consistent with informal field data which also suggested that rural resident peasant commuters were prominent in the industrial labor force, I decided to check this surprising finding against existing government records.

Accordingly, Table 11 presents a comparison of male taxpayers who resided in the three peri-urban districts of interest – Gezawa, Kumbotso and Ungogo. Below each tax year on the left-hand margin of the table, the number and percentage who pay their taxes at work through the "Pay As You Earn" system (i.e., PAYE) is given. Below the number and percentage of PAYE taxpayers are the total number of taxpayers enumerated in the district. If one examines the proportion of taxpayers who pay their taxes at work, which is only possible if one is working in the modern formal sector that includes state, industrial or commercial services, then one has found a crude indicator of the degree to which peasants in the peri-urban area are becoming integrated into and thus dependent upon formal sector urban wage labor. Let us examine the changes suggested by this data for the period 1963/64 to 1974/75.

Though data for several years was not available, especially in Gezawa, the trend toward increased formal sector taxpaying is clear. Ungogo district, for example, shows an increase from .1 percent PAYE taxpayers in 1966/67 to 9.8 percent PAYE taxpayers in 1974/75. Most interestingly, the cyclical increases and declines in the number of PAYE taxpayers reflect the demand for industrial labor as determined by the cyclical market conditions of Kano's industrial economy during this period. Given the fact that the tax records reflect employment for the year prior to the date when the actual tax was recorded, the increase in PAYE taxpayers in 1970/71 reflects the industrial boom that was stimulated by the civil war and the import restrictions. By 1973/74, PAYE taxpayers declined to 6.4 percent, a trend which corresponds to the trade recession prior to the stimulation of the economy that occurred with the increase in petroleum revenues in 1973/74. And here, the increase in PAYE taxpayers for the year 1974/75 appears to reflect the demand for labor brought by the upturn in industrial production from the distribution of petroleum revenues.

More importantly, the evidence from the PAYE tax data confirms the findings of the industrial survey. The peri-urban peasantry is gradually being squeezed by their own natural increase and the gradual expansion of the urban perimeter into peasant lands. In turn, they have become dependent upon urban wage labor and other sources of urban income. Moreover, if nearly ten percent of the taxpaying males of Ungogo district were paying their taxes through formal sector employment, a comparatively priviledged occupational situation, one should expect that a proportion seveal times this number are employed in the lower paid informal sector. Hence, the peri-

Table 11
Formal Sector Taxpayers (P.A.Y.E.)* by Peri-Urban District
District

Year	*Gezewa*	*Kumbotso*	*Ungogo*	*Total*
1963/64		0.2		0.2
% PAYE	No	(24)	No	(24)
Total Taxpayers	Data	(13,964)	Data	(13,964)
1966/67		1.7	0.1	0.8
% PAYE	No	(237)	(14)	(251)
Total Taxpayers	Data	(14,065)	(15,721)	(29,786)
1968/69	0.1	3.7		2.0
% PAYE	(12)	(539)	No	(651)
Total Taxpayers	(18,646)	(14,390)	Data	(33,036)
1969/70		0.9	1.1	1.1
% PAYE	No	(128)	(162)	(290)
Total Taxpayers	Data	(13,810)	(14,568)	(28,378)
1970/71		1.2	9.9	5.8
% PAYE	No	(165)	(1,544)	(1,709)
Total Taxpayers	Data	(13,907)	(15,595)	(29,502)
1971/72	0.1	3.6	9.7	4.3
% PAYE	(13)	(530)	(1,561)	(2,104)
Total Taxpayers	(18,285)	(14,791)	(16,034)	(49,110)
1972/73	2.8	3.4	7.6	4.5
% PAYE	(540)	(506)	(1,237)	(2,283)
Total Taxpayers	(19,061)	(15,037)	(16,201)	(50,299)
1973/74	3.0	4.6	6.4	4.6
% PAYE	(580)	(721)	(1,042)	(2,343)
Total Taxpayers	(19,418)	(15,518)	(16,363)	(51,299)
1974/75	3.5	4.2	9.8	5.8
% PAYE	(704)	(666)	(1,668)	(3,038)
Total Taxpayers	(19,861)	(15,824)	(16,963)	(52,648)

*Pay As You Earn (P.A Y.E.)

urban peasantry cannot be considered rural in the normal usage of the term: rather they are becoming semi-proletarianized communities whose material existence is increasingly determined by the market cycles of industrial capitalism. Peasant life is eroded as their youths gradually migrate to the city

for employment or as the local authority and/or land speculators gradually engulf them.

Industrial Labor: Social Origins by Urban Status

One way to comprehend the historically rooted impact of urban status on an unevenly developed industrial proleteriat is to examine workers' social origins. While the process of proleterianization in a peripheral capitalist urban center will, in the long run, homogenize differences among urban status groups, during this period such differences are real and inhibit the organizational development of an urban working class. Table 9 compares the social origins of each urban status category by the sector of his father's primary occupation. Rows 8-10 provide status characteristics of the respondent's father. In the case of migrants and commuters, the intergenerational occupational mobility is from the agricultural sector to the industrial manufacturing sector. Note that among these two rural-born urban status groups, there is a slight tendency for migrants to have come from higher status service occupations such as religious teachers (*mallams*), public servants (i.e., sons of village heads), and commercial backgrounds.

Interestingly, among migrants, those reporting *mallamai* fathers are nearly double the frequency reported among commuters, and approach the frequency reported among urbans. Moreover, it is of interest to note that among migrants, if the frequency for a father in religious service occupations is combined with the father's secondary occupation, then 18.2 percent of the migrants originate from fathers whose primary or secondary occupation was religious. This is an extraordinary occurrence, for it surpasses the frequency achieved by the urbans and suggests that there is a relationship between *mallams* and Quranic school networks and rural-urban labor migration networks. (I have analyzed this relationship elsewhere so I shall not repeat it here.)[6]

When social origins of the urbans are investigated, there is a clear break with the pattern established by the rural-born migrants and commuters. Commercial service accounts for the social origins of over 35 percent of the urbans; handicraft manufacturing or craft labor accounts for over 10 percent; and labor service occupations, of which most are peddlers and hawkers, accounts for over 18 percent. Together, these commercial, craft and peddler occupations account for the social origins of over 64 percent of the urbans. Here one discovers a classic situation of intergenerational downward mobility, where sons of free producers and traders are unable to maintain the occupation and status of their fathers' social class position. While market forces and competition from industrial production have not eroded the career opportunities of *mallams'* sons, as is the case for craft and commercial occupations, a significant number of *mallams'* sons are engaged in industrial labor. Because sons are usually trained in Quranic studies as well as

for moral leadership one discovers that *mallams* and Quranic students are interwoven as a status group within a first generation industrial proletariat. This finding suggests that sons of *mallams* are unable to make a secure living in traditional occupations, such as tailoring or commerce, which allow them to continue Islamic scholarship.

The statistical data confirm the importance of urban status as a source of uneven development within the industrial proletariat. Note that nearly all, irrespective of urban status, are descended from uneducated, *talakawa* families. Thus, *talakawa* status is constant across the three urban status groups. Given the occupational advantages as well as the social education provided by urban living, the urbans emerge as the most advanced group within the Hausa-speaking industrial proletariat, while the commuters are the most politically backward.

The statistics for western education in Table 10 illustrate the virtual absence of educational opportunity for the peasantry in the peri-urban area. While behind urbans in literacy and schooling, migrants fare better than commuters; and of course, just as in the case of Quranic education, urbans have much greater levels of literacy and participation in western schooling. One expects that once the Federal Government's universal primary education program becomes established, far greater numbers of those having attended rural primary school will be represented in the industrial labor force.

When the effect of urban status on occupational attainment is examined in table 10 then the correlation between industrial inequality and urban status is unambiquously present. Just as in the case of entry itno the commercial occupations of the petty entrepreneurial class, urban status determines to a significant degree the opportunities for commuters or migrants to gain entry into higher paying skilled or supervisory positions. In all positions within the skill hierarchy, there is a clear linear relationship between urban status and skill attainment. For example, while slightly less than one half of the urbans are in unskilled positions, over three quarters of the commuters hold these positions. And further, while the mean number of years at one's present job is higher for urbans, there is less than one year separating them from the commuters. Hence, though commuters have been employed in factory labor for some duration, they have not advanced upward in the skill hierarchy. The industrial survey illustrates the sociological differences and uneven development within the industrial working class that are explained by urban status.

The Development of Kano's Industrial Working Class: Some Conclusions

Thus far I have described the social and geographical characteristics of industrial labor in Kano during a period when society and economy were in the transition to semi-industrial capitalism. At this time, the expansion of industrial employment was complemented by an expansion of labor recruit-

ment from the northern states, especially from the peri-urban areas surrounding urban Kano. As a result, the comparatively uneven development of the industrial proletariat was due, not only to the diverse ethnic origins of workers, but also from the differentiation represented by urban status. Because the commuters did not depend totally on the market for the means of subsistence, and, equally important, because commuters did not develop the socially determined consumption needs as did urban resident workers, the rural resident commuters were the least class conscious and the most politically backward members of the industrial working class. On the other hand, the migrants who, like the commuters were rural-born but unlike the commuters, depended upon the market for subsistence (i.e., housing, food and necessities) quickly became socialized into the urban working class with regard to class consciousness and political awareness. Again, one of the interesting aspects of the Hausa-speaking migrant's mode of integration into urban Kano arises from the role that Islamic (Quranic) school networks play in linking the rural areas to the urban labor market (e.g., see above. 13.8 percent of the Hausa-Fulani workers cite Islamic education as the reason for migrating to Kano). Further, in researching the origins of class consciousness among Kano's industrial workers, I discovered a consistent correlation between participation in Islamic organizations and developing a class conscious perspective. Thus the role of Islamic organizations and networks, though pre-colonial and pre-capitalist in origin, continues to *articulate* with emerging industrial capitalist social processes such as urban class formation. Any understanding of industrial class formation necessitates that one take Islamic institutions into account.

In the case of the urbans, who are mostly downwardly mobile traders and craft producers, one discovers the source of leadership among the industrial working class. Many were involved with NEPU; most were experienced in the ways of urban organization; among the worker-*mallams* from this urban status group, the tendency to interpret Islamic texts as supporting workers' rights was much higher than their rural counterparts; and, most importantly, as Table 10 indicates, urbans were nearly twice as likely as migrants to be literate in western script. This latter feature enabled them to follow public affairs and the state's labor policies. Even among urbans, literate workers were much more likely to develop higher levels of class consciousness than their illiterate yet urban-born counterparts. Literacy, therefore, is a powerful determinant of working class consciousness among Kano's workers.

Part of the reason for the militancy of the urbans is that they considered themselves "sons of Kano" with ancient family traditions of craft production and commerce. The inherent alienation and degradation of industrial labor was unacceptable to them precisely because they felt that the system was alien, introduced by Europeans and lacked human dignity; and also because their self-esteem and sense of social justice was so much higher than

their rural born counterparts, the migrants and the commuters. Hence, in comparison to Western Europe, where guild traditions of feudal origin were mobilized by newly proleterianized workers to resist the deprivation of early industrial capitalism, one finds in Kano, an analogous yet more informal urban tradition of resistance held by the descendents of commercial and *craft* producing families. Together with *mallamai* leadership, the urbans have not only resisted the process of proleterianization but formed the cadre for the development of trade unions in Kano's factories. Again, the combination of commercial and craft origins, deep involvement in Islamic organizations such as Islamic brotherhoods and Quranic schools and a sense of protecting one's "Own town" distinguish the urban-born industrial workers and have enabled them to play a leading role in the trade union organizations that have emerged since 1973 in Kano's industries.

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Methodological Appendix

From October 1970 to June 1972, I lived, researched and, in a marginal way, participated in the life of a workers community called Tudun Wada, in the shadows of Bompai industrial estate. Tudun Wada was created in the 1930s as a residential area for northern Muslim migrants to Kano who worked for the government either as police and soldiers or night soil collectors; the development of Bompai industrial estate since the late 1950s had made it a densely populated community of wage workers. As such it was considered low in status relative to the old city, but higher in status than areas such as Sabon Gari or parts of nearby Gwagwarwa. After establishing a residence in a new ward, I began explaining and introducing myself to the local notables and officials. During the first two months I spent most of my energy learning local concepts, personalities, vocabulary, and conducting informal life histories with the labourers who resided there and participated in the active street life. Direct observation of community life was possible because the street and entryways of houses were public and especially active between three and nine p.m. Quranic students chanted verses; food sellers haggled over prices; workers rested and played cards; brightly dressed prostitutes emerged from houses; and children played and ran errands for their parents.

January brought a federal government-sponsored report written by the Adebo Commission recommending wage increases which, when backdated, formed an arrears payment amounting to ten times the weekly salary of the lowest paid worker. Wage increases were recommended for the public sector but the position of the private sector was more ambiquous. This created a situation where the industrial workers employed in the private sector organized wildcat strikes and, when necessary, violent confrontations in order to receive their arrears pay. At the same time as the report's publication, the Muslim festival of *Id el Fitr* approached, requiring significant expenses and gifts to wives and relatives. Here is an example of combined development or the articulation of two modes of production whereby the consumptive demands of fulfilling festival obligations exerted pressure on workers to demand immediate payment of their arrears pay (maximum cost per worker = ₦ 18). The intensity of the strike is explained by the interaction between the 19th century Muslim system and the modern capitalist system.

