


NC
JQ
3096
.125

11/11

ATROCACY

BASIS FOR NATIONAL STABILITY

Partyless Democracy




B. I. C. IJOMAH

AFROCRACY

AFROCRACY: BASIS FOR NATIONAL STABILITY
(Partyless Democracy: First Step Towards Evolving Permanent Political System)

PROF. B.I.C. IJOMAH
Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Bendel State University, Ekpoma,



IDODO UMEH PUBLISHERS LIMITED

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieved system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publishers.

Copyright © Prof. B.I.C. Ijomah, 1988

Designed, Printed and Published in Nigeria by:

Idodo Umeh Publishers Limited,
52, Ewah Road, P. O. Box 3441,
Benin City, Bendel State.

DEDICATION

Dedicated to my family, and all those who have the courage to try new methods.

P R E F A C E

In writing this book, I expect that the conventional notion inherited by Nigerians and, indeed, Africans from the colonial masters, that democracy can only exist if political participation is based, *ab initio*, on the prior establishment of political parties, will now be re-examined in the light of African experience.

The African experience has shown that western democracy grafted onto an alien political system has not only destroyed that political system, but also destroyed itself. This book argues that wherever democracy has thrived, certain preconditions were attained. In Britain and America, for example, it was shown that the beginning of democratic experiment was as rough as it has been on the African Continent, but gradually, the people learnt by experience that a viable political system could only evolve out of the debris and confusion of a given national experience. It was therefore not surprising that the British noted that in order to have a stable political system, only those who understood the issues involved, and were sufficiently mobilized in the interest of the nation could meaningful participate in political elections. Indeed, there were the requirements that in order to vote, certain property qualifications were to be met, i.e., only those who possessed property could vote in any election.

Secondly, it was also required that the voter attain a minimum educational qualification, and that such a voter would have satisfied some residential qualifications.

In the United states of America, voting was not equal and universal *ab initio*. There was racial and sex discrimination in voting. As pointed out in the main body of this book, it was only after the feminist movement in the second half of the nineteenth century that women were allowed to vote in Britain.

In advocating a partyless democracy as a first step towards evolving a permanent social system in Nigeria, the author sincerely believes that democracy should be allowed to germinate at the grass root and evolve upwards to the national level.

Consequently, the process recommended in this book is such that elections will be held at the lowest levels under the

surveillance of organised but higher bodies. After the elections at the ward and local government levels, people that cooperated at those very low levels would galvanise into groups sharing certain political orientations. It is on the basis of these interest aggregations that elections at the state level would be conducted. In short, political parties would evolve out of the practical experiences of the political participants.

The imposition of political parties on the grassroot by a central authority is the surest way to destroy democracy, because by the very nature of such an imposition, done by decrees, only the propertied class or the successful capitalists could form the nuclei of viable political parties, but not of a viable political system. In order to dominate the political system, such political parties resort to exploiting the masses in order to sustain themselves in power. Parties which are not based on ideological convictions attract followership in proportion to the amount of money they are willing to dispense with. Those offered appointments on party auspices, become duty-bound to finance the party. In order to finance the party, they in turn exploit their positions to the detriment of the nation.

It is therefore my hope that the present administration will not repeat the mistakes of the past and will sufficiently mobilise the people at the lower levels as well as the higher echelons of the society. Social mobilization is not the same thing as social excitation. To arouse the political consciousness of the people, the government must ensure that the people feel the orientation of the mobilizers; but there can be no political orientations in the absence of ideological orientations. It is, therefore, very timely to challenge the nation to evolve an orientation around which the masses and indeed Nigerians would be mobilized.

Discussions on the televisions and on the radios can only achieve what the discussions of the WAI (War Against Indiscipline) achieved on the screens of televisions and on the pages of newspapers. WAI could have had tremendous impact on Nigerians if it was utilised as an instrument for championing novel national consciousness. That the WAI failed in Nigeria underscores my argument that in order to mobilize a people, the mobilizers themselves should be seen to have been sufficiently mobilized along some given orientations. It also underscores the

paradox that those deemed politically inept have become the instruments for mobilizing the politicians.

We hope that if the Afrocratic principles are adopted in the process of military disengagement, and in conducting elections, the nation would experience gradual but systematic stability, and the prospects of further military interventions would become a twentieth century political mirage.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am immensely grateful to my two devoted secretarial staff, Mr. Aaron Ubakah and Christopher Ebhodaghe who patiently typed the manuscript. This book would not have seen the light of the day but for their untiring efforts. I am also grateful to Dr. O. Osa, Ag. Head of Department of Languages and Literature, Dr. Sam. Ukala and Dr. Fred. Emordi who found time to go through the corrections. Any remaining errors are mine. I cannot sufficiently thank Mrs. G. O. Adegoke and Mr. J. Unomah, the two Librarians who worked on the index.

I must openly thank my wife, Mrs. J. Amechi Ijomah, for her patience, tolerance and understanding when I neglected her.

