The Transformation of KATSINA

1400—1883

Yusufu Bala

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The area now known as the Savannah and Sahel regions extending to Nigeria and the Republic of Niger was a scene of much political and economic transition between 1400 and 1883. To this region belonged the part of the West African Sudan which has come to be known as 'Katsina' and located in Kaduna State of Nigeria, the most powerful and populous concentration of black population in the world.

What sort of historical processes actually took place in this region during this epoch? Were these processes based on ethnic, tribal and racial considerations, or were they a product of other factors?

In his **The transformation of Katsina,** Dr. Yusuf Bala Usman, using materials gathered from both oral and widely scattered documented sources, attempts a reconstruction of these processes and presents a new insight into what transpired in this region within the period under review.

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KATSINA

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THE TRANSFORMATION OF KATSINA: (1400—1883)

The Emergence and Overthrow of the *Sarauta* System and the Establishment of the Emirate

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This study emerged from research undertaken for a thesis, completed in 1974, for a Ph.D. degree of Ahmadu Bello University, titled, 'The Transformation of Katsina: c.1400—1883. The Overthrow of the Sarauta System and the Establishment and Evolution of the Emirate'. The research was only possible because of the cooperation of many people in Nigeria and Niger Republic from whom I collected oral traditions and discussed various aspects of the history of Katsina and the Sudan. The names of some of them are listed on the abbreviation pages 224—227. I am deeply grateful to all of them for their assistance, kindness and often generous hospitality. Among those not listed are the Emir of Katsina, Alhaji Usman Nagogo; the Wazirin Sokoto, Alhaji Junaidu; the former Nigerian Ambassador to Niger, Alhaji Sani Kontagora; M. Boubo Hama; M. Dioulde Laye; and the late Issaka dan Kousso of the Niger Republic.

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Preface

This study is concerned with the nature of the historical process which over a period of five hundred years, (c.1400—1883), produced the successive political systems to which the inhabitants of an area of the West African Sudan which has come to be known as 'Katsina' belonged. This area is now a part of the Savannah and Sahel regions of Nigeria and the Republic of Niger.

The study was conducted primarily to discover whether this process was essentially composed of the movements and conflicts of racial, tribal and ethnic units and groups and their armies. For this is the conventional and still widely-held view of the historical development of the people of the area, and indeed of the whole of the African continent. It is doubts about this view and concern about its contemporary political significance which led to this study.

These doubts arose in the first place over the theoretical issue of what meaningful categories and terms are to be used in the definitions of the substantive units of this historical process. Or, more concretely, the issue of the actual meaning at particular historical moments and in particular historical contexts, of categories and terms like 'Hausa', 'Fulani', 'Bare-bare', 'Nupe', 'Katsinawa', 'Sakkwatawa', 'al-Barnawi', 'al-Sudani' and many others. And secondly, because of the way the conventional view is contradicted in many respects by the primary, especially internal, sources of the history of the area.

As it turns out, the study is incomplete in some important respects. Although in the course of field and archival research about 150 villages, towns and cities were visited, over 200 interviews conducted, and a dozen manuscripts recovered, there are clear indications that these have not plumbed the depth of the rich source material at present available in both Nigerian and Nigerienne Katsina and neighbouring areas. Much more exhaustive and comprehensive research would have been desirable in Katsina and in neighbouring areas like Daura, Damagaram, Abzin, Zamfara, Zazzau and Kano; and especially among communities claiming a Katsina origin in the middle Benue, middle Niger and the Volta regions. Documents of various kinds from letters to ledgers and scholarly works should have been sought in the libraries and archives of Western and Northern Africa, the Hejaz, Turkey, and among the bibliothetic loot in the public and private collections of Britain and France and other countries of Europe. There should also have been a much more intensive interpretation of the source material from a broader base of reading of the secondary works on similar historical processes in Africa and elsewhere.

These limitations notwithstanding, the study indicates that the conventional view is not supported by evidence in the primary, especially the internal, sources of the history of the area. The significant features of this historical process were not the movements and conflicts of races and tribes and their armies, but the changes in the nature and configuration of productive occupations, in the composition of settlements, in the structure of lineages, and the changes in beliefs and the associated political ideology. The study reveals how changes in these were the key factors which brought about significant transformations. For example, the collapse of the political system of corporate and autonomous *garuruwa* (towns) and *birane* (cities), and out of this the emergence of the Katsina *Sarauta* system in the fifteenth century; and also the overthrow of this *Sarauta* system and its replacement by the emirate system, and the incorporation of Katsina into a large polity at the beginning of the nineteenth century, which this latter transformation involved.

If this study succeeds only in raising doubts in the minds of the reader regarding the conventional view of the historical process of the formation, overthrow, collapse and transformation of political systems in Africa, and encourages the critical review now going on, it will have achieved its purpose.

1 *The emergence of the Sarauta System: c.1400—1684*

The evidence for reconstructing the history of Katsina before the Jihad has been largely preserved in the form of oral traditions, some of which were recently recorded, numerous kinglists and various accounts of the history of neighbouring areas.[1] It is possible to reconstruct from these a fairly coherent picture of the kingdom's history. We can certainly discern some important themes in the political evolution of the communities of the area, like the changes in the nature and scope of political authority, the political role of Islam and the growth of interdependence between Katsina and its neighbours.

The termination of this chapter at the end of the reign of the Sarkin Katsina Muhammadu Jan Hazo in 1684 is not because the period before is seen as constituting a distinct historical epoch in the kingdom's history, but is mainly for convenience of exposition. However, it should be noted that in several ways the period 1641—84 saw both the culmination and the beginning of some important developments. The reign of Muhammadu Uban Yara (1641—71), followed by that of his son Muhammadu Jan Hazo (1671—84), afforded these four decades a certain unity, suggesting that a measure of dynastic stability had been attained. Other important developments in this period of about half a century, involved Katsina's relations with Kano, Zamfara and the Kwararrafa and the growth in the influence of the *ulama* (intelligentsia). The real significance of all these developments is better appreciated when the historical process that produced them is traced back to the ancient centres that existed in the area from the early part of the second millenium A.D.

THE ANCIENT CENTRES

(1) *Durbi-ta-Kusheyi.*

The earliest period of Katsina's history is seen in the traditions as an

1. See discussion of sources and of chronology.

epoch of giant hunters sometimes termed 'Adawa'.[2] These people are associated with certain sites situated within a radius of about 30 kilometres from the Birnin Katsina. The better known of these are the earthen mounds of Durbi-ta-kusheyi and those near the town of Bugaje. Similar traditions of ancient races of giants occur for Zazzau, Zamfara, Kano and parts of Borno.[3] Such legends are found in the historical mythology of peoples in many other parts of the world.

There is a belief in Katsina that the earthen mounds found at Durbi-ta-kusheyi, and in a degraded form near Bugaje and Muduru, were tombs belonging to this epoch. In the absence of any systematic archaeological investigation it is not possible to establish whether these earthen structures really are burial mounds and if they were what type of culture and what epoch produced them. When we examine the traditions closely we find that although stories of giants occur in the folklore of the Hausa-speaking peoples and, for example, the adventures of Gizo with Botorami and other giant *dodanni* (monsters) are well known, these stories of Katsi, Bagari Jirgo, Buga, Dala, Daka and the others seem to fall into another category of folklore. They contain references to specific places, geographic features and epochs. The earthen mounds at Durbi-ta-kusheyi for example, are looked upon as remains of the peoples of the past, just like the huge pots that are dug up on farmland, and often treated with awe as *kayan mutanen da* (remains of peoples of the past). Bagari Jirgo is believed to have lived near what is now the Kofar Samri quarter of the Birnin Katsina, at a time when the Sagi (now a dry watercourse forming a major landmark in the Birni) was a large stream that often threatened to flood his settlement.[4] The anonymous writer of the *Tārīkh Imarat Qaryat Kashna* has Bagari Jirgo as the founder of a dynasty which ruled for 3,500 years.[5] The stories of Katsi and Buga are recounted as *labarun da* (stories of the past) and belong to a quite distinct genre of folklore from the tales, fables and other compositions of a clearly fictional nature. These figures are termed 'Adawa' or 'Sanodawa', the name for an ancient people referred to several times in the Qur'an.[6] It seems that these traditions form part of a definite historical outlook on ancient times in the region and any attempt to reconstruct the early history of the area must come to terms with them.

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2. *MAB(b)*, August 1972. H.R. Palmer, 'Book of Katsina by Dan Masani', *PP-NHRS*, Reel 42 (BKD./PP-NHRS).
3. P.G. Harriss, *Sokoto Provincial Gazetteer* (mimeo), 1956, p. 46 (S.P.G.) Alhaji Abubakar Dokaji, *Kano Ta Dabo Cigari*, Zaria 1959, p. 13. Anonymous, 'The So', H.R. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs* II, Lagos, 1928, p. 64.
4. *B.K.D./PP-NHRS.*
5. Anonymous, *Tārikh Imārat Qaryat Kashna*, PP-NHRS, ms 197, (T.I.K./PP-NHRS).
6. *The Holy Quar'an* (trans.) Abdullah Yusuf Ali, Beirut, 1968, S9: 65, S26: 123—140,

The discovery of microliths by R. Soper on the mounds at Durbi-ta-kusheyi and at two other places in the vicinity of the Birnin Katsina suggests that there were continuous settlements here since the late Stone Age.[7] These giants mentioned in the traditions probably represent, in the collective folk memory of the people of the plains of Hausaland and Borno, the hunting communities of the Late Stone Age, whose way of life would have rapidly vanished with the introduction of iron weapons and implements. To the iron-using agriculturalists and hunters these Late Stone Age hunters, who killed the great mammals and carnivores with crude weapons and traps, would have appeared as a people of tremendous physical prowess. Durbi-ta-kusheyi and other sites on the central plains associated with this epoch were, like Dala and Gaya in Kano, probably centres where the transition to iron-using technology and permanent agriculture took place.[8] For our purposes it is sufficient to note that these fragments of evidence indicate that from the earliest times (*tun addau,* is significantly the expression of this in Hausa) the neighbourhood of Birnin Katsina was the site of some major centres. Its emergence as the metropolitan area of a kingdom in the fifteenth century was the outcome of developments that are obscure to us now but that seem to go back into past millenia.

(2) *Kwatarkwashi*

Another important centre before the formation of the kingdom of Katsina, grew up around the *duwatsun* (granitic outcrops) Kwatarkwashi. These are situated in the area of *laka* (dark red clay) soil on the edge of the Sokoto Basin which forms part of a belt of well-drained and fertile soil on which the major centres of the Kasar Zamfara like Dutsi, Birnin Zamfara and Kiswa were also situated. A tradition of Kwatarkwashi states that it was founded by hunters in the time of Kumayau.[9] The discovery of stone axes and microliths along the banks of the *gulbin* (large river) Sokoto and its tributaries indicates that this was perhaps an area where there has also been continuous settlement since the Late Stone Age.[10]

The crucial factor however, in the emergence of the place as a religious and political centre, was the existence of this complex of massive granitic

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S46: 21—26.

7. R.S. Soper, "The Stone Age in Northern Nigeria", *JHSN,* III.2, 1965, p. 192.
8. There is a single radio-carbon date of 630± 95 A.D. for an iron furance in Kano, near Dala hill. F. Willett 'A Survey of Recent Results in the Radiocarbon Chronology of Western and Northern Africa', *JAH* XII.3, 1971, p. 368.
9. *S.P.G.*, pp. 154—155.
10. Soper, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

outcrops which dominate the plains for several miles around. These *duwatsu* are associated in the pre-Islamic religious beliefs of the Hausa-speaking peoples with the *iskoki* (spirits), which are some of the active beings which directly influence human affairs. Because of this association, rocks like those of Kwatarkwashi all over the Kasar Hausa became centres for the worship of the iskoki and for religious festivities over and above those of *dangi* (patrilineal clan). The earliest known centres of religious and political influence in Kano and Zazzau were around such hills as Dala, Gwauron Dutse, Kuffena, Madakarci and Turunku.[11] In the Kasar Katsina, besides Kwatarkwashi there were several such centres and some of these are still places of worship for the non-Muslim peoples of the area.[12]

Kwatarkwashi, however, seems to have emerged as the major centre for the worship of *Magiro* (Bagiro) for an area extending beyond the gulbin Ka into the Middle Niger Region.[13] Magiro which seems to have developed out of the worship of the spirit of the ancestors, is one of the most ancient and powerful religious cults of the Kasar Hausa and is often termed the *Kakan Tsafi* 'grandfather of all fetish'[14]. The centre of this cult at Kwatarkwashi was at a rock called Dungai.[15] The first *maigari* (head of a town) was known as Mangul, but his successor known as *Gemen Dodo* (beard of the fetish), is said to have been responsible for Kwatarkwashi's relations with Katsina, before he became the Kwatarkwashi.[16] The growth of the place as a significant centre of population with a maigari, cannot be easily dated, but it is associated in the traditions with the move of the settlement to the rock of Dungai.[17] It is likely, however, that Kwatarkwashi had emerged as a religious and political centre before the formation of the kingdom of Katsina.[18]

(3) *Kwiambana.*

About 80 miles to the south of Kwatarkwashi lies a complex of large walled towns the significance of which in the history of Katsina is still

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11. A. Smith, "Some Considerations Relating to the Formation of States in Hausaland", *JHSN*, V.3, 1971, p. 340.
12. The *dutsin Birchi* at Birchi, still serves religious functions for the arnan Kainafara of that town.
13. H.D. Gunn & P.A. Connah, *Peoples of the Middle Niger Region of Nigeria*, London, 1960, p. 55. P.G. Harriss, 'Notes on the Dakarkari Peoples of Sokoto Province, Northern Nigeria', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, LXVIII, January—June 1939, p. 127.
14. R.C. Abrahams, *Dictionary of the Hausa Language*, London, 1962, p. 57. Tremearne, *The Ban of the Bori*, London, 1968, pp. 263, 265.
15. *S.P.G.*, p. 155.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*
18. There is a list of 28 Kwatarkwashis ruling before 1931, given in *ibid.*, p. 155.

obscure. The last of these towns to be abandoned was Kwiambana, the walls of which are about 4.8 kilometres in circumference. A few kilometres to its south and again to its north-east lie two other ruins of walled towns of about the same size.[19]

The walls of Kwiambana enclose the dutsin Kwiambana at the base of which water was obtained from a large water hole fed by a spring.[20] It is surrounded by low stone walls which might have formed part of some sort of agricultural terracing. The nature of the soil of the area indicates that it had been intensely tilled in the past, and parts show clear signs of agricultural exhaustion, even though the area is now covered by the developed *doka (Isoberlinia doka)* woodland of the Kwiambana Forest Reserve. The vegetation inside the walls *(Adasonia digitata)* include huge baobabs and some white silk-cotton trees *(Eriodendron orientale).* In many of its physical features this settlement bears a striking resemblance to those of the ancient settlements of the plains of Zazzau.[21] In fact the complex of Kuffena is only 80 miles away on the same latitude to the east; and the western gate of the 'Fulani Wall' of the Birnin Zaria is known as the Kofar Kwiambana.[22] The traditions of Kwiambana say that it was founded by one Dama Kasa, a Bakatsine, and was as old as the Birnin Katsina,[23] it was the metropolis of the Katsinawa Laka settlements south of the gulbin Ka, like Karaushi, Sengiakun, Daraga.[24] Emigrants from this area were found to be playing important political roles in the gulbin Kebbi area and in the areas of Yawuri by the sixteenth century.[25] The first Kanta of Kebbi who, by 1516 was a *barde* (title of official) of Songhai in the gulbin Kebbi area, is said to be the son of a Magaji of Kwiambana who left with his supporters as a result of succession disputes.[26]

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19. See *Nigerian Federal Surveys Map,* 1: 1,000,000, Sheet 100, 1970.
20. P.E. Clover & P.J. Aitchison, *Tsetse Control and Land Use in Northern Nigerian,* I, pp. 77—78.
21. M.J. Mortimore, 'Settlement Evolution and Land Use', in M.J. Mortimore, *Zaria and Its Region,* A.B.U., Geography Department, Occassional Paper No. 4, 1970, p. 106.
22. M.G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau,* London, 1960, Map. C.
23. *S.P.G.,* p. 159.
24. *Ibid.,* p. 160.
25. M. Adamu, *The Hausa Kingdom of Yawuri,* forthcoming ABUP Zaria. M.B. Alkali, *A Hausa Community in Crisis: Kebbi in the Nineteenth Century,* M.A. Thesis, A.B.U., 1969, p. 51.
26. Alkali, *op. cit.,* p. 51.

The town of Kwiambana was clearly an ancient centre of considerable importance in the early history of Katsina. It is not possible, with the evidence available, to reconstruct a picture of its position. When we can it should provide us with some insight into the process that produced some of the great *kasashe* (lands/territories) of Hausaland especially Katsina, Zazzau and Kebbi. Kwiambana seems to have been one of the several garuruwa and birane of Hausaland to develop a measure of metropolitan status but whose further political growth was stunted by the emergence of the great territorial kingdoms which, spreading out from other centres, absorbed them. Kwiambana seems to have suffered the fate of Rano in Kano, Karigi in Zazzau and perhaps even the Birnin Zoma along the banks of the gulbin Zamfara.

THE FORMATION OF THE SARAUTAR KATSINA

The established traditions and hypotheses.

The earliest reference to the kingdom of Katsina extant, is in a letter written in the last decade of the fifteenth century from Cairo by the Sheikh ᶜAbd al-Rahman b. Abi Bakr al-Suyūti (1445—1505) to *'al-malik Ibrāhim, Ṣaḥib Kashna'* (king Ibrahim, lord of Katsina)[27] A description of the 'kingdom of Casena' was given by the traveller Al-Hasan b. Muhammad Al-Wazzān (1465—1550) in an account of his travels recorded in the 1520s.[28] While we can therefore state with some confidence that the kingdom of Katsina had emerged by the end of the fifteenth century, it is not possible to be so definite about its genesis. We have several traditions available about the origin of the kingship of Katsina and there are numerous lists giving the names and length of reign of over 35 rulers before the jihad, covering a total timespan of over 400 years.[29] One of these traditions has it that the first Sarkin Katsina was known as Kumayau, son of a ruler of Daura, Bawo, son of Bayajidda. This tradition was recorded by Heinrich Barth in 1853 and nowadays is widespread in the written and oral sources.[30] A version of it recorded by F. de F. Daniel suggests that Kumayau established himself after conquering an older kingdom, that of the Durbawa, whose dynasty continued to provide some of the kings alternately, until a stranger from Yandoto, Korau,

27. This letter *(risala)* is reproduced in Usman dan Fodio's *Tanbih al-ikhwan ala ahwal ard al Sudan,* PP-NHRS, Jos Museum Collection, MS. vol. 3, f. 1717—46 (T.I.S./PP-NHRS).

28. Al-Hasan b. Muhammad al-Wazzan Al-Fasi, *The History and Description of Africa,* III, London, 1896, p. 830; vol. I, p. XLVI.

29. See the appendix on chronology.

30. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa,* Vol. I, London 1965, p. 474.

came, seized the throne and established a new dynasty.[31]

Another tradition maintains that the first ruler of Katsina was known as Kashina son of Bawo who, after founding a settlement at a place known as Kumayau, came to another place known as Zaye, where he built the Birnin Katsina.[32] What seems to be a variant of this has Katsi establishing a settlement at Durbi-ta-kusheyi, where his son became the first king, but this son, Sanau, was killed by Korau who seized the throne and built the Birnin Katsina.[33] The tradition recorded by Landeroin however, is that the first Sarkin Katsina was Muhammadu Korau, the first born of Bawo.[34] He went to the Durbawa to preach Islam and became a *malam* (teacher/scholar) to the Durbawa king Jabdayaki Sanau. He used his influence on Sanau, tricked him, had him killed and proclaimed himself king. He had a wall built around the Durbawa capital which he named Katsina, after his companion Katsi who directed the building of the walls.

The names Kumayau, Sanau and Korau feature in the kinglists among the first 10 rulers.[35] Kumayau is almost invariably placed as the first ruler and given a reign of 60 years or more. The name Korau often appears twice, in the second instance as Muhammadu Korau placed almost invariably immediately after Sanau (Jabdayaki). These traditions and the kinglists constitute the main body of the evidence dealing directly with the genesis of the kingship. Various attempts have been made to reconstruct the early history of the kingdom using these, the most notable of such are those of H. Barth and H.R. Palmer.

Barth suggests that the kingdom of Katsina came into existence about the early part of the thirteenth century with a dynasty ruling from a village known as Ambutai, sited where the Birnin Katsina is now.[36] The dynasty founded by Kumayau, according to Barth, was overthrown a century later when Korau from Yandoto killed Sanau and established a new dynasty. Barth is of the opinion that the Birnin Katsina only emerged in the latter part of the sixteenth century and developed rapidly when it began to receive some of the commerce diverted from Songhai by the Morroccan conquest of 1591. Palmer, on the other hand, suggests that by about 1200 A.D. a group of Diggara Berbers, represented in the legends by the figure of Kumayau, had established a kingdom around the settlements of Durbi-ta-kusheyi and Bugaje, but that the more important

31. F. de F. Daniel, *A History of Katsina,* (mimeo) (n.d.), pp. 1—3.
32. A. Mischlich 'Uber Sitten Und Gebraucher in Hausa', MSOS 10, 1907, p. 162. This source gives a *kirari* (praise epithet) of Katsina as 'Zaya ta Korau'.
33. *T.A K./PP-NHRS. f.1.*
34. Tilho, *Documents Scientifique de la Mission Tilho,* II, Paris, 1911, p. 457.
35. See appendix on chronology.
36. Barth, *op.cit.,* Vol. I, pp. 473—476.

Katsina kingdom of this period was situated in the region of Katsina Laka around Yandoto, and was associated with the Wangarawa.[37] He suggests that this was the kingdom that Al-Wazzan refers to as 'Guangara' and that Korau was the ruler of that kingdom who, around the first half of the thirteenth century, took control of the other Katsina in the north. Almost all of the subsequent writing on the early history of Katsina has followed along the lines suggested by Palmer and Barth.[38]

It is clear that any attempt to reconstruct the genesis of the kingdom of Katsina requires the interpretation of several conflicting traditions and kinglists which consist of information whose status as historical evidence varies considerably. Barth and Palmer fail to properly examine the evidence they use, and Palmer especially ignored some contradictions in the various traditions available to him.[39] Their reconstruction of the early history of Katsina suffers not only from these methodological limitations, but also from a neglect of the actual social and political conditions which enabled these dynasties to arise. The general limitations of this type of approach in reconstructing the history of the formation of the kingdom of the Kasar Hausa has already been examined.[40]

The political situation before c.1450.

When we direct our attention to searching for the actual historical process which produced the kingdom of Katsina we find that the available evidence indicates that whatever political institutions had previously existed in this area, the first Sarkin Katsina was Korau, whom we can tentatively place about the middle of the fifteenth century.[41] The major item of the royal regalia of Katsina is to this day a short sword known as *Gajere* (The Short One), which the traditions say was the sword Korau used to slay Sanau. The other two items are the *Tukunyar Karfe* (The Iron Pot), which is also said to belong to Korau, and a longer sword known as the *Bebe* (The Deaf One) which was captured on the battle field after the great victory against the Sarkin Gobir Yakubu in 1795. The palace in the Birnin Katsina is known as the *Gidan Korau* (The House of Korau) and accession to the throne in Katsina is to this day termed 'shiga Gidan Korau' (entering the House of Korau). In fact the name 'Korau' is now an epithet for Sarkin Katsina. The most formal kirari of the Sarkin Katsina which has come down to this day is:[42]

37. H.R. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs*, III, Lagos, 1928, pp. 74—78. (S.M. III).
38. Daniel, *op. cit.*, pp. 1—4; S.J. Hogben and A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, *The Emirates of Northern Nigeria*, London, 1966, pp. 156—161.
39. See discussion of sources.
40. Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 330—337.
41. See appendix on chronology.
42. Daniel, *op. cit.*, pp. 45—46; *T.A.K./PP-NHRS*, f. 1—2. This kirari can still be heard occasionally from the *maroka* at the palace in Birnin Katsina. The expression 'Abu gungurun' is untranslatable. 'Gungurun' evokes great, mysterious power and strength.

Korau Rakasa!	Korau the powerful one!
Korau dan Korau	Korau! son of Korau!
Korau jikan Korau!	Korau! grandson of Korau!
Korau magajin Korau!	Korau! heir of Korau!
Rakasa! magajin Rakasa!	The powerful one! Heir of the powerful one!
Korau abu gungurun!	Korau *abu gungurun!*
Korau mai tukunyar karfę!	Korau! The owner of the iron pot!
Korau mayen Samri!	Korau, the wizard of Samri!
Yanka mashidi bakon Sanau!	The slayer of the host, guest of Sanau.

Almost all the kinglists and the traditions have the reign of Korau as the beginning of a new epoch in some form or the other.[43] In several of the traditions he figures as the founder of a new dynasty, whatever origins he is given. It seems therefore that in order to understand the genesis of the kingdom of Katsina, we must turn to developments taking place during the era of Muhammadu Korau. Before doing so we shall attempt a reconstruction of the outlines of the political situation, before his era, in the central plains of the Kasar Katsina where the major developments seem to have taken place.

By the beginning of the fifteenth century, several permanent settlements seem to have existed in this area of which we know of Durbi-ta-kusheyi, Birnin Samru, Yandaka, and the rocky fortress of Karohi slightly to the south-west.[44] There were probably others in the vicinity of the area that became the Birnin Katsina, and to the east around the Dutsin Bamle.[45] Within some of these settlements there seems to have already emerged a maigari exercising authority above that of the *masu gidaje* (heads of households) the heads of the religious cults, and occupations.[46] These masu gari

43. In some of the kinglists Korau is given as the first Muslim ruler. In others it is simply stated that Islam was introduced in his reign. See appendix on chronology.

44. *T.A.K./PP-NHRS*, F. 1—4.

45. To the north east of the dutsin Bamle are the sites of several birane like the Birnin Mamman.

46. For this description of the pre-Korau political communities of the Katsina area I have drawn upon *T.A.K/PP-NHRS*. Anonymous, *Tarikh arhab hadha al balad al-sunama Kano* (trans. and ed.) H.R. Palmer, as 'The Kano Chronicle' in S.M. III (K.C.), pp. 97—132. Hiskett, (ed.) 'The Song of Bagauda', *loc. cit.* J.H. Greenberg, 'Islam and Clan Organisation Among the Hausa', *South-West Journal of Anthropology*, 3, 147. J.H. Greenberg, 'Some Aspects of Negro Mohammedan Culture Contact' *American Anthropologist* New Series, Vol. 43. 1941, pp. 51—61. G. Nicolas, D. Doumesche & M. Mouche,

like the Durbi, the Sanni and the Yandaka, would draw some of their authority from their position within a senior lineage, an important religious cult, or occupation. The pre-Kwaru ruler of dye-pits would most likely be the Kanoji, the head of the dyers, and as we have already seen in a religious centre like Kwatarkwashi, the Kwatarkwashi was a priest of the Magaji cult. The position of the Durbi was connected with their control of the shrines of ancestral figures around the tombs of Durbi-ta-kusheyi. But in spite of the existence of this type of basis for the authority of the masu gari, they represented an essentially new form of political authority in the area. They seem to have emerged as part of the political changes associated with the growth of permanent agriculture and associated crafts and industries and of course, the consequent growth of permanent concentrations of populations. These economic and social changes seem to have produced settlements consisting of diverse kinship, religious and occupational groups, next to other settlements of similar diversity. It is as head of these settlements supervising such things as the distribution of land in the belts of *karkara* (inhabited areas) around the town; the provision of security; some forms of religious worship; and relations with other garuruwa and birane that the masu gari emerged. The heads of the various kinship groups, religious cults, and occupations like the *magajiyar bori, uban farauta, magajin rafi, sarkin makera,* (titles of officials) would retain considerable autonomy and exercise some authority over general affairs of the settlement. But with the increasing diversification of occupations and lineages, with immigration and disputes over the land in the karkara and along the *rafi* (water course) and the growth of other settlements nearby, the authority of the maigari would grow. The gari or birni, as a larger community subsuming all these older units, would emerge with this development. Together with its satellite *kauyuka* (villages) and *rungage* (rural hamlets) set up by hunters, miners and smelters or farmers, the gari would be an embryo of the territorial kingdom.

It is not clear how far the authority of these masu gari had developed on the area of the central plains. Durbi-ta-kusheyi seems to have been a religious and political centre of some importance; an importance perhaps partly derived from the existence of shrines for the worship of ancestral figures around some of the baobabs growing near the tombs in that settlement; two of these trees were known as Kumayau and Katsina his wife.[47] A dominant lineage might already have emerged at Durbi-ta-

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Etudes Socio-Economique de deux Villages Hausa, Etudes Nigerienne, 22, IFAN/ CNRSH, Niamey, 1968. Smith "Some Considerations.....", *loc. cit., passim.* A. Smith "The Early States of the Central Sudan" in J.F.A. Ajayi & M. Crowder *History of West Africa* I, 1971, (U.W.A.L.), pp. 185—192.

47. These two baobabs are now dead, but there were several younger ones on the site when I visited it last in August 1972.

kusheyi. The names of Kumayau, Rumba-Rumba, Bataretare, Tarwai, Jernanata and the others who appear on the kinglists before Jabdayaki Sanau, were of these ancestral figures, of which Kumayau was most likely one, and of some of the Durbis who ruled before Sanau.[48] By the middle of the fifteenth century the influence of the Durbi seems to have extended to the area of the Birnin Katsina where we find a religious shrine around the tamarind tree, known as Bamada, under the control of Durbawa.[49] The actual position of the other garuruwa is difficult to establish, but the picture that emerges from the fragments of evidence available is one in which the Durbi held a position of pre-eminence over the other political and religious centres of the area, controlling the shrines of Durbi-ta-kusheyi and later that of Bawada. This political situation was called into question with the emergence around the *koramar* (large stream) Tilla of new centres of power and wealth.

The roots of this development however, went back to the growth of a network of trade routes which linked the settlements of the area.[50] One of the focal points of this network was the dutsin Bamle, one of the few sources of iron ore in the area, and a market that was held at a nearby place known as the Rufan Najandarawa. This market, or more appropriately trade fair, attracted traders from the regions of Gazawa to the north and was linked with the area of the Birnin Daura by a route which went via the ancient wells in the *dajin* ('bush') Zode.[51] The commodities on this trading network included pottery, iron ore, grindstones, cotton, indigo, and textiles. The pottery came from the area of Ajiwa, grindstones were obtained from the area of Kwata near Mani, while iron ore was mined at dutsin Bamle, Matsai, and was probably brought in from places like Tama to the south.[52] Cotton and indigo would have come in from the south and the west through Yandaka and Karofi, where *baba* (dyestuff) was produced.

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48. This seems to be a feasible explanation given the association of these names with individual tombs and the rather strange names these 'rulers' have, quite different from Sanau and Korau, which are normal Hausa personal names. The worship of ancestral figures formed one of the older religious system of the Hausa-speaking people. This involved sacrifices to these ancestors on their tombs which even today are often sited under *kuka* or tamarind trees. The Magiro cult might be an ancient outgrowth of this. See Tremearne, *op. cit.*, pp. 263—264; C.K. Meek, *The Northern Tribes of Nigeria,* London, 1925, p. 17.
49. Daniel, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
50. See Map.
51. *SFJ(b),* August 1972.
52. The northern parts of the Kasar Katsina came to be deficient in iron ore, cotton, and indigo.

The era of Korau, c.1445—1495 A.D.

By the beginning of the fifteenth century settlements around the koramar Tilla and the koramar Gisu were emerging as one of the important foci of this trading network. Iron mining and smelting developed nearby at the *kwarin* Tama (the iron ore quarry) and the high ground near the *fadamar* (valley botton) Tilla became a *zango* (resting place for caravans) for long distance traders and a major junction of trade routes.[53] This development seems to have been part of the economic expansion that was taking place in the major population centres of the Kasar Hausa and Borno from the early fifteenth century.[54] The local trading networks became linked together by the exchange of salt, natron, kolanuts, slaves, and horses, and this began to produce a system of markets covering a vast area stretching from the basin of the Black Volta to the shores of Lake Chad, from the Abzin Plateau to the Middle Niger Basin and beyond.[55]

The commercial network linking the garuruwa and birane of the central plains of Katsina was drawn into this larger economic system and new centres of wealth emerged around the fadamar Tilla and kwarin Tama. The system within which Durbi-ta-kusheyi had maintained a religious, and a certain measure of political, hegemony was becoming bypassed; and various groups and forces existed favouring its transformation. There were, for example, the masu gari of the other garuruwa and birane like Birnin Samri, Yandaka and Karofi who viewed the Durbi as another maigari, by the reduction of whose pre-eminence they could benefit. Korau is known as the *'Mayen* Samri' (The Wizard of Samri), and the *'Zaron* Samri' (The Hero of Samri) and had clearly close identification with that Birni, even if he was not its maigari.[56] Furthermore, the shrine of Yuna around the tamarind tree of Bawada, sited just over one mile west of the fadamar Tilla, was emerging as an influential religious centre in its own right. Inna, also known as *Uwa* (The Mother) represented

53. *AAK(k),* August 1972. The fadamar Tilla had abundant supplies of ground water and pasture.

54. *K.C.*, p. iii.

55. *Ibid.*, pp. 11—12.

56. The source of the view that Korau went to the Birnin Katsina area from Yandoto is Barth, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 227. H.R. Palmer built on this and on the accounts of Al-Wazzan his hypotheses on 'Guangara' (S.M. III, pp. 74). Barth obtained the information presumably while he was in Katsina in 1851 and 1853. It seems that his informant said that Korau came from the Yandoto region because it was widely known that Korau was the 'Mayen Samri', but in the mid-19th century the only Samri was the town south-west of old Yandoto. The Birnin Samri was abandoned during the Jihad wars, and its maigari, the Samri, is said to have fled to the town Samri in Katsina Laka, while some of the inhabitants went to establish a settlement known as Suarawa near Bichin in Kano.

the spirit of the earth and is the central figure of the iskoki pantheon,[57] around which the other spirits of natural phenomenon like Duwatsu (thunder) Gajere (the forest) and Sarkin Rafi (rivers) occupied defined places in the iskoki cosmology. This religious system was more relevant to the heterogenous community growing in the Birnin Katsina area than the more particularistic ancestor-worship cults around the tombs of Durbi-ta-kusheyi. To the farmers, artisans, and traders moving in from the west from Borno and settling at Rafukka, Unguwar Yammawa and other settlements near the fadamar Tilla and the kwarin Tama, the shrine of Bawada provided a more meaningful focus of religious activity.[58] Even the non-Muslim Fulani pastoralists moving into the area in the time of Jabdayaki Sanau, the last of the Durbawa leaders before Korau, would have found a place for their beliefs in the iskoki religious system.[59] The influence of the Muslims among the Wangarawa, Fulani and Barebari moving into the area about that time would have been less favourable to the older and narrower religious and political system of the Durbawa.[60] The very heterogeneity of the settlements in terms of descent, religion, and occupation, was a condition favouring the growth of a political authority standing above the old kinship, religious and occupational groups. The shrine of Inna (Mother Earth) provided a more suitable foundation for such a political authority based on notions of territoriality that were already incipient in the old political system.[61] Even sections of the Durbawa that had come to be associated with Bawada and the new centres of population and wealth nearby might have favoured a change in the political situation.

There were certainly several forces and groups making for change. But the immediate cause of the crisis which resulted in the killing of the Durbawa leader Jabdayaki Sanau and the emergence of Korau as Sarkin

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(GIG (k), August 1972). To a person with no special knowledge of the history of Katsina, Samri, then existing, would have been the natural place to identify Korau with. But Samri also existed before the Jihad and according to Gorharty, *(Gusau District Re-assessment of: NNAK/SOKPROF*—S.2513) it was the seat of a 'Sarkin Yamma' a son of S. Katsina Badankari, who changed the sarauta to Samri. It seems much more likely, however, that the 'Samri' identified with Korau in the Kirari was the Birnin Samri, not only because of its proximity to Durbi-ta-kusheyi, and the site of Birnin Katsina, but especially because the gate of the Birni known as Kofar Samri directly faces the site of the Birnin Samri, located about 20 miles away on a sort of island in the marshes of the gulbin Kaita.

57. Daniel, *op. cit.*, p. 39. Tremearne, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
58. *K.C.*, p. 111.
59. Anonymous, *Kitab Tartib Umaran Kashna,* PP-NHRS, MS 19 (K.T.K.).
60. M.A. Al-Hajj, 'A Seventeenth Chronicle on the Origins and Missionary Activities of the Wangarawa', *Kano Studies,* I.4, 1968, p. 10. *K.C.*, p. 104.
61. Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 187—188.

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61. Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 187—188.

Katsina is still not clear. The traditions represent all this as a personal contest between Korau and Sanau, with Sanau as leader of the Durbawa exercising some influence over the shrine at Bawada.[62] The gist of the numerous traditions is that Sanau was the ruler when Korau came and established close relations with him. He took advantage of this intimacy even, it is said, with Sanau's wife, to trick Sanau and kill him. The details of this episode vary but the seizure of power by Korau created an unprecedented situation in the area: the Durbawa refused to accept him.[63]

And, although Korau might have drawn some support from the Birnin Samri and perhaps Yandaka, the masu gari of these towns would have been reluctant to subordinate themselves to him. Korau, on the other hand had the advantage of taking control of the shrine of Rawada, which came to be enclosed within his palace, and he had access to the wealth of the settlements around it.[64]

A condition which favoured the emergence of the new political system around Korau was the position the settlements in the area that became the Birnin Katsina came to occupy among the garuruwa and birane of these plains. Because of the wealth, the diversity of the occupations of the inhabitants, and their position in the communication system of the region, the older settlements came to be dependent on them to a degree they had never before been to any other single centre. Moreover, the killing of Sanau, by dealing a severe blow to the influence of the Durbawa, had eliminated a political centre whose authority—however limited—had provided some order in the relations between the various communities of the area at a time when the need for such an order was increasing.

Korau could not move into Sanau's position, he could however move in to fill the political vacuum left after the demise of Durbawa authority. In doing this he was helped by the identification he came to have with the shrine of Bawada. As one of the *kirarin* (praise epithet) bori reveals, he came to be seen as one of the sons of Inna and after his death occupied a place in the iskoki pantheon:

Korau dan babban gida!	Korau, son of the great house!
Korau, dan da a ke so!	Korau! The beloved son!

62. Daniel, *op. cit.*, pp. 2—4. Tilho, *op. cit.*, p. 457. Barth, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 277. *T.A.K./PP-NHRS*, f. 2—4. I. Dankousso and R. Caranci, *Katsina: Traditions Historiques des Katsinawa apres la jihad*, CRETO/NRSH, Niamey, 1970, pp. 5—8.

63. *T.A.K./PP-NHRS*, f. 1—3.

64. A *soro* (hall) came to be built on the site of the shrine where some of the rites of installing a new *Sarki* were conducted.

Farin aljani mai daraja!	The eminent white jina!
Ba duka kowa ba	Not everybody (is possessed by you)
Yarima, dan masu gida	Prince! son of the owners of the house![65]

This close identification of Korau with Mother Earth provided an important religious basis for his authority, and that of his successors, over the kasar Katsina. Korau also seems to have had some association with Muslim elements there and might even have professed Islam; he was also known as Muhammadu Korau.[66] With these in his favour he made attempts to reconcile himself with the various elements of the communities of the area. According to a tradition he persuaded the people who had earlier fled from him to visit his house and eat his food and they agreed to make payments to him in the form of iron bars, this became regularized and was the 'beginning of *kharaj* 'land tax'. [67] Once he had overcome the hostility of the Durbawa and the other elements of the Birni area, the masu gari around would have found it in their interest to come to terms with him. Some of those who refused to do were probably forcibly replaced, as is assumed to have happened in Karofi where a supporter of Korau known as Gazobi was installed as the maigari.[68]

The long reign of Korau it seems was not taken up with far-reaching changes, but in taking measures to establish the new institutions and relations on the new sarauta political system. The garuruwa and birane retained considerable autonomy and Korau probably only intervened on matters of defence, appointment of maigari, and the running of the main markets and zango.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE SARAUTA SYSTEM

Internal developments.

The new pattern of political relations that developed around Korau produced a more cohesive political community made up of several garuruwa and birane. These remained largely autonomous in their internal affairs, but subordinate to the Sarkin Katsina who lived in the largest and wealthiest of the birane. This system was transformed under the

65. *MDK(m)*, June 1973.

66. See appendix on chronology.

67. *T.A.K./PP-NHRS*, f.2.

68. *Ibid.*

successors of Korau, and by the end of the seventeenth century the Sarakunan Katsina exercised sovereign authority over hundreds of garuruwa and birane whose territories composed the kasar Katsina, covering an area of about 15,500 square kilometres.[69] They appointed the officials who supervised the masu gari, important occupations like dyeing, weaving and smithing, and leading positions in the army. This process of transformation cannot be properly reconstructed with the fragmentary evidence available, but starting from the choice of a successor to Korau we might be able to identify the general outline of this process.

When Korau died, the choice of his successor fell on his family, companions, and the leading masu gari such as the Durbi, Yandaka, Samri and Gazobi, whose continued loyalty was crucial for the survival of the new political system.[70] As already indicated, the economic and social conditions of the area had created the need for some form of central political authority above that of the individual garuruwa and birane. Korau as the Sarkin Katsina, began to provide this in a form and to a degree different from that provided earlier by the Durbawa leaders. Moreover, the pressure from the other kingdoms expanding nearby—like Kano, which had started to raid into Katsina by the second half of the fifteenth century, helped to ensure the loyalty of the various garuruwa and birane to the new government in the Birnin Katsina.[71] In any case, the role of the more senior masu gari in the selection of the new Sarkin Katsina enhanced their position in the new system. The distinction between the *sarakunan galgajiya* (traditional title-holders) who had a voice in the selection of a new Sarki, and the other *sarakunan garuruwa* (rulers of territories as the powerful masu gari became), began. The Durbi, the Yandaka, the Samri and the Gazobi formed the core of the former, which later came to include the Galadiman Katsina and the Kauran Katsina whose sarautu grew out of the palace and the army, respectively.[72] The exercise of this role by the senior sarakunan garuruwa incorporated them further into the new political system. We find the Durbis continuing with their religious functions, this time in the rites of installation of a new Sarkin Katsina.[73]

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69. See Map B.

70. *T.A.K./PP-NHRS*, f. 2. This gives the Galadiman Katsina as one of the notables who chose Korau's successor. But as this sarauta had probably not emerged by then, this seems to be an anachronism.

71. *K.C.*, p. 112.

72. The position of the Galadima was held by slaves and eunuchs. A kirari of the Galadiman Katsina was *Nda Babban bawa'*. (Nupeman, the great slave!). Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

73. *T.A.K./PP-NHRS*, f. 3.

The reign of Korau's immediate successor Ibrahim Sura (c.1495—1497) was short. In a letter addressed to him from Abd al-Rahman al-Suyūti from Cairo, he was referred to as 'sahib Kashna' (lord of Katsina) and warned about his responsibility to God for the conduct of his subjects whom he should actively guide along the right path and to each of whom he should ensure that justice was done.[74] Al-Suyūti's letter is only one example of the type of influence at the level of political ideas and outlook which helped to transform the institution of Sarkin Katsina into the central institution of the new political community.

More powerful and pervasive influences came from some of the kingdoms of the *bilad as-Sudan* like Borno, Kano, Kebbi and Songhai, where important political developments were then taking place. In all these polities the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries was a period of radical political changes associated with the Mai Ali Ghazi in Borno (c.1470—1503); the Sarkin Kano Muhammadu Rumfa (c.1463—1499), the first Kanta in Kebbi (c.1513), and the Askia Muhammadu Toure in Songhai (c.1493—1528).[75] The ideas and attitudes which brought about and generated these changes were made up of elements of the Islamic and non-Islamic outlook on government found in these areas. In general these changes made for the prevalence of a conception of a political community incorporating diverse descent, linguistic, and occupational groups, around a government standing above all these with sovereign right over defined territory with which the community was closely identified. They produced the ideological climate within which the Katsina sarauta system emerged.

One of the most influential exponents of the Islamic dimensions of this ideological climate was the Sheikh Abu Abdullah Muhammad b. Abd al-Karim b. Muhammad al-Maghili (d.1503), who was in Katsina in 1490s, and exerted his influence both forcefully and directly.[76] He is associated with the introduction of Islam into Katsina where he figures in several traditions as 'Abdulkarimu'.[77] In a treatise on government he wrote for the Sarkin Kano Muhammadu Rumfa, entitled *Taj al-din fima yajib ala-l muluk,* a copy of which was found in Katsina, he states:

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74. *T.I.S./PP-NHRS,* f. 1717—46.

75. Smith, *op. cit.,* pp. 182, 196—199. J.O. Hunwick, 'Songhay, Bornu and Hausaland in the Sixteenth Century', *H.W.A.* I, pp. 205, 215—216, 222, 227—232.

76. A.A. Batran, 'A Contribution to the Biography of Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abd-al-Karim Ibn Muhammad (Umar-a-Amer) al-Maghili al-Tilimasani', *JAH,* XIV.3, 1973, pp. 390—393.

77. Alhaji Zakariya Badamasi, 'Letter to Palmer', *PP-NHRS,* Reel 44.

> Verily kingly power is a vice-regency from God and a stewardship from God's apostle.... Every prince must order his kingdom well both at home and abroad and must do all that in him lies for the welfare of his subjects. For this he has servants.... to do him service; men who give council; trusty men who collect and spend; ascribes and accountants who keep records; messengers, informants, watchers and patrols.... strongholds well-fortified and provisioned, spirited horsemen and bold footmen ready for all emergency....[78]

Al-Maghili urges the ruler to watch his officials closely and to intervene directly in the administration to ensure justice and the observance of Islamic practices.[79] He urges that Islamic practices should be enforced on all Muslims, and that non-Muslims should be prevented from interferring with these.[80] He emphasized the necessity for a Muslim ruler to be accessible and have direct relations with his subjects by sitting: '.....every day where the women and children may have access to him [when] they are not satisfied by his appointed judges and governors, for it is often against these that the people have complaint... The veiling of the prince from his subjects is the source of mischief'.[81] The last line here is a refrain which comes up at the end of each chapter of the treatise and shows the importance Al-Maghili attached to close and direct relations between the Muslim ruler and his people, and his abhorrence of bureaucracy.[82]

It is not possible here to establish the specific ways in which Al-Maghili's ideas influenced the people and the sarakuna of Katsina. There are several traditions about the great influence he exercised as one of the early pro-

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78. Abu Abdullah Muhammed b. Abd al Karim b. Muhammad Al-Maghili, *Taj al din fi ma yajib ala-l muluk* (ed.) Muhammadu Zayyan b. Muhammad al-Wamun, Wazirin Katsina, Beirut, 1931, trans. into English as *The Obligation of Princes*, T.A. Baldwin, Beirut, 1932, from which I have quoted, pp. 6, 9.

79. Al-Maghili, *op. cit.*, p. 13. The injunction about enforcing the observation of Islamic practices comes in his other work, *Mukhtasar fi ma yajuz ala-l hukkam fi radd al mas an al-haram* trans. by H.R. Palmer, as 'An Early Fulani Conception of Islam', *JAS*, 15, 1914—15, pp. 185—188.

80. Al-Maghili, *Mukhtasar*...., p. 18.

81. Al-Maghili, *Taj al din*...., pp. 15—16.

82. Al-Maghili, *Taj al din*...., *passim*. It is significant that although he advocated greater integration of the kingdoms around the central government, he emphatically warned against the growth of a powerful hierarchy of officials. This attitude also found strong expression in the writing of all of the three major leaders of the nineteenth century Jihad. Three centuries after Al-Maghili, we find Usman dan Fodio stating in 1806, that:

> ....when the oppressor is sure that the oppressed person will not have access to the ruler he becomes even more oppressive. The subjects keep loyal as long as they have accesss to him, but when he secludes himself there comes into being many other rulers.

A Critical Edition of Dan Fodio's Bayan Wujub al-jijra, F.H. El-Masri, Ph.D. Thesis, Ibadan, 1968, p. 585. See Chapter IV for Muhammadu Bello's warning to the emir of Katsina Umarun Dallaji on this problem of officials. The widely held assumptions

pagators of Islam in Katsina and Kano.[83] In fact according to one tradition recorded in the *Tarikh Asli Katsina wa Asli Ghubir* in a rather anecdotal fashion, he was the first to introduce Islam into Katsina.[84] Although this is clearly a case of what has been called 'structural amnesia', the account gives us a hint of the political dimensions of Al-Maghili's activities:

> The Sheikh Maghili arrived from the east and called them to religion and they said "What is religion?" He replied "prayer, fasting and mosques". Then the people of the country accepted what he said, saying "we are oppressed" The *amir* and his sultans said "we do not agree....this story will cut our authority". But after the *talakawa* [the common people] had agreed, they said "we like religion". And the Sheikh said to them "your subjects have preceded you in this; since my word is doubted by you it will be found that the people of your country will not obey you as they have obeyed me". They said "we repent to you". Then he prayed to God for them that the *amir* of Katsina should sometimes be *salih* [faithful] and sometimes *jabir* [gentle].[85]

The political impact of his ideas is likely to have been enhanced because he was not simply putting forward his personal views; he was setting out the ideals of political leadership given in the Qur'an, the *hadith* (traditions regarding the Prophet Mohammed) and associated with the *al-khulafa' al-rāshidūn*. Even if some of the specific measures he advocated, such as the organization of revenue collection and spending, were not wholly adopted, his writings and preaching created a climate of opinion, a political outlook, which made for certain types of changes in the political system. This outlook would make it a religious duty on the part of a Muslim ruler to carry out policy which would bring about much greater social and political integration of the kingdom. It was certainly not the kind of outlook which would have favoured the Sarkin Katsina remaining the paramount head of semi-autonomous garuruwa which he related with as politically corporate units. In fact there are indications that several rulers of Katsina executed policies which followed the lines advocated by Al-Maghili.

Sarkin Katsina Ali Murabit fortified the Gidan Korau and turned it into a *qasr* (citadel).[86] He was probably a builder of *ribāts* (frontier strongholds) elsewhere in the kingdom, hence the sobriquet 'Murabit'

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that the Islamic political tradition in this area simply favoured the growth of powerful bureaucracies is erroneous.

83. *T.A.K./PP-NHRS*, f. 4. Alhaji Zakariya Badamasi, op. cit., p. R.S. Rattray, *Hausa Folk-Lore, Customs, Proverbs, etc.* vol. I, Oxford, 1969, pp. 12-14.

84. *T.A.K./PP-NHRS*, f. 14—15.

85. *Ibid.*

86. *K.T.K./PP-NHRS*, f. 1. Anonymous, *Kitab Ila Masrifat Umara Kashna*, PP-NHRS, Jos Museum Collection, vol. 2, f. 1009—12 (K.M.K./PP-NHRS).

(the men of the ribāt).[87] These ribāts might have been intended to secure the border with Kano which was attacking Katsina about that time.[88] Such fortified settlements might have also served as bases from which the authority of the Sarkin Katsina was exercised over the territory, independent of the sarakunan garuruwa. In a period like this, when Islam had considerable political force and Muslim migrants were moving into Katsina, these settlements would most likely become centres for the spread of Islam. About three centuries later, in another epoch when Islam was a much more powerful political influence, the emirate government consolidated its social basis by establishing new towns and transforming existing ones.[89]

The palace fortified by Ali Murabit would have already emerged as the hub of political power in the kingdom. The position of the senior members of the ruling dynasty was also becoming established as new sarautu like that of Iya, the mother of the Sarki, the Magajiya Maskumi and the Magajiya Yaljigari, held by *magaddai* (princesses); and the titles of the senior wives and concubines like Maidaki, Mailalle, Maimashariya and Maiwurari.[90] The Magajiya Yaljigari had the responsibility for reporting the news of the town to the Sarki, while some of the titled wives and concubines ran various religious cults of the iskoki.[91] From this palace other sarautu held by courtiers, slaves and eunuchs would have begun to emerge, like the Ajiya, the Baraya, the Turaki, the Shantali and the Jakafadiya. The first two were in charge of the royal finances and stores, while the other three were responsible for the royal chambers. It was out of such functions in the palace that the sarautu such as the Sarkin Bai and the Galadiman Katsina emerged.

The changes taking place in the reign of Ali Murabit, and in the reign of his immediate successors, seem to have consolidated the position of the dynasty. The Sarkin Katsina Aliyu Karyagiwa is said to have succeeded to the throne while he was still young and is also reported to have made war on Yawuri, over 320 kilometres from the capital.[92] There is no record of such a war in the extant oral traditions of Yawuri, although

87. It is given as 'murabus' in *K.T.K./PP-NHRS,* which in Hausa means one who has abdicated or retired. But *K.M.K.* gives 'Murabit'. Other lists give it variously as 'murabu', 'murabut' or even 'murabbuci'. See also Hunwick, 'Songhay, Bornu....' *loc. cit.,* p. 213.

88. *K.C.,* p. 112.

89. See pp.? 90? 91 *Ibid.* f.?

90. *T.A.K./PP-NHRS,* f.

91. *Ibid.* f.

92. *K.M.K./PP-NHRS,* f. 1009—12. *S.M.* Vol. III, p. 80.

there is mention of movement into the area of Katsinawa immigrants, some of whom came to play important political roles.[93] But if, as is likely Kwiambana was being incorporated into the kingdom by this period, then expeditions from here into the Birnin Yawuri area were quite feasible.[94]

The extension of the kingdom which was probably taking place from this period raised the political power and economic resources of the Sarakunan Katsina far above that of the masu gari. It led to the establishment of new sarautu to supervise these sarakuna, to run the frontier towns, regulate the major forms of economic activity, and generally administer a political community that was becoming larger and more complex. It is not surprising therefore, that there was a judge in Birnin Katsina in the reign of Aliyu Karyagiwa, the jurist Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Abi Muhammad Al-Tazakhti, who died in the Birni in 1529/30 and left behind his commentaries on the *Mukhtasar* of Khalil.[95]

Perhaps it might have been this growth in the political and economic power of the Sarkin Katsina that enabled the Sarkin Katsina Ibrahim Maje to pursue policies which would have begun, in a decisive fashion, to change the nature of the relations between the Sarki and the rest of the community. Ibrahim Maje was noted for his generosity.[96] But he also attempted to enforce the observance of Islamic practices. As the writer of the *Kitāb ila Maᶜrifat ᶜUmarā Kashna* states:

> There were those who did not marry; he ordered them to marry. There were those who did not pray; he ordered them to pray. If there were a home which did not have a mosque at the door, he would say, bring me the householder be he a protected person or Moslem. He ordered places of worship *(sawami)* to be built in every village....[97]

Such a policy was in line with the injunctions of the Muslim jurists regarding the responsibility of the Muslim ruler to his subjects. It led to the development of a political community composed basically of the Sarkin Katsina, and the talakawa of the Sarkin Katsina. Thus, instead of having a kingdom composed of Durbawa, Gozkawa, Wangarawa, and

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93. Adamu, *op. cit.*

94. There was an expedition as far south as Karissen in the reign of the Sarkin Katsina Gozo (c.1800—1801). Tilho, *op. cit.*, p. 460. A.B. Mathews, *Historical and Anthropological Report on the Katsinawa,* NNAK/SNP—17/8—K.2100, p. 4.

95. A.D.H. Bivar and M. Hiskett, 'The Arabic Literature of Northern Nigeria to 1804: A Provisional Account', *BSOAS* XXV, 1962, p. 110. Alhaji Zakariya Badamasi, *op. cit.*

96. *K.M.K./PP-NHRS,* f. 1009—12. *K.T.K./PP-NHRS,* f. 2.

97. *K.M.K./PP-NHRS,* f. 1009—12. *K.T.K./PP-NHRS,* f. 3.

Fulani, all subordinated as corporate units to the Sarki as paramount, there began to be a kingdom composed of Katsinawa, who were also members of the sub-communities based on descent and location. Providing the political leadership for this process of community-formation was one of the significant achievements of the sixteenth century kings of Katsina. By the end of the seventeenth century this new community had been established and taken its definite form.

The reign of Ibrahim Maje was followed by that of Abd al-Karim (c.1563—1565) who ruled for only 2½ years. He was followed by Yusufu who reigned only for a few days and was deposed, the reasons for which are not known;[98] but there is a tradition which says that he abdicated.[99] Whatever this involved, it did not prevent the army of Katsina from launching its most devastating attack on the Kasar Kano in the next reign, that of Ibrahim (c.1565—1575).[100] Kano was, of course, just then undergoing a prolonged political crisis which involved a civil war and the deposition of 4 consecutive rulers.[101] We cannot therefore assume that the effectiveness of these attacks on Kano indicated a stable political situation inside Katsina, even though the length of reign of the Sarakuna after Yusufu—Ibrahim (c.1565—1575), Muhammadu Wari (c.1575—1587) and Suleiman (c.1587—1600)—indicate a more normal pattern of succession.

About a century later however, in the reign of the Sarkin Katsina Muhammadu Uban Yara (c.1641—1671), Katsina was able to exert considerable pressure on Kano and in this instance it seems that Katsina's ability to do this was owing to a stable political situation inside the kingdom. Within Kano itself, the reign of Kutumbi and his immediate predecessor Muhammadu Nazaki (c.1618—1623), was an era of considerable expansion in the number of settlements, wealth, and in the power of the Sarkin Kano.[102] In spite of this Katsina withstood a 9-month long siege by Kutumbi and the second invasion ended with the death of Kutumbi in c.1648.[103] The causes of this war are examined elsewhere, but it seems to have been connected with certain actions of the Katsina government which had earlier rejected a peace offer from the Sarkin Kano

98. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 16. *K.T.K./PP-NHRS,* f. 3. See appendix on chronology.
99. *AMM(m),* September 1971.
100. *K.C.*, p. 14.
101. *Ibid.*, pp. 114—115.
102. *K.C.*, pp. 117—118.
103. *Ibid.; K.M.K./PP-NHRS,* f. 1009—12; *K.T.K./PP-NHRS.*

Muhammadu Nazaki.[104] The killing of Kutumbi was followed by the deposition of his son Al-Hajj (c.1648) and the making of a peace treaty through the intervention of the ulama.[105] The strong position from which the foreign policy of Katsina was conducted in this period was also reflected in relations with Zamfara, where a crisis in Zamfara's relations with Katsina led to a conflict between the sarakuna of Zamfara and the Sarkin Zamfara Zaudai Dan Daka.[106]

The two reigns of Uban Yara, and his son and successor Muhammadu Jan Hazo, covered a period of 44 years (1641—1684) and seem to have constituted an era when the position of the Sarakunan Katsina, was well established both internally and externally. But the social and political developments behind these produced a Muslim intelligentsia which, in the Birnin Katsina and other urban centres like Yandoto, Dan Ashita, and Kurmin Dan Ranko, wielded considerable influence. These new urban centres had developed within the political framework of the sarauta system, and some of them were actually established as a matter of policy by the Sarakuna. But within them, Islam increasingly became the major bond of social cohesion, providing the basic code of social conduct, also, a Muslim intelligentsia began to emerge as the leaders of these communities, distinct and independent of the sarakuna. By the mid-seventeenth century, some of these mallamai (the intelligentsia) wielded considerable influence in the Birnin Katsina. Among them was Abu Abdullah Muhammad b. Masani b. Ghumehu b. Muhammad b. Abdullah b. Nuh al-Barnawi al-Kashinawi (1595—1667), known as Dan Masani, living in what became the Masanawa quarter of the Birnin Katsina,[107] and his student Muhammad al-Kashinawi (Ibn al-Sabbaqh), known as Dan Marina, who lived in the Marina quarter of the Birni.[108] These two played an important part in the vigorous intellectual life of the Birni in that period, engaging in numerous disputations. Together with Muhammadu b. Ahmad al-Tazakhti (d.1529) known as Dan Takum they came to be regarded as the patron saints of Katsina.

The saving of the Birnin Katsina from the Kwararrafa in the reign of Sarkin Katsina Muhammadu Jan Hazo (1671—1684) is ascribed to the

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104. *K.C.*, p. 116.
105. *Ibid.*, p. 118—119.
106. K. Krieger, *Geschichte Von Zamfara,* Berlin, 1959, p. 37.
107. Bivar & Hiskett, 'The Arabic....,' *loc. cit.*, pp. 114-116. H.F.C. Smith, 'Seventeenth Century Writer of Katsina', Supplement to Bulletin of News of the Historical Society of Nigeria, VI. 1, 1961, pp. 1—4.
108. Bivar & Hiskett, 'The Arabic....' *loc. cit.*, pp. 113—114.

advice and prayers of Dan Masani.[109] This was probably the successor to Abdu Abdullah b. Masani, for the *lakabi* (nick-name) became a sort of honorific used for the leading scholar among his descendants.[110] After the Kwararrafa had retreated, the Sarkin Katsina Jan Hazo is said to have visited Dan Masani and humbly expressed his gratitude, granting him the right of giving sanctuary to people wanted for certain offences.[111]

Although some of the mallamai became confidants and advisers of the sarakuna, there was also a strong and persistent tendency among them of avoiding close association with the sarakuna. The Dan Masani, for example, never came to be incorporated as a sarauta into the central government, the position remained that of an influential malam whose influence the sarakuna had to take into account. The attitude expressed by Muhammad b. Al Hajj al-Rahman al-Barnawi in the *Sharb al-zulul*, a widely known poem written in the late seventeenth or early eighteenth century, also reflects this tendency among the ulama, as these lines reveal:

> The roots of God's religion and of worship is the eating of that which is legal....
> If you are present at the eating of the food of unjust men, you have a choice. Consider what is given as food....
> If you eat, the consequences will not be upon you. His crime will be upon him....
> And likewise the taking of *dinars* which have been seized unjustly and *dirhams* taken forcibly....
> And the like of this is the gift of the governor, for all of it is unlawful, profit from error....[112]

Moreover, the devout ulama had more concrete reasons for keeping their distance from the Sarakunan Katsina besides fear of being contaminated with illegally gotten wealth. The palace (Gidan Korau) remained a stronghold of various cults of the iskoki under the Maidaki, and other senior wives and concubines. The rites of installation of a new Sarki involved flagrantly fetishistic practices in the *Soron* Bawada (Hall of Bawada) and other places.[113] It is likely that most of the Sarakunan Katsina, with perhaps the exception of a few of the devout Muslim among them, patronized shrines of the iskoki like the one at Kukar Jangare through officials like the Durbi. The importance attached to *tsafi* (fetishistic worship) in the government and the palace would have varied with the ruler, but it remained a permanent feature of the political system

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109. Aiman Zagami Muhamman, 'Labarin Zuwan Kwararrafawa a Birnin Katsina', *Hausawa da Makwabtansu*, I, Zaria, 1970, p. 41 (H.M.I.).
110. This honorific is now a sort of title bestowed by the emir on a senior descendant of the wan Dan Masani.
111. Liman Zagami Muhamman, "Labarin Zuwan...." *loc. cit.*, p. 41.
112. Bivar & Hiskett, 'The Arabic....' *loc. cit.*, pp. 123—129.
113. *T.A.K./PP-NHRS*, f.

closely identified with the dynasty. It made the devout ulama keep their distance from the Sarakuna and was an issue making for conflict between them.

The significance of external relations.

As has already been shown, influences from outside the area that became the Kasar Katsina played a part in creating conditions out of which the kingdom emerged. From its very inception external relations played an important role in its development. Katsina's most regular relations were with its immediate neighbours, the kingdoms of Daura, Kano, Zazzau and Zamfara and the polities of Tegama, Abzin, Damargou, and in the Middle Niger region to the south-west. But close relations also developed with more distant places like Borno, Nupe, Kebbi, Songhai, the communities of the Volta basin, and the cities of the Sahara and the North African mountains and coast. With the evidence available now however, we can only sketch out some aspects of these relations in order to place the internal development in the kingdom in its international context.

Very little is known at present about Katsina's relations with Daura and other polities to the north. An ancient trade route to the towns of western Borno passed through Daura.[114] Another east-west route which came to be established linking Borno with Gobir, Zamfara and the west, passed through the northern borderlands of Katsina meeting the northern route to Agades, Tuat and the Fezzan in the area of Birnin Tagar. Along these routes Katsina exported grains, leather, textiles, kolanuts and slaves while importing natron and horses from Borno, salt from the Abzinawa, goats and sheep from Adar and Damargbou, and fine cloths, paper and other luxuries from North Africa and Fezzan. The imports made up an important part of Katsina's export trade southward and the operations of the trade brought immigrants from these areas into Katsina and led to the growth of quarters like Tudun Malle, Tawatinke, Sararin Tsako in the Birni, and settlements like Dutsi, Agalawa, Keffin Bujawa elsewhere.