From January until June, the 1964 strike, early union organizations, the failure and represession of unions (no factory unions existed in 1971-72), and the tactics used in the settlement of the 1971 Adebo strikes in several factories, formed the core of my research. By June I had collected detailed histories, sometimes hour by hour, of the strikes and the workers efforts to create permanent workers organizations. The data collected by informal methods was qualitatively insightful and rich in detailed personal accounts of what it meant to engage in an industrial action for both experienced and neophyte workers. But the virtual absence of statistical data meant that after nine months of field work, I had no sound or reliable knowledge of how representative of industrial workers my informants and strike participants were. Matters such as age, ethnic composition, rural-urban origins and education of the industrial labour force remained unknown. It was clear that I needed census level material before engaging in structured interviews and especially before defining theoretically important sample categories.

After visiting many factories and observing management practices, I decided to generate a representative sample of cases from which the general socio-demographical characteristics of the industrial labour force could be ascertained; this meant that samples of workers with theoretically salient social characteristics could be randomly selected from the initial listing. In order to maximize the impact of industrial variables, the five largest employers of industrial labour were chosen. Though this sample was not representative in that at least one firm was drawn from the three industrial areas of Kano with three

being selected from the overwhelmingly largest area, the Bompai industrial estate. After training six local university students as enumerators, all production workers were interviewed on selected socio-demographic characteristics including: age, time in factory, housing and amenities, ethnicity and literacy. Hausa-Fulani workers were asked additional questions on land and land sales, employment history, fathers, occupation and social status. The socio-demographic survey took six weeks and enabled me to observe the organization, management style and process of production in each factory.

Following the enumeration, the interviews were coded and organized into broad categories that were relevant for sampling decisions. One surprise to me and my informants concerned the Hausa-Fulani. As the majority ethnic group in Kano, they accounted for just over 50 per cent; but approximately one-third were rural resident commuters to the factory. Though I expected to sample by urban or rural birth, the commuters required inclusion in any final sample of structured interviews both because of their number and because their rural residence allowed a control over the effects of urban residence on workers attitudes. The existence of so many commuters provides graphic example of how participant observation techniques lack representativeness. A second surprise concerned the vast number of ethnic groups enumerated: over 100. Because the Hausa-Fulani were the majority in our enumeration and, for a variety of political and economic reasons, are likely to increase as a proportion of the industrial labour force, they alone were selected for final interviews. I reasoned that the cost of including other ethnic groups as controls outweighed any possible gain; and further that additional samples of Hausa-Fulani such as the commuters, would yield far more interesting data. Secondly, the remaining ethnic groups were more educated and less 'conservative' or rather less dominated by an authoritarian political structures than were the Hausa-Fulani. Hence, I believed that the Hausa-Fulani were least likely to exhibit 'modern' consciousness or behaviour and reasoned further that any change shown among the Hausa-Fulani relative to more 'modernized' groups is even more likely to be true among the remaining groups. Finally, my resources simply did not permit elbaorate sampling nor a large number of cases, and the Hausa-Fulani appeared to be the wisest investment.

The final sample called for 45-50 randomly selected interviews from each of three categories: *urbans*–life-long inhabitants of Kano city; *migrants*–rural born migrants to the city; and *commuters*–rural resident commuters to the factory. Additional controls that were designed to eliminate deviant factory workers allowed only for uneducated, married, Muslim, aged 20-40 and unskilled to be included in the sample. With this sampling framework I awaited completion of the final Adebo wage review report which was scheduled for October 1971, the logic being that if its publication resulted in more strikes, the researcher should be certain to interview after the second wave of strikes. Despite this precaution, the disrupting froce was not additional strikes but a trade recession which led to lay-offs in all factories and the closing down of two firms. This required a reorganization of my sample to include only three of the five original firms. Fortunately, the old city firm, having the most urban born workers, and two large firms at Bompai remained operative and formed the basis for a new sample, yet one based exactly on the earlier sampling criteria.

Throughout the debate over the second Adebo report, compounded by a cholera epidemic and the retrenchment of workers, I continued to develop interview items for inclusion in a final interview schedule; after evaluating the ability of local interviewers, I decided to administer this myself. Not only did this increase the quality of interviewing, it allowed me to evaluate the quality of items for future data analysis. In short, it kept me close to my data and allowed me to follow-up interesting respondents for informal interviews outside the factory.

Living and conducting participant observation in the community proved to be invaluable when items were translated into Hausa. For example, my elite member translator, whom I had employed earlier as an enumerator, translated 'strike' into the Hausa word for 'riot' while the workers always used the term for 'rebellion', whereby legitimacy was inferred. Pre-testing items and especially the mean of language choices was done individually and in groups. Workers were asked, 'what they would believe a question to mean if asked . . . . . ' and if they believed anyone would resist answering such a question. Actually, pre-testing the instrument was quite popular as many workers asked when their factory was to be interviewed.

Final interviews were conducted from January through May 1972. After locating the worker, who was relieved from work, the purpose and potential benefits of my research were explained and the worker was encouraged to refuse if he could not be open or preferred not to be interviewed. Only six refusals were recorded, partly because the previous enumeration had shown that no harm occurred from being interviewed. But most important was the fact that I had been resident in the area for over 14 months before interviewing began.

The interview schedule recorded family, residential Islamic and occupational history in great detail because my informal research convinced me that these were influential areas of experience. Attitudinal items focused on the strike, worker's politics and organizations, adjustment and evaluatión of industrial labour, ethnic tolerance, education, stratification evaluation, and aspirations. By remaining in the factories for five months I was able to collect additional observations and notes on the management and labour process involved in production. Being an interviewer enabled me to discuss the strike with management and to gather information on how they viewed their labour force.

SOME REMARKS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF RAW MATERIAL PRODUCTION IN THE COLONY OF KANO c.1912-1919

by
Sule Bello

Introduction

This paper is an extract from a research work in which I am currently engaged. As such issues which have been dealt with in other parts of the research will be found to have been mentioned only in passing in this paper.

The subject of the paper, however, is something which has not received enough attention from various researchers involved in the study of Kano. Most students have remained content with re-echoing the officially established and much publicised myths of "indirect economy". The relevance of this paper, therefore, lies in the attempts made to identify the nature of colonial production especially as it relates to the control over resources on the one hand and the gradual development of mass poverty on the other.

The significance of the intensive and pervasive development of raw material production, both agricultural and mineral, for export is related firstly to the decline and stasis in other sectors of the economy (manufacturing, food production and processing, etc.) and the increasing dependence on the importation of manufactures and foodstuffs from the colonising country.

The colonial state, however, in conjunction with the colonial companies pursued specific policies designed to develop further this form of production. These included various Native Authority Ordinances relating to the production of various crops, rules relating to the standard of cotton, hides and skins, groundnuts, etc. provision of seeds and fertilisers, experimental farms and livestock inspections. Promotion campaigns were also undertaken by the Native Authority. Later these campaigns came to involve the use of film shows, posters etc. There were also rules relating to mining activities. The development itself tended to assume a specific form of organisation, viz: the concentration and centralisation of the resources, and hence production process under the colonial companies and their agents and the consequent decline of cottage or household-based production.

It is worthwhile to note that the development of raw material production is associated with two concommittant developments. The first was increasing foodshortage and increasing dependence on imported foodstuffs. The second was the increasing destruction of cottage industries with its related significances – technological dependence concentration of production and the importation of manufactured items. Related to, and as a consequence of the above factors, was the improverishment of the majority of the population and the changing relations between the settlements. The problem of food shortage is treated here while the question of industrial activitiy, although briefly referred to here, is largely dealt with elsewhere.

J.S. Hogendorn has popularised a myth on the question of the development of groundnut production in relation to cotton production. This particular myth, which has found a number of able disciples, has it that the peasantry preferred producing groundnuts to cotton due, essentially, to the "higher prices" obtained.[1] In the first place, even before colonial domination, Kano was the principal importer of cotton from Zaria and Katsina Emirates due to its massive cotton based production of textile goods.[2] Secondly, Kano itself (due to the soil) is not a suitable locality for the cultivation of cotton. On the other hand it does not appear that the colonial government was particularly bent on the promotion of cotton cultivation in opposition, or as an "alternative", to the cultivation of groundnuts. Colonial policy on the matter is explicitly stated thus:

> "It is advisable not to press too strongly the cultivation of any particular crop, but to leave it to the descretion of the planters, after informing them as far as possible of the prices obtaineable and the probable extent of the demand. District Officers will forward samples of actual and possible economic products for transmission to the Imperial Institute".[3]

It is evident therefore that the crucial issue is why "the people" had to plant these crops for cash at all. This was necessitated by the fiscal policy imposed by the colonial state – otherwise "the people" would not even have "responded" to British cash if it was not imposed.[4]

B. The Production of Agricultural Raw Material

To a large extent, a number of issues dealing with agricultural production were, as far as the Native Authority was concerned, contained in specific ordinances dealing with particular issues, such as cotton growing (1916) and diseases of animals (1917) which were said to "have been drawn up in agreement with the wishes of the Director of Agriculture and Chief Veterinary Officer."[5] The two most important in this connection were the departments of agriculture and the veterinary division. Another important aspect to this development was the incorporation of merchants as the commercial agents of colonial companies.

The most extensive type of agricultural raw material produced and exported were groundnuts and in lesser quantities cotton and sheanuts.

Hides and skins also formed a substantial part of the raw material produced and exported. This form of production was largely carried out by peasants and pastoralists although on a marginal scale and alongside this there was production based on personal estates.

Groundnut production for export appears to have developed considerably after 1911. By 1913 it was reported that "purchases of groundnut" was "at a standstill due to the fact that the railway could not evacuate prior purchase".[6] The figures of groundnuts exported via the railways, apart from a few falls during famine years, suggest an increase in the development of this form of production even up to 1960.[7] The major method for promoting this form of production apart from the initial imposition of the payment of taxes in sterling currency seems to have been the increasing monetization of exchange, cash advances and increasing private land ownership. Campaigns were also instrumental in this respect: for example, "Baba of Karo" mentioned the campaign mounted by the Native Authority while the Emir was said to have, as a demonstration, himelf cultivated a large farm of groundnuts.[8] According to Hogendom "gifts" or "dashes" of "goods and cash" were made by the middlemen to persuade farmers to grow groundnuts.[9] This however does not only appear to be economically untenable but it is not corraborated by the available evidence. It was reported in 1921 by the Resident that there was an "extensive" and in his "opinion" most objectionable method adopted which he described as "that of advancing money to the farmer for an option on his future crops."[10] Similarly it was reported by Rowling that usually crops was "Cited as a security for loan" and "disputes after harvest related to higher prices in the market and attempts to sell and repay the cash."[11]

As far as the production of cotton was concerned in 1916, in order to destroy the indigenous type of cotton planted and substitute for it one which was preferable to the B.C.G.A. and which would probably help in destroying textile production in the Emirate, the Native Authority drew up a rule relating to the cultivation and sales of cotton. The rule was as follows: "The purpose of this rule is to improve the cotton grown in Kano territory.

1. In any district where foreign cotton seed is distributed it is forbidden to grow native cotton.
2. After the cotton crop is in every person who sowed cotton is hereby ordered to dig up and burn all the old roots before the next rains come, in order to prevent the spread of disease. Any person who omits to do this is guilty of an offence.
3. Any seller of cotton who mixes foreign and native cotton together and thus exposes for sale is guilty of an offence.

Any person who commits any of the above offences is liable on a first conviction to a fine of five shillings or to 7 days imprisonment, on a second con-

viction to a fine of 10 shillings or 14 days imprisonment, and for subsequent offences to a fine £1 or to one month's imprisonment."[12]

In 1919 the B.C.G.A. supplied American long staple cotton seed. In Kano division this was distributed in Turaki Mainya district. In this respect about 60 tons of the seedlings were distributed.[13] Two years later it was reported that "the actual areas in the division under American seed were Kura, Karaye, Tundun Wada and Gwarzo.[14] Not coincidentally these also happen to be most of the major centers for internal textile production.[15] It was also reported by a colonial official that there was "a wide-spread belief that growers of cotton must sell it to the B.C.G.A. or some buyer on behalf of B.C.G.A. or government".[16] To further buttress this, the adulteration ordinance made it a penalty to mix "native" and "American" cotton to the extent that two colonial firms, Lagos Stores and Grace Brothers, were in 1921 prosecuted.[17] This particular development contributed not only to producing some cotton for the B.C.G.A. but above all in destroying internal textile production for Lancashire industries.