I wish to recall with humility and respect, the life and time of our great hero, General Murtala Mohammed who was the first to experiment on my ideas sent to him in 1975, that a partyless democracy was possible. It worked in 1976. I congratulate General Babangida, the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe and Vice-Admiral Augustus Aikhomu, Chiefs of General Staff, for their boldness in threading where only a Murtala dared.




TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Pages
Preface	5
Introduction	11
1. CHAPTER 1	
NIGERIA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM:	
PAST, PRESENT AND THE FUTURE	18
A cursory survey of Nigeria's Political Party Experience	20
The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons. . .	21
The Richard's Constitution, the Obduracy and	
Ignorance of Nigerian Leaders.	22
The Rise of Regional Parties and the Great Hiatus	25
The Action Group.	25
The Northern People's Congress	28
Party Politics and National Stability	29
Classification of Nigerian Political Parties	35
2. CHAPTER II	
THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF AFROCRACY	45
The Individual as the Basic Unit of Analysis in	
Afrocracy	55
3. CHAPTER III	
AFROCRACY (POLITICS WITHOUT POLITICAL	
PARTIES): BASIC FOR NATIONAL STABILITY ...	61
Democracy	65
The Interest Theory of Representation	69
The Sovereignty of the People.	69
Who is Entitled to Vote in a Democracy	71
Education as a Qualification to Vote.	73
Other Qualifications	73
Social Characteristics of Decision Makers in a	
Democracy: A Comparative Analysis of British	
and Nigeria	77
The Various Elections	78
The Structural Model of Elections in an Afrocracy	91
The Mechanics for Military disengagement in Nigeria ..	98
The Timing	101

4. CHAPTER IV

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN NIGERIA: PROPOSALS FOR THE THIRD REPUBLIC	105
Genesis: The Origin of Nigerian Military	105
The Role of the Military.....	107
Experience Fighting a Defensive War.....	109
For and Against Military Interventions	112
Demystification of Modern Military	120

5. CHAPTER V

TRADITIONAL RULERS, MODERNIZATION AND THE NEW LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION	
Conceptual Clarification	124
Origins of The Traditional Rulers	125
Traditional Rulers at Independence and Post Independence Period.....	131
A Council or Committee	134
Preparation for the Successor	135
The New Local Government Structure and the Role of Traditional Rulers.....	136

6. CHAPTER VI

MENDING A SOCIOPOROUS NATION BEFORE THE THIRD REPUBLIC	
Rationale.....	145
Genesis of Socioporusis.....	146
Leadership.....	149
Nationalism and the National Dilemma.....	153
Political Parties in a Culture of Poverty.....	156
Electoral Malpractices and the Culture of Poverty:	
Who is entitled to Vote?	161
Religious Indoctrination Without Christian Principles.....	162
Military Anomie and Military Intervention	167

CHAPTER VII

STRATEGY FOR WINNING ELECTIONS IN A PARTYLESS DEMOCRACY	175
Campaigns.....	177
Electoral Slate at the Local Government Level	179
The two Party System.....	179
What should be done.....	181
Pessimism	183
Questions	188

INTRODUCTION

This book has become very necessary because of the nation's continued search for a viable political alternative. In this search, even the market women had to be given a hearing, and views were gathered from all sectors of the country. This, indeed, showed how desperately the nation needed immediate solutions. The paradox of the nation's dilemma is however in failing to realise that in any given social system, there must be the rulers, and there must be those specialised in advising the rulers. Throwing the political debate open to the market women simply gave the unfortunate impression that the governance of such a complex nation as Nigeria is the same as selling fish in the market.

Since the advent of Major-General I. Babangida's administration in 1985, the nation has been called upon to debate the IMF Loan with its conditionalities. Our economic experts and theoreticians adduced argument. Some were convincing, others were merely echoing the intentions of the World Bank, and the various financial clubs in Paris, London, and New York. Nigeria's rejection of the IMF Loan was greeted with ovation which was not allowed to die down before the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was introduced. The IMF had wanted a 60% devaluation of the Naira. Our national pride and sensibilities were hurt. We preferred a self-inflicted wound, no matter how deep and painful, to a wound inflicted by some outside clubs; and so we were advised that the Second Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM), was the answer. We now know from experience that it is not the answer. Obviously, those who cried loudest in asking the Government to reject the IMF were not economic experts. But economic experts were called in to discuss the SFEM. The problem with SFEM is not with the system itself, but with the human beings who manage the system. It would appear that we had not attained the maturity in international banking, and so those behind the Paris, London and New York finance clubs found their way to make a mess of the SFEM using their long tentacles, so much so, that instead of the 60% devaluation of the Naira, demanded by the IMF, the SFEM has devalued the naira by more than 400%. In throwing a spe-

cialist topic to the laity for debate, particularly when Engineers, Medical Doctors, historians, and even linguists