Relations with the people to the north would have become closer over the centuries with the southward shift of the Hausa-speaking people of the Abzin like the Gobirawa, the Tazarawa, and even groups of the Taoreg.[115] The Gobir centre of Birnin Lalle was only about 80 kilometres from the northern border, just beyond the gulbin Kaba, while another centre, the Birnin Maya, was only a few kilometres from the Maradi valley and, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, was an important market for this area.[116] These migrations of the people of the Abzin

114. See Map

115. Y. Urvoy, *Histoire des Populations du Soudan Centrale* Paris, 1936, pp. 178—179, 238—239, 243—244.

116. *Ibid.*, p. 244. Nicolas *et al op. cit.*, p. 17.

also led, in the early seventeenth century, to the establishment of the town of Illela by a group under one Tambari Illela, who came to be one of the senior sarakuna of Katsina, entitled to three beats of the *tambari* (kettle drum) at his installation.[117]

We do not know how all this affected relations between the Sarakunan Katsina and the Sultans of Agades, a dominant power in these northern regions. The reasons for Katsina's support for the Sultan of Agades Muhammad Al-Mubarek in the civil war of c.1601 have been given as aid to Borno.[118] This might well have been the case. But given the interest of Katsina in preventing Taoreg raids into its territory, ensuring security for its citizens on what was a major pilgrimage and trade route, and the settlement of the Abzinawa in Katsina itself, Katsina could not help being drawn into the turbulent politics of the Abzin.[119]

This involvement in the internal politics of a neighbouring state was not unusual; it happened in relations with Zamfara which, up to the middle of the seventeenth century, seem, on the whole, to have been peaceful.[120] The town of Kiawa, one of the major towns of Zamfara, seems to have had close relations with Katsina and controlled towns built by Katsinawa like Gada and Rawaya, before its incorporation into Zamfara.[121] In the middle of the seventeenth century however, a conflict developed between Katsina and Zamfara during the reign of the Sarkin Katsina Uban Yara (1641—1671). The background to this conflict is obscure, but one of the causes was the killing of a *basarake* (a member of the aristocracy) of Zamfara by Uban Yara (i.e. the killing of the Turaki in the country of Daka).[122] This led to an attack on Katsina by the Sarkin Zamfara Zaudai dan Daka which was opposed by the sarakuna of Zamfara because they said Katsina was a friendly neighbour which had given them support when they went to war in the Abzin, Kebbi and Zabarama.[123] Serious conflict in Zamfara developing out of this was averted by the death of Zaudai, but because of the crisis the sarakuna refused to install a son of Zaudai and instead appointed Aliyu dan Daka,

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117. P.G. Harriss, *Assessment Report on Marusa District*, 1920, NNAK/KATPROF/HIS-40.
118. Hunwick, "Songhay, Bornu....", *loc. cit.*, p. 221.
119. *GIT(n)*, September 1971, gives that the territory of Katsina once reached as far north as the southern gate of Agades.
120. Krieger, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
121. *S.P.G.*, pp. 127, 149.
122. *K.M.K./PP-NHRS*, f.
123. Krieger, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

who was the first Muslim ruler of Zamfara and a builder of mosques in its villages and towns.[124] We do not know the type of relations the Sarkin Zamfara Aliyu came to establish with Katsina. Possibly his policy of actively encouraging Islam was in some ways connected with the flourishing of Islamic learning in Katsina in the reign of Uban Yara (1641—1671) and Muhammadu Jan Hazo (1671—1684), associated with the Dan Masani (1655—1667) and Dan Marina.[125]

These episodes in Katsina's relations with Ahir and Zamfara, clearly implying much more than we can at present perceive, provide an illustration of how Katsina came to be involved with the internal politics of its neighbours. Such involvement created a network of relations between dynasties, groups of mallamai and sarakuna covering the Kasar Hausa and neighbouring areas which, by the end of the eighteenth century, had brought about considerable political interdependence in the area. This was behind the preoccupation of the Sarakuna of Katsina of the eighteenth century with developments in Zamfara and Gobir; and the active participation by groups from the Abzin, Zamfara, Daura and Kano in the Jihad wars in Katsina. The existence of these network of relations was one of the conditions which favoured the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate in the early nineteenth century.

The evidence regarding Katsina's relations with other polities in the west are much more scanty and in a way rather tantalizing. Abd al-Rahman as-Sadi mentions two military encounters involving Songhai and Katsina, one in 1514 and the other in 1554.[126] The former is often seen as part of Songhain conquest of Katsina and Kano and the latter as an attempt to reconquer Katsina.[127] The real significance of this information in the *Tarikh al-Sudan* cannot be assessed without further evidence regarding Katsina's relationship with this powerful but distant polity. The evidence regarding Katsina's relations with Kebbi are only slightly less scanty. The first Kanta moved into the gulbin Kebbi area from Kwiambana, an early metropolis of Katsina Laka.[128] There are traditions that the Kebbi forces once invaded the town of Dan Ashita on Katsina's eastern border.[129] The Kanta is said to have been killed in Katsina territory on his way back to Kebbi after conducting an expedition towards Borno:[130] this was

124. *Ibid:*, p. 38.
125. Bivar & Hiskett, "The Arabic....", *loc. cit.*, pp. 114—116.
126. Abd al-Rahman as-Sadi, *Tarikh al-Sudan,*, ed. and trans. O. Houdas, Paris, 1891—1900.
127. Hunwick, 'Songhay, Bornu....' *loc. cit.*, p. 215.
128. Alkali, *op. cit.*, p. 51.
129. *GID(a)*, August 1972.
130. Alkali, *op. cit.*,

after the famous Kebbi-Borno encounter of c.1561.[131] All this evidence however, does not add up to make a clear picture of Katsina-Kebbi relations. These relations, which would have involved considerable trade, especially between Katsina Laka and the cities and salt producing centres of Kebbi, considerable migrations and diplomatic exchanges, still await reconstruction.

Relations with Kano were close from a very early period and are easier to reconstruct. It is likely that there was trade between the two areas even before the formation of the kingdom of Katsina.[132] Iron ore, cotton, and indigo were probably sent from the Gozaki-Pauwa region into Kano; leather, leather goods, goats and grindstones were sent down from the northern parts. Textiles and dyestuff was probably a major export of Kano into areas of Katsina, while the movement of food grain between the two areas would have fluctuated with the nature of the harvests. The expansion from the fifteenth century of long-distance commerce created a new and more complex pattern of exchange between the two areas, and an attempt is made in the next chapter to sketch its outline in the late eighteenth century: the 'trans-Saharan trade' formed one aspect of this commerce. The volume and value of goods in this however, were small compared with the more regular exchange of bulk raw materials, livestock, food, grains and manufactured goods produced by the agricultural, pastoral and manufacturing sectors of the two economies.[133] The governments derived much greater revenue from the tax on salt from the Abzin, natron from Borno and from much more established and regular sources like the dye-pit tax, weavers tax, and other taxes on crafts and manufacture. In any case Kano had access to trans-Saharan commodities through routes besides that through Katsina to Agades.[134] The hypothesis that rivalry over the control of the Sudan end of the trans-Saharan trade was the reason for the series of military conflicts between Kano and Katsina from the latter part of the fifteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth century needs to be re-examined[135] Not

131. Ibid. Hunwick "Songhay, Bornu....," *loc. cit.*, pp. 222—223.
132. Hiskett, (ed.), 'The Song of Bagauda....,' *loc. cit.*, p. 115.
133. I have examined this question in 'Some Aspects of the External Relations of Katsina Before 1804', *Savanna*, 1.2, December 1972, pp. 178—179. And in greater detail in *'Some conceptual problems in the study of the economy and political communities of the Central Sudan'*, paper presented at the 19th Annual Congress of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Zaria, December 1973, pp. 4—10 (mimeo.).
134. Kano had access to the markets of northern Africa and the Sahara through Borno —an account of the commerce of Kano in the sixteenth century indicates that it was as involved with Fez as it was with Cairo. See D. Lange & S. Bertoud 'L'Interrieur de l'Afrique Occidentale d'Apres Giovanni Lorenzo Anania' (XVI Siecle), *Journal of World History*, UNESCO, XIV. 2, 1972, p. 343.
135. Usman, "Some Aspects....", *loc. cit.*, pp. 177—180.

only do we not know the nature and magnitude of these 'wars' but we have to examine them closely for their political substance and general context.

Some of these 'wars' might have been only raids for booty, as the expedition of the Sarkin Kano Muhammadu Zaki (1582—1618) and those of the Wambai Giwa and Bako dan Kutumbi in that period seem to have been.[136] Others might have involved weightier political issues, as the expeditions of the Sarkin Kano Abdullahi dan Rumfa, who camped for four months on the gulbin Kaita near the Birni and then returned to Kano; and the Katsina expeditions in the reign of Abubakar Kado (1565—1573).[137] The last of these series of military conflict reported seem to have involved some serious political issues. Its immediate cause was the killing of a slave called Magani, who seems to have belonged to somebody from Kano who was visiting Katsina.[138] This person might have been a representative of the Kano government on a mission to Katsina and the killing of his slave constituted what, in modern diplomatic parlance, would be called 'a grave act of provocation'. This incident took place after the Sarkin Kano Muhammadu Nazaki (c.1618—1623) had attempted to bring about peace and his approach had been spurned.[139] A Katsina attack after the rejection of this peace offer was defeated at Karaye and the Wamban Kano, Giwa, started raiding into Katsina from there.[140] Raids were also conducted into Katsina territory by Bako dan Kutumbi who raided the town of Kurmin Dan Ranko.[141] There were clearly sufficient reasons for tension in relations between the governments of Katsina and Kano and these might be behind the killing of the slave Magani, and the subsequent war. The Sarkin Kano Kutumbi (c.1623—1648) was successful in imposing a prolonged siege on the Birnin Katsina from his camp at Dugazawa.[142] When he returned on a second expedition however, his army was surprised and routed at night while it camped outside the western gate. Kutumbi was killed at Rurumawa just on the Katsina-Kano border.[143] His son Al-Hajj who succeeded him was deposed after a reign of just over 8 months.[144] The ulama then intervened and peace was made in the reign of his successor Shekarau (c.1649—1651).[145] The mallamai who intervened as peacemakers are given as Shehu Ataman, Malam Bawa and Liman Yadoiya, further illustrating

136. *K.C.*, p. 116.
137. *K.C.*, pp. 112—114.
138. Usman, 'Some Aspects....', *loc. cit.*, p. 177.
139. *K.C.*, p. 117.
140. *Ibid.*
141. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
142. *K.C.*, p. 118.
143. *Ibid.; B.K.D./PP-NHRS.*
144. *K.C.*, p. 119.
145. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

the influential position the ulama in this area had come to occupy by the mid-seventeenth century.[146]

The nature of the relations between the Sarakunan Katsina and the Mais of Borno is more difficult to reconstruct with the fragmentary evidence available now. The attempts that have been made to examine this evidence and the cultural and economic context of these relations closely, indicate that Borno occupied a special position in the international system of the Central Sudan which is obscured by the widely-held notions of a Bornoan 'empire'.[147] Borno was a major source for natron, salt, horses, articles of clothing, saddlery and other commodities which played an important role in the commerce of Katsina and neighbouring areas. It was also an important market for textiles, leather goods from these areas, and for other commodities brought from Nupe, Oyo and the Volta basin. Traders from Borno played an active part in the development of the extensive networks of long-distance trade which, from the early fifteenth century, came to link the major population and production centres of the Central Sudan.[148] The Birnin Katsina emerged as one of the early modes of this commercial network. Migration of the Barebari into Katsina seems to date back to this period. Groups of identifiable migrants in this early period included a group led by one Tamma from the Logone area of Borno which first settled at Tama in eastern Katsina and then moved to Godia in western Kano in the reign of Sarkin Kano Abubakar Kado (c.1565—1573).[149] There were also the groups which included the family of Abu Abdullah Muhammad b. Masani who were settled in Katsina when he was born in 1595. He was known by the lakabi of 'al-Barnawi al-Kashinawi'.[150]

Borno, through its position in the commerce of the area and the movement of scholars, like the family of Dan Masani, exercised a strong and permanent influence on Katsina and other kingdoms of the Kasar Hausa. By the sixteenth century Borno was well established as a leading centre of learning, a source of religious and cultural inspiration for the ulama of Katsina and neighbouring areas.[151] The Mais of Borno claimed to be Caliphs, and Muslim scholars held prominent positions in their

146. *Ibid.*
147. Y.B. Usman, *A reconsideration of the history of relations between Borno and Hausaland before 1804,* paper presented to the Borno Seminar, Maiduguri, January 1973.
148. *K.C.*, p. 111.
149. *Ibid.*, p. 114. They might have come from Bagarmi further to the east.
150. Smith, 'A Seventeenth Century Writer....' *loc. cit.*, p. 1.
151. Smith, 'Some Notes on the History of Zazzau Under the Hausa Kings' in *Zaria and its Region* (ed.) M.J. Mortimore, p. 88. Muhammadu Bello, *Infaq al-Maisur (ed.) C.J. Whitting, London, 1951.*

government.[152] A close reading of the poem by Muhammad b. al-Sabbaqh, celebrating the victory of the Mai Hajj Ali b. Umar (c.1644—1684) over the Kwararrafa, reveals great admiration for the Mai, not only as a victor and saviour, but as a Muslim ruler.[153] Dan Marina even called him 'the Amir ul Muminin' a title which was never applied or claimed by any of the Sarakuna of Katsina and other kingdoms of Hausaland.[154]

The payment of what had come to be known as 'tribute' by the rulers of Katsina to Borno, appear to have arisen, not so much as a result of a Bornoan military conquest or the threat of it to Katsina, but out of the situation of its cultural hegemony and commercial importance which came to prevail.[155] This tribute is said to have amounted to 100 slaves sent to the Mais by every new Sarkin Katsina on his accession.[156]

These aspects of the external relations of Katsina, especially its relations with Borno, reveal that a process of integration and incorporation involving Katsina operated at two levels. Internally, hundreds of towns and numerous groups of heterogenous origin were integrated around the institution of Sarkin Katsina into a territorial kingdom. At the same time commerce, migration, and the spread of Islam, was bringing about the incorporation of the kingdom into the Islamic community of the bilad as-Sudan. The Jihad movement led by the Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, which in the early nineteenth century attempted to establish a political framework for this community, was one outcome of this historical process the outline of which has been sketched in this chapter.

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152. J.E. Lavers, 'Islam in the Bornu Caliphate: A Survey', *Odu*, 5, 1971, pp. 30—33.
153. *S.M.*, vol. III, p. 83.
154. Usman, 'Some Aspects....', *loc. cit.*, pp. 185—187.
155. See Usman, *'A Reconsideration ....'*, where the whole question of tribute is examined using fresh translations of parts of *K.C.*
156. Barth, *op. cit.*, vol. I.

2 *The pattern of settlements in the eighteenth century*

Before we proceed to examine the nature of the society and the state in the Kasar Katsina and neighbouring areas in the eighteenth century, we shall outline the pattern of settlement in that period. This is in order to indicate a general outline of the material conditions in which the Jihad, and the social and political developments leading up to it, took place.

IDENTIFICATION

When we attempt to reconstruct the pattern of settlement in this area before the Jihad, we find that not only do we have to cope with the problem of scanty evidence but, in order to distinguish between various phases of settlement at each particular site, the additional one of sifting the limited evidence available. Many settlements have been built on the site of abandoned ones, or alongside those already existing with which they have often merged: others have been transformed physically by the arrival of immigrants. The complexities of settlement evolution over a long historical period in an area of fairly dense population and considerable migration, are reflected in the numerous contradictions in the traditions of the founding and development of many settlements.

MARADI

According to some of the Maradi traditions for example, Maradi was the title of a sarki of some status ruling over the gulbin Maradi area before the Jihad.[1] But other traditions of Maradi have it that, when the exiled Katsina prince Dan Kasawa arrived in the area in the early nineteenth century, there was no such sarauta or town in the area; only small villages on the plateaux, and the valley was thickly forested.[2] According to this latter tradition, the person who became the maigari of Maradi under Dan Kasawa, came in from Rano about the same time as Dan

1. Nicolas *et al, op. cit.*, p. 8.
2. *GIM(n)*, September 1971.

Kasawa.[3] 'Abd al-Qadir b. al-Mustafa records however, that Maradi was besieged by Soba, an early eighteenth century ruler of Gobir, and was taken by the Sarkin Gobir Bawa Jan Gwarzo (d.1789).[4] While this information corroborates the former tradition that Maradi dates back to the early eighteenth century, it does not establish that the settlement and the sarauta continued to exist in the 30 or so years between the occupation by Bawa Jan Gwazo in c.1789 and the arrival of Dan Kasawa in c.1816. The location of the nineteenth century town of Maradi in a valley subjected to heavy flooding makes determination of the successive phases of settlement through examination of the wall difficult.[5] Judging from the traditions however, it seems that the settlement, or settlements, of Maradi had declined in size and importance by the early nineteenth century. Small villages remained on the plateaux like Jiratawa, Sumarana and Runjin Magarya, with a population largely made up of hunters and farmers.[6]

RUMA

But perhaps, the best example of the difficulties that arise in unravelling the history of settlements in this area, even when fairly detailed information is available, occurs in the case of Ruma. Here, it seems there was a settlement of some importance from early times, but some of the traditions point to the eighteenth century as the period when the settlement was founded. Ruma was sited near a spring among huge rocky boulders 40 kilometres west-south-west of the Birnin Katsina. The site has an abundant supply of ground water sufficient even for dry season cultivation.[7] This, combined with its location on a high ground, from which a panoramic view of the countryside for kilometres around is obtained, and the huge rocky boulders around it, make it one of the best natural fortress in the Kasar Katsina. According to one body of tradition Ruma was established when a group of immigrants from the Abzin known as

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3. *Ibid.*
4. 'Abd al-Qadir b. al-Mustafa, *Raudat al-afkar*, extracts from which have been translated for me by Abdullahi Smith, from a text in PP-NHRS, Reel 1, Ms. 49. *R.A.*, refers here to this translation, where it provides information omitted in the Hausa translation in *Hausawa da Makwabtansu*, I, Zaria, 1970. (H.M.I.). Where they agree I quote H.M.I. pp. 12—13. For the dating of the death of Sarkin Gobir Bawa Jan Gwarzo see D.M. Last, *The Sokoto Caliphate*, London, 1967. p. 7 fn. 25.
5. Maradi was flooded in 1945. The site of the town occupied in the nineteenth century is now a sandy fadama.
6. Nicolas *et al op. cit.*, p. 17. P. David, 'Maradi Precolonial l'Etat et La Ville', *BIFAN*, XXXI, Ser.B, No. 3, 1969, pp. 645—648.
7. Hugh Clapperton passed through Ruma on May 12, 1824 and noted that: 'There was abundance of limpid water and on all sides were seen fruit trees, well cultivated fields and numerous hamlets and towns. Being market day the road was crowded with

the Rumawa moved into the area in the mid-eighteenth century.[8] According to this tradition, these immigrants settled near a town known as Yar Larba, which was the seat of a Gatarin Katsina known as Jan Gizo.[9] After the death of Gatarin Jan Gizo a leader of the new settlement of Ruma, Hassan, was given the sarauta of Garatin Katsina.[10] The town was attacked by the Sarkin Gobir Yakubu (d.1794—95) and was contested for in the Jihad wars and then again in the *boren* (revolt) Dan Mari of 1842—44[11]. Ruma was clearly a town of great strategic importance from which the western approaches to the Birnin Katsina and the densely settled central plains to its south and east was controlled.[12] It seems unlikely that a town at this site was only established when the Rumawa arrived in the eighteenth century. It would seem more likely, and might have become obscured in the traditions (because of the important role the Rumawa came to play in the area in the nineteenth century) that Ruma, by whatever name it was then known, was a frontier fortress from the early period of the kingdom even if, in the epoch of the Gatari Jan Gizo, it went through some major developments.[13] *Yar Larba* was probably a market for Ruma and other towns of the area like Maiwa, Dumburum, Madaddabi, Yandaka, Runeyo, Kaikatanga and several others destroyed in the revolt of 1842—44, but which formed a significant cluster of towns in that north-west region in the late eighteenth century.[14]

The difficulties which arise in establishing the evolution of the settlements of Maradi and Ruma have been cited in some detail in order to illustrate one of the main problems conditioning the reconstruction of the settlement pattern of eighteenth century Katsina. We shall proceed to outline this pattern, but it should be kept in mind that this attempt is limited by such difficulties, which can be tackled properly only by a detailed study of each site, making extensive use not only of oral tradition

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people. Some of whom were driving before them as fine bullocks as I have ever seen in any country.... Near the channel of one of the little streams winding among the crags of siennite, I saw five or six plantain trees growing wild. These were the first I had seen in the country, and on inquiry the inhabitants told me that this plant did not bear fruit nearer than Zegzeg'. E.W. Bovill, *op. cit.*, p. 706.

8. *SRM (b),* August 1972.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *SRM(b),* August 1972. *Ruma District File,* NNAK/KATPROF/I/9.
11. *H.M.I.,* p. 14.
12. Ruma is only about 8 kilometres west of the ancient town of Yandaka, which seems to have been an important zango on a major western route from the Birnin Katsina. Bovill, *op. cit.,* p. 706. G.F. Lyons, *A Narrative of Travels in Northern Africa in the Years 1818—19 and 1820,* London, 1966, p. 132.
13. *Ruma District File,* NNAK/KATPROF/I/9.
14. *Yar Larba* means 'Of Wednesday', the sort of name given to weekly markets held on Wednesday. *SRM(b),* August 1972.

and archaeology, but even of the botanical sciences, a field which is clearly beyond the scope of this book.

BIRNIN KATSINA

In tracing the genesis of the kingdom we have attempted to show how one of the conditions which favoured the emergence of Korau as Sarkin Katsina was the growth of an economic and religious centre on a piece of high ground near the confluence of the Koramar Tilla and the Koramar Gizu, to which the older settlements of the area became dependent to a considerable degree.[15] This dependence increased when the place became the seat of a new government ruling over these settlements of the surrounding plains and areas beyond. This development laid the basis for the growth of the Birnin Katsina into the most important urban centre of the kingdom, with extensive fortifications in the form of a wall and a moat, with a circumference of about 12 kilometres.[16] Beyond this, at a distance of about 2 kilometres, was a rampart built with earth and reinforced at the base and on the outside with laterite ironstones with a circumference of about 32 kilometres.

The history of the building of these fortifications is obscure. The outer earthwork is known as the Ganuwar Amina.[17] There are indications of old wall remains in parts of the Birni. Although these have not been properly identified, the city seem to have grown around the settlements of Unguwar Makera, Unguwar Yammawa, and Rafukka in area A of Map D. These settlements were centred around farming activity in the *fadamomi* (valley bottom lands) of Tilla and Gizu; the iron works of the Kwarin Tama and the commercial activity in the zango nearby. The earliest fortifications probably enclosed these settlements, with the Gidan Korau built around the tree shrine of Bawada covering most of the south-western section. The 'town' houses of the senior sarakunan garuruwa, like the Durbi, the Yandaka and the Samri came to be the centres around which new quarters developed, such as the Kofar Durbi, Kofar Yandaka, Kofar Gazobi, Kofar Samri and the Kofar Kaura quarters.

The expansion in the manufacture of leather, textiles and metal goods, as well as in commerce, led to considerable immigration into the new

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15. See above.

16. These figures and subsequent ones on the size of walled towns are based on rough estimates derived from maps and my own field observations. For the walls of the Birnin Katsina, I have used *KATSINA:* 1.12,500, Northern Nigeria Surveys, Kaduna, 1967, and *KATSINA,* N.W. Sheet No. 54, 1.500,000, Federal Surveys, 1970.

17. The reason why some of the earthworks of parts of the Kasar Hausa are associated with this figure of Hausa historical folklore is not clear. See A. Smith, "Some Notes on the History of Zazzau under the Hausa Kings", *loc. cit.,* pp. 85—6.

metropolis. This produced new *unguwoyi* (quarters of towns or cities) to the south and west of the older block of settlements, inhabited by merchants, artisans and other groups attracted by this growing urban centre, forming area B of Map D. By the end of the eighteenth century this block of settlements had become the most densely settled part of the Birnin Katsina and, made up of the present-day quarters of Masanawa, Makudawa, Gambarawa, Darma, Tsohuwar Kasuwa, Gafai, Albaba, Kofar Yandaka and Kofar Guga, had come to be known as the *cikin* (compound) *Birni* as distinct from other sections of the city. It was here that the workshops of the tanners, leather workers, silversmiths, tailors and other artisans were located. It was here that the main markets were found and the hostels and shops providing for the *fataka* (caravan trade) and other travellers.[18] The great trading houses with *ma'adanawa* (stores/ ware houses) of textile goods, natron, lead, brass, salt, silver, kolanuts, cowries and other goods, and their halls of business where major commercial transactions were conducted, were also here. Together with all these commercial and manufacturing establishments were the schools and mosques of the ulama which came to form the hub of religious and cultural life in these quarters of the cikin Birni.

The economic and cultural importance these quarters of the cikin Birni came to have by the late eighteenth century, is a reflection of the transformation that the Birni underwent in the 300 years since it became the capital of the kingdom. In the earlier period its centre of gravity was in the iron working and agricultural settlements of Makera and Rufukka, the zangon Tilla, and in the shrine of Bawada and the palace built around it. The iron workings were of little importance by the end of the eighteenth century as iron, and iron-made goods, were imported from the area of richer iron ore deposits elsewhere where the wood fuel for smelting was also abundantly available. Food was brought in from the farms in the extensive karkara beyond the walls and from the rest of the kingdom. The gardens of Rafukka would have retained some importance for the cultivation of irrigated crops and vegetables like wheat, onions, and maize, and in emergency situations of drought or prolonged siege. The farmland within the walls was also important in conditions of siege, but in normal times its importance seems to have been as grazing ground for the large numbers of sheep, goats, donkeys, camels and horses kept in the Birni. The zangon Tilla retained some importance as a stopping place of travellers right up to the early twentieth century, but it lost its role as the centre of commercial activity to the Birni markets, the

18. *Hikayat Ghuzu,* PP-NHRS, Ms. 191 (H.G.).

markets in the karkara around Dugazawa and Ajiwa, and the trading houses of the cikin Birni.[19]

The two centres of gravity of the Birnin Katsina at the end of the eighteenth century were the Gidan Korau, and the cikin Birni. The Gidan Korau with its huge *sauruka,* (area of fallow land) for the conduct of royal business, its stores, stables and houses of the princes, slaves and eunuchs had by then attained the size of a small town complete with a wall, a moat and the two gates of Kofar Bai.[20] The palace complex was known as the cikin Gida as distinct from the cikin Birni from which it was separated by wide open spaces, the remnants of which now form the field of Kangiwa, outside the Kofar Soro. Away from these two blocks of dense housing were the quarters that developed around the gates. Initially these were the town houses of the sarakunan garuruwa who brought in the labour to maintain the adjacent stretches of wall. Hostels and other facilities for travellers had developed around the houses of the *sarkin kofa* (head/keeper of the gate). In some cases these kofa quarters had, like the Kofar Yandaka and the Kofar Guga, really merged with the cikin Birni and formed an integral part of it both economically and socially. The establishment of the sarauta of kofa to supervise the movement of people through these gates, brought sarakuna directly under the central government into authority in these quarters.

The land between the walls and the ramparts comprised farmlands, gardens and open woodland covered with shrubs and brushwood. During the farming season temporary homesteads might be established in the area, but there are no indications of any quarters growing up in it: it was, perhaps, of great importance as grazing ground. Outside these ramparts there seem to have been a narrow belt of woodland and shrub; not, however, continuous, as the karkara of the settlements around the Birni such as Tsagero, Barawa, Sabon Gari, Dutsin Safe, Ajiwa, Dugazawa, and Kabakawa, which in parts extended right up to the ramparts.

These settlements, situated within a 30 kilometre radius of the Birnin Katsina, were its true satellites. Some of them, such as Tsagero, were country estates of the sarakuna where large establishments of slaves were maintained and where some of the princes were brought up.[21] Others were old settlements which could not develop autonomous urban status because of their proximity to the Birni. There were the hamlets of the

19. Dugazawa is referred to in connection with a mid-seventeenth century event. *K.C.* p. 118
20. Hugh Clapperton who was in the Birnin Katsina for about four days in May 1824 noted: 'The governor's residence resembles a large village and is about half a mile east of all other buildings', Bovill, *op. cit.*, p. 708.
21. *GTB(t),* July 1972.

large markets like Dugazawa and Ajiwa; and others like Barawa and Sabon Gari which were probably garrisons. Additionally, there were settlements, such as Majen Gobir, Bugaje, and Kwami, of specialized merchants, artisans, mallamai and others whose occupations and circumstances required a certain proximity to the Birnin Katsina.

THE PLAINS OF INGAWA

Although the area of the central plains was the most densely settled part of the kingdom and held numerous settlements, very few of these seem to have remained as important urban centres by the late eighteenth century. This was partly due to the economic and cultural pull of the Birnin Katsina, and also to the policy that the central government seems to have pursued of keeping these towns under close control and generally maintaining small units of territorial authority in this area. The Birnin Samri and Kaita appear to have retained some status as important urban centres in their own right. The history of the former is now completely obscure, while that of the latter is extremely complex, as it was formed through the merging of numerous independent settlements.[22] The most distinctive urban centre on these central plains by the late eighteenth century was Ingawa.

This town, situated about 60 kilometres south-east of the Birnin Katsina, was the centre of a prosperous district along the border with Kano. It is located on the southern extension of the belt of *jigawa* soil that covers most of northern and eastern Katsina. Unlike the rest of this jigawa land however, it suffers no serious shortage of iron ore, and even grindstones were mined at Doddoji nearby.[23] Water was available at fairly shallow depths and the fadamomi of the gulbin Gari and the gulbin Jani provided excellent grazing ground and soil suitable for the cultivation of some cotton and indigo. Ingawa itself was built along the fadamar Masibi, formed by a tributary of the Jani.

Even before the emergence of the town of Ingawa as a kind of metropolis for these plains, the area seemed to have held several important settlements. There was the ribat of Dan Ashita which became important, not only for its mosque and tomb of a saint, but as a significant dyeing centre; and the Birnin Takiyawa, one of whose inhabitants was the famous professional warrior, Bako Na Mashi, who was employed by

22. The Birnin Samri in the marshes of the lower gulbin Kaita broke up during the Jihad wars. Kaita was situated higher up in the same basin and seems to have consisted of several settlements whose various phases and relations were rather complex. *GIG(k)*, August 1972. Dankousso & Caranci, *op. cit.*, pp. 159—160.

23. A.T. Grove & R.A. Pullan, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

Sarkin Kano Kumbari (c.1731—1742) for the campaign against the Sarkin Ringim Ada.[24] Also the Birnin Dara, which seemed to have vanished long before the Jihad, leaving its name to an area of farmland and pasture known as the karkarar Dara.

The town of Ingawa grew up in an area with a long history of urban development. Apparently it developed around a *nasarrawa* (royal country residence) of the Sarakunan Katsina, built near the fadamar Masibi and the well of Dandan, in the vicinity of a stopping place on a route from the Birnin Katsina to the Birnin Kano. The town walls extended from this palace, and one of the gates of the palace, the Kofar Bai, seemingly once formed one of the gates of the town. We do not know when this country palace of the Sarakunan Katsina was established, but they certainly seemed to have paid some attention to this area, either because of its wealth in agriculture and livestock or its position at the crossroads of routes to all directions. It was certainly the site of some important events in Katsina's foreign relations. In the sixteenth century the Kebbawa besieged the town of Dan Ashita, camping among the silk cotton trees to the west of the town.[25] The Sarkin Kano Kutumbi (c.1623—1648) whose death marked the end of a series of wars between Katsina and Kano, is said to have been killed at Rurumawa about 16 kilometres from Ingawa.[26] In the eighteenth century the Sarkin Kano Babba Zaki (c.1768—1776) built a fortress at Garun Shami near Kunchi, and the Sarkin Katsina Wari Maikere (c.1755—1768) built one at Zuchi facing it across the frontier.[27] These were perhaps some of the reasons why so much attention was given to the area by the Sarakunan Katsina.

Although such attention might have provided some stimulus to the area's growth, it was the establishment of a leader of the Yerimawa Fulani as a Sarkin Fulani, based in Ingawa, that led to the emergence of Ingawa as a metropolis for the area. Groups of the Yerimawa were in these eastern borderlands by the late seventeenth century; others were further north around Sandamu, Gamagira and Yamel.[28] Some of these Yerimawa clan leaders established good relations with the central government and one of them, Inti, was given the sarauta of Sarkin Fulani

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24. *LIS(i)*, August 1972. A. Solken 'Die Geschichte Von Ada', *Mitteilungen der Ausland Hoschachule unter Universität* Berlin, 39, 1936, p. 152. The founder of the town of Mashi much further to the north, is said to be one Bako, from Daura, who became a famous warrior. Dankousso & Caranci, *op. cit.*, pp. 178—179.
25. *GID(a)*, August 1972. *B.K.D./PP-NHRS.*
26. *B.K.D./PP-NHRS.*
27. *Ibid.*
28. 'Asalin Mutanen Ingawa' *Ingawa District Notes*, NNAK/KATNA W763, p. 31. Dankousso & Caranci, *op. cit.*, pp. 113—114.

Dambo with the royal palace at Ingawa as his palace.[29] He came to exercise authority, not only over some of the Fulani, but over neighbouring settlements like Koda, Shamiya and territory extending eastwards into the marshes of the gulbin Gari to the east; as his kirari *'Inti mai gabas bunari!'* indicates.[30]

The Yerimawa maintained their large herds and, as the environment was favourable, there was the growth of a well integrated farming and pastoral economy in which weaving and dyeing played an important role. In the dry season the cattle did not have to be taken far, only eastwards into the marshes of the gulbin Gari, or along the watercourses of the upper gulbin Kaita basin to the north. In the eighteenth century the area attracted other groups of pastoralists such as the Baawa, the Jobawa, the Fulani Yamri and the Wodabe. Various markets for the sale of livestock existed in the area and, in the nineteenth century the great livestock market of Runjin Bauchi developed.

THE KARADUWA-BUNSURI CONFLUENCE

The part of Katsina known as 'Katuka' is said to begin from the southern bank of the gulbin Karaduwa, but its centre was Gozaki, over 50 kilometres away on the border with Zazzau.[31] The garuruwa and birane, in the confluence area of the Karaduwa and Bunsuru rivers, seem to have formed a distinct cluster of their own in central Katsina around the Birnin Bakane and the Birnin Dugul. Birnin Bakane was situated on the very fertile alluvial soil within the immediate area of the confluence, the actual point where the waters meet being only 8 kilometres away at Zobe. Its fortifications include a wall with a circumference of about 6 kilometres. Judging from this, the extent of the slag at a smelting place about 3 kilometres away, and the number and size of the dye-pits inside and outside the walls, the Birnin Bakane, when it flourished, must have been one of the premier cities of this part of the Kasar Katsina. It was situated on a long fadama, extending for over 16 kilometres from Zobe to Karaduwa, which provides abundant grazing ground, soil for the cultivation of cotton and indigo, and for dry season farming; the woodland along the sandy banks of the *gulabe* (large river) consisting of forests of *giginya* (deleb palm; *(Borassus flabellifer)*) a source of the building rafters. Fishing was possible in the numerous lakes and ponds, some of which were quite large, like the Tabkin Karaduwa.

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29. 'Asalin Mutanen Ingawa', *loc. cit.*, p. 28.
30. *SRI(b)*, August 1972.
31. 'Katuka' and 'Garewa' are two names given to the eastern and western sections of southern Katsina respectively. The people of these areas are referred to in some contexts as Katukawa and Garenawa. Both terms seem to define cultural-geographical dimen-

The Birnin Bakane was the metropolis of a large number of town in the confluence area of the Bunsuru and Karaduwa, of which we know of Makera, Wangarawa, Garangamawa, Birnin Kaji, Birnin Doka, Birnin Dugul and Papu. The prosperity and the population of this region seems to have declined by the late eighteenth century. Why, it is not clear, but since it has remained a largely underpopulated region up to the twentieth century, the reasons may lie in some persistent environmental or economic factors. The area became largely covered with the woodland of the dajin Papu and the dajin Zuri which extends south-westwards to link up with the dajin Pauwa covering another area of vanished prosperity in the late eighteenth century.[32] Dugul continued as a sort of metropolis, but seems to have become much smaller and poorer than it was in its heyday when the Birnin Dugul, built around the dutsin Dugul, is said to have consisted of 99 unguwoyi[33] The town of Matazu, which had emerged on the banks of the *kogin* (river) Damari, a tributary of the gulbin Karaduwa, developed into an important urban centre. It was peopled by immigrants from some of these declining towns, and others from Borno, Gogori in Kano, and areas of Zamfara, who, by the end of the eighteenth century, succeeded in establishing a flourishing dyeing industry there, an important market, and a centre for scholarship.[34] But although the Karaduwa-Bunsuru confluence area formed its hinterland, its orientation was towards the great centres of commerce and learning in the north and east.

The availability of abundant pasture and water attracted Fulani pastoralists into this area. By the end of the eighteenth century there were permanent settlements of the Daneji at Masoji and Papu, and of the Dangawa at Yantumaki.[35] The area remained covered by one of the largest stretches of daji in the Kasar Katsina right up to the twentieth century, for even the policy of town building pursued by the emirs of the mid-nineteenth century did not alter its settlement pattern.

RUNKA

To the west of the Karaduwa-Bunsuru confluence area, in a dissected plateau region separating the Sokoto Basin from the Katsina uplands,

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sions. The saying *'Garewa kashin shanu!'* (Garewa, like cow dung!) might be referring to the densely settled nature of the area.

32. The towns of the dutsin Pauwa region seem to have been declining in the late eighteenth century. But traces of the ruins of Kurkutawa, Durmin Birni, Lmbisa, Barebari, and Maidorowa indicate that at one time the area was densely settled.

33. *GIM(m),* September 1972.

34. *Ibid.*

35. *GIO(g),* August 1972.

was another cluster of settlements around the town of Runka. Besides Runka there were Duru, Biri, Birnin Mago, Ganuwa Zabuwa, Jangarai, Babban Duhu and several others, of which there are now only traces of ruined walls, mostly located at the foot of the numerous inselbergs dotted all over this region. They form what could be called the fourth complex of inselberg settlements which cover the western part of the Kasar Katsina, with the complexes around Kwiambana, Birnin Kogo and Kwatarkwashi forming the first, second, and third respectively.

Some of these settlements like Duru had close connections with Kwatarkwashi and were themselves centres of the Magiro cult.[36] While Jangarai seem to have developed around the Kukar Jan Garai, an important shrine of the bori cult, the town of Biri, was a centre of iron working. Runka was the largest of these settlements and although it is not possible, without an intensive examination, to unravel the various phases of settlement around the dutsin Runka, it apparently grew into a town of considerable size with a market important for the commerce in foodgrains, food ingredients like *kalwa* (seeds of locust bean *(Parkia filicoidea)* tree) and forest products. There was also a zango inside the walls for *fatake* (itinerant traders) travelling to the region of Kiyawa and the west. When the Jihad wars broke out in 1804 Runka, Zakka, Ruma and Zandam were the major towns of north-western Katsina and the conquest of Runka by Muhammadu Na Alhaji in 1805 was an important victory of the Katsina *mujahiddin* (participants in the Jihad campaigns).[37]

BIRNIN YANDOTO

In the late eighteenth century the town of Yandoto, situated on a swell of land forming a watershed between the gulbin Gagare and the Sokoto, was a metropolis of the northern part of a geographical region known as 'Katsina Laka'.[38] Like the much older settlement of Kwatarkwashi, about 16 kilometres to its north-west, Yandoto was located on a belt of clay loams richer and more suitable for a greater variety of crops than the sandier soil found over most of the Kasar Katsina. Unlike Kwatarkwashi, however, it was not an inselberg settlement, although a low range of lateritic ironstones hills provided natural fortifications in the west and south. Its main walls extend east to the fadamar Yandoto, formed by a tributary of the Gagare.

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36. *KDT(r),* August 1972.
37. *T.M., op. cit.,* pp. 95—96.
38. 'Katsina Laka' means 'loamy Katsina'.

We do not know when Yandoto was built. Unlike Rawaya, and some of the towns built by Katsinawa in that region, it did not become incorporated into the kingdom of Zamfara and was not directly involved in the upheavals that accompanied the collapse of that kingdom in the mid-eighteenth century.[39] In fact, on balance, Yandoto was more likely to have gained from the break up of the urban centres of northern Zamfara, since this resulted in considerable immigration southward.[40] Some of these migrants, attracted by the more stable political situation in Katsina, would have moved into Yandoto. Considerable urban expansion certainly took place in the area immediately west of Yandoto, which took the form of the establishment of new towns like Anka, Sabon Gari, Ruwan Gora, Morai and Kumikumi and extension of the older ones like Maradun and Tumfafi.[41] As an already established town in the area, Yandoto would have benefitted economically from these developments, but its location on a major route leading into this region from the rest of the Kasar Hausa and Borno, and the more active interest the government of Katsina took in the region, seem to have given it considerable advantage in its relations with these new towns,[42] which led to its growth into the metropolis of an area extending westwards beyond the Kasar Katsina. The growth of these towns, coming together in the second half of the eighteenth century with the increase in economic activity in southern Kebbi, and the expansion of trade with the Volta region, established Yandoto as the hub of the communications system of western Hausaland.[43] This development seems to have laid the groundwork for the emergence, in the early nineteenth century, of the emirate of Katsina al-Gharbi as an integral part of the metropolitan core of the Sokoto Caliphate, separate from the emirate of Katsina.

BIRNIN KOGO

In the region to the south of Yandoto were three clusters of settlements around Birnin Kogo, Maska and Gozaki. All three appear to have been established by the time the kingdom was founded in the fifteenth century, and their incorparation into it brought a fairly small, compact but prosperous area into the kingdom. They were the seats of the three senior sarakuna garuruwa of the south, the Kogo, the Sarkin Maska and the

39. *S.P.G.*, pp. 127, 132.
40. Krieger, *op. cit.*, pp. 66, 80, 85.
41. *S.P G.*, pp. 127, 132.
42. See p. 46.
43. Alkali, *op. cit.*, pp. 95—6; Joseph Dupuis *Journal of a Residence in Ashanti,* London, 1960, p. cxxvi.

Sarkin Gozaki, the latter two had full scale palaces with fortifications and the two gates of Kofar Fada and Kofar Bai, like the Gidan Korau and the palace at Ingawa.

The Birnin Kogo, once a great urban centre, seems to have been going through a period of decline in the latter part of the eighteenth century. The rise of the town of Zagami, about 15 kilometres to the east, and the growth of Yandoto and its satellite towns, like Samri to the north-west, apparently left the Birnin Kogo as a backwater. The major routes bypassed it, going to its north through Zagami-Yankuzo to Yandoto, and south through Mahuta, Macika, Kwiollo, Birnin Gwari, and Kotonkoro. In fact the area seems to have increasingly come under a royal prince with the title of Machika; Samri was under another prince, while Yandoto was placed under a central government official.[44] All these economic and political changes considerably reduced the position Birnin Kogo had held in the previous centuries, and by the end of the eighteenth century the centres of urban growth in the Birnin Kogo area were at Zagami and around the tungage and kauyuka of hunters and blacksmiths at places like Buzu, Mununu and the Dutsin Magudiya. Faskari, now an important town in the area, grew around the latter in the nineteenth century.

MASKA

In the late eighteenth century, Maska, on the other hand was the metropolis of a prosperous and densely settled region composed of the towns of Birnin Pampam, Gwaya, Birnin Damari, Bakin Dutsi, Duya, Mahuta, Tunburkai, Bakari, Rahin Iwa and numerous others of which only the ruins can now be traced.[45]

The region of Maska, and the area extending eastwards to Gozaki, had the most abundant and regular rainfall of all the areas of the Kasar Katsina and really forms part of the same climatic belt as Zazzau. It is also well-drained with a series of watersheds of rivers flowing in all four directions. Both the uplands and the fadamomi were intensely cultivated for a great variety of crops including various species of yams and potatoes and the more southerly species of millet, like *acca*. There was good grazing ground on the open fadama though limited by the thick woodland around the uncultivated watercourses, and by the rather

44. Gerharty, *Gusau District Reassessment Report*, 1914. NNAK/SOKPROF S.25134, p. 7.
45. J.C. Clayton, *Maska District Assessment Report*, 1917. NNAK/SNP 183 P—1917. A.D. Hanlyn, *Maska District General Report*, 1923, NNAK/KATPROF. 1/1881. *Maska District Notebook* NNAK/KATPROF/1/6.

broken nature of the country to the south-west of Maska. Iron ore was abundant with centres of iron-workings all around at Birnin Gwari, Zagami and Tandama. It was a major centre for the production of cotton and indigo and a large weaving and dyeing industry flourished in the town of Maska which came to be famous for a type of textile known as dan Maska.[46]

The town of Maska is situated on a swell of land between the valleys of the gulbin Tubo and its tributary the river Magajin Dutse, about 30 kilometres upstream from the Birnin Zaria. Its walls have a circumference of about 5 kilometres, with the old mosque and the palace of the Sarakunan Maska near the eastern gate.

BIRNIN GOZAKI

Situated in the same geographical region and only about 30 kilometres to the east of Maska was the town of Gozaki, the seat of the Sarkin Gozaki and, by the late eighteenth century, one of the largest and best fortified towns of southern Katsina. Around it were towns such as Abasawa, Dabaibayawa, Danja, Dabai and Tandama and numerous other towns and villages in its extensive Karkara, forming what apparently was the southern pole of settlement in the kingdom and the core of the area known as Katuka. The relations of this town with Maska, also a town of Katuka, are not clear. There are traditions in Maska that the town was founded by migrants who had passed through Gozaki, and it is certainly Gozaki that is nowadays referred to as the centre of Katuna.[47]

The economy of the region is similar in most respects to that of Maska, but the area here is more open and more densely cultivated. The only woodland was along the chain of lateritic ironstones hills stretching from Tandama to Makurdi, along which were some of the main iron ore mines of the kingdom. This area was also a major centre of cotton production.[48] The towns of the Gozaki region developed close relations with Kudan, Dan Mabawayi, Palgore, Rogo and towns of the equally densely settled regions of Kano and Zazzau. The cultivation of cotton on the *gandaye* (large farm) that were established there came to depend on the import of slaves from Zazzau and a considerable proportion of the cotton cultivated was exported to Kano.[49]

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46. *MMM(s)*, August 1972.
47. Dankousso & Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 76. *MYT(b)*, August 1972.
48. See p. 203 for a brief description of Tandama's economic circumstances in the mid-nineteenth century.
49. *MMM(s)*, August 1972. *H.M.I.*, August 1972.

The town of Gozaki itself, seems to have grown from some very ancient settlements among the inselbergs of Kuraku, just outside the walls to the north.[50] The Kwararrafa attacked Gozaki in their invasion in the second half of the seventeenth century, but the town withstood their long siege helped, according to the traditions, by its thousands of walls and thousands of scholars.[51] Its oval shaped walls have a circumference of about 6 kilometres and lie between the rocks of Kuraku and a river, the Rahin Kofa. These rocks stretching along its northern side make it virtually impregnable from that direction. There are indications of wall extension in the south to enclose part of the fadama of the river Rahin Kofa. Near the southern gate was the palace, fortified with a wall and a ditch; and nearby are traces of a mosque and the site of an ancient baobab tree, a shrine of the iskoki.

OTHER CENTRES

Besides these towns there were many others which, though they were not centres of distinctive regions in the late eighteenth century, had been settled continuously for a sufficiently long period to produce stable and coherent urban communities.

Among the towns which seem not to have formed part of any of the main regional clusters, were those such as Yashe, Kusada, Kankiya, Mashi, Matsai and Matazu, all located along important routes.[52] There were others which, though not of a distinctly regional metropolitan status were more autonomous, like Gezawa, Tasawa, Kaga, Illela, and Zandama. Gezawa, whose traditions claim that it is as old as the Birnin Katsina, was the major settlement of a small area of intensive agriculture within a few miles radius of the fadamar Gezawa.[53] Although the Rafa, the maigari of Gezawa, ruled over these settlements, Gezawa seem to have maintained a rural character with the Rafa as the head of a collection of farming patrilineages. Zandam on the other hand, which is perhaps as old as Gezawa, had, by the end of the eighteenth century become a town of considerable size around the dutsin Zandam in the extensive fadama of the gulbin Gada. The town of Tasawa situated in a much more extensive valley, that of the gulbin Kaba, was settled in the eighteenth century by the Tazarawa moving southwards from their old centre,

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50. *Assessment Report Galadima District,* 1921, NNAK/KATPROF! 1/1695.
51. *H.M.I.,* p. 41.
52. See Map of routes, p. 249.
53. *GIG(n),* September 1971.
54. *GIT(n),* September 1971. Y. Urvoy, *Histoire de Population du Soudan Centrale,* Paris, 1936, p. 238.

Birnin Tazar, to the north, near Ourefane.[54] By the late eighteenth century Tasawa was a junction of major routes.

THE PATTERN OF ROUTES

These settlements were linked by an extensive network of routes. The map presents the pattern of the major routes as they existed in the late eighteenth century. Their establishment in this area is closely connected with the extension of permanent settlements: they did not simply spread out over an open terrain, as is widely assumed about routes in the savannah areas of West Africa.[55] The natural vegetation of the area, untouched by human foraging is very difficult to pass through, even where it exists only in the form of bushes and shrubs.[56] The creation of areas of karkara and saura through the activity of man and livestock was a basic precondition for the establishment of these routes; and it is through these areas that the routes passed. In the areas of daji paths had to be made by cutting down the trees and shrubs and marking out fords, which had to be regularly maintained. The large bodies of men and animals travelling on these paths needed not only a clearing through which to move, but food, water and other provisions at regular intervals and these were more easily obtained if the routes passed through areas of permanent settlement. All these determined the pattern of the routes, and the composition and volume of the traffic that passed on each.

Responsibility for the security of travellers on routes to and from their towns rested with the masu gari who were also responsible for providing escorts up to the boundary of their territory where there were dangers of wild animals or brigands. Officials responsible for specific routes were sometimes appointed with the title of *tafarki*. Stopping places for caravans, (zango) were established inside or just outside the towns, and were placed under an official of the maigari known as the sarkin zango. Hostels and stores for travellers were built in the larger towns, often near the gates, or in the commercial quarters. Where these did not exist the sarkin kofa provided lodgings in his house, attached to the gate.

THE ISSUE OF 'THE CITY-STATE'

The settlement pattern of the Kasar Katsina in the late eighteenth century was made up of a series of birane and garuruwa surrounded by areas of permanent cultivation on which were located the kauyuka and

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55. A. Mabogunje, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
56 When Hugh Clapperton, on his journey from Sokoto to Zurmi in May 1824 through the dajin Gundumi, went through a new path in order to avoid the raiders of the tawaye

unguwoyi dependent on these towns. Most of the settlements were located on uplands, near areas of fadama, or in the vicinity of one of the duwatsu. Beyond this belt of permanent settlement, where the main commercial, industrial and agricultural activities were carried on, the less permanent and smaller settlements were situated in the areas of saura and daji inhabited largely by hunters, woodcutters, pastoralists, miners and some farmers.

Some of the birane and garuruwa developed sufficient hegemony over an area to become the centres of what we call regional clusters. Within these clusters close relations of economic and cultural inter-dependence developed, which were often reflected at the political level. Other towns maintained greater self-sufficiency, or developed relations with more distant places, sometimes neighbouring states. Even the towns within the regional clusters, however, developed close relations with other towns outside the kingdom. The position of Gozaki, Maska and Yandoto has already been touched on. Kwatarkwashi was metropolis of a network of religious centres associated with the Magiro cult, extending beyond the Kasar Katsina into the settlements of the Kamuku, Achipawa, Dakarkari and other peoples of the Middle Niger Region.[57] The position of Tasawa, on the northern borders, was similar to that of Yandoto, a junction of international highways of trade having close connections with the settlements of Damagaram, Damargou and the Tagama.

Given the existence of these birane and garuruwa forming the metropolises of their regions, and the often close economic and cultural relations several of the towns of the kingdom developed with others outside, the characterization of the kingdom as a 'city-state' is erroneous. The term 'city-state' is applied to the states of the Kasar Hausa because of the analogy that is drawn between them and the medieval city-states of the Baltic Coast and the Italian penisular, like Geno, Venice, Lubeck or Hamburg.[58] As political and social formations and in terms of their historical role these city-states of Europe differed from the kasashe of Hausaland in some fundamental respects. The European cities developed

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this is what happened: "We took a new road where no water is to be had in order to avoid the Tooias, as the rebels of Gobir and Zamfara are called.... We now pursued a a foot path through thick wood full of briars, which tore our cloth; and as I had neglected to put on my boots, my legs were much lacerated." Bovill, *op. cit.*, p. 702

57. Harriss, 'Notes on the Dakarkari...' *loc. cit.*, p. 127. Gunn & Conant, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

58. M.G. Smith, 'The Beginning of Hausa Society', The *Historian in Tropical Africa,* London (ed.) J. Vansina, etc., p. 352. T. Hodgkin, *Nigerian Perspective,* Oxford, 1960, p. 31.

as enclaves of merchants and artisans, in opposition to feudal nobility and the feudal state whose economic and social base lay in the rural agricultural settlements. When these cities developed into independent states, this aspect of their nature was accentuated. The birane and garuruwa of the Kasar Haúsa on the other hand came to be the main bases of the power of the kings; and it was from these cities and towns that this power was exercised over the rural settlements. The contradiction between the ruling class and the artisans and merchants was not expressed in terms of the opposition of the town to the countryside, but was contained within the walls and often expressed in the tensions and rivalries between the cikin Gida and the cikin Birni, the kofar Fada and the *bakin Kasuwa*, producing different forms of political relationships.

Moreover, the great birane like the Birnin Katsina, Birnin Kano, Birnin Zamfara, did not dominate the economy and territory of their polities to the same extent as did the European city-states. The Birnin Katsina was not the Kasar Katsina in the sense that the *civitas Venetiarum* was the *respublica Venetiarum*. It was simply the capital and the largest city of the kingdom in which there were several others, some of which were older, had their own lineages of sarakuna, established civic consciousness and strong economic and cultural relations with other towns and cities outside the kingdom. The analogy with the city-states of medieval Europe has obscured, rather than clarified, some significant features of the settlement pattern of the states of the Kasar Hausa. The significance of this pattern does not lie in the dominance of one urban centre, as the term 'city-state' implies, but in the existence of numerous urban centres which constituted the cells of the political community to which immigrants of diverse origin were assimilated to become Katsinawa, Kebbawa, Kanawa, and each of which maintained a corporate existence and some measure of autonomy both from the capital and each other. Although the administration was organized around them and it was really through the masu gari that the Sarakuna ruled, the autonomous cohesion of these communities made them potential centres of opposition to royal authority. While they were the cells into which people were assimilated into the political community of the kingdom they were also a major source of its fragility. The emergence of Islam as the main bond of the urban communities of Katsina was, for example, one of the developments undermining the bases of the political system centred around the institution of the Sarkin Katsina.

3 *The Society of Katsina in the late eighteenth century*

THE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM

The significance of the transformation that the political community of the Kasar Katsina underwent in the nineteenth century can be appreciated only through an understanding of its nature when the Jihad wars broke out in 1804. The first two sections of this chapter are concerned with outlining the pattern of settlement and the nature of the economy in the late eighteenth century. This sets the background to an attempted reconstruction in outline, of the state of the society in the same period. The major political developments internally, and in respect to external relations in the second half of the eighteenth century, are traced in the last section of this chapter.

The numerous writings on the emergence of the Sokoto Caliphate have established a picture of the state of society in the Kasar Hausa in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries which suggests that its main feature was the racial/ethnic division between the Habe and the Fulani and, subsidiary to this, the division between the Muslims and the non-Muslims:[1] there are various refinements of this which point to other divisions between the Habe ruling class and the Habe commoners; between the nomadic Fulani and the sedentary Fulani for example. The emphasis varies according to the areas and issues upon which the writers have focussed, but a sort of consensus has been established that the major political feature of the society in the epoch of the Jihad was the racial/ethnic division between the Habe and the Fulani.

1. H.A.S. Johnston, *The Fulani Empire of Sokoto,* Oxford, 1965; M.G. Smith, *Government* in Zazzau: *1800—1950,* London, 1960; M.G. Smith 'Pluralism in Precolonial African Societies', *Pluralism in Africa* (ed.) L. Kuper & M.G. Smith, Los Angeles, 1969, pp.133—136; R.W. Hill *The Development of Central Administration in Katsina Emirate: Northern Nigeria, 1888—1944,* Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia, 1968; Last, *op. cit.,* pp. lix-lxxxli.

However, serious problems arise when an attempt is made to comprehend the major social and political developments in the Kasar Katsina during this period by way of such a perspective. The categories of Habe, Fulani, Muslim, syncretist and non-Muslim, as they have been used, obscure rather than clarify crucial dimensions of these developments. The distinction between Muslims, syncretists and non-Muslims, for example, is meaningful only at a very general level. But to employ these categories as if they represent fixed entities in the society, obscures the fact that one of the major political issues of the eighteenth century in this area was the question of who was a Muslim: the Shehu Usman Dan Fodio had serious disagreement on this with his teacher, Shehu Jibril b. Umar, one of the initiators of the Islamic reform movement that the Shehu Usman came to lead.[2] The categories of Habe and Fulbe certainly hint at one form of the occupational, linguistic and cultural diversity of the society in the language of the Fulfulde-speaking people of the area[3]. But when these categories are made to represent a fundamental dualism instead of being regarded as very loose distinctions, they inhibit our comprehension of the real extent and nature of this diversity, beyond the view that the society was an amalgam of racial/ethnic groups. Not only are the definitions of Fulani and Habe so used vague, but they obscure the complexities of the relationship of the various dimensions of communities such as descent, and language and territoriality; the nature of the convergence of which in the formation of communities like the Fulfulde-speaking people, was problematic even for writers of the Jihad period such as Abdullahi Dan Fodio.[4] A more accurate, if rather complex picture of the state of society in the Kasar Katsina in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, might be obtained if we attempt our reconstruction around the more palpable and concrete groups that made it up, like the garuruwa and birane *sana'oi,* (occupational groups) *zuri'oi* (descent groups or lineages) and through an examination of the changing significance of the various systems of religious belief.

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2. El-Masri, *op. cit.*, p. 25; F.H. El-Masri, 'The Life of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio Before the Jihad', *JHSN,* II.4, December 1963, pp. 438—439; M. Last & M.A. Al-Hajj, 'Attempts at Defining a Muslim in Nineteenth Century Hausaland and Borno', *JHSN,* III.2, 1965, pp. 233—235.

3. Habe (sing: Kado) is the opposite of Fulbe in the Fulfulde language. It is a general term applied to all non-Fulbe and does not specifically refer to the Hausa-speaking people. S. Abubakar, *The Lamibe of Fombina,* Zaria/Ibadan 1978, *passim.*

4. Abdullahi Dan Fodio states: 'Our tribe is Turudbi, who came from Futa and they according to what we have heard are the maternal uncles of all the Fulani, because Uqba b. Amir came to them they being one of the tribes of Rum and their king accepted Islam without fighting. Uqba married one of their king's daughter and he fathered all the Fulani.... And they spoke the language of their father. As for what is said that the children were the first who spoke the language it is far-fetched because all languages

The birane and the garuruwa were not only the hubs of the administration and centres of manufacture and commerce, but constituted cohesive communities, distinct from, if closely dependent on, the kauyuka and tungage around them. Although there was a whole spectrum of types of settlements, from the Birni to the tunga, a general distinction between urban society of the gari and the birni and rural society of the kauye and the tunga was well established. The gari or birni with its walls and moat, its dense latticework of mud houses divided into various unguwoyi, its *kafi* (wooden stockade), regular market, and mosque for Friday prayers, was a corporate unit with a pronounced identity above that of the component lineage and occupational groups and separate from the rural communities around.[5]

The cohesion of these urban communities arose not only because they were units of administration, defence and commerce, but also because of the existence of a hierarchy of age grades of elders, adults, young people and children incorporating all the town population. The dattawan gari, who seem to have played an important role before the rise of the sarauta system, remained influential and were consulted by the maigari on major matters affecting the town. It was the adults and youths who made up the labour and defence forces of the town. They were mobilized for the maintainance of the walls, the building of the market, mosques, and other communal facilities, like paths, fords and wells. The youth and children of the various quarters came together for circumcision, games, harvest and religious festivities.

By the end of the eighteenth century the observation of Islamic practices, like the payment of *zakat* (Islamic tithe) the Ramadan fast, the Juma'at and Id' prayers, the Id' Maulud and New Year celebrations, the baptismal, marriage and funeral assemblies, constituted the major bonds of these communities. Just as the Shari'a and the Sunna had become the established bases and framework for social conduct, these practices and observations constituted an important part of the fabric of social existence.

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are established from the time of Adam and that is a violation of the established order of things. The more reasonable (explanation) is that they spoke the language of their mother and the Turudbi have no original language other than that language', *Tazyin al-waraqat,* Ibadan, 1963, pp. 97—98. See also *Ida al-musukh* (trans.) M. Hiskett, 'Materials relation to the State of Learning Among the Fulani Before Their Jihad', *BSOAS,* XXIII, 1960, p. 560; and *I.M.*, pp. 207—212.

5. There were instances, however, when the mosque of a particular town attracted large numbers of worshippers from neighbouring towns, as the mosque at Karofi did on the eve of the Jihad. The Friday communal prayers, had become a feature of well established urban communities.

The cults of the ancestors around the tombs, which were of great importance as bonds of the permanent settlements of this area in an earlier epoch, were of little relevance in communities composed of people of heterogeneous descent. They might find a weak expression in beliefs about the efficacy of the *kafin gari* (protective charm buried by the founders of the town in the centre or beneath the walls and gate). The cult of the iskoki also continued to play some role in these towns. It was important in certain *forms* of psychiatric treatment and as magic or superstition associated with particular rocks or trees, but not as a coherent system of religious belief or as a social bond. Some of these old shrines of the iskoki might be visited by some people in times of emergency like drought, plague, floods, or an invasion; also they often provided sites for the festivities of the town youths. It was the custom in the town of Dayi, for example, for the youths to organize games and dances around the baobab tree on the dutsin Dayi during the harvest season.[6] The youths of Matazu followed a similar custom in the dances and games held around the baobab Guzami during the marriage season.[7]

The hegemony that Islamic beliefs and norms attained in these communities was the outcome of certain social processes. It was in large measure due to the increasing descent and occupational heterogeneity of the inhabitants resulting from diversification of the economy and its integration with that of neighbouring areas. One of the more identifiable aspects of this process was immigration. Among the streams of immigrants into the towns of Katsina which can be identified was an influx of Arabs from Kano in the 1730s.[8] These were mainly traders and financiers leaving Kano because of the exactions of the Sarkin Kano Kumbai (c.1731—1743). Groups of the Agadasawa also came to settle in the towns of Katsina later in the eighteenth century who, it seems, were involved in the diversification of the leather working industry.[9] The immigration of the Barebari into the Birnin Katsina also continued in this period. One Malam Usman, a malam from Borno came with his family to settle in the Tsohuwar Kasuwa quarter in the late eighteenth century.[10] As the story of Abu Bakr al-Saddiqu reveals, some of the Bornoan elements settling in Katsina in this period came to establish marital and other connections with the Diula traders operating there from towns in the Upper Niger and Volta regions.[11]

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6. *GID(m)*, August 1972.
7. *GIM(m)*, September 1972.
8. *K.C.*, p. 124.
9. Barth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 371.
10. *ABM(b)*, July 1972.
11. I. Wilks, 'Abu Bakr al-Siddiq of Timbuktu', *Africa Remembered*, Madison, 1967, pp. 159—160.

It was a group of Barebari hunter/warriors under one Tani, who established the town of Kanembakasbe on the northern borders.[12] The town of Karofi, a centre of dyeing, was receiving Nupe immigrants joining the tailors and embroiders in the Unguwar Nupawa there.[13] Another stream of migrants coming into Karofi in this period were from Pauwa in the Kasar Zazzau, led by one Agirgi.[14] In the reign of Gozo some families from Zamfara settled at the town of Radda nearby, from among whom the descendants of one Malam Muhammadu Mugu came to occupy an influential position in the town in the nineteenth century.[15] To the same town came a group known as the Kawadawa, from Gadanya in Kano, some of whom also came to be quite influential.[16] The expansion of the town of Matazu in the eighteenth century was not only due to the emigration of people from the declining cities of the Karaduwa-Bunsuru confluence area. A group came to settle as tailors from Wanaka in the upper Sokoto river basin to the unguwar Shantalawa of the town.[17] Traders and artisans also came from Gogori in Kano.[18] Other identifiable groups of immigrants, some of whom settled in the towns, were the Dangawa, a section of which under Marori went to the settlement that became Kafin Dangi;[19] another section of the Dangawa settled at Yantumaki.[20] There was also the migration of the Tazarawa from Birnin Tasar to establish Tasawa on the banks of the gulbin Kaba on the northern border.[21]

In general the heterogeneity of the inhabitants in the town, their contacts with distant places, the concentration of wealth, the diversity of occupations, the cultured leisure of some of the inhabitants, produced in the *'yan birni* (city folk), *'yan maraya* or *'yan riga* (townfolk) a consciousness of being distinctly more cultured and civilized than the *kauyawa* (rustic folk) around them.