The supply of hides and skins to colonial companies would seem to have been largely facilitated and developed by the need for cash not only by pastoralists but also butchers and leather workers as well as merchants. Leather tanning was not only discouraged but the Resident was ordered to buy the hides untanned and send them to Lagos.[18] Livestock collected as *Jangali* must also have contributed to securing hides and skins for export. On the other hand the establishment of official slaughter houses, and the exemption from *Jangali* of livestock on route to slaughter houses, might have contributed to the availability of hides and skins. Slaughtering animals anywhere other than in slaughter houses was also made illegal. Active discouragement of leather tanning and flaying also contributed to the availability of raw hides and skins. Related to this was the increasing destitution of pastoralism due to excessive *Jangali*, droughts, the restriction on grazing areas, the creation of forest reserves and the presence of rinder pests which might have forced a number of them to sell to wealthy individuals for export. There were droughts in 1914, cattle sickness in 1915 and rinder pest in 1920. In the latter, cattle deaths in the division were estimated at 13,876 – a figure which the Resident suspected of suffering "from so many causes of inaccuracy."[19] Despite all of this, however, *Jangali* was enforced and collected as usual. By 1950, it was reported that 245 square miles were constituted as forest reserves and a further 487.47 square miles were about to be constituted.[20] It was also reported in 1916 that the formation of a reserve at Dajin Rugu in Katsina had adversely affected pastoralists, being "the chief grazing area in the province."[21] In 1926 it was reported that forest reserves were established at Bunkure, Rurum, Iggi and Burdungu. These are not only parts of the most fertile lands in the division but they are also free from tsetse fly.[22] In the 1950 economic survey it was reported that in the whole prov-

ince 600 square miles were grazed and that the "1,000 square miles of unoccupied tsetse ridden parts" were in Tundun Wada, Birnin Kudu, Gwaran and in areas of flooded bush along the valley of the Hadejia River.[23] Thus virtually all such areas were in Kano division. Yet these areas had practically no forest reservations.

C. Production of Minerals

Regulations guiding mining activities came directly from the central government, through the department of Mines, although the Resident had a duty to supply labour, communications, etc., when requested to do so. The major mineral obtained from the Riruwai – Tudun Wada district was tin, although small quantities of columbite, wolfram, cassiterite, and gold were also obtained. In this respect, there were dominant mining companies securing control over the mining areas from the colonial government and utilising wage labour for profitable production and export of minerals.

(i) Establishment of the Mining Companies

After the conquest and the declaration of all mining areas as Crown property, these were systematically given out to various mining companies. Of these mining companies the most dominant was the Kano Tin Areas which bought out the interests of Kano syndicate in 1911. The other was the Karacho Mining Company. In 1910, the Kano Syndicate Limited of 206 Cresham House, Old Breads Street, Lndon. E.C. submitted its memorandum and articles of association to the colonial government.[24] The company claimed "a total working capital" of £2,500 i.e. 2500 shares of £1 each. It had the following directors:[25]

1. Francis A. Govelt, British, of 6 Throgmorton Street, E.C. Gentleman.
2. Lestocq R. Erskine, British, of Binfield Manor, Brachell, Berks, Gentleman.
3. James A. Macnair, British of Greshman House, Old Broad Street, London E.C. Accountant.

However this company was bought over by Kano Tin Areas in September 1911.[26] Kano (Nig.) Tin Areas Limited of Nigeria Office – Gitlspur Street, London E.C. submitted its Memorandum and Articles of Association in 1911.[27] It had a total capital of £2000,000 divided into 400,000 shares of 10/- each. It list of directors was given as follows:[28]

1. Assheton Leaver – Fernceist Iven Health, Bucks (Chairman, Tin Area).
2. Francis Algernon Covett, esq., 6 Throgmorton Street, London E.C. (Chairman, Lake View Consols Ltd.).
3. Cyril D'arey Leaven Esq., Field House, Herpenden, Herts, (Director, Tin Areas).
4. Dermot J. Moorey Esq., Effinghen, Surrey (Managing Director of Kano Syndicate).

5. Lewis Norman Way Esq., Dewer House, Hay Market, London S.W. (Director of Tin Areas).

Not much information is available of Karacho Tin Mining Company. It had a total capital of £15,000. It was granted a certificate of incorporation on the 3rd of July, 1979.[29]

The explanations of the financial (working and nominal) Capital are quite wounded and dubious and the Resident, in one note, had to admit that he could not understand what was supposed to be considered as their "Working Capital" and concluded that "fortunately (they) are not under any obligation to follow the tortuous, and sometimes shady paths of company finance."[30]

(ii) Acquisition of Land

Land was granted to the companies through licences by the government, the major ones being prospecting and mining licences. While the first cover the total area to be prospected for minerals, the second grants the actual rights to proceed with mining activities. Most reports are quite silent about the pre-existing population of these areas. These mining areas have however been given as follows:[31]

1. Baba Area
2. Shiburo Area
3. Gayia Area
4. Kwaya Area
5. Mofuta Area.
6. Satu hill Area.
7. Magariji Area.

These licences were usually "exclusive" i.e. the companies being the only legally recognised users of such lands. In March, 1916, the new minerals ordinance, which superceded the 1913 proclamation, came into force.[32] It was said that in formulating its provisions "the local council of the Nigerian Chamber of Mines was given every opportunity to offer suggestions and criticisms" and the two basic improvements upon that of 1913 were that it included provisions "which made it cheaper for companies to acquire land" and that "the possession of tin ore other than by the holders of mining land has been made illegal, and the purchasing of it may only be carried on by persons specially licensed. This will no doubt assist in the prevention of tin stealing."

Mining leases were granted for a period "not exceeding 21 years." This however was constantly "renewable". For alluvial leases there was a fee of 5/- per acre per annum.[34] Exclusive prospecting licences were said to be £5 per square mile per annum. A royalty of 5% upon the value of metal won was also charged.[35]

In 1911, for the Kano Tin Areas alone the "total area in question" was

said to amount to about 44 square miles.[36] Mining lease was granted for 640 acres (1 square mile), exclusive prospecting licences for "some 21 square miles" and "for the remainder of the area formal application for exclusive prospecting have been made."[37] Even though "the ground already proved .... constituted an extremely small proportion of the total area scheduled" yet it was said that:

> "The total reserves established to date represent at the present market price a gross selling value at Liverpool of approximately £524,000."[38]

By the end of 1917 the mining area had risen to 739,15 acres.[39]

(iii) Labour Mobilisation

We have shown elsewhere that the supply of labour to the tin mines was greatly facilitated by the fiscal policies of the colonial government or through outright compulsion.[40] It was reported that "in 1913 Kano Tin Areas employed 5 Europeans and 97 "black workers".[41] In 1917 it was employing 8 Europeans and 232 "black workers".[42] In 1946 the number of average labourers on the tin fields was given as 1,130:625 "tributors" and 505 'average non-tributors:[43] For example in 1921 the colonial government commenced recruiting labour for the tin mines and about 400 were sent,[44] whereas in 1918 'efforts were made" by the colonial government" to induce an influx of labour to the mines field from all parts,"[45] of the Northern Provinces. In fact the 1942 Legal Notice authorised all D.O.'s to perform the duties of authorised labour officers."[46] Information on wages is almost non-existent. This can however be deduced from the 1958 government report on this subject.

It was stated that there did not appear to have been any "minimum wage applying generally throughout Nigeria."[47] It was even stated, officially, that migrant labourers employed during the dry season usually left for their villages during the dry season and the "offer of wage incentives often failed to check this movement away."[48] On the other hand it was stated that mineralized alluvials were more easily workable during the rainy season.[49] The need for compelling labour during the wet season is particularly illustrated here.

Information on the conditions of work is quite scanty. In 1913, however, a dynamite explosion was said to have caused the death of two labourers and two more were injured. This resulted in a 'disturbance' after which *Dogarai* were stationed at the site.[50]

Besides forced labour for the mines and low wages, other conditions for very profitable activities were created for the companies by the colonial government in two important respects. The first was concessions on "tax policies" and the second the provision of an infrastructure and lesser transport costs. Carriers were also used to transport tin to Lokoja. Information on the pattern of taxation of companies, apart from minor royalties, non-

existent and probably such taxes did not operate during the earlier periods. In any case the disposition of the colonial government on this can be deduced from the various legislations passed in the 1950's. These included, among other things, an income tax relief or "a period of tax holiday" for companies with assets of not less than £5,000 for a period of about 5 years.[51] During this period all profits and dividends were also exempted from tax.[52] Similarly there was import duties relief for a maximum of 10 years for companies involved in "industrial production" i.e. factories and various extensions of European industries, mining included.[53] Lastly, all profits and dividends "may be freely transferred to the country of origin" and "capital may also be repatriated."[54] On the other hand, I have indicated in a different paper the heavy taxation to which peasants, pastoralists, artisans and labourers were subjected.[55]

Secondly, roads and rails were constructed for the companies to evacuate their goods at minimum cost. These roads were built by either forced labour and/or the taxation of the "public" i.e. the productive sector of the population. In 1913, for example, two surveyors were sent by the government for road construction plans to "Ningi mines and Zin'der"[56] In 1911 it was said that "a branch line (of the railway) from Zaria to the tin fields (of Riruwai) had been sanctioned by the authorities and the survey and earthwork in progress (were) expected to be completed early in 1912."[57] In 1916 the railway rates as well as shipping friehgts for tin ore were reduced.[58]

(iv) Profitability of Mining Operations

Even though the reports on rate of production and profits handed over to the colonial government by the mining companeis are unreliable even if only due to the attempts to evade the payment of high royalties a rough idea of the profitability of the venture can be seen from the available, if quite sketchy, evidence.

It was reported that in 1916 the Kano Tin Areas won only 25.5 tons of ore.[59] In 1918 total exports of wolfram, although not determined, were estimated at 18 tons, all from Liruen Kano.[60] In the same year, the tin areas were reported that a small quantity of gold was being obtained from Sumaila.[62] In 1949, 318 tons of cassiterite and 109 tons of columbite, which were said to be in small quantities relative to tin, were obtained.[63] In its memorandum, the Kano Tin Areas claimed that:

> "The company should be in a position to produce from Baba Mining lease and deliver in Liverpool concentrate at a total cost of approximately £50 per ton which should at the present market price yield a profit of some £73:10:0 per ton."[64]

From the available evidence it is clear, therefore, that the various companies established control over mines and the previously independent miners, utilising the tools and labour of the latter. It was this condition of production which provided the various companies the profits from which came the wages, the so called "working capital" and the capital for "full operations"

(i.e. fixed assets). This is clearly stated in the Kano Tin Areas Memorandum as follows:

> profits from the immediate treatment of the more easily worked alluvial, in addition to the working capital provided by this issues, should furnish the company with all the funds that may be necessary for its full operations and its establishment on a large profit-earning basis."[65]

The profits would however, appear to have been larger. For example, in the 1918 mines departmental annual report average profit for the year per ton was given as £94.90[66] In the same report it was stated that the record price of £389 per ton was recorded in August. On the basis of the companies estimates therefore this would amount to a profit of £389 per ton.[67]

D. Consequences of the Development of Raw Material Production for the Colony

The most immediate consequence of raw material production was the general decline of production in other sectors of the economy. In the first place agricultural production came to be increasingly reduced to mere farming operations – largely for exportable crops. As a result of this there was a decline in food production, cultivation of raw materials for internal production and the processing of agricultural products. The alienation of land (e.g. forest and game reserves, mining and residential areas, etc.) seems to have affected not only agriculture, pastoralism but also wood-working and hunting activities. Secondly the decline and stagnation of cottage based production in turn led to increasing centralization and concentration of production under colonial factories on the one hand and increasing destitution of artisans, pastoralists and agriculturalists on the other.

A number of very critical factors would seem to have contributed to the decline in food production. In the first place it has to be noted that groundnuts themselves constituted a very important food item for the local economy and this was illustrated effectively during the 1914 drought and famine[68]

Secondly, available information on the export-import trade via the railway is to be treated with caution for two reasons. The first is that these data effectively block an understanding of the external control exercised over internal production and exchange. This, as will be shown soon, has obscured the internal developments which tended to increasingly centralize the ownership and processing etc. of foodstuffs under colonial companies and their agents. Secondly these statistics of the railway seem to represent only a minute fraction of the total trade of the colony and in a number of cases are not even reliable. For example, it was reported that less than 10% of the firms' import-export trade went via the railway "due to delays".[69] Similarly in 1913 it was reported that native traders were "incurring very serious lossess" due to "the neglect of the railway to provide a reasonable time period for the carriage of perishable goods after accepting them" and as

such "something like £2,000 worth of kolas were destroyed and many lost their entire working capital."[70] Similarly in 1914 "natives" were still complaining about "total loss and delay in delivery."[71] This suggests that a number of merchants must have carried on their trade by other means – foot, pack animals, etc. However, a rough idea could be gained from the railway statistics returns in the annual reports. For the quarter ending 30th June and 31st March 1913, the two dominant exports were groundnuts and hides and skins. Alongside these were corn, potash, beans and onions.[72] In subsequent reports raw materials tend to become the most outstanding and constant while food imports continue to rise. By 1949, the most important exports were groundnuts, groundnuts oil and livestock while apart from kolanuts and other manufactures there were flour, salt, sugar and soap on the import list.[73]

It does appear, however, that the total land area, in terms of acreage utilised for food production tended to decline not only due to the massive cultivation of groudnuts but also due to the alienation of land by the colonial government for residences (as was the case with virtually the whole of Kano Township and Barracks) roads and railways, government demonstration farms, forest and animal reserves as well as areas granted to mining companies for both prospecting and mining. Contributory to this was the fact that field holding (which contributed tremendously to food production under the Emirate government) had been abolished.[74] This decline in total acreage could probably have been offset had there been increasing productivity on the land under cultivation. The evidence suggests increasing lack of productivity. In the first place there was a tendency for the agricultural labour force to diminish (in both quantity and quality) while there was no basic change in the techniques of farming operations.[75] Not only was it that those peasants engaged on the land were largely involved in groundnut production, dry season migrations to the urban centres and tin mines as well as forced labour on the roads, railways and transportation but a number of "able bodied youngmen" tended to leave the land and become permanent wage labourers – resulting, according to an official colonial report in less food production.[76] It would also seem that slaves were, formerly largely employed on farm and industrial production.[77]

On the other hand there was increasing growth in the number of the non-productive sector of the population (e.g. administrators, commercial middlemen, army and the police, students and destitutes). These depended on the productive sector for their sustainance, while the central government and Native Authority establishments had their employees, it was reported that district heads also had paid staff on their lists,[78] and "the village heads employed large staff of servants to do the work for which they were appointed."[79] There were two sets of police – government and "native"; in 1918 there were about 84 of the former while among the latter about 242

were officially recognised by the government.[80] Average number of prisoners by 1921 in Kano gaol alone was reported as 566.[81] In 1914 a number of soldiers plus 300 carriers were further recruited for the colonial army.[82] On the other hand in 1915 it was reported that there were increasing migrations from the rural areas to the township and from various parts of West Africa into Kano.[83]

The Native colonial staff were supported through the funds from general taxes and *Zakka*. For example for the quarter ending 31st June, 1913, about 955 tons of grains were secured; of these 200 tons were supplied to the railway workers (Bukuru extention) and 20 tons to the mining survey team while it was said that most of the balance was absorbed locally, – by troops and police, etc.[84] During the 1914 drought and after the collection of taxes, the Native Authority contributed £10,000 for colonial war fund, the companies made profits in reselling groundnuts and the resident reported that "how important it is that drastic measures should be taken has been shown lately in the collection in *Zakka*".[25] In 1921, in view of the increasing cost of living and making comparison with the rises in the pay of government employees, soldiers, police etc." it was "urged" that "the salaries of Native Authority officials should be raised."[86] In 1930, however, and during the "unprecedented slump in price" and "particularly related to export crops" it was reported that "it was not found necessary to reduce the taxation" and as a result many farmers were forced to sell food crops.[87] In his 1937 report, Fairbarn, stated that in the rural areas not only were there "insufficient payments to producers" but a "scarcity" of fuel, grazing lands and building materials.[88] This would seem to have been related to colonial policy on forest reservations and land acquisition. Such were the origins of a large, highly consumptive, unproductive sector and a still larger, exploited, dwindling and productive sector of the colonial economy.

However the colonial state through its policies on foreign trade, availability of raw materials, slave labour and activities in agricultural production set the stage for the progressive destruction of local food processing. Information on this is scanty but one can deduce from various fragments. It has already been noted how taxation and custom duties in relation of long distance trade facilitated the increasing importation of salt, sugar etc. The Native Authority ordinance on "native liquor in 1917 effectively made it a crime to brew, sell or even possess native liquor.[89] An examination of Imam Umoru's accounts on the economy clearly show the wide based cottage production and processing of such food items as corn milling and grinding, bakeries, oil extraction from nuts, confectionaries, etc.[90] On the other hand the increasing destruction of these under colonial domination led to their centralization under colonial companies and their agents. By the 1940's the colonial government was setting up various missions to study and recommend on the "Industrial development" of the colony. A sub-committee the

"Ado. Industrial and Commercial Sub-committee" after its surveys, investigations and conclusions recommended to the governments that there were two basic needs for economic development in the colony. The first was that foreign capital and industries by expatriates were needed. The second was that the government should provide more local arts and craft schools i.e. labour for demand in factories (or "industries"). Such "industries" included poultry farming, corn mills, sugar refinery, henna crushing machines, grinders etc.[19] By the 1950s private enterprises engaged in the processing of vegetable or animal oils and fats, liquor or beer, food processings, confectionaries etc. were preponderating in the township.[92] These companies were owned by foreign capitalists either as direct plants or through intermediaries. The external control over these is particularly illustrated by the patent law which has it that:

> "Under the registration of United Kingdom patent Act., at present in force in Nigeria, only persons who are grantees of patent in the U.K. or any person deriving his rights from such grantees by assignment, transmission, or other operation of law may apply to the registration of patents within 3 years from the date of issue of the patent to have such patents registered in Nigeria."[93]

These companies were employing labourers ranging from 25 to 500.[94]

The dominant position of the colonial companies with respect to distribution of commodities also means, and increasingly involved the control over the processing and distribution of food items. Instrumental to this was the increasing monetization of the economy (including other parts from which food was previously imported e.g. Southern parts of Nigeria) and the cost of transporting goods by the railway or lorries.

These two factors – the total decline in foodstuff production and processing and the centralization of food imports under colonial companies operating for high profits led to, in the first place, insufficiency ("scarcity") of food in relation to the total consumption. Secondly the value of food items, increasingly rose to the advantage of companies and their agents. Where this insufficiency could be alleviated through imports it was further aggravated by the hoarding and price policies of the companies and their agents. These appear to be the basis of the inflation and rising cost of living. In most of the annual reports there are prices of food items and these seem to be increasingly on the rise. Not only of such internally produced food items (e.g. guinea corn, beans etc.) but in the Kano economic survey of 1950 it was reported that imported manufactured goods have been rising at a rate ranging from 450 – 800% annually while local produce for export "have risen less than 400% if at all."[95] This is amply demonstrated by the famine of 1914. Not only was it more profitable to resell the groundnuts purchased by the companies from the peasants back to them than to export it to Britain but there was also large importation of foodstuffs from the south. This means that for those peasants, pastoralists and other workers who had no remaining cash (having paid taxes) or resources of debt and/or sales of land/

cattle and other possessions there was no possibility of acquiring foodstuff. Those who had such means would in turn become further destituted. This is further confirmed by an official report which attributed the failure of the relief operations to two factors. The first which would appear to be ineffective, was given as "late arrival" of foodstuffs. The second was given as lack of cash on the part of the victims to purchase the foodstuff.[96] From the second it follows that even if the foodstuffs, had "arrived early" the victims could not, still have been able to purchase them. The major reason for the famine was thus the lack of surplus on the part of the productive sector of the population having paid such in numerous forms of taxes to the government as well as providing the profits of colonial trading companies) and its immediate effect was to further disposses them from the land and other possessions and possibly throw them into debt, unemployment and destitution (if they had escaped death from hunger).

These developments of declining food production and labour force, rising prices (and hence commercial profits), low wages for labour and peasant produce, increasing of producers' taxes and massive destitution led to what is termed "increasing cost of living". But this "living" (in terms of food shelter, clothing etc.) was effectively coming under the control of the companies and to the extent that its "cost" increased it did so to the advantage of the companies. Such was the issue that led the government to consider increasing pay for its staff (on the other hand taxes for the productive sector were increasing). That is to say that the productive sector contributed to the colonial government (in form of labour and taxes) funds for its operations in creating conditions conducive for the colonial companies. They similarly produced various raw materials for these companies and their intermediaries. On the other hand they consumed imports (etc) only to the extent that they further the profits of private enterprises. The destitution of the productive sector was thus caused essentially by their lack of control over their labour and (its products), lost land and cottage industries, and as a result of these the decline in their material well being viz: foodstuffs, shelter clothings etc.

FOOTNOTES

1. See my paper *"The role of the Colonial State in the Foundations of the Kano Colonial Economy C. 1903-1912"* Post-graduates seminars, Department of History A.B.U. Zaria – Dec.1978 p.2.
   Also J.S. Hogendorn *"Nigerian groundnut Exports: Origins and Early Development.* Zaria, 1978" p.58 ff.
2. See my paper *"A rexamination of the Origins, Nature and types of relationships between the State and the Economy of Kano Emirate by the Last decade of the 19thC."* Department of History A.B.U. Samaru Zaria, P.G. Seminars June 1978.
3. A.H.M. Kirk Greene "The Principles of Native Administration in Nigeria" London 1965 pp.105-106.

4. My paper "The role of . . . . . " *op. cit* pp. 11
5. NAK/SNP 10/416 P/1920. p.6
6. NAK/Kanprof/717/1913 Kano province report for 1913 para. 39.
7. See "Nigeria: Handbook of Commerce and Industries, Lagos 1962.
8. M. Smith *Baba of Karo London* 1954 p.42-43.
9. J.S. Hogendorn, *opcit* p.987
10. NAK/SNP 10/9/120P/1921 para. 118.
11. C.W. Rowling *Report on land tenure* Kano province, *Kaduna* 1949. p.53.
12. NAK/SNP 10/413P/1920 See role III
13. NAK/SNP10/7/318/1919 *report no. 57.*
14. NAK/SNP10/9/120P/1921 para. 129.
15. NAK/SNP12/67/1909 para. 32.
16. NAK/SNP10/316P/1920 para 42.
17. NAK10/9/120p/1921 para 132.
18. Lord Lugard *"Protectorate of Northern Nigeria 1900-1913"* Annual reports published by E.P. Microfilm Ltd. No. 96937 reel 52, Group two, London 1974. Available at KIL, ABU, Zaria. p.429.
19. NAK/SNP10/9/102p. para. 134.
20. NAK/Kanprof/6991. 5.4 Kano Economic Survey 1950 p.54.
21. Ibid p.51-52.
22. NAK/Kanprof/2978/1926.
23. NAK/Kanprof/6991 5.4 p.50
24. NAK/SNP11/132m/1910 *Kano Syndicate Ltd.* p.1
25. NAK/SNP11/131m/1910 *Kano Syndicate Memorandum and* Articles of Associations p.1
26. NAK/SNP17/12004 vol.1 para 114.
27. NAK/SNP11/344m/1911 *Kano (Nig.) Tin Areas Memorandum, Articles of Association and Propectus of*
28. *Ibid* p.1
29. NAK/SNP11/824m/1919 *Karacho mining Company, Memorandum and Articles of Association of.*
30. NAK/SNP11/344m/1911 See Comments by the Resident on the prospectus submitted by the Co. and dated 14/8/11.
31. *Ibid.* p.2.
32. NAK/SNP11/209m/1917 *Mines Department Report (Annual)* 1916 para 20.
33. Ibid Para. 23. Backing this particular ordinance was the State Control over all lands as clearly stated in Kanprof No.57 *Land; rural land policy* para. 3 which states "The (traditional) ultimate ownership of land whether occupied or not was therefore rested in the hands of the community and is now by the land and native rights ordinance vested in the government."
34. NAK/SNP 11/344m./1911 p.2.
35. *Ibid* p.2
36. *Ibid.* p.2.
37. *Ibid.* p.1.
38. *Ibid.* p.1.
39. NAK/SNP 11/643m./1919 *Mines department annual report* 1918 appendix A.
40. See my paper "The role of . . . . . " *op cit* p.13.
41. NAK/SNP 11/643m./1919 Appendix A.
42. NAK/SNP 11/209m/1912 Appendix A
43. NAK/Kanprof/6128 *Mines field labour advisory report, p. 6*
44. My paper "The role of . . . . . " op cit p.13
45. NAK/SNP 11/643m/1919 para 23
46. "Nigeria: Handbook of . . . . . " op cit
47. *Ibid* p. 230 – 231
48. *Ibid* p.230

49. NAK/Kanprof/6991 3.4 p.9
50. NAK/Kanprof/Kano province report for quarter ending June 30th 1913 para 21.
51. *"Industrial Directory"* 4th Edition published for Federal Ministry of Information, Apapa. 1967 p.42.
52. *Ibid* p.42
53. *Ibid* p.42
54. *Ibid* p.43
55. My paper "The role of . . . . . opcit. *passim.*
56. NAK/Kanprof /717/1913 para 25.
57. NAKSNP 11/344m/1911 p.2.
58. NAK/SNP 11/209m/1917 para 18–19.
59. *Ibid* para 28.
50. NAK/SNP 11/643m/1919 pra 18.
61. *Ibid* appendix A.
62. NAK/Kanprof/3512/1939 p.19.
63. NAK/Kanprof/6991 5.4 p.19
64. NAK/SNP 11/344m/1911 p.2.
65. *Ibid.* para 2.4
68. This famine is referred to below.
69. NAK/Kanprof/108/1916 para.11.
70. NAK/Kanprof/606/1913 para. 31
71. NAK/Kanprof/447/1914 para 73.
72. NAK/Kanprof/717/1913.
73. NAK/Kanprof/6091 5.4 p.72-76.
74. See relevent Sections E.W. *Ferguson "Nineteenth century Hansaland – being a descritpion by Imam Umoru of the land, economy and society of his people"* Ph.D. Thesis California, 1973.
75. The question of technology development under colonialism we have treated elsewhere and is now in a draft form.
76. NAK/SNP7/ 5490/1908 *Report by Major Festing on the Migration of Agricultural classes.*
77. See relevent section in E.W. Ferguson *opcit.* and Mary Smith *opcit.*. also NAK/ SNP 10/9/120 p./ 1921 para 121.
78. *ibid* para 14.
79. *Ibid*
80. NAK/SNP 10/7/93p/1919 para. 82-89
81. NAK/SNP 10/9/120p/1921 para 87
82. NAK/Kanprof/447/1914 para.4.
83. NAK/Kanprof/108/1915 p.2
84. NAK/Kanprof/606/1913 para.7
85. NAK/Kanprof/376/1914 para.20
86. NAK/SNP10/9/120p/1921 para 107-108.
87. NAK/Kanprof/438/1930 p.7
88. NAK/Kanprof/4048/p.30-31.
89. NAK/SNP 10/413p/1920. rule II *To prohibit the drinking of native intoxicants.*
90. See relevant sections in D.W. Fergusion *opcit.*
91. NAK/Kanprof/6209 S.2 *passim*
92. "Industrial directory . . . . . *opcit* p.24
93. *Ibid* p.43-44.
94. Ibid p.1
95. NAK/Kanprof/699/5.4 p.77
96. NAK/Kanprof/447/1914 para. 3.