Not only was there this general division between the townspeople and the rustic folk but each town was conscious of, and fostered, its distinctive identity. All the established towns had their own kirari, which often expressed their origin and corporate character. The kirari of the town of Matazu: *'Danku garin ban Allah! Madina ta Hausa!'* (The town

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12. P. Lephay, *Recensement Canto Kanambakach*, 1933, Services des Archives, Niamey.
13. *GIK(d)*, August 1972.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *GIR(r)*, August 1972.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *GIM(m)*. September 1972.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *GIK(k)*, August 1972.
20. *DAY(d)*, August 1972.
21. *GIT(n)*, September 1971; Urvoy, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

of the devout worshippers of Allah! The Madina of Hausaland!) exemplifies the self-assertive consciousness of some of these towns, of which some even had their own *take* (drum tune) played on special occasions.

The Birnin Katsina, one of whose kirari was *'Katsina dakin kara! Tudu garin Dan Madina.'* (Katsina, the place of politeness and courtesy! The swell of land, the town of Dan Marina!), had the most self-conscious and assertive 'yan birni. The inhabitants of the cikin birni quarters of the Birnin Katsina saw themselves as not only distinctly more cultured and civilized than the inhabitants of all other cities and towns, but also distinct from the princes, slaves, and other *mutane fada* (men of the palace) inhabiting the palace complex. Opposition between these two main sections of the city was often expressed in rivalries among the *samari* (young men) in games, dances and the courting of girls; an opposition which seems to have sharpened in the late eighteenth century. The traditions record one instance in which this provoked a serious political crisis, which occurred when two princes, sons of Sarkin Katsina Tsagarana (c.1767—1768), killed the son of an *attajiri* (rich merchant) of Gambarawa in a quarrel over a girl. The people and ulama of the cikin birni demanded capital punishment for the princes, but Tsagarana refused to execute his children and the situation was only saved when a *fatwa* (formal legal opinion by a malam) was sought from a malam in Yandoto.[22] The malam pointed out that the Shari'a gave an alternative to capital punishment, the payment of blood-money, and the relatives of any person so killed who accept this will be rewarded by Allah. The story of Kunar Bakin Wake, relating how the people of the Birni were saved from a sadistic prince, (who rode on people using spurs on their sides), by someone known as Bakin Wake, who fell with the prince into a furnace as he 'rode' him, is well known, and expresses this conflict in a legendary form.

Among the quarters of the cikin birni strong rivalry also existed and the youths competed in games, the *takkai* (a dance), wrestling and boxing. It was in the Birnin Katsina more than anywhere else that the urban way of life with its prodigality, outspokenness, cultured leisure, vanity and decadent pleasures flourished. The anonymous writer of the *Hikayat Gozo* gives us a glimpse of what it was like in the Birni on the eve of the Jihad wars; he states:

> On the whole what caused the government to pass to the Fulani other than that the rich men boasted of their houses [full] of gold and silver? Every rich man had a square house which they filled with gold and silver. And the result was that it was a city of vainglory. It had seven gates and in it were seven

22. *MML(a)*, July 1972.

> places of treasure. One of them was the store of gold from the Guga gate to the Yandaka gate. And the letters *ma'adanawa* [stores/warehouses] of salt from the gate of Guga to the gate of Marusa. And outside the town, *kwalli* [antimony], silver, tin or lead. And that place is from the market of Darma to inside Albaba.... And the kings tried to evade the consequences of this by giving wealth to the ulama and the ulama tried to evade the consequences by means of charms for fear of disorder and the killing of one another....[23]

Even though the opulence of other urban centres was perhaps not as great as that of the Birnin Katsina, the identity of their inhabitants as Kogawa, Gozakawa, Matazawa, mutanen Ingawa, mutanen Yandoto was equally strong, with the special type of intensity found in provincial urban centres everywhere.

No proper evaluation of the state of society in the Kasar Katsina is possible without taking into consideration these major constituent units of the political community. While on the one hand they were the centres of wealth, civilized living, and culture, whose improvement and expansion represented the main form of economic and cultural development, they remained potential centres of dissent and rebellion against the central government.

THE OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

If the towns were the most cohesive social and political entities in the kingdom based on territoriality, the occupational groups were the most distinctive units formed around economic activity. Six main categories of occupational groups can be distinguished in this period, the farmers, pastoralists, artisans, merchants, officials and the intelligentsia; we shall consider here those directly involved in economic activity[24] Others, which did not easily fit into any of these categories, were the butchers, singers and musicians, and hunters.

These occupational groups, especially the hunters, farmers and blacksmiths, were some of the earliest forms of supra-clan social organization in this area, even prior to the formation of the kasashe which had brought together under the *uban farauta* (head of a hunt) *sarkin noma* (head of the farmers) and *sarkin makera* (head of the smiths) people from various lineages to carry out common economic activity and associated religious rites.[25] As the economy expanded these occupational groups became more specialized, and it was around the dyepits, iron works and markets that extensive networks developed which came to link the various settlements and created conditions for the formation of the

23. *H.G.* f. 3

24. For the mallamai and masu sarauta see relevant sections below.

25. Smith, 'The Early States of the Central Sudan', *loc. cit.*, p. 186.

kingdom. Within the kingdom, these groups of traders and artisans were incorporated into various hierarchies under the sarakunan sana'a appointed by the Sarkin Katsina. By the late eighteenth century we can distinguish over a dozen of these officials responsible for the supervision, regulation and taxation of the main artisan and trading activities. These include:[26]

Sarkin Makera	—blacksmiths	Mudda	—dealers in grain
Tarno	—weavers	Sarkin Dawa	—woodcarvers
Danhaganzame	—dyers	Sarkin Zaki	—honey collectors
Majema	—tanners	Sarkin Pawa	—butchers
Zannuwa	—sellers of natron	Sarkin Magina	—builders
Gariya	—dealers in salt	Sarkin Aska	—barbers.

Acting through subordinate officials appointed by each maigari they attended to the maintenance of standards, the allocation of land and other facilities; the regulation of trade and the collection of taxes. It was also through these hierarchies that these occupational groups were mobilized to serve the government—the hunters and smiths for military expeditions; the brokers for official trading transactions; and the builders for the building and maintenance of walls, palaces and other public works.

Not only did the political organization of the kingdom maintain the corporate existence of these occupational groups, but they developed strong internal lines of solidarity. Although most specialized occupations were carried out by the gidaje, they did not seem to have developed any caste-like exclusiveness. These households included *barori* (servants/clients) slaves, and other strangers who became attached as apprentices, or just extra hands, all of whom were often absorbed into the household patrilineages through marriages and co-habitation. The recruitment and absorption of people from outside the lineages however, were rarer in respect of occupations requiring highly specialized training or with which some magical awe or taboo was associated. The former condition applied to the hunters and pastoralists, while the latter applied to the butchers and the blacksmiths. But even with these the expansion of activity led to the need to acquire more hands, and among the richer families of the occupations, slaves and servants did most of the menial jobs and were often absorbed, so that within a few generations the *bawan Runji* (slave of the butchers) became a fully fledged *dan Runji* and the bawan Fulani became a fully fledged baFulatani, with changes in fortunes effected through marriages, births and deaths.

Although there was competition within the occupational groups for

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26. Davies, *op. cit.*, pp. 657—658; *Unpublished Papers of Malam Rilwanu Caranci* of the Katsina Local Authority Information Service, (in his possession).

raw materials, and markets, which could become quite intense among the town-based artisans and traders, members of the same occupations had certain interests in common in relation to the maintenance of good trading conditions, the imposition of various regulations, and the incidence of taxation. In this regard they were represented, in their relations with the political authorities and other groups, by the heads and other senior members of the occupations in each locality. Thus, although these sarakunan sana'a of the towns, like the *sarkin pawa* (head of the butchers) were part of an administrative hierarchy, unlike most of the central government officials they came from among the leading families of the occupation in each town and had the dual role of being both officials and representatives of corporate interests. The existence of these occupational groups with their extensive ramifications cutting across the territorial kinship and religious ties was an important feature of the society of the Kasar Katsina.

THE DESCENT GROUPS

The important role that the towns and the occupational groups came to have in the political system involved a transformation in the political significance of the lineages or descent groups. Several patrilineal households formed lineages or descent groups and, although the various kinship and descent relationships were reckoned for three, four or even more generations, these large kinship groups did not seem to have maintained any effective cohesion in economic or political affairs. In the villages, the homesteads of people belonging to the same lineage or descent groups might cluster together, maintaining considerable cohesion and cooperating with each other in generating activity. In the less densely populated areas of southern Katsina, some of these clusters might even take the form of a large gida, all enclosed by a *darni* (corn-stalk wall), recognizing a senior elder as the maigida. It was among the aristocracy, intelligentsia, richer pastoralists and highly specialized artisan and trading groups, that we can identify these extended lineages and trace their role in the society in the late eighteenth century.

The most important of these descent groups, at the centre of the political systems, was the ruling dynasty, whose actual composition at the end of the eighteenth century is not clear—as the rather disjointed genealogical chart A in appendix incidates. The genealogical information in the various kinglists does not conclusively establish whether these kings of the late eighteenth century, each of whom were known as *jikan Korau* (grandson of Korau), were the actual descendants of Korau or only his political heirs. Barth is of the opinion that a new dynasty replaced the descendants of Korau about the middle of the tenth century of the *hejira* (c.1643 A.D.) and this dynasty, which he calls that of the

'Habe', ruled up to the outbreak of the Jihad wars.[27] This hypothesis of Barth's has not been supported by any of the evidence available. The accession of the Sarkin Katsina Ibrahim Badankari (c.1565—1575), coming after what seemed to have been a period of crises, with the short two and a half year reign of Abdulkarim (c.1563—1565) and the abdications, or deposition, of Yusufu (c.1563) after a reign of about one week, might have involved some form of dynastic change.[28] There is a fragment of tradition recorded by Palmer that Ibrahim Badankari came from near Ruma.[29] It is perhaps also significant that the kinglists give genealogical information with regard to the descendants of Ibrahim Badankari, starting with Muhammadu Wari b. Ibrahim Badankari (c.1631—1641), then Muhammadu Uban Yara b. Muhammadu Wari (c.1641—1671), followed by Muhammadu Jan Hazo b. Uban Yara (c.1671—1684) and, after a break of two reigns (1684—1702), Ibrahim Badankari's great-great-grandson Karyagiwa b. Muhammadu Jan Hazo (c.1702—1728).[30] The fragmentary genealogical information for the period 1565—1804 suggests that distinct sub-lineages had developed within the dynasty of Dakasari.[31] Although the actual lines of division within the ruling dynasty cannot yet be established with any certainty, it is clear that when the Jihad began this was not a monolithic, racially exclusive caste standing apart from the rest of the population, but a conglomeration of various patrilineages resulting from several generations of marriage with wide sections of the population, reflecting this diversity in its composition perhaps more than any other family.[32] As the jikokin Korau they constituted a corporate descent group, but between its various branches and between individuals, *zumunci* (relations of fraternal cooperation) existed alongside those of *gabar gida* (bitter fraternal rivalry). It is in the interplay of what are essentially the two aspects of all kingship relations in this area that we must look for some explanation for events like the assassination of Gozo and Dokau in c.1801, and the opposition of some of the princes to Bawa dan Gima (c.1801—1805).

Other ruling lineages existed in the old established towns such as Birnin Samri, Yandaka, Gozaki, Maska and others. They were also found among the Yerimawa at Ingawa, the Sullubawa at Zandam and

27. Barth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 475.
28. K.T.K. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
29. 'Mallam Salisu'. Notebook I, *PP-NHRS.*
30. See genealogical chart on the Sarakunan Katsina.
31. Dakasari is a rather ubiquitous, but mysterious, figure who features in the kinglists and in the songs of the 'yan bori.
32. *T.A.K./PP-NHRS.*

the Rumawa at Ruma. These latter three, together with the Dangawa and the Daneji, were some of the large lineages in Katsina in the late eighteenth century whose history can be traced. An examination of their nature, and the survey of the various groups of the Katsina ulama in the next sub-section, might further reveal the complex role of descent and kinship ties in the society and demonstrate how the perspective which reduces all this complex social formation into a racial dualism of Habe/ Fulbe prevents us from grasping the dynamics of historical development of society in the Kasar Katsina.

The *Yerimawa* traditions say that they are descended from Ardo Kurukuru, and migrated to Borno from Nalle.[33] They seemed to have emerged as a distinct group in Borno through association with a Borno official, the Yerima, hence the name Yerimawa. By the end of the seventeenth century they had moved into the Kasar Katsina, having left Borno as a result of some trouble with the Bornoan authorities, and their migrations involved several groups who came to settle in Sandamu, Gamagira in Daura, Yamel in Katsina and Dambarta in Kano. A leader of one the groups that settled in Katsina, Inti, was given the sarauta of Sarkin Fulani Dambo and established at a country palace of the kings at Ingawa. The Sarakunan Fulani of the Yerimawa seemed to have maintained close and amicable relations with the Sarakunan Katsina, and the authority of Inti came to extend not only over the Fulani of the eastern borderlands but over the settlements of these plains such as Koda, Shamiya, Kurfoji, Doddoji and Bowaji.[34] To the east of these settlements around Ingawa, in the area of the marshes of the gulbin Gari, other groups of the pastoral Fulani maintained their nomadic ways, moving in the border regions of Katsina, Daura and Kano. It was in this area that a section of the Yerimawa was established under one Dan Tunku when the Jihad wars started in 1804.[35] The actual nature of the kinship relations between the family of Dan Tunku and the Yerimawa at Ingawa is not clear, but elements of strong fraternal rivalry seem to have existed, and Dan Tunku's choice of location in these marshes might have been connected with this. When the Jihad fighting intensified in the dry-season of 1805, Dan Tunku led a contingent which inflicted defeat on a combined Katsina-Daura expedition sent to attack the mujahiddin of Kano.[36] He subsequently

33. 'Asalin Mutanen Ingawa', *loc. cit.*, p. 26; Dankousso & Caranci, *op. cit.*, p.112; *MAD(a)*, August 1972.

34. The title of Dambon Ingawa is said to have arisen because of the fine *dambu*, (a pastoral Fulani food), the Yerimawa leaders used to feast the kings of Katsina with. *DIA(i)*, August 1972.

35. *SDC(g)*, July 1972.

36. *I.M.*, pp. 95—6

attacked the Sarakunan Fulani of Ingawa, who appears to have remained loyal to the Katsina government. This episode, and the rebellion he led against Amir Ibrahim Dabo (1819—1846) of Kano, which astonished even the authorities in Katsina, is dealt with in the next chapter.

This process of differentiation and dispersion among the large descent groups, also took place among the *Sullubawa.* This group, which was among the earliest of the Fulfulde-speaking people to move into the Kasar Hausa, has its origins associated with the Mandinka, the Wakore and the Torankawa.[37] By the mid-eighteenth century their major concentrations were around Zandam, where the Sarkin Sullubawa had his seat.[38] Towards the end of the century this concentration dispersed and some clans and families of the Sullubawa moved westwards to the Sokoto-Rima confluence area; southwards to the basin of the river Kaduna in the Kasar Zazzau; northwards to the areas of Garabi in the gulbin Maradi area and to various settlements in the vicinity of the Birnin Katsina, such as Shinkafi, Yandoto, Morai.[39] The reasons for this dispersion are not known, but probably it had roots in the proliferation of the group, their absorption into diverse occupations and political allegiances; and perhaps rivalry over the sarauta of Sarkin Sullubawa.

A dispersion on the same scale does not seem to have taken place among the *Rumawa.* This group, which claims to originate from 'Rum', moved into the north-west region of Katsina in the eighteenth century from the regions of Abzin.[40] They were a group of caravan traders when they arrived and according to their traditions, in the course of their movement from 'Rum' they had spoken Arabic, Asbinanci, Hausa and Fulfulde. Groups of farmers, pastoralists, hunters and warriors developed from among them. A section with a base in Ruma became saraki and were known as the Gatarawa after the sarauta of Gatarin Katsina, to which one of their leaders was appointed. The Rumawa warriors under the Gatarin Katsina seem to have played an important role in the wars with Gobir in the late eighteenth century and the fortress was the scene of serious fighting in the Jihad wars, in which the Rumawa seemed to have fought on both sides.[41]

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37. Alhaji Iliyasu, *Fakhral Fulbe Fi Tarikh Kabilatu Sulbe,* NNAK/KADCAPTORY/O.AR.3/1384—1964, f. 12. *Amir of Katsina Genealogical Tree,* NNAK/SNP/17/4-37-82. Barth, *op. cit.,* III, p. 111. M. Junaidu, *Tarihin Fulani,* Zaria, 1957, p. 8.

38. Illiyasu, *op. cit.,* f. 13—15. *Emir of Katsina Genealogical Tree.*

39. *Ibid.* Last, *op. cit.,* p. 13.

40. *SRM(b),* August 1972. *Ruma District File,* NNAK/KATPROF/1/9; *Ruma Antiquities (Stones) At,* NNAK/KATPROF/1/59.

41. *I.M.,* pp. 95—96.

Another important lineage in the late eighteenth century whose history we can trace was that of the *Dangawa*. They moved into the Kasar Katsina from Macina west of Borno, in a group made up of 12 families.[42] They trace their movement, however, through Bebeji and Gogori in western Kano and then to Tafashiya in central Katsina. While they were in the Tafashiya area some of the families under one Marori moved north to settle at a town near the present site of Kafin Dangi, ruled by the Barebarin Katsina. This group seemed to have been largely mallamai, and was perhaps attracted by the concentrations of mallamai in the small towns of the central plains. The larger and more pastoral groups moved away, finally settling at Yantumaki along the banks of the gulbin Bunsuru. This was a well-weathered area with good grazing, where towns like the Birnin Kaji and Birnin Doka which once formed part of the central cluster in the Bunsuru-Karaduwa confluence area, had become depopulated. The family which settled under the Barebarin Katsina produced a scholar, Usman dan Marori, who joined the group of scholars supporting Umaru Dallaji in that area, and who upon victory was appointed to rule Kafin-Dangi. Yantumaki served as an important base for the *jama'a* (community) under Umaru Dallaji in the early phase of the Jihad wars.

The most pastoral and distinctly 'Fulbe' of the major descent groups whose history can be traced were the Daneji or Danezawa. They claim descent from one Danejo, and their traditions maintain that they migrated from the region of the Chad together with the people of Nati, the Natirbe, and the people of Baaje, the Ba'awa.[43] From Shanono they moved into the Kasar Katsina establishing homesteads along the Karaduwa river at Papu. Like the pastoral Dangawa they were attracted by the extensive areas of grazing land in this depopulated region. Their transhumance trek took them into the kingdom of Zazzau; and it was probably in the course of this that Gudindi, reputedly the richest and most persistently nomadic of the three leaders, Dudi, Gudindi and Gandi, came into conflict with the Sarkin Maska, who accused him of grazing on his crops and had him arrested and tortured. When the Jihad wars began some of their leaders gave active support to Umaru Dallaji and Gudindi led the contingents against Maska.

Unlike the Yerimawa, Sullubawa and the Rumawa, the Daneji did not become fully incorporated into the political system. When they moved into Katsina they established their homesteads in the depopulated Karaduwa-Bunsuru basin, where there was good grazing, water supply,

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42. *DAY(d)*, August 1972; *KIK(k)*, August 1972.
43. *GIO(m)*, August 1972; *MMT(y)*, August 1972; Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.* pp. 77, 95.

and extensive areas of daji and away from the large town and dense areas of karkara. Their leaders who participated in the Jihad, like Dudi and Gudindi, were adult men when they moved into the Kasar Katsina.

Besides these large lineages there were several others, the evidence of whose position in the late eighteenth century is more fragmentary. For example the Ba'awa, who were found along the eastern districts around Ingawa and in the town of Sabon Gari.[44] In the north-west region near the Rumawa were the Alinko'en or Alibewa who seem to have been associated with the Zurmi area of Zamfara for a long period.[45] In the reign of Nafata they came in conflict with the Gobir authorities and one of their leaders, Ali al-Faris, was killed; and when the Jihad started contingents led by Muhammad Mamoda one of their leaders, played an important part in the Katsina campaigns.[46] Spread all along the trade routes and in the major towns was another descent group, whose actual role in the Katsina Jihad is not known, but which was one of the most cohesive of the trading patrilineages—the Kambarin Barebare. This group specialized in the kolanut trade to Gwanja and had developed a major centre at Gummi in the gulbin Zamfara valley, from where they rendered help to the Shehu Usman Dan Fodio.[47]

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF SYSTEMS

At a very general level the inhabitants of the Kasar Katsina fell into three main religious categories: Muslims, syncretists and non-Muslims. But in a society where all fundamental political issues had a religious form and where Islam had been establishing an ideological hegemony, transforming, for over 3 centuries, the significance and often nature of the older systems of belief, these categories do not fully reflect the social and political dimensions of religious belief.

From a very early period the religious and political systems of the area were inextricably bound. The emergence of Muhammadu Korau as Sarkin Katsina at one level represented a victory for the cult of the iskoki around Inna/Uwa over the ancestor cults around the tombs of Durbita-kusheyi. The legitimacy of Korau was based on his identification with this primordial form of religious belief, the Earth cult around Inna.[48] In this way, a solid foundation for the dynasty, in the religious belief of the

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44. *Iguda, Sarkin Iyatawa Or Mallam Umoru, Nov. 6, 1907,* Reel 44, PP-NHRS.
45. *S.P.G.,* pp. 186—7.
46. Last, *op. cit.,* p. 12.
47. P.E. Lovejoy, 'The Formation of a specialised group of Hausa Kola Traders in the Nineteenth Century', *JAH,* XIV, 4, 1973, pp. 636—640.
48. *MDK(m),* June 1973; see above.

people already living in the area that became the Kasar Katsina was established. This brought to the side of the dynasty a particular religious element—the Earth cult—which, in several West African kingdoms was a source of weakness for the dynasties, because they were not identified with them.[49] Thus, although some of Korau's successors were Muslim and encouraged Islam, as a dynasty their legitimacy continued to be based on the iskoki system of religious belief.

But alongside the evolution of the kingdom into an integrated political community under the Sarkin Katsina as sovereign monarch, were two processes of religious change which, in the late eighteenth century, came into sharp contradiction. The first was the spread of Islam, its belief system, values and norms of conduct. Since the fifteenth century, when Muslim travellers like the Sheikh Abdurahman Zagaiti and his people from Wangara, and the Sheikh Abdulkarim al-Maghili from Tlemcen came into this area and stayed in the cities, the growth of towns and the expansion of commerce had involved the spread of Islam.[50] As has been shown, some of the ideas regarding the duties of a Muslim ruler propagated by al-Maghili encouraged the emergence of the kingship into the central institution of the kingdom. The building of ribats, the appointment of Quadis and the enforcement of certain Islamic social practices by rulers like Aliyu Murabi (c.1496—1521) and Ibrahim Maje (c.1547—1563), reflected this association between Islam and royal authority in some of the reigns.[51] As a result of all these developments the iskoki system of religious belief came to be considerably modified to fit in with monotheistic Islamic cosmology. By the late eighteenth century, the high God, Ubangiji, was clearly identified with Allah and the iskoki were seen as that order of beings known as spirits, with a distinction drawn between the non-Muslim and Muslim spirits. Korau significantly belonged to the latter.

The second process of religious change, concomitant with the evolution of the kingdom into a centralized monarchy, was the incorporation of the great figures of the dynasty into the iskoki pantheon alongside Korau. This could not however, fit in with Islamic cosmology with its clear distinction between the various orders of being and strong opposition to any tendencies to deify human beings. But this process, by which figures like Dakasari and Gozo for example, became iskoki to be conjured with

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49. J.S. Trimingham, *A History of Islam in West Africa*, Oxford 1963, pp. 35, fn. 2, 36.
50. M.A. Al-Hajj, 'A Seventeenth Century Chronicle on the Origins and Missionary Activity of the Wangarawa', *Kano Studies*, I, 4, 1968, p. 8. Alhaji Zakariya Badamasi, *Letter to Palmer*, PP-NHRS, Reel 46. *T.A.K./PP-NHRS.*
51. See above.

alongside Korau, was a natural and necessary development of the religious belief system on which the dynasty based its legitimacy and its right to rule over the land of Katsina. Its rejection would call this legitimacy into question and require the establishment of an alternative religious foundation.

The contradiction between these two processes of politico-religious change expressed itself forcefully in the reign of Gozo (c.1795—1801), whose action in this regard verged on schizophrenia. When he was selected to succeed his brother, Agwaragi, he refused to go through the rites of installation and is said to have ridiculed some of the fetish objects involved.[52] He was a builder of mosques and supporter of the Shari'a. The traditions of the ulama express a high regard for him as a devout Muslim. His kirari is *Gozo dan Rahmata ka san Allah!* (Gozo, son of Rahmata, you have faith in God!) and many of the kinglists refer to him as 'Son Allah Gozo' (The believer in God, Gozo).[53]

But Gozo seems to have become involved in the worship of the iskoki and a kukar Gozo is said to have existed near the town of Kuraye, about 30 kilometres south of the Birnin Katsina where he is said to have worshipped.[54] Like Korau he was incorporated into the pantheon around Inna, and the 'yan bori to this day invoke the iska Gozo.[55] It seems quite likely that Gozo's actions were not the expression of a smooth syncretist balance, but the actions of a ruler genuinely torn by a dilemma between two systems of religious beliefs which, whilst becoming integrated at the level of cosmology, were becoming opposed on the question of political order and legitimacy. In c.1801 he went on an expedition, travelling as far west as Rikina in what seems to have been an attempt to meet the Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, then living in that region.[56] He failed to meet the Shehu, and on his return was assassinated at Dokau and succeeded

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52. *Akhbar Amir Kashna Man Jara Bainaku Wa Akhihi,* PP-NHRS, Reel 42, Ms. 197.

53. *K.T.K./PP-NHRS.* Tilho, *op. cit.*, p. 459. Other kinglists refer to him as Tsagaram Gozo; like the kinglist in the possession of Liman Ali of Maradi. *AUG(b),* July 1971.

54. *GIR (r),* July 1972.

55. Mati Dan Kucingi of Musawa (MDK(m), June 1973) gives the kirarin Gozo as:

Gozo dan uwar gona!	Gozo, the son of the mother of the farm!
Dan Arkilla!	Son of Arkilla!
Dan Bagudu!	Son of Bagudu!
Dan uwan ci karhi!	The relation of the one who wins with strength!

A kirari of Na Gozo is recorded by A.V. King, 'A Boorii Liturgy from Katsina,' *African Language Studies,* VII, London, 1960 p. 116.

56. Gadado dan Laima, *Al-Kashf wal bayan* (trans.) U.F. Malumfashi, *The Life of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio and Sultan Bello Being a Translation and Analysis of Raud al Jinan and Kashf wal bayan* M.A. Thesis, ABU/ABC, 1973, p. 33.

by Bawa Dan Gima.[57] His fate indicating that the problem which preoccupied him was insoluble within the existing framework of political order.

The real significance of these political developments in the late eighteenth century, can only be grasped when we identify the social and political role that religion played in the society. Although there was still some diversity in religious belief in the kingdom, the only communities whose beliefs had not been basically modified to fit in with monotheistic Islamic cosmology had by this period developed in isolation from the mainstream of the society. These were communities like those of the worshippers of Magiro at Kwatarkwashi and other centres, like the dutsin Duru and the dutsin Gingin. There were also the *arnan* (animistic) Kainafara around the dutsin Birchi, and the communities of the custodians of the major religious shrines like the Kukar Jangarai and the tombs of Durbi-ta-kusheyi. Some of the more highly specialized artisan and farming lineages, whose cohesion had been maintained since the period of ancient settlements, also continued to practice exclusive cults.

The majority of the population however, had come to identify themselves as Muslims and with the dominant Islamized culture. In some of the rural homesteads, especially among the specialized hunters, farmers and pastoralists, the iskoki belief system retained a certain hold because it was so closely bound up with man's relationship with nature, which was the major preoccupation of these sections of the rural population. Within this system various major elements of natural and social phenomenon were integrated around the spirit of the Earth, the Mother, as this karari of Inna reveals.[58]

Inna uwar mu	Inna, our mother
Inna uwar Ibrahim (Sarkin Rafi)	Inna, mother of Ibrahim (Owner of the river)
Inna ta Mallam Sambo	Inna, of Malam Sambo. (Owner of the cattle)
Garama ba sawaita	*Garama ba sawaita*
Domema uwar yau	The necessary one, mother of today
Inna uwar Rankwanzama	Inna, the mother of Rankwanzama
Inna mai kosson mai nobbom	Inna the owner of butter and milk

57. Tilho, *op. cit.*, p. 460. Palmer records a saying: *"In an ki hidi a hidi, Kaura shi ya kashe Gozo!"* (Even if it is not revealed it shall be revealed that it is the Kaura who killed Gozo!), 'Abdurahman' Notebook I, *PP-NHRS,* Reel 46. According to the account in which this saying is recorded, the Kaura had married a Fulani woman and had trouble with Gozo. When Gozo asked him to kill the Fulani he went to Dokau and stayed there. When Gozo went after him the Kaura obtained 'medicine' from Dan Fodio and killed Gozo there.

58. *MDK(m),* June 1973.

Ta maidawa, dan Jigo	Of the Owner of the Forest, the son of Jigo
Allah abin dogara	Allah the Dependable One
Inna abin dogara	Inna the Dependable One
Inna mai gida bisa kuka	Inna the owner of the house on the kuka tree
Inna mai gida bisa suri	Inna the owner of the house in the anthill
Inna mai gida bisa labi	Inna, the owner of the house on the cattle path
Ba dan ke ba,	If not because of you,
Sai a ce aljani karya ne!	It will be said that spirits do not exist.

In the cities and towns, however, this belief system did not have a similar basis: there was very little preoccupation with man's direct relationship to nature. Religion in the urban society was important, not so much in mediating the relations between man and nature, but in mediating the relations between man and man. Townspeople who did turn to spirits were more interested in those that would influence their individual or family fortunes, and not in the more collectivist spirits of natural phenomenon like *Gajere dan Jigo* (owner of the forest) or *Tudwatsu* (thunder).

Morever in urban society, with more intense social and economic intercourse, people sought in religion the proper ways of conduct, the means of establishing the correct basis for social relations. This was not a salient need in the rural areas, with a more regular cadence of life and the diffused network of social and economic relations closely knit to kinship and other established ties. For the townspeople it was Islam which provided the basis on which trust could be established, business conducted and community life sustained. For these people the iskoki might feature as magic and superstition, and in the treatment of some forms of psychiatric disorder, but their social and political relevance had considerably declined.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA

This development was of great significance as it was accompanied by the growth in the size and influence of the Muslim intelligentsia as a distinct and self-conscious social strata. When we put together the fragmentary evidence regarding this strata in the late eighteenth century we find that there were numerous groups of mallamai all over the kingdom, and within the Birnin Katsina we can identify four important groups at Masanawa, Gafai, Tsohuwar Kasuwa, Gambarawa and Maiardawa.

The mallaman Masanawa, descendants of the Wali Abu Abdullahi b. Masanih al-Barnawi al-Katsinawi (1595—1667), lived in the Masanawa quarter of the Birnin Katsina around the mosque and the house of their illustrious ancestor. Although the honorific of Dan Masanih was retained by the family, it seems not to have carried any duties and they appear

to have maintained themselves distinct from the government, caring for their schools and mosques in the cikin Birni. We do not know exactly the role they played in the Jihad struggle, but they traditionally had some contact with the Shehu Usman dan Fodio, and it is likely that the neutrality adopted by the inhabitants of the cikin Birni was due partly to their influence and that of the other ulama.[59]

One of the most influential of these ulama in the late eighteenth century was from among the mallama Gafai. This was Malam Yahaya dan Malam Buhari of Yandoto. He had moved into the Birnin Katsina with over 300 students from Yandoto, while his brother, Malam Abubakar, had moved to Kano where he became one of the noted scholars in the reign of the Sarkin Kano Babba Zaki (c.1768—1776).[60] The tradition regarding Malam Yahaya's settlement in the Birnin Katsina illustrates the position that the mallamai had come to occupy in the society. It was Malam Buhari, his father, who had been asked to give a fatwa regarding the correct punishment of the princes who had killed a person from the cikin Birni. When the messenger to Malam Buhari arrived it was found that he was secluded in meditation and his son Malam Yahaya gave the fatwa. As has been recounted above, this saved the situation, and Tsagarana (c.1767—1768) invited Malam Buhari to move and settle in the Birnin Katsina—an invitation which he declined—after his death however Malam Yahaya took it up and moved with his students. He was offered a house near the palace which he refused and instead was given land in Gafai on which he had a house built, from which he and his successors exercised considerable influence in the affairs of Katsina.[61]

There were the mallaman Tsohuwar Kasuwa, like Malam Usman and his son Malam Ladan, who moved in from Borno and built a great reputation as scholars.[62] They settled with one Malam Ubasu, a scholar and a famous builder who reputedly was invited by the Shehu Usman Dan Fodio to take part in the building of Sokoto, and was accompanied there by Malam Ladan.

The diversity of origin of this intelligentsia is illustrated in the case of the Mallaman Gambarawa. There was the famous Malam Kisko, who started life as a professional wrestler before settling down in Gambarawa

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59. There is a tradition that during the fighting over the capital in the Jihad wars the people of the cikin Birni locked their doors. *AUG(b)*, July 1971.

60. *MML(a)*, July 1972. *K.C.*, p. 124.

61. Malam Yahaya is the grandfather of Alhaji Modu, an influential malam of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Katsina. See H.R. Palmer, *History of Katsina*, NNAK/SNP/17-8/K.2076, p. 59.

62. *ABM(b)*, July 1972.

to become a renowned scholar, taking an active part in the disputations for which the scholars of the Birnin Katsina were well known.[63] In the same unguwa was the family of Malam Muhammadu Batasiye whose father, Malam Muhammadu Bakone, had moved to Tasawa from the west, from where the family had moved to Birni to establish a reputation as scholars and dispensers of medicine.[64] Nearby in Makudawa was a Malam Bako, of Arab descent, who seemed to have been closely connected with the great merchant families of that quarter.[65]

In the small towns around the Birni we can discern three groups of scholars living at Kwami, Makurdi and Morai. The leading family at Kwami was that of Malam Umaru Kaki of Malle origin.[66] It was to this small town, about 6 miles south of the Birnin Katsina, along a major route to the south and the south-west, that another *bamalle* (members of the Mallewa clan who trace their origin from Mali) Malam Usman Bakaduba came to live in the mid-eighteenth century. He was the father of the mujahid Muhammadu b. Alhaji (d.1806/7) whom he left behind with the family of Malam Umaru Kaki at Kwami when he proceeded on his journey to Mecca. When the Jihad started Muhammadu b. Alhaji had become an influential scholar in Runka and neighbouring towns to the southwest of the Birni.

A few kilometres east of Kwami was the village of Makurdi to which another family of mallamai from the west led by Muhammadu Chomo came in the mid-eighteenth century.[67] They had passed through areas of Kebbi before coming to settle in Katsina and there are traditions that in the course of their travels they had come into contact with the Shehu Usman Dan Fodio. A grandson of Muhammadu Chomo, Malam Hambali, was appointed qadi in the Birnin Katsina by the amir Umaru Dallaji, which led to the establishment of this family in what came to be known as the Unguwar Alkali quarter of the Birni.

The group at Morai was made up of Sullubawa scholars who had moved from Zandam with the great dispersion of that clan in the late eighteenth century. Their leading scholar was Liman Na Morai son of Liman Dan Bala of Zandam.[68] This group maintained their ties with another group of Sullubawa scholars at Kanwa, from among whom Malam Muhammadu,

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63. *MAG(b)*, July 1971.
64. *AUG(b)*, July 1971.
65. *ABM(b)*, July 1972.
66. *GYO(m)*, August 1972. *YAD(d)*, August 1972. *Assessment Report Yandaka District*, NNAK/KATPROF/1/1898.
67. *MAD(b)*, August 1972. *GIU(a)*, July 1971.
68. *Emir of Katsina Genealogical Tree.*

father of Ibrahim Dabo amir of Kano (1819—1846), is reputed to have come.[69]

Further away to the south and east of the Birnin Katsina on the densely settled central plains, there were other groups of mallamai at Benye, Dallaji, Rugar Bade and Dan Ashita. Near Benye, at Yanuku, there was the family of Ahiwa, a Fellata Borno whose leading scholar when the Jihad started was Malam Muhamman Na Benye,[70] who was born at Yanuku, one of a rather prosperous cluster of settlements around the town of Benye. He lived in Benye, and was made the Imam for Friday prayers at the venerated mosque of Karofi, a few kilometres to the south-west of Benye. He became one of the leading mujahiddin in the contingent under Umaru Dallaji.

About 30 kilometres east of Benye was the family of Malam Umaru Dallaji whose origin is traced to Borno, and who was said to come from among the Arabs of Wadai, living in the town of Dallaji.[71] They had moved to Dallaji from Makar, east of Giremawa, and Malam Umaru's father Malam Abdulmumini lived at the village of Dasije, about 1½ kilometres west of Dallaji.[72] Malam Umaru's early life seemed to have involved extensive travelling as a scholar within Katsina and beyond. This must have been a formative experience as well as giving him the extensive contacts he used to mobilize support for the Jihad all over the kindom. Some of this support came from groups of mallamai such as the mallaman Rugar Bade, who lived near his home town which was about 4 kilometres west of Dallaji. This was a settlement of salt merchants, presumably from the areas of Bedde, which included certain families of scholars. The imam of the settlement was Malam Usman Dan Malam Dan Ila, who was from the area of Ingawa and who became one of the supporters of Umaru Dallaji in the Jihad.[73]

The situation in the town of Dan Ashita, along the border with Kano, is more difficult to reconstruct. There are traditions that the tomb of a saint, known as Shehu Abbas, was sited there. He is associated with a group of scholars who moved into the town in the time of the Sarkin Katsina Wari Maikore (c.1755—1767).[74]

Our information regarding the rest of the kingdom is more scanty. Certainly a large and influential group of ulama were at Yandoto. One

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69. Iliyasu, *op. cit.*, f. 15.
70. *AMS(b)*, July 1971.
71. *GID(b)*, August 1972. *MAM(b)*, August 1972.
72. *GID(b)*, August 1972.
73. *MAM(b)*, August 1972.
74. *B.K.D./PP-NHRS.*

Muhammadu Sa'ad, a nephew of the Shehu's grandmother Ruqayya, lived at Yandoto where he married before returning to Konni.[75] He came from a branch of the Turudbi of Musa Jokollo most noted for learning; his brother was Malam Muhammadu Sambo who taught the Shehu and who died at Agades in 1793. There was the family of Alhaji Mustapha, father of the mujahid Alhaji Umaru who, together with Malam Sambo Dan Ashafa, was driven out of Yandoto during the Jihad.[76] There was Malam Sambo Dan Ashafa's family. His grandfather Malam Abdurahman had met Alhaji Mustapha in Borno and accompanied him back to study under him at Yandoto.[77] The ulama of Yandoto, like those of Matazu, seem to have occupied a powerful position in this prosperous metropolis of Katsina Laka. This position was perhaps one of the factors that influenced their attitudes towards the movement of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio.

By the late eighteenth century there was in Katsina a largely Islamized population in terms of its norms, values and identity, whose rulers were also Islamized, but whose legitimacy as a dynasty was based on the iskoki belief system. A numerous and self-conscious Muslim intelligentsia existed, some of whose members were employed by the sarakuna for their skills as individuals, but who had no established and institutionalized role in the government which was run mainly by royal slaves and eunuchs. Unlike Borno, from whence many of the ulama originated and had studied, there was not a single political office in the Katsina government for a member of the ulama. Dan Masani was a sort of honorary title with no duties or specific political responsibilities. In spite of the diversity of their origin, status, occupational affiliations, and their often intense rivalries, as a social strata they were very influential and were conscious of being distinct from the sarakuna, who patronized some of them, though as a group kept them at a distance. The atmosphere of political uncertainty created by the upheavals in the kingdoms to the west of Katsina (dealt with in the next section) and the crises brought about by Gozo's policies and demise, all enhanced their influence. The reformist activities of the Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, his teachers and disciples in the Sokoto-Rima basin, provided a focus for the activity of some of them, a means of

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75. Last, *op. cit.*, p. 37. See also p. 5 and the 'Genealogy of Shehu Uthman b. Fodiye and some of the Scholars Related to Him c.1800'.

76. A. Abubakar and C. Shebar, *A Brief History of Yandton Daji* Maru Teachers' College, 1964, a typescript obtained from Alhaji Garba Nadama.

77. *Ibid.*

channelling their restlessness and dissatisfaction with the existing political order.[78]

THE ISSUE OF CATEGORIES

In the foregoing sketch of the state of society in Katsina in the late eighteenth century, an attempt has been made to come to grips with its more palpable and substantial entities and dimensions, beyond the more widely used categories of Habe/Fulani; Muslim/Pagan. It outlines a context in which other categories reflecting different orders of economic, social and political relationships, like citizens and non-citizens; freemen and slaves; rulers and subjects, can be used meaningfully. Even the categories of Habe, Fulani, Muslim, syncretist and pagan can be used in this context to clarify, rather than obscure, the nature of the society and its movement.

The real substance of the role of the Kauran Katsina, Kuren Gumari, for example, who was involved in the assassination of Gozo in c.1801 is not defined in any way by simply categorizing him as 'Habe'. He was not only a *bawan sarki* (royal slave) but head of the sarakunan yaki.[79] He belonged to the masu sarauta class and whatever his descent, was most likely bred, perhaps even born, in the cikin Gida or the kofar Kaura quarter of the Birni, with all that this implies regarding his connections, attitudes, values and culture. Just as the Sarakunan Fulani of Ingawa were not simply members of the masu sarauta class, but also mutanen Ingawa (Ingawa people) belonging to a lineage of Fulani descent from Borno.[80] The real social and political dimensions of a figure like the mujahid Malam Muhammadu Na Benye are not revealed by categorizing him as 'Fulani'. He was an influential malam; the imam of a venerated mosque in the old established urban centre of Karofi. He himself is

78. Some of the restlessness of the ulama of Katsina in the eighteenth century is expressed by Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Fulani al-Kashinawi al-Daranqawi, who said: 'I yearned to settle in many lands but could not find peace in any of the lands I visited. I have been enslaved by ambition and had I contented myself I would have been much happier'. *Al-Durr al-Manzum wa Khutsat al-Sir al-Makhtum*, Nuroamaniye Kutuphaves, No. 5075, Istanbul. Muhammad b. Muhammad studied under various scholars in the Sudan including one Muhammadu Fodi, who might be the father of the Shehu Usman, he went to Mecca and performed the pilgrimage in 1142 A.H. (1729/30). He later settled in Cairo where he died in 1742/43, leaving Hassan al-Jabarti as the custodian of his books and property. I am grateful to Muhammad Al-Hajj for providing me with this and other information about this scholar.

79. See p.

80. See pp.

descended from a Fulani lineage at Yanuku but belonged to the town of Benye, hence his lakabi 'Na Benye'.[81]

All categories defining economic, social and political reality only take on substance in the context of specific historical situations.[82] New contexts transform their meaning. The political and social changes out of which the Sokoto Caliphate emerged gave new meaning to many categories and terms. The term Musulmi, for example, came to mean, in certain contexts, a member of the new political community under the *amir ul muminin* (Muslim emir) at Sokoto. While *Kafiri* (unbeliever) was applied in these contexts to all those dissident elements opposed to it. These dissident elements formed around remnants of the old dynasties at places like Maradi and Tsibiri termed the new rulers 'Fulani' or more derisively as 'Agwai'. These and other terms like *yan ridda* (apostates), *zindikai* (atheists), *tawaye* (rebels), *munafiki* (dissimulators) came to form part of the political vocabulary of this area in the nineteenth century.[83] It is important, therefore, to distinguish between the function of these terms in defining the lines of political conflicts and the complex historical reality which they sought to define or obscure.

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81. See p.(Folio 198).
82. It is significant that in most of the studies of the *political* history of the Central Sudan, indeed of all Africa, it is categories defining what are primarily linguistic entities like Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri, Bantu, that Western social scientists and historians have used. The more relevant politico-cultural categories like Kanawa, Katsinawa, Bornoan, are largely ignored. This might be because these linguistic categories appear more fixed. They lend themselves more easily to constructions which ignore historical movement, and present the picture of immutable warring tribes. A nineteenth century scholar Abdullahi Dan Fodio went beyond this level of analysis in his account of the origins of the Turudbi, distinguishing between language, descent, and territorial origin. See my paper, 'The Problem of Ethnic Categories In The Study of the Historical Development of the Central Sudan: A Critique of M.G. Smith and Others'.
83. The degree to which some of these terms had become internalized by the mid-nineteenth century is suggested by the story that the Emir of Katsina Saddiku (c.1836—1844) developed violent personal hostility to Habu Dan Doshero, the acting Galadima of Sokoto, because he called him a *sindiki* when he was being deposed. Saddiku was later responsible for the killing of Habu in c.1851, at Gora.

4 *The State in the late eighteenth century*

THE STRUCTURE

The Sarkin Katsina

The central institution of the political system was the kingship. The authority of the Sarkin Katsina, the Magajin Korau (Heir of Korau), over the territory known as the Kasar Katsina and over the people who lived in this territory, was the major bond of the Katsina political community. The Sarkin Katsina was a sovereign monarch, limited only in constitutional terms by the traditions and conventions established by Korau and Korau's successors which in the first part of the rites of installation over the corpse of his predecessor, every new king undertakes to follow.[1]

Succession to the office was limited to *yayan sarki* (royal princes) and the selection was done by the sarakunan *karaga* (kingmakers). This formal body was, by the late eighteenth century, made up of the Galadiman Katsina, the Kauran Katsina, the Durbin Katsina and the Yandakan Katsina, but the actual process of selection involved other sections of the central government, especially senior members of the royal family, the officials of the Gidan Korau and some of the senior sarakunan garuruwa.

Immediately a successor was chosen, the rites of installation began with the slaughter of a black bull whose blood was used to anoint the prospective king and whose hide was used as a burial shroud for the dead one. The selected prince stepped over the corpse of his predecessor and he was lectured on the heritage and ways of his ancestors which he undertook to follow. He was then dressed in a *walki* (leather apron) *baurar zinariya*, (a golden armlet) and *kirin zinariya* (a golden ward) to be hung on his shoulders together with *jan gwado* (a piece of thick woven red cloth)

1. *T.A.K./PP-NHRS*, and *Akhbar Amir Katsina.... PP-NHRS*. These two, especially the former, are my sources for the royal rites of installation.

after which he was taken to the house of a senior princess. His hands and feet were hennaed, (as was done with a bridegroom) and after 7 days there *wankan sarauta,* (the ritual bath of installation) took place. This rite marked the formal accession to kingship, and the new king stayed in the house of the magajiya to receive pledges of loyalty from his subjects. Following this he went out of the Birnin Katsina to a tree shrine where for 7 days, festivities and sacrifices were made. On his way back to enter the palace, the people of the Birni hid in their houses and locked their doors as he passed. More sacrifices took place at the entrance of the palace and he spent another 7 nights in seclusion in the Soron Bawada. The last part of these rites took place in the Soron Kofa, where the new king was presented with the sword of Korau, 'Gajere', a horse and a golden object *(tukunya?).*

These rites clearly impressed upon the Sarki and his subjects the sacred basis of the kingship and emphasized its continuity back to the times of Korau. The foundation of the ruler's legitimacy in the iskoki system of religious belief was also brought out. It is not surprising that Gozo's refusal to perform these rites at his accession should produce a situation of political uncertainty, which even his assassination failed to resolve.

The authority of the Sarkin Katsina was exercised through a hierarchy of sarakuna who, in terms of their relationship to him, fell into 3 main groups. These were (1) the sarakuna drawn among the princes, princesses and other members of the dynasty; (2) the sarakunan sarki, officers of the central government, appointed by the Sarki and deriving their authority entirely from their offices. By the late eighteenth century, they consisted largely of royal slaves, eunuchs and some freeborn fadawa, and constituted the central administrative cadre of the kingdom. (3) the masu gari and the sarakunan garuruwa ruling in the individual towns, appointed by the Sarkin Katsina from among noble lineages of these towns. These had an independent basis for their authority in their position within these communities. Although they represented an older form of political authority, older than the kingship, the masu gari came to form the local organs of administration in the kingdom.

The Central Administration

Five major divisions can be discerned in the central administration of the late eighteenth century.[2] There were the sarakunan fada, (officers of the court) headed by the Galadiman Katsina, an office held by a royal eunuch. They were responsible for running the affairs of the Gidan Korau,

2. For this description of the central administration, I have drawn on: David, *op. cit.*, pp. 655—661; *AIT(k),* July 1972; *SDC(g),* July 1971; *AAM(s),* July 1972.

the fortified palace and complex where the royal living quarters, the halls for the conduct of royal business, the stores, treasury, arsenal and the royal stables were situated: the Galadiman Katsina, who lived near the palace and deputised for the Sarki, was in overall charge. Subordinate to him were the Ajiya, in charge of the treasury; the Baraya, in charge of the stores; the Turaki and Shantali, in charge of the royal chambers, the audience halls and general court protocol; and the Madawaki in charge of the royal stables. Within the palace was also the Tamburan Katsina, head of the royal drummers who played on the ancient *Tambura* (kettle drums) on special occasions; and various court artistes like the *Makadan kwashi* (kettle drum (small), players) *makadan kotso* (players of open hour-glass drum), *masu kakaki* (head of kakaki players), *masu algaita* (head of reed pipe players) and the *Sarkin Mahaukata* (royal jester).

In addition to these were the sarakunan yaki, headed by the Kauran Katsina, who were responsible for leading the various sections of the army into battle and held command over garrison towns. Although all senior sarakuna were expected to equip and maintain a contingent of cavalrymen and foot soldiers to lead into battle when summoned, the Kauran Katsina, the Ubandawaki, Sarkin Karma, the Sarkin Baka, Magayaki, had specific responsibility for military organization. The Kaura was responsible for the defence of the Birnin Katsina and had a house in the kofar Kaura as well as at other settlements dispersed over the kingdom. While the Kaura had general responsibility for military organization, and specific reponsibility for the defence of the capital, the Marusan Katsina, based at Gwiwa, was commander of the eastern frontier, and the Gatarin Katsina, based at Ruma, was the commander of the north-western frontier. The Magayaki it seems, was responsible for the arsenal in the palace and the personal protection of the king. The Ubandawaki was in charge of the central body of *'yan lihida* (heavy cavalrymen) who were largely composed of royal slaves. The army was made up of cavalrymen using swords, lances and thrusting spears. The heavy cavalry both men and horses was protected by quilt chain mail and metal hats and shields of various types. There was a *dakaru* (large infantry force) made up of *'yan baka* (bowmen) and *'yan karma* (swordsmen). The actual formation the army adopted in battle depended on the strategy pursued. In the Battle of Dan Kaishi against the Gobir army under Bawa Jan Gwarzo in 1789, the Katsina army was drawn up in seven lines. The backbone of the Gobir army was broken when, in an assault led by the Dan Galadima they came up against the third line, composed of heavy cavalry, under the Ubandawakin Katsina, and were surrounded, battered, and many killed.[3] In these wars of the reign of Agwaragi, Katsina seems

to have pursued a strategy aimed at defending the towns and fighting battles in the border areas when a clear numerical superiority was attained, thus inflicting decisive defeats over the enemy; a strategy which succeeded admirably in battle with Gobir. However, as will be seen in the next chapter, this did not work with the mujahiddin who avoided decisive battles and were made of several contingents operating separately. These contingents were in some instances able to surprise the Katsina army—as Dan Tunku did in 1805—and inflict severe defeat before it had taken up what had become its established battle formations.

The sarakunan sana'a were responsible for specialized economic activity, and they, like the military chiefs, were largely drawn from among the royal slaves. For some of the occupations a member of a leading family practising the occupation might be appointed. A list of the various sarautu of this division of the central administration is given on page 180. These officials, who went on tours throughout the kingdom, were also regularly involved with treasury, stores and army officials for provisioning the government and handling the large resources that came in as revenue.

In charge of the 7 gates of the Birnin Katsina were the sarakunan kofa, responsible for regulating the movement of people and goods in and out of the Birni, and thus closely connected with the security of the capital. They provided hostels for travellers, and possibly assisted the sarkin sango or tafarki in collecting *kudin hito* (customs duties) but one of their major functions was that of providing security service in the capital directly under the Sarkin Katsina.

The fifth division of the central administration was concerned with the supervision of the masu gari. This seems to have involved all the senior sarakunan sarki, each of whom was given specific responsibility for a number of towns in various parts of the kingdom. Those who lived permanently in the Birnin Katsina, like the Galadima, or who had several towns under them, delegated responsibility to representatives who lived in these towns, known as *jekada*.

Administration of the Settlements

The affairs of the various cities and towns were in the hands of the masu gari and, although a broad distinction can be drawn between them and the sarakunan sarki, they were by no means a uniform group.

Among them were the sarakunan garuruwa of the large and old established towns and cities like the Sarkin Maska, Gozaki, Kogo, Dugul,

3. H.F. Backwell, *Kauran Namoda Assessment Report*, October 1913, NNAK/SNP/705P/1913.

Samri, Yandaka, and the Gazobi at Karofi. These sarakuna were distinctive centres of authority in their various regions. Their dynasties and the communities over which they ruled had maintained considerable cohesion for long periods, in some cases going back before the formation of the kingdom. They had considerable autonomy and the central government officials responsible for supervising them acted more as representatives of the Sarkin Katsina sent to live with them, than as supervisory officials. Some of them, like the Samri and the Gazobi, maintained town houses in the Birni and at their installation the tambari was played, signifying a semi-royal status.[4]

The Sarkin Maska, for example, lived in a fortified palace in Maska complete with kofar fada and kofar bai like the Gidan Korau, and had his own hierarchy of sarakuna supervising the numerous masu gari subordinated to him. There were the princes of Maska, the Galadiman Maska and the Dan Galadiman Maska: the senior sarakuna of Maska, the Durbin Maska, the Madawakin Maska, and a number of military officials known as the jaruman Maska.[5] They ruled in, or supervised the towns of the Sarkin Maska, such as the Birnin Pampam, Gwaya, Rafin Iwa, Yakurutu, Batarawa, Duya and many others making up the Maska regional cluster.

Similar in status to these, but of different origin, were the sarakuna appointed over the large cohesive immigrant groups, like the Barebarin Katsina, the Sarkin Fulani Dambo, Sarkin Sullubawa, the Tambari Illela, and the Tasar of the Tazarawa. The Sarkin Fulani Dambo for example, who also lived in a palace at Ingawa, had a whole hierarchy of officials which included the Magaji Shamiya, Magaji Koka, the Dan Ila, the Ruga and the Chiroman Gari.[6] Although this group was initially established over certain groups of clans, they came to rule over settlements and develop a territorial base resembling the older sarakunan garuruwa.

Then there was the general run of masu gari who had much less autonomy or status, and over whom the central government exercised much closer control. In new towns established at the intiative of the central government the maigari could come from among the royal slaves or free officials. In other towns, divisions or any conflict among the local notables would strengthen the hand of the central government and enable it to appoint its own men. In general the administration of the garuruwa was a replica of the central administration, as each maigari

4. *Kaura District Notes,* NNAK/KATPROF/I/811; Daniels, *op. cit.*
5. C.J. Clayton, *Maska District Assessment Report,* NNAK/SNP-10/183/1917.
6. "Asalin Mutanen Ingawa", *loc. cit.*, pp. 36—37.

would often have under him various officials responsible for defence, economic activity, and the affairs of the gari itself. In the well-established communities, the dattawan garai were consulted on certain matters by the maigari and might even influence the selection of a new one.

Taxation

The main source of revenue for the government was the kudin kasa which seems to have been levied on all those engaged in general farming activity. The unit of assessment was the gida and it was really a tax on the produce of the gandun gida. Other agricultural taxes were levied on fadama cultivation, kudin rafi and upland cultivation of various crops like groundnuts, tobacco and indigo. Besides these there were the various kudaden sana'a, (tax on commerce and manufacture), and kudin hito, (custom toll levied only on certain produce when it enters the kingdom); *jangali,* a tax on cattle, was also collected.

Other sources of revenue for the central government were the produce of the royal estates worked by slaves and the peasantry of the area where these were located. The booty obtained from wars might have been of some significance in the period when the kingdom was expanding and raiding into the south-west region; this would have been in the form of captives enslaved. Warfare with the kingdoms of Kano, Zazzau and Gobir was not, it seems, a profitable enterprise, and any booty captured was probably off-set by the expenditure in horses, provisions, weapons, and manpower.

Dependencies

On the borders of the kingdom to the south-west, were certain polities whose governments, by the late eighteenth century, had become dependent on the state of Katsina. These were Kwiambana, Kumbashi, Karissen, Maburria, Mahorro, Kakihun, Salaba, Birnin Gwari and Koriga.

They were all located in areas which, from an early period, received a considerable number of immigrants from Katsina. Kwiambana was the centre of a cluster of towns even before the fifteenth century, whose growth into a fully fledged kingdom was hindered by the rise around it of the kingdoms of Zazzau, Zamfara, Kebbi and Katsina. The rulers of Kwiambana therefore came to establish a sort of dependency relation with Katsina. As more immigrants moved in from Katsina, attracted by the iron resources of the area and the trade route to Nupe and the west, these Katsinawa became involved in the formation of kingdoms which came to incorporate disparate clans of the Kamuku, Achipawa, Dakar-

kari, and Kambari, living in this area.[7] The role of these Katsinawa in the political and economic development of this area oriented the trading and cultural networks of the area towards Katsina, even though the kingdom of Kebbi continued to exercise some influence. Kwatarkwashi came to be a major religious shrine for the numerous worshippers of Magiro inhabiting this region. Some of the titles of the sarakuna of these small kingdoms were modelled on those of Katsina.[8] The hunters, iron workers and traders of the area became geared to supplying the markets of Katsina, which they were connected to by a major trade route passing through Birnin Kogo, and later through Yandoto.

The actual nature of the political dependence on Katsina by these kingdoms is dificult to reconstruct. They came under the influence of Kebbi, Yawuri and Zazzau at various times and at different levels. Slaves and other migrants from this area formed a section of the Kebbi army and constituted a large proportion of the population of the kingdom of Yawuri.[9] The location of these kingdoms between large states gave them room for manoeuvre. Koriga is said to have shifted its allegiance to Katsina only in the eighteenth century, because of the meagreness of the gifts they were receiving from the rulers of Zazzau.[10]

The political relations with Katsina largely involved the granting of recognition of new rulers by sending them certain regalia of office. Katsina might have also acted as an arbitrator in their disputes.[11] Possibly too there were agreements regarding the supply of slaves to the government and the treatment of Katsina traders. In any case the government of Katsina maintained an interest in this region right up to the reign of Gozo (c.1796—1801), when an expedition was sent against the Sarkin Karissen.[12]

THE PROCESS

Crisis in the Dynasty: c.1755—1801

The evidence for the actual workings of the political system, even in the late eighteenth century, is scanty. It is possible however, to discern

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7. A.B. Matthew, *Historical and Anthropological Report on the Katsinawa*, NNAK/SNP/17-8K.2100; A.B. Matthews, *Achifawa, Historical and Anthropological Report on*, NNAK/SNP/17-8/K.2; A.B. Matthews, *Anthropological and Historical Report on the Kamberi*, NNAK/SNP/-178/K.2105; G.L. Monk, *op. cit.*, passim; K. Hamilton, *op. cit.*
8. Matthews, *Historical and Anthropological....Katsinawa*, p. 8; G.L. Monk, *Kwongoma History*, August 1912; NNAK/MINPROF/161—1912.
9. Alkali, *op. cit.*, p. ; M. Adamu, *op. cit., passim.*
10. Monk, *Koriga District....*, p. 12.
11. Matthews, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
12. Matthews, *op. cit.*, p. 4; E.V. Rochefort-Ree, *Kontagora, Nupe and Ilorin Provinces: Ethnographical Survey*, NNAK/SNP/9-8/2923/1921; Tilho, *op. cit.*, p. 460.

certain features of the political situation that obtained in the period from the reign of Wari Maikore (c.1755—1767) to the assassination of Gozo in c.1801.

One of these features was, dynastic rivalry. Although competition for the kingship was a permanent feature of the political system, it seems to have taken on serious dimensions in this period. The crisis over the accession and assassination of Gozo (c.1796—1801) appears to have linked this rivalry with the problem of politico-religious legitimacy confronting the dynasty.[13] Another feature of this period, was the government's pre-occupation with foreign relations and the defence of its territory. Although the government was fairly successful in its foreign relations and emerged from the political turmoil of the second half of the eighteenth century with its territory intact, and in fact occupying a strong position in its relations with Gobir and the successor states of Zamfara, this pre-occupation diverted its attention from serious internal developments. There were no long-term measures to deal with significant social developments that were changing the composition and nature of the society, such as the growth in size and influence of the ulama, and the increasing assertiveness of the inhabitants of the cikin Birni; or to incorporate the groups of wealthy pastoral Fulani moving in from the regions of Borno, during the late eighteenth century, like the Daneji, Dangawa and the Natirbe.

We can trace the growth of sharp dynastic rivalry back to the reign of the Sarkin Katsina Gima (c.1734—1747) and perhaps even further, to the 26 year reign of Karyagiwa b. Jan Hazo (c.1702—1728), which was immediately followed by two short reigns each of 3 years, before the accession of Gima. The accession of Gima Dan Dakasari, whose name is omitted from most of the kinglists but occurs in the traditions, seems to have marked some important break in the order of dynastic succession.[14] Whatever the circumstances of this break were, it does seem to have involved the emergence of a distinct royal sub-lineage, the Gimawa, one of whose members was ruling when the Jihad wars started in 1804. But dynastic division seems to have been not simply between the Gimawa and the rest. In what was apparently the senior branch of the dynasty, serious conflicts occurred in the mid-eighteenth century and continued up to the Jihad. A tradition refers to a civil war on the death of the Sarkin Katsina Wari Maikore (c.1755—1767), in which hundreds of people were killed.[15] This is mentioned at the end of a brief account of

13. *Akhbar Amir Kashna*....PP-NHRS.
14. See genealogical chart of the Sarakunan Katsina.
15. A. Mischlich and J. Lippett, 'Deitrag zur geschichte des Mohammedanism in der Hausa Landern', *MSOS*, 6, 1903, p. 203.

the spread of Islam in the Kasar Hausa, but the names of the rulers involved have become muddled. This was brought about by the intense dynastic conflicts involving the Sarakuna and princes in the second half of the eighteenth century.

The Sarkin Katsina Agwaragi (c.1778—1796), in spite of his successful conduct of Katsina's foreign relations, came to face opposition towards the end of his reign,[16] one centre of which was led by his brother Gozo This opposition might have been connected with the powerful position that the sarakunan yaki had attained in his reign, marked as it was by two great military victories. However, it probably had a more fundamental basis in the social developments outlined above which were increasingly bringing the political system into a state of contradiction with the dominant system of religious belief and social conduct. The length of the reign itself, one of the longest in the eighteenth century, provoked some disaffection and Agwaragi became so preoccupied by relations with Gobir and Zamfara that he failed to deal with this and more basic political issues within the kingdom. An account of the accession of Gozo gives us a glimpse of the circumstances in the last years of Agwaragi's reign:

> He lived for along time and ruled Katsina for 60 [sic] years. And those who were waiting for him to die from among his brothers, and cousins and other princes grew tired. Disaffection spread in his time and this pained the heart of Gozo, for he was righteous man disliking disaffection in the land and proud of ruling according to the Shari'a. Then it occured to him to consult the *ulama* and he called one of them and complained of the difficulty he was in because of his desire to remove his brother Agwaragi on account of the disaffection and to revive the Sunnah and avoid evil practices.[17]

Gozo is said to have brought about Agwaragi's death through the agency of a gold stirrup which he obtained from a malam and presented to Agwaragi.[18] When Agwaragi died the kingmakers are said to have been left with little choice but to appoint Gozo. They agreed to his installation in spite of their misgivings regarding his attitudes towards the rites of installation and the heritage and traditions of the kingship. Although Gozo successfully imposed himself on them, his position was weak from the outset. The ulama who supported him held no positions in the government and he had to work with the sarakunan sarki whose attitude towards him was at best wary and lukewarm. His policies of supporting the Shari'a and the Sunnah, while at the same time patronizing worship

16. *Akhbar Amir Kashna*....PP-NHRS.
17. *Ibid.*
18. There is another tradition which says that Gozo died of illness and before he died, he made a prophetic statement that after him his people will be enslaved, *H.M.I.*, p. 42.

of the iskoki, even if in secret, only rendered him more vulnerable to his opponents. His assassination at Dokau in c.1801 after he had attempted and failed to meet the Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, revealed how serious the political situation had become. There are various traditions about his death. There appears to have been an attempt to cover up the facts and pass it off as a natural death. The killing of a king creates a dangerous precedent in a political system centred on kingship. The assassination seems to have been carried out by a group led by the Kauran Katsina, Kuren Gumari. Among their immediate grievances was the length and duration of the expedition which seem to have taken them as far west as Rikina and as far to the south-west as the kingdom of Karissen beyond the gulbin Ka.[19] Whatever the immediate motives of Gozo's assassins, it was made possible by the prevailing political state of tension and disaffection at all levels of the political systems.