THE LONDON AND KANO PAPERS – AN INTRODUCTION

by
Robert Shenton

The London and Kano Company in Perspective

The London and Kano Trading Company, founded in 1904, was the first British firm to operate in the city of Kano. It was the creation of two former members of the British colonial service in Northern Nigeria, Loder Donnisthorpe and John Esmond-White. The company was quite small even by turn of the century standards, having a share capital of only £15842 as late as 1910. The shareholders of the Company reflected its dimunitive stature, being described as spinsters, gentlemen and solicitors. (P.R.O. 17301, x/1 01856).

In its first year the Company took up residence in the old city near the Emir's palace on a plot of land leased to it by the Emir. To put the matter modestly, The Company was not successful. It operated in an intensely competitive market and was unable to meet the competition. Its competitors were the merchants of the trans-Saharan trade. As Marion Johnson (Journal of African History) has shown, the last quarter of the 19th century was a time of dramatic change in the age of old desert trade. The penetration of North Africa by Western capital, as well as the change in the goods traded across it had both served to alter the trade. Until 1850, the trade had been bankrolled by capital from both sides of the desert and the commodities traded across it had largely been slaves, craft goods, and luxury items. By the last quarter of the 19th c., however, the trade was being bankrolled by Manchester merchants and the commodities traded were largely British textile imports and tanned skins and ostrich feather exports. It was into this trade that the London and Kano Company tried to enter.

They were unsuccessful, and the reasons why they were unsuccessful are important for an understanding of the development of the political economy of colonialism. First of all, the London and Kano Company had to face expensive transport costs. Expensive not simply because of the limitations of the transport network from the coast, but also because of the monopoly positions of the Elder-Dempster shipping lines in the West African trade and the near monopoly of the Niger Company on river transport. Second, the

London and Kano Company did not have the access to the complex monetary system of the trans-Saharan traders which was capable of transforming cowries into European currency. Fourth, the Company did not have access to the skilled skin selectors of the trans-Saharan traders nor did it have access to the market intelligence which often made the difference between successful trading and a storehouse of unsaleable goods. Given all this, it is no wonder that the Company foundered. These difficulties also seem to explain why the trans-Saharan trade continued as long as it did and why the Niger Company wisely chose to stay on the rivers.

The Company survived this initial period of trade. That it did so owed less to its own resources than to the needs of the colonial state. The primary difficulty facing the colonial state in Northern Nigeria after the conquest was the realisation of the taxes in a form which would allow it to meet its obligations. Since most of these obligations were external to the Protectorate, this meant British silver. Yet, the only way that taxes could be collected in silver was if silver was paid out for goods and services. Thus, the colonial state needed an active European merchant capital sector for its own fiscal survival. Lugard unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the Niger Company to trade in Kano. That firm refused, and for good reason. As a Niger Company official wrote:

> "Kano is a great central market for the distribution of goods and products which have no possible chance of a market in Europe and therefore it would not pay the (Niger) Company or indeed any other firm of European merchants to trade in them. (RNC papers).

The situation of the colonial state was, however, desparate. The desparation of the colonial state coincided, happily for the stockholders of the London and Kano Company, with the entrance into the Company's board of one Mr. Lewis Way in late 1905. Way was known to Lugard through family connections. Thus, when Way demanded that the Company be given tariff concessions and the use of government transport so that it might better compete with the trans-Saharan traders, Lugard replied favourably. Lugard's justification of this favourable treatment to his superiors merits notice.

> I may add that in my private view, it is also a benefit to West Africa to enlist in a participation of its trade a firm unconnected with the Liverpool shipping monopoly and so to throw open to a larger circle than that which has (with the exception of the Niger Company) hitherto engrossed it.
> I have recently learned that Mr. Way has joined the directorate of the Kano Trading Company; and I believe it is his intention, if the firm promises well, to amalgamate his business with it. This appears to me to afford the opportunity I have long sought for to introduce a valueable competitor to the Niger Company in Northern Nigeria, and opening the interior to develoment – a policy to which the Niger Company, though they have advanced it in theory, have been lamentably slow in giving effect . . . . . (Lugard papers)

Thus, it was Lugard's need to solve the problem of the realisation of taxation combined with the Niger Company's wariness of the Kano market which gave birth to the concessions which kept the London and Kano

Comapny afloat. Yet, if Lugard ameliorated the Company's difficulties, it did little to lessen his. The London and Kano Company was too small and too marginal to the Protectorate's economy to put a sufficient amount of currency into circulation to aid in the solution of the problem of realisation.

It is clear that Lugard realised this, and from an early date he saw the construction of the railroad north from Lagos through Ibadan as the way to the colonial state's financial salvation. If and when the railway reached Kano, it would simultaneously reduced the Niger Company's near monopoly on cheap transport and dramatically cheapen transport, make British merchants competitive, put British silver into circulation and thus make taxes realisable. When, however, the parsimony of the Imperial Treasury stalled the Lagos line at Ibadan, these plans were ruined. It was then that Lugard began agitating for the Baro-Kano line, the line which was eventually built.

That the Baro-Kano railway was built, however, at a time when the more prosperious south could not obtain permission to continue the Lagos line north is in need of explanation. Happily, the explanation is not difficult. Lugard, with the help of his wife and Times' correspondent, Flora, was able to enlist the likes of Winston Churchill, Edmund Morel, editor of the African Mail; and Sir Alfred Jones, who controlled the Elder-Dempster shipping lines, in an amazing campaign which convinced the cotton hungry manufacturers of Lancashire that a railway to Kano was the answer to their problems of shortages and high prices.

While it is likely that Churchill and Morel actually believed their own propaganda it is just as likely that Jones, Lugard and his wife did not. For Jones, the railway would be good business as it had the potential to increase his shipping tonnage cotton or no as it would be his ship which would carry the railway construction materials. For Lugard and Flora, the campaign was clearly a means to an end of their taxation problems. Few saw through the campaign but one who did was the Liverpool merchant, John Holt, who when asked by Morel to enlist subscribers for the capital of the newly formed British Cotton Growing Association, which was the vehicle of the campaign replied:

> I do not object to it, (the BCGA) but there is no reason why I should shout about and tell people what I do not believe. . . . . I am not going to be dishonest to please anybody. I do not want anyone to put money into Africa and lose it on my advise . . . Would not Jones put £100,000 in it to give his steamers freight if he thought there was a margin in it to pay expenses, not to speak of profit? Don't be deluded.

Yet, deluded they were and as a result of the political pressure from Lancashire the Baro Kano line was built. The cynicism of the cotton campaign was made clear by Lieutenant Governor Wallace in a letter to the head of the Niger Company, Lord Scarborough in 1910. He wrote:

> As you are aware, we raised the cotton cry to get the railway. Once that was assured and the money voted, the cry to a great extent ceased, as it had served its purpose (RNC papers)

For the London and Kano company, the construction of the Baro-Kano line was a happy event. Cheap transport in conjunction with the taxation policies of the colonial state insured that the company could now successfully compete with the trans-Saharan merchants, not only in hides and skins but in the new commodity, groundnuts, which because of their high bulk to value ratio, were singularly unsuited to the desert trade.

The London and Kano Papers

The papers of the London and Kano Company were discovered by the author in 1976 in a disused Barclay's Bank warehouse in Lagos. The company had been forced into voluntary liquidation in the mid-1960s and its record constituted its sole unvendable asset. Aside from a mass of relatively recent materials, the records are most complete for the period 1915-1924. The records which survive for this period are largely in the form of correspondence between the company's Lagos and Kano offices and its head office in England. These records provide us with insight into trading practices, including market research, credit, price agreements between European firms, and most importantly price data for imports and exports on a weekly basis for nearly a decade. The latter are especially important for the economic historian for price series of this frequency over a decade are all but nonexistant for Nigeria or for that matter, West Africa. Moreover, we are fortunate in that the period covered by this data is an especially interesting one, including as it does the dramatic post World War one boom and recession. This period illustrates some important characteristics of European merchant capital in Northern Nigeria and in particular high lights certain structural weaknesses of it. The latter, in turn, shed light on a number of issues including commercial competition and the pattern of the concentration and Centralisation of Merchant Capital.

The Post World War One Boom and Recession

As a result of the disruption of shipping during the course of the First World War, there was a great part of consumer demand which the manufacturers of Europe could not immediately adjust to. This demand became inflationary, and this inflation of prices was translated back into a dramatic inflation in the price of raw materials, including groundnuts, a raw material in the making of margarine and soap. By February of 1920 the Kano price for groundnuts had reached as high as $36 per ton compared with $9.10 per ton in 1916. This rise in the price of groundnuts was paralleled by similar increases in the prices of imported cloth, the latter increasing nearly 300% over pre-war levels.

By mid-1920, however, as manufacturing output began to appraoch pre-war levels, the real and more lasting effects of the war began to be felt. The improverishment of a war-torn Europe imposed limits on effective

consumer demand. Margarine and soap sales fell and with them the price of groundnuts. The latter dropping to a mere £6 per ton by December of 1920.

This rapid boom and bust exposed two central weaknesses of the European merchant firms active in the Kano groundnut trade and paved the way for an important reconstitution of European merchants capital in Nigeria as a whole.

The first of these weaknesses was, the competitive nature of the trade. By 1917 there were several European firms trading in Kano and they competed ferociously. This competition is described by a Niger Company director in 1914.

> A most determined attitude was adopted by the firms established at Kano ––– to at once secure a strong and dominating position there. A common policy seems to have been adopted by each new comer, namely to struggle for a position at any cost. This being the case, it is probable that the (Niger) Company's trading in Kano Division during 1913 was conducted without profit. The whole trade now realise that the policy pursued last year in connection with the groundnut industry can only prove detrimental to the best interests of the country and also render it impossible for the product to command a first rate position among the crushers of Europe.

Attempts to overcome the weakness of competition, however, met with little success. Although 'pools' or price agreements were made between the firms in 1914 and 1916 both were broken by individiual firms, forcing the price of groundnuts higher. This fierce competition, especially in 1919, exposed the second major weakness of the firms. This was their reliance on long-term commercial credit which was in turn exacerbated by the speculative nature of the import-export trade.

From an examination of the records of the London and Kano Company, we learn that the time period between the purchase of groundnuts in Kano and their sale in Europe was often as great as a year. Similarly, we learn that it often took a year between the placement of orders for cotton cloth with the Lanchashire manufacturers and the sale of that cloth in Northern Nigeria.

These lengthy periods between purchase and sale meant that European merchants in Kano were heavily dependent on relatively long-term, commercial credit. This reliance on credit was risky. The firms had to gamble on an expected rise or fall in the markets for groundnuts and cloth.

For groundnuts, this risk could often be alleviated through the practice of "selling forward", or the sale of expected purchases at current European prices. In a rapidly rising market such as that of 1919, however, the benefits of "selling forward" were more than counter-balanced by the expected gains of shipping to Europe and then selling at the "spot" or current market price. The situation was much the same in the firms' purchase of cotton cloth, only in reverse.

In a rapidly rising market it was in the firms' interest to order large

amounts of cloth immediately before expected price increases. This speculative buying was greatly abetted by the competitive nature of the trade.

The full implication of the above practices manifested itself in the price collapse of late 1920. As a result of speculative buying the firms found themselves with large inventories of both high priced cotton cloth and groundnuts warehoused in Europe which could only be sold at below their original Kano purchase price. For the largest of the European merchant houses this situation proved fatal. The Niger Company, the pride of Goldie and the former employer of Lugard, succumbed. Its credit was stopped and the Elder-Dempster lines refused to ship its cargoes on account. Thus in 1920, the Niger Company was purchased by Lever Brothers, the soap and margarine manufacturer. Through similar processes of the concentration and centralisation of merchant capital Lever Brothers, and its successor Unilever, were to gain a commanding presence in the Nigerian economy and that of the world.

A Plan to the Archivists

The records of business, existant and defunct, have been allocated a low priority in the creation of Nigeria's Archives. Yet, as I think I have demonstrated, they are an invaluable source for the historian. I urge the archivists of Nigeria to search out and preserve these records. I refer here, not merely, to the records of European firms, and Banks, but to those of Nigerian businessmen as well. I also urge that historians help the archivists in this task by turning themselves toward a study of business history and by depositing their discoveries with the authorities. As so often is the case, the useless bill of lading, customs receipt or order book of the present may turn out to be a vital link in the reconstruction of the past.