His successor was, significantly, Bawa Dan Gima, a choice which would have aggravated the problem of dynastic rivalry as it involved bypassing numerous princes of the main branches of the dynasty.[20]

The collapse of the State of Zamfara and its consequences

We have already examined Katsina's external relations up to the reign of Muhammadu Uban Yara (1641—1671). The evidence that Katsina became involved in some affairs with Zamfara in that reign has already been discussed. This period saw the beginning of certain developments in the political situation of the Sokoto-Rima basin which, throughout the eighteenth century, came to involve Katsina more deeply with its western neighbours. A proper grasp of these developments which culminated in the break-up of the great cities of Kebbi, the collapse of the kingdom of Zamfara, and the establishment of a new Gobir capital at Hirnin Alkalawa, and in a whole new political configuration in western Hausaland would require an exhaustive study of the social and political history of the region beyond the scope of this book. Here, we shall only touch upon certain aspects of political development relevant to an understanding of the political circumstances in which Katsina found itself in 1804.

These political developments, which came to transform western Hausaland in the eighteenth century, can be traced to the growth of new

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19. Tilho, *op. cit.*, p. 460. Matthews, *Historical and Anthropological....Katsinawa,* p. 4.

20. Tsagarana (c.1767—1768) had many children and grandchildren. Besides Agwaragi and Gozo, his children included Maremawa, Binoni, Magajin Halidu. His grandchildren included Dan Kasawa, Dauda, Dan Mari, Dan Baura, and Dan Mahedi all of whom ruled in Maradi. *GIT(n),* September 1971; see genealogical chart of the Sarakunan Katsina.

centres of the Gobirawa at Birnin Lalle, Goran Rami to the north-west of Katsina and at Alkalawa in the Kasar Zamfara, in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.[21] They were also connected with the expansion of the urban centres, and the wealth, of the Kasar Zamfara taking place at about the same time.[22]

Birnin Lalle, Goran Rami and other settlements of Gobir Tudu developed regular commercial relations with the towns of Katsina. The market of Naya close to Goran Rami and only a few kilometres from Maradi became a great trade fair;[23] a major route from Borno to Birnin Zamfara went through this area.[24] The early eighteenth century Sarkin Gobir, Muhammadu Dan Chiroma, whose father and immediate predecessor had established the capital of Birnin Lalle maintained friendly relations with the rulers of Katsina.[25] This policy however, was reversed by the Sarkin Gobir Soba, who besieged Maradi in the first half of the eighteenth century.[26] He failed to take it and directed his expeditions against Adar and Abzin until his people, tired of continual warfare, refused to support him and he was caught with a small army and killed in a battle with the Abzinawa.[27] A period of crises followed in Gobir, with a succession of short reigns.[28]

Meanwhile Alkalawa, near Birnin Zamfara where some of the Gobirawa had settled, like the other settlements of the Kasar Zamfara in that period was growing in size and prosperity.[29] The warriors among the Gobirawa living there took part in the raids on the cities of Kebbi and amassed considerable wealth.[30] When in the course of the political crisis in the Gobir centres on the borders of Abzin the Sarkin Dan Ashsha was deposed, the Gobirawa leaders took advantage of a prolonged delay in appointing a Sarkin Zamfara to succeed Malo, by appointing as the new Sarkin Gobir, Babari, from among the Gobirawa settled in the Kasar Zamfara.[31] The deposed Sarkin Gobir Dan Ashsha moved to Katsina with his supporters where he stayed in the town of Majen Gobir, about 15 kilometres south of the Birnin Katsina.[32]

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21. Urvoy, *op. cit.*, pp. 243—244.
22. Krieger, *op. cit.*, pp. 40, 43—44.
23. Nicolas (etc.) *op. cit.*, p. 8.
24. *Ibid.*
25. *H.M.I.*, p. 12.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *H.M.I.*, p. 12.
28. *Ibid.*
29. Krieger, *op. cit.*, p. 58.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *H.M.I.*, p. 12.
32. *Ibid.*

This produced an explosive political situation in the whole area. The government of Zamfara had refused to appoint a sarki in Alkalawa leaving the settlement under a maiunguwa,[33] also it had not permitted a wall to be built around the settlement, leaving it with a stockade of *kawara* (stakes) as a kafi.[34] With the installation of Babari as the Sarkin, Gobir was faced with a situation in which one of its Gobirawa subjects had been appointed not just Sarkin Alkalawa but Sarkin Gobir. For the government of Katsina the situation was fraught with dangers and anxieties. While Dan Ashsha could be a means of exerting influence on the policies of Gobir centres using the support he might retain there—and perhaps even on Zamfara also, through the Gobirawa settled there—his position as the sarki of an ancient dynasty living only a short distance from the Birnin Katsina, and as a pretender attracting the hostile attentions of Babari and his supporters, clearly endangered the security of Katsina. Relations between Dan Ashsha and the Katsina government deteriorated, while Babari seems to have succeeded in avoiding hostilities with the successors of Sarkin Zamfara Malo, perhaps by moving out of the Kasar Zamfara altogether.[35] The outcome of this political imbroglio was that Dan Ashsha, with the help of a Katsina contingent, attempted to regain his throne. The expedition was defeated by Babari, who caught Uban Ashsha, tortured and killed him,[36] and followed this with a powerful raid on Katsina which brought him right to the walls of Birnin Katsina.[37] He also raided into Kano and areas to the east.[38] After he had reigned for several years, hostilities against the government of Zamfara began and following a long campaign Babari conquered the Birnin Zamfara in c.1762, benefiting from divisions between the Sarkin Zamfara Maroki and his sarakunan yaki. He established Alkalawa as the new capital of Gobir.[39]

Resistance from groups of the Zamfarawa continued up to 1801 and considerable emigration to southern Zamfara and western Katsina took place.[40] By the end of the reign of Bawa Jan Gwarzo (d.1788) large parts of northern Zamfara had been incorporated into Gobir, and the garuruwa of southern Zamfara such as Mafara, Maradun and new centres like Sabon Birni and Anka, had emerged as centres of small kingdoms.

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33. Krieger, *op. cit.*, p. 58.
34. *Ibid.*
35. Krieger, *op. cit.*, p. 63; *H.M.I.*, p. 13.
36. *H.M.I.* p. 12.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*; Krieger, *op. cit.*, p. 66.
40. Last, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

The disintegration of the established and prosperous kingdom of Zamfara, the establishment of Alkalawa as the capital of a government around a dynasty from among the small and divided Gobirawa immigrants, (all coming within half a century of the break up of the great cities of Kebbi) created an atmosphere of political uncertainty in the whole of the Kasar Hausa. These dramatic political upheavals revealed the fragility of the internal and international framework of political order. Accompanied as they were by far-reaching changes in the demography of the area and the composition of settlements, they had an impact on the outlook of large sections of the population—an impact felt strongly in Katsina, which was closely involved both in the political developments and the demographic changes. These upheavals produced various reactions including a greater preoccupation with the immediate means of obtaining security and stability in the area and, among some sections of the population, a preoccupation with fundamental issues of political and social conduct and the basis of political community.

Political engagement in the west: c.1768—1801

The reaction of the Sarakunan Katsina was the former and they became greatly preoccupied with the security of the kingdom and the maintenance of stability in the region for the rest of the eighteenth century. The expedition of the Sarkin Katsina Karyagiwa (c.1768—1778) to Mafara in the *bazara* (hot season, just prior to rains) of 1774 was perhaps not only to demonstrate Katsina's military presence to Mafara and the small states emerging in that area, but also to curb the spreading influence of Gobir there in the reign of the Sarkin Gobir Bawa Jan Gwarzo (d.1788).[41] The support given to Kiawa in its conflicts with Gobir was part of the policy of maintaining some influence on the successor states of Zamfara and restraining Gobir.[42] This was not so easy, as the political relations in the area—with so many autonomous centres of power and so many conflicting allegiances—became very intricate. Kiawa's relations with the government of Gobir for example, were determined not only by the support they gave to the old Zamfara dynasty, but also by the rivalry between the sarakunan Kiawa in which Gobir became involved, and by the influence the Sarkin Kiawa asserted beyond his domain in the Maru area of southern Zamfara.[43]

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41. Krieger, *op. cit.*, p. 60. H.F.C. Smith, "A Fragment of Eighteenth Century Katsina" *BNHSN*, 4.5, March 1961, p. 5. The kirari of Karyagiwa is given as *Ma ci Mafara!* (The Conqueror of Mafara!) in 'Katsina: Kiraren Sarakuna', Historical Notes on Northern Nigeria, Note Book No. 9, Reel 46, *PP-NHRS.*
42. Krieger, *op. cit.*, p. 65; Backwell, *op. cit.*
43. Backwell, *op. cit.*

This policy towards Katsina's western neighbours was accompanied by a policy aimed at consolidating the control of the central government over the towns along the western borders. A *madawaki* (titled official) of Katsina was placed at Yandoto, to supervise that growing metropolis of Katsina Laka.[44] The Rumawa who had come to settle in the north-west region in the middle of the eighteenth century, were used to garrison the fortress of Ruma under one of their leaders appointed to be Gatarin Katsina, a measure which further incorporated them into the political system.[45] In this way the government sought to provide for effective defence and control over the sarakunan garuruwa of the border and prevent any rebellious tendencies that might be generated by developments in the west.[46]

The maintenance of stable and peaceful relations however, was more difficult to achieve. In the east the differences with Kano, which led to the building of fortifications at Zuchi by the Sarkin Katsina Wari Maikore (c.1755—1767) and across the border by Sarkin Kano Babba Zaki (c.1768—1776), were peacefully resolved.[47] Relations with Zazzau, after an expedition to Marachi in the first half of the eighteenth century, seem to have remained stable and were probably largely conducted through the Sarkin Maska and the Sarkin Gozaki.[48] In the north, incursions by some of the Tuareg were handled by settling a group of warriors at Kanambakashe and fortifying the northern outposts like the Birnin Karfe.[49]

The problems involved in relations with Katsina's neighbour to the west were more intractable. The government of Gobir was attempting to establish its authority over Zamfara which was proving difficult and was not helped by Katsina's intervention in the affairs of the area. And although the rulers of Katsina took certain diplomatic measures in an attempt to establish stable and peaceful relations with the Sarkin Gobir Bawa, these measures only papered over basic conflicts in policies and were unsuccessful in the long run.[50] When hostilities started in 1788, the army of Gobir conquered Maradi, advanced into Katsina and laid siege to the Birnin Karofi, which lay between Maraki and the Birnin

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44. Gerharty, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
45. See pp.
46. There was a rebellion in Katsina by one Bawa Bahago in the reign of Agwaragi which was crushed with the aid of Gobir. P. Edgar, *Hausa Medicine and Other Notes*, 1910, NNAK/KADCAPTORY/O/AR.2/31.
47. *B.K.D./PP-NHRS.*
48. Palmer, *S.M.* III, p. 81.
49. Lephay, *op. cit.*
50. Tilho, *op. cit.*, p. 459; *R.A.*

Katsina.[51] The Sarkin Katsina Agwaragi (c.1778—1796) came out with an army and, after unsuccessful attempt to obtain a peaceful settlement, battle was joined at Dan Kaishi.[52] The Gobir army faced a Katsina army organized in a seven line battle formation.[53] An assault led by Dan Galadima Gobir Na Allu, son of Bawa, after penetrating the first two lines was stopped by the third line of cavalry under the Ubandawakin Katsina[54] and surrounded and destroyed with many Gobirawa warriors killed.[55] This broke the backbone of the Gobir army and Agwaragi won a decisive victory. The death of Sarkin Gobir Bawa Jan Gwarzo, shocked by this catastrophe and grieved by the loss of his son, followed 40 days later.[56] The Katsina strategy was clearly defensive and, it seems, even cautious, as there was no attempt to follow up this rout with an invasion of Birnin Alkalawa or Gobir territory.

The Sarkin Katsina Agwaragi, still preoccupied with the search for security and a stable political atmosphere, established friendly relations with Bawa Jan Gwarzo's successor Yakuba (c.1788—1795).[57] In the early years of Yakuba's reign gifts were exchanged and a Katsina smith, the Sarkin Makera Jan Garo, was sent to Birnin Alkalawa at Yakuba's request.[58] The basic issues however, were still unresolved. The Gobir government, weakened by the defeat at Dan Kaishi, was still seeking to consolidate its authority and firmly define the Kasar Gobir on the political map of the area. This produced another conflict over Kiawa and it seems there were other issues, such as the killing of the Katsina smith sent to Birnin Alkalawa by Yakuba.[59] Yakuba attacked Ruma and sacked it; taking his army right to the gates of the Birni and then passing on to Kano.[60] Agwaragi pursued a defensive policy, keeping his army along a semi-circle formed by the towns of Mani, Doro, Sabon Gari and Ruma, protecting the Birnin Katsina and the densely settled areas around it.[61] When the Gobir expedition re-entered Katsina Agwaragi was in Ruma with only a small contingent of the army, the bulk of the troops was left under the Kaura to protect the Birni.[62] Battle was joined in Zamfara territory and Agwaragi, calling up the bulk of his army now that the Birni was safe from Yakuba, achieved a clear numerical superiority

51. *H.M.I*, p. 13.
52. *R.A.*
53. Backwell, *op. cit.*
54. *Ibid.*
55. *Ibid.; H.M.I.*, p. 13.
56. *H.M.I.*, pp. 13—14; Last, *op. cit.*, p. 7, fn. 25.
57. *B.K.D./PP-NHRS.*
58. *Ibid.*
59. *Ibid.*
60. *Ibid.; H.M.I.*
61. *B.K.D./PP-NHRS.*
62. *B.K.D./PP-NHRS.*

and inflicted crushing defeat on the Gobir Army.[63] Yakuba was killed, his head cut off and together with his sword carried back to the Birnin Katsina.[64]

This defeat brought an end to any further Gobir attacks on Katsina. The successors of Yakuba Nafata (c.1795—1801) and Yunfa (c.1801—1808) apparently came to terms with Katsina's influence in the area and stopped attempting to upset the established political patterns. It was not difficult for them to accommodate themselves to Katsina's influence, since the main concern of the Katsina government was not the conquest of those territories the Gobir government was attempting to control, or the overthrow of that government, but the maintenance of a stable political situation in the region. This had been made clear by their policy after the two decisive defeats of Gobir. The successor of Agwaragi, Gozo, maintained an active involvement in the affairs of the west. He recognized a leader of the Kasarawa Fulani, Bube, as the Sarkin Fulani Bungudu based at Kumikumi.[65] He went on an expedition to Kokia near Zurmi and on another which took him to Rikina on the border of Kebbi.[66] He was killed at Dokau while on this expedition, but before this he had made contact with the Sullubawa at Shuni and Wamako and attempted to meet the Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, whose relations with the government of Gobir were then deteriorating as he emerged as the leader of a powerful movement in the region. The successor to Gozo, Bawa Dan Gima (c.1801—1805), might not have maintained the same level of involvement in that direction but the position of Yandoto, as the commercial and cultural metropolis of the upper Sokoto-Zamfara basin, was maintained and the area remained outside the orbit of Birnin Alkalawa.

The fact that Katsina emerged from this period of great political upheavals with its territory intact and its influence enhanced, was no mean achievement by the rulers in the second half of the eighteenth century. The Sarkin Katsina Agwaragi demonstrated considerable military and political skill in dealing with the problems of Gobir and Zamfara, and is clearly revealed as a formidable warrior and statesman. But this achievement was at the expense of working out and executing policies to deal with the new social and political developments inside the kingdom, such as the growth in the size and influence of the ulama, the immigration of wealthy clans of pastoral Fulani, and the assertiveness of the inhabitants of Birnin Katsina.

63. *Ibid.*
64. Daniels, *op. cit.*, p. 4; *B.K.D./PP-NHRS.*
65. Malam Isiyaku Tsafe, *Collection of Histories of Hausa* Towns, NNAK/KADCAPTORY *O*AR.2/62.
66. Backwell, *op. cit.*, Last, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

5 *The overthrow of the Sarauta System: c.1801—1808*

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTRADICTIONS

In the period just before the Jihad campaigns began, few events more clearly demonstrated the close connection between the internal political developments and the external relations of Katsina than the assassination of the Sarkin Katsina Gozo (1795—1801) at Dokau. The expedition on which Gozo was assassinated by men of his own army in a way, marked the culmination of a major achievement of the sarakunan Katsina in the second half of the eighteenth century. They had successfully come through a phase of deep involvement in the great political unpheavals in western Hausaland with their territory intact and their influence in that region enhanced. The scope and effectiveness of that influence was revealed by the expedition on which Gozo conquered the town of Gandi and continued as far west as Rikina near the Sokoto-Rima confluence.[1] The limitations of that influence however, were shown on the same expedition by the failure of Gozo's attempt to meet the Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, who was already a leader of the major current of Islamic reform to which Gozo had shown some sensitivity in his domestic policies.[2] The opposition to these policies within the central government, the tension caused by dynastic conflicts, and the powerful position the sarakunan yaki had attained in the government, all converged to lead to his assassination on his return to Dokau from Rikina in the Kasar Katsina. This act of regicide seriously weakened the position of the institution of Sarkin Katsina within the political system. It exacerbated competition within the dynasty and further enhanced the powerful position of the sarakunan yaki in the central government.

The installation of Bawa Dan Gima to succeed Gozo involved the bypassing of numerous princes; not only the sons of Gozo, but those of the five kings between the end of the reign of Bawa's father, Gima, in c.1747 to the accession of Gozo in c.1796.[3] The choice of Bawa Dan

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1 *P.A.*

2 *P.A.*, Tarikin S. Usman in Malumfashi, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

3 See appendix on chronology.

Giwa brought to the throne a prince from a distinct sub-lineage of the dynasty, the Gimawa, which had not produced a Sarki for over half a century.

Bawa Dan Gima had to contend not only with many well-established and disgruntled princes, like Maremawa Muhammadu, Magajin Halidu, Dan Kasawa and Rauda, but he was confronted with an over-mighty warlord in the person of the Kauran Katsina Kuren Gumari, who had been directly involved in the assassination of his predecessor (see p. 88). The military victories in the second half of the eighteenth century had built up the power and prestige of the sarakunan yaki. The routing of the Gobir army at the Battle of Dan Kaishi in c.1788—1789 was mainly the achievement of the cavalry under the Ubandawakin Katsina; the Kauran Katsina played a leading role in the operations culminating in the last major encounter with Gobir, which ended with the spectacular victory at the Battle of Kiawa in c.1795—1796 when the Sarkin Gobir, Yakuba, was killed and his head and sword taken back to the Birnin Katsina.[5] Such military victories enhanced the power and prestige of the sarakunan yaki, who might have been handled successfully by the Sarkin Katsina Agwaragi, under whom these victories were achieved, but as he died within a year of the Battle of Kiawa, the difficult problem of dealing with victorious commanders was left to Gozo. This problem perhaps, was one of the factors behind his expeditions to Zuchi in northern Zamfara and to the small kingdom of Karissen, far to the south-west beyond the gulbin Ka.[6] Gozo's assassination by elements of the army showed how intractable this problem of dealing with powerful and prestigious sarakunan yaki had become, especially as it came to be mixed up with several others which Gozo's successor, Bawa, would not even have time to tackle before the whole political system faced a major challenge.

Starting from a weak position in his relations with the 'yan sarki and the sarakunan yaki, the Sarkin Katsina Bawa Dan Gima also had to cope with the growth of the self-conscious assertiveness of the inhabitants of the Birnin Katsina, directed against the royal establishment.[7] Since he did not belong to the main branch of the dynasty he had the initial advantage of not being so closely identified with the royal establishment,

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4. Backwell, *op. cit.*
5. *B.K.D./PP-NHRS.*
6. Tilho, *op. cit.*, p. 460; Backwell, *op. cit.;* Mathews, *Historical and Anthropological Report on the Katsinawa,* p. 8.
7. See pp. (Folio 106—108, 133).

represented in the eyes of the 'yan Birni by the Palace (Cikin Gida). But his ability to utilize this advantage, by directing the assertiveness of the 'yan Birni against the central government officials and away from himself—taking cognisance of the deep-rooted attitude expressed in the saying: *Ba a mugun sarki, sai dai mugun bafade!* (There is no bad king, only a bad courtier!)—was hampered by the general weakness of his position. He was also at a disadvantage in his position as successor to the assassinated Gozo, popular regard for whom seems to have increased after his violent end and whose Islamizing tendencies came in for more favourable public recognition. This attitude towards Gozo after his death, was expressed in the heavily barbed kirari clearly directed against his successor, Bawa: *Gozo dan Rahmata ka san Allah! Ko an ci birnin kura ba a ba kare jan ta!* (Gozo the son of Rahmata, worshipper of Allah! Even when the city of the hyena is vanquished a dog cannot be given the task of dragging its body!).[8]

But the assertiveness of the 'yan Birni was expressed not only against Bawa Dan Gima, but also in an ostentatious display of wealth and other such practices reflecting the general lowering of the standards of social conduct in the society. There is a well known story illustrating this trend in the Birni. It concerns two merchants, one of whom was said to be a Haji Andi of Gafai, who attempted to outmatch each other in wealthy ostentation, with one putting a *tarbush* cap on each of the thousands of *zankaye* (pointed wall-top) on the city walls and the other following up by putting muslin turbans around each of these.[9] As the writer of the *Hikayat Gozo* points out there was public awareness of this loosening of the moral fabric of the society.[10] The sarakuna and the mallamai were afraid that unless it was checked it could lead to *fitna* (calamity), and the killing of one another.[11] In an attempt to prevent this the sarakuna are said to have given wealth to the mallamai and the mallamai resorted to charms, a development which probably led to further divisions amongst them with some sections becoming further alienated from the sarakuna.[12] For these mallamai, already disaffected with the general trend of events in the society, the assassination of Gozo, who had attempted to resort to what they saw as the only solution to the social malaise—the revival of the Sunnah and the establishment of the Shari'a—confirmed that the rot had eaten into the highest levels of government and there was nothing good to be expected from that

8. Palmer, 'Katsina: Kiraren Sarakuna', *loc. cit.*
9. *H.G.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*

direction. In their eyes, Bawa Dan Gima was a creature of the bayin sarki in the palace, who at best were indifferent, if not openly hostile to the establishment of the Shari'a and the Sunnah, which they tended to associate with the pretensions of the ulama.[13] The disaffected sections of the ulama would further avoid any dealings with the central government and would view with distrust those who associated with it. The tradition among the ulama of this area of avoiding close contact with kings was an old one. It had been demonstrated a few decades previously in the Birnin Katsina by the refusal of Malam Yahaya from Yandoto to settle near the cikin Gida when he was invited to do so by the Sarkin Katsina Tsagarana (c.1767—1768); he chose instead to live in Gafai, in the cikin Birni.[14] A section of the ulama however, continued to associate with the sarakuna, hoping to enhance their wealth and influence and perhaps viewing withdrawal from the sarakuna as an attitude which would encourage fitna in what they saw as an essentially Muslim community. Under such conditions disputations and divisions between the various groups of the ulama, often quite sharp in Katsina, become intensified, even in circles not affected by the reform movement growing up around some of the mallamai of western Hausaland.

With such a political situation within the central government, in the capital, and among the ulama, the birane and garuruwa seem to have become more autonomous. In the south, the Sarkin Gazaki emerged as a powerful and wealthy potentate.[15] The Sarkin Maska Birgiji increasingly conducted relations with the Sarkin Zazzau as a Sarki in his own right.[16] In the Runka area around Bindawa, at Karofi, Benye, and the towns of the central plains the influence of mallamai, disaffected with the prevailing social and political trends, favoured increasing autonomy The mosques at Karofi and Sabongari are said to have attracted large numbers of worshippers rivalling the *juma'at* mosque in the capital.[17] In general, the paralysis of the central government left the masu gari largely on their own and the tendency towards autonomy in these garuruwa and birane asserted itself.

There were other communities however, established only in the latter part of the eighteenth century, which had never been fully integrated into the political system. These had enjoyed a considerable measure of autonomy from the start, as their foundation had either coincided with

13. The anti-Islamic influence of the fadawa in Gobir and Kano on matters connected with the jihad are noted by Bello. *I.M.*, pp. 69, 83.
14. *MML(g)*, July 1972.
15. *MMT(y)*, August 1972.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *GIS(r)*, July 1972.

the central government's preoccupation with events elsewhere, or with its internal paralysis. Such communities were to be found in the area of the great gulabe in the northern and eastern borders and the central region. They were generally settlements of hunters, farmers, pastoralists, living on the border, or in areas like the Karaduwa-Bunsuru basin where the urban centres had declined. On the northern borderlands for example, there were the towns of Tasawa established by Tazarawa migrants moving south from the Birnin Tasar in the eighteenth century; the town of Kanembakashe established a little later, in the reign of Gozo, by hunters and warriors from the regions of Borno.[18] There were also in this region the small settlements of the gulbin Maradi area like Jiratawa, and Sumarana, established on the plateaux on the Katsina-Gobir border by hunters and farmers avoiding the birane, and barely touched by urban culture and Islam.[19] In the gulbin Gari area to the east were communities of the pastoral Wodabe, Hontorbe and sections of the Yerimawa, also remote from the mainstream of political and cultural life.[20] In the Karaduwa-Bunsuru basin in central Katsina, were communities like those at Yantumaki, Dangani and Papu, established by the Daneji, the Dangawa, and other pastoralists moving in during the late eighteenth century Although the heads of the leading clans of the Dangawa and the Daneji were recognized by the Sarkin Katsina, as the Dangi and the Sarkin Fulani Daneji, they were not as fully integrated into the social and political system as were for example, the Yerimawa rulers of Ingawa.[21] All these communities came to play important roles in the Jihad campaigns and in the political developments leading to the emergence of the emirate system.

Although the roots of these stresses and strains in the political system can be traced to long-term social and political trends—such as immigration, the rise and fall of urban centres, the pattern of religious change, growth in the number and self-consciousness of the Islamic intelligentsia, the evolution of the dynasty and the relations of Katsina with its western neighbours—it was the assassination of Gozo which effectively strengthened them and paralyzed the central government. Even if such an act was not unprecedented in Katsina it starkly highlighted the problem of succession and legitimacy afflicting the dynasty and the whole of the sarauta system in Katsina. An act of regicide by its nature strikes at the heart of a political system centred on kingship, but when it occurs in a

18. Urvoy, *op. cit.*, p. 236.
19. Nicolas (etc.) *op. cit.*, p. 8; David, *op. cit.*, p. 645.
20. See pp. (Folio 118—119) Dupire, *op. cit.*, pp. 23—26.
21. These had not developed definite territorial bases like the Sarkin Fulani Dambo of Ingawa and the Sarkin Sullubawa.

kingdom in which the basis of the legitimacy of the dynasty, and even the institution of kingship, were coming into open contradiction with the dominant system of religious belief and social integration, (as in early nineteenth century Katsina) then it strikes not just at the heart, but at the very foundation of the political system. General confidence in its stability and the solidarity of the elements at its core—both essentially for the survival of a political system in the face of external challenge—are seriously undermined by such an act.

THE CHALLENGE OF USMAN DAN FODIO

The forces that were soon to emerge to challenge this political system centred around the institution of Sarkin Katsina, were already building up within and outside the kingdom. But although Gozo made attempts to come to terms with some of these currents, his successor was preoccupied with the more immediate problem of survival. Bawa Dan Gima's most pressing concern was with the maintenance of his position and the assertion of his authority within the central government, especially over the 'yan sarki of the main branch of the dynasty, and the sarakunan yaki. As his kirari; *Dakasumi ka na a wurin ka!* (Dakasumi you are in your place!) suggests, his major problem and preoccupation was staying in his 'place', i.e. on the throne.[22]

But as this paralysis gripped the central government of Katsina, a malam in Gobir was becoming widely known in the region as a scholar, a *sufi* and a mujaddid. It was even believed in some quarters that he might be the Mahdi expected to appear at the beginning of the thirteenth century of the Hijra which opened in 1786 A.D.[23] This malam, Usman Dan Fodio, from a family of established Turudbi scholars who had lived in the Birnin Konni area since the fifteenth century, was born in Maratta in 1754.[24] He had started preaching in about 1774—1775, teaching the fundamentals of Islam to his audiences and calling on them to reject all *bidi'a* (innovation) and order their lives according to the Sunnah and the Shari'a.[25] While preaching he continued with advanced studies under various scholars like Usman Binduri and the Sheikh Jibril b. Umar whose examples of 'enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong' inspired him, and he saw himself as carrying on with their work in the

22. Palmer, "Katsina: Kiraren Sarakuna", *op. cit.*

23. M.A. Al-Hajj, *The Mahdist Tradition in Northern Nigeria,* Ph.D. thesis, A.B.U., 1973, pp. 78—81.

24. Last, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

25. F.H. El-Masri, "The Life of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio Before the Jihad", *loc. cit.*, pp. 438—439.

traditions of the earlier mujaddids of the bilad as-Sūdān such as the Sheikh Abd al-Karim al-Maghili (c.1503) and the Askia Muhammad Toure (1493—1528).[26] As he attracted students he conducted advanced classes for them and they also went out to preach and establish schools.[27] He produced works which they could use as textbooks and gave them advice on teaching methods.[28] The Shehu Usman, as he came to be known, also wrote poems for popular instruction on the fundamentals of Islam, and these were widely circulated in oral and written form in both Fulfulde and Hausa.[29]

His status as a majaddid had risen in the eyes of the Muslim population when at the Id' prayers at Magani, about 3 years after the opening of the thirteenth century in 1785, he emerged successfully from a public confrontation with the formidable Sarkin Gobir Bawa Jan Gwarzo.[30] In the presence of about 1,000 mallamai assembled for the Id-al Kabir prayers from all over the kingdom of Gobir, the Shehu went against convention by refusing to accept Sarkin Gobir's gift of 500 *mithqals* of gold. Instead he made five requests—some of which touched on basic issues relating to the authority of the Sarkin Gobir—pertaining to freedom to preach, treatment of Muslims and prisoners, and the question of taxation; all of which were granted by Bawa Jan Gwarzo.

This incident at Magami further revealed him as a mujaddid along the lines prophesied by that powerful influence on Islam in this area, the Sheikh Abd al-Karim al-Maghili, who had stated that:

> ....at the beginning of every century God will send a learned man to the people to renew their faith. And the characteristics of this learned man in every century must be that he commands what is right and forbids what is disapproved of, and reforms the affairs of the people, and judges justly between them, and assists truth against vanity and the oppressed against the oppressor, in contrast with the characteristics of other learned men of his age.[31]

Within a few years of this incident the Shehu Usman brought out a major work, the *Ihyā' al-sunna wa ikhmad al-bid'a* in which he elaborated on the themes of his preaching, urging reform in current practices of marriage, inheritance, and other aspects of social relations which went against the Sunnah and the Shari'a.[32] His personal conduct, strong

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26. M. Hiskett, "An Islamic Tradition of Reform in the Western Sudan from the 16th to the 18th Century", *BSOAS,* XXV, 1962, pp. 576—591.
27. El-Masri, "The Life of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio Before the Jihad", *loc. cit.,* p. 443.
28. *Ibid.*
29. Last, *op. cit.,* p. 9.
30. El-Masri, 'The Life of Shehu Usman....', *loc. cit.,* p. 441.
31. Hiskett, "An Islamic Tradition of Reform...." *loc. cit.,* p. 584.
32. *Ibid.*

commitment to social reform, and the relevance of his pronouncements to the disquiet afflicting Muslims and others in the region, made him the centre of a community of scholars drawn from all over the bilad as-Sūdān.[33] An attempt by the Sarkin Gobir Nafata in the late 1790s to curb his influence and that of his community had no marked success.[34]

But in spite of the influential position which the Shehu occupied in Gobir, Zamfara and neighbouring areas, the Sarkin Katsina Bawa Dan Gima had no reason to feel directly threatened by him. The Kasar Katsina did not fall into the sphere of the Shehu's preaching activity. Most of his preaching and teaching were conducted far to the west, in the areas of Konni, Kebbi and western Gobir. In fact the Shehu probably never preached in any of the towns of Katsina, although there is a tradition that he studied *furūᶜ* and *lugha* in the school of Malam Kisko of the Gambarawa quarter of Birnin Katsina.[35] This tradition finds no corroboration in the extant sources, which include some fairly detailed accounts of the Shehu's education and travels.[36]

His preaching tour of 1202—1206 A.H./1788—1792 A.D. in the upper Sokoto river area, during which he stayed for a year at a settlement known as Daura just east of Bakura, and for 5 years at Faru further upstream, might have taken him into the settlements of the western border region of Katsina.[37] Certainly his preaching activity at Daura, close to the Katsina border, attracted sufficient attention to be the subject of rumours that his gatherings were places for the promiscuous mingling of men and women; which brought a rather sharp retort in verse from one al-Mustafa Gwani, a scholar from Borno also sojourning in that area.[38] Abdullahi Dan Fodio, the Shehu Usman's companion and younger brother who was with him on this tour, in reply denied the allegations of promiscuity at the Shehu's gathering and said that the mingling of men and women at the Shehu's meetings was a lesser evil than that of leaving the people of that part of Zamfara to drown in ignorance.[39] Some

33. The *Hasā'l muhimma* brought out by the Shehu in March 1803 gives us a glimpse of the important issues producing this disquiet. See Al-Hajj, *The Mahdist Tradition.....*, pp. 68—69.
34. Last, *op. cit.*, pp. 12—13.
35. *AUG(b)*, July 1971.
36. E.g. Abdullahi Dan Fodio's *'Idā 'al musākh* in Hiskett's 'Materials Relating to the State of Learning....', *loc. cit.*, and Gidado b. Laima's *Raud al jinān in Malumfashi, op. cit.*
37. *T.W.*, p. 86.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 86—87.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

of the attention the Shehu attracted at Daura clearly was hostile, for Abdullahi accused 'certain devils of men' of spreading the rumours.[40] In spite of this however, it is unlikely that this tour, which brought the Shehu on to the borders of Katsina, had any immediate impact in the Kasar Katsina. It was not unlikely that by coming close to Zurmi, a town in regular touch with Katsina through a major route, more people in Katsina interested in Islamic reform would have heard of him. Possibly it was on this tour that he established good relations with some of the Alibawa living in the Katsina-Zamfara border region around Zurmi.[41] A leader of the Alibawa, Muhammadu Namoda, came to play an important role in the Jihad campaigns in Zamfara, Katsina and Gobir.[42] This might also have been the occasion when the Shehu obtained supporters from among the Kasarawa settled at Kumi-Kumi and other settlements of what came to be the Bungudu area, which was just then being drawn into the orbit of Katsina.[43] All these contacts and influence established by the Shehu would not have been regarded by the government in the Birnin Katsina, as an immediate threat; preoccupied as it was by what were seen by the sarakuna to be the weightier issues of relations with Gobir and the polities of Zamfara.[44] The Shehu's influence would, in any case, pale by comparison with the long-established and more imposing influence of the mallaman Yandoto nearby.[45] The tour of Zamfara ended in about 1793—1794; and by 1801 Shehu Usman would have been established at Degel for about 8 years.[45] Thus the centre of his activity would have shifted far to the west of the Kasar Katsina, even before the accession of Gozo in c.1795—1796.

Furthermore, the Shehu's active supporters among the ulama of Katsina lived largely outside the Birnin Katsina in the smaller towns and the villages. Besides a few among the mallaman Tsohuwar Kasuwa, those supporters nearest the capital were to be found at places like Makurdi, Morai, Kwami, Sabongari, all small towns within a radius of fifteen miles of the Birni.[47] Malam Muhamman Na Alhaji was one of the most firmly established supporters of the Shehu in Katsina. He was a highly

40. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
41. Last, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
42. See p.
43. Malam Isiyaku Tsafe 'Labarin Asalin Bungudu', in F. Edgar, *Collection of Histories of Hausa Towns*, NNAK/KADCAPTORY/O/AR.2/62; *S.P.G.*, p. 128.
44. This preaching tour to Daura and Faru in 1788—1792 would have coincided with the early years of the reign of Sarkin Gobir Yakuba when Sarkin Katsina Agwaragi was engaged in trying to secure a stable political arrangement in the area through co-operation with Yakuba.
45. See pp. (Folio 81—83, 139—146).
46. *T.W.*, p. 96.
47. See pp. (Folio 133—141).

respected scholar with a following among the inhabitants of large towns such as Runka, and Zakka, and smaller settlements to the south-west of his hometown, Kwami.[48] Towns like Benye and Karofi and smaller settlements like Dallaji, Rugar Badde, Kamri and others in the densely settled central plains were also main centres where adherents to the principles taught by the Shehu lived.[49] Malam Muhamman Na Benye, for example, had built up a following at Benye near his home at Yanuku and at Wurma and Karofi where he led the juma'at prayers.[50] It was generally in these small towns of the central plains, and in the newly established communities of pastoralists in the Karaduwa-Bunsuru basin like Papu and Yantumaki, that Malam Muhamman Na Benye and Malam Umarun Dallaji built up a following, away from the Birnin Katsina and the other major birane.[51] To the north of the Birnin Katsina lived Malam Umarun Dumyawa at Aina, with a following at Kusa, Garabi, Zandam, and with kinsmen among the Sullubawa of Morai, Kanwa and Shinkafi in the vicinity of the Birni.[52]

Before the outbreak of fighting in the *damana* (rainy season) of 1804 these supporters of the Shehu in Katsina did not seem to have formed an organized body. The various mallamai appear to have conducted their teaching and preaching independently, exchanging books and occasionally meeting at Degel or at certain schools and mosques in Katsina. Their small number, the localized nature of their influence and their location, mostly in small towns away from the major centres of population and political power, made it appear that they could be safely ignored, even if their activity was noted by the government. A situation of confrontation such as was to be found between the community at Degel and the government of Gobir did not seem to have existed in Katsina before the Battle of Tabkin Kwatto in June 1804. Because of this, the statements made in the *Masa'il muhimma* brought out in March 1803 by the Shehu—affirming the obligations of Muslims to break with non-Muslims, obey an Imam and make the Hijra and Jihad—would not have had the urgency and immediate relevance in Katsina that they had had in Gobir.[53]

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48. *Assessment Report: Yandaka District, 1909.*
49. See (Folio 137—139)
50. *AMS(b),* July 1972.
51. See (Folio 121—123).
52. Gidado b. Laima lists 'the learned Sheikh Umar Dumyawa' as 'one of the scholars of his (the Shehu) time from other than his tribe....', in (R.J.) Malumfashi, *op. cit.,* p. 50. None of the other known leaders of the Katsina jama'a appears on this list of scholars. Umarun Dallaji is listed earlier (p. 40) as one of the Shehu's nuwwab.
53. Al-Hajj, *The Mahdist Tradition* ...., pp. 68—69.

There are however, traditions which suggest that even in Katsina political tension at some levels might have been high. Perhaps it was less apparent here because the supporters of the Shehu worked 'underground': traditions exist that Malam Umarun Dallaji visited the Birnin Katsina several times on conspiratorial missions and that he collected a large number of knives before the outbreak of fighting.[54] Such traditions might imply some specific organization was attempted, even before the repressions launched by Bawa Dan Gima after the defeat of the Sarkin Gobir at Tabkin Kwatto. When he decided on the Hijra the Shehu is said to have asked his supporters who were then at Degel to return to their countries and prepare.[55] It is probable that Malam Umarun Dallaji was involved in such an attempt to organize some of the supporters of the Shehu in Katsina; he seems to have had the closest connections with the Shehu's immediate circle and would be more aware of developments in Gobir.[56] He had his early education at Dallaji (where he was born), with members of his family and one Malam Muhammadu Baabsine. He might also have stayed with his paternal aunt living at Sabongari.[57] For more advanced studies he went to Borno and is said to have travelled widely before joining the Shehu, accompanying him on his preaching tour helping to carry the baggage.[58] Muhamman Bello probably chose him as the messenger to the jama'a of Katsina and Kano in the early *kaka* (harvest season) of 1805, because he was well known and trusted and had extensive contacts with the various groups supporting the Shehu in that area.[59]

THE JIHAD CAMPAIGNS

The First Phase: July 1804—September 1805

The movement of the reformist ulama around the Shehu Usman Dan Fodio emerged as a definite challenge to the existing political order when

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54. *GIT(i),* July 1972. H.R. Palmer, "Iguda, Sarkin Iyatawa on Malam Umaru, 6 Nov. 1907", *PP-NHRS,* Reel 44.
55. Muhammad b. Salih, *Taqyid al-akhbar,* PP-NHRS, Ms. 97, f. 5.
56. Malam Umarun Dallaji seem to have had close personal relations with Muhamman Bello. Some traditions explain his ascendancy over the other Katsina leaders as arising from devotion and loyalty to Bello.
57. *GID(b),* August 1972. Kitab *Tartib Umaran Katsina,* NNAK/KANOPROF/6/AR.4/66. This is an anonymous compilation made up of a Katsina king list and a brief account of the jihad in Katsina. It is from the collection of the Emir of Kazaure Adamu. It is quite a different work from another of the same title cited here as *K.T.K./PP-NHRS.* This work is cited as *K.T.K./NNAK* in order to distinguish it from the other one.
58. *MYA(s),* August 1972.
59. *I.M.,* p. 95.

homage was paid to the Shehu at Gudu, in February 1804, as the amir al-muminin—the commander of a community of Muslims committed to the establishment of Islamic political authority in the lands of the Sudan. Within a few months, this new political community, largely made up of mallamai and ɗalibai, had survived raids sent against it by the Sarkin Gobir and the Sarkin Konni, and its forces had gone on to capture the town of Matankari and the Birnin Konni.[60] In June 1804 they routed an expedition led personally by the Sarkin Gobir Yunfa at Tabkin Kwatto; the Sarkin Gobir barely escaping with his life.[61] After this victory many groups and individuals such as the Sullubawa of the Ardo Manori, the Sarkin Burmi, Sarkin Mafara and the Sarkin Donko, flocked around the Shehu as the leader of the Jihad and of opposition to the government of Gobir.[62]

This victory, won by the followers of a malam against an expedition led by the sarki of a major kingdom, alerted other Sarakuna to the challenge posed by these developments. The Sarkin Katsina and other rulers were, it seems, consulted by Yunfa before he went on the expedition which ended so disastrously for him at Tabkin Kwatto.[63] Whatever was involved in this consultation, the defeat at Tabkin Kwatto and the warning messages Yunfa sent to the other rulers urging them to take precautions, spurred the government of Katsina into action.[64] Orders went out from the Birnin Katsina to the sarakunan Katsina to raid and destroy everyone who followed the Shehu.[65] Many of the Shehu's followers in Katsina were killed or captured and others fled and were forced to unite and defend themselves.[66] They attempted to effect organized resistance by taking up positions in fortified towns like Yantumaki and Madaddabai, near Ruma.[67] In this way the various groups of mallamai who had propagated the message of the Shehu in Katsina made their hijra several months after that of the Shehu. The repression launched by the government forced the various groups—hitherto only loosely connected by their associations with the Shehu and their attitudes towards the state and society—into a distinct political movement; the jama'a in armed opposition to the government of Katsina. A section of this jama'a, led by Malam Muhamman Na Alhaji, continued with the hijra across Zamfara encountering many difficulties on the way until by about September—

60. *T.W.*, p. 109.
61. *Ibid.*
62. Last, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
63. *I.M.*, p. 84.
64. *Ibid.*; *T.W.*, p. 114.
65. *I.M.*, p. 84.
66. *Ibid.*
67. *Ibid.*

October 1804, they finally reached the Shehu at Kirari.[68] Their arrival and that of another group, led by Malam Agali from the Adar-Gobir borderlands, strengthened the Shehu's jama'a and raids in the neighbourhood of Birnin Alkalawa, which preceded the Battle of Tsuntsua, were begun by them.[69]

By the time Malam Na Alhaji and his people arrived at Kirari, the Shehu had already sent out letters from Magabshi to the rulers of Katsina, Kano, Zazzau and others in the region. In these letters the Shehu is said to have explained that he was striving to revive the Sunnah and establish the Shari'a by destroying *bidi'a* (heresy against one's religion/sect) that he was on the side of Truth against Falsehood.[70] He asked them to be sincere Muslims and to stop all practices forbidden by the Shari'a, and requested their help in his Jihad. He told them not to be deceived by the rumours spread by his enemies into helping them against him; and warned them that joining his enemies would only bring calamity upon them, as Allah had sworn to help the believers and defeat the unbelievers. When the messengers of the Shehu, Abd al-Rahman and Allamu Zamanu, delivered the letter to Sarkin Katsina Bawa Dan Gima, it was read then torn up with anger and contempt. The Sarkin Kano Alwali, on the other hand, wavered before rejecting it, while the Sarkin Zazzau Isiaku Jatau accepted the requests of the Shehu but found himself opposed by some of his people.

This letter doubtless prompted the Sarkin Katsina to intensify the repression of the Shehu's followers, and by the end of 1804 their resistance within Katsina seems to have been effectively crushed. Those who remained in Katsina would have lain low, especially after hearing the news of the heavy defeat inflicted on the mujāhidūn at the Battle of Tsuntsua in December 1804, at which about 2,000 of them were killed.[71] The mallami of Dutsin, Makurdi and Kwami, and others who had not attracted the government's attention as supporters of the Shehu, are likely to have remained in Birnin Katsina—safe amongst its teeming population. There were also scattered groups in the rural areas among the Sullubawa of the gulbin Maradi area and the Deneji of the Karaduwa basin. In towns where definite hostility to the mujāhidūn had developed among influential sections of the ulama, the supporters of the Shehu were harrassed and forced to flee, as happened to Alhaji Umaru b. Al-Mustafa and Malam Sambo b. Ashafa from Yandoto.[72]

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68. *I.M.*, p. 84.
69. *Ibid.*, pp. 83—84.
70. *Ibid.* p. 83.
71. *I.M.*, p. 87. *T.W.*, p. 114.
72. *I.M.*, p. 104. This Alhaji Umaru was Alhaji Umar b. al-Mustafa whose family lived in

Then sections of the ulama who had already been hostile to Shehu Usman and his adherents, now found themselves with the backing of the Sarakuna against a movement they would see as bringing about fitna in an essentially Islamic community. But the solidly orthodox position taken by the Shehu in his pronouncements, like the letter from Magabshi and the *Wathiqa ahl al-Sūdān,* sent by the end of 1804, made it difficult for these ulama to effectively challenge and provoke adverse opinion against him and his followers on Islamic grounds.[73] This dilemma was probably behind the unconditional refusal of the leading mallamai of Yandoto to discuss the rights and wrongs of their position with a contingent led by Muhammad Bello in 1806. As Bello reports:

> ....I sent forward Muhammadu b. Ashafa and I said to him tell them that I had not come to raid them but I had come to argue with them. And if we are in the right they should repent and follow, but if they are in the right we must repent and desist from that which we are in. But when he said that to them, they replied: 'we shall not dispute with you in anything. And we do not like to see him. May God not bring us together with either him or his father in this world or the next'.[74]

But in Katsina, where serious disaffection had grown among Muslims, only a challenge to the mujāhidūn on Islamic grounds would have affected the sympathy for the Shehu's cause among the generality of Muslims, even those who for various reasons were not prepared to actively identify with it. As the correspondence with the Sheikh Muhammad al-Kanemi reveals, such a challenge to the mujāhidūn was difficult even in defence of the more deeply Islamized government of Borno.[75]

In fact the solidly orthodox and moderate nature of the Shehu's appeal to the Sarakuna ruling over predominantly Muslim populations, placed these rulers in an awkward position. Where the appeal was rejected, as in Katsina, the mujāhidūn could justifiably identify the government as one of unbelievers and call upon all Muslims to join them in its overthrow, forcing the Muslim population of Katsina to face basic issues of loyalty and identity. The policy of forthright oppositon to the mujāhidūn by the Sarkin Katsina Bawa Dan Gima, might have made for a more

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Yandoto for several generations and *not* Mallam Umarun Dallaji as Last, *op. cit.*, p. 37, fn. 89, assumes. The 'Dallaji' included in the 1951 Whitting edition is either a copyist or editorial error. See A. Abubakar and C. Sheban, *A Brief History of Yandoton Daji,* Maru Teachers' College 1964, for the genealogy of Alhaji Umaru b. al-Mustafa. These are traditions collected from one Mallam Tsoho Gusau, a descendant of Sambo Dan Ashafa and preserved in typescript form. I obtained a copy from Alhaji Garba Na Dama.

73. A.D. Bivar, "The Wathiqa ahl al-Sūdān: A Manifesto of the Fulani Jihad", *JAH,* II.2, 1961, pp. 235—243.

74. *I.M.*, p. 104.

75. *Ibid.*

vigorous physical repression of the movement at the initial stage. But it reduced the government's ability to defend itself on the politico-religious plane and made the accusation of the mujāhidūn that it was a government of *kuffār* (unbelievers) stick more closely.[76] The more peaceful outcome in Zazzau where the Sarkin Zazzau Isiaku Jatau agreed to support the mujāhidūn, and war was avoided, made it easier to present the government of Katsina not only as one of *kafara,* (atonement for breach of Muslim precepts) but also one of *bughāt* (oppressors) and *muharibum* (war-mongers) to the Muslim population.[77]

It was at this level that the conflict between the mujāhidūn and the government of Katsina continued in the period between the end of 1804 and September 1805, when no serious fighting took place in the Kasar Katsina. The accession of Maremawa Muhammadu Tsagarana —from the main branch of the dynasty—after the death of Bawa Gima sometime in 1805, might have lessened tension within the dynasty, but did not significantly alter the politico-religious complexion of the government, or the disadvantageous position in which it had been placed by the programme of the mujāhidūn. The flagrantly polytheistic rites that would have been performed at the installation of the new ruler would only have confirmed to the Muslims in Katsina what the mujāhidūn were saying—that it was a government of unbelievers who worshipped trees and rocks, making sacrifices to them.[78]

About March 1805 Malam Muhammadu Na Alhaji, who had taken an active part in the fighting in Gobir and Zamfara, moved back into Katsina and established himself at a place in western Katsina, from where he managed to beat back the expeditions sent against him.[79] His success, small as it was, would have raised the morale of the supporters of the Shehu in Katsina, especially as they coincided with the first major victory of the mujāhidūn since June 1804; that is, the capture of Birnin Kebbi on 13 April, 1805.[80] Birnin Kebbi was the first capital of a major kingdom to fall to the mujāhidūn. This victory would have demonstrated that the movement of the Shehu was still vigorous and that success in armed Jihad against the Sarakuna was possible. Further it would have led to an erosion of support for the government of Katsina.

The Second Phase: September 1805—March 1806

On the military plane, however, the government of Katsina retained

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76. Bivar, "The Wathiqa...", *loc. cit.,* p. 242.
77. *Ibid.*
78. See pp. 78—79. for a description of the royal rites of installation.
79. *I.M.,* p. 91. Only the letters G.r.b can be identified from the place name given here.
80. Last, *op. cit.,* pp. 33—34, fn. 66.

the upper hand. By the beginning of the dry season of 1805—1806 the base at G.r.b. held by Malam Muhamman Na Alhaji had been destroyed or by some means effectively contained. It was about this time that the new Sarkin Katsina Maremawa Muhammadu felt sufficiently secure at home to join the Sarkin Daura Abdu in an expedition against the jama'a of Kano whose successes at this time posed a more palpable threat.[81] The Kano jama'a had just then inflicted a severe defeat on the forces of the Sarkin Kano Alwali at the Battle of Dawakin Girma.[82] The joint Katsina-Daura expedition however, was defeated—even before it encountered the main contingents of the Kano jama'a—by Dan Tunku based around Dambarta in the Kano-Katsina border region.[83] Dan Tunku was the leader of a community largely made up of pastoral Fulani and hunters grazing their cattle in the fadamomi of the gulbin Gari and its tributaries. When the Jihad fighting started Dan Tunku was already in rebellion against the government of Kano and hostile to his more established kinsmen, the Yerimawa leaders of Ingawa.[84] He came out in support of the Shehu after the victory of the Kano jama'a at the Battle of Dawakin Girma, joining the movement which was challenging the governments of both kingdoms from which he was alienated.[85] His army is said to have been small and probably consisted mainly of bowmen. But with the toughness often to be found among people of remote border regions, and their intimate knowledge of the terrain, they routed the better equipped and mounted warriors of Katsina and Daura, before these more conventional fighting men had a chance to take up proper battle formations. This was the first important victory over the forces of the Sarkin Katsina by the mujāhidūn and it is indicative of the nature of the conflict that it was inflicted outside the Kasar Katsina. It marked the beginning of the second phase of the Jihad campagns in Katsina.

Meanwhile groups of the Katsina jama'a were rallying to Yantumaki, one of the walled towns they used as a base of resistance to the repressions of 1804.[86] Dauda and Yamusa, two sons of Dangi Yusufu the head of the Dangawa living at Yantumaki, were active members of the Katsina jama'a. When Malam Umarun Dallaji arrived there around October 1805 he found them preparing for a campaign.[87] He confirmed the news of the success in Kebbi, for he had been sent by Bello to inform them

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81. *I.M.*, p. 95.
82. Salih, *op. cit.*, f9v.
83. *I.M.*, p. 95.
84. *GII(i)*, August 1972. *SDC(c)*, July 1971.
85. Salih, *op. cit.*, f9v.
86. *DAY(d)*, August 1972. *I.M.*, p. 95.
87. *I.M.*, p. 95.

of the situation there and rally them to carry on with the fight.[88]

The expeditions which they launched from Yantumaki in the dry season of 1805—6 seem to have been directed to places where support could be rallied from known sympathizers or elements whose loyalty to the regime could be subverted. The important towns such as Kusada, Yashe, Kankiya, directly under the central government, were avoided. The armed contingents attacked a settlement only if the inhabitants rejected their call for support; but before such a contingent arrived at a settlement some propaganda would have been carried out within it by their supporters. The rocky fortress of Karofi for example, which was to prove difficult to conquer for a much larger and better equipped force in 1842—3, fell to the mujāhidūn during this campaign, with little fighting, because of the work already done there by Malam Muhamman Na Benye and his people. On arrival outside a settlement the armed contingents of the mujāhidūn sometimes announced their arrival in a dramatic fashion, with one of them standing on the walls and making the call to prayers.[89] This direct and emotionally charged appeal to the inhabitants identity as Muslims had a tremendous psychological impact, discouraging any ideas of resistance even before the actual military strength of the contingent had been perceived. Meetings sometimes took place between the mujāhidūn and the leaders of the community against which their expeditions were directed as at Bindawa where the dattawan gari came out to meet Malam Umarun Dallaji who spoke to them and obtained their support.[90] At such meetings the inhabitants were told of the need to revive the Sunnah and enforce the Shari'a, and called upon to support the Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, the 'Reviver of Islam', 'Light of his Age', in his Jihad against unbelievers, oppressors and war-mongers ruling over them. The obligation of Muslims to conduct Jihad against non-Muslim governments would have been persistently emphasized. This point had already been stressed by the Shehu in his *Wathiqat ahl al-Sūdān,* then in circulation, and elaborated further in a later (1806) more scholarly work, the *Bayān wujūb al-hijra ʿalā'l-Ibād.*[91] It is probable also, that specific abuses of the Shari'a by the Katsina government received mention at these meetings and attention drawn to the fetishistic religious rites enacted at the installation of the Sarki in 1805. The charge of war-mongering and oppression was important. For the spokesmen of the Katsina jama'a could truthfully point out that they were actually attacked and had to flee and unite in defence of their

88. *Ibid.*
89. *MAM(i),* July 1972.
90. *GIB(b),* August 1972.
91. Bivar, 'The Wathiqat....,' *loc. cit.,* pp. 235—243. El-Masri, *A Critical Edition....*

lives and property. By pressing charges of war-mongering against the Sarkin Katsina the mujāhidūn would be countering a potentially serious accusation levelled at them; that they were power seekers and trouble makers, causing discord in a community in which the majority of the inhabitants were Muslims. The attitude that in spite of the sins of even *shirk* of its rulers, Katsina was essentially part of the *dar al Islam* in which armed Jihad was not only wrong, but an act of unbelief, was likely to be widespread among sections of the Muslim population, especially the established ulama like those of the cikin Birni, Yandoto and such places as Matazu and Dan Ashita. To these ulama their mosques and schools would be seen as the centres of these communities and they would fail to see why they should abandon such old established centres of Islamic learning and worship and make hijra because of the prevalence of certain forms of bidi'a, which constituted only disobedience and not unbelief.[92] This was likely to be a major point in the arguments of the mallaman Yandoto opposed to the Jihad. The spokesmen of the Katsina jama'a would have conceded that the majority of the inhabitants of the Kasar Katsina were Muslims and the forms of bidi'a they practised did not make them unbelievers. But they would have pointed out that since the religion of a country is that of its ruler the fetishistic practices of the Sarakunan Katsina showed that they were not Muslims, Katsina was part of the *dar al harb,* and to wage armed Jihad against its polytheistic rulers was obligatory on all Muslims. This point was constantly emphasized by the Shehu because of its great importance in influencing attitudes to the Jihad in the predominantly Muslim part of the bilad as-Sūdān.[93] The argument of the mujāhidūn was effective in at least preventing active Muslim support of the government, because the leading ulama of Katsina were not prepared, publicly and actively to defend the Islamic status of the government, as Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi had done in Borno.[94] In Katsina, the only ruler who had rejected the flagrantly

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92. For the mallamai of places like the Birnin Katsina, making the hijra meant abandoning schools and mosques whose traditions go back to Muhammad b. Abd al-Karim al-Maghili (d.1503); Muhammad b. Ahmed al-Tasakhti (d.1529); Abu Abdullahi Muhammad b. Masanih (1595—1667) and his contemporary Muhammad. b. Sabbaghi. The latter three, better known as Dan Tukum, Dan Masani and Dan Marina, came to be regarded as the patron saints of Katsina. The strength of the attachment that could have existed to the actual places where these scholars lived and died is illustrated by the veneration accorded to the house and mosque of Dan Masani and the tomb of Dan Marina to this day. Abd al-Qadir b. al-Mustafa in a book brought out in the 1820s the *R.A.*, reports that he made one of these *ziyara* to the tomb of Dan Marina, as people do today from Katsina and elsewhere. *H.M.I.*, p. 11.

93. The Shehu's argument is set out in B.G. Martin, 'Unbelief in the Western Sudan: Uthman Dan Fodio's Talim al-ikhwan', *Middle Eastern Studies,* I.W., October 1967, and M. Last & M.A. Al-Hajj, 'Attempts at Defining a Muslim....,' *loc. cit.*, passim.

94. *I.M.*, pp. 124—127.

festishistic installation rites in recent times had been assassinated. The ulama had no position in the government, as in any properly constituted Muslim government they should have had, and thus no basis for actively defending the government against the accusations of the mujāhidūn.

In spite of the mujāhidūn's strong ideological position, their campaigning with the word and the sword, which in modern parlance would be called 'armed propaganda' met with opposition. There was an attack against Karofi by government forces after they had taken it; and more serious opposition was met in Yandoto and neighbouring settlements where Malam Sambo b. Ashafa and Alhaji Umaru b. al-Mustafa had been harrassed and forced to flee from the town.[95] An *ardon* (clan head) Fulani living near Yandoto called upon by Malam Sambo to follow Allah by support for the Shehu, is said to have answered that he saw no reason to support some ragged malam against a *'sarkin duniya'* (lord of the world) like the Sarkin Katsina.[96] Malam Sambo had to resort to the sword to conclude the argument, and managed to seize some horses with which he equipped his contingent and attracted more people to join him.[97]

In general, however, the dry season campaign in the central region was fairly successful. The settlements of Dangani, Papu, Gyaza, Karofi, Radda, Kamri, Benye, Rugar Badde, Bindawa, Dallaji and Kahin Dangi, and a few others in that area, were brought to the side of the jama'a. It was also probably on this campaign that the town of Sabon Gari, about 15 miles south-east of the Birnin Katsina, (where an aunt of Umarun Dallaji lived), was subverted and the active cooperation of some of the inhabitants obtained.[98] During these campaigns the forces of the Jama'a were joined by some of the inhabitants of these settlements they had won over; among which were Bidago from Kamri, Malam Usman Dan Malam Dan Ila from Rugar Badde, Usman Dan Marori from Kafin Dangi, and Dudi from Papu.[99] They would also have attracted to their ranks the more restless elements of the society looking for adventure and booty. A number of these *asharārai* (rogues) joined Dan Tunku.[100]

It was not easy for the government of Katsina to move effectively against these expeditions of the mujāhidūn, nor was it in a position to effectively mobilize opinion against the jama'a with a view to isolating

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95. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
96. 'Labarun Mallam Sambo' in F. Edgar, *Collection of Hausa Stories*, 1911, NNAK/KADCAPTORY/AMss/O-AR.2/48.
97. *Ibid.*
98. *GIS(r)*, July 1972. *GIT(t)*, July 1972.
99. *GIK(b)*, August 1972. *GIK(k)*, August 1972. *MAM(b)*, August 1972.
100. *SDC(g)*, July 1971.

them. If, by evoking the religious foundations of the dynasty in the iskoki belief system, or around Islam, this had been attempted it would have intensified the very contradictions undermining their position. The government's military organization was primarily geared to dealing with expeditions launched by other governments, or bands of the Tuareg, and to sending expeditions out;[101] these were organized under the sarakunan yaki, with the masu gari providing contingents to augment those of the Sarkin Katsina and attending to the defence of their towns. This military organization had, in the eighteenth century, proved effective not only for defensive but even offensive expeditions and for dealing with internal rebellion. These rebellions, often centred around some prince or a maigari, had specific territorial bases which, by mobilizing the forces of neighbouring towns and if needed even bringing in the warriors of the central government, were easily isolated, contained and crushed. But the jama'a of Katsina did not depend on a specific territorial base and their supporters were found all over the kingdom. Not only did they obtain assistance from the mujāhidūn in neighbouring kingdoms, but when pressed in Katsina they moved out to join the fighting in those areas. They attempted, and often succeeded, in coordinating their activity with the mujāhidūn in Zamfara, Kano, Zazzau and Daura, much more consistently and effectively than the Sarakuna were able to do. The widespread and sustained mobilization of military forces throughout the kingdom essential to contain and crush this type of rebellion, was beyond the experience and the capabilities of the Katsina military organization whose leaders had had their battle experience in the much more regular contest with Gobir in the late eighteenth century. That they had emerged from this contest successfully increased their difficulties insofar as adapting themselves to deal with the more elusive, and at the same time more pervasive mujāhidūn was concerned, or indeed, even to comprehend what was essentially a new type of warfare in this area. An effective mobilization of forces against the Katsina jama'a would have had to involve much greater central control over the garuruwa and birane; a condition which did not obtain even in the period before internal conflicts had considerably weakened the hold of the central government over them.

After his defeat by Dan Tunku, the Sarkin Katsina returned to the Birni and seems to have left the fighting to the sarakunan yaki in the garrison towns and to the masu gari. By avoiding the towns where the powerful sarakunan garuruwa lived, the mujāhidūn avoided a direct clash with the powerful local potentates. However, they continued the work of propaganda and subversion within these towns and the settlements around

101. See above.

them. It was in this way that Malam Na Alhaji consolidated his position in the Runka area, even though he was not then in a position to take Runka or any of the other major towns of that area.

The sarakunan yaki of the central government however, were more aggressive. They sought out the contingents of the jama'a, attacked them, and attempted to take back some of the towns that they had won over. The Ubandawakin Katsina moved to Yandaka, an ancient walled town about 40 kilometres west of the Birnin Katsina, on the main route to Zurmi and Birnin Alkalawa.[102] From there he raided the section of the jama'a which had seized control of the town of Ruma and might even have sent raiding parties against the contingents of Malam Na Alhaji to the south-west and of Malam Umaru Duyawa around Zandama to the north-west.[103] There had been some serious fighting in the Ruma area earlier, for in 1804 some of the mujāhidūn had retreated to the nearby town of Madaddabai and made it a stronghold for resisting the repression.[104] With the assistance of the contingent under Malam Muhammadu Nemoda based around Zurmi they had succeeded in taking over Ruma.[105] The fall of Ruma would have been seen as a major weakness in the north-western defences of Katsina by the sarakunan yaki whose strategic theories had been formed by the contest with Gobir in which the fortress of Ruma played a crucial role. The Ubandawaki started his operations by directing his raids at Ruma, which was only about 8 kilometres away and which posed the most immediate threat to his base and to the Birnin Katsina. Although he succeeded in defeating parties of the jama'a from Ruma, he was unable to retake the fortress, a failure which hindered the Ubandawaki from effectively dealing with other groups of the jama'a operating in this western region of Katsina. The situation around Ruma became one of stalemate which seemed to reflect the temporary stabilization of forces all over Katsina in the early months of 1806.