BARA BY SOME ALMAJIRAI IN KANO CITY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

by

Isa A. Abba

Within the last three decades *bara,* begging for charitable alms, by some *almajirai* in Kano City has became one of the most serious social problems facing the Muslim society, the Kano Municipal Local Government, the Local Education Authority and the successive governments of Kano State.

Many attempts have been made to stop or at least to minimize the problem, but there has been little if any success so far.

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to find out and critically assess (a) the reasons why some parents, especially from the country side, place their children with itinerant *mallams* or Quranic teachers or send them to, say, Kano City in the name of search of Muslim education or scholarship; (b) exactly what this group of *almajirai* do apart from the supposed learning or studying; and finally (c) their economic and social effects.

However, before doing that a brief survey of the history of the development of Muslim education and a comparison between the Middle East, the Magrib or North Africa and what obtains in West Africa, especially Hausaland will be made.

The Qur'an revelations enjoined Muslims, among many other requirements, to observe the five daily prayers, fast the month of Ramadhan, give alms to the poor and the needy, and for those who can afford it perform the Holy Pilgrimage. The Qur'an and the Hadith deal on some important aspects in the normal life of Muslims. These include legislation on marriage, inheritance, eating and drinking habits, business transactions and responsibilities of an individual in the society.

It is therefore obvious that every Muslim has to learn or study the Qur'an and Hadith in order to perform the various obligations enjoined upon him, and, also to "Retain the revelations just as God had communicated them, to continue to understand them and to pass them on to new Muslims and new generations."[2]

During his life time, Prophet Muhammad started a system of formal education. He also made many references in his sayings and actions which

emphasized the importance of education in general and on educating the society especially the Muslim children.

As long as the Prophet lived, he was the judge, the teacher, the administrator and the interpreter of the revelations. In 632 A.D. the Prophet died. With his death, travel for learning by the Muslims can be said to have started, as it became necessary for the young Muslim community, the *Ummah,* to meet the *sahaba,* the companions of the Prophet, to hear directly from them the sayings, actions, approvals and disapprovals of Muhammad — the Messenger of God.

In addition as Shalaby emphasized, the "Muslims were very eager to (initially memorize and later to) collect the Prophet's Traditions, and the only way was to listen directly to the Companions who had the Hadith from the Prophet."[3]

"With the conquest of foreign realms (which started shortly after the death of the Prophet), the *Sahaba* and the scholars deserted the capital of the new community"[4] and established themselves in the recently conquered areas in order to spread and teach the Qur'an and Hadith. Such a development meant more travel for those who wished to learn or study.

Thus, during the first century of Islam (622-722 A.D.) a number of Muslim students and scholars travelled extensively within the Muslim Empire. For example some travelled from Mecca or Medina to Kufah to listed to Abd. Allah b, Mas'ud, some from Kufa or Syria to Mecca to listen to Abd. Allah b. Abbas.[5] Formal study of the Qur'an was also firmly established by the end of the first century of Islam.

During the second century, numerous centres of learning were established and scholars of varying ability, inclinations and thoughts emerged. This further encouraged travel by students.

"Within" the first three centuries A.H. (by the tenth century A.D.), four major subjects of higher study were developed to preserve the Qur'an and to derive clearer practical guidance from it. These subjects were Arabic language, *Tafsir* (explanation of the Qur'an), *Hadith,* and *figh* (jurisprudence)."[6]

According to Shalaby, "Travel, however, lost some of its significance from the fourth century A.H. or about 11th. century A.D. That was due to the practice of writing down the Traditions and allowing students to rely, in their study, upon written collections without meeting the traditionists"[7] And by the "Fifth century A.H. schools began to flourish in many parts of the Muslim World (especially in the Middle East) and to them the most learned of the time were invited, and so travels were directed mostly to the schools which were well-equipped and staffed."[8]

From the above brief one thing is clear, that although the ages of the students who travelled for learning was not indicated, it can be said with some measure of certainty, that it was not young children (say between the

ages of seven and nine) who formed the majority of these *almajirai*. And if the practice of roaming the strees and begging for alms in the name of scholarship was done during those early centuries, it could have been mentioned by the numerous works on Muslim education.

In the Middle East and to some extent in North Africa parents do not place their young children with itinerant *malams* or send them to urban centres to learn the Qur'an and live by begging. Students undertook long distance travels to other towns or centres of learning only when they were fairly matured and after they might have completed, at home, how to read and write the Qur'an. Thus, most of the travels were (and still are) for specialization.

It appears, however, the practice is different in West Africa especially in Hausaland. Children travel long distances to other areas especially urban centres at a very early age, say seven or eight years, to learn how to read and write the Qur'an or attend what the Hausa call '*makarantan allo*.'[9]

Islam was introduced in Hausaland before the 15th. century. It was said that the Wangarawa traders who came to Kano during the reign of the 11th. ruler of Kano, Yaji (1349-1385), played a leading role in the spread of Islam in Hausaland.

"By the 18th. century, great centres of Islamic learning were established in plces like Zaria, Kano, Katsina, Yandoto and Degel."[11] Another very important neighbouring region or area where great Islamic centres of learning equally flourished during that period was the Kanem/Borno Empire. "Borno area was famous for the great number of its reciters and readers of the Quran"[12] Sultan Muhammad Bello in *Infaq al-Maysur* testified to that by saying:" Indeed there are not to be found in these countries ordinary people more scrupulous than they in reciting the Qur'an and reading it and memorizing it and writing it out. And the ordinary people did not cease to be thus to the beginning of the jihad."[13] Thus during those centuries and even to this day many Muslim students from various parts of Hausaland who wished to specialized, say, memorizing the Qur'an or writing it out travelled to Borno.

From the various written sources available so far, it can be said that, most, if not all the students who travelled from one centre to the other in Hausaland or Borno either to acquire more knowledge or to communicate what they have learned to others were not young children of the ages of seven, eight or nine. In other words, they must have completed learning how to read and write Qur'an first with their parents or in their towns villages before they started to travel for specialization.

Looking at the biographies of almost all the Sokoto *jihad* leaders,[14] officials and scholars in Hausaland from the end of the 18th century to the end of the 19th. century, hardly any one of them was said to have learnt

how to read and write the Qur'an by following itinerant *mallams* or travelling to a distant town and engaging in *bara*, in the name of scholarship.

Some informants insist that some parents' practice of placing young children with itinerant *mallams* or sending them to distant towns where they live at the mercy of the society existed before this century. However, efforts to get information on how, when and there it started, have proved unsuccessful. But, as to why the practice, the following are their answers.

The questions were put to some parents in and around Kano city, Quranic teachers, the *almajirai* (both of the Quranic and *ilm* schools), officials of the local and state governments and some interested observers.

Their answers are largely similar and those parents argue and even insist that:

(a) *'Karatu sai da bakunta'*[15] which means, to learn or study effectively one has to leave his hometown or village and become a stranger. It may also mean one has to keep away from parental care, interferring relations and distracting friends.

(b) *'Karatu sai da karanchin abinci'*[16] meaning, learning could only be effective if coupled with less eating. It may also mean that one cannot seriously learn/study when contented or has more than enough to eat.

(c) by placing their children with itinerant Quranic teachers, or sending them to distant places like Kano, it instils the love for Islamic education in the minds of the children. The method also gives them a firm foundation in education. Therefore, once they grow up in it, the children would continue to search for higher education on their own and would never leave it!

(d) Some even insisted that without *bara*, the education received would not have *baraka*, blessing or usefulness:

Before assessing these arguments, let us go back and put forward some of the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad on education in general.

The Prophet was reported to have said:

"Obtaining knowledge will not be possible with bodily ease."[17]

and

"Whoever sets out seeking knowledge will be walking in the path of God until his return, and whoever dies while travelling for learning will be regarded as a martyr."[18]

Probably these Hadith encouraged some teachers or parents to subject children to all sorts of hardships, difficulties and indignities in the name of scholarship which the Prophet did not recommend. But, in the two Hadith cited above, neither is there the slightest suggestion that Quranic or Ilm school students have to beg for alms, nor is there the suggestion that children between seven and nine years old, should be placed with itinerant *mallams* in the name of Islam. In fact the Qur'an, the Prophet, the Sahaba and Muslim jurists consistently emphasized that it is obligatory on parents to look after and give their children (especially the young ones) proper parental upbringing.

Looking at the first argument (*karatu sai da bakunta*), it can be said that a child of seven, eight or nine years old in fact including even adolescents need completely the opposite. They need parental closeness, love, kindness, acceptance and respect of their communities. They should not be made to feel neglected if at all they are to grow up as normal human beings. These are basic human psychological facts known long before development of Western psychology.

It should also be noted that, quite a number of Muslim parents in many parts of the Northern states of Nigeria, including Kano City itself, had never placed their children with itinerant *mallams* or forced them to beg for alms and yet these children had grown up to become learned scholars.

Even where adults decide to pursue Islamic higher education there is no injunction or Hadith which says that they have to beg for alms.

The second argument (*Karatu sai da karancin abinci*) is also very weak, especially for the age group which this paper is particularly concerned with. It is an obvious fact that, normal children up to the age of puberty, grow very rapidly. Their bodies require more food than normal adults, and therefore to attempt to reduce their biological requirements would seriously affect their mental alertness, crucial for learning.

As for the third reason (developing a life long love of scholarship), it has been found out that a majority of the *almajirai* who came to Kano City for *makarantan allo* or scholarship, ended up taking other professions or occupations. In fact many informants agree that *almajiranci* is now adopted by many as a stepping stone to other occupations like trading. The *almajiranci* origin gives them easy acceptance in the eyes of the businessmen and the community.

The last argument (blessing from beginning), is just probably, aimed at justifying and institutionalizing begging. However many are known to have become learned Muslim scholars without ever begging for alms.

The above assessment clearly shows that, the apparent arguments of some Muslim parents, who allow their children to roam the streets of Kano or place them with itinerant *mallams* begging for alms in the name of almajiranci, are not acceptable. Then, how can we explain their actions. To do that, we have to examine what their children do in Kano City apart from the supposed learning or studying.

But, first, it has been observed that Kano City has the largest number of *almajirai* in the Northern states of Nigeria, probably followed by Maiduguri in Borno State. The following are probably some of the reasons, apart from the fact that, Kano has the largest population in the Western Sudan, the most important commercial centre in the region and the pre-eminent city in Hausalnd for legal study (e.g. the Madabo Centre).[19] Many of the *mallams* prefer the city, because of the patronage, especially monetary support or

payments, for the religious services they offer to the businessmen and women.

It can be said that today, Islam and Islamic education, have taken a firm root in Hausaland and therefore, Quranic teachers could be found in every Muslim community, however small. The important question to ask at this point is, why the preference of Kano City, since as mentioned earlier, the rural areas could have been the best places for concentration for students who wish to pursue Islamic scholarship seriously? This is because the city, especially Kano, is full of entertainments and trading activities which could distract the attention of the youth.

The answers of many *almajirai*, especially those between the ages of seven to twelve, *Gardawa* (adult *almarijai* still learning to read, write and recite the Qur'an) and some of their teachers, tend to confirm the views of many keen observers that, most of the *almajirai* who roam the streets begging for alms are on *'cin rani'* – dry season migration – under the cover of Islamic scholarship. There are of course some few among them who were handed over to some *mallams* by their parents for life, or until, it was hoped, they would have finished learning the Qur'an. Such students spend the wet season on the farm of their teacher.

The following are some samples of their answers rendered in English:–
(a) Many of us prefer to come to Kano City to learn/study more than to any other town in the Northern States because it is easy to get some unskilled jobs to do, *sadaka* – charitable alms, clothing and where to put up.
(b) I left my home town because work on the farm was too much for me, so I came to Kano as an *almajirai* to do some work in order to earn some money with which to pay some people to do the work on our farm and also maintain my family.[21] This informant continued by saying that he competed with another man over a girl whom they both wanted to marry but lost to his rival because he is poor. Therefore he decided to come to Kano for *'neman ilmi da abin hannu'*–scholarship and money.
(c) I left my home town for Kano City to learn the Qur'an for three reasons: I did not want to be distracted by friends; I hate farming; and I wanted to escape early marriage.[22]

The contention that many of the *almajirai* in Kano City are on dry season migration can be further strengthened by the fact that a large number of them return to their parents in the country side during the wet season to help on the farms, despite the fact that it is the most suitable time for studying or learning in that area of Nigeria.

The parents of such children or *almajirai* get a number of benefits by sending their children away during the dry season to other towns or villages in the name of education. "it reduces the family grain consumption . . thus, the strain on a peasant family."[23] Their children also return at the beginning of the wet season with some money, clothing and a number of valuable

items which may appear to be more valuable or crucial to these parents than proper parental upbringing of their children not to talk of the social consequences of exposing these young children to urban centres, like Kano City.

Some people may argue that, to the poor, what to eat is more crucial than the proper upbring of their children. But, it has to be pointed out that, there are thousands of Muslim parents in the Northern States of Nigeria who were or are *very poor*, yet would *never* allow their children to roam the streets begging for alms in the name of Islamic or any education for that matter. They would rather toil even to death to provide for their children.

Taken as a whole, the statements of the informants above on why they prefer Kano City contradicts the arguments given earlier on as to why they left their towns or why some parents placed their children with itinerant *mallams* for Quranic education.

If the intention was for serious Islamic education or scholarship, then, following the normal and at least acceptable way of doing it could have been better.

Discussing the Muslim students in Kano City by the end of the 19th century Chamberlin said" . . At the turn of the century students who wanted to pursue Qur'an study seriously usually left Kano City for eastern Kano Emirates, Damagaram Hadejia or Borno. They would spend their time in these rural areas, living frugally, often in cornstalk huts, concentrating all their energies on the Qur'an. The city it was felt was too full of distraction of friends, of entertainments, and the attraction of trading." And, "most students who left the city were not children. They were advanced students completing a full reading of the Qur'an and moving on to memorization"[24]

When placing their young children with itinerant *mallams*, the parents in most cases don't give them anything to live on. The children are therefore left to the Muslim society or the society in general to look after them. Thus, most of them spend a greater part of their valuable time trying to get what to eat, what to wear and what to save for their teachers but more so for themselves and their unconcerned parents.

Thursdays and Fridays are free days for the *almajirai*. They could be seen all over the city and environs playing or begging for alms from house to house, at the traffic lights, houses or offices and other strategic places like the markets. They also engage in all sorts of menial jobs in return for a token reward. Normally they do the jobs without first agreeing on how much they could be paid. Some serve as temporary house boys. Others could be found at markets, motor parks, the railway station and so on, offering their cheap labour as porters for whatever the temporary employer could offer.

Voices of young children calling *Ina dako?* could be heared especially in the Sabon Gari market. For example, some could be seen at the main gate of Bayero University, Kano, serving as porters for leaving or returning students.

A number of them are engaged as temporary hawkers of petty goods.[25] Most of the *almajirai,* especially those from the ages of 12 or 14, engage as part time weavers of various types of traditional Hausa/Kanuri caps like the *kube* or *Zanna* Bukar. Some serve as "security guards" for owners of bicycles motor cycles and vehicles who park them at the markets, shops, cinema houses, mosques, etc., in return for some payment.

According to some informants, maybe because of the present rush for wealth which has gripped the country, most of the *almajirai* being part of the society, tend to show less attention to their studies and devote more time to those things that could bring money quick and easily.

Thus, the *almajirai* who some twenty or thirty years ago could hardly be seen on the streets during the hours of learning or study (6 or 7 a.m. to 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. to 4 p.m.) are today almost permanently on the streets. The time between 10-2 p.m. which is supposed to be a period for writing new verses on their slates after having memorized or understood the earlier ones adequately, is now mostly used for roaming the streets begging or in search of one thing or another, in entertainment places or demonstrating some deviant behaviours.

More importantly however, most of the *almajirai,* may be because of the various attractions of the city life, end up abandoning their studies for various occupations. Many of the factory workers in Kano City whom Lubeck interviewed had come to Kano originally for Quranic education[26] although only a very negligible number continue with their scholarship or go back to their villages as *mallams.*

Economic and social effects

By engaging in menial jobs for their subsistence in Kano City, the *almajirai* especially the younger ones provide very cheap labour, especially when in many cases they receive without any objection whatever is given to them in return for the services they render.

The fairly elderly ones contribute to the large scale production of the traditional embroidered caps, espcially the *kube.* It is therefore not surprising to find that of every ten men in the city, eight or nine of them could be seen wearing the locally made caps, especially *kube.* In fact a number of the *almajirai* end up abandoning scholarship, taking the making of the caps as a profession. Many of them could be found making the caps especially in the afternoon and evening around public lights or private and public buildings.

The availability of cheap labour results, to some extent, in adult unemployment. Occasional scuffles have been observed at various public places like markets and cinema houses, between some *almajirai* and non-*almajirai* adults over who among them should look after a parked vehicle. Generally, it could be argued that the *almajirai,*apart from say the influx of foreigners from the neighbouring African states, contributed and still contribute sub-

stantially to the relatively cheap labour in Kano City. For example, since many of them are floating labourers, they are ready to accept, at the initial stage, anything offered to them by the various factories as the starting minimum wage.

Their presence, or role, probably explains why many families do not engage full time house boys especially in the city. Some landlords also use them as unofficial 'security guards' for their newly completed or uncompleted buildings in the name of providing them with accommodation or some just accommodate them in the *zaure* – the entrance room to a house.

Socially, the problems of the *almajirai* are more serious and disturbing. Many observers are of the view that *almajirai* (the term today is almost synonomous with beggars) are products of 20th. century economic conditions like poverty and breakdown of family ties.

The social effects on the young *almajirai* have been aptly described by Alhaji Sheikh Ahmed Lemu, the Grand Qadi of Niger State, when he seized the occasion of the launching ceremony of a half-a-million Naira appeal fund for the building of the Jama'atu Nasril Islam College of Arabic Studies and the opening of a Secretariat in Zaria to say:—

> "By begging at early childhood, the child loses his dignity from the very start of his life, making him to develop a dependent mentality which inevitably kills his intelligence and all capacities of initiative."[29]

A number of observations could be made from the above well chosen words, but for the sake of brevity the following may be enough. It is not surprising to find that many adults who were subjected to this disgraceful practice during childhood have less respect for human dignity, they were those that are easily recruited for thuggery by people with strong persuasions or personalities like Maitatsine – Muhammadu 'Marwa'. They could not easily see the consequences of what they were asked to do, even though it may be obvious to any normal human being. They also form the majority of adult idlers who, even at times, tend to insist that they have to feed fat on the society without making any positive contribution. Or when they take up an occupation, it is in most cases the easiest, trivial, or unimaginative one like *yankan farce,* fingernail cutting, looking after bicycles, vehicles, at public places, as a life occupation.

It is however, important to mention here that, there have been some few exceptions. There are some among those *almajirai* who came to Kano City and were known to have roamed the streets begging and later took to trading and are now successful business men.[30]

Those *almajirai* who go from place to place collecting left-over foods are exposed to many health hazards thus adding more problems for the health services of the city

In many cases they eat food left by various people, some, no doubt, with communicable diseases, like tuberculosis, diarrhoea or dysentry. The pro-

blem could further worsen during epidemics and the resultant consequences are obvious.

Conclusion

Muslims have to learn or study the Qur'an and Hadith in order to perform the various obligations enjoined on them, and also to retain the revelations just as Allah communicated them through Prophet Mohammad, to understand them and to pass them on to new Muslims and new generations. But this does not mean that it has to be done through the practice of abandoning young children to roam the streets begging for alms.

Neither the Qur'an nor the Hadith indicated that the practice is acceptable in Islam and in fact that the two sources are very clear on the responsibilities of parents to their children more especially the under-aged. They should show love and good parental upbringing and education that is necessary for adult life.

The system of placing children from the ages of seven or eight by some parents with wandering Quranic teachers and roaming about the streets begging for charitable alms in the name of Islamic scholarship appears to be mostly practised only in West Africa, more especially in Hausland.

The arguments by the parents of some children that, for a child to learn or study seriously he must be exposed to all sorts of difficulties and indignities do not agree with the Islamic way of child upbringing nor with simple psychology of child's education. And above all, the scholars of Hausaland during the 18th or 19th century learnt how to read and write the Qur'an first with or near their parents and did not roam the streets or wander from one village to another, begging for alms, in the name of Islamic education.

From the answers of the various *almajirai* and *mallams* inolved in this practice, it is apprent that a majority of the parents send their children to, say, Kano City not so much for scholarship but for *cin rani*, even though such a view has been flatly rejected by them during the interviews. The economic and social effects of the presence of *almajirai* are many, such as the cheapening of unskilled labour, the large scale production of locally hand made caps like the *kube*, an increase in the health problems of the city and an increase in crime and other deviant behaviours.

Lastly, it's important to ask, have *almajirai* increased or are they on the increase in Kano City within say the last twenty years? Were there efforts made to stop or minimize the practice?

The continued spread of Western education has been one of the silent gradual, but, sure means of phasing out the practice.

Chamberlin indicated that "Virtually all informants (interviewed in Kano City) agreed that Western Education has reduced the number of students."[31]

However, it should be pointed out that the introduction of the Islamiyya Primary School System in the Northern States of Nigeria since the 1950's has also contributed tremendously in reducing the number of the *almajirai*.

It is very easy to say that Western education has reduced the number of *almajirai* in general, but other contributary factors must also be taken into consideration. These include the fact that the economic conditions of some people in the country side, have improved since independence, as a result of, the creation of states, local governments, the oil money, the establishment of more industries, the construction industry and so on. Therefore, there is less tendency by some poor parents to drive their children away in order to save grain consumption since they could now afford to provide for them.

However, the arguments by others who took a contrary view seems to be stronger. That these developments in fact worsen the situation and contributed to the increase in the number of *almajirai*.

That oil money has certainly meant that, there is lots of loose money in the cities and that a small boy can contribute more to his family's support by selling junk (e.g. soft drinks, plastic balls, plastic bags in the markets, car seats, etc.) at street corners than, by living in the country producing food and other useful things.[32] The construction industry no doubt produced some pushy and corrupt illiterates who have gone to the city and dealt in cement and rice and such things and thereby have become very wealthy while the "fools" who remain in the village doing useful things like studying and growing food remain poor. Hence, poverty has increased not diminished. And, that the building of senior staff houses in a little village for the local government official will create tensions which had never existed before – before everyone lived in mud houses with thatched roofs, but now *some* live in large cement houses with asbestos roofs and electricity and plumbing and have cars. Obviously the farmer in his mud house is relatively worse off than before, and he too would be encouraged to go to the city to try his luck or send his son to go and get his 'share of the national cake."[33]

An attempt to stop the practice of *bara* by *almajirai* was started as far back as 1959 when the then Kano Native Authority warned parents against allowing or 'abandoning' their children to roam the streets begging in the name of scholarship. And, Quranic teachers were warned not to collect children from their parents, for the purpose of taking them to other towns for learning the Qur'an, without the approval of the village or District Head.[34] However the warning yielded very little result and in fact, some *malams* started a campaign against the local or traditional authorities. They were accused of trying to undermine Islam at various preaching centres in Kano.

A number of efforts have repeatedly been made since then, including some by the military governments but all to no effect. One of the ways some of the military governments in the Northern States thought they could stop

the practice was through the Universal Primary Education launched in September 1976. On the eve of the launching of the U.P.E., the Kano Municipal Local Government, with the support of the state government, started sending the *almajirai*, especially the young ones. back to their parents or towns and villages.

There were quick reactions from certain *mallams* and even scholars. During a certain *Juma'at* prayer one malam took to the loud-speaker at the Kano Central Mosque and said that there was a new serious threat to Islam and the study of the Qur'an. And he specifically said the campaign to return Quranic pupils to their towns and villages was aimed at wiping out the Quran reciters.[35] He therefore called on the Muslims to rise against it.

According to some informants at the Islamic Education Centre, the present Kano State Government also got itself involved not only on the whole attempt to stop begging by both the young and the old but the practice of some *mallams* wandering from town to town with some Muslim children for learning.

At a meeting attended by a number of *mallams,* it was decided that in future, any parent who wished to place his child with a wandering *mallam* or send him to another town, or Kano City, should provide what the child **would need to maintain himself. The question to be asked: will it work?**

MODERN KANO STATE AND HER NEIGHBOURS



It appears from the attempts so far made, *bara* by some *almajirai* (not almajiranci itself) in the name of pursuing Islamic education is a serious problem facing the Muslim society in Kano and the Northern States of Nigeria in general.

FOOTNOTES

1. Almajirai (pl.) *almajiri* (s) is a Hausa word for pupil (s)/student (s) borrowed from the Arabic word *Al-muhajirun* "the emigrants". The word came into popular usage by Muslims to mean the followers of Prophet Muhammed who migrated with him from Mecca to Medina in 622 A.D. The act is referred to as *Hijdra* – Latinized as *Hegira.*

   The first stem of the verb, *hadjara,* means "to cut someone off from friendly association" See Lewis, B. Ch. Pellat and J. Schact (editors) *The Encyclopaedia of Islam,* New Edition, Vol. III, pp. 366-7; and Hughes, T.P., *Dictionary of Islam,* Lahore, p.174.