The Third Phase: 1806—1807

The situation in the main spheres of campaigning was sufficiently stabilized by the bazara of 1806 to enable the leading mujāhidūn to travel out of Katsina to Birnin Gada in Zamfara where, together with others from Kano, Daura, and Zamfara, they met Muhammad Bello. This meeting, and the conquest of Yandoto and its towns immediately afterwards, marked the beginning of another phase of the Jihad in Katsina;

102. *I.M.*, p. 95.
103. *Ibid.*
104. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
105. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

a phase in which the Katsina jama'a moved decisively on to the offensive and their campaigns became more integrated with those in neighbouring areas.

The meeting at Birnin Gada was initially scheduled for Magami where the Shehu himself was to have them.[106] But the Shehu, already over fifty years old could not undertake the long, rather hazardous journey from Gwandu and sent Muhammad Bello to represent him. Bello told the leaders assembled at Birnin Gada that the Shehu's instructions were that they should formally make their baya'a to Bello who would receive it on behalf of the amir al-muminin; that each should take an oath to 'hear and obey' his instructions and to follow the Sunnah in everything, everytime, and under all circumstances. They all agreed, made the baya'a, and took the oath.[107] In his message the Shehu also said that Allah would make them victorious, but warned them not to become corrupted like the Sarakuna they were fighting and to avoid injustice, envy, and disunity. He told them that the appearance of the Mahdi was imminent and that until then the Jihad would not cease. Each contributed to the funds of amir al-muminin and Malam Sulaiman b. Jammo was formally appointed the Amîr of Kano, where the mujāhidūn already controlled a large portion of the territory.[108]

It was probably at this meeting at Birnin Gada that three of the leading figures of the Katsina jama'a, Malam Muhamman Na Alhaji, Malam Umarun Dumyawa and Malam Umarun Dallaji were formally authorized by Muhammad Bello on behalf of the Shehu to command expeditions in Katsina.[109] This was in line with practice followed elsewhere in this Jihad and conformed to classical precedent. In the fighting in Gobir, Zamfara and Kebbi, commanders of expeditions had to be formally authorized by the amir al-muminin, and they went out with the Muslim flag. [110] As the amir al-muminin, the Shehu was the commander-in-chief of the Muslim army, and command of expeditions conducted with any contingent of this army had to be authorized by him.[111] The authority to command expeditions however, did not necessarily involve authority to rule over the territory conquered by that expedition,[112] which also

106. *I.M.*, p. 104.
107. *Ibid.*
108. *Ibid.*
109. A widely-known account of the jihad in Katsina has these three commanders receiving their 'flags' from the Shehu all at the same time. Umarun Dallaji is said to have gained ascendancy over the others because he obeyed the Shehu's instructions and waited to bid farewell to Bello while the others lost patience waiting for Bello and left for Katsina without bidding him farewell.
110. Last, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
111. *L.H.*, p. 45.
112. *Ibid.*, pp. 24—25.

had to be specifically granted. The appointment of Malam Sulaiman Dan Jammo as amīr in Kano, over the actual commanders of the Kano contingents and expeditions, demonstrated this distinction which, in the period 1808—1816 became blurred, with serious consequences. The appointment of the three leaders of Katsina formalized the positions they were coming to hold in what were emerging as the three main spheres of operation in the Kasar Katsina; Malam Na Alhaji in the Runka-Zakka area; Malam Umarun Dumyawa in the upper gulbin Maradi region around Zandam; and Malam Umarun Dallaji in the Karaduwa-Bunsuru basin and the central plains.

After the meeting at Birnin Gada which had brought together a large number of mujāhidūn it was decided to launch a combined expedition against Yandoto under the command of Muhammad Bello. This well-fortified and flourishing town of south-western Katsina was so famous as a centre of learning that it was sometimes known by the epithet 'Madina'.[113] Its leading ulama were not only hostile to the Jihad but were actively encouraging opposition to it which at this time was becoming stronger in the neighbouring towns of Katsina and Zamfara and among some of the rural communities of the pastoral Fulani of the area.[114] The towns of southern Zamfara had provided crucial support for the Shehu in the difficult days of 1804—5, but some of them were now coming out openly in opposition.[115] Kiawa, an ancient fortified town near the Katsina border was being drawn into a conspiracy involving the Gobirawa, Burmawa, and sections of the Kal Geres Tuareg.[116] The mallaman Yandoto living in a birni at a major junction of routes to all these settlements were seen as providing Islamic justification for this wide-spread movement of opposition to the Jihad which, if allowed to develop, could seriously challenge the position the mujāhidūn had won in the whole of western Hausaland. Yandoto was,therefore, not just an unconquered Katsina town, but the centre of a serious threat to the whole movement. The attack against it was successful, taking place after the ulama of the town had rejected an offer of discussion and parley made by Bello and communicated by Sambo Dan Ashafa.[117] The expedition occupied Yandoto for several days and then went on to conquer the many other settlements of that cluster, including a community of the pastoral Fulani opposed to the Jihad, capturing large quantities of booty.[118]

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113. Abdulqadir and Shebar, *op. cit.*
114. *I.M.*, p. 104. 'Labarin Mallam Sambo' *loc. cit.*
115. Last, *op. cit.*, pp. 32—34.
116. Last, *op. cit.*, p. 35.
117. *I.M.*, p. 104.
118. *Ibid.*

With the Yandoto region effectively conquered and no longer posing a threat from the rear, the contingent of Malam Na Alhaji in the west immediately launched an expedition against the town of Runka.[119] The town fell easily and an expedition sent by the Ubandawakin Katsina to retake it was beaten back.[120]

About this time, in the late bazara of 1806, the Battle of Farfara took place near Zurmi. Muhammadu Namoda severely defeated a combined attack on Zurmi by the Gobirawa, the Zamfarawa of Sarkin Kiawa and Sarkin Burmi and some of the Kel Geres Tuareg.[121] The victory of Namoda improved the position of the jama'a at Ruma who, with the assistance of this mujāhid and in concert with Malam Na Alhaji, were able to put sufficient pressure on the Ubandawakin Katsina based at Yandaka to force him to move back to the Birni.[122] This enabled Malam Na Alhaji to move in to take the town of Zakka, which became his main base up to his death in c.1807. The retreat of the Ubandawaki back to the capital is seen by Muhammad Bello as marking an important stage in the Katsina campaigns.[123] With the victory at Yandoto, and then Zurmi, the abandonment of Yandaka and the fall of Zakka the mujāhidūn became effectively in control of the major settlements of western Katsina, enabling Malam Na Alhaji to start sending expeditions to Abukur and Batagarawa and other settlements close to the capital.[124]

The dry-season campaigning of 1806—7 opened with Malam Umarun Dallaji also on the offensive. He was conducting expeditions in the upper Karaduwa river area along the border with Kano and, by December 1806, he had joined up with a contingent from Kano and another led by Malam Ishak of Daura.[125] The Kano contingent had been engaged in subduing some towns of western Kano, such as Damargou, Bichi and Buguyi which had broken the *aman* (peace treaty) they had made with them.[126] The Kano jama'a had campaigned in this area in the bazara of 1806 in an attempt to establish control and to prevent any link-up between the forces of the Sarkin Kano and the Sarkin Katsina.[127] Together with Umarun Dallaji and Malam Ishak, they campaigned in this area for 4 months, until the bazara of 1807 when shortages of food forced

119. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
120. *Ibid.*
121. Last, *op. cit.*, p. 35.
122. *I.M.*, pp. 95—96.
123. *Ibid., p. 96.*
124. *B.K.D./PP-NHRS.*
125. Salih, *op. cit.*, f1vv.
126. *Ibid.*
127. *Ibid.*

them to disperse.[128] In this campaign they took many settlements in this densely settled area including Farin Ruwa and Gogori in Kano, and Tabanni, Kurkujan and Dayi in Katsina.[129] Since Karaye, Godiya and Kabo had already been taken by the jama'a of Kano, this campaign made the authority of the mujāhidūn dominant on these plains of western Kano and South-eastern Katsina.[130]

The Final Phase: 1807—1808

Meanwhile Malam Na Alhaji had consolidated his position to the south-west of the Birni and was moving in closer. Malam Umarun Dallaji joined him and they invaded the Birni from the western and southern sides. Umarun Dallaji established himself at Sabongari, about 24 kilometres south-east of the Birni on the main route to Birnin Kano.[131] Although he already had contacts there, his entry was resisted by a Sarkin Fulani of the Ba'awa who was killed in the ensuing encounter before Umaru entered.[132] His main supporters there were two brothers from among the Durbawa, Dumaji and Dan Jatau, one of whom, being the Ubandawaki of the Durbin Katsina, became his contact with the sarakunan sarki.[133] Na Alhaji on the other hand maintained his base at Zakka, and his warriors used Kwami and Batagarawa, closer to the Birni.

With two contingents of the Jama'a outside the walls, gathering more and more support, and serious disaffection spreading even among the senior sarakunan sarki, the Sarkin Katsina sought to avoid battle and sent to Na Alhaji requesting peace, ignoring Umarun Dallaji.[134] This move by the Sarki brought about divisions in the ranks of the jama'a between those who wanted to make peace and those who wanted to press on with the war. If the Sarkin Katsina's intention in making this offer was to stir up dissention among his enemies he seems to have succeeded.[135] Malam Na Alhaji was inclined towards peace, while the party of Malam

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128. *Ibid.*
129. *Ibid.*
130. These towns had been conquered in the *kaka* (harvest season) of 1805. Salih, *op. cit.*, f. 10, f. 11v.
131. *I.M.*, p. 95.
132. Palmer, 'Iguda Sarkin Iyatawa on Mallam Umaru.....' *loc. cit.*
133. *GIS(r)*, July 1972. *B.K.D./PP-NHRS.*
134. *I.M.*, p. 96. *B.K.D./PP-NHRS.*
135. A serious dispute over strategy also occurred among the jama'a of Kano in the bazara of 1806 while they were at Gora and concerned the future direction of their campaign. As Salih's remarks indicated, it almost caused a serious rift among them. Thus, while the loose structure of the jama'a gave the campaigns greater flexibility, it also carried the danger of disunity. The preservation of unity therefore came to be a pre-eminent consideration which enhanced the authority of the amir al-muminin, on the jama'a's.

Umarun Dallaji was opposed to this.[136] As they could not resolve the issue among themselves and, in the event of a peace agreement, it involved the important question of the status of the Sarkin Katsina, they sent for instructions to the amir al-mu'minin at Gwandu.[137] Orders came back to reject the peace offer and continue with their attacks.[138] The mujāhidūn, especially the leadership in Gwandu, had suffered from many instances of broken aman from the Zamfarawa, Kebbawa, the Gobirawa and the Tuareg, and by this time were wary.[139] As Bello also points out, there was a real danger that a peace treaty at this time would lead to the break-up of the jama'a, which had become seriously divided over the issue.[140] Before the messenger bringing these orders had arrived, Malam Na Alhaji, the main force behind the peace party, had died.[141] The question of who would take his position preoccupied the leaders of the contingents that had followed him. Several of them, including the Dangi Dauda b. Yusufu and one Dahala, probably the malam from Pauwa in Zazzau who was later appointed to rule Karofi by Umarun Dallaji, sought to take Na Alhaji's place.[142] A crisis was averted with the resort to more familiar hereditary principles and Na Alhaji's rather youthful son, Muhamman Dikko, was made commander over the contigents.[143] The Dangi Dauda and Dahala did not accept his leadership and the former emerged as a leader of an autonomous section of the jama'a after victory.[144]

After rejection of the Sarkin Katsina's peace offer Malam Umarun Dallaji emerged as the senior commander, and raiding against the Birni and neighbouring settlements which had not declared for them began in earnest. The jama'a harrassed communications into the Birni, attempting to impose a sort of siege. An expedition led by the Sarki came out and raided the base of Sabongari but failed to dislodge them.[145] The fortifications of the Birni however, remained impregnable to them. When the

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136. *I.M.*, p. 96. *B.K.D./PP-NHRS.*
137. This was certainly an important question as developments in neighbouring kingdoms show. The Sarkin Zazzau Isiaku Jatau had been formally installed as amir of Zazzau by a delegation sent by the Shehu led by Malam Dansabuwa in late 1805. The jama'a of Kano had told the Sarkin Alwali that if he repented and made the hijra to join them, 'when God has given them authority [they will] return his authority and permit him to enter the Birni', Salih, *op. cit.*, f7v, f11.
138. *I.M.*, p. 96.
139. Last, *op. cit.*, pp. 34—35. *T.W.*, pp. 118, 120.
140. *I.M.*, p. 96.
141. *Ibid.*
142. *B.K.D./PP-NHRS.*
143. *Ibid.*
144. *Ibid.*
145. *I.M.*, p. 96.

Sarkin Katsina came out with another expedition he reached as far as Iyatawa, a town about 6 kilometres north of Sabongari. The mujāhidūn went out to meet him and battle was joined on a piece of high ground just beyond a stream which flows outside the northern gates of Sabongari.[146] In this encounter the Sarkin Katsina and the Kauran Katsina were killed and the expedition routed.[147] Magajin Halidu was immediately installed as the new Sarkin Katsina, but the morale of the government forces had been considerably shaken and desertion increased.[148] The Durbin Katsina left the Birni and went to Tsagero and the Galadima went to a place known as Danyaggaba.[149] Some of them had already established contact with Malam Umarun Dallaji through some of those whom he had won over to his side, like the Ubandawakin Durbi.[150] The sarakunan garuruwa, like the Illela, simply stayed in their towns and failed to turn up to pay homage to the new king.[151]

The forces of the jama'a moved nearer to the Birni, attempting to cut off its food supplies from the karkara around. The acute shortage resulting from this, and what seems to have been a generally poor harvest in the northern parts of the kingdom in the kaka of 1807, forced more people to move out of the city.[152] The near famine conditions in the Birni; the desertion of some of the senior sarakuna; and the increasing hostility of the inhabitants made to suffer acute privations for a cause with which they did not identify or were hostile to, made the Sarki's position in the capital untenable. The degree of alienation between the royal establishment and the inhabitants of the Birni is perhaps best illustrated by a tradition about how the family of the Imams of Maradi came to join the exiled dynasty in its flight. It is said that among the leading mallamai of the Birni was one Hajji Babba of Wangarawa origin, a confidant of the Sarkin Katsina who fled to Dankama.[153] When Hajji Baba was asked by this Sarki, Magajin Halidu, to join him in his flight he did not go to bid his family farewell because he knew that they would prevent him.[154] In these circumstances it was only the Sarki with his court, the princes and princesses and a few supporters like Hajji Baba who moved out of the Birni to Dankama about 32 kilometres to the

146. *Ibid., K.T.K./NNAK. GIS(r),* July 1971.
147. *K.T.K./NNAK.*
148. *I.M.,* p. 96. *K.T.K./NNAK.*
149. *K.T.K./NNAK.*
150. Palmer "Abdurahman", *loc. cit.*
151. *Ibid.*
152. Barth, *op. cit.,* I, p. 478.
153. *LAL(k),* September 1971.
154. *Ibid.*

north.[155] This town was situated in the fertile lands of the lower gulbin Kaita basin, from where some of the grain supplies for the Birni came. With its smaller and less assertive population, its more manageable fortifications for the reduced military forces left with the Sarki, it was more suitable as a base from which to continue to fight the rebellion of the jama'a. It was also situated on a route to the north, where military aid might be obtained from Kance, Damagaram and the Kel Geres Tuareg and where it was possible to retreat in case of another defeat.

As soon as the Sarki fled to Dankama, the mujāhidūn moved in and took the Birni,[156] and from there launched an attack on Dankama, but failed to take it.[157] The Sarkin Katsina then launched an expedition against them from Dankama, which succeeded in forcing them to abandon the Birni and retreat to Sabongari.[158] Their rather hasty move into a city denuded of food and provisions, whose extensive fortifications they did not have the forces to man, was a serious mistake that could have ended more disastrously. The mistake is noted in many of the oral accounts of the Jihad campaigns and ascribed to their failure to follow the Shehu's specific instructions.[159] But in the flush of the victory of killing a Sarkin Katsina and forcing his successor to flee from the Gidan Korau, general strategic considerations even those insisted upon by the Shehu, could have been forgotten. Some of the leaders would have been anxious to finish off a struggle that had continued for over 3 years and to set about ruling as had their comrades in Kano; some of their followers would have been eager to get their hands on the booty they expected to find in the city.[160]

The Sarkin Katsina however, did not show any anxiety to settle in the Birni, for after forcing them to retreat he returned with his forces to Dankama.[161] He received military assistance from the Sarkin Kance, a small kingdom dependent on Damagaram, and a contingent of the Tuareg joined him.[162] Seeing that he had won a victory, the first in this phase of the campaign, more people seem to have flocked back to his standard. But the presence of a large body of men and horses in Dankama began to tell on the food supply of the area which was already low due

155. *LAL(k)*, September 1971. *I.M.*, p. 96. *K.T.K./NNAK.*
156. *I.M.*, p. 96. *K.T.K./NNAK.*
157. *I.M.*, p. 96.
158. *Ibid.*
159. *GIT(t)*, July 1971. *GIS(r)*, July 1971. *AMS(b)*, July 1971.
160. The Birnin Kano was taken by the mujāhidūn in May/June 1807, Salih, *op. cit.*, f. 15.
161. *I.M.*, p. 96.
162. *Ibid.*

to a poor harvest.[163] As the inhabitants of Dankama and neighbouring settlements began to feel the pressure of the Sarki's court and army on their food supply they became restive and saw that the further presence of the Sarkin Katsina there would completely exhaust their supplies.[164] The disaffected elements made contact with Malam Umarun Dallaji and began to conspire with him against the Sarkin Katsina.[165]

Malam Umaru had stayed on at Sabongari preparing the next move after this setback and was receiving reinforcementts. A contingent under Malam Muhammadu Namoda came in from Zamfara; others arrived from Kano and Daura.[166] With Muhammadu Namoda—a seasoned warrior who had won the great victory of Farfara—in command, the forces of the mujāhidūn left aside the half-deserted Birni, and directed themselves to eliminating the forces of the Sarkin Katsina.[167] With a much larger number of warriors, including seasoned fighters from Kano and Zamfara, and the hostile attitude of the people of Dankama towards the Sarki in their favour, they now had a better chance. When the two forces met near Dankama a fierce battle took place in which the Sarkin Katsina and many of his chiefs were killed and his force completely routed.[168] Remnants of his forces fled north-eastwards into the land of Korgom, another small kingdom dependent on Damagaram.[169] With the help of the Tuareg an attempt was made to rally them and another Sarki was appointed.[170] The mujāhidūn pursued them and were reinforced by the arrival of the Amir Ahir, Muhammad al-Baqiri.[171] The new Sarkin Katsina, with remnants of the court and army, were surprised around the well of Tsirakau in Korgom, and he fell into a well and was killed.[172] The others fled into Damagaram appointing Dan Kasawa, a son of Tsagarana, as leader, in order to maintain their cohesion and be in a position to deal with the government of Damagaram.[173]

The mujāhidūn then turned back on those garuruwa and birane on the eastern plains who had not already submitted to them. The decisiveness of their victory at the Battle of Dankama and the food shortages

163. *K.T.K./NNAK.* Maradi informants emphasize the importance of famine conditions as a factor in the demise of the Katsina government.
164. *K.T.K./NNAK.*
165. *Ibid.*
166. *I.M.*, p. 96.
167. *Ibid.*
168. *K.T.K./NNAK.*
169. *GIT(n)*, September 1971.
170. *I.M.*, p. 96. *K.T.K./NNAK.*
171. *I.M.*, p. 96.
172. *K.T.K./NNAK.*
173. *GIT(n)*, September 1971.

experienced then, would of course have undermined any will in these towns to resist. There is a record of one instance of determined resistance, at the town of Mani where the maigari, the Mani Ibrahim Arne, refused to submit peacefully to Umarun Dallaji and was killed in the ensuing encounter.[174] By the Muharram of 1223/February—March 1808 Malam Umarun Dallaji had settled in the Birni and the bulk of the contingents had dispersed back to their homes.[175] However, several important towns and cities still remained which had not submitted to the authority of the jama'a. Among these were Maska and Gozaki in the rich agricultural and manufacturing districts along the border with Zazzau. The town of Kurmin Dan Ranko to their east had been taken by one Gudindi, one of the supporters of the Jihad from among the Daneji, but the victories in the north seemed not to have enabled him to continue and take the more important birane of Gozaki and Maska, only about 40 kilometres away.[176] The Sarkin Gozaki and the Sarkin Maska at this time are said to have been very wealthy and generous to their people.[177] The Sarkin Maska Birgiji had gone to the considerable expense of building and maintaining a large new mosque in his town.[178] Moreover, in Zazzau nearby, with which these towns were closely in touch, political developments favoured the confirmation of their resistance to the jama'a. In Zazzau, the successor of Isiaku Jatau, Nakau, had repudiated the support his father had given to the Shehu and had come out openly against the Jihad since his accession in c.November 1806, and he was not overthrown until December 1808.[179]

Another aspect of the campaigns in this area was that the leadership was in the hands of the pastoral Daneji, who did not seem to have had contacts with the inhabitants of large urban centres like Maska and Gozaki. These leaders were, in any case, not prepared to commit themselves wholeheartedly to the Jihad campaign at the expense of the welfare of their large herds. Those among them strongly committed to the Jihad, such as Gudindi's younger brother Dudi, had remained in the north with Malam Umarun Dallaji and the leadership had devolved on others like Gudindi who is reputed to have owned thousands of heads of cattle.[180] His

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174. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
175. 'Katsina Chronology', *PP-NHRS.*
176. Dankousso & Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
177. *Ibid.*, p. 76. *MMT(y),* August 1972.
178. Dankousso & Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
179. D.M. Last, 'A Solution to the Problems of Dynastic Chronology of Nineteenth Century Zaria and Kano', *JHSN,* III.3, December 1966, p. 461.
180. *GIO(g),* August 1972. *Tarihin Malumfashi.*

pastoral activity kept him on the move, settling only for short periods at Kurmin Dan Ranko, Gadanya, Godiya, Dutsin Zaki and other places in south-eastern Kano and southern Katsina.[181] It was not until about 1809—1810 that with the assistance of one Buma from the more sedentary communities of the Maska area, and with assistance sent by the new emirate authorities in Zazzau, that a decisive campaign was launched against Maska and Gozaki and they were taken.[182]

Meanwhile Malam Umarun Dallaji had become involved in the campaign against Birnin Alkalawa.[183] In the dry season of 1807 he had taken part in an expedition against it together with Muhammadu Namoda; and he joined in the third expedition which took that city in October 1808.

181. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, pp. 77—79. *GYT(m)*, August 1972.
182. See Genealogical Chart B.
183. Last, *op. cit.*, p. 38—39.

6 *The demise of the Jama'a of Katsina: c.1808—1817*

THE AFTERMATH OF THE CAMPAIGNS

The success of the mujāhidūn in killing two successive Sarakunan Katsina, bringing about the death of a third and forcing the remnants of the court and the army to flee into Damagaram, effectively eliminated the institution of the Sarkin Katsina, the core of the Katsina sarauta system. These developments marked the end of a process which started when the Shehu Usman Dan Fodio was invested at Gudu in February 1804 as amīr al-mu'mīnin and he called upon Muslims in the bilad as-Sūdān to establish Muslim political authority in conformity with the Sunnah and the Shari'a, purged of all innovations. At the same time they marked the beginning of a process of incorporating Katsina into a large political community whose central institution was the amīr al-mu'mīnīn, represented in Katsina by an amir.

But the elimination of the central institution of the Katsina sarauta system occurred after the government of the Sarkin Katsina had lost control over most of its territory to the jama'a of Katsina who, through a series of campaigns from 1805, had established their authority over it. The nature and composition of the Katsina jama'a and the pattern of campaigning meant however, that the new pattern of political authority which emerged was one in which power was considerably diffused among the leaders of the various contingents of the jama'a.

One of the leaders of this jama'a, Malam Umarun Dallaji, by the end of 1808 had been appointed as the emir of Katsina and was delegated by the amīr al-mu'mīnīn with specific powers to govern the province of Katsina.[1] His effective control was, however, limited to the territory

1. There are no records extant of the actual date of his appointment as emir. The years given for his reign (29) when deducted from the date of his death (Safar 1252) place his appointment in early 1808. In *I.M.*, p. 115, Bello refers to an 'Amir of Katsina' taking part in the expedition which captured Birnin Alkalawa in October 1808. In *I.M.*, completed in 1812, Bello lists Umarun Dallaji as the na'ib in Katsina. It is likely that Umarun

he and his close lieutenants had taken during the Jihad campaigns. This covered part of the Karaduwa basin and a large portion of the eastern and central plains. The contingents of the other two leaders who had also been authorized by the amir al-mu'minin to command expeditions in Katsina, Malam Muhamman Na Alhaji and Malam Umarun Dumyawa, controlled territory to the south-west and the north-west of the Birnin Katsina respectively. From the town of Zandam Malam Umarun Dumyawa, with his lieutenants Malam Ara from Makuna and Malam Yusufu Na Garabi, controlled territory extending north-westwards into the lower gulbin Maradi area and eastwards past Kusa, around the Birni, to the vicinity of the town of Kaita. The contingents led by Malam Muhamman Na Alhaji, which came to be led by his son Malam Muhamman Dikko after his death in c.1807, controlled territory extending south-westwards from the Birni to the marshes of Dan Musa and westwards, leaving out the Ruma cluster, to the border with Zamfara. Other smaller contingents, which were autonomous even though not under a 'flagbearer', (i.e. a commander authorized to take command by the Shehu) also existed. There were the contingents of Dangi Dauda, who was based at Yantumaki in the upper Bunsuru basin; and those led by the Daneji brothers, Dudi, Gandi and Gudindi, based at Papu in the Karaduwa basin but who had come to occupy leading positions among the jama'a in that area and in the southern districts extending up to the border with Zazzau. There were the people of Ruma, based at Ruma and the other settlements of that north-west region.

The largest contingent however, was that under Malam Umarun Dallaji. This was made up not only of his own following, drawn from Dallaji and neighbouring towns of the central plains, like Bindawa, Rugar Badde, Kamri, Sabongari and Kafin Dangi, but included also the scholar Malam Muhamman Na Benye and his people from Benye and the Karofi area.[2] After the death of Muhamman Na Alhaji and the rejection of the peace offer made by the Sarkin Katsina Maremawa, Umarun Dallaji had emerged as the leading commander of the Katsina jama'a and it was mainly from his base of Sabongari that the last phase of fighting was conducted. It was to him that some of the sarakunan garuruwa who came to side with the jama'a, (like the Dambo of Ingawa) pledged their allegiance and he led the expeditions against the towns of the eastern plains such as Mani.[3] When the forces of the jama'a moved back into the Birni after the Battle of Dankama, Malam Umarun Dallaji took

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Dallaji was formally appointed emir between the death of Mallam Na Alhaji in 1807 and the expedition to Alkalawa in September 1808.

2. *MAM(b)*, August 1972. *AMS(b)*, July 1972. *GIK(k)*, August 1972. *GIK(b)*, August 1972.
3. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

control of the palace while the other two senior commanders took houses in the Kofar Guga and the Kofar Yandaka.[4] Malam Umarun Dumyawa, who had already moved into the house of the Sarkin Sullubawa at Zandam, first lived in the Galadinci quarter near the palace and then moved into the town house of the Sarkin Sullubawa at the Kofar Guga.[5] Muhamman Dikko, who maintained houses at Zakka and at his father's birth-place, Kwani, took the town house of the Yandakan Katsina.[6]

There is a tradition that these three shared out the kingdom and that even the Birnin Katsina was divided into three, each taking a section adjoining his territory outside the walls.[7] It is unlikely that such specific division of territory was resorted to. What seems to have happened is that the general distribution of authority and territory that had emerged out of the campaign was observed. Malam Umarun Dallaji recognized as amir, was responsible for the main Juma'at mosque in the Birni and meetings were held at his palace; he did not attempt to interfere in the running of the affairs of the territory controlled by the other leaders, which might even have been considered to include the quarters they inhabited in the Birni.[8] The appointment of people to govern the settlements, the collection of *jizia* (tax; see Glossary) and *kharaj* (land tax); the regulation of commerce and manufacture; the establishment of new settlements; and, it is said, even the appointment of qadis were left to each leader.

Certain developments within Katsina and in the large polity of the Caliphate, however, were creating conditions which did not favour the continuation of this pattern of diffused political authority. One of these was the emergence of a powerful triumvirate made up of the amir Umarun Dallaji, Malam Muhamman Na Benye, and Dudi. There was also the influence exerted from the headquarters of the Caliphate at Sifawa where, in 1812, a more formal division of responsibility had been attempted by the Caliph. This favoured greater regularization of the structure of authority in the emirates under those leaders specifically delegated to govern them as territorial emirs.[9]

The power of Umarun Dallaji, who controlled the largest territory, increased as he regularized the administration of his territory and came to work closely with these two influential figures of the Katsina jama'a. When he set out on this process of regularization he came in conflict with

4. *Ibid.*, p. 63. *MAB (b)*, August 1972.
5. *MAB(b)*, August 1972.
6. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 63.
7. *Assessment Report: Yandaka District, 1909.*
8. *MAG(b)*, July 1971.
9. Last, *op. cit.*, p. 41

that old rebel Dan Tunku. From his base at Dambarta, Dan Tunku had continued to harrass his kinsmen, the Yerimawa leaders of Ingawa, even after the latter had pledged their allegiance to Umarun Dallaji and accepted the authority of the mujāhidūn.[10] An expedition against the people of Dan Tunku who were harrassing the Dambo of Ingawa, met with no success, but the Dambo did manage to maintain his authority until Dan Tunku started another rebellion in c.1819.

Elsewhere Umarun Dallaji was more successful in regularizing and consolidating the position of his supporters who had taken up the leadership of the communities in which they lived. Malam Usman Dan Malam Dan Ila who had been the *liman* (imam) of Rugar Badde, was appointed to govern that town; similarly Bidage became established at Kamri; Aga, a cousin of Malam Umar, was appointed over Dallaji; another relation Hammuda at Tsagero; and Usman Dan Marori at Kafin Dangi.[11] In several instances the masu gari, who had supported the jama'a, or had just peacefully surrendered to them were confined; as in Ingawa where the Dambo Yalando was retained, and at Radda, where the Magajin Radda Kawaje continued.[12] In conducting the affairs of these towns Umarun Dallaji came to rely increasingly on Muhamman Na Benye and Dudi. The former had an established local reputation in the central plains, was held in respect among the jama'a and had his own following from Benye and Karofi.[13] Of the Daneji brothers, Dudi was the most committed to the Jihad. One of his brothers had taken the towns of Gozaki and Maska and the other, Gandi, was based at Papu as the Sarkin Fulani Daneji. Dudi had good connections among the settled and nomadic Fulani of southern Katsina and the Bebeji-Shanono area of western Kano.[14]

With the support of these two men, with the greater wealth and manpower in the territory under him, and the authority he derived from his position as the amir, Umarun Dallaji began clearly to overshadow the other leaders of the Katsina jama'a. This trend of affairs was favoured by the Caliphate authorities, as was clearly demonstrated in the neighbouring emirate of Kano where the Shehu had helped to strengthen the weak position of the Amir Sulaiman b. Jammo (1806—1819) when he faced a serious challenge to his authority from some of the leading mujāhidūn of that emirate.[15]

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10. *Yerimawa Fulani Origin of,* NNAK/KATPROF/I-HIS-17.
11. *GIT(t),* July 1972. *GIK(b),* August 1972. *GIK(k),* August 1972. *MAM(b),* August 1972.
12. *GIR(r),* August 1972.
13. *AMS(b),* July 1972. *MAG(b),* July 1972.
14. *GIO(g),* August 1972. One of the leaders of the Kano jama'a was Malam Muhamman Dansabuwa, a ba Daneje from western Kano.
15. *K.C.,* p. 128.

The reaction among the groups of the Katsina jama'a to this development varied. To some, the loose structure of the jama'a, with its autonomous units operating separately coming together only for major expeditions, might have seemed a suitable framework for the new political system whose basis, after all, was obedience to the Shari'a and the Sunnah and not the *mulki* (power) of any king. Such system would have given more scope to the garuruwa and birane and found favour among sections of the ulama and pastoral and farming communities who had, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, enjoyed a certain measure of autonomy. But the weight of the historical experience of the inhabitants of Katsina went against this system which would differ considerably from the sarauta system established for several centuries here and in neighbouring areas. On the other hand, to continue with a diffused pattern of political authority, as existed in the jama'a, might have been seen, even by the leaders who cherished this autonomy, as compounding the problem of consolidating their newly won authority over communities accustomed to a fairly centralized political system. It was partly these conflicting considerations which prevented the leaders of the smaller groups of the jama'a coming out openly to oppose the growing power of Umarun Dallaji, which in any case hardly encroached on their small, localized spheres of influence. For some there were certain other considerations. For example, the Dangi Dauda of Yantumaki's position as the leading baDange was not quite secure in the face of the growing influence another baDange, Usman Dan Marori, was developing in the circles around the emir.[16]

It was the leaders of the two major groups who reacted against these developments towards transforming the jama'a pattern of political authority. Both Muhamman Dikko and Umarun Dumyawa reacted by attempting to establish much tighter control over the territories under them. Malam Umarun Dumyawa, who is said to have been senior in age to Umarun Dallaji and an established scholar in his own right, reacted much more strongly. He was already pursuing a policy of establishing new settlements in the territory under him—a policy encouraged by both Abdullahi Dan Fodio and Muhammadu Bello.[17] Faced with the growing

16. Although many Sullubawa occupied influential positions around the amir al-mu'minin Bello and in the emirates of Kano and Zazzau, this did not seem to have especially favoured the position of Malam Umarun Dumyawa within Katsina. There was no simple correlation between kinship connections and political relations as is so widely assumed in western historical and social science studies of Africa.
17. *I.H.*, pp. 82—83.

power of Umarun Dallaji he began to encourage this much more vigorously. The area under his control was sparsely populated, and the fighting in the dry season of 1807—8 and the poor harvest of that year doubtless caused further depopulation. He therefore offered to waive the kharaj and to provide extensive farming land to any able-bodied men who came to settle there.[18] Naturally, most of the settlers who moved in came from the more densely populated central and eastern plains controlled by Umarun Dallaji. The vigour with which Umarun Dumyawa pursued this policy suggested to Umarun Dallaji that his intentions were not simply to build up settlements but to get sufficient able-bodied men in his territory with which to augment the military forces under his control.

As relations between the two deteriorated, Umarun Dumyawa and Muhamman Dikko are said to have restricted the flow of food into the Birnin Katsina from the areas they controlled.[19] A market was established, at a place known as Kaura to the north-west of the Birni, where people taking grain to the Birni were stopped.[20] Rivalries and disputes among the ulama of the Birnin Katsina seem to have become linked with this crisis among the leaders.[21] A quarrel, between the *yan barge* (stable boys) of Umarun Dumyawa and Umarun Dallaji, sparked off armed conflict between the followers of the two leaders in the Birni.[22] The followers of Umaru Dallaji, who were much stronger in the Birni, attacked the house of Umaru Dumyawa who left and went back to Zandam, but some of his property was seized.[23] It was while he was at Zandam that a rebellion broke out in the villages of the gulbin Maradi plateaux in c.1816. The official appointed by Umarun Dumyawa to collect jizia from the *arna* (animists) living there was killed and his head sent to a prince of the old Katsina dynasty in Damagaram, as an invitation to return.

THE MARADI REBELLION: 1816—1817

The threat posed by the rebellion which broke out in the villages of the gulbin Maradi area in c.1816 was not immediately apparent in the Birnin Katsina or Zandam.[24] Although this area was only about 24

18. *MAB(b),* August 1972.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *MAB(b),* August 1972.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*
23. *K.H./PP-NHRS.*
24. See appendix on chronology.

kilometres to the north-west it was at that time a rather remote border region of little economic or political importance. No important settlements had grown up there since the abandonment of Maradi during the wars with Gobir in the late eighteenth century.[25]

Conditions in the Gulbin Maradi Area

This was then an area of small villages and clusters of homesteads on the plateau (like Sumarana, Jiratawa and Rumjin Magarya) and of thickly wooded valleys.[26] In these lived the autochthons of the area and other specialized agriculturalists and hunters, with names like Mazumawa, Korofawa, Sorawa and Nafatawa. Like other communities of hunters and cultivators living in remote rural areas, Islam had not made much headway among them and the dominant religious system was still that of the iskoki, and the patrilineal clan an important unit of political organization. Various paramount authorities had emerged among them, like the Sarkin Mazu and the Maradi. The former was the head of the Mazumawa and the latter was the maigari of the settlement, or group of settlements, known as Maradi. A route from the Birnin Katsina to the trade fair at Naya in Gobir passed nearby. The communities of the area, however, enjoyed considerable autonomy and were largely ignored by the central government, except when the Gobir rulers attacked in that direction in the eighteenth century.

During the Jihad, there seems not to have been any contest for this remote and sparsely populated area, but it fell into the sphere of Umarun Dumyawa who had taken the towns of this north-west region. When he began to establish effective control over the territory under him the arnan maradi began to feel the weight of the new authorities, whose administration was more vigorous than the old one in the late eighteenth century. In his attempt to attract settlers into the territory he controlled, Umarun Dumyawa had stopped collecting kharaj from the able-bodied men coming to settle in the area. It was presumably in order to make up for this loss of revenue and to build up the wealth under his control that heavy demands for jizia were imposed on the arna of the Maradi area. They were made to pay this in the form of large quantities of guinea corn and millet;[27] also, their blacksmiths were forbidden to produce weapons.[28] This policy of disarming the population threatened one of their major occupations —hunting— from which they derived essentials like meat, and materials

25. See pp. (Folio 61—62, 166, 173).
26. The description here is drawn from Nicolas *et al*, *op. cit.*, pp. 6—8. David, *op. cit.*, pp. 640, 645.
27. David, *op. cit.*, p. 646.
28. *Ibid.*

for leather apparel. Their traditions speak of one Mano, who collected jizia from them, as living in great luxury when he stayed there.[29] But in spite of the heavy exactions imposed on the people of this area, the presence of the new authorities was not secured through the establishment of a separate Muslim settlement, and this facilitated the success of the rebellion.

The Rebellion

For communities who, a few years back, had been virtually independent, the policies of Malam Umarun Dumyawa were intolerably oppressive. They looked back on the days before the Jihad as a sort of golden age under the rule of the distant and benevolent jikokin Korau. A delegation led by one Gadabo was therefore sent to invite the remnants of the old dynasty to return and free them from this new yoke.[30] Muhamman Dan Kasawa, who had taken the title of Sarkin Katsina on the way from Tsirkau to Damagaram, feared treachery and told the delegation that he would accept their invitation if they produced the head of the official, Mano, who was oppressing them. They returned and started to prepare an insurrection under the leadership of Gadabo and one Ashalu-maitawaye. Bows and arrows, axes and knives were secretly made in the thickly wooded valley. The support of the iskoki was invoked at a shrine around the *Gawon Barki* in the valley.

When Mano's party arrived to collect jizia they were welcomed and accommodated within the settlements as they normally were. Ashalu-maitawaye gave a signal for the insurrection when he killed Mano, who was staying in his house. The rest of the party was finished off by their hosts separately and Mano's head was cut off and sent to Dan Kasawa at Gafai in Damagaram. Dan Kasawa and his people had moved to this town in western Damagaram after relations with the Sarkin Damagaram Sulaiman b. Tintima (c.1812—1822) had become strained.[31] From Gafai, Dan Kasawa attempted to enlist the support of the Tazar, the nearest important sarki of Katsina, based at Tasawa nearby, but his approaches were unsuccessful.

Therefore, when he received confirmation that the arnan Maradi had seriously embarked on a rebellion he agreed to join them.[32] On arrival

29. *Ibid.* pp. 646—647.
30. This account of the rebellion is drawn from David, *op. cit.* pp. 646—648. *GIS(m),* September 1971. *GIO(a),* September 1971. *GIG(n),* September 1971 and *GIT(n),* September 1971.
31. Tilho, *op. cit.*, p. 440.
32. *GIG(n),* September 1971.

in the Maradi area, Dan Kasawa decided to establish a separate settlement in the thickly wooded valley near the Gawon Barki.[33] The new settlement was stockaded and prepared as a base for the reconquest of the Kasar Katsina. Dan Kasawa did not attempt to rule over the arna, although the old Katsina titles were used in an endeavour to reconstitute the form of the old government. And since the arna, like the Jinjino Bakawa, remained, when united, the most formidable military force in the area, attempting to impose anything over them was dangerous.[34] The major arna groups on the whole maintained considerable autonomy from the sarakuna and exerted considerable influence as a body.[35] Some of them joined in the expeditions against the emirate but they remained essentially a defensive force, making the settlements of central Maradi virtually impregnable. A refugee from Rano, Wagasa, became the maigari of the new settlement of Maradi and a sort of intermediary between the sarki and the arna.[36]

The Raids of Dan Kasawa

Once Dan Kasawa had established a base in the Maradi valley, he started raiding the neighbouring settlements of the emirate and within a short time had taken Garabi and Maraka. The former was the base of one of the lieutenants of Umarun Dumyawa, Malam Yusufu Na Garabi.[37] He pressed on and harrassed Zandam so effectively that Umarun Dumyawa was forced to move back to the Birni and the town was abandoned.[38] Dan Kasawa then attempted to encircle the Birni by raiding the Ruma area to the west and Shinkafi in the east.[39] His strategy was to conquer the territory by taking the settlements systematically, thus extending the area under his control out from his Maradi base. In this way he hoped to achieve the reconquest of the whole territory. But the raids were also important in the immediate sense of providing booty which, in the form of food, clothing and livestock, or other commodities that could be exchanged for these, largely sustained his forces. This was essential for preservation of his territorial base, as exacting the means of dependence on the arna was not feasible and could be dangerous.

Dan Kasawa benefited from the fact that the Maradi rebellion was part

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33. David, *op. cit.*, pp. 650—651.
34. *GIG(n)*, September 1971. Ritter, *Barth and Overweg in Africa* n.d. copy in Kashim Ibrahim Library, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, pp. 49—50.
35. *GIG(n)*, September 1971. *GIS(m)*, September 1971. David, *op. cit.*, p. 654.
36. *GIG(n)*, September 1971.
37. R. Caranci, *Labarin Kurfi*, typescript in the possession of Muhammadu Ja, Maradin Kurfi.
38. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 56. *MAB(b)*, August 1972.
39. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, pp. 55—56.

of what came to be known as the Tawaye, the widespread series of revolts against the Caliphate which flared up after the death of the Shehu in April 1817.[40] These revolts led by Malam Abdulsalami at Kware, by Banaga Dan Bature in the upper Zamfara river area and in the region of Kadaye near the Gagare-Rima confluence and in Kebbi, engaged the forces of the amir al-mu'minin Muhammad Bello on a wide front. They were partly a reaction to the passing of the great mujāddadi,[41] but they also represented a revival of the old forces of opposition to the Jihad, which once again posed a serious challenge to the authority of the mujāhidūn in the Sokoto-Rima basin and neighbouring areas. The rebels won a major victory in 1817 when an expedition under the command of the amir al-mu'minin Bello was defeated by the Banaga and the Sarkin Burmi.[42]

THE REBELLION OF DAN TUNKU AND THE PLIGHT OF GUDINDI

The attacks of Dan Kasawa represented only one facet of the challenge to the authority of the mujāhidūn in Katsina in the years immediately after the death of the Shehu. For while Dan Kasawa was pressing on with his raids from the north-west, Dan Tunku started a rebellion in c.1819 against the emir of Kano Ibrahim Dabo b. Mahmud (1819—1846), which spread into eastern Katsina. The centre of the rebellion was Dambarta, close to the Katsina border, and it was supported by the *ardo'en* (pastoral Fulani) of the Wodabe, the Hontorbe and other pastoral Fulani communities of this border region.[43] These nomadic and semi-nomadic communities were resisting the attempt by the new authorities in Kano to impose more effective control over them.[44] They found a leader in Dan Tunku, who was determined to remain the autonomous lord of the marshes as he was becoming even before the outbreak of the Jihad wars.

In Kano, other rebellions had broken out about the same time against the new amir Ibrahaim Dabo.[45] Most of the north-western region of Kano bordering Katsina, therefore easily fell to the rebels who were looked upon by the emirate authorities as *al-murtaddin* (apostates).[46] They attacked the town of Ingawa and the Dambo Yalando fled to Daye

40. Last, *op. cit.*, pp. 67—70.
41. These rebellions after the death of the Shehu bore certain similarities to the Wars of Ridda after the death of the Holy Prophet.
42. Last, *op. cit.*, p. 68.
43. Salih, *op. cit.*, f. 37—40.
44. *Ibid.*, f. 40.
45. Salih, *op. cit.*, f. 37—38. *K.C.*, p. 128.
46. *Ibid.*, f. 39.

and Dan Tunku appointed his son, Kutunu, as the new Dambo.[47] The rebels also took Gwiwa, an important town of the north-western frontier that was garrisoned by the Marusan Katsina before the Jihad.[48] The success of these rebels shook the authority Umarun Dallaji was trying to establish over the eastern plains.

Political conditions in the southern region of Katsina were equally unsettled at this time. Gudindi, who had conquered the town of Maska, had left with his cattle and moved back into Kano: Maska was left under Dan Buma. Gudindi had been forced to leave Maska when Nanaga Dan Bature, one of the leaders of the tawaye in southern Zamfara, with support from the town of Kaya across the border in Zazzau, raided the outskirts of the town.[49] He succeeded in seizing larger numbers of Gudindi's cattle and, it is said, even one of his daughters, Da.[50] When the cavalry of Banaga continued to attack, Gudindi fled to Abasawa nearby where he was met by Muhammad Yero, one of the freebooters with some attachments to the mujāhidūn. Muhamman Yero had earlier offered to assist Gudindi despoil the inhabitants of the town of Maska, whom he said were supporting the Banaga, but Gudindi had refused.[51] He now turned on Gudindi and seized some of his cattle and property. Gudindi fled to Hunkui in Zazzau and continued into Kano where he stayed with his cattle for the next 5 years, grazing them around Godiya. Dan Buma, who stayed to rule over Maska, remained loyal to the amir of Katsina. However, the activity of freebooting elements like Muhamman Yero, (better known as Kogo-mai-kumaru, with the kirari: *Ma ci amana, dan Dada!* (Breaker of the aman, son of Dada!)) made political conditions in this area very unsettled.[52]

In the north-west, Umarun Dumyawa had been forced out of Zandam, and the settlements under Muhammad Dikko were becoming threatened by Dan Kasawa'a raid; and it was therefore on Umarun Dallaji that the task of organizing expeditions against the Maradawa fell.[53] He also sent out expeditions against the rebellion in the east.[54] By late 1820, the emir of Kano had started to press back the rebels of Dan Tunku and, with pressure on them from Katsina in the west, they were forced to retreat into the more inaccessible parts of the gulbin Gari marshes. Some

47. "Asalin Mutanen Ingawa", *loc. cit.*, p. 33.
48. Harriss, *Assessment Report on Marisa District, 1920.*
49. Clayton, *op. cit.*
50. *MMT(y)*, August 1972.
51. *Ibid.*
52. *Ibid.* Clayton, *op. cit.*
53. K.H./PP-NHRS, p. 55.
54. Salih, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

of the pastoralists who had joined the rebellion fled eastwards in the direction of Borno.[55] Dan Tunku and his own people, when forced to abandon Ingawa and Dambarta, had established a stronghold among some rocks on the northern bank of the gulbin Gari, from where they withstood several attacks and kept control over the surrounding territory they had conquered from Kano and Katsina.[56] The amir al-mu'minin intervened, and peace was made between Dan Tunku and the emirs; and Dan Tunku was formally appointed as emir over the territory in which he had managed to retain control from his rocky stronghold, which became the town of Kazaure.[57] Katsina lost some territory and several towns to this new emirate. In Ingawa a new Dambo, Bagware, from the old lineage, was appointed by Umarun Dallaji, who emerged out of all this development with more effective control over the settlements of the plain and his status as amir enhanced.[58]

In the south, Umarun Dallaji supported the position which Dan Buma came to occupy in Maska; he also appointed one Maigamo to rule over Gozaki and its towns. Maigamo seemed to have acted as a sort of supervisor, leaving the administration of Gozaki and the other towns with some of the old masu gari like the Galadiman Gozaki Gagori.[59] A ribāt was established at Bakori near the ruins of an abandoned town, and settled with people from the Gozaki cluster; but it had to be abandoned due to attacks from the people of the Banaga.[60] It was established again under one Dan Rakiya.

THE PASSING OF THE JAMA'A SYSTEM

The rebellion in the gulbin Maradi area did not immediately lead to a resolution of the crisis within the central leadership of the Katsina jama'a. Coming together with other developments in the plains of Ingawa, in the Maska region, in Zamfara and other metropolitan districts of the Caliphate however, it created conditions within which the crisis of leadership was resolved and the pattern of authority of the jama'a transformed. Malam Umarun Dallaji emerged with much greater

55. *Ibid.*, f. 40. *Yerimawa Fulani, Origin of:*
56. *Yerimawa Fulani, Origin of:*
57. In H.R. Palmer, 'Kazaure: Sarki's Recollections, February 1909' it is given that Dan Tunku was appointed emir of Kazaure in the year as that of the emir of Zazzau Yamusa b. Al-Hajj, whose accession Last gives as Ramadan 1236/June 1821. Last, 'A Solution ....,' *loc. cit.*, p. 467.
58. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 115.
59. *Danja District Record Book*, I, 1937, NNAK/KATPROF/I/25.
60. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

authority as the emir of Katsina, and the position of the other leaders, as helpers of the emir, was defined more clearly by the amir al-mu'minin. The mallamai of Birnin Katsina, who had not formed an integral part of the jama'a, also came to be incorporated into the emerging emirate system. The amir al-mu'minin came to exercise more direct and effective control over Katsina and regularized supervision over the affairs of the emirate by giving the responsibility to one of the senior companions of the Shehu, Doshero b. Mujakka.[61]

The resolution of the leadership crisis and these other developments, came about after Umarun Dumyawa, Muhamman Dikko and some other leaders of the Katsina jama'a sent a delegation to Sokoto to protest against what they regarded as Umarun Dallaji's tyrannical conduct.[62] Even after the Maradi rebellion, clashes had continued between the followers of the leaders in the Birni; and the followers of Umarun Dallaji, being stronger, were harrassing those of the other leaders. By this time there was also growing dissatisfaction among the ulama of the Birnin Katsina, who felt that they were being ignored and neglected by the leaders of the jama'a who were running public affairs with their own small cliques.[63]

These protests coincided with the rebellions facing the amir al-mu'minin Bello. Some of these rebellions found the unsettled conditions along the western borders of Katsina an advantage.[64] The success of Dan Kasawa in taking large portions of the gulbin Maradi basin provided a friendly rear area for the Gobirawa of Gwanki operating from Kadaye further downstream on the Rima.[65] The unsettled conditions in south-western Katsina favoured the operations of Banaga Dan Bature, who was making Muslim settlements in the upper Sokoto river area impossible and threatening to cut off a major route linking Sokoto with Kano and Zazzau.[66] The amir al-mu'minin Bello might also have realized that the disaffection and unsettled conditions in parts of Katsina could produce rebels from among the Katsina jama'a along the lines of Malam Abdulsalami of Kware.[67] He therefore regarded the complaints from Katsina seriously and summoned Umarun Dallaji to Sokoto.[68] He warned

61. *GIG(s)*, October 1971. Last, *op. cit.*, pp. 90, 100.
62. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 54.
63. *ABM(b)*, July 1972.
64. Last, *op. cit.*, pp. 68—70.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
67. *Ibid.*
68. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, pp. 54—55.

him against the practices of which he was accused and urged him to cooperate with the other leaders whom he should treat as his helpers and not rivals; he additionally instructed Umarun Dallaji to incorporate the ulama of the Birnin Katsina into the administration of the emirate, and Doshero was given responsibility for supervising its affairs.[69]

Muhammad Bello followed this up by visiting the Birnin Katsina and conducting what is known as the 'Gwaji' among the ulama.[70] This seems to have taken the form of public discussions in which the amir al-mu'minin attempted to assess the knowledge and convictions of the leading ulama of the Birni, in order to find which were suitable to be qadis and advisers to the amir. Before leaving Katsina he established some of them in these positions and ordered that grants of *waqf* land be given to each of them in the karkara around the Birni. The mallaman Tsohuwar Kasuwa, led by Malam Ladan b. Usman, who was well-known to Bello, were granted land at Kafi and Tsuntsuwa.[71] Land was granted to the mallaman Gafai, at Jino and Nangohi; the mallaman Gambarawa around the Dutsin Safe and Ajiwa; and the mallaman Makurdi around their settlement; one of them, Malam Abubakar Dan Kande, was among the qadis appointed. The amir al-mu'minin's establishment of these mallamai as qadis and advisers to the emir, with secure sources of income independent of the emir and other leaders of the jama'a, helped to stabilize the political situation in Katsina. Their establishment in this manner brought out the openly Islamic nature of the new government, which some members of the jama'a were tending to treat as fruits of victory and exclusive preserves for them and their followers.

The rebellions and unsettled conditions in Katsina in the period 1817—1821 not only created conditions which favoured the emergence of the emirate system in Katsina but they produced specific situations which called for the extension of the authority and power of the emir Umarun Dallaji. As has been shown, wherever rebels or freebooters had weakened the authority of one of the leaders of the jama'a it was Umarun Dallaji who moved in to restore it, further bringing about the incorporation of that territory into the emirate system.

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69. *GIG(s)*, October 1971. Last, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
70. *ABM(b)*, July 1972.
71. *Ibid.*

7 *The establishment of the Emirate*

THE POSITION OF THE EMIR UMARUN DALLAJI

The emergence of the emirate system in Katsiña was also furthered by the death of some of the leading members of the jama'a, and their replacement, as heads of influential groups, by younger men who were more suited to the new developments.

Malam Muhamman Na Benye died in about c.1816 and the leadership of his people went to Kastukane, one of his senior companions.[1] However, Kastukane was killed a few years later by the Maradawa, while he was supervising ploughing at a farm near Yandaki; a son of Muhamman Na Benye, Abubakar, took his place. Another leading member of the jama'a, Dudi, died in c.1820 and his position was taken by his son Abdullahi.[2] Thus the leadership of two powerful groups who had supported the emir Umarun Dallaji went to two young men who did not compare with him in terms of status or influence and who looked up to him for support against rivals in their own families: both of whom married the emir's daughters. This left still living only Umarun Dumyawa whose status as a mujahid was comparable to that of Umarun Dallaji. The position of Umarun Dumyawa had been seriously weakened by the inroads the Maradawa continued to make in the territory under his control, and like Muhamman Dikko he came to rely increasingly on Umarun Dallaji for the defence of what remained. The political system emerging was one in which Umarun Dallaji controlled the main military forces of the emirate and appointed the people to govern many of the towns. The other leading members of the jama'a continued to run the affairs of the territory under their control, subordinate to him in matters of defence, relations with other emirates and states, and internal disputes.

The administration of the territory under Umarun Dallaji was then further regularized. The settlements of the central plains around Dallaji

1. *AAM(r)*, July 1972. There are traditions that he was killed by the tawaye of Maradi.
2. *GIO(g)*, August 1972.

he placed under his cousin Agga Dan Jangarta.[3] These included Bindawa, where one of his early supporters Bagime was placed, and Rugan Badde where another early supporter, Malam Usman, became the maigari.[4] Nearby were the towns of Kamri under Bindage Dan Magam, and Kahin Dangi under Usman Dan Marori, both members of Umarun Dallaji's contingents.[5] On the east bank of the gulbin Kaita at Tsagero Umarun Dallaji placed a relative known as Hammuda, whilst his son, Abubakar Saddiku, was placed over the town of Mani and neighbouring settlements.[6] The Dutsi area was put under Tige, a baToranke, who had had serious misunderstandings with Umarun Dallaji which were only resolved in Sokoto.[7] To the south of this was Ingawa and other towns of that cluster like Kofa, Shamiya and Kurfeji, under the Dambo Bagware who had been appointed by Umarun Dallaji after the Dan Tunku rebellion.[8] At Karofi he appointed Dahala as the maigari, while at Radda nearby he confirmed Kawaje as the Magajin Radda.[9] Over the town of Dayi, on major routes to the south and the west, he appointed Dan Sambo, a baNatirbe whose people grazed their cattle in the Karaduwa and Challawa basins.[10]

At the Birnin Gozaki was Maigamo who ruled through the old masu gari, like the Galadiman Gozaki Gagori.[11] The ribāt at Bakori mentioned above had come under one Dan Rakiya, who had been sent from the Birni and was perhaps supervised by Abubakar Dan Muhamman Na Benye, who was coming to take special responsibility for such settlements, having built one near the Birnin Rimi, south of the capital.[12] The ruler of Maska Jaji Dan Gudindi, and his successor Muhamman Sani Dan Gudindi, were placed under the supervision of their cousin Abdu Dan Dudi.[13] The successor of Gudindi had been Jaji,[14] but because he had maintained

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3. *Danyusufa District Notebook*, NNAK/KATPROF/35. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 135.
4. *MAM(b)*, August 1972. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 136. *MAM(b)*, has it that a baDallaje known as Ja'e ruled Rugar Badde after the Jihad before the appointment of Malam Usman. This could have been any of the supporters of Umarun Dallaji from the town of Dallaji. It was only late in the nineteenth century that 'baDallaje' came to mean a member of the dynasty of Umarun Dallaji.
5. *GIK(b)*, August 1972. *GIK(k)*, August 1972.
6. It is not clear whether it was his son Jabba whom he appointed or a relation, Hammuda. *GIT(t)*, July 1972. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, pp. 55, 101.
7. Harriss *Assessment Report on Marusa District, 1920.*
8. See p. 135.
9. *GIK(d)*, August 1972. *GIR(r)*, August 1972. The position of Karofi in the administration was not clearly defined up to about 1870.
10. *GID(m)*, August 1972.
11. *Danja District Record Book*, 1.
12. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 145. *GIB(b)*, August 1972.
13. *GIO(g)*, August 1972.
14. *MMT(y)*, August 1972. Clayton, *op. cit.*

such a strong attachment to pastoralism and spent most of his time at the cattle encampments he was replaced by Muhamman Sani.[15] When this happened Jaji went with his cattle to live in Zazzau.[16]

By this time a sort of inner policy-making group seems to have emerged around Umarun Dallaji, composed of his son Saddiku, Abdu Dan Dudi, and Abubakar Dan Muhamman Na Benye. The two latter were heads of important groups in the jama'a, but even more than their fathers had they came to be closely absorbed into the councils of the emir. Abubakar and Saddiku came to share responsibility for military affairs, with Saddiku also in charge of the settlements of the Mani plains, and Abubakar of ribāts like Yandaki, Bakori and Rimi. Abdu Dan Dudi assumed special responsibility for the south, beyond the gulbin Karaduwa. Associated with this inner circle around Umarun Dallaji were the ulama whose advice was regularly sought; these seem to have included Malam Ladan Tsohuwar Kasuwa, a well-known figure in Sokoto;[17] also Malam Abubakar Dan Kande of Makurdi, who came to establish a house near Durma and later, his son Malam Hambali, who also became a qadi in the Birni.[18]

There were also the other leaders of the jama'a whose position as helpers of the emir had been clearly defined. They appointed the people to govern the settlements in the territory they controlled, and kept control over the collecting of jizia and kharaj. Malam Muhamman Dikko for example, lived at the Kofar Yandaka quarter of the Birni and at his houses in Zakka. Over Zakka, Kwami, and other settlements of the area under him, he appointed people from among his family and followers, like his son Namoda, whom he placed at Batagarawa, and his wazir Kosau Dan Igge, from the family of a rich merchant of Tsauri.[19] Umarun Dumyawa also maintained a house in the Birnin Katsina but, since he was forced to leave Zandam, he had been attempting to establish a new town to its south-east which came to be known as Bugaje.[20] The territory under the Dangi Dauda, who lived at Yantumaki, was less compact as he attempted to control all settlements of the Dangawa; in addition to Yantumaki he controlled Tafashiya, Baragutawa, Dan Ali, Amarawa and Karfi.[21] In Yantumaki he continued with the old system established by his father, leaving the administration of the town to a sort of maigari, with the title of Sabongari.[22] Political authority among the people of

15. *MMT(y)*, August 1972.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *ABM(b)*, July 1972.
18. *GIU(a)*, July 1971.
19. *Danja District Record Book*, I, 1937.
20. *MAM(b)*, August 1972.
21. *DAY(d)*, August 1972.
22. *Ibid.*

Ruma, however, remained considerably fragmented with almost a dozen autonomous leaders in Ruma and neighbouring settlements such as Dankar, Manawa, Kunnawa and Kurawa.[23] Although the Gatari Abdullahi Dan Faskari attempted to establish a sort of paramountcy over the various Rumawa groups, taking advantage of the seniority of the Gatari title before the Jihad, the Rumawa remained fractious and divided; a situation which played into the hands of Dan Mari when he started to organize for the rebellion which broke out in 1842.[24]

The attempt to regularize the political system under the emir and the need to formalize the position of young men who were rising to influential positions, but who lacked the prestige built up by their predecessors before and during the Jihad, led to an increasing use of the titles of the sarauta system. This gave a much more hierarchical appearance to the political system than existed in reality. The titles of the clan leaders, like the Dangi and the Sarkin Sullubawa, which had existed before the Jihad, never really went out of use. The leading mujāhidūn however, were known by the honorific of malam: Muhamman Dikko was sometimes known as the 'Magajin Malam.'[25] The use of titles became widespread when Umarun Dallaji started giving old titles to his close lieutenants. He gave Saddiku the title of Kauran Katsina and Abdu Dan Dudi the title of the Galadiman Katsina. Some of the old princely titles were also resorted to; Muhamman Bello, a son of Umarun Dallaji, was made Yerima; another son, Jabba, was made the Binoni; Agga became Dan Yusufu, and Bagime was made the Dan Bindi. The title of Gazobi was taken by Dahala at Karofi; Muhamman Sani at Maska, came to be known as the Sarkin Maska, and Maigamo at Gozaki as the Sarkin Gozaki.

These titles do not seem to have been distributed to systematically reflect the old sarauta system, but were resorted to on an adhoc basis. Saddiku, for example, whom Umarun Dallaji seems to have groomed as his successor, was not given a princely title but that of Durbin Katsina; while Bagime who was not a son, or even relative, of the emir was given the princely title of Dan Bindi. Neither were these titles related to functions except in the obvious case of those governing towns, like the Sarkin Maska, and the Sarkin Gozaki. Abdu Dan Dudi, for example, who was given the title of Galadiman Katsina, was not simply a functionary in charge of the court and the affairs of the palace, as the pre-Jihad Galadimas were, but was a powerful figure in his own right, supervising many of the towns in the south.

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23. *GIU(s),* August 1972.
24. *SRM(b),* August 1972.
25. *YAD(d),* August 1972. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

This development was in line with what had been happening in Sokoto, where Bello had given out titles after his accession, one of which, that of Galadiman Gari, went to Doshero, the Caliphate official supervising Katsina; similar developments had already taken place in Kano and Zazzau.[26] Besides these influences from within the Caliphate, another factor favouring the resort to old titles was the challenge from Maradi, where a conscious attempt was made to reconstitute the form of the old sarauta system and evoke a mystique around the titles.[27] This was done in order to more effectively undermine the loyalty of the Katsinawa to the emirate, whose loose structure would be made to appear not only alien to Katsina but confused. With the accession of Dan Mari in c.1836, the challenge from Maradi became increasingly posed in these terms.

The use of these old titles was however, a very sensitive political issue among the mujāhidūn. The Shehu in the *Kitāb al Farq*, written during the period of campaigning, had warned his followers against imitating the titles of the governments they were fighting.[28] The rulers of the provinces of the Caliphate he said should be called emir, and they should only appoint to four main positions, that is, to that of the wazir, the qadi, the *sa'i* (assessor of cattle tax) and the *wali al-shurta* (police chief). Abdullahi b. Fodio, writing in 1807 in the *Diyā' al hukkām*, intended as a guide for the jama'a of Kano, gave a longer list of the officials which were permissible.[29] He included, besides those mentioned by the Shehu, an official in charge of the chancery, the division of land, and the supervision of *hurumi* (public land); but he emphasized that the only justification for appointing officials was for the performance of specific functions necessary for the Muslim community.

The accession of Abubakar Saddiku in c.1836 did not bring about any dramatic changes. When Umarun Dallaji became sick and died in Safar 1251/May-June 1836, consultations seem to have been made by a representative of the amīr al-mu'minin Bello with the notables of Katsina; but no formal body of electors was convened.[30] The appointment of an emir was the prerogative of the amir al-mu'minin who, although under obligation to consult with the leaders of the Muslim community concerned was not bound to accept the nomination of any established body of 'kingmakers'. In any case, the establishment of such a body in Katsina after the death of Umarun Dallaji would have caused serious problems, because the leading figures of the jama'a who would have constituted

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26. *K.C.*, p. 129. M.G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau*, p. 142.
27. David, *op. cit.*, p. 657. *GIO(a)*, September 1971.
28. M. Hiskett, 'Kitāb al Farq....', *loc. cit.*, p. 569.
29. *L.H.*, pp. 23—44.
30. See (Folio 439 note 1).

this, like Umarun Dumyawa and Muhamman Dikko, openly aspired to the office themselves.[31] The amir al-mu'minin Bello's choice of Saddiku to succeed Umarun Dallaji was a great disappointment to these mujāhidūn. They seemed to have hoped that Bello would adopt the same policy he had followed earlier in Kano where, after the death of the emir Suleiman in 1819, he appointed Ibrahim Dabo, who was not related to Suleiman.[32] A similar policy had been followed in Zazzau in 1821 when, after the death of the emir Malam Musa, Bello appointed Yamusa who was a leading mujāhid but no relation to Musa.[33]

The specific considerations that determined Bello's choice are difficult to establish. In choosing Saddiku to succeed Umarun Dallaji he not only diverted from the policies he had followed in Kano and Zazzau, but he also passed over Saddiku's senior brother Muhamman Bello. It is said that Bello chose Saddiku because he was the most devoutly learned of the sons of Umarun Dallaji.[34] He had certainly had much more administrative and military experience and been closely involved in public affairs during his father's reign. He had succeeded in establishing emirate authority over the settlements of the Mani plains, an area where serious resistance was met by the mujāhidūn; and also took command of expeditions against the tawaye. He was the leader of the Katsina contingent that went to assist the amir al-mu'minin Bello in the campaign in the bazara of 1836 which ended in the great victory at Gawakuke.[35]

THE PRINCIPLES OF EMIRATE AUTHORITY

Another way in which amir al-mu'minin Bello tried to regularize the affairs of Katsina was by writing a short guide on the principles of politics *(siyasa)* entitled: *Usul as Siyasa wa Kayfiyat al-Makhlas fi Umūr al Ri'āsa* (The Principles of Politics and Way of Deliverance in Matters of Leadership).[36] It was written at the specific request of Umarun Dallaji and addressed to him. Although it does not explicitly refer to the situation in Katsina, it succinctly defines the philosophical basis of the new government and the principles of policy and conduct which Bello expected Umarun Dallaji to follow. It is not yet possible to date it with any accuracy, although the reference to the *Kitāb al-fara,* written by the Shehu in 1806, gives us some idea.[37] The tone, and some of the

31. *K.H./PP-NHRS.*
32. *K.C.*, pp. 128—129.
33. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
34. *AUG(b),* July 1971.
35. *K.H./PP-NHRS,* p. 56.
36. Muhammad Bello, *Kitabu Usul as Siyasati,* NNAK/KADCAPTORY/AR.s/4. I used the translation by Abdullahi Smith.
37. B.G. Martin suggests that it might have been written between 1806—1812. See B.G.

emphasis, suggest that it was written to provide a clear theoretical basis for the policy and conduct of the emir of Katsina, as part of the attempt to resolve the leadership crisis and place public affairs in the emirate on a sound Islamic basis.[38] It seems that this work was intended to complement another measure of Bello—the establishment of some of the ulama as qadis and advisers to the emir. However, at whatever date it was written, it defines the moral and political framework within which the emirs of Katsina were expected to operate and is therefore essential for an understanding of the emirate system.

Muhammadu Bello starts with a statement which indicates that his relations with Umarun Dallaji were quite close:

> I have been asked by the sincere brother and upstanding friend, the kind Umarun Dallaji, the warrior on the paths of God—may his Jihad be justified, may God make him victorious, prolong his power and high position and aid him with his spirit and multiply the number of his supporters—to write for him a few words concerning the principles of politics and the way of deliverance on matters of leadership.[39]

After the introduction he goes on to point out to Umarun Dallaji the great dangers and opportunities which exist for a ruler. For while a just ruler is especially blessed by God, the tyrannical and unjust ruler is abhorred by Him and totally doomed. With numerous quotations from the Hadith, he highlights God's strong abhorrence for unjust rulers and the inevitable punishment awaiting them. He then begins to elucidate the principles of siyasa.

These principles, he states, are seven and are derived from the need to establish *ad'l* (justice) in the world. The first principle of Muslim leadership is the establishment of a just order in human society through the implementation of the Divine Law (Shari'a) and obedience to the Sunnah of the Prophet. Muslim leadership, is not sought for its own sake, its only purpose is to see to the establishement of the proper order of human society *(nizam al ᶜālam)* thus preventing injustice and discord, and protecting the rights of all as they have been established in the Divine Law. It is in this way, Bello continues, that Muslim government differs fundamentally from that of kings who follow custom and not the Shari'a. In what seems to be an oblique reference to the Sarakuna overthrown in the Jihad, he says that these non-Muslim kings adhere to custom

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Martin, 'A Muslim Political Tract from Northern Nigeria: Muhammadu Bello's Usul al Siyasa' in D.F. MacCall and N.R. Bennett, *Aspects of West African Islam*, Boston University Papers on Africa, V, 1971, p. 64.

38. Muhammad Bello, *Kitabu Usul as Siyasati*, NNAK/KADCAPTORY/AR.s/4.
39. Bello, *Kitāb Usul as Siyasati*.

even to the extent of undermining the foundations of their own states. He refers Umarun Dallaji to the *Kitāb al Farq,* in which these differences between Muslim governments and the government of unbelievers are explained.

After this brief and rather philosophical explanation of the basis of Islamic government, Bello goes on to the conduct of the Muslim leader, whether he is the Caliph, an emir or any other official. The Muslim leader according to Bello should be firm, but also gentle, and generous. This is a point to which he returns later; generosity, tolerance, and gentleness were obviously seen by Bello as important qualities needed in Muslim leadership. The special emphasis he lays on them in the *Usul as Siyasati* indicates that he considered the leaders in Katsina, and perhaps elsewhere in the Caliphate, to be deficient in these qualities, as indeed most militant reformist governments in their early phases tend to be. He certainly had reasons to take such a view regarding the Katsina leadership, whose quarrels, mutual accusations, and the conduct of their followers in places like Maradi, failed to demonstrate either much tolerance, generosity or gentleness.

Again, when he moves on to deal with the relationship between the emir and his advisers and administrators, he makes certain points which though of general application apparently also had some relevance to the political situation in Katsina in this period. He strongly urges Umarun Dallaji to keep the company of devout mallamai and to listen to their advice. He warned him against the venal ulama who, he says, are greedy for material things. Bello obviously saw this as sufficiently important to warrant his direct intervention in the selection of suitable mallamai to act as qadis and advisers in Katsina. This action also relates to his strong warning about the supervision of officials and administrators, of whom he had a rather low opinion. He urged Umarun Dallaji to be very careful in his selection of administrators and to closely supervise them. For, he says, the majority of them are slaves to their stomachs, to greed and vanity, and would use the emir for their own ends, and desert him the moment power is taken away from him, for 'wherever there is a *dirham,* (Middle Eastern coin) they will serve and prostrate'. Again, while this principle regarding the conduct of administration is of general relevance and follows the tradition of the early Muslim Caliphate and the attitudes of Muhammad b. Abd al-Karim al-Maghili, it might have been intended as a warning to prevent Umarun Dallaji going along with his agents and followers as he did during the clashes in the Birni.

The last three principles deal with the relationship between the emir and his subjects. Bello makes it an important duty of the emir to see that the spirit of justice is inculcated among the people. For, as he points out, using a Hadith, a people who are unjust towards one another will

get an unjust government. The duty of the emir, to forbid what is wrong and order what is right, should however be performed without harshness but with fairness and tolerance; Bello says that people should not be condemned or punished on account of marginal errors or deviations. But the responsibility of the emir to procure and safeguard the welfare of his people does not end with the spiritual and social aspects of their lives, it extends to their material and economic well being. It is the emir's duty to actively develop their means of livelihood and material conditions of existence. It is the sixth principle of politics according to Bello that the Muslim leader should:

> lay down for the people of his domain their worldly and religious duties. He should see to the rearing of craftsmen, and the encouragement of artisans whom the people cannot do without.... He should in addition exhort the people to produce and store food; settle populations in urban and rural areas; build walled towns and bridges; maintain markets and roads; and work for the realisation of their general welfare as a whole.... build mosques and fill them with prayer and worship; appoint judges and teachers and arrange for the payment of their due stipends; appoint the educators of children and preachers and inspectors of public morals to ordain the right and forbid the wrong; and collectors of the poor tax and investigators for the oppressed and destitute.[40]

THE 'BOREN DAN MARI': 1842—1844

Although no major crisis broke out over the accession of Saddiku, his relations with several of the Katsina leaders was often strained, and by the end of his reign he seemed to have alienated many of them. This feature of Saddiku's reign created favourable conditions in which Dan Mair (c.1836—1843) was able to organize a large-scale revolt which was only crushed with assistance from Sokoto and neighbouring emirates and which ended in his deposition in 1844.

Immediately after his accession, relations between Saddiku and his senior brother Muhamman Bello became so strained that Bello was forced to move out of the Birni with his family and settle in the town of Dayi.[41] Saddiku sent one of his lieutenants, Fandiku, against him and Bello fled southwards as far as Sokoto[42] where, although the two brothers were reconciled and Muhamman Bello returned to live in Katsina, Saddiku kept him out of the government.

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40. Bello, *Kitabu Usual as Siyasati.*
41. *K.H./PP-NHRS,* p. 60.
42. *Ibid.* Fandiku is given as a *kane* (younger brother) of Saddiku in Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.,* p. 53, but as his name does not appear on any of the lists of Umarun Dallaji's sons, this word here is probably being used to mean 'junior cousin', and *not* 'younger brother'.

Saddiku was a very active and assertive emir, full of self-confidence, but he seemed to have lacked the tact necessary to handle Umarun Dumyawa[43] and Muhamman Dikko, whose loyalty to him was at best lukewarm. These two surviving members of the central leadership of the Katsina jama'a were becoming old and sensitive and, although their control over the territory under them was passing to their supporters, they were determined to maintain their status and a measure of autonomy vis-a-vis the emir, especially one whom they looked upon as a mere child.

The emir Saddiku, however, did not seem to have much time for them. He took firmer control of the expeditions against the Maradawa, attracting many of their people to follow him, for even before his accession he had proved himself a successful military commander. He started systematic conquest of the territory occupied by the tawaye of Maradi, taking advantage of the setback they had suffered at the battle of Gawakuke where Rauda (c.1830—1836) had been killed together with his allies, the Sarkin Gobir Ali and a Tuareg leader, Ibra. He succeeded in reconquering several settlements including Kwongolom, Tsekki, and Keffin Kuggi;[44] but the success of his military expedition led him to ignore the political situation within the emirate. Although he was aware of the subversive activities of Dan Mari and reported these to Sokoto[45] these appear only to have increased his determination to prosecute the armed Jihad and continue with his military campaign against the tawaye. In this policy he would have found encouragement in the attitude of the amir al-mu'uminin Abubakar Atiku b. Usman (1837—1842), who was very conscious of the obligations of fighting the Jihad and campaigned every year.[46]

Indeed, there was some justification for this policy of maintaining the offensive against the bases of the tawaye. For, with the establishment of the town of Tsibiri as the rebel Gobir capital close to Maradi, and the accession of that tough warrior Mayaki as the Sarkin Gobir, and of the politically astute and audacious Dan Mari as the Sarkin Katsina (Maradi) in 1836, the tawaye had become formidable.[47] The strategy

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43. See p. (Folio 322—323) below on the character of Saddiku.
44. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 60.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
46. Atiku was intensely conscious of his responsibility to conduct the armed jihad. This might have encouraged Saddiku in his preoccupation with military expeditions. Atiku became caliph just over a year after Saddiku's accession. Saddiku was appointed after Umaru's death in May-June 1836. Atiku succeeded Bello about October 1837. Last, *op. cit.*, p. 82.
47. H.R. Palmer, 'Mijinyawa of Dankama, 22 February 1907', Reel 44, *PP-NHRS*. Tilho, *op. cit.*, pp. 462—463.

adopted by Dan Mari differed from that of Dan Kasawa and Rauda. He had embarked on straightforward military conquest of the territory and, favoured by the weakness of the emirate in the north-west region, had been successful in taking, or contesting, for most of the gulbin Maradi basin as far south as Zandam. Rauda, on the other hand, came to the throne at a time when the Maradi advance had been halted and the emir, in coordination with the Caliph, was on the offensive against the tawaye. He became involved in a complex of alliances with other groups of the tawaye, like the Kel Geres and the Gobirawa of Ali, and it is said that at one time he even made an aman agreement with the amir mu'minin Bello.[48] Dan Mari's policy was decidedly different from all these. Although both Dan Kasawa and Rauda had encouraged disaffection and any form of rebellion in the emirate, it was Dan Mari who made this the cornerstone of his policy and he came closer to overthrowing the emirate than any of the rulers of Maradi. He opened his reign with a symbolic gesture which nearly ended disastrously for him, but which act set the tone of audacity and daring associated with his reign. To affirm that he was the legitimate Sarkin Katsina and show with what impunity he could operate close to the Birni, he attempted to have his askin sarauta, (the ritual shaving of a new Sarki) at Yanhoho, about 12 kilometres east of the Birnin Katsina.[49] An expedition from Katsina caught him by surprise and he barely escaped with his life, fleeing with his head half shaved.

He found that there were division and conflicts within the society of the emirate which the emir did not, or could not, settle but of which he could take advantage. For example, he encouraged divisions and discord among the leaders of the people of Ruma and secretly obtained the support of some, such as the Gatari Abdullahi.[50] His agents moved into the settlements in the territory under Umarun Dumyawa and Muhamman Dikko and other areas where emirate authority was weak and divided and there was disaffection. For example, Dan Mari built up support at Karofi where Umarun Dallaji had appointed as ruler Dahala, a recent immigrant from Pauwa in Zazzau, whose successors became engaged in bitter rivalry[51] He also found supporters among the ulama of Matazu who seem to have been restive under the Danezawa ruling over them, whom they probably looked upon as rustic and ignorant.[52] Dan Mari even built up support in the cikin Birni where some of the mallaman

48. *K.H./PP-NHRS.*, p. 57.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
50. *SRM(b)*, August 1972.
51. *GIK(r)*, September 1972.
52. *GIM(m)*, September 1972.

Gambarawa are said to have secretly brought him into the Birnin at night.[53] He worked on all the conflicts and divisions in the new emirate but his main line of propaganda was that the emirate government was one of alien Fulani whose rule had no legitimacy and was temporary. He said that the Shehu Usman Dan Fodio had predicted that it would end after 40 years and that these 40 years were almost up.[54] This found ready response among sections of the population who felt oppressed by the new authorities, or whose position in the emirate did not accord with what they had expected from the Jihad and who therefore felt left out and badly used. There seem to have been such feelings in places like Ruma, Karofi, Gyaza and Matazu—mostly towns which had become used to considerable autonomy in the eighteenth century—and by this period were beginning to feel the weight of the new authorities. Some of the inhabitants of these towns had actively supported the mujāhidūn, but because they were not absorbed into the various contingents of the jama'a were left out of the emirate administration. Furthermore, the political and administrative structure in the western districts was very complex and failed to provide a clear focus for local loyalties. It did not seem to have been clear, for example, whether the supervision of the town of Karofi was the responsibility of the heirs of Muhammadu Na Alhaji or that of the emir.

All these factors were compounded by the fact that Saddiku lacked the political astuteness of his father.[55] Neither did he have his extensive contacts with people from all walks of life, which the latter had built up before and during the Jihad campaigns. In any case, after the death of Umarun Dallaji, it would have required a lot of political effort to prevent the sense of drift which afflicted public affairs in the emirate. This is quite a normal problem after the death of founders and initiators, especially if they have provided leadership for almost three decades like Umarun Dallaji. Saddiku's preoccupation with military campaigns against the tawaye appear to have prevented him putting in the necessary political effort.

Therefore when news spread that a major expedition led by amir al-mu'minin Abubakar Atiku had been defeated by the tawaye at Tsibiri and Atiku killed, it did seem as if the time for the revolt had come and the prophecy that 'Fulani rule' was coming to an end 40 years after

53. *YAD(d)*, August 1972. *MMT(y)*, August 1972. MMT(y) recounts that Dan Mari even subverted some of the warriors of the emirate. He was visited by one of the warriors of Maska.

54. *YAD(d)*, August 1972.

55. In the opening address of a letter to the Muslim community of Katsina, the caliph Aliyu Babba refers to Umarun Dallaji as 'the shrewd one'.

its establishment was to be fulfilled.[56] Indeed the death of Atiku at Katuru in the kaka of 1842 occurred almost exactly 40 lunar years since the hijra of the Shehu in 1804. Rebellion therefore broke out at Ruma and in Karofi, Matazu, Gyaza, Takabawa, Wurma and Karkujan,[57] and the inhabitants of these towns refused to pay the kharaj that dry season. The Gatari Abdullahi of Ruma and the Liman Gimshimi at Matazu openly declared for the tawaye; and at Karofi the Gazobi Ibrahim was killed.[58] The loyalist elements at Karofi moved out to Wakaza, a settlement to the east of the town.[59] A whole swathe of territory, from Ruma near the border with the emirate of Zamfara, to Kurkujan on the Kano border, was in revolt, virtually cutting the emirate into two.[60]

Dan Mari moved in with his forces to defend the new bases of the tawaye and fan the revolt. From Karofi he sent expeditions against the Birni.[61] Saddiku informed the new amīr al-mu'minin Aliyu b. Bello (1842—1859) and came out against the rebels. He apparently started with Ruma, as it was on the main route to Sokoto and Zurmi. At Ruma the rebel leadership failed to overcome the endemic divisions of the Rumawa and most of the towns surrendered, the inhabitants fleeing in all directions.[62] Matazu and Karofi, however, proved much more difficult to conquer, even after contingents were sent in from Sokoto and about 8 other emirates.[63] The Ciroman Kano Muhamman b. Dabo led

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56. Atiku was actually wounded in the battle with the tawaye and died a few days later at Katuru. Last, *op. cit.*, p. 83.
57. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 61. W.A. Gowers, *Gazetteer of Kano Province*, London, 1921, p. 19.
58. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 61. *SRM(b)*, August 1972. *GIM(m)*, September 1972. Barth, *op. cit.*, III, p. 572.
59. *GIK(d)*, August 1972.
60. Lt. Villomone, *Monographie du Cercle du Madaou*, Services des Archives du Madaou, 1913; see map C for its impact on communications.
61. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 61.
62. *SRM(b)*, August 1972. *Ruma District Notebook*, NNAK/KATPROF/1/7.
63. *K.H./PP-NHRS* gives the emirates who sent contingents as Kano, Daura, Zazzau, Zamfara, Kazaure, Katagum and Jama'are. Gowers, *op. cit.*, p. 13 gives Kano, Bauchi, Gombe, Zaria, Katagun and Misau. *Assessment Report Yandaka District 1909* gives only Kano, Zamfara, Zaria and Kazaure. The Gowers' list is the most questionable, as it leaves out the more immediate neighbours like Zamfara, Daura and Kazaure. *K.H./PP-NHRS* gives the names of some of the commanders of the various contingents from the emirates:

Kano	— Ciroma Mahmud b. Dabo
Hadejia	— Muhamman Dan Zara son of the emir
Zamfara	— The Emir Mahmudu
Jama'are	— The Emir Sambole
Zazzau	— The Emir
Daura	— The Emir
Katagum	— The Emir

a contingent of 400 horsemen who played a key role in the campaign, especially at Matazu where they broke through one of the main fortifications, in the form of a dense thicket, of Karmatako river outside the walls.[64] The Matazawa are said to have been sustained for part of the siege by the food supplied from the *rumbuna* (hut for storing crops) of one sarkin noma who lived there, but when these were exhausted they were reduced to eating asses and even boiled calabashes.[65] Dan Mari fortified himself at Karofi and the siege in both Matazu and Karofi lasted for several months of 1843.[66] When Dan Mari realized the overwhelming force mustered against him, he decided to break out and return to Maradi, but he was forced to give battle at Taura about 2 miles to the east of Karofi, where many of his warriors were killed and he only narrowly escaped.[67] He reached Maradi, but died a few months later,[68] heartbroken after such tremendous endeavour which had come so near to success. The site of the 'Dagar Taura', as the battle outside Karofi is known, is marked by an earthen mound still standing, which is said to be the mass grave of the people killed there.

Saddiku started punitive expeditions against the peoples of the areas who had joined the tawaye, which made more people flee northwards into the territory controlled by the tawaye.[69] The amir al-mu'minin Aliyu Babba (1842—1859) opposed the measures taken by Saddiku, whose punitive measures, taken in the areas where the rebellion had found support, were seen by the rulers of these areas as an attempt to depopulate them further, and disaffection with his rule grew. His differences with Sokoto, which might have involved other matters, came to a head when he openly refused to obey an instruction from the amir al-mu'minin Aliyu Babba and was discourteous in his reply and demeanour.[70] The amir al-mu'minin decided to depose him and he was taken away from Katsina and placed in exile at Gwardoji near Raba.[71]

The emir of Jama'are Sambole's dates are given as 1824—1854 in *The Emirates of Northern Nigeria* by S.J. Hogben & A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, London 1966, p. 496. It is also stated here that he took part in the Battle of Gawakuke in 1836, p. 493.

64. *GIM(m)*, September 1972.
65. *Ibid. K.H./PP-NHRS*, P. 62.
66. *GIM(m)*, September 1972. *YAD(d)*, August 1972. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 62.
67. *YAD(d)*, August 1972. *MMT(y)*, August 1972. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 62.
68. *Ibid.*
69. *SRM(b)*, August 1972.
70. *GIG(s)*, October 1971. *ASK(s)*, July 1971.
71. *Ibid.*

The reign of the new emir Muhamman Bello opened with a drastic change of policy towards the inhabitants of the areas where the boren Dan Mari had found support. The punitive measures against the inhabitants, which were leading to further depopulation of these areas, were stopped and people were encouraged to resettle and several new towns were founded. The amir al-mu'minin Aliyu Babba encouraged this and is said to have given orders for the building of the town of Kurfi for example.[72]

By March 1853, when Barth passed through this town on his way to Sokoto from Birnin Katsina, he estimated its population at 8 - 9,000.[73] He noted its special gates, the triple walls in front of them and the double moat. The town was founded on a well watered site near an inselberg, the dutsin Kurfi, and had become an important zango on the route to Sokoto. There had been previous settlements on that site, one of which was founded by one Mammani in the early years of the nineteenth century.[74] In the aftermath of the boren Dan Mari several homesteads came to be established there. Walls were built around these under the supervision of the Kaura Abubakar and the Yandaka Hassan b. Muhamman Dikko,[75] and people were brought in to settle from areas of Zakka, Birchi, Wurma and even from Kafinsoli.[76] Among the settlers were groups of the Sullubawa, which included the people of the mujāhid Malam Yusufu Na Garabi, led by his son Jabba.[77] They moved into these western districts of the emirate in the 1830s, after the attacks of the tawaye had forced them out of their settlements in the gulbin Maradi basin.[78] They settled at several places such as Badde, Sullubawa, Ginjimi near Zakka, and Kafinsoli.[79] Some of the more pastoral of these Sullubawa however, were reluctant to settle in the new walled town. The Sarkin Sullubawa Abubakar had to be brought in to put pressure on them.[80] A political arrangement was evolved in the new town in which Jabba acted as a sort of paramount maigari over the various groups within it, each of which for a time, maintained a measure of autonomy.

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72. Rilwanu Caranci, *Labarin Kurfi*, typescript Ms in the possession of Maradi Muhammadu Ja, p. 5—6. *AAK(d)*, August 1972.
73. Barth, *op. cit.*, III, p. 92.
74. Caranci, *Labarin Kurfi*, p. 5.
75. Caranci, *Labarin Kurfi*, pp. 5—6. *AAK(d)*, August 1972.
76. Caranci, *Labarin Kurfi*, p. 5.
77. *Ibid. AAK(d)*, August 1972.
78. Caranci, *Labarin Kurfi.*, pp. 3—5. *AAK(d)*, August 1972.
79. Caranci, *Labarin Kurfi*, pp. 4—5.
80. *AAK(d)*, August, 1972. The problem of settling down the semi-nomadic Sullubawa was faced by the caliphs. The caliph Ahmad b. Atiku (1859—1866) is said to have had some success in settling some of these south-west of Sokoto; but this involved the application

About 20 kilometres to the south-west of Kurfi, another new town, Ummadau, was founded and similarly fortified with multiple walls and moats.[81] It was settled with people uprooted by the rebellion from places like Takabawa, Ruma and the Wurma area. A section of the Gatarawa of Ruma, which had fled southwards when Ruma broke up during the rebellion came to settle, led by one Mamudu son of the Gatari Hamman. Others came in from the other towns of the Ruma area[82] including the people of Manawa, Kunnawa and Kurawa. The Rumawa brought with them their old rivalries and divisions and Ummadau emerged with a uniquely fragmented urban administration.[83]

The town of Tsaskiya, founded about the same time only about 5 kilometres south of Ummadau, developed into a more politically cohesive urban community. It was formed by bringing together the three villages of Tsaskiyawa, Kyara and Kurawa.[84] One of the bayin sarki known as Shinkafa, was sent from the Birni to supervise the building of the walls, and when they were completed the new town was placed under one Wake from among the Sakkwatawa immigrants living in Tsaskiyawa.

At Karofi, the hub of the rebellion, the people who had moved out to Wakaza during the fighting, moved back into the town and the local administration was reorganized.[85] A new maigari, Abu Dan Dugaji, was appointed, leaving aside the children of Danhala, whose rivalries and quarrels had done so much to weaken authority there. Titles were established to formalize the authority structure under the maigari and in a way to evoke the old glories of Karofi, the seat of the Gazobi and one of the premier urban centres of Katsina, with a senior and ancient sarauta. These new titles included those of a Yerima, Rijiya, Ajiya, Sarkin Karma, and a Galadiman Karofi to administer the town itself, following the administrative pattern operating in many other towns.

As part of the general policy of reorganization and resettlement, the new emir gave greater support to the authority of the Yandaka Hassan. By c.1845 the position of the heirs of the mujāhid Malam Muhammadu Na Alhaji was a rather weak one. Malam Muhamman Dikko's position went to his son, Namoda, who died after about two years (c.1840—1842).[86] He was succeeded by another son of Muhamman Dikko,

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of direct political pressure. Last, *op. cit.*, pp. 116—117. *S.P.G.*, p. 103.

81. *GZU(s)*, August 1972. Barth, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 571—572.
82. *GZU(s)*, August 1972. *MSM(k)*, August 1972.
83. These divisions of the Rumawa in Ummadau came out quite clearly in the course of the interviews I had at Ummadau on 25/8/1972. See discussion of sources, pp. (Folio 439 ff).
84. *MTN(t)*, August 1972.
85. *GIK(d)*, August 1972.
86. *YAD(d)*, August 1972.

Abubakar, who had very little time to set himself up, for within a year the boren Dan Mari broke out. Many of the settlements in the territory under him became involved and suffered severely in the consequent disruption and depopulation. In the first year of Muhamman Bello's reign Abubakar was captured by the Damagarawa while on an expedition to Kance, and his brother Hassan appointed to his position.[87] Abubakar's return from captivity, after the appointment of Hassan, only made matters worse. The situation was saved however, when Abubakar agreed to move away and settle at Goge near Kwatarkwashi.[88] Yandaka Hassan built a large estate near Tsauri, where he spent most of his time trying to restore the settlements under him and properly consolidate the administration there.[89] His own position in the emirate hierarchy became enhanced when he married a daughter of the emir Muhamman Bello[90]

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP UNDER THE EMIR BELLO: 1844—1853

The crises of 1842—1844 starkly revealed the dependence of the emirate authorities in Katsina on Sokoto, both militarily and politically. The boren Dan Mari was only crushed with the assistance of military forces mobilized from other emirates, on the orders of the amir al-mu'minin. With these forces an overwhelming superiority was attained over the rebels and their main centres were isolated, besieged and crushed. This was made possible because in spite of the brilliant agitation and campaigning of Dan Mari, the rebellion remained essentially an expression of local grievances. Dan Mari skilfully wove these grievances around the appeal for restoration of the old dynasty of the Sarakunan Katsina;[91] but they failed to fuse into a movement with sufficient force and breadth to seriously challenge the existence in Katsina of the new political system centred around the amir al-mu'minin.

The deposition of Saddiku and the adoption of the policy of resettlement and reorganization by the emir Muhamman Bello brought out, in a more concrete fashion, the degree to which Katsina had become incorporated into the new political system. A letter sent from Sokoto to Katsina in the early years of the reign of Muhamman Bello reveals some aspects of the ideological basis of this incorporation.[92] It also reveals how the amir al-mu'minin Aliyu Babba defined the position of the new emir of Katsina in the aftermath of the crises. The letter was

87. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 63 *L.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 63.
88. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit., p. 63.*
89. *Ibid.*, p. 63—64. *YAD(d)*, August 1972.
90. *MYA(s)*, August 1972.
91. (Folio 294—301).
92. NNAK/SOKPROF, Outwards Correspondence 75.

significantly addressed not just to the emir but to:

> ....the community of Muslims, our people of Katsina and the emir, the skilful and vigilant, distinguished and sagacious, wise and renowned, Muhamman Bello, son of Umarun Dallaji, the shrewd one. And to their learned and righteous men and their merchants and chiefs....

It was a 'hasty' letter intended to advise the Muslim community of Katsina on important matters which they had neglected. The amir al-mu'uminin starts by advising them to repent and to have sincere faith in God and good intentions. For intentions he says, are the basis of all action. He then goes on to quote from the Qur'an and the Hadith to remind them of their obligations as Muslims to obey the recognized leaders of the Muslim community. He warns:

> Do not busy your tongues with the abuse of kings, but turn to God that he may fill their hearts with affection towards you. And there is the fact that the sanctified basis of law and of the caliphal community consecrated to God, is obedience to the Imam, because it preserves the unity of the religion and regulates the affairs of the Muslims. Verily, disobedience to the sultan tears down the pillars of the Sunna. But by obedience to the sultan the prescriptions of the Law are enforced, and religious duties are discharged, bloodshed is avoided and the roads are made safe. He who is disloyal to the sultan has gone astray and is in error. But he who loves him dearly and counsels him sincerely merits a high place in religious and worldly affairs. In the Hadith it is said: "Hear and obey even if an Ethiopian slave is placed over you"....Then there is the necessity of abandoning strife which brings disappointment and exhaustion ...In general, obedience to the Imam is incumbent upon all good men when he orders them to come or go, if he orders them to fight the enemy under any leaders sincere or deceitful....

The practical relevance of this letter to the political situation in Katsina in the early years of Muhamman Bello's reign is obvious. Aliyu Babba is reminding the Muslim community that obedience to the caliph and to the emir and the appointed leaders, is a religious obligation. He strongly warns them against strife and dissention, urging them to sincerely accept, as part of their faith, full unification within the Caliphate. He urges them to avoid harshness and hard-heartedness and to be gentle with and always consult one another. He prays that they would cooperate in fighting their enemies, in peopling their country, and in seeking the welfare of Islam and its people.

This letter emphasises the corporate nature of the Muslim community and the importance of unity, cooperation and consultation with it under the leadership of the emir. Given the political situation in Katsina at that time, the new emir Muhamman Bello needed to seek the cooperation of the leading figures of the emirate. The deposition of Saddiku had made some of them more powerful, especially those like the Kaura Abubakar and the Galadima Abdu Dan Dudi, who had been with Umarun Dallaji. The Kaura Abubakar had been a close lieutenant of Umarun Dallaji from about 1818 and had even married his daughter, Nana. By

1844 he had been part of the central leadership of the emirate for about 26 years.[93] Under Umarun Dallaji he had shared, with Saddiku, responsibility for defence and for expeditions against the tawaye. Although the emir Saddiku apparently did not delegate as much responsibility to him, he remained an influential figure in the government and is even said to have aspired to the emirship when Saddiku was deposed.[94] From about 1820 the Galadima Abdu Dan Dudi had also belonged to the inner councils of Umarun Dallaji and was responsible for the supervision of a large number of towns south of the gulbin Karaduwa;[95] he also was married to one of Umarun Dallaji's daughters the Magajiya Hanatari[96]

There were also other influential figures in the government whose cooperation the new emir needed. The Durbi Fandiku and the Marusa Dankande for example, supervising major settlements of the plains east of the Birnin Katsina. These settlements had not been involved in the boren Dan Mari, and the economy and administration had not been disrupted here, as had been the case in the areas west of the Birni. These two, therefore, had a solid base from which they could exercise considerable influence in the affairs of the emirate.

Durbi Fandiku is said to have been a baDallaje and was quite close to the emir Saddiku, whose office of Durbi he took over in 1836 when Saddiku became emir.[97] He was sent by the emir Saddiku on an important and delicate mission—the arrest of Muhamman Bello at Dayi. As a result of his closeness to Saddiku he was probably in a weak position in the immediate aftermath of the crises but, with a stable and populous territorial base in the Mani plains, he easily recovered and continued as a powerful figure in the government. The antecedents of the Marusa Dankande, like those of Fandiku, are rather uncertain; he is said to be from Tube in Daura.[98] He supervised the settlements of the Dutsi region along the border with the emirates of Daura and Kazaure.

Besides these leading figures around the emir there were other notables who were based away from the capital, such as the Sarkin Maska Muhamman Sani living in Maska, the Dangi Zangina living at Yantumaki, and the Dambo Mazawaje living at Ingawa. Although supervised by officials of the emir they were powerful figures in their own right and

93. See pp. (Folio 276—277).
94. Barth, *op. cit.*, III, p. 92.
95. See pp. (Folio 294—295).
96. *GIO(g)*, August 1972.
97. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 55. Fandiku is referred to here as a kane of Saddiku. This could mean a cousin as his name does not occur in any of the lists of Umarun Dallaji's children.
98. Harriss, *Assessment Report on Marusa District.*

constituted the core of the sarakunan kasa. The Sarkin Maska Sani also married a daughter of Umarun Dallaji, Aya, and he gained prestige and consolidated his authority through his successful campaign against raiders of the tawaye harassing the Maska region.[99] He had killed a prominent Maradi raider, known as Dan Gozo, and as a deterent to others had his head stuck on a spear and kept outside the walls of Maska.[100]

But although the position of the territorial lords, like the Sarkin Maska Sani, provided an important element of stability in the emirate, the more immediate and palpable factors determining the position of the new emir Muhamman Bello, were relations with the officials of the central administration in which he suffered from certain initial disadvantages. He was easy-going by nature which enabled some of these officials to take advantage of his lack of administative and military experience.[101] This weakness was compounded by the failure, in the early years of his reign, of the military expedition he conducted. He failed to take a settlement of the tawaye known as Tunduku.[102] He joined the emir of Daura in an expedition against Kance which was defeated; and his brother Yerima Jabba, the Yandaka Abubakar, and the Mashi Ayashe, were captured by the Damagaram forces under Ciroma Magram.[103]

Muhamman Bello therefore began by conducting himself carefully, following the instructions from Sokoto closely and leaving many things in the hands of the Kaura Abubakar, Durbi Fandiku and the Marusa Dankande. The position of the Kaura Abubakar had been further strengthened when he won a victory on an expedition to Dan Gantama just after Bello's defeat at Tunduku.[104] But it was the Marusa Dankande upon whom Bello increasingly relied, even appointing him as his deputy during his absence from Katsina. Marusa Dankande took advantage of this to illegally enrich himself, and his relations with the emir became very strained.[105] The Marusa Dankande complained about Bello to the

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99. *MMT(y)*, August 1972.
100. *Ibid.*
101. Bello's sense of humour is apparent from his handling of Barth, (who clearly lacked it, and took himself very seriously) and became upset by what he refers to, as Bello's 'injustice' and 'comedy'. In spite of himself however Barth did perceive this aspect of Bello character referring to him as 'an actor', 'lively humourist', 'the eccentric man', although he continued to rant against him as 'the outlaw', 'the unscrupulous governor of Katsina', etc.; for no apparent reason other than Barth's own worrisome and sour temperament. Barth, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 84, 86, 90.
102. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 63.
103. *Ibid.*
104. *Ibid.*
105. Harriss, *Assessment Report on Marusa District. K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 64.

amir al-mu'minin, Aliyu Babba,[106] and the emir and all the senior officials were summoned to Sokoto but Dankande fell sick and could not go, and died soon afterwards.[107] Jan Bature, a baSulluba of Kusa, was appointed to be the new Marunsa,[108] and when he died Bello wanted to appoint Muhammad Gidado, a baSullube of Kofar Samri to the office.[109] This was opposed by the Kaura Abubakar and the Durbi Fandiku on the grounds that Gidado was too young for that office; Bello gave way and someone else was appointed.[110] The new Marusa faced a revolt at Dan Aunai, one of the important garuruwa in the territory he supervised[111] and he was driven from the town when he visited it. The emir Bello went to Doro nearby and summoned the Dan Aunai and other leaders of the revolt, giving them the impression that he was going to dismiss the Marusa; instead, when they came he arrested the Dan Aunai and had him executed. He appointed as the new Dan Aunai a brother of the one executed; the Marusa was dismissed and Bello appointed Gidado—his original choice for the office.

But just as Muhamman Bello was beginning to assert his authority, the deposed emir Saddiku, who had fled from Sokoto and joined the tawaye, returned with an army and camped at Kaita, about 20 kilometres north-east of the Birni.[112] This provoked a fresh political crisis.

THE RETURN OF THE EX-EMIR SADDIKU: 1853

When Saddiku was deposed he was taken to Sokoto and given an estate near Raba,[113] where he built up a large farming establishment and amassed considerable wealth.[114] He then joined and led the tawaye and in c.1851 accompanied the Sarkin Gobir Mayaki on an expedition to Gora near Maradun.[115] While on this expedition he sought out Habu Dan Doshero—the caliphate official who had advised on his deposition—and killed him.[116] Saddiku had developed a strong personal animosity towards

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106. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 64.
107. *Ibid.* Harriss, *Assessment Report on Marusa District.*
108. *Ibid.*
109. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 64.
110. *Ibid.*, pp. 64—65.
111. *Ibid.*, p. 65, gives an account of the revolt and its outcome.
112. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 65.
113. *ASK(s)*, July 1971.
114. *Ibid.*
115. *Ibid.* Alhaji Saidu, *Tarikh Umarau Sokoto*, NNAK/KADCAPTORY/O/ARI/91, English translation p. 37, implies that Saddiku fled to the tawaye immediately after his deposition; Last, *op. cit.*, pp. 86—87.
116. *ASK(s)*, July 1971. *GIG(s)*, October 1971. F. Edgar, 'Labarin Sarkin Katsina Saddiku Dan Umarun Dallaji', *History of Sarkin Musulmi Shehu Usman Dan Fodio*, 1911,

Habu, in fact, one of the reasons for his deposition was the rudeness, and lack of respect he showed towards this senior official of the amir al-mu'minin, it is said he even went to the extent of refusing to shake hands with him.[117] Habu had pressed for Saddiku's deposition, even though his father had advised against it.[118] Saddiku's animosity is said to have been fuelled by this and by a remark of Habu at his deposition that he was not a *saddiq* (righteous) but a *zindiq* (atheist).[119]

Saddiku stayed in the towns of the tawaye, and was met at Maradi by the traveller Adolf Overweg who was there in January/February 1851.[120] But his relations with the rulers of Maradi became uneasy—partly because he started to give advice on the Shari'a—and as a result had to move from Maradi to Gazawa.[121] This was where Barth encountered him on February 3, 1853.[122]

To assist Saddiku to conquer Katsina, the Sultan of Damagaram, Ibram, whose relations with the emirates of Katsina and Daura were at this time hostile, sent hundreds of horsemen.[123] When Saddiku came in with his army he encamped at Kaita,[124] many of the settlements of the region fell to him and he attempted to enforce a siege on the Birni.[125] From Kaita he demanded that Muhamman Bello abdicate and leave the palace peacefully, as he did not want to shed Muslim blood in a civil war.[126] A number of notables of Katsina, including two sons of Umarun Dallaji, Musa and Ahmadu Rufai, (better known as Ahmadu Garnakaki), flocked to his standard and there was much movement between the Birni and Kaita.[127]

Muhamman Bello sent an appeal to Sokoto which met with immediate response.[128] Aliyu Babba came to Katsina and sent for Saddiku, whose warriors from Maradi and Damagaram were already melting away, probably dissatisfied with the apparent stalemate that had ensued for about two months.[129] Saddiku, probably torn by an acute dilemma between

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NNAK/KADCAPTORY/AMSS/O/AR:2/37.

117. *GIG(s),* October 1971.
118. *Ibid.*
119. *ASK(s),* July 1971.
120. Barth, *op. cit.,* III, p. 81.
121. *MMT(y),* August 1972. Tilho, *op. cit.,* p. 463, records that the Sarkin Katsina (Maradi) Binoni refused him refuge.
122. Barth, *op. cit.,* III, p. 81.
123. *ASK(s),* July 1971. *K.H./PP-NHRS,* p. 65.
124. *Ibid.*
125. *ASK(s),* July 1971.
126. *Ibid.*
127. *ASK(s),* July 1971. *K.H./PP-NHRS,* p. 5.
128. *ASK(s),* July 1971.
129. *Ibid. K.H./PP-NHRS.*

his desire to conquer and rule Katsina, and his faith as a Muslim, peacefully surrendered to Aliyu Babba.[130] He was placed under detention and tried in public at the Kofar Soro,[131] which had not happened when he was deposed in 1844, and Aliyu Babba apparently realized that this was necessary in order publicly to establish the illegality of Saddiku's conduct. He was charged with disobedience to the amir al-mu'minin, insubordination to a caliphate official, and the killing of that official. It is said he confessed that when he killed Habu he was acting as a *kafiri* (unbeliever). He was formally received back into the Islamic faith and given *wankan tuba* (the ritual bath).[132] He was taken back to Sokoto under guard together with some of the notables who had flocked to his side when he was in Kaita, including Ahmadu Rufai and Musa.[133] While in Sokoto this time, he was closely watched and not given the facilities and freedom he had enjoyed during his first stay.[134]

Perhaps even more than the crises of 1842—1844, this episode revealed the inner strength of the new political system. Saddiku could have fought —and fought effectively. His warriors from Maradi and Damagaram were disappointed that he did not, and some of the Katsina notables had been ready to join him. Some, such as Ahmadu Rufai and Musa were dissatisfied with their subsidiary role in a government dominated by people whom they considered to be of lower status—like the Kaura Abubakar and the Durbi Fandiku. Some of the elements for a civil war were there, but Saddiku seemingly became overwhelmed by a strong feeling of guilt over his association with tawaye, the enemies of the Muslim *umma*.[135] The high degree to which he had internalized the values of the new political community, even if on occasions his conduct diverged from official policy, was the cause of the melancholy mood in which Barth found him, his refusal to fight from Kaita, and his peaceful surrender to the amir al-mu'minin.[136]

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130. *ASK(s),* July 1971. *K.H./PP-NHRS,* p. 65. Edgar, 'Labarin Sarkin Katsina Saddiku', *loc. cit.*
131. *ASK(s),* July 1971. Edgar, 'Labarin Sarkin Katsina Saddiku', *loc. cit. AMS(b),* July 1972.
132. *MMT(y),* August 1972.
133. *ASK(s)* July 1971. *K.H./PP-NHRS,* p. 65.
134. *ASK(s),* July 1971.
135. *Ibid.*
136. Barth who met Saddiku at Gazawa on February 3, 1853 a few months before his return to Kaita gives this description of him: 'Saddiku was a stately person of tall figure, a serious expression of countenance and a high and powerful chest.... He had something melancholy about him'. The rest of the description tells us more about Barth's attitudes than about Saddiku. But Barth observed that he understood Arabic tolerably well and was quite pleased to get a copy of the Linjilah. This fits in with what is remembered in Katsina about his personality—serious, deeply religious, but something of a 'loner'.

The failure of Dan Mari's spectacular attempt to overthrow the emirate authorities in Katsina in 1842—1844 placed the tawaye of Maradi in a defensive position. The successor of Dan Mari, Binoni, (c.1843—1847) was unable to alter this situation; but neither were the emirate authorities able to take advantage of this setback suffered by the tawaye. Before he was deposed, the emir Saddiku was preoccupied with punishing the inhabitants of the areas which had joined the rebellion. His successor Muhamman Bello came to be preoccupied with resettlement and reorganization in the west and the establishment of his authority within the government. The early expeditions he launched were largely unsuccessful.

Conditions in Maradi: c.1843—1853

For most of the decade 1843—1853, Maradi was under a series of weak rulers. These rulers Binoni, (c.1843—1847) Dan Mahedi, (c.1847—1851) and Dan Baura, (c.1851—1853) were old men—children of the Sarkin Katsina Agwaragi who had died in c.1795.[137] Binoni became blind before his death and his successor Dan Mahedi was deposed because of his incompetent military leadership.[138] Dan Baura is said to have conducted a total of four campaigns, one of which brought him to Barawa, about 25 kilometres west of the Birni.[139] On another expedition he forced the emir Muhamman Bello to leave Musawa where he had gone to supervise the building of the walls.[140] Dan Baura was killed in c.1853 during the battle at Daura involving the Sultan of Damagaram, Ibram, the former Sultan Tanimu, Sarkin Gobir Mayaki and the emir of Daura Bello.[141] His death is said to have been brought about through a conspiracy hatched by the supporters of a prince, the Dan Baskore Abd al-Rahman b. Rauda.[142] Dan Baskore was appointed immediately after Dan Baura's death and installed properly when the expedition returned to Maradi.[143]

With the government of Maradi weakened by aged rulers, conspiracies and intrigues, the most serious threat to the emirate and the metropolitan districts of the Caliphate was posed by that tough and wily warrior the Sarkin Gobir Mayaki, from Tsibiri (about 10 kilometres west of Maradi).

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137. David, *op. cit.*, p. 673. See appendix on genealogy.
138. H.R. Palmer, 'Notes on Katsina, 1909', Reel 44, *PP-NHRS.*
139. *Ibid.; K.H./PP-NHRS,* p. 67.
140. *K.H./PP-NHRS,* p. 67.
141. Lt. Villomme, *Monographie du Cercle Madawa,* 1913, Service des Archives, Zinder.
142. *GIT(n),* September 1971.
143. *Ibid.*

Mayaki's expeditions were mainly directed against the settlements of northern and central Zamfara and those of Katsina Laka[144] On one of these expeditions to Kwatarkwashi, Mayaki was accompanied by the Sarkin Katsina (Maradi) Dan Mahedi.[145] They were, however, driven away by forces mobilized by the amir al-mu'minin Aliyu Babba from Katsina, Daura and Kazaure.[146] Aliyu Babba conducted a large scale campaign with contingents from many emirates during which he sacked more than a dozen settlements, including Tasawa which was burnt.[147] After Dan Mahedi was deposed, (for incompetent military leadership) another ageing prince, Dan Baura, was appointed. In 1853 he joined the Sultan of Damagaram, Ibram, and the Sarkin Gobir, Mayaki, in an attack against Daura, where Tanimu b. Suleiman, the Damagaram pretender, who had already ruled between c.1841—1843 had found refuge.[148] The attack was repulsed, Dan Baura and Ibram were killed, while the redoubtable Mayaki escaped.[149]

When the Dan Baskore Abd al-Rahman b. Rauda was installed after Dan Baura's death, the tawaye of Maradi were still weak and on the defensive, not only in relation to Sokoto and Daura, but also in relation to the emirate of Katsina. After the failure of Muhamman Bello's expedition to Tunduku, others which had been conducted by the Kaura Abubakar and the Durbi Fandiku were successful.[150]

On the political plane the consequence of the return of Saddiku was to improve and strengthen the position of Muhamman Bello. What is more, the punitive measures of Saddiku had forced many groups favourably disposed to the tawaye, like the Rumawa of Gatari Abdullahi, to flee into Maradi, reducing considerably the number of potential pockets of support for the tawaye within the emirate. The foundation of new well-fortified towns like Kurfi and Ummadau, the reorganization of the administration of the older towns like Karofi; and the political

144. Last, *op. cit.*, pp. 83. 86—87, 116.
145. *K.H./PP-NHRS.* p. 63.
146. *Ibid.*
147. *Ibid.* The success of this expedition might have been one of the causes of the deposition of Dan Mahedi—but the chronology is uncertain. Ahmed b. Atiku also burnt Tasawa during the reign of Dan Baskore (Tilho, *op. cit.*, pp. 463—464; Last, *op. cit.*, p. 118). M.G. Smith, 'A Hausa Kingdom....' *loc. cit.*, p. 98, ascribes the second sacking of Tasawa to amir al-mu'minin Ahmadu Rufai (1867—1873) citing Tilho, p. 464, where the name given is in fact *not* Ahmadu Rufai, but 'Ahmad Gorouza' who, on p. 476 is said to be a son of Atiku and the commander of an expedition which encountered Sarkin Gobir Mayaki, sent out by Aliyu Babba. This clearly indicates Ahmed b. Atiku (1854—1866). See also Last, *op. cit.*, p. 86.
148. Tilho, *op. cit.*, p. 443. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 68.
149. Tilho, *op. cit.*, p. 443. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, f. 68.
150. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, pp. 63, 66.

consolidation of the position of the Yandaka Hassan and the Sarkin Sullubawa Abubakar, had generally strengthened the emirate in what had been its weakest flank.

In the face of this Dan Baskore adopted a new policy different from that of his predecessors.[151] At one level his reign did mark a new epoch, for he was the first ruler of Maradi whose father was not a Sarkin Katsina. While this meant that he had much firmer roots in Maradi and was more attuned to its specific ethos—as he was bred and perhaps even born there—it also might have meant that he was not as obsessed with the return to Katsina as were the others, born and bred in the Gidan Korau. Dan Kasawa (c.1816—1830) had set out to systematically conquer emirate territory, extending the area under his control from the Maradi valley, in an attempt to encircle the Birni. Rauda (c.1830—1836) continued with this but in order to pose a broader and more formidable political and military challenge to the Caliphate, joined in an attempt to build a wide tawaye alliance with the Tuareg and the Gobirawa. Dan Mari (c.1836—1843) on the other hand, set himself out to organize a rebellion to overthrow the emirate authorities, coming much closer to success than any other ruler of Maradi; but the audacious and spectacular nature of his enterprise brought about a spectacular failure and would have discredited this much more difficult and complex policy, which probably never found favour with most of the warriors of Maradi.

The Pattern of the Raids

The objectives of Dan Baskore's policy however, were to spread fear and evoke a sense of insecurity in order to disrupt administration and communication over a wide area. With his cavalry he launched lightning raids, mostly directed at the towns of Katsina, but occasionally going into the metropolitan districts of the Caliphate and into Kano and Zazzau. Some of his early raids were aimed right into the heartlands of the emirate at settlements in the Karaduwa-Bunsuru basin. He raided the towns of Dan Gani; and at Sayaya he executed three of the dattawan gari (town elders).[152] This raid threatened the security of the new town of Musawa, whose walls Muhamman Bello was building when Dan Baura (c.1851—1853) forced him to retreat to the Birnin Katsina. Dan Baskore registered another success at Kusada. Moving out swiftly from Maradi he surprised the inhabitants, plundered and burnt this large town on the border with Kano, spreading fear and threatening the security of the densely settled

151. See pp. (Folio 294—297) for the strategies of the first three rulers of Maradi.
152. *K.H./PP-NHRS,* p. 68. *Musawa District Record Book,* NNAK/KATPROF/I/38.

plains.[153] Dan Baskore continued to raid into the Kusada area right up to the end of his reign; one of his raids even bringing the Emir of Kano, Abdullahi b. Dabo (1855—1882), with an army to Mawashi to join up with the emir Muhamman Bello.[154]

He conducted similar swift raids in the region of Dallaji, which was the home district of the Dallazawa. Attacking the settlements here had a symbolic significance for the tawaye, for they could be seen as the cradle of the Jihad in Katsina. On one expedition Dan Baskore even succeeded in burning Dallaji and making a camp on a *tudu* (hill) close to the tomb of Abdulmumini, father of Umarun Dallaji.[155] The site of his camp is now marked by a tree known as the *kanyar* (African ebony) Dan Baskore. Although assistance was sent to Dallaji from neighbouring towns when he attacked, it was too late. Dan Baskore, who came to perfect rapid cavalry movements over long distances, struck so fast, that whenever assistance came to the settlements he was attacking it was too late, for he had either completed his attack or had moved on and had to be chased—at the pace he set. It was in this fashion that he conducted most of the 83 expeditions against the Caliphate with which he is credited during his 25 years reign.[156] He attacked towns in widely dispersed areas of the Emirate, including Makurdi, Wurma, Matazu, Koda, Jani, Benye and Kurmin Dan Ranko.[157] Twice he attempted to besiege the Birnin Katsina. On one occasion, when Bello was away supervising the building of the walls of Mashi he encamped just outside one of the gates.[158] He was attacked at night by a contingent led by Abdu Na Dabo and left in the morning.[159] On another occasion he encamped outside the kofar Guga, and is even said to have caught a sister of Gidado, Baturiya, but was forced to move away going off in the direction of Makurda.[160]

As Dan Baskore perfected his tactics of swift cavalry movement over long distances, he began to raid into Kano and Zazzau. On one of these expeditions he was followed by Muhamman Bello, but he continued into Kano, refusing to give battle in Katsina, and attacked Gwarzo. Even though Bello stopped at Matazu and sent assistance to Gwarzo,[161] Dan

153. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 70.
154. *Ibid.* pp. 73, 76.
155. *Ibid.*, p. 71; *GID(b)*, August 1972; *GIG(m)*, August 1972.
156. Tilho, *op. cit.*, p. 465.
157. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, pp. 73, 74, 75, 77. *AMS(b)*, July 1972.
158. *K.H./PP-NHRS.*
159. *Ibid.*, p. 71. Tilho, *op. cit.*, p. 463, records that Dan Baskore attempted to besiege the Birnin Katsina twice but does not give the detail.
160. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 71.
161. *Ibid.*

Baskore was still able to surprise the town, pillage it and kill the Sarkin Dawaki Dan Ladan and his son.[162] It was in this fashion that he attacked Karaye and Dumbulum in western Kano and Kudan in northern Zazzau; his rapid movements making any co-ordinated resistance difficult, until the emir Ibrahim b. Bello (1871—1883) began to match the swiftness of his movements and thus forcing him to give battle.[163] When he was pressed and wished to avoid battle, Dan Baskore took to the protective cover of the dajin Rubu. He also used it for some of his deep penetrative raids, especially when he planned to take good advantage of surprise.[164] In this area of fairly thick woodland, and in its extension into the Kogo region further south, there were communities like Duru and Faskari who supplied the armies of the tawaye with food and provisions.[165] The inhabitants of both Faskari and Duru maintained a dual allegiance, paying tax to the emirate and supplying the armies of the tawaye with corn meal and other provisions, for which they might get some of the booty in return. This enabled these armies to move with less baggage and thus execute the rapid movements for which they became famous.

Dan Baskore however, was not as successful when the element of surprise was not in his favour. The Tarno Muhamman Gajeren Badde once led an expedition which caught him unawares at Unguwar Mata in Maradi; then he had to flee and one of his warriors, the Sarkin Rafi, was taken prisoner.[166] Similarly, at the battle of Muri in Maradi territory, several of his warriors were killed and he narrowly escaped death at the hand of the Durbi Gidado.[167] His most spectacular defeat however, occurred in the territory of the emirate, early in the reign of the emir Ibrahim about November/December 1871. He was surprised by a contingent of some of Katsina's most seasoned warriors quite close to the Birni, his forces completely routed and hundreds of his horses caught.[168]

Except on rare occasions, however, Dan Baskore's capital remained secure. His reign and that of his immediate predecessors, Dan Mahedi

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162. *Ibid.*
163. *Ibid.*, pp. 72, 73. *LAL(k)*, September 1971.
164. *Ibid.*, pp. 72, 76. Last, *op. cit.*, p. 119, fn. 23. This might have been the raid of Dan Baskore and the Gobirawa of Tsibiri to Gadan Sarkin Arna near Sokoto, mentioned by Tilho, *op. cit.*, pp. 463—464. It is said to have occurred about the time of the death of the caliph Aliyu Karami, mid-October 1867, and not in the reign of Ahmadu Rufai.
165. *GIF(k)*, August 1972. *KDT(r)*, August 1972.
166. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 69.
167. *Ibid.*, pp. 72—73.
168. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

and Dan Baura, were periods of prosperity and expansion.[169] The town of Maradi grew and he built walls to replace the wooden stockade around it.[170] Among the new settlers were groups of the pastoral Fulani related to the Alibawa of the Zurmi area, who settled in the town under one Alu, leaving their cattle outside.[171] They became well established in the kingdom and one of the sons of Alu, Hassan, became a leading military commander and its most powerful figure in the last decade of the nineteenth century.[172]

Although there were many raids and counter-raids between the emirate and Maradi in this period, no significant territorial changes seem to have taken place. One of the effects of this military activity within Maradi was to tilt the political balance in favour of the warriors and the arna bowmen, like the Jinjino Bakawa, the mainstay of Maradi's defences. Dan Baskore's raids into Katsina did cause some general insecurity in the years when they were intense. They also gave added impetus to the building of walls which, on the whole were quite effective against his light cavalry forces. Because the targets of his raids were so widely dispersed they did not result in the sort of massive disruption and major shifts of population such as had been caused by the activity of Dan Kasawa (c.1816—1830) and Dan Mari (c.1836—1843) in the north-western districts. The raids of Dan Baskore clearly favoured the rise to powerful positions in the government of 'new men' like the Durbi Gidado, the Tarno Muhamman Gajeren Badde, Iya Abdu Na Dabo, who took a leading role in the expeditions against him. One of the sons of Umarun Dallaji, Ahmadu Rufai, also emerged as a renowned warrior and powerful figure in the emirate in the course of this military activity during his period. The emir Ibrahim's effective campaigning in the Emirate and in Maradi against Dan Baskore, was one of the factors that helped to consolidate his position as emir and that of the other officials who worked closely with him.

It is important to realize that the 83 raids Dan Baskore is credited with were not evenly distributed throughout his 25 year reign. The picture of unrelenting hostility and raiding against the Caliphate that has come to be painted of his reign, is not based on close examination of even the fragmentary evidence available. His raids appear to have been lighter in his first decade, becoming intensified after about c.1866, when he conducted the joint expedition with the Gobirawa to Gidan Sarkin Arna

169. David, *op. cit.*, pp. 674—676. Villomme, *op. cit.*, records that the reign of Dan Mahedi was one of prosperity and excellent crops.
170. David, *op. cit.*, pp. 674—675.
171. *GIO(a)*, September 1971.
172. *Ibid.* David, *op. cit.*, pp. 676—678.

in Sokoto.[173] In his first decade he was probably preoccupied with consolidating his position aware, as he was, of the intrigues that had brought the demise of his two immediate predecessors. He was in a difficult situation in this regard, for while Dan Mahedi was brought down for military incompetence, Dan Baura was brought down by a conspiracy which took advantage of his military daring. Dan Baskore would also have been engaged in developing the town of Maradi. A conflict with the ruler of Damagaram, Baba b. Sulayman (1853—1884), was another problem engaging his attention. This conflict, perhaps about boundary demarcation in the region of Kantche and Korgom, brought about the intervention of one Shettima Nasr *na'ib* (deputy) of the Sheikh Umar al-Kanemi (1837—1880) and others from Kukawa and Zindar.[174]

The pattern of hostilities over the years was clearly quite complex, influenced as it was by the preoccupations of Dan Baskore, the emirs, and Caliphs. Over certain months or years, a situation of tacit aman might prevail with no serious encounters, only formalized exercises. Depending on political conditions within the two polities and in neighbouring areas, this situation might be transformed into one of active and serious clashes. It was perhaps no coincidence that the intensification of hostility, in about 1866, came after the death of that old warrior the Kaura Abubakar, who had been dealing with the tawaye for about four decades (c.1818—1866). What connections, if any, there was between his death and the intensification of hostilities cannot be determined with the evidence we have; but in studying this conflict, we must remember that these men were not inveterate enemies hating, and intent on exterminating, each other. All kinds of personal links came to be established between them involving respect and knowledge of each other's actual position, motives and interests, and these led to various patterns of tacit and formal arrangements and understanding of which we can now only get hints. They, however, formed an important part of the historical situation into which we must penetrate in order to feel the texture of the broader political contest they were engaged in, and go beyond banalities about the 'Fulani' and 'Habe'

173. Tilho, *op. cit.*, p. 464. Last, *op. cit.*, p. 119, fn. 23.

174. *From Alhaji Muhammad b. as-Said al-Murabit Yahya to Amir Ramadan b. Amir Rauda.* NHRS/Bornu Ms 45. The others were Al Hajj Muhammad b. as-Said al-Marabit Yahya, Mala Kashim and Kacella Jatau, servant *(ghulam)* of the Sheikh Umar. The conflict might have been over boundary demarcation in the region of Korgom and Kance, which occurred on the second reign of Tanimu b. Suleiman (c.1853—1884), Tilho, *op. cit.*, p. 461, fn. 1.

8 *Outlines of the Emirate System*

THE OPERATIONS

The authority of Sokoto

The arrest and public trial of Saddiku, and the detention of some of the people who had gone over to his side in 1853, by the amir al-mu'minin Aliyu Babba in person, considerably strengthened the position of the emir Muhamman Bello within Katsina. It also reinforced the authority of the amir al-mu'minin over the emirate which, for the next four decades, was to be exercised largely through Umaru Dan Doshero, the Galadiman Gari of Sokoto (c.1855—1896). Saddiku had killed Habu Dan Doshero, an elder brother of Umaru in c.1851.[1] Their personal and official relations had been very bad since Saddiku was emir, and after his deposition he developed a deep-seated grudge against Habu. For the killing of Habu Dan Dosheru alone—a senior caliphal official, from a notable Sokoto family—Saddiku was liable to capital punishment; but he was only publicly tried in Katsina, formally received back into the Islamic faith and taken away to detention in Sokoto.[2] This firm but magnanimous action of Aliyu Babba avoided provoking feelings of rancour and vengeance between the people of Saddiku and those of Habu Dan Doshero. It reaffirmed the framework of Islamic legality on which the authority of the amir al-mu'minin and his official, the Galadima, rested in Katsina. The outcome of the Saddiku affair provided a favourable beginning to the new caliphal supervisor of Katsina, Umaru Dan Doshero.

Umaru was not new to the work of supervising the government of Katsina. He had assisted the previous Galadima and accompanied him on visits to Katsina where Barth met them in February 1851.[3] As the Galadiman Gari of Sokoto he was one of the senior officials of the Caliph,[4] and a member of the council of electors which normally elected

1. See p. (Folio 318—319).
2. See p. (Folio 321—322).
3. Barth, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 86, 92.
4. Last, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

the Caliph.[5] To his position was attached several farming estates on both upland and fadama at Wurno, Tofawa, Gandi, Tsabre and Chimawa.[6] He visited Katsina at least annually and often more frequently, and on one visit he is said to have stayed for three months during the bazara.[7] From Sokoto he maintained correspondence with the emirs of Katsina, issuing direct instructions in some cases, as he did to the emir Abubakar, ordering him for example, to give more land to one Malam Muhammad b. Abd al-Rahman al-Talib.[8] He was responsible for collecting that portion of the revenue raised by the Katsina government, which was sent annually to the Caliph.[9] He advised the Caliph on the appointment of new emirs in Katsina and was in fact delegated by the Caliph Ahmadu Rufai (1867—1875) to install the emir of Katsina, Ahmadu Rufai (1870—1871).[10] His nephew and assistant Shehu Dan Habu, acting on his behalf, was delegated to install the emir of Katsina, Musa (1883—1888), by the Caliph Umar b. Ali (1881—1891).[11] Other offices under the Galadima included the Sarkin Fada, Sarkin Gada and Garkuwa.[12]

The emirs of Katsina consulted him over appointment and dismissal of senior officials, especially those requiring the Caliph's approval.[13] The esteem with which he came to be held by the emirs, arising partly from his age and long tenure, is reflected in a letter from the emir Abubakar who addressed him as '....the illustrious lord, the perfect authority, the beneficient Imam, the powerful wazir, Galadima Umar b. Doshero ....'[14] By this time he was one of the most influential of the caliphal officials in Sokoto and is said to have been among those proposing to demand the abdication of the Caliph Umar b. Ali (1881—1891) just before he died, because of his illegal and improper conduct.[15] In the early years of the next Caliph's (Abd al-Rahman b. Atiku (1891—1902)) reign he was sent to settle a dispute between Daura and Kazaure;[16] on this visit he stayed at Ingawa.[17]

On such occasions it does not seem as if the Galadima moved around with a large following. Barth observed that the Galadima he accompanied

5. *Ibid.*
6. *GIG(s),* October 1971.
7. *K.H./PP-NHRS,* p. 86.
8. *From Sultan Katsina Abubakar b. amir Ibrahim to Galadima Umar b. Doshero,* NHRS Ms 160/46.
9. Barth, *op. cit.,* III.
10. *K.H./PP-NHRS,* p. 75.
11. *GIG(s),* October 1971.
12. *Ibid.*
13. See p. (Folio 371).
14. *From Sultan Katsina Abubakar to Galadima Umar....*
15. *S.P.G.,* p. 105.
16. *K.H./PP-NHRS,* p. 86
17. *Ibid.*

from Katsina in March 1853 had 20 mounted horsemen with him, besides the escort provided by the emir of Katsina.[18] The authority that the Galadima exercised was clearly not connected wih any military force he wielded when he visited Katsina, but arose from his position as an official of the Caliph.