   Among the Hausa, the word also means those who left their towns, villages, or parents, relations and friends for the sake of learning or in search of scholarship. In some contexts today, the word is synonomous with a beggar or destitute. For example, the *New Nigerian* newspaper on its front page, Saturday, 11 July 1981, said, "The State House of Assembly (in Kano City) has become a playground for destitute children – *Almajirai.*" In fact when indicating my intention to write on the topic to some academic staff of Bayero University, Kano, their first reaction was "so you are going to write on beggars!"
2. Chamberlin, J.W. *The Development of Islamic Education in Kano City, Nigeria, with emphasis on Legal Education in the 19th.* and 20th. centuries; Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1975, p.9.
3. Shalaby, A. History of Muslim Education, Beirut, 1954, p.182.
4. *Ibid.* p. 182
5. for details see *ibid.* p.192
6. Chamberlin, op. city. p.14.
7. Shalaby, *op. cit.*, p.185.
8. Ibid., p.185.
9. My thanks to Dr. A.A. Hamid of the Department of Islamic Studies, Bayero University, Kano, for drawing my attention to this contrast.
10. See Al-Hajj, M.A., "A Seventeenth Century Chronicle on the Origins and Missionary Activities of the Wangarawa", *Kano Studies,* Vol. I No. 4, 1968, p.8 and Khani, A.H. Literary Activity in *Hausaland in the Late 18th. and early 19th Centuries with Special Reference to Shaykh Uthman b Fudi, died 1817.*

    M.A. Thesis, Library Science, A.B.U., 1975, p.31.
11. Kani, *ibid.* p.27
12. Kani, *ibid,* p.18
13. *Ibid.* p. 18. Quoted from *Infaq al-Maysur* by Muahmmad Bello cited by J.E. Lavers in "Islam in Borno Caliphate", *Odu,* A journal of West African Studies, New Series, No. 5, April 1971, p.29. However, Arnett, E.J. The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani (being a paraphrase and in some parts a translation of the Infakul Maisuri of Sultan Mohammed Bello) p.8, state about Borno that "There are not to be found in our towns students and writers of the Koran equal to theirs. It is stated that they remained steadfast up to the time that our jihad began . . . . . "
14. See, for example, Last, M. *The Sokoto Caliphate,* Longmans, 1967, Ch.I; Sa'ad, A. "The Scholastic Community of Yola. Adamawa", a paper presented at a Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Seminar at ABU, 1974. "The Biographies of a Number of Scholars in Fombina (Adamawa)" in Abba, I.A., *Islam in Adamawa in the 19th and 20th Centuries,* M.A. Thesis, A.B.U., 1976. etc.

15. Informants interviewed June/July 1981 in Gwale, Bompai, Kofar Na'Isa, Kwana Dan Gora, Kura, Garko, etc. See also Lubeck P. "Contrast and Continuity in a Dependent City: Kano Nigeria", in Abu-Lughod, J. and Hay, C., editors, *Third World Urbanization*, Chicago Ma'aroufa Press, 1977, p.286.
16. Malam Umaru Abubakar Alaramma and others, August 1981.
17. Sahalaby *op.cit.*, p.181.
18. *Ibid.*, p.181
19. Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
20. Interview with Mal. Ahmadu Rufa'i, June 1981, at Gwale Quarters, and was supported by many informants.
21. Interview with Malam Aminu Gardin, Malam Kofar Naisa, August 1981, age 25.
22. Salisu Danbatta, about the age of 19, Kofar Dan Agundi, August 1981.
23. See Lubeck, *op. cit.*, p.286.
24. Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, p.136
25. A number of such were interviewed. I met one Usman who hailed from Shinkafi in Sokoto State hawking yams in March 1981. He first travelled to Maiduguri to learn the Quran and then decided to come to Kano where he could get a job easily and study.
26. Lubeck, *op. cit.*, p.286.
27. See *New Nigerian*, Editorial, Wednesday, 12 August 1981.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *The New Nigerian*, Monday 10th August 1981, front page.
30. Because most of them are living, the informants in Gwale, Kofar Naisa, Bompai and near the Kano Central Mosque insisted that their names should not be mentioned.
31. Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, p.80.
32. Comments by Dr. Philip Shea, Dept. of History, Bayero University, Kano.
33. *Ibid.*
34. Informants at the Islamic Educational Centre, Shahuci, July, 1981.
35. Alhaji Aliyu Ibrahim Danbatta and some informants at the Islamic Education Centre, including Alhaji Barau Danbatta, July/August 1981.

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Paden, J. M., The Influence of Religious Elites on Political Culture and Community Integration in Kano Nigeria; Ph.D. Thesis. Harvard Umu. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Feb., 1968 Vol. 1-5.

A KANO ANOMALY: A TERRACOTTA FIGURINE

by
Murray Last

The earthenware figure, 17¼inches high was "dug up at one of the gates of Kano in the course of railway construction" – but at what date is not yet known. The figure was given by a Mr. Tucker to the Newbury Borough Musuem (in England), and a note about it was published in the journal *Man*, item 87, in 1929 by H.J.E. Peake and H.J. Brauncholtz (of the British Museum). The figure was then sold in 1947 to the British Museum; it had presumably been damaged during the war, as it was re-constructed by the British Museum's technician, L.R. Langton. The Museum of Mankind (as the Ethnographic Department of the British Musuem is now called) have kindly supplied both the photograph and the later information about the figure; I am particularly grateful to Dr. Nigel Barley for his assistance.

It was suggested by Peake and Braucholtz that the figure was Ankwe (Plateau State) origin. William Fagg (of the British Museum) subsequently attributed it to the work of Azume, an Ankwe/Goemai women potter who died about 1951. The assumption that the figure was made in the 20th century is based on its similarity to the figure whose photograph was published by C.K. Meek in The Northern Tribes of Nigeria, volume 2, fig. 98 facing page 26. But the 20th century date is not *a priori* immediately convincing – at least until further evidence is available.

There is no firm indication either where or when the figure was dug up. If the phrase "in the course of railway construction" means the original period of a railway building ca.1910 when the railway station was on the site of the present Government Secondary School, then the gate in question might be either Kofar Nassarawa or Kofar Dan Agundi (the Kofar Middle or Sabuwar Kofa was not cut until the 1930's). If however the 'railway construction referred to was the building of a spur line along the eastern wall of Kano City, then the gate must be either the Kofar Mazugal or the new gate, cut in the 1920's (?), called the Kofar Jakara. Whichever the gate, there is the mystery of how such a figure of 'an Ankwe household deity' came to the buried beneath or near a gate of Kano city. One hypothesis is that it was

deliberately buried there to protect Kano from attacks such as had been launched in the 18th century by the Kwararafa or in the 19th century by the Ningawa. The burial site at a *gate* would suggest this. For it is surely unlikely that an Ankwe trader or slave, for example, who simply wanted for some reason to hide the figure, would bury it at a gate. Similarly the fact that the figure was not broken implies it was deliberately buried intact, and not thrown away as rubbish or as an idol fit to be destroyed. Furthermore, being made of pottery and not, for example, wood, the figure would not deteriorate when buried, and thus could possibly be much older than the 20th century dated suggested by the British Museum. It is hoped that further enquiries will eventually shed more light on its origin.

Kano Terracotta Figurine

APPENDIX I

ADDRESS BY THE GUEST SPEAKER ALHAJI SA'IDU M. GWARZO HEAD OF SERVICE, KANO STATE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE HISTORY OF KANO, BAYERO UNIVERSITY, KANO ON 7TH SEPTEMBER 1981

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice-Chancellor, Distinguished Guests, Distiguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am inclined to consider it a foolhardy act for a lay man to accept an invitation such as that you kindly extended to me to be one of the speakers on this momentous occasion. Consequently, as I stand to address you I hope you will bear with me and excuse my little and rusty knowledge of the value of history in a contemporary Nigeria which I have chosen to make my theme. If my choice proves to be unwise – for this is a subject that may have been discussed ad nauseum considering the dwindling numbers of history graduates applying for administrative posts over the last three years in the civil service of this state – I should hope that my humble contribution will be yet another voice advocating the need for a bettter place for the study and teaching of history in our institutions. Before I go further, I would like to welcome you all to Kano. I conclude from the papers that will be presented that you are going to spend the next few days in the Kano that is behind us as well as that of today. I would like to congratulate the Bayero University for focusing its attention this time on Kano. I dare say the choice of Kano as the subject of this year's deliberations is significant for many reasons. Some of them are so obvious and so well known that it is worth my while to skip them and avoid boring you, repeating what is part of you as historians. Certain recent events, however, seem to me to justify, if any justification is required; the choice of Kano for your conference. First and foremost, one might like to find the causes of the "ballot-box" revolution, if you permit me to use the term, during the first democratic elections in Nigeria since 1964. Secondly, the cause of the tragedy known as the Maitatsine Religious Disturbances of last December may be found in the religious past of Kano. If the causes of that calamity are not important, the effects or results, one of which disrupted economic and social life of a bustling city like Kano and the famous terminus of the trans-Saharan caravans, should excite the historian. Another of the recent events is the mob action that occurred on the 10th July 1981 officially

christened "the July 10th Rampage" during which public property was wantonly destroyed, contrary to previous similar mob reactions to certain given situations and circumstances.

If you find these events too recent to attract your attention, or they are polemical, gruesome, the decline in some industries which made Kano famous, or the disappearance of the donkey and other beasts of burden, may do so. While Kano may lack monuments or artifacts, such as the Ife and Benin bronzes, largely for religious reasons, I venture to suggest that its social and economic past provides a fund of information and an inspiration to the present generation, as the papers listed for presentation during the conference demonstrate and obviate the necessity of suggesting topics for study for the current conference can consequently turn to my theme.

I must confess that I do not study enrolments into our secondary and tertiary institutions, or the break down of their graduates, even if these are published in a handy form. I am inclined, however, to assume that those who enrol in history courses are on the decrease in actual numbers and in proportion to new and softer disciplines which I shall omit to specify. I am sure you are concerned about this and you are doing your very best to arrest the situation, convinced as you are of the values of your discipline. I do not pretend that the task is easy. As you are well aware, most countries of the third world are anxious to become industrialized. In Nigeria universities of technology have been established towards the attainment of this goal. Some people less satisfied with this go further clamouring that Nigeria has the resources to join the nuclear club: It is obvious that it will be a Herculian task to expect that disciplines such as history will have a place in the scheme of things. However, a forum such as this should bring the developing nations back to sanity and reality. We should not be diffident to recommend or demand the establishment of universities of history, convinced as we are of the usefulness of history. If we do not push the study of history we shall be doing the developing nations great disservice (or harm) – for various reasons.

Looking at the nature and composition of the developing nations suggests that in addition to the basic needs, they also need to be guided towards self-realization. Having been given responsibility to manage their affairs, I feel that the developing nations need to know who and what they are, in the first instance. They must, if they are to develop in an orderly manner, inquire into their past which has been obliterated by colonial subjugation. To build on the colonial legacy is a fallacy. This has been shown in nearly every African of solving the immediate post-independence problems may have averted the *coup d'etat* that occurred in many an African country. One wonders whether the types of regimes that emerged after the coup are in fact what the colonial masters should have left behind. I am amazed that when Nigeria sought a constitution to replace that bequeathed to it by the

British, the constitution makers failed to look back to the various systems of administration in pre-colonial Nigeria. I should have thought that a study of the systems of administration under which such empires as the Kanem, Oyo and Sokoto Caliphate rose flourished and fell, might provide a basis for a constitution that would be more suitable for a Nigeria that experimented with a western system with disastrous results, if one were to make a judgement on the matter. Next to self-realization which history may enable the developing nations to acheive, is appreciation in my view. I humbly suggest that appreciation could come only as a result of inquiries into origins, to wit the study of history. I wonder how many telephone users stopped for one moment to ponder over how many hours of experiment it took Graham Bell to produce the first practical telephone. Similarly, extremely few television viewers may have heard of J.L. Baird or may have known that it took the latter and the British Broadcasting Corporation nine years, from 1926, the year of Baird's practical demonstration of television, to produce the first high definition television service. Today we take so much for granted because we do not bother to learn the story of beginnings of things, events, etc. Unless we do so, we shall not appreciate what we have or the human effort put and sometimes the lives lost, in the process of development. I intend to stop at the two examples of the value of the study of history just given. I have chosen self realization and appreciation to focus attention on the responsibility of historians in controlling and directing development efforts of emerging nations. True, the latter have wrested independence from their respective, imperial masters but the process of de-colonization where it has started, has been slow and superficial. It is common knowledge that most developing countries refer major issues affecting them to the erstwhile colonial power and many vital decisions of the developing nations' are taken in the metropolis of the former colonial powers. This phenomenon, so some scholars assert, is why the ECOWAS, for instance has not yet made the impact its founders had aspired to. Ladies and gentlemen, I feel that I have filled in the time and space permitted me in the care for the conference. I believe I have, in the course of my address, bored you and confused you. In that wise, I have accomplished my task for that is what is expected of a guest speaker. I might also have made statements and assertions that may irritate or infuriate some. If there is anything that I say which will contribute to the development of historical research and teaching, I say *Alhamdu Lillahi*. I am convinced that the study of history has tremendous value. The study requires the same application as any discipline. It compares in the search for the truth with science. The study of history requires the logic of algebra and the imagination necessary in geometry. In terms of analytical approach, it has no second. Writers of history, in my opinion, produce the best prose. It is in the light of all this that I call for a "renaissance" in the study of history in our educational institutions. On this note, ladies

and gentlemen, I wish you a successful conference. I look forward eagerly to reading your deliberations which I understand will be published in due course. I am sure they will serve as an incentive to me to study the history of my state and town which I have regrettably not done. In our days we learnt about Hannibal rather than Kanta; about the Wars of the Roses in lieu of Basasa. Waterloo meant more to us than Gindin Giginya. Reformation replaced the Jihad as a topic for our study. You can go on endlessly. In retrospect I should say I should have no regrets for accepting your kind invitation for which I thank you once more.

APPENDIX II

SEMINAR PARTICIPANTS

	Name	Address
1.	Alhaji Lawan Tukur	*British Council, Kano*
2.	Fidelis E. Idoko	*Bayero University, Kano*
3.	M.I. Mukhtar	*Bayero University, Kano*
4.	Mai Sudan I. Mukhtar	*A.B.U., Zaria*
5.	Tijjani M. Naniya	*Bayero University, Kano*
6.	Gwennette Mlean	*Kano*
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