The Emirship of Muhamman Bello: 1853—1870

Although the Galadima did not form part of the Katsina emirate government his role as its supervisor formed an important and permanent part of the context in which it operated. The central office of the government was that of the emir, who was also an official of the amir al-mu'minin vested with specific powers to administer the affairs of the people living in a defined territory. The principles of Islamic political authority as expounded by the amir al-mu'minin Bello (1817—1837) in the *Usūl as-Siyāsa,* addressed to the first emir of Katsina Umarun Dallaji has been examined above.[19] It was within the context of these that the emir was delegated with certain responsibilities and vested with authority over specific matters.

The emir's most important responsibility was to see that the people over whom he was placed performed their religious duties.[20] He was to encourage them to be devout Muslims; to pray five times a day; fast during the month of Ramadan; pay *zakka* (tithe); and study the Qur'an and the Islamic sciences—through the building of schools, mosques and the establishment of the Shari'a and the Sunna. He was authorized to conduct the jihad; divide war booty and impose capital punishment. He was also authorized to use public revenue to improve the material and other aspects of the living conditions of the people in his emirate. The authority of the emir over the land was limited to the execution of these responsibilities. The land did not belong to the emir and he had no right to cede it, sell it, or dispose of it as he wished. The appointment of the emir was the sole prerogative of the caliph, who was not bound to consult any specific body of people in the emirate. The caliph was bound only by his oath and the injunction of consulting the leaders of the Muslim community.

The deposition of the second emir Saddiku in 1844 because of his insubordination to the caliph practically demonstrated the position of the emir as an official of the caliph. Although Saddiku had alienated several

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18. Barth, *op. cit.*, III.
19. See pp. 144—5.
20. This description of the constitutional position of the emirs is derived from *Usul al-Siyasa: Diya'ul Hukkam* and Last, *op. cit.*, pp. 56—57.

of the notables of Katsina and they favoured his removal from office, his deposition was primarily a Sokoto action, and that was clearly how he saw it.

The emir appointed to succeed Saddiku, Muhamman Bello, carried out the policy which Aliyu Babba had instructed Saddiku to follow and Saddiku had refused. This policy of resettlement and colonization in the area disrupted during the boren Dan Mari, helped to stabilize the political situation in the emirate.[21] With the attainment of greater political stability, Muhamman Bello began to assert his authority even in face of opposition from some of the more established officials of the emirate government, such as the Marusa Dankande, the Kaura Abubakar and the Durbi Fandiku. This trend of affairs was interrupted by the return of Saddiku to Kaita and the political crisis this provoked in 1853. The outcome of this crisis left Bello in a stronger position than ever before, but it also reinforced the authority of the amir al-mu'minin over Katsina. Bello's personal and official relations with the Caliph Aliyu Babba and with Umaru Dan Doshero seem, on the whole to have been quite good. Aliyu Babba is said to have visited Katsina several times because of his keen interest in its affairs.[22] He even copied in his palace some of the architectural features of the palace at Katsina.[23] The marriage of Muhamman Bello to a daughter of the mujāhid Ali Jedo further improved his Sokoto connections.[24]

In the period after 1853 Bello moved in and more decisively established new men in important positions around him. He had already appointed Gadado, son of the Sarkin Tafarki Dahiru, as the Marusa, although the Kaura Abubakar and the Durbi Fandiku had earlier opposed this appointment on the grounds that he was too young for the post.[25] When Durbi Fandiku died he appointed Gidado to the office of Durbi, giving him a position which had attained considerable status because of the role of the first two incumbents, Saddiku and Fandiku.[26] Gidado was made Durbi in order further to consolidate emirate authority over the settlements in the plains of Mani (many of which were supervised by the Durbi) which were becoming susceptible to tawaye infiltration.[27] The Durbi Gidado not only established firmer central control over this area, but came to command numerous expeditions against the tawaye and

21. See pp. (Folio 302—318).
22. *Ask(s),* July 1971.
23. Alhaji Saidu, *op. cit.,* p. 46.
24. *K.H./PP-NHRS,* p. 70.
25. *Ibid.,* pp. 64, 65.
26. *Ibid.,* p. 64.
27. *GIG(m),* August 1972.

even deputizing for the emir on occasions.[28] Other men whom Bello brought close to him in the government were two Baddawa from among the bayin sarki, Dutsi and Muhamman Gajeren Badde, and Abdu Na Dabo, son of Kosau a lieutenant of the mujāhid Muhamman Dikko. Bello also brought in other men from the more established lineages of the jama'a. These included his son Ibrahim, who took the office of Yerima, and his brothers Ahmadu Rufai and Ahmadu Dan Kyau. Ahmadu Rufai (better known as Ahmadu Garnakaki) was appointed over the town of Kankiya, which he developed, adding an extension to its south.[29] He also emerged as a seasoned warrior with considerable prestige among the warriors of the emirate. Ahmadu Dan Kyau who was given the office of Dan Yusufa, after Jabba, another son of Umarun Dallaji, had a less forceful personality, but was quite a figure during the reign of the emir Bello.[30] The Sarkin Sullubawa Abubakar also rose to be quite influential in the government. He took command of expeditions and was occasionally left to deputize for the emir.[31]

The rise of all these men to influential positions around the emir involved, at one level, the passing away of one generation and the coming to power of another in the second part of the reign of Bello. About 1860, for example, Abdu Dan Dudi who held the office of Galadiman Katsina, died and was succeeded by his son Shawai.[32] The death of Abdu eliminated an influential figure of the emirate government who, since about 1820, had been part of the inner councils and had supervised a large number of settlements south of the gulbin Karaduwa. He was one of the powerful triumvirate—others being Saddiku and Abubakar—on whom Umarun Dallaji came to depend, as he asserted his authority over the other leaders of the Katsina jama'a. Abdu Dan Dudi remained an influential figure in the reign of Saddiku, though he was probably not as closely involved in high-level policy-making as before. Although the boren Dan Mari disrupted some settlements in the area under his supervision, and Matazu was in fact one of the main rebel strongholds, his position was not as seriously challenged as was for example that of the Yandaka Abubakar or the Sarkin Sullubawa Abubakar. He continued to be influential in the government under Bello and was respected as one who had served Umarun Dallaji as a close lieutenant. Although his successor Shawai was the son of Magajiya Hanatari, a daughter of Umarun Dallaji, he could not succeed to his father's position as he did not then have anything

28. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, PP. 64, 67, 80.
29. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 201.
30. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 66.
31. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, pp. 69, 70.
32. Tarihin Malumfashi; *GIO(g)*, August 1972.

comparable to his father's political weight.[33] Unlike his father, he was in every respect junior to the emir Muhamman Bello.

The death of Kaura Abubakar (c.1866), coming after that of Abdu Dan Dudi, marked the passing away of the old guard who had dominated the political scene in the second quarter of the nineteenth century.[34] Abubakar had also been one of the youthful triumvirate around the emir Umarun Dallaji. When Saddiku became emir he seemed to have kept him at a distance, though he remained an influential figure throughout the reign and came out of the crises of 1842—1844 as one of the most powerful men in the emirate. Barth was told that he even aspired to the emirship when Saddiku was deposed.[35] He came to work closely with Muhamman Bello, emerging not only as a senior official but as the senior military commander. He was succeeded by his brother Usman, who died a few years later, to be succeeded by another brother Isiaku, who continued as Kaura right into the early years of the reign of the emir Abubakar.[36] The death of the Kaura Abubakar further enhanced the relative position of the emir Bello within the emirate hierarchy. No one surpassed him in experience and political weight, or probably even in age.

The Yandaka Hassan, whose position had been established in the early years of the reign of Bello and who came to be quite a senior figure, could not really occupy the same position vis-a-vis Bello, as had the Kaura Abubakar, and the Galadima Abdu.[37] The Sarkin Sullubawa Abubakar who, like Hassan, had the status of being the heir of a leading mujāhid also could not occupy that position, although he came to work quite closely with the emir Bello. The position of the heirs of Malam Umarun Dumyawa had been considerably weakened by the attacks of the tawaye in the north-west region, and it was only after the boren Dan Mari that the political situation there came to be stabilized.[38]

The strong position that the emir Bello came to occupy in Katsina and the limitations of this position are illustrated in what may be called the 'Karofi affair'. Bello decided to bring the supervision of the town of Karofi and its satellite settlements directly under the central administration. Karofi was the main stronghold of the boren Dan Mari and after

33. Although Shawai was appointed to the office of Galadima with all the title, formal responsibilities, etc. his political position differed considerably from that of his father. This is usually obscured in title-centred studies.

34. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 71.

35. Barth, *op. cit.*, III, p. 92.

36. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 72.

37. See pp. (Folio 312—313).

38. See pp. (Folio 261).

that rebellion the emir had its administration reorganized. The bitter rivalries of the sons of Dahala had weakened emirate authority there and created some of the local conditions which produced the rebellion.[39] Even after the reorganization it remained under the supervision of the Yandaka Hassan. It was to Hassan's successor Sule, that Bello made his proposals for taking the supervision of Karofi under the central administration. Yandaka Sule b. Muhamman Dikko agreed to these,[40] but several of his brothers opposed the proposals and saw them as an attempt to reduce the territory under the Yandaka. The emir Bello informed the Caliph of his plan and was given full authority to execute it. Some of the brothers of the Yandaka Sule went to Sokoto and appealed to the Caliph who, upon hearing their version, is said to have cancelled the previous ruling. When they returned to Katsina, Bello clamped them in jail but died soon afterwards, in June 1870.

The Emirship of Ahmadu Garnakaki: 1870—1871

The new emir, Ahmadu Rufai, reviewed the case of the brothers of Yandaka Sule in the light of the Caliph's new ruling and released them.[41] A complaint was lodged against Yandaka Sule, perhaps over his whole role in the affair, and he was dismissed. The town of Karofi was left under the supervision of the Yandaka Sada b. Muhamman Dikko who succeeded Sule.

Although he reigned for only nine months, Ahmadu Rufai was an active emir, as his handling of the 'Karofi affair' shows. He is known as *'Garnakaki! Sarkin Tilas!'* (The powerful one! The forceful ruler!). There is a tradition that this epithet was connected with the way he came to be installed as emir and not simply with his administration. It is said that the person chosen by the Caliph Ahmadu Rufai (1867—1873) to succeed Bello, was the Dan Yusufa Ahmadu Dan Kyau.[42] But when the Galadima Umar came with the letter of appointment from Sokoto and the Liman was reading it to the assembled notables of Katsina, Ahmadu Garnakaki simply took advantage of the fact that the name Ahmadu was mentioned and with his armed followers overawed the gathering into accepting that he was the Ahmadu intended. However there is no evidence to corroborate this. Nevertheless, it is quite conceivable that when the two main candidates for emirship have the same

39. See pp. (Folio 295—296).
40. The account of this affair is from *YAD(d)*, August 1972.
41. *YAD(d)*, August 1972.
42. *AAM(r)*, July 1972. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 75. *AUG(b)*, July 1971, says that it was Ibrahim b. Bello whom the caliph had chosen.

name, which also happens to be the name of the caliph writing the letter of appointment, all kinds of confusion could arise—especially in the tense atmosphere of such gatherings—when the name of the new emir is announced and he is formally installed.

What seems more likely was that in choosing a successor to Bello, the Caliph took into consideration the actual political situation in Katsina at that time. In the first place many of the powerful figures of the central administration then were quite formidable warriors, like Kaura Isiaku, Durbi Gidado the Magajin Gajema Abdu Na Dabo, and the Tarno Muhamman Gajeren Badde. All these would be easier to handle by a seasonal and prestigious warrior like Ahmadu Garnakaki.[43] Secondly, this was a period when Dan Baskore had intensified his raids into Katsina. Just about a year before Bello's death the emir of Kano, Abdullahi (1855—1882), had come to Mawashi in Katsina to assist against Dan Baskore.[44] After this, Dan Baskore came on an expedition and encamped outside the kofar Guga; from where he was forced to move away toward Makurda, raiding the settlements of these plains.[45] Such considerations would have clearly favoured Ahmadu Garnakaki over all the other candidates, among the sons of Umarun Dallaji.

Ahmadu Garnakaki certainly had a strong following in the army and is said to have owned a contingent of tough 'Gwarawa' fighters.[46] He had commanded several expeditions, including one against Dan Baskore when the latter raided Karaye.[48] He was wounded in the fierce encounter near Muri in Maradi in which the Durbi Gidado nearly killed Dan Baskore.[48] His martial prowess was quite apparent during his short reign when he took a decisively offensive stance against Dan Baskore.[49] He sent the Durbi Gidado against Kwamna and the Kaura Isiaku against Age; he himself took command of an expedition against Haddama. When he received news that Dan Baskore had come out, he went to meet him at Kadandani and sent Kaura Isiaku with an expedition into Maradi to attack his rear guard. Of the five expeditions recorded during his reign only one, to Kwamna, is said to have failed with even one of the senior bayin sarki killed. Further evidence of his activity was his attempt to

43. *Fauwwa, Kankara Sarkin Gwari District Note Book*, NNAK/KATPROF/I/33.
44. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 75.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 74—75.
46. *AUG(b)*, July 1971.
47. *K.H./pp-NHRS*, p. 73.
48. *Ibid.*
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 75—76. *AAM(r)*, July 1972, recounts that when the tawaye heard that Ahmadu Garnakaki was emir, they began to improve their fortifications.

settle a section of the Dauraji Fulani at Durumi near Mahuta.[50] He appointed one Disho among them as the Sarkin Fulani Dauraji.[51]

The Emirship of Ibrahim dan Bello: 1871—1883

The emir Ahmadu Rufai had started what promised to be an eventful reign when, within nine months of his accession he died. In about October/November 1871, the amir al-mu'minin Ahmadu Rufai appointed Ibrahim, son of Bello, to succeed him. Ibrahim was born in c.1835 and had been given the title of Yerima when he was barely over ten.[52] Although he was only about 38 years old when he became emir, he was not without experience in public affairs. He had taken command of several expeditions against the tawaye.[53]

One of his major problems on his accession, was the attitude of his uncles. There were over a dozen of these living, and some of them were sorely disappointed that they were passed over in favour of their nephew. They expected the pattern of appointing the children of the first emir, established by three precedents in 1836, 1844 and 1870, to continue. Although they held many offices like Bebeji, Binoni, Dan Zambedi, Dan Bindi, Kusada, Mayana, Furia and Machika, each involving responsibility over one or two towns, none of them occupied a powerful position in the government. The Dan Yusufa Ahmadu Dan Kyau, who was quite prominent in Bello's reign, had died just before, or just after, the accession of Ibrahim. Those who were left lived mostly in the Birnin Katsina and the settlements around Dallaji. With their families, following status and social connections, they were capable of creating dissention, and opposition to the emir in the Birni and among the emirate ruling class. Malam Musa, son of Umarun Dallaji, who had never had much to do with government was, for example, building up a reputation for piety and learning.[54]

From the outset therefore the emir Ibrahim had to depend on the powerful figures who had risen during his father's reign, especially on the Durbi Gidado and Muhamman Gajeren Badde, whom he appointed as Magayaki to succeed the Magayaki Dutsi. Ibrahim also took measures to curb the strength of any dynastic opposition that might be built against him. He removed one of his Dallazawa relations, Maigida, from Kankiya, a large and strategically placed town, and appointed him as

50. *MYT(b)*, August 1972.
51. *Ibid.*
52. *MYS(s)*, August 1972. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 63.
53. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, pp. 67, 69.
54. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

Yerima with responsibility over the new town of Musawa, further removed from the capital.[55] When Maigida died a few years later he appointed his son Abubakar to the office of Yerima.[56] The position of Dan Yusufa, one of the more important offices of the 'yayan sarki, was given to Zaki, a distant cousin.[57]

The emir Ibrahim also improved his connections with Sokoto by marrying a daughter of the Caliph Abubakar Atiku b. Bello (1873—1877).[58] But the factor that really strengthened his position with the caliphs was his active and generally successful campaigning against the tawaye. He joined the Caliph Abubakar Atiku b. Bello in an expedition into Maradi on which the Gidan Garere was sacked and the forces of Dan Baskore defeated near Fatotuwa.[59] The town of Maradi is said to have been saved only because of assistance from Damagaram.[60] On another expedition on which Ibrahim joined the Caliph, Madarumfa was burnt.[61] Ibrahim also took an active part in the campaign of the Caliph Mu'azu b. Bello (1877—1881) against Sabon Birni and Tata.[62] But although large forces were mobilized from several emirates, Sabon Birni was not taken.[63]

On his own expeditions Ibrahim registered major victories against Dan Baskore. His reign opened with the great victory near the Birni in which hundreds of Dan Baskore's horses were captured.[64] On another expedition to Maidagizo, under his personal command, one of the Abzinawa leaders of the tawaye, Tambari Muka, was killed.[65] Together with the emir Abdullahi of Kano, Ibrahim drove Dan Baskore away from the Ingawa plains.[66] On one of last raids that Dan Baskore carried out Ibrahim chased him and forced him to give battle as he was about to take to the protection of the dajin Rubu.[67] He also forced another Maradi commander, the Dan Yusufa, to give battle near Tsaskiya on the edge of the dajin Rubu.[68] An expedition under the command of Iya Na Dabo sent out by the emir Ibrahim, attacked an expedition of Barafia

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55. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 76.
56. *Ibid.*
57. *Dan Yusufa District Record Book*, 1937, NNAK/KATPROF/1/27.
58. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 76.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 77. *S.P.G.*, p. 104.
60. *S.P.G.*, p. 104. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, pp. 76—77.
61. *S.P.G.*, p. 104.
62. Last, *op. cit.*, p. 123. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, pp. 78—79.
63. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, pp. 78—79.
64. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, p. 76.
65. *Ibid.*
66. *Ibid.*
67. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

(c.1878—1882), immediate successor of Dan Baskore, near Kusada. After a short sharp encounter Iya Na Dabo gave him unrelenting chase through Kurkujan-Kogari-Karaduwa-Dogon, Ruwa-Dan, Musa-Rubu, and right up to the border with Maradi.[69] Ibrahim's other commanders won victories against the tawaye in their own home territory. During his reign, for example, the Durbi Gidado successfully raided over a dozen settlements in Maradi including Chidafawa, Hasau, Gabbi, Tokara, Kufan Unguwa, Gidan Kabda, Gidan Sallau and Kefin Abarshi.[70] There were also several instances of failure, as at Tambudu and Guzmaka where Durbi Gidado's raids were successfully repulsed, and at Tunfushi when an expedition under the Kaura Isiaku was defeated and the Dan Iyau and the Illela Ladan killed.[71]

On the whole Ibrahim was quite successful in his military campaigns and this was one of the factors that caused Mazawaje (c.1882—1884) of Maradi to sue for peace.[72] Ibrahim had not only intensified raids into Maradi but had adopted the strategy of giving active chase to the expeditions of the tawaye, raiding in the emirate. He continued to maintain the offensive stance taken by Ahmadu Garnakaki towards the tawaye, placing them more and more on the defensive. Dan Baskore's successor, Barafia, continued with the trend which had started under Dan Baskore, and extended more of his raids beyond Katsina, into the emirate of Kano and Zazzau where the response to the Maradawa was not as sharp and effective as it had become in Katsina.[73]

Ibrahim's military successes helped to consolidate his position and that of his lieutenants within Katsina, and in relation to Sokoto; one consequence of which was that his warriors and officials came to dominate the political scene whilst members of his family were left aside and ignored. Unlike his father Bello, Ibrahim—perhaps feeling more insecure —did not incorporate any of his uncles or cousins into the inner councils of the government or place them in command of important expeditions. This led to the building-up of considerable frustration amongst them which found expression in some of the policies of his successor Musa (1883—1888), and of his son, the emir Abubakar (1888—1904).

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69. *Ibid.*
70. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, pp. 76-78.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
72. Tilho, *op. cit.*, p. 464. David, *op. cit.*, p. 676.
73. *K.H./PP-NHRS*, pp. 77, 78. Tilho, *op. cit.*, p. 464.

The Emir's Officials

The accounts of political developments in the nineteenth century in Chapter IV and in preceding sections of this chapter have already indicated the nature of the operations of the central administration of the emirate government. By the reign of the emir Ibrahim (1871—1883) there were three main sections of the central administration which are described as the bayin sarki. They are distinguishable primarily in terms of their relations with the emir whose office was the central organ of the government.[74]

The bayin sarki (lit: slaves of the emir) were the primary executive arms of this office. They held the following offices in the central administration:

1. Magayaki	the senior bawan sarki	9. Dan Kafi	) emir's cavalry
2. Sarkin Bai	) deputies to Magayaki	10. Ubandwaki	)
3. Sarkin Yara	)	11. Sarkin Karoma	emir's swordsmen
4. Ajiya	treasury and stores	12. Sarkin Baka	emir's bowmen
5. Baraya	) stores	13. Sarkin Bindiga	emir's musketeers
6. Shantali	)	14. Zagi	emir's stables
7. Turaki	) emir's chambers	15. Sarkin Dogarai	police and guards
8. Kasheka	)	16. Ganuwa	fortifications.

Each of these officials had assistants holding titles like *mukkaddas*, madawaki or sarkin fada. The bayin sarki were responsible for the conduct of official business in public and private chambers of the emir's palace. They looked after protocol, and acted as messengers and guards. They were also responsible for the emir's treasury and stores and for the army directly under the emir. The Magayaki was the senior bawan sarki and his deputies were the Sarkin Bai and the sarkin Yara. Together with the Ajiya and the Turaki, these were senior officials of the central administration involved in policy making at the highest level and in the supervision of the sarakunan kasa. It was the Magayaki, for example, who supervised the collection of the kudin kasa (also known as *kudin tausa* [land tax]) throughout the emirate. All of the bayin sarki were liable to be sent on military expeditions. Some of the Magayaki's were even given actual commands of whole expeditions.

74. This description of the central administration is derived from information and discussion with *AIT(k)* July 1972; *SDC(g)* July 1971 and the Private Papers of Malam Rilwanu Caranci.

The bayin sarki formed a large proportion of the population of the cikin Gida, the palace complex. They formed a distinct social strata with a heterogeneous origin, but a corporate identity, outlook, and even lineages. Some of these lineages could be traced back to the bayin sarki of the pre-jihad government, and certainly in their outlook, role and identity, they represented a certain measure of continuity with the old political system. Not all of them had the legal status of bayi, although the bayi formed the largest proportion. But various individuals from groups moving into Katsina came to be incorporated, and to have the social and political status of bayin sarki. Powerful bayin sarki of the nineteenth century, for example, included the Magayaki Dutsi and the Magayaki Muhamman Gajeren Badde. These two came from among Baddawa immigrants who had moved into the Birnin Katsina in the early nineteenth century and seemed to have acquired the status of bayin sarki through their incorporation into the cikin Gida. Muhamman Gajeren Badde, the best known of these, rose through the offices of Sarkin Dawa, Shantali, Tarno, Sarkin Bai to become Magayaki during the reign of Ibrahim (1871—1883). One of his successors as Magayaki was Na Samu'a Babarbare and about the same time there was a Banupe holding the office of Shantali.

Besides being the primary executive arm of the emir the bayin sarki provided many of the officials responsible for regulating and supervising specialized economic activity of which the following can be identified:

1. Tarno	weaving	8. Matsai	markets
2. Danbagan-zame	dyeing	9. Sarkin Zango	caravans
3. Majema	tanning	10. Sarkin Dillalai	brokerage
4. Sarkin Dawa	woodcarving and other activity using forest products	11. Sarkin Pawa	butchers
5. Sarkin Makera	iron working	12. Sarkin Rafi	fadama cultivation
6. Sarkin Magina	building	13. Magaji Rogo	cassava cultivation
7. Gariya	salt trading	14. Magaji Kwaya	groundnuts and cotton cultivation
		15. Magaji Yado	potatoes, yams and other roots.

Some of these offices came to be closely integrated with the other offices of the bayin sarki. The Magayakin Muhamman Gajeren Badde, for example, was promoted to the office of Sarkin Bai from that of Tarno. The Tarno was one of those offices of the bayin sarki, like Magayaki and Ajiya, which in their administrative role were very close to those of the sarakunan sarki.

The sarakunan sarki were officials of the emir and were made up of the:

1. Galadiman Katsina
2. Kauran Katsina
3. Durbin Katsina
4. Marusan Katsina
5. Iyan Katsina
6. Kankiya
7. Mashi.

They were the senior advisers of the emir, the supervisors of the sarakunan kasa, and senior executives often delegated with authority by the emir to carry out specific tasks. They were the senior military commanders who took command of most of the expeditions not personally commanded by the emir. This applies to all of them except the Galadima who normally stayed in the Birni as the emir's deputy. The sarakunan, besides supervising a large number of the sarakunan kasa, or *hakimai,* (officials) all over the emirate, were often sent out to perform specific tasks such as resettlement, reorganization of administration, or the resolution of conflicts in the districts. Unlike the bayin sarki the emir had to obtain the amir al-mu'minin's approval for dismissal and appointment to some of these offices of the sarakunan sarki.

The offices of Galadiman Katsina and Kauran Katsina came to be attached to the lineages of the mujāhid Dudi and the mujāhid Malam Muhammadu Na Benye respectively. These two were the leading companions of Umarun Dallaji, and their sons, Abdu Dan Dudi and Abubakar, came to be his close lieutenants after their father's death. As a result they came to be seen as the two senior officials of the sarakunan sarki; the Galadima as the deputy and the Kaura as the senior military commander. In practice this did not always obtain as is clear from the accounts of actual political development given here.

For most of the century the other offices of the sarakunan sarki did not become attached to any specific lineages. The family of the Durbi Gidado however, came to assert strong claims to that office after his death in 1883.[75] But the emir Musa (1883—1888), refused to recognize this claim and appointed his son Yero to the office. The emir Abubakar (1888—1904), dismissed Yero and appointed Gidado's brother, Muhamman Sada Durbi, and after Sada's death in c.1893 gave the office to Gidado's son, Muhamman Dikko. The other offices remained largely unattached, although the tendency to attach each to specific lineages occasionally asserted itself.

See pp. (Folio 434—435).

The 'yayan sarki formed a politically potent section of the central administration, but had the lightest administrative responsibilities. They held a number of offices of which the following can be identified:

1. Yerima
2. Dan Yusufa
3. Dan Zambedi
4. Binoni
5. Bebeji
6. Kusada
7. Mayana
8. Furia
9. Maremawa
10. Machika
11. Magajin Halidu
12. Lambisa
13. Barahiya

The 'yayan sarki were given responsibility for the supervision of towns but, like other officials of the central administration living in the Birnin Katsina, they sent out representatives, (jakadu) to live there permanently, while they only visited, staying at times for a few months; they also took part in military expeditions. The emirs Saddiku, Ahmadu Rufai and Ibrahim, all took command of expeditions before they became emirs. More often, however, the 'yayan sarki joined expeditions under the command of others. As potential emirs they could become centres of dissent and opposition to a reigning emir. The emir Saddiku had difficulty in his relations with the Yerima Bello immediately after his accession. Even after their reconciliation in Sokoto he kept him out of the government. It was the attitude taken by some of the 'yayan sarki, including Musa and Ahmadu Garnakaki, which intensified the crisis created by the return of Saddiku in 1853. It was also their dissatisfaction with the emir Ibrahim's appointment in 1871 which made him so heavily dependent on officials like the Durbi Gidado, Kaura Isiaku and Magayaki Gajeren Badde. As will be shown in the next chapter, rivalries among the 'yayan sarki created serious problems in the reigns of Musa and Abubakar.

The Territorial Administration

The major responsibility of the central administration officials was the supervision of the sarakunan kasa or hakimai. Each of these had under him several *masu gari* (head of towns) or *dagatai* (village headmen). The basic unit of administration remained as it was before the jihad, the gari (with its dependent kauyuka and areas of karkara, saura and daji), under a maigari. The day-to-day administration of the towns was in the hands of the heads of the various quarters known as the masu *unguwa:* while the affairs of the villages, hamlets and homesteads were in the hands of a senior maigida vested with that title. Each maigari had his own officials and agents whom he appointed. The officials responsible for regulating and taxing specialized economic activity often came from leading families in that occupation. They were nominated by the maigari and appointed after the approval of the emir's official responsible.

Within the territory of each hakimi or sarkin kasa were several of these garuruwa forming distinct administrative units. These territories were clearly defined but not always contiguous, especially in the case of sarki like the Dangi of Yantumaki and the Sarkin Sullubawa, the administration under whom was made more complex by their status as clan heads and as heirs of leading mujāhiddin. The major sarakunan kasa of the late nineteenth century which can be identified were:

1. Yandaka
2. Sarkin Sullubawa
3. Sarkin Maska
4. Dangin Yantumaki
5. Dambon Ingawa
6. Sarkin Gozaki
7. Sarkin Gwari Pauwa
8. Maradin Kurfi
9. Magajin Yamel.

The garuruwa and other settlements in the territory of each of these, where identifiable, are given in the appendix which also lists the administrative units supervised by various officials of the central administration.

The sarakunan kasa lived largely in one of the towns in their territories, although most of them kept houses in the Birnin Katsina. These offices were all attached to definite lineages. The appointment and dismissal of the Yandaka, Sarkin Sullubawa, Dangin Yantumaki and some of the others were subject to the approval of the Caliph. Some of them had quite elaborate administrative systems under them, similar to that of the central administration. In Maska where the Sarkin Maska Muhamman Sani had to rely on the pre-jihad institutions and personnel, many of the old offices were kept.[76] This was also the case in Ingawa, where in fact the same lineage continued to rule. But in Ingawa groups of mallamai are said to have risen to positions of great power under the Dambo Mazaddau and his son Saidu.[77] Besides the Sabon Gari mentioned above, the Dangi at Yantumaki also had various officials responsible for the day-to-day administration of Yantumaki town. There was the Mukkaddas who supervised the Sabon Gari; the Wambai, the Turaki and even a Sarkin Yaki, responsible for collecting jangali from the Dangawa who had moved into the Sokoto region[78]

The territorial administration in the areas under the supervision of the Galadiman Katsina became quite complex. When Dudi and the Galadima Abdu came to supervise large numbers of settlements south of the gulbin Karaduwa, they appointed their kinsmen as both hakimai and masu gari over many of them.[79] The office of Dan Ranko ruling

76. See pp. (Folio 152—153).
77. 'Asalin Mutanen Ingawa', *op. cit.*
78. *DAY(d)*, August 1972.
79. *GIO(g)*, August 1972.

over Mahuta, Kagara, Dantutture and Dankajiba, went to a son of the Galadima. Others which came to be attached to sons or close relatives of the Galadima were Matazu, Dayi, Sarkin Gozaki, Sarkin Fulani Papu and Gatawa. In this instance the sarakunan kasa, and in some cases masu gari, came to be closely linked with a senior sarki. This made it difficult to distinguish between the role of the Galadima as part of the central administration, and as head of a family of hakimai and masu gari in the areas under his supervision. A similar development took place in the Mani plains arising from the long tenure of Durbi, supervising the settlements of the area.

The Military Organization

Although command of expeditions was normally given to the officials of the central administration, the sarakunan kasa also kept contingents of *barade* (cavalry) and *dakaru* (infantry). The cavalry force was made up largely of bayi and other dependents, while the infantry was drawn from among the *yan farauta* (hunters) and other able-bodied men skilled in the use of weapons. The dakaru were organized under the sarakunan baka and the sarakunan karma.

The main cavalry weapons were *takobi* (the sword) *mashi* (the lance), *asigiri* (the throwing spear) and various types of daggers and personal arms for close combat. The weapons of the infantry were mainly bows and arrows, swords, war-axes, *kwinkele* (clubs) and various types of daggers. The largest contingent of the cavalry was under the emir. Barth reports that the emirate had an armed force of 2,000 horsemen and 8,000 foot soldiers. He witnessed a review of a contingent of cavalry by the emir Bello on 21 January 1851 and gave this description of their appearance:

> The governor....about noon held a sort of review of several hundred horsemen, whose horses in general were in excellent condition. They were armed with a straight sword hanging on the left, a long heavy spear for thrusting and a shield either of the same description as that of the Tuarick, of oblong shape, made of the hide of the large antelope or else of bullock or elephant's hide, and forming an immense circular disc of about five feet diameter....some of them wore a dagger at the left arm, while I counted not more than five muskets. Their dress was picturesque and not too flowing for warlike purposes; the large shirt or shirts (for they generally wear two) being fastened around the breast with an Egyptian shawl....Most of them wore a black *rawani* or shawl around their faces.[80]

This seems to have been a contingent of light cavalry with a few *yan bindiga* (musketeers). The *yan lihidda* (heavy cavalry) wore *lihidi* (quilt), *sulka* (chain mail) and *kwalkwali* (metal head gear).

80. Barth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 454.

The control of the largest and best-equipped body of warriors was one of the emir's pillars of power. This was reinforced by the fact that he had the sole prerogative to authorize military expeditions and appoint commanders. This is a power the emir derives from his position as the deputy, na'ib of the commander-in-chief of the Muslim army, the caliph. In his letter to the Muslim community of Katsina, the Caliph Aliyu Babba (1842—1859), emphasises this power of the amir al-mu'minin and by implication that of the emir, when he states: 'In general, obedience to the Imam is incumbent on all good men, when he orders them to come and go; if he orders them to fight the enemy under any leader, sincere or deceitful'.[81]

The military organization of the emirate worked in such a way that the best warriors came to be absorbed into the emir's forces and incorporated into the administrative system with territorial or other responsibilities. The role of warriors was one of the problems which the political system of Maradi failed to solve, with dire consequences to its stability in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. How the process actually operated in the emirate is best illustrated in the career of Muhamman Sani, a famous late nineteenth century professional warrior better known as 'Dan Waire' which is examined in the next chapter.[82]

The Judiciary

One of the measures the amir al-mu'minin Bello took to stabilize the emerging emirate system in Katsina, was the granting of landed estates to various groups of the ulama of Katsina. Some of the mallamai from Makurda, Tsohuwa Kasuwa and Gafai were also appointed as qadis.[83]

The appointment of qadis all over the emirate was the emir's responsibility, and by the late nineteenth century such appointment had been made in most of the important towns such as Ingawa, Maska, Mani, Kankiya, Kurfi, Musawa, Caranci, Pauwa and Kusada.[84] Even smaller settlements in densely settled districts, like Rugar Badde and Muduru, had qadis who served them and the neighbouring communities. In the Birnin Katsina, these officials came to be drawn largely from some lineages of mallamai in Gafai, Tsohuwar Kasuwa, and in a quarter near Darma that came to be known as the Unguwar Alkali, where the descendants of Malam Hambali, who was a qadi for most of the first half of the

81. See p. (Folio 311).
82. See p. (Folio 397).
83. See pp. (Folio 134, 135, 136—7).
84. *GIU(a)*, July 1971. *AIT(k)*, July 1972. *MAM(b)*, August 1972.

nineteenth century, lived.[85] Some of the ulama were not appointed as qadis but became advisers to the emirs when they heard cases in their courts or received appeals from the courts of the qadis. The final court of appeal however, was the court of the amir al-mu'minin at Sokoto.

Taxation

Taxation in various forms was the main source of revenue of both local and central administration. The military expeditions were occasional sources of booty, in horses, captives and weapons, and sometimes clothing and even food grain were seized, although as a factor in the fiscal affairs of the emirate's administration, booty seems not to have been very significant. Some revenue was certainly raised in the sale or ransoming of captives and other booty. Ransoming was in fact a well organized exercise. In a letter to the emir Musa (1883—1888), the Sarkin Katsina (Maradi) Masallachi, suggested that the road through Karofin Kura was better than the road through Damagaram for the exchange of prisoners.[86] But even if some money was raised through the ransoming of captives and the sale of booty it could not have been significant against the expenditure of equipping and mounting expeditions.[87]

The major source of revenue was the various taxes falling under the category of kharaj. The zakka, a canonical tax obligatory on all adult Muslims, amounting to ten per cent of their wealth, went largely to the ulama and the masu gari. It was from the kudin kasa (also known as kudin tausa, [land tax]), kudin sana's (tax on specialized trades, craft and agriculture), jangali (cattle tax), kudin hito (custom dues) and jizia (tax on protected non-Muslim communities), that most of the revenue was raised.

Barth reports that in Katsina the land tax was levied at the rate of 2,500 cowries annually on every head of family (maigida).[88] He estimated the emirate's population at 300,000—stating that only about half of these pay the tax. From this he computed a total revenue from land tax of

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85. Ahmed Abu al-gaith al-Tuwati refers to a judgement of 'the *qadi* Hambali' in his ledger book in a context indicating that this occurred in 1839—40. *Kitab Ziman ul-doya,* NNAK/KATPROF/AMss/G/Ar. 3.

86. *From Sultan of Katsina Masallati b. Sultan of Katsina Dan Mahedi to Sultan of Katsina Musa b. Umarun Dallaji,* NHRS/Ms IV/72—48.

87. The Dan Barhin Nuhu, son of Durbi Gidado, took part in thirteen expeditions on which he obtained a total of 31 captives. Eleven of these were obtained on one expedition to Galadunchi, which the emir Abubakar commanded. See *Littafin Tarihin Kankiya,* NNAK/KATPROF/I—51.

88. Barth, *op. cit.,* I, p. 479.

20 to 30 million cowries annually. He also reports that a tax of 500 cowries was levied on every slave.

The land tax seems to have varied through the nineteenth century between 1,200 to 3,000 cowries per maigida annually.[89] The norm seems to have been around 1,200 towards the end of the century, and the tax even came to be known in places as *shabibiyu* meaning 'twelve-twelve' (i.e. the twelve hundred cowries).[90] This tax was essentially one on the produce of the gandun gida, (the main household farm) and was levied on the maigida. It was the major source of revenue for both the central and local administrations.

Another source of revenue, was the tax on specialized agriculture and trades (kudin sana'a). Palmer gives the following list in a memo drawn up early in the twentieth century:

1. kudin rafi	3,000 per farm	7. butchers	2,500 per person
2. potatoes	1,200 per farm	8. salt cutters	2,400 per person
3. groundnuts	1,200 per farm	9. smiths	10 hoes or 1,000 cowries
4. cassava	1,200 per farm	10. livestock brokers	5,000 cowries
5. weavers	2,400 per person	11. users of forest products	5,000 cowries
6. tanners	2,400 per person	12. dyers	3,000 per pit.[91]

Palmer does not give his source for these figures and my informants have generally given lower figures than these. The tax on dye-pits, for example, is given at Dan Ashita, an important dyeing centre in the nineteenth century as 100 cowries per dye-pit.[92] The tax on smiths is given at Kankara, the major centre of iron working in the nineteenth century, as 5 hoe blades per *kan makara* (blacksmith's work).[93] Palmer's figures are likely to err towards exaggeration because the colonial administrators generally attracted information, especially on sensitive matters like taxation, which emphasized the oppressive nature of 'Fulani rule'. In Doro the tax on weavers is said to have varied between 1,200 and 2,000 cowries annually.[94]

For jangali, another important source of revenue, especially after the reforms of the emir Bello, Palmer gives the figure of 5,000 cowries per cow per annum. It is likely that a considerable proportion was actually

89. *MKD(m)*, August 1972.
90. *GIT(b)*, August 1972.
91. H.R. Palmer, *History of Katsina*, NNAK/SNP/17/8—K2076, pp. 94—95.
92. *GID(a)*, August 1972.
93. See pp. (Folio 421—422).
94. MKD(m), August 1972.

collected in kind and this made computation on the basis of cowries more difficult.

Kudin hito was the tax collected on some commodities when they were brought into the emirate. Barth reports that each of the freeborn Abzinawa in the caravan he accompanied to Katsina in January 1851 paid one *kantu* (block) of salt and 500 cowries for each beast of burden.[95] This tax which went straight to the central administration, was also paid on natron, salt and some other commodities brought in from the north-east.[96]

Clearly, the pattern of taxation in the emirates is complex. Some of the local rates imposed by the masu gari like kudin *tsanya* (rating on moats) are sometimes compounded in the figures and given as land tax or as kudin sana'a. The study of the tax system requires detailed and painstaking examination of the figures and of their general political and economic significance, a task beyond the scope of this study.

95. Barth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 456.
96. *AAK(k)*, August 1972.

9 *Changing patterns of settlement and economy: 1808—1883*

SETTLEMENT

One of the most important of the activities the emirate administration was engaged in was the fostering of new settlements. The establishment of new settlements was one of the major tasks that the caliphs took upon themselves and urged upon the emirs.[1] In the *Usul as-Siyasa,* the Caliph Bello tells Umarun Dallaji that one of the duties of the Muslim leader was to see to the colonization of rural areas through the foundation of villages and walled towns.[2] This was to be not simply for administrative convenience and defence, but as part of a general policy of fostering the material welfare of the people. It should involve the encouragement of farmers and artisans; the provision of facilities for the storage of food; and the regulation of markets and roads.[3]

The Sarakunan Katsina had often actively encouraged urban development; this had sometimes involved the establishment of ribats like Dan Ashita and Kurmin Dan Ranko, and the building of mosques in the villages and towns.[4] The Sarakunan Katsina of the late eighteenth century did not seem to have actively engaged in this as some of their predecessors had done. By this period there were areas of the kingdom like the Birnin Kogo region and the Karaduwa-Bunsuru confluence area, where urban centres were declining or had already been abandoned.[5] But the political framework enabled new towns to grow up with relative ease, as happened on the northern borderlands and in the Karaduwa-Bunsuru basin.

During the wars of the jihad a number of settlements broke up and were abandoned; some, such as Yandoto and the Birnin Samri were important and well-established urban centres.[6] It was really the upheavals

1. Last, *op. cit.*, pp. 75—78, 115-118.
2. Bello, *Usul as-Siyasa.*
3. *Ibid.*
4. See pp. (Folio 77—80).
5. See pp. (Folio 22, 81—83).
6. See pp. (Folio 261—2).

in the rest of the first half of the nineteenth century, however, which brought about widespread disruption of settlements and communications. The raids of Dan Kasawa and Rauda led to the break up of the settlements in the Maradi basin like Garabi and Maraka and the abandonment of major urban centres like Zandam and Kaga further south.[7] The boren Dan Mari and the punitive expeditions of the emir Saddiku led to widespread disruption of settlements in western Katsina. Ruma, and the cluster of towns around it, were abandoned completely and a whole swathe of territory along the border with the emirate of Zamfara was denuded of its towns.[8] The disruptive impact of these political upheavals after the jihad wars was generally confined to the western and south-eastern districts. It is not unlikely, however, that the ruins of walled towns in the Maska region were caused by the activity of the people of the Banaga, and other raiders of the tawaye in that area.[9] The new town of Bakori was destroyed by raiders of the Banaga and only later resettled.[10]

There were, however, other factors besides these upheavals and conflicts which were leading to changes in the pattern of settlement in the first half of the nineteenth century. These included the growth of centres of economic activity and administration, and the sedentarization of the nomadic and semi-nomadic Fulani. These factors continued to operate during the rest of the century and constituted the positive forces making for urban development.

The Western Districts

The establishment of the towns of Kurfi, Ummadau, and Tsaskiya in these districts, after the crises of 1842—1844 have already been discussed. Tsaskiya developed into an important market with a flourishing trade in foodgrains and kalwa.[11] Ummadau and Kurfi became important as zango on the route to Sokoto and the west. The former was the last stopping place before the route enters the wilderness of the dajin Rubu.[12] The Maradi Sani b. Jabba (c.1868—1915), obtained the services of an expert builder, the Sarkin Magina Na Kunci, and built a fine house in Kurfi, and a large mosque which is still standing.[13] The settlement of Tsauri nearby became a fair-sized town after it was walled by the Yandaka

7. See pp. (Folio 298—302).
8. See pp. *Ibid.*
9. (Folio 264—265). *Maska District Notebook*, NNAK/KATPROF/1/6 contains a list of 31 of these ruins.
10. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 145.
11. *MTN(t)*, August 1972.
12. Barth, *op. cit.*, III, p. 93. *GZU(s)*, August 1972. *MSM(k)*, August 1972.
13. *AAK(d)*, August 1972.

Hassan, which it is said, he was prompted to do by the Caliph Aliyu Babba who stayed there on his visit to Katsina over the Saddiku affair in 1853.[14] Hassan also built himself a large house there and a small, finely built mosque in front of it facing the eastern gate. This town remained the main base of the descendants of Muhammadu Na Alhaji.

The Eastern Plains

By founding new settlements the emir Muhamman Bello sought to consolidate emirate authority further in the Kaita area. He developed a large estate near the town and saw to the establishment of many small settlements. These included Dan Kaba and Allemi which were built as keffi and came under two of the emir's senior Baddawa officials.[15]

Further to the east of Kaita more extensive urban development was taking place in this period. Walls were built around the settlement of Mashi,[16] the building of which was supervised by an official of the emir, the Mashi Shehu, who, after the walls were finished was sacked and replaced by the Mashi Danadari.[17] A stretch of woodland between Mashi and Kaita where the settlements, like old Muduru, had been abandoned was recolonized and a new town of Muduru was built near the ruins of the old one.[18] A malam from Karari, Muhammadu Shikarawa, was appointed over it and it was settled with people from Goma and neighbouring settlements.[19] Malam Muhammadu also acted as a qadi for the whole district.[20]

About 23 kilometres south of Mashi was the town of Doro, whose population and commerce seem to have been expanding in this period. Doro, like Mashi, existed before the jihad, but was probably then overshadowed by Mani where a powerful potentate, the Mani, lived.[21] The growth of Doro in the second half of the nineteenth century was connected with the settlement there of long-distance traders (fatake). A new suburb known as Kauyen Falke was founded by one of these traders known as the Falke Abdu.[22] The fatake of Doro seem to have become involved in the trade in bayi, which is said to have made the population of Doro very heterogeneous, with people from among the Mandara, Bassa,

14. *YAD(d)*, August 1972.
15. *Kaita District Notebook*, NNAK/KATPROF/I/36, pp. 21, 25.
16. *Tarihin Mashi*, 1959, Mashi District Office.
17. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 180.
18. *GIM(m)*, August 1972.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*
21. See pp. (Folio 240).
22. *MKD(m)*, August 1972.

Angas and Dakarkarsi retained to work as bayin gandu on the estates near the town.[23] Thus Doro became a centre of this rather specialized type of trade, even though the town of Dutsi continued as the main market of the area.

The town of Giremawa about 6 kilometres east of Doro, first settled by Bornoan migrants before the jihad, also expanded in this period.[24] Groups of the Daneji and Dauraji Fulani came to settle close by at Alkandi, with their cattle.[25] The building of the new town of Giremawa was only started by the emir Musa (1883—1888) and completed by the emir Abubakar (1888—1904).[26] But even before the move to the new town the sedentarization of these pastoralists had added to the population and prosperity of Giremawa and they had become sufficiently integrated into it to be known as the Fulani Giremawa.[27] The town of Machinawa, a few kilometres to the north-east of Giremawa received migrants from Machina, led by one Bere, sometime in these middle years of the nineteenth century.[28] This increase in population went alongside the growth of Machinawa as a centre of pottery, supplying pottery and potters to neighbouring areas and even to more distant places in the south.[29]

The Plains of Bindawa

The settlements of these plains were raided many times by Dan Baskore. They were quite prosperously situated, as they were on easily tilled jigawa (light, sandy soil) with good water supply.[30] The area was densely settled with small and medium-sized towns and large numbers of villages and hamlets, making them easy prey for the forays of Dan Baskore.

His raids, which have already been described, gave added impetus to urban development here. A wall was built around the town of Caranci by the Kaura Abubakar and extended later by the Kaura Isiaku.[31] Abukur and Rimi, further to the north had walls built around them about the same time.[32] A new wall was built around Tama and the emir Bello

23. *Ibid.*
24. *GIG(m)*, August 1972.
25. *Ibid.*
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*
28. *GAM(d)*, August 1972.
29. *Ibid.*
30. One of the kirari of the town of Dallaje is *'Dallaje garin ruwa!'* (Dallaje the town of [plentiful] water!). There is a permanent spring in the river Jani flowing just outside the town to the east. *GID(b)* August 1972.
31. *AAM(r)*, July 1972.
32. *Ibid.*

appointed one Danzane to rule the town.[33] It was after Dan Baskore's attack on Koda that the emir Ibrahim sent one of his officials, the Sarkin Rafi, to supervise the building of the walls of Kafin Dangi.[34] The inhabitants of the other small towns close by, noted by Hugh Clapperton on his journey through the area in May 1824, were brought in to settle there.[35] A weaving and dyeing industry, using cotton and indigo largely imported from the south and west, flourished there.[36] The Barebari Mamuda, grandson of the mujāhid Marori lived there, but the administration of this large town was placed in the hands of a subordinate official, the Galadima.[37]

Due partly to the raiding of Dan Baskore into this area the town of Yashe, on the border with Kano, expanded. Barebari came to settle there, in the Gumborawa quarter[38] and some of them, like one Dan Geda, were involved in the kolanut trade to Gonja.[39] Some of the others might have been attracted by the vigorous commercial activity that developed in these border regions after the rebellion of Dan Tunku. This activity is reflected in the growth of three major markets along this stretch of the Kano-Katsina border at Tunas, Runjin Baushi and Matanfada.

The ruins of the ancient ribat of Dan Ashita were occupied during the rebellion of Dan Tunku by one Malam Sabo moving away from Roni.[40] A new mosque was built on the ruins of the old one and the town became once again a centre of the 'ulamā'. The Imams of the towns, coming from the family of Malam Sabo, continued as the leading figures of the new community. The cultivation of cotton and indigo was revived in the surrounding fadama and a dyeing industry developed, supplying the large border markets nearby.

The Musawa Area

The small town of Jikamshi about 12 kilometres to the south of Matazu expanded after the jihad as it received more settlers moving from the Karaduwa-Bunsuru confluence area, from Kano, and even from as far away as Sanyina in the Sokoto region.[41] The main section of these Sanyinawa moved and settled with their cattle on the western bank

33. *GIT(b)*, August 1972.
34. *GIK(k)*, August 1972.
35. Bovill, *op. cit.*, p. 711.
36. *GIK(k)*, August 1972.
37. *Ibid.*
38. *IDY(k)*, August 1972.
39. *Ibid.* A kirari of Yashe is *'Yashe garin Dangeda'* (Yashe the town of Dangeda).
40. *GID(a)*, August 1972.
41. *LHM(m)*, August 1971. *Musawa District Record Book.*

of the gulbin Karaduwa, at what became the town of Garun Sanyina.[42]

Jikamshi was sited between some of the major routes to the west, going through southern Katsina and near a major route from the Birnin Katsina to the Gozaki region and Zazzau. It was almost halfway between Matazu and Kurkujan, two towns which had joined the boren Dan Mari. The area to its west then was covered largely by the dajin Zuri, dajin Dugul and the dajin Papu with very few urban centres. The ancient birane that once flourished here, like the Birnin Dugul and Birnin Bakana, had completely vanished or were in process of decline. These seem to have been some of the considerations that caused Bello take a personal and active interest in building up this town. He came himself to supervise the building of the walls and was attacked while he was there by Dan Baura, (1851—1853) who forced him to retreat to the Birni.[43] The extension attached to the old walls of Jikamshi to the north was completed and the new town, which came to be known as Musawa, was placed under the Yerima Ibrahim, son of Bello.[44] The maigari of Jikamshi, the Dan Jikamshi, was reduced to the status of a maiunguwa in charge of the older part of the town.

The south-eastern Districts

Even in the districts along the south-eastern border with Kano, the raids of Dan Baskore had a direct impact on urban development. On one of his deep raids Dan Baskore attacked and sacked the town of Kurmin Dan Ranko;[45] this, it is said, was with the collusion of some of the inhabitants.[46] Kurmin Dan Ranko was the regional metropolis of several settlements in this border region, one of which Dan Tutture had broken up before the jihad and it was only resettled in the late 1840s.[47] Some of the people fleeing from Kurmin Dan Ranko moved into these towns, but others fled into Kano. Mahuta was built further south to resettle the inhabitants, and Kurmin Dan Ranko was later partially reoccupied but lost its former importance.[48] Some of the mallamai, whose presence

42. *Musawa District Record Book*. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 140.
43. *K.H./PP-NHRS.*, p. 67.
44. In the *Musawa District Record Book*, it is said that the settlement of Musawa came under the Yerima since the time of Umarun Dallaji. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 141.
45. *MHA(k)*, August 1972.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *GID(t)* August 1972. It was resettled with Kanawa and Zagezagi and some people from other areas of Katsinawa, under one Abubakar who was the maigari with title of Ubandwakin Dan Tutture.
48. *ANW(d)*, August 1972.

had made it a centre of learning, never returned.[49]

A new settlement, around a group of mallamai from the unguwar Banga in Sokoto, was founded to the north-west of Kurmin Dan Ranko, near a major east-west route going through Gora-Mai-kasuwa-Ketare-Kankara to Yan Kuzo and the Katsina Laka region.[50] This was the town of Wawalkaza about 10 kilometres to the north of the iron ore mines of Kankara. This group of mallamai was led by one Malam Bai, who became the head of the new settlement.[51] During the time of his heir, the Liman Macchido, the emir Muhamman Bello had the settlement walled,[52] and it became one of the zango on the east-west route and a centre of Islam in the rather wild Pauwa region.

The Maska Area

The jihad wars started a period of severe upheavals in this regional metropolis of south-western Katsina. This interrupted a period of prosperity and expansion under the Sarkin Maska Birgigi, (who is remembered for his building of a large mosque in Maska town and for his generosity).[53] Partly for this reason, Maska was one of the last of the birane of Katsina to fall to the mujāhidūn. Even after it was taken by a contingent under Gudindi the raids of the Banaga and the activity of freebooters like Kogo-mai-kumaru left conditions unsettled.[54] The strong attachment to nomadism of the first two leaders of the jama'a here, Gudindi and his son Jaji, left emirate authority very weak in the area. It was only with the appointment of the Sarkin Maska Muhamman Sani, another son of Gudindi, that stable conditions began to return. He effectively contained the raiders of the tawaye and stabilized the political situation, using many of the offices and personnel of the Sarakunan Maska.[55]

The cultivation of cotton and indigo remained the basis of important commercial and manufacturing activity in Maska. These products were processed into *sulaye* (bunches of thread) and baba (dyestuff) and exported to northern Katsina and eastwards into Kano. The textile industry that had flourished in the town was revived and Maska continued to be famous for a type of cloth known as Bunu dan Maska.[56] Weavers came

49. *MHA(k)*, August 1972.
50. *Magaji Tudu: Tarihi Wawar Kaza*, NNAK/KATPROF/I/52.
51. *Ibid.*
52. *Ibid.*
53. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 76. Clayton, *op. cit.*
54. See p. 156.
55. *MMT(y)*, August 1972.
56. *MMM(s)*, August 1972.

to Maska in the dry season from as far away as Doro, Mani, Ingawa, and Kurkujan, setting up their looms there and working until the bazara when they packed and returned to their homes in the north. This manufacturing activity and commerce brought more people into the town. The Sarkin Maska Abubakar built a new wall extending the town to the south-east,[57] this extension only filled slowly as the emir of Zazzau, Sambo b. Abd al-Qadir (1878—1888), saw it as an attempt to attract people away from border settlements in his emirate and took measures to counter this.[58] By the time of the Sarkin Maska Halilu the new extension was filled and Maska continued as one of the leading birane of Katsina.

The significance

The establishment of new towns was not only important as a means of creating the social and economic pre-conditions for improving the material welfare of the population, or even just as a measure of defence. It also represented an attempt to consolidate the emirate political community on a firm foundation of new towns whose identity and composition was inseparable from it. The corporate identity and composition of the urban centres that were well-established by the time of the jihad developed within the framework of the sarauta system. The jihad and the subsequent social and political changes altered this, and elements of the emirate system predominated in most of these centres—a predominance which, in certain circumstances, was precarious. Opposition to the town administration, in places like Matazu, Karofi, Ruma, and Kurmin Dan Ranko and some others well established before the jihad, took the form of evoking the past. Thus opposition was not simply against the new ruling groups in the towns but against the whole of the emirate system, often ending up in alliance with the tawaye, as occurred in all the towns mentioned above.[59] In the new urban centres founded under the emirs like Bakori, Kurfi, Malumfashi, Tsaskiya, Musawa, Wawalkaza the hegemony of the new political system was more solidly based in the very elements that composed them. Their identity and their internal social and political structures started within the emirate, and political conflicts within them tended to remain inside the emirate framework and were easier for the emirate government to contain.

57. *MMT(y)*, August 1972.
58. *Ibid.*
59. See pp. (Folio 294—301).

At another level, however, urban development in nineteenth century Katsina represented a continuation rather than a break with the pre-jihad epoch. The extension of the authority of the 'jikokin Korau' from the Birnin Katsina involved the transformation and establishment of garuruwa and birane from where this authority was exercised on the villages and hamlets. In the same way, the political integration of the emirate involved the transformation of old towns and the establishment of new ones to act as centres from where the officials of the emirate government ruled the villages and hamlets.

Even before the spread of Islam in this region, the birane and garuruwa were seen as the centres of cultured and civilized existence. The culture and way of life emanating from them had become hegemonic. This situation, found among most of the Hausa-speaking people, was reinforced when Islam took root in these towns and the urban way of life became essentially an Islamic way of life. Thus, under both the sarauta and emirate systems, urbanization was seen as the means of fostering good living conditions, enlightenment and civilization.

ECONOMY

As has been indicated above the growth of urban centres involved changes in the economy.[60] The establishment of the towns of Tsaskiya and Kurfi, for example, led to the growth of new markets and stopping places for caravans in the western districts. The growth of the town of Doro, in the Mani plains, was connected with the settlement there of fatake involved in the trade in slaves, they also maintained large farming estates nearby—while the expansion of Giremawa was partly brought about by the settlement there of groups of semi-nomadic Daneji and Dauraji Fulani. The town of Kafin Dangi on the central plains, came to be a new centre of weaving and dyeing, using cotton and indigo brought in from elsewhere. The reoccupation of the site of Dan Ashita revived the cultivation of indigo and a flourishing dyeing industry developed serving the border markets nearby. The town of Dan Tutture, resettled in the 1840s, grew into a prosperous little border town attracting migrants from Kano and Zazzau. Indigo and cotton cultivation was developed and indigo and dyestuff was sent to Kano, Daura and to places as far away as Hadejia and Nguru.[61] Weaving and dyeing came to be established,

60. The growth of urban centres and the expansion of commerce was taking place all over the Caliphate in this period, actively encouraged from Sokoto. The Caliph Ahmad b. Atiku (1859—1866) is remembered in Sokoto for repairing markets, securing roads and for the installation of metal gates on many towns. *S.P.G.*, p. 102.

61. *GID(I)*, August 1972.

supplying cloth to markets like Gora-mai-kasuwa, Karaye, Rogo and Gwarzo in Kano.[62] Similarly the cultivation of indigo and cotton and the development of weaving and dyeing were some of the factors that brought about the expansion of the town of Maska in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Clearly, the consolidation of the new political community through the building of new towns was closely bound up with the transformation that the economy was undergoing in the nineteenth century and was not just a reaction to raiding and warfare. It is not possible to trace this pattern of economic transformation in detail within the scope of this study. However, an attempt is made below, to sketch in some of the more obvious aspects.

Communications

Some of these changes in the economy were certainly directly caused by the wars and rebellions of the nineteenth century; one of the more obvious of which was the pattern of east-west communication across the territory of the emirate.[63]

The break up of the city of Yandoto in c.1806 eliminated a major commercial centre and a junction of routes in south-western Katsina.[64] When Gusau emerged as an important urban centre in the area in the middle of the nineteenth century, it was located over 26 kilometres to the north-west. It became integrated into the commercial network of the Sokoto basin and also the headquarters of the small emirate of Katsina *al-gharbi*, covering south-western Katsina and areas of Zamfara.[65] The preconditions of this had been established by the situation of Yandoto in the region in the eighteenth century.[66] The real effect of the break-up of Yandoto on the economy of the emirate is difficult to assess. The Birnin Kogo region in spite of the establishment of the town of Faskari nearby remained as it was in the late eighteenth century, an economic backwater. A more palpable consequence of the break-up of Yandoto was that the old east-west route across southern Katsina that passed through that city lost some of its importance. This route from Birnin Kano-Gwarzo-Gora-mai-kasuwa-Ketare-yan Kuzo-Yandoto became affected by the unsettled conditions in the Yandoto region caused by the

62. *Ibid.*
63. See Map B.
64. See pp. (Folio 81—3).
65. *S.P.G.*, p. 144.
66. See pp. (Folio 83—5).

activity of raiders of the tawaye.[67] The Birnin Kano-Farin Ruwa-Gyaza-Radda-Birchi-Zurmi route, skirting the Karaduwa-Bunsuru basin and then going northwards to Zurmi, became more important, but this was also partly due to the fact that the town of Sokoto, the capital of the Caliphate, established in c.1809, was closer and much more accessible from Zurmi

Another important route from Katsina to the west was the Birnin Katsina-Yandaka-Ruma-Zurmi road. With the break-up of Ruma and the settlements around it during the boren Dan Mari, this latter route declined in importance and the one through the Gyaza-Radda-Birchi area became quite a key highway for the communications not only of Katsina and the emirate of Zamfara, but of the whole Caliphate. It was perhaps due to the importance attached to this route that the amir al-mu'minin Aliyu Babba mobilized—with such despatch—the forces of several emirates to assist Saddiku against Dan Mari, whose rebellion had cut it. It was perhaps for the same reason that Saddiku's punitive measures, which were depopulating the settlements along this route, met with such opposition in Sokoto. The towns of Ummadau and Kurfi were established partly in order to serve this route, which remained a premier highway of the Caliphate right down to its overthrow.

But with the stabilization of political conditions in the upper Sokoto river area, the old Yandoto route through southern Katsina began to carry more and more traffic. Some of this went to Gusau and north-westwards to the settlements of the Sokoto-Rima confluence. A large proportion, however, went along the valley of the river Zamfara, through Anka-Gummi, to the market town of Jega and on to the Niger port of Illo. Another branch of this went south-westwards from Gusau-Magami-mai-tarko-Bena-Kotonkoro-Kumbashi-Yawuri, along another equally ancient highway, to the west and south.

Nevertheless, it is important to realize that it was not simply military activity *per se* that led to the disruption of communications, as is so often widely assumed. It was only certain types of military activity, especially those aimed specifically at travellers by the *'yan samame* (raiders) and other such bands, or those that destroyed settlements and prevented cultivation over wide areas. Thus, although to the north-east of the Birnin Katsina important urban centres like Dankama and Birnin Samri were also destroyed during the jihad wars—and in fact the whole of the Kasar Katsina to the north of the latitude of Dankama became part of a hostile kingdom—there was no significant shift in the patterns of communications in this area. The Birnin Katsina-Gazawa-Tasawa-

67. See pp. (Folio 264—265).

Tegama-Agades route continued to be used as before, and the Birnin Katsina-Gazawa-Korogom-Zinder route also remained equally, indeed more, important. This was because, in spite of the considerable military activity in this region involving all the major polities, for most of the century this was military activity under the control of governments with defined policies. These policies did not often involve the deliberate disruption of all north-south and east-west communication in the area, though they did involve the deliberate disruption of *some* of the communication network. Dan Baskore for example, attempted to disrupt communication *within* the emirate of Katsina. The boren Dan Mari brought about the disruption of communication over most of the north-western and west-central districts of the emirate. Similarly, the emirate government, pursuing what was an essentially defensive strategy, disrupted settlement and communication in the Maradi kingdom. But all the governments had an interest in keeping the major border routes open and movements by large caravans across hostile border were permitted. The organization of the ransoming of captives, an outcome of the type of military activity the governments engaged in, required facilities for communication, as a letter from the Sarkin Katsina (Maradi) Masallachi to the emir Musa (1883—1888) reveals.[68]

Agriculture

Agricultural activity in Katsina was also directly affected by these rebellions and wars. The break-up of Dankama and Birnin Samri led to the abandonment of acres of grain-producing farmland in the lower gulbin Kaita basin. The area between the ruins of Dankama and the Birnin Katsina remained largely uncultivated right up to the middle of the nineteenth century when Barth passed through it coming from Gazawa in January 1851.[69] An area of farmland to the south of this, lying between Kaita and Mashi, had also reverted to daji by this period. Cultivation was resumed when the Marusa Dankande founded a gandu near the ruins of old Muduru and it was expanded when a new town of Muduru was established by the emir Bello.[70]

We can only assess the impact of all this on agricultural production in Katsina if we know where the farmers who abandoned their farms here went to, and what occupations they engaged in, or if they simply moved to other parts of Katsina. We know for example that some of the inhabitants of Birnin Samri went to establish the settlement of

68. *From Amir of Katsina Masallachi to Sultan of Katsina Musa*, NHRS/IV-72.
69. Barth, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 450—452.
70. *GIM(m)*, August 1972.

Saurawa near Bichi in Kano;[71] another group went to settle at Samri, in Katsina Laka.[72]

The upheavals of the nineteenth century had their most palpable impact on agriculture in the western and north-western districts of the emirate. In the years after the victory of the mujāhidūn, Malam Umaru Dumyawa, controlling the district to the north-west of the Birnin Katsina, started a policy of colonizing this area. He encouraged farmers to move in and settle, but before these settlements could take root the Maradi rebellion broke out in c.1816.[73] Within a few years the whole of the Kasar Katsina north of the latitude 13.15′ came under a new government established in Maradi; but besides the Maradi area itself, and the fadamomi of Gazawa, this was not an important agricultural zone. The raids that Dan Kasawa and his successors launched from here against the much richer agricultural zone just at its south however, brought about considerable depopulation in the area to the north-west of the Birnin Katsina. The Zandam-Kaga area for example, an area of rich agricultural production, became depopulated and the farms were abandoned.[74] Some of the people forced to leave this area moved northwards and helped in the colonization of the basin of the gulbin Maradi.[75]

When the boren Dan Mari broke out in 1842, the depopulated area became extended from Kaga right down to Runka. Some of the inhabitants moved northwards to settle in the Maradi basin; the Rumawa, for example, forming concentrations in the Madarunfa-Fatotuwa area. Those who remained within the territory of the emirate were settled in the early years of the reign of the emir Bello (1844—1870) when a vigorous policy of resettlement in the western districts was pursued. Tsaskiya, one of the new towns founded, developed into a major market for food grain, indicating the production of a considerable grain surplus in that area. Barth, who travelled through the area in March 1853, noted the large numbers of cotton grounds there.[76] One of the cotton fields he observed, was within the walled ruins of Takabawa, destroyed in the boren Dan Mari.[77]

The rebellion of Dan Tunku in c.1819—1822 on the eastern borders and the activities of the people of Banaga in the Maska region, also

71. *GIG(k),* August 1972.
72. *MHS(s),* August 1972.
73. See pp. (Folio 255—263).
74. *Ibid.* and Maps B and C.
75. David, *op. cit.,* pp. 667—669.
76. Barth, *op. cit.,* III, p. 93.
77. *Ibid.*

led to the disruption of agricultural activity. The impact of these upheavals was sometimes double-edged for instance the unsettled conditions around Roni led to the reoccupation of Dan Ashita and the revival of indigo cultivation in the fadamomi nearby.[78]

Besides these changes in the acreage cultivated there was also the development of intensive cultivation in cotton, indigo and tobacco. Cotton and indigo were produced over wide areas in the western districts and to the south of the gulbin Karaduwa. Tobacco cultivation was also fairly wide-spread, although the major centres were in an area just south of the Birnin Katsina around Kabakawa and in a belt extending in a semi-circle towards Zandam.

The main centres of cotton production were located in the Maska-Gozaki region. While at Maska, the cultivation of cotton went on alongside that of indigo and, at Tandama, cotton cultivation was the premier agricultural activity even before the jihad. By the mid-nineteenth century an area of woodland just outside Tandama, known as the Dogon Dawa, had been transformed into large cotton estates.[79] These were owned by a class of rich farmers living there such as Mayaki, Bakoshi Mai-dogon-geme, Umaru-riga-ta-kashe-ka, Namama and Bina.[80] On these estates the labour of bayin gandu was used for the intensive cultivation of cotton. Mayaki, for example, is said to have had over 100 bayi on his gandu at Dogon Dawa, and often harvested over 500 *kwararo*.[81] The kirari of Tandama clearly reflects its status as a centre of intensive cotton production: *Tandama garin bawan Jatau! Garin da kuyya daya ke kwararo goma!* (Tandama the town of the slave of Jatau! The town where one ridge produces ten kwararo).[82] Some of the cotton was sold in the market held there on Saturdays and Wednesdays and which had become famous for cotton. Some of the rich cotton farmers took their produce to Birnin Zaria where they sold it and required bayi for their estates.[83] It is said that these transactions took place in the trading houses of Kusfa, Durumin Maigarke and Marmara in Birnin Zaria, in whose warehouses and stores the cotton was deposited and who provided accommodation and brokerage service for these rich Tandama farmers.[84]

Intensive cultivation of another commodity, tobacco, developed in the nineteenth century. One of the main centres of its cultivation was

78. See pp. (Folio 74).
79. *MYT(b)*, August 1972.
80. *Ibid.*
81. *MYT(b)*, August 1972.
82. *Ibid.*
83. *Ibid.*
84. *Ibid.*

Kabakawa, about 8 kilometres south of the Birnin Katsina. There seems to have been a growth in the demand for it in Damagaram and the Abzin. Barth observed that the tobacco of Katsina, of which he bought a good quantity while he was there in 1853, was held in high regard as far west as Timbuctoo.[85]

The cultivation and preparation of tobacco required much labour and and capital. Heavy cattle manuring on the farm is essential before the tobacco seedlings are replanted.[86] Some of the rich tobacco farmers of Kabakawa like Hamidu, Dan Mairo, and the Galadima Dabbo had many bayin gandu to work for them and kept herds of cattle for manuring.[87] Dan Mairo is said to have had over 30 bayin gandu, while Hamidu had between 40 and 50.[88] The Galadima Dabbo is said to have had at least 50 head of cattle; a fairly large herd for such a densely settled and cultivated area.[89]The tobacco is planted after the millet harvest, towards the end of the damana[90] and harvested in the dry season after which the leaves have to be prepared and kept in a specially built hut for over 3 months. A rich farmer might produce anything up to 2,000 *sanka,* as the bundles of tobacco leaves are known, each of which sold, in the nineteenth century, at prices which varied between 50 to 200 cowries. The cured tobacco was bought by the Abzinawa, who visit the tobacco producing areas and the nearby markets like Dugazawa, and Ajiwa. There were also the specialized tobacco traders living here and in the Birni, who took it to the markets of the north, especially in Damagaram, from where among other things, they obtained salt and natron.[91]

Pastoralism

The growth in the intensive cultivation of cotton and tobacco was facilitated by the availability of cattle manure. Both cotton and tobacco are crops requiring fairly heavy manuring. It has already been pointed out that the rich tobacco farmers of Kabakawa obtained this partly from their own cattle; some of them keeping fairly large herds for that kind of densely cultivated karkara.[92] The rich cotton farmers of Tandama also built up large herds, which were both a secure source of manure and a means of realizing their capital. One of them, the baGozaki, Mayaki had a herd of over 100 head at his gandu in Dogon Dawa near

85. Barth, *op. cit.*, III, p. 85, fn. 1.
86. *SGM(s),* September 1972.
87. *Ibid.*
88. *Ibid.*
89. *Ibid.*
90. *Ibid.*
91. *Ibid.*
92. *Ibid.* Clearly 'mixed farming' was not a colonial innovation as is so often assumed.

Tandama.[93] The importance of cattle and smaller livestock as a source of manure and a stock of wealth had always been one of the major links between the agricultural and pastoral economy in Katsina.[94] The sedentarization of the nomadic and semi-nomadic Fulani strengthened this link. This process continued and even intensified in the nineteenth century.

It was after the jihad, for example, that sections of the pastoral Sullubawa, settled at Girka near the ruins of Birnin Samri.[95] Another group of the Sullubawa, including the people of Malam Yusuf Na Garabi, were made to settle at Kurfi when that town was built after the boren Dan Mari.[96] On the plains, groups of the pastoral Daneji and Dauraji settled at Alkandi, just outside the town of Giremawa, and came to form the Fulanin Giremawa.[97] Further to the south of Giremawa in the regions of Ingawa, a section of the pastoral Tuntumawa who had previously grazed their cattle around Jalli in western Kano settled.[98] Later in the century they returned to the semi-nomadic life and moved northwards settling at Goma in the reign of Abubakar (1888—1904) and later at Damle. A section of the Wodabe of the Katsina-Kazaure border region also became sedentarized and came to be known by the other Wodabe as the Katsinanko'en.[99]

In the Karaduwa basin more of the Daneji came to settle around Mazoji and Papu. Although those who came to graze in the Maska-Gozaki region had, under Gudindi and Jaji, remained strongly attached to nomadism, they became more sedentary under the Sarkin Maska Muhamman Sani and his successors.[100] In the latter part of the reign of the emir Muhamman Bello (1844—1870), the areas of Mahuta and Dankanjiba in the south-eastern districts received an influx of Dauraji Fulani over whom the Emir Ahmadu Rufai (1870—1871) appointed a Sarkin Fulani Dauraji.[101] A section of these Dauraji passed on to settle at Murai in Zazzau, but among these some families moved back again into Katsina, settling at Tandama.[102] Already the Tandama area was receiving an influx of Ehohi Fulani from the north;[103] these had regularly

93. *MYT(h)*, August 1972.
94. See pp. (Folio 303—306).
95. *MGY(g)*, August 1972.
96. See pp. (Folio 302—305).
97. *GIG(m)*, August 1972.
98. *SFJ(b)*, August 1972.
99. Dupire, *Peul Nomade*, p. 41.
100. See pp. (Folio 180)
101. *MYT(b)*, August 1972.
102. *Ibid.*
103. *Ibid.*

visited the area during the dry season when they produced the *kwarori* (special raffia bags), used for packing cotton.[104]

It seems that the process of sedentarization of the nomadic Fulani in Katsina—a process that had been going on in the area before Korau[105] —was accelerated after the jihad. A whole complex of ecological, economic, social and political factors were involved, relating to water, pasture, disease, markets, kinship ties, taxation and all aspects of pastoral activity.[106] In general, however, political conditions obtaining after the jihad favoured its acceleration. One factor which favoured the increased sedentarization of the Fulani after the jihad, was the incorporation of the leadership of several large clans into the government and local administration of the emirate; the best example of this were the Daneji.[107] Within this group the tension between their incorporation in the jama'a and in the administration of the emirate on the one hand and the nomadic way of life on the other, expressed itself forcefully in the erratic conduct of Gudindi and the abdication of his son Jaji from the office of Sarkin Maska.[108] This type of sedentarization brought about by the incorporation of the leadership of a clan into an administrative system based on territorial units was not peculiar to the emirate system. A similar process took place in the Maradi kingdom. There, the leadership of a semi-nomadic clan related to the Alibawa became incorporated into the Maradi political system around the office of Dan Yusufa.[109] This brought about the sedentarization of a large section of this clan in the Madarumfa-Maradi region.

Another reason why many groups of the nomadic Fulani settled was the direct pressure the emirate government, supported by the caliphs, brought to bear upon them. The notion that the emirate government was a 'Fulani' government, which became the main contention of the tawaye, became widespread and this might have produced attitudes favouring settlement among some of the nomadic Fulani.

Moreover, sedentarization was encouraged by the jangali, (cattle tax) policy adopted by Umarun Dallaji and Saddiku. Under these two emirs, the Muslim pastoralists were exempted from jangali, and only the

104. *Ibid.*
105. See p. (Folio 21).
106. *Ibid.*
107. See p. (Folio 122—123).
108. See pp. (Folio 242—243, 264—265, 276).
109. *GIO(a)* September 1971.

non-Muslim pastoralists were made to pay,[110] which rendered conditions easier for the Muslim pastoralists and thus encouraged them to stay within the emirate. It also encouraged the Islamization of the non-Muslim pastoralists, a process which it has been argued was not easily compatible with the highly specialized pastoralism of the *bororo*[111] (nomadic Fulani). The Emir Bello, altered this policy and made jangali an administrative tax, rather than jizia payable by non-Muslims only, and it came to be levied on all cattle owners.[112] The consequences of these reforms are touched on below, in the section on the political dimensions of these economic changes.

The great cattle plague of c.1891—1892, in which hundreds of thousands of cattle died, forced large numbers of the Fulani of Katsina to abandon pastoralism and settle down to other occupations.[113] It is not clear how far this affected the nomadic pastoralists and what was the general pattern of recovery. The consequences of these changes in pastoralism touched on all aspects of the economy and society, and on the whole a much greater integration of pastoralism and agriculture was brought about, which helped to facilitate the extension of permanent cultivation over almost all of the eastern and southern districts. Livestock also came to play a more important part in commerce. From these places and others, like Gora-mai-kasuwa, cattle, goats, and sheep were exported southwards, some going westwards to Nupe and Ilorin and others eastwards towards Lafia and the middle Benue region.[114]

Manufacture

The major trends in manufacturing activity in the second half of the nineteenth century are more difficult to define. Leather working seems to have remained an important activity, with the Birnin Katsina as the main centre producing for export.[115] The Birnin Kano area, which remained the major hub of the textile industry in the region, continued to exercise a strong pull on the weaving and dyeing centres of southern Katsina. However, there was some revival of this industry in the central and northern districts. The cotton and indigo markets of southern and

110. H.R. Palmer, *Kano Province Report Half Yearly Ending, 30/6/1909*, No. 40, NNAK/SNP/7/10-3635—1909.
111. Abubakar, *op. cit.*, pp. 168—170.
112. Palmer, *Kano Province Report, No. 40, 1909.*
113. *SFJ(b)*, August 1972.
114. *GII(i)*, August 1972.
115. Barth, *op. cit.*, III, p. 85, fn.

western Katsina are said to have been frequented by traders buying raw cotton, thread, and dyestuff to take northwards.[116]

The evidence for the expansion of iron working in the second half of the nineteenth century is more palpable and might have been connected with the extension of cultivation. The iron ore mines of the Kankara-Durdugau region attracted miners and smelters from other parts of the emirate and from Daura, Kazaure and Kano.[117] Blacksmiths also came, setting up their works near the mines. One *hoge*, (a horseshoe shaped piece of pig iron), is said to have cost up to 1,000 cowries at Kankara and could be used to produce 10 to 30 hoe blades, depending on its size.[118] During one iron working season from the early kaka to the late bazara, one kan makera could produce 500 hoe blades. Traders came in to buy the pig iron, the iron implements and weapons, directly from the iron workers, or through the iron brokers at nearby settlements and markets, such as Kankara and Ketare. The iron workers themselves took a part of their production back home, selling some of it en route. The arrival of makera and *'yan tama* (iron workers) from the south is said to have annually caused a sharp rise in the prices of textiles at Dan Ashita, for example, where the iron worker bought clothes and clothing material to take back to their homes further north. The status that Kankara attained as a centre of iron working is revealed in its kirari: *Kankara ta Danjamka Gwanjar karfe! Idan mutum ya zo da arziki ya dau karfe! Idan ya zo da tsiya ya sha kibiya!* (Kankara the town of Danjamka the Gonja of iron! If a man comes with spirit of goodwill he can take back plenty of iron! If he comes with ill will he receives an arrow!).[119]

In spite of the expansion of iron working in the Kankara-Burdugau area, the iron workers of Katsina continued going to mines further south. An iron ore mine near Tandama became quite important, not only for its iron, but also for its rough and restless population of iron workers, brokers and others drawn to a centre of dry season boom, who rebelled several times against the maigari of Tandama in the nineteenth century.[120]

Iron working near Birnin Gwari and Koriga continued to expand and by the late nineteenth century the iron works of Koriga are said to have

116. *MYT(b)*, August 1972. *MHM(s)*, August 1972. *GID(m)*, August 1972.
117. *MHD(k)*, August 1972. P.J. Jaggar 'Kano City Blacksmith: Precolonial Distribution Structure and Organisation' *Savannah*, 2.1, June 1973.
118. *MHD(k)*, August 1972.
119. *MHD(k)*, August 1972.
120. *MYT(b)*, August 1972.

produced annually thousands of hoe blades and *yar kuriga* became an epithet for a certain type of hoe.[121] The iron workers of the Koriga area are said to have used a special forced draught furnace which produced fine quality pig iron.[122] The rate of production of this type of furnace is said to have been slower, but that of the furnace which produced faster resulted in metal of an inferior quality.[123] The greater demand for iron seems to have led to an expansion of iron working even in the northern parts of the emirate. The smiths of the towns of Kaga and Zandama, resettled in the late nineteenth century, obtained pig iron from the iron workers at Matsai, about 15 kilometres north-east of the Birni.[124] Iron working also developed at Lafiaro, to the east of Kaita, which is said to have attracted iron workers from as far as Kano.[125]

Commerce

Changes in the commercial sector of the economy of Katsina in the nineteenth century have come to be closely associated with the fighting that took place in the area in that period. The view expressed by Barth, that this fighting led to a rapid decline in the commercial importance of Birnin Katsina in the nineteenth century, has gained widespread currency.[126] There was indeed protracted fighting around the Birnin Katsina in the last phase of the jihad campaigns, and the subsequent rebellions and raids of the tawaye touched parts of the area around the Birni, especially to the north and west. But the actual impact of all this on commercial activity cannot be properly assessed with the fragmentary evidence available now.

There are, indeed, some indications of commercial decline in the Birni Katsina and its environs in the first half of the nineteenth century. The town of Benye, the centre of a cluster of towns about 40 kilometres south of Birnin Katsina on a major southern route, was inhabited by rich Agalawa merchants.[127] One of these rich merchants was a woman, remembered as Mairam, and is said to have owned over 3,000 camels, and the site of her house is still identified in the ruins of old Benye, as Gidan Attajira.[128] These merchants are said to have quarrelled with the maigari,

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121. Monk, *Koriga District* ....p. 507. Hamilton, *Birnin Gwari District*.... Mischlich, *Uber Die Kulturen*....p. 168.
122. Monk, *Koriga District*....pp. 5—6.
123. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
124. *GIZ(j)*, August 1972. *GIM(j)*, August 1972.
125. C. Graham, 'Some Sketches of Katsina From the Past', *The Nigeria Field*, XXXIII.2, April, 1968, p. 90.
126. Barth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 478.
127. *AMS(b)*, July 1972.
128. *Ibid.*

in the early years of the nineteenth century, and moved out to Kano.[129] The whole Benye cluster lost its commercial importance.

Another indication of commercial decline was what seems to have been a significant emigration of *ghuraba* (foreign) merchants from Katsina to Kano in the reign of the Emir Saddiku (c.1836—1844).[130] Some of these merchants were probably those who settled in the Kulkul quarter near the Kasuwar Kurmi in the Birnin Kano, in the reign of the emir of Kano, Ibrahim Dabo, (1819—1846) led by one Abdullahi Kutkut.[131] Other streams of artisans and merchants arrived in Kano from Katsina and Zinder a few years later, settling in the Dandalin Turawa and the Dala hill area.[132]

An important factor behind these emigrations was the positive commercial attractions of the Birnin Kano area. Its commerce was benefitting, by the mid-nineteenth century, from the social and economic developments in the emirates of the east and south-east, covering a vast area stretching as far south as the basin of the Benue. The emir of Kano, Ibrahim Dabo, encouraged these merchants and artisans from Katsina and Zinder to move in and settle in Kano.[133] The unsettled political conditions in the last years of the reign of Saddiku, when the prospects of a long drawn out war with the tawaye in the centre of the emirate were real, would also have favoured such emigration.[134]

It is not possible, however, to speak in terms of a decline until the actual level of commercial activity before the jihad is established. Neither have we established the rate and nature of immigration into Katsina by merchants from elsewhere. It is quite clear though, that both Clapperton and Barth were much more impressed with commercial activity in the Birnin Kano than with what they witnessed in the Birnin Katsina.[135] Given their assumption that the Birnin Katsina was, before the jihad, the major entreport of trade with northern Africa, they inferred from this that the commerce of the Birni must have declined, since it was less than what they observed in Birnin Kano.[136] But given the type of people they

129. *Ibid.*
130. Alhaji Zakariya Badamasi, *op. cit.*
131. M.U. Adamu 'Some Notes on the Influence of North African Traders in Kano', *Kano Studies*, I.4, 1968, pp. 43—44.
132. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
133. *Ibid.*, pp. 43—44.
134. See pp. (Folio 298—302, 318—319).
135. Bovill, *op. cit.*, pp. 650—654; 708—709. Barth, *op. cit.*; I.
136. This assumption regarding the commercial importance of the Birnin Katsina before the jihad is derived from the writings of people connected with the Association for Promoting the Discovery of the Interior Parts of Africa. See *Proceedings* pp. 162—179.

associated with in these areas and their general outlook, they were much more inclined to give greater weight to the commerce involving the rich Abzinawa and north African merchants.[137] Barth, for example, noted tobacco fields in the Kabakawa area and also the high esteem with which the tobacco of Katsina was held; but was, apparently, unaware of the commercial activity of the *fataken taba* (itinerant tobacco merchants) which was bringing not inconsiderable wealth to the settlements of the karkara south and southwest of the Birni.[138] Most of the tobacco was bought in the homesteads of the tobacco farmers and at the large karkara markets like Ajiwa, and Dugazawa, through an aspect of commercial activity which did not attract the attention of these travellers.[139]

Another type of commercial activity in the environs of the Birni which was unlikely to come to the notice of such travellers developed at Sabon Gari, which Clapperton passed close by.[140] In the second half of the nineteenth century it developed into a centre of lively commerce in cotton, indigo textiles and mats.[141] Rich merchants and financiers living there, like Oshe and Shafi'i, are said to have built considerable fortunes from financing textile manufacture and commerce. Others specialized in the mat-making industry, exporting large quantities of *karammu* (hard white mats), southwards and bringing back, among others things, thread and dyestuff.[142]

And although Benye had declined and its rich Agalawa merchants had moved into Kano, the town of Caranci, only about 10 kilometres east of Benye, emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century as an important market town. It was walled by the Kaura Abubakar and has remained an important market town to this day.[143]

In general, the fragmentary evidence available does not conclusively support Barth's view of commercial decline in the Birnin Katsina after the jihad. There are certainly indications which point towards a decline, like the emigration of Agalawa and the ghuraba merchants from Benye and the Birni into Kano. But there are also definite indications of vigorous commercial activity in the second half of the nineteenth century in the settlements around the Birni. Much more detailed study is necessary before we can establish the dominant trend; but this requires placing the commerce of the Birnin Katsina in the context of the commerce in

137. Bovill, *op. cit.*, passim. Barth, *op. cit.*, passim.
138. Barth, *op. cit.*, III, p. 85, fn.
139. *SGM(s)*, September 1972.
140. Bovill, *op. cit.*, pp. 709—711.
141 *WHS(g)*, July 1972. *MIS(g)*, July 1972.
142. *MIS(g)*, July 1972. *WHS(g)*, July 1972.
143. *AAM(r)*, July 1972.

the whole of the emirate and not assuming that its important commerce was primarily geared to the trans-Saharan trading networks. The commercial situation in the late eighteenth century also needs to be established before the significance of whatever trend obtained after the jihad can be appreciated. Certainly one identifiable major trend in the commerce of the emirate in the nineteenth century was the growth of markets which tended to specialize in one or two major commodities. The market of Runjin Baushi, which specialized in the commerce in livestock has already been mentioned.[144] Kankara, Ketare and the markets of that area grew up around the trade of the iron works, while Tandama became important for both cotton and iron.[145] Among the new towns established in the mid-nineteenth century we find Tsaskiya becoming a major grain market.[146]

The political dimensions

The social and economic developments outlined in the preceding two sections of this chapter involved important changes in the emirate's political system. As has already been pointed out, the establishment of new urban communities and the transformation of existing ones greatly assisted the consolidation of its social base. Alongside these were changes in agriculture, pastoralism, manufacture and commerce, which gave the new state organization and its ruling class a more solid basis in the structure of the economy.

The extension of settlement and of cultivation involved the establishment of large farming estates by the notables of the emirate government. The resettlement of the depopulated districts around Kaita, for example, really got under way after the emir Bello had developed a large gandu and a nassarawa there.[147] The keffi of Dankaba was established around a farm of one of the emir's officials Muhamman Gajeren Badde.[148] Another official of the emirate government, the Sarkin Tafarki Dahiru, was given land at Lomi a few kilometres north of Yandaki, he built a gandu there and colonized an abandoned tract of territory between Kaita and the Birni. Further to the east, the powerful Marusa Dankande had, even before the establishment of the town of Muduru, built a gandu in the stretch of woodland between Kaita and Mashi.[149] The expansion of the settlement of Tsauri involved the establishment there of a large

144. See pp. (Folio 392).
145. See pp. (Folio 411—412, 421—422).
146. See pp. (Folio 306).
147. See pp. (Folio 388).
148. *Kaita District Note Book*, pp. 21, 25.
149. *GIM(m)*, August 1972.

farming estate by the Yandaka Hassan.[150] Several gandaye were established by the Yerima's around the new town of Musawa.[151] All over the emirate the extension of cultivation and settlement brought into the hands of members of the emirate aristocracy more farming land, giving them firm roots in the agricultural economy.

While these changes in the pattern of cultivation and settlement enhanced the agrarian wealth of emirate officials, the reforms in the cattle tax, introduced by the emir Bello, brought more revenue to the central and local administration.[152] These reforms also provided the administration with an instrument for much closer supervision of pastoral activity. The cattle of both Muslim and non-Muslim Fulani, came to be enumerated; their wet season and dry season grazing ground determined. Although some of the clans like the Dangawa and Dauraji initially paid jangali only to their sarakunan Fulani, the majority of the Fulani in Katsina were taxed in the territory in which they grazed in the damana.[153] When the jangali reforms of Bello were first introduced, it is likely that some emigration of the pastoralists from Katsina took place. Among those who stayed the changes favoured greater sedentarization and the establishment of close social and economic ties with the local ruling groups.

The regularization of the supervision and taxation of major manufacturing activity in the reign of Muhamman Bello, had similar consequence for the revenue of the emirate administration and for the relations between the emirate ruling class and the producers. An organization for this existed before the jihad.[154] Although some of the titles of the officials in this organization were distributed under the first two emirs, the political situation then did not make for any close and regular supervision of specialized economic activity over all the emirate.

By the mid-nineteenth century however, an official known as the Tamama was established at Kankara to supervise and collect the taxes from the iron workers there.[155] Although each section of the iron ore mine was under an officially designated *Uban* Tama, from among the yan tama, it seems the tax was collected only from the blacksmiths.[156] Each blacksmith's work was taxed 5 hoe blades per person.[157] The

150. See p. (Folio 308).
151. *LHM(m)*, August 1971.
152. Palmer, *Kano Province Report no. 40.*
153. *MYT(b)*, August 1972. *DAY(d)*, August 1972.
154. See p. (Folio 149).
155. *MHD(k)*, August 1972.
156. *Ibid.*
157. *Ibid.*

Sarkin Makera of the whole emirate occasionally made a tour from the Birni, but the officials here seem to have been left with considerable autonomy.

Commercial activity also came to be more closely supervised by the administration. It was the emir Muhamman Bello, for example, who appointed Dahiru a baSullube of Shinkafi, to ensure the security of the major route to the north and north-east, and to collect custom duties on them.[158] His post came to be known as that of the Sarkin Tafarki *(tafarki* = highway). During the crises of 1842—1844 the activities of brigands and yan samame from Maradi had made these important arteries of commerce unsafe. The Abzinawa and other merchants, from whom the custom duties were collected, had taken advantage of this to avoid payment. Dahiru mobilized the yan karma and yan baka of this area east of the Birni, with whom he was closely connected, and placed them at various points to secure the roads, the zango, and to collect custom duties at places like Kwarin Tsiga, east of Mashi and at Tilla.[159] He supervised all these from his homestead at Lomi, near Yandaki and later from a large house he built in the kofar Samri quarter of the Birni. He was succeeded as Sarkin Tafarki by his son Muhamman Gidado, who rose to become one of the leading warriors and officials of the central administration from the reign of Bello until his death about three months after that of the emir Ibrahim in 1883.[160]

Even the local administration provided instances of the close connection between developments in the economy and the evolution of the political administrative system. As has been shown, the sedentarization of the pastoral Fulani not only allowed for greater extension of cultivation, but led to the growth of commerce in livestock. One of the main centres of this was the plains of Ingawa where the great livestock market of Runjin Baushi was situated. Merchants taking part in this trade moved into the town of Ingawa, and some of them, like the Madugu Guga a Babarbare from Kandawa, and the Madugu Alhassan a Bagobiri from Bauje, developed close relations with the Dambon Ingawa Mazaddu and his son Dambo Saidu.[161] These rulers of Ingawa came to invest in the trading expeditions of such merchants, providing them with livestock, horses and even cash.[162] Through this enterprise they built up large fortunes. The Dambo Saidu came to have a large stable of several hundred war horses and with these took an active part in the campaigns against the

158. *GIS(m),* August 1972. *MYA(k),* August 1972.
159. *GYA(k),* August 1972.
160. *K.H./PP-NHRS,* passim.
161. *GII(i),* August, 1972. *Asalin Mutanen Ingawa,* p. 39.
162. *GII(i),* August 1972. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.,* p. 118.

tawaye.[163] He became a powerful figure in the emirate, leading a rather flamboyant life and maintaining a large establishment at his palace in Ingawa.[164] His close involvement with commerce however, which was bringing him a lot of wealth, came to effect his public functions and he was accused of levying excessive taxes and seizing free citizens to sell off as slaves.[165] These were some of the causes of the boren Dara, when the people of the Dara area in his territory rebelled and refused to pay tax and were only crushed with contingents sent by the emir Abubakar (1888—1904).[166]

Clearly the roles of individuals and groups in both the sarauta and emirate systems were crucially determined by their relations to the various forms of economic activity. These relations determined not only the volume and nature of the economic resources they had access to, but also their links with the various occupational groups forming the society. The emphasis that has been given to titles in the study of the political system of the region has led to a neglect of this dimension.[167] Hierarchies of titles represent what is essentially schematization of the political system based on certain conceptions of its operation. When properly studied, these titles, like all political terms, might give an indication of the general outline of a political system. However, it is only by examining the more fundamental dimensions of the political system—one of which is its relations with the major forms of economic activity—that we can go beyond the simplistic nominalism of these title-centred studies. The sketch above only touches some aspects of the political dimensions of the economic changes in Katsina in the nineteenth century. It is intended to indicate that the nature and development of the emirate political system cannot be grasped in isolation from its relations to the major forms of economic activity.

163. *Asalin Mutanen Ingawa*, pp. 42—43.
164. *Ibid.*
165. Dankousso and Caranci, *op. cit.*, p. 118. *GII(i)*, August 1972.
166. *AIT(k)*, August 1972. *GID(i)*, August 1972.
167. See, for example, M.G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau. 1800—1950*, London, 1964, which is the most notorious of these title-centred studies.

A note on sources

UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS

Kitāb ila ma'arifat umara Kashna, PP-NHRS, xerox Vol.2, Ms61, pp. 1008—1016.

This seems to be a copy of an old king list compiled in the early eighteenth century.[1] It contains 26 names of kings starting with 'Kumayo' and ending with Karyagiwa b. Jan Bazo (c.1702—1728). This is followed by an account of the origin of the dynasties of the Hausa kingdoms. The entries under Ibrahim Maje (c.1547—1563) and Muhammadu Uban Yara (1641—1671) have much more detail and both kings are praised for their active support of Islam and the ulama. There is, however, more specific detail on Uban Yara. The time, the day, the date and year of his death are given; so are his genealogical connections with some of his predecessors and successors. The information about crises in Katsina's relations with Kano and Zamfara in his reign, which are given in it, are corroborated by two independent sources, the *Tarīkh arbāb hadha ala balad al musammā Kano* and the *Tarihin Zamfara.*[2] The compiler of this manuscript perhaps used an older document compiled by a contemporary of Uban Yara. Some of the praises of Uban Yara sound as if the writer knew him—'He honoured him with understanding who made requests to him'. The translation used is by Professor Abdullahi Smith.

Kitāb tartib umara Kashna

There are two manuscripts with this title. One is a king-list in the Palmer Papers (Ms19), which seems to be a copy of an older king-list derived from some of the documents used in the compilation of the *Kitāb ila ma'arifat umara Kashna,* as is clear from the similarities in the brief entries after the names and years of reign of several kings.[3] The second

1. See my 'The Dynastic Chronologies of Three Polities of Katsina: (i) The Kasar Katsina. (ii) The Emirate of Katsina. (iii) The Kingdom of Maradi' forthcoming.
2. Krieger, *Geschichte von Zamfara,* Berlin, 1959, pp. 37—38.
3. See Usman, 'The Dynastic Chronologies.....'.

ms, carrying the same title, also contains a king-list of Katsina with similar content to the former; this is followed by a Kano king-list. The major difference between the two is that the second continues on after the king-list with an account of the jihad campaign up to c.1808. It is from the collection of the emir of Kazaure Adamu (1941—1968) in the NNAK/Kanoprof: 4:66. The statement under Jan Hazo (1671—1684) 'We pray to God to lengthen his days....' shows that this section was copied from a document written during his reign. Another evidence of compilation by contemporaries of the kings comes with Karyagiwa Duban (c.1768—1778) whose entry begins *'And now* Kariagiwa Duriagiwa Duba'—giving no years.[4] Although originals of both manuscripts were probably compiled in the nineteenth century, they were clearly derived from king-lists compiled by successive writers over a long period of time.[5] Both mss were translated by Professor Abdullahi Smith.

Kitāb zimam ul-duyun of Ahmad Abu al-Gaith al-Tuwati, NNA/Katprof:3.

This is the ledger book kept by this Tuwati trader who lived in the Birnin Katsina in the middle years of the nineteenth century. Abu al-Gaith was met by Barth in 1851.[6] Two of my informants, Alhaji Barmo Makudawa and Abba Darho, who participated in the group interview in the Unguwar Alali, were descended from him. He is remembered in the Birnin Katsina as 'Alhaji Bulgai'. Part of the ledger has been translated for me by Professor Abdullahi Smith and contains detail of many forms of financial and commercial transactions, entered by this banker and merchant. Some of the entries give the dates fixed for the payment of debts:—Rabi 1, 1255 (May/June 1839), for example, indicating that he had lived in the Birni for at least ten years when Barth first met him in 1851.

Other unpublished manuscripts from the Palmer Papers

Most of the important unpublished ms used in this study come from the collection of Sir Richmond Palmer who worked as a colonial administrative officer in Nigeria. This collection, known as The Palmer Papers, Jos Museum Collection, is available on microfilm and xerox with the Northern History Research Scheme, Department of History, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. The Arabic ms were written from the time of his first posting to Katsina in March 1905, at Palmer's specific requests.

4. See text of K.T.K./NNAK in *ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. M. Dupire, *Peul Nomad* Paris, 1962.

Some of them were copied from other documents, while others were perhaps oral traditions written down then. It seems though, that most of the accounts in Arabic had, to some extent, been drawn from other Arabic documents. The *Tarīkh Asli Kashna wa Asl Ghubir* was perhaps based on some documents but the information from it was incorporated with rather anecdotal oral traditions. In general they suffer from the weaknesses of oral traditions and poorly preserved documents. Because of the way they were produced, there might have been a danger of some of them being written, not to communicate any authentic historical information, but merely to satisfy Palmer's curiosity. The letter from Alhaji Zakariya Badamasi to Palmer illustrates that the ulama were not necessarily overawed by Palmer and in some cases held their ground by refusing to make up information to satisfy him.

> 'Greetings, peace and respect to mista Fama, the al-qadi of the English. May God give him victory.
> From Al-Hajj Zakariya known as Badamasi: As for your question concerning Ibn Sabbagh, his name was Muhammed, his father's name Abd al-Aziz. As for the name Dan Takum, look for it in the book which he wrote, which is called *Jami sharh Mukhtasar al-Khalil*.... He and Ibn Sabbagh were not contemporaries. Ibn Sabbagh lived many years before, but we forgot the number.... As for your question, who was the Sultan at the time when the foreigners of Kano moved to Katsina because of heavy taxes, the answer is that we did not hear of this. We heard that they were here originally.... As for your question regarding the Amir of Katsina during the time of Ibn Sabbagh we have mentioned it to you before in a letter...'

It also seems that these documents for Palmer were not written from a particular angle to suit any colonial or native authority policy. Palmer makes no use of them in his reports and memorandum, in fact he generally ignores them and, with the exception of a few king-lists[7] does not even use them in his publication on the history of Katsina. Palmer even ignores the detailed notes he made from some documents on the history of Katsina in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, like the 'Book of Katsina by Dan Masani' and 'Katsina History'. The latter is a 41 page compilation containing detailed annalistic account of the history of Katsina, from the appointment of the three commanders of the jama'a by the Shehu, to the visit of Kaura Hassan of Maradi to the Birnin Katsina in June—July 1907; probably it was written about that time. A list of the emirs (p. 59) stops with Yero, assigned 2 years. The account itself —perhaps copied from a more detailed one in summary by Palmer—gives the events in a loose chronological order. Sometimes the month in which an event occurred is given; in some instances the year of the particular reign in which it occurred is also given. Palmer however, attempted to determine the years, and to place the whole account in a firmer chronolo-

7. H.R. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs*, III, Lagos, 1928. pp. 79—83.

gical framework using the chronological information he had about the caliphs as his reference. This attempt was clearly not successful although it was tried several times in his notebooks.

It seems that Palmer did not even succeed in getting the correct years for events which took place while he was in Katsina. The last item in the account is the arrival of Kaura Hassan in Katsina and this is given as taking place in Jumada 1, in the first hegira year after the appointment of Dikko.[8] Palmer places this in 1324 A.H.,—which would give the date as June-July 1906 A.D.—for the visit of Kaura Hassan. But as he himself reports in a letter to the Resident Kano, dated 30/6/1907 (SNP15/3-B3), Kaura Hassan arrived in Katsina on 29 June 1907 and visited him that afternoon. The Jumada 1 of the first hegira year after the appointment of Dikko fell between 12 June 1907 and 11 July 1907; showing clearly that the account is corroborated by the letter, but that Palmer's chronological determination is wrong.

I have not used the chronology suggested by Palmer for this account, and although I have tried to establish one it is impossible as some of the events were clearly incorrectly placed. Instead I have limited myself to establishing dates—or the relative chronological position—of events using internal evidence and other sources. In general the accounts contain a good deal of reliable information and some of this is corroborated by Tilho and the *I.M.* and by oral traditions. I have treated it as a loose annalistic compilation from which to draw specific items of information. In his notebook I (microfilm reel 46), Palmer compiled a more accurate chronology for the nineteenth century; he does not of course, indicate his source. It is used here for reconstructing the chronology of the emirs.[9]

Besides making detailed notes such as these, Palmer also collected oral traditions, fortunately he gives dates (and in some instances the names of the informants) and these fell in 1907—1909.

COLONIAL ARCHIVES

Reports and records of the British colonial administration in the Nigerian National Archives, Kaduna.

The historical information in these sources about the period studied here is derived from oral traditions collected by British colonial administrators. The information was intended to guide them in initiating and

8. H.R. Palmer, 'Katsina History', Notes, *PP-NHRS,* Microfilm reel no. 46.

9. See appendix on chronology.

executing colonial policy. The oral traditons were collected through group and individual interviews at the district headquarters, and occasionally at other important towns in the district. A large proportion was collected in the early years of this century. The earliest seems to be the *Assessment Report Yandaka District* 1909 (NNAK/Katprof: 1-1898). Most of the others were collected in the 1910-1940 period. Their major strength as sources for the history of the nineteenth century is that they were collected from people of whom some were adult in the late nineteenth century. One of the persons who supplied information for the *Dan Yusufa District Notebook* (NNAK/Katna—W768) for example, was Alkali Muhammadu Kwaine of Rugar Bade, who was interviewed in December 1927. Muhammadu Kwaine was born in c.1848 and was a mature young man during the latter years of the reign of Bello (1844—1870). He was appointed Alkali in 1888 and was thus an active participant in the government in the last decade of the century. He would personally have known people who were eyewitnesses, or participants, in the jihad campains. His son, Malam Abdullahi Maikano, about 77 years old, and one of my informants, would have only the faintest memory of pre-colonial Katsina and was able to communicate only what he had read and learnt from his father and others of his father's or grandfather's generation. The early records of the colonial administration often contain information obtained from actual participants in the late nineteenth century.

The great weakness of these records is that most of the colonial administrators who collected the oral traditions did not understand Hausa. Those who did spoke it in a staccato fashion very difficult for an ear not familiar with 'Hausar Bature' to understand. They therefore relied on the assistance of interpreters whose English was generally poor. The possibility of misunderstanding, especially if a district officer thinks his Hausa is very good, or his interpreter assumes that his English is excellent, was clearly considerable. The collection of information of any type by the colonial administration was, due to the nature of the colonial situation, regarded as a highly political act which could have all sorts of consequences. The master/subject-people relationship, between a European—especially a district officer—and the informants prevented any genuine exhanges of historical information. Few of the colonial administrators were trained in the recovery of historical data of any type, especially oral traditions. Their own assumptions about the history of the area coloured not only their questions but how they comprehended the answers they received and how they wrote them out in a coherent form. Even without such weaknesses, the information in these records is scanty, limited to certain aspects of political history—administration —and containing very little on social, intellectual and economic history; thus it can really only be used to supplement other sources.

In general, the records of the colonial administration contain some real nuggets of authentic tradition, as well as a lot of interpretation and narration of dubious value, especially in the reports and memorandum. The *History of Katsina* (SNP/17/8 K.2076) is a good example of the latter while P.G. Hariss' *Assessment Report on Marusa District* 1920 (NNAK/Katprof His 40) contains some good examples of the former.

Reports of the French colonial administration in the Services des Archives, Niger Republic

My comments on the British colonial records apply equally to these. I was unable to make extensive use of the records in the Niamey and Zinder depositories of the Services des Archives, because I do not understand French sufficiently well. I copied portions of documents that looked interesting, or had them photocopied for translation later. My difficulties were not mitigated by the fact that they were all uncatalogued.

ORAL TRADITIONS

The reliability of oral traditions is a function of their modes of preservation and transmission. Except for the kirari of towns, people, and the iskoki, and the genealogical recitations of the *bambadawa* (clans of genealogy specialists), most of the traditions that I collected were not 'set pieces'. They were preserved in the memory of my informants in what might be said to be an 'open' form, susceptible to those factors that shape human memory and lacking the formal inner structure (such as exists in the kirari and recitations of the bambadawa) with which to counteract some of the distorting elements.

My informants were largely elders and, to whatever social strata they belonged, they are expected to know the history of their community. For example, they are expected to know the origin and history of their own families and of the people with whom they lived and worked, in order to understand the nature of their kinship relations. They are expected to know the history of the settlement in which they live in some detail, because from this knowledge basic information for resolving issues on land, housing, succession to offices—and a whole gamut of social and political relations are derived by the community. A *dattijo* is, by definition, an elderly person who can be consulted on such issues, on questions of right and wrong, and who also knows the al'adu (customs) of his community. One duty of the elders is to transmit all this to the children, young people and adults as part of their education.

In the course of interviews I tried to emphasize this aspect of my relationship with informants—as a member of a younger generation to whom the transmission of historical information is normal—and in a way,

obligatory. Nevertheless, the formal nature of the interviews detracted from this aspect and clearly, political and social factors entered which would not have arisen in the normal course of an elder passing on such information to the young people of his community. Some of these considerations might be partially deduced from the brief biographical notes on each informant.

Methodology

Interviews were conducted, and recorded in my notebooks, in Hausa. After exchanging greetings I usually began by introducing myself, explaining that I was from Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria where we were attempting to write the history of the various kasashe: that the histories of Sokoto, Yawuri, Kebbi and Adamawa had already been written and that I had been assigned to write the history of the Kasar Katsina before the British and for this reason wanted to record the history of their town, family, or group.

If the person, or persons began to talk immediately I simply listened and made notes. Otherwise, I opened with a question on a specific detail—such as the name of the founder of the settlement or quarter, or its kirari. As far as possible I tried to leave informants free to say whatever they wished and although sometimes this resulted in disjointed information, in general it seemed to draw more out. I tried to fit my questions within the context of the information offered, but when some irrelevant argument arose I usually diverted this by a question leading to another track.

Various versions sometimes emerged in group interviews—though often differing only in nuance. In such cases I recorded all versions and tried to indicate the variations. If the response was disinterested I persisted, but allowed the matter to drop if the disinterest continued. As I have described in my thesis upon which this book is based, at Ummadau disagreements between two informants in a group interview became so violent that I had to conduct two separate interviews. In most cases I was unable to return for a second interview, though when it was possible the results were most fruitful. Discussions conducted at night, as a hira, in an informal relaxed fashion were useful. I learned a lot from the reflections and general observations of the informants; unfortunately on these occasions it was not possible to take notes, only to listen and contribute my own observations and information and occasionally throw in questions. Although I attempted to cross-check information by raising the same question at different interviews, or from different angles at the same interview, I tried as much as possible to avoid giving my informants the impression that they were being interrogated.

My impending visit was known several weeks in advance by the district heads. The Emir had requested my itinerary and his secretary notified all district heads and urged them to cooperate with me. Sometimes I asked to visit specific villages and often discussed this with the district head and people whom I interviewed in the district headquarters. In the villages, although I could ask for people with knowledge of specific groups or occupations the village head usually decided whom to invite for interview.

Most interviews with individuals took place at their houses, while group interviews were usually in the village or hamlet head's house; the village or hamlet head was present in most cases, whilst several other people listened. I was always accompanied by a representative of the district head, and in the Birnin Katsina, in 1972, I was accompanied to the first interviews by Malam Dan Sayyadi Masanawa, one of the emir's representatives.

ABBREVIATIONS

A. *Written Sources*

B.K.D.	— Book of Katsina by Dan Masani
BSOAS	— Bulletin, School of Oriental and African Studies
H.G.	— Hikayat Ghuzu
H.M.I.	— Hausawa da Makwabtansu, I
I.M.	— Infāq al-maisūr
JAH	— Journal of African History
JAS	— Journal of the African Society
JHSN	— Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria
K.H.	— Katsina History
K.M.K.	— Kitāb ila ma'arifat umar Kashna
K.T.K.	— Kitāb tartib umara Kashna
L.H.	— Liya'ul Hukkami
M.S.O.S.	— Mitteilungen des Seminars fur Orientalische Sprachen an de Koniglichen Friedrich Wilhems Universitat zu Berlin
NHRS	— Northern History Research Scheme
NNAK	— Nigerian National Archives, Kaduna
PP	— Palmer Papers
R.A.	— Raudāt al-afkār
S.P.G.	— Sokoto Provincial Gazetteer
T.A.K.	— Tarīkh asl Kashna wa asl Ghubir
T.I.K.	— Tarīkh Imarat Quariyat Kashna
T.W.	— Tazyīn alwaraqāt

B. *Oral Sources*

AAK(d)	— Alhaji Abdulkarimu Kurfi, Dutsinma District
AAK(k)	— Alhaji Abu Kyahi, Kofar Samri, Birnin Katsina
AAM(s)	— Alhaji Abdullahi Mai'ajiwa, Sarkin Fadan Kaura
ABM(b)	— Alhaji Barmo Makudawa, Birnin Katsina
ADP(k)	— Abdullahi Damo Pauwa, Kankara District
AIG(g)	— Alhaji Ibrahim Gandi, Gafair, Birnin Katsina
AIG(k)	— Alhaji Ibrahim Gwarije, Kofar Yandaka, Birnin Katsina
AIT(k)	— Alhaji Isiaku Turakin Katsina, Cikin Gida, Birnin Katsina

AJG(s) — Alhaji Jibril Gago, Sarkin Fulanin Dankama
AKG(m) — Alhajiya Karime, Gidan Magajin Malumfashi
AMM(m) — Alhaji Muhammadu Maitafsiri, Maradi
AMS(b) — Alhaji Muhammadu Sani Benye, Benye
ANW(d) — Alhaji Nuhu, Wakilin Danranko, Ganizago
ASK(s) — Alkali Sada, Kofar Samri, Birnin Katsina
AUG(b) — Alhaji Urwatu Gambarawa, Birnin Katsina
DAY(d) — Dangi Abashe Yantumaki, Dutsinma District
DIA(i) — Dambon Ingawa Abubakar, Ingawa
GAM(d) — Galadima Ado, Machinawa, Dutsi District
GIB(b) — Group Interview Bindawa, Bindawa District
GID(a) — Group Interview Dan Ashita
GID(b) — Group Interview Dallaji, Bindawa District
GID(i) — Group Interview Dara, Ingawa District
GID(k) — Group Interview Dakin Karatu, Bakori
GID(m) — Group Interview Dayi, Malumfashi
GID(o) — Group Interview District Office, Dutsi
GID(t) — Group Interview Dan Tutture
GIF(k) — Group Interview Faskari, Kogo District
GIF(m) — Group Interview Funtua, Maska District
GIG(k) — Group Interview Girka, Kaita District
GIG(m) — Group Interview Giremawa, Mani District
GIG(n) — Group Interview Gezawa, Niger Republic
GIG(s) — Group Interview Galandanci, Sokoto
GIH(r) — Group Interview Hanagare, Ruwan Kaya
GII(i) — Group Interview Ingawa, Ingawa District
GIK(b) — Group Interview Kamari, Bindawa District
GIK(d) — Group Interview Karofi, Dutsinma District
GIK(k) — Group Interview Kafindangi, Kankiya District
GIK(y) — Group Interview Kofar Yandaka, Birnin Katsina
GIM(m) — Group Interview Mudum, Mani District
GIM(m) — Group Interview Matazu, Musawa District
GIM(n) — Group Interview Maradi, Niger Republic
GIO(g) — Group Interview Ofishin Galadima, Malumfashi
GIO(k) — Group Interview Ofishin Kaura, Rimi

GIO(m) — Group Interview Ofishin Mallamawa, Batagarawa
GIO(s) — Group Interview Ofishin Sarkin Pauwa, Kankara
GIQ(a) — Group Interview Qartiar Assao, Maradi
GIR(r) — Group Interview Radda, Rimi District
GIS(m) — Group Interview Sabongari, Rimi District
GIT(b) — Group Interview Tama, Bindawa District
GIT(n) — Group Interview Tasawa, Niger Republic
GIU(a) — Group Interview Unguwar Alkali, Birnin Katsina
GIZ(j) — Group Interview Zandam, Jibiya District
GKI(j) — Gatarin Katsina, Ibrahim, Jibiya
GTB(t) — Galadiman Tsagero Bala, Tsagero
GYA(k) — Galadiman Yandaki Abubakar, Kaita District
GZU(s) — Gatari Zakari Ummadau, Safana
IDY(k) — Iliyasu Dangoggo Yashe, Kankiya District
KDT(r) — Korau Dan Taro Runka
LAF(k) — Liman Adamu Faskari, Koto District
LAL(k) — Liman Ali dan Liman Dan Kullu, Maradi
LDS(d) — Limamin Dutsi Sule, Dutsi
LHM(m) — Ladan Hamza Musawa, Musawa District
LZI(k) — Limamin Zagami Idirisu, Kogo District
MAB(b) — Malam Ahmadu Bugaje, Bugaje
MAD(a) — Malam Abubakar Dan Amarya, Ingawa
MAG(b) — Malam Aya Gamarawa, Birnin Katsina
MAM(b) — Malam Abdullahi Maikano, Bindawa District
MAM(i) — Malam Aminu na Mallam Idi, Bambadawa, Birnin Katsina
MDK(m) — Mati Dan Kucingi Musawa
MDY(m) — Magajin Dissi Yahaya, Musawa District
MGY(g) — Malam Garba Yalwa, Girka
MHA(k) — Malam Halilu Abdurahman, Kurmin Dan Ranko
MHD(k) — Malam Hamidu Dagari, Kankara
MHS(s) — Malam Haruna Sabi, Sabi
MIS(r) — Malam Isa Sabongari, Rimi District
MJM(j) — Mazanya Jibrin Marrarrabar Jibiya
MKD(m) — Mati Kabdaro Doro, Mani District
MML(a) — Malam Muhammadu Lawal Atule Gafai, Birnin Katsina

MMM (s) — Malam Musa na Mallam Saidu Maska
MMT (y) — Malam Muhammadu Tukur Yuguda, Maska
MSM (k) — Magajin Shehu Maianguwar Kwayawa
MSD (r) — Malam Sani Dodo Runka
MTN (t) — Magajin Tsaskiya Nuhu, Tsaskiya
MYA (s) — Malam Yakubu Abubakar, Safana
MYT (b) — Mukkadas Yero, Tandama, Bakori District
SRI (b) — Sarkin Bambadawan Ingawa, Bal
SSY (b) — Shantali Shehu Yarinci, Birnin Katsina
SFJ (b) — Sarkin Fulani Juma'are, Birnin Kuka
SGM (s) — Sule Gari Maisumuwa, Shaiskawa, Birnin Katsina
SRM (b) — Sarkin Ruma Mu'azu Batsari
WLM (g) — Waziri Labo Majen Gobir
YAD (d) — Yandaka Abdullahi Dutsinma, Dutsinma District

GLOSSARY OF HAUSA WORDS AND TERMS

ad'l—justice
al-adu—customs
*Algaita (*pl. *algaitu)*—double-reed vibrated pipe of conical bore
*alkali (*pl. *alkalai)*—a judge
Ardoen—pastoral Fulani clan head
Ardo—clan head of the pastoral Fulani
arne (pl. *arna*)—an animist
ashararu (pl. *asharurai*)—rogues
asigiri—spear
attajiri (pl. *attajirai*)—rich merchants
baba—dyestuffs
baki (pl. *babbaku*)—black
Bamalle—member of *Mallawa* clan, who trace their origin from Mali.
Bambadawa—clans of genealogy specialists
ban iska—a dry spell in the wet season
Barde—title of a war official
barori—servants/clients
basarake—member of the aristocracy
baurar zinariya—golden armlet
Bawan Runji—slave of the butchers
bazara—hot season, before the rains (February—May)
bidi'a—uncanonical innovation
birni (pl. *birane*)—a city
bore—rebellion
Bori—possession cult/the actions of one possessed by an *iska* (earth spirit)
Bororo—nomadic Fulani
bunu—women's blue-black cloth
daga—a battle
daji—forest woodland
dajin—'bush'
Dakaru—infantry
dalibi (pl. *dalibai*)—a student
dambu—pastoral Fulani food
damana—the rainy season
Dan (pl. *'Yayan*)—son of
Dangi—patrilineal clan
darni (pl. *darnuka*)—corn-stalk wall
dawa—guinea-corn
dillali (pl. *dillalai*)—a broker
Dodanni—monsters
doka—(tree: *Isoberlinia doka)*

dutsi (pl. *duwatsu*)—granitic outcrops
Fada—the palace/court
fadama (pl. *fadamomi*)-valley-bottom land
falke (pl. *fatake*)—long-distance trader
fari (pl. *farfaru*)—white
fatake—caravan traders
fataken taba—tobacco merchants
fitna (pl. *fitinoni*)—calamity
gabar gida—bitter fraternal feud
gajere (pl. *gajeru*)—a short person, or thing
gandu (pl. *gandaye*)— a large farm
gari (pl. *garuruwa*)—a town
gero—millet
ghuraba—foreign
gida (pl. *gidaje*)—a household/homestead
Giginya—deleb palm *(Borassus flabellifer)*
gona (pl. *gonaki*)—a farm
gulbi (pl. *gulabe*)—a large river
Gungurun—an onomatopeic expression applied to a person, or thing, of formidable appearance.
hakimi (pl. *hakimai*)—an official (now applied to district heads)
hira—leisurely conversation at night
hurumi—public land
Iska (pl. *Iskoki*)—spirit
jakkasa—reddish-brown soil
jama'a—community
jan gwado—piece of thick woven red cloth
Jarumi (pl. *jarumai*)—brave warrior/a title of Maska
jigawa—light, sandy soil
jika (pl. *jikoki*)—grandson
kafara—atonement for breach of Muslim precepts
kafi—wooden stockade around a settlement/a settlement with such a stockade
Kafin Gari—protective charm buried in the centre, or under the wall of a settlement
kafiri (pl. *kafirai*)—unbeliever
kaka—harvest season
kakaki—long trumpet
kalwa—the processed seeds of the *dorowa* (locust-bean tree) *(Parkia filicoidea)*
kan makera—blacksmith's work
kane—younger brother
kantu—block (e.g. of salt)
Kanya—African ebony tree *(Diospyros mespiliformis)*

karaga—seat of a ruler
karammu—hard, white mats
kasa (pl. *kasashe*)—earth/land/territory/country
kauyawa—rustic folk
kauye (pl. *kauyuka*)—a village
kharaj—land tax
Kiraren bori—*kirari* for earth-spirits
Kirari—verbal identificatory praise-epithet of person, place or thing (*take* realization in musical sound).
kirin zinariya—golden wand (associated with a king's installation ceremony)
kofa (pl. *kofofi*)—gate
Kofar bai—gate at the back of a palace
Kofar fada—front gate of a palace and area nearby
koge—horse-shoe shaped piece of pig-iron
kogi (pl. *koguna*)—a river
koroma—large stream
kudin—money
kudin hito—customs dues
kudin karofi—tax levied on dye-pits
kudin saka—tax levied on weaving
kwalkwali—metal head-gear
kwarin—quarry
kwarori—raffia bags for packing cotton
kwararo—an alley
Kwinkele—clubs
ladan—the muezzin
laka—dark clay soil
lakabi—nick-name
lihidi—quilt
liman (pl. *limamai*)—an imam
ma'adanawa—stores/warehouses
ma'auna—retailers of food grain
madugu (pl. *madugai*)—leader of a trading caravan
Magaji (pl. *magaddai*)—heir/title of official
Magajin Rafi—official responsible for valley/land; also name of an *iska*
Magajiyar Bori—female head of the *'yan bori* ('children' of *bori;* cult adepts)
Magiro—tradional religion
mahalbi (pl. *mahalba*)— hunter/shooter
mahauci (pl. *mahauta*)—butcher
mai (pl. *masu*)—owner (possessive prefix)
maigari (pl. *masu gari*)—ruler of a town
mai gida (pl. *masu gidaje*)—head of a household
mai unguwa (pl. *masu unguwoyi*)—head(s) of (various) quarter(s) of a town

Makadan kotso—players of single-membrane, snared, hour-glass drum with variable pitch
Makandan taushi—players of single-membrane, snared bowl-shaped drum (small kettle-drum)
malam (pl. *mallamai*)—scholar/intelligentsia
malka—period of heaviest rainfall
maroki (pl. maroka)—Generally, any acclamator, solicited or not, who hopes to obtain reward as a means of livelihood —in song *(waka);* in speech *(kirari)* with or without musical accompaniment; or solely on musical instrument *(take)*
mashekari—a semi-permanent pastoral encampment
mashi—a lance
masu arziki—the rich
Mukaddas—deputy
munafiki (pl. *munafukai*)—a dissimulator
mutum (pl. *mutane*)—man
nassarawa—royal country residence
noma—farming
rafi (pl. *rafukka*)—watercourse
rumbu (pl. *rumbuna*)—hut for storing crops
sa'i—assessor of cattle tax
samari (sing. *saurayi*)—young men
sana'oi—occupations
sanka—bundles
Sarakunan galgajiya—traditional title holders
Sarakunan garuruwa—rulers of territories
Sarakunan karaga—kingmakers
Sarakunan sana'a—heads of occupational groups
Sarkin duniya—'lord of the world'
Sarkin makera—head of the smiths.
Sarkin noma—head of the farmers
Sarkin pawa—head of the butchers
soro—hall
sulaye—bunches of thread
sulke—chain-mail
saura—fallow land
tabki (pl. *tabkuna*)—lake
tafarki—highway
takkai—a dance
takobi—sword
talaka (pl. *talakawa*)—commoner
tama—iron ore
tambari—large single-membrane bowl-shaped drum (large kettle-drum)
tawaye—rebellion (used in 19th century to refer to rebels against caliphate authorities, often identified with the old dynasties)
tsafi—fetishistic worship

tsanya—moats
tsauni (pl. *tsaunuka*)—lateritic ironstone hills
tubu—high ground; a hill
Uban farauta—head of a hunt
ulama—the intelligentsia
unguwa (pl. *unguwoyi*)—a quarter of a town or city/in rural areas a hamlet
walki—leather apron (associated with a king's installation ceremony)
wankan sarauta—ritual bath of installation (of king)
yaki—war
'Yan (pl.) (sing. *dan*)—sons of
'Yan barga—stable boys/household servants
'Yan bindiga—musketeers
'Yan birni—city folk
'Yan farauta—hunters
'Yan kasuwa—traders (merchants)
'Yan likidda—heavy cavalry
'Yan maraya or *'Yan riga*—town dwellers
'Yan ridda—apostates
'Yan samame—raiders/slavers
'Yan tama—iron miners and smelters
yawon almajiranci—itinerant scholarship
zakat—Islamic tithe
zango—resting place for caravans
zaure (pl. *sauruka*)—entrance hall to a house
zindiki (pl. *zindikai*)—atheist
zumunci—fraternal cooperation
zuri'oi—descent groups or lineages.

GLOSSARY OF ARABIC WORDS

aman—peace agreement
amir al-mu'minin—commander of the faithful
baya^{c}a—the act of pledging loyalty to a Muslim ruler
bughāt—oppressors
dar al-harb—non-Muslim land
dinar—coin made of precious metal
dirham—Middle Eastern coin
fatwa—formal legal opinion given by a malam in answer to a question submitted to him
Hadith—traditions relating to the Prophet Mohammed
jizia—the tax paid by protected non-Muslim people to a Muslim government
al-khulafā' al-rāshidūn—the four rightly guided caliphs
kuffār—unbelievers

mithqal—a unit of currency
Mujāhid (pl. mujāhiddun)—member of a jihad movement
Muharibun—warmongers
Nuwwab (sing. *Na'ib*)—deputies
qadi—a judge
ribāt—frontier stronghold
saddīq—righteous man
Wālī al-shurta—police chief
zindīq—atheist

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MAP A

LOCATION OF KASAR KATSINA c 1800 A D



TRANSFORMATION OF KATSINA BY Y. B. USMAN

MAP B MAJOR SETTLEMENTS AND ROUTES OF THE KASAR KATSINA AND NEIGHBOURING AREAS C 1880 A.D.



MAP C. MAJOR SETTLEMENTS OF THE EMIRATE OF KATSINA AND NEIGHBOURING AREAS C 1900 AD





MAP 5
YUSUFU BALA USMAN
THE TRANSFORMATION OF KATSINA C 1400-1883

GENEALOGICAL CHART : A

SOME GENEALOGIES OF THE SARAKUNAN KATSINA SINCE C 1565 AD



1	Sarkin Katsina	—	C 1565 – 75	7	Sarkin Katsina	—	C 1767 – 68	12	Sarkin Katsina (Marad-)	C 1816 – 1830	20	Sarkin Katsina (Marad-)	C 1880-83
2	Sarkin Katsina	—	C 1600 – 18	8	Sarkin Katsina	—	C 1778 – 96	13	Sarkin Katsina	C 1830 – 36	21	Sarkin Katsina	1883 - 84
3	Sarkin Katsina	—	C 1636 – 61	9	Sarkin Katsina	—	C 1796 – 1801	14	Sarkin Katsina	C 1836 – 43	22	Sarkin Katsina	1884 - 88
4	Sarkin Katsina	—	C 1661 – 71	10	Sarkin Katsina	—	C 1801 –	15	Sarkin Katsina	C 1843 – 48	23	Sarkin Katsina	1888 - 89
5	Sarkin Katsina	—	C 1671 – 84					16	Sarkin Katsina	C 1848 – 51	24	Sarkin Katsina	1889 - 90
6	Sarkin Katsina	—	C 1702 – 28					17	Sarkin Katsina	C 1851 – 53	25	Sarkin Katsina	1890 - 94
								18	Sarkin Katsina	C 1853 – 75	26	Sarkin Katsina	1894 - 95
								19	Sarkin Katsina	C 1875 – 80	27	Sarkin Katsina	1898 - 1920

GENEALOGICAL CHART B

THE FAMILY OF THE EMIR UMARUN DALLAJI



YUSUFU BALA USMAN
THE TRANSFORMATION OF KATSINA C 1400-1883

GENEALOGICA CHART: C

GENEALOGIES OF SOME OF THE EMIRATES' ARISTOCRACY



KUSUFU BALA USMAN
THE TRANSFORMATION OF KATSINA C 1600-1980

Index of names

Note: Titles are indicated in parentheses following names, nicknames are similarly recorded. In an attempt to avoid confusion in the case of rulers, the approximate dates of reign appear, also in parentheses, as available. The appellation 'Malam' has been omitted since, in the absence of other titles, it may generally be assumed.)

Subject index

Y. B. Usman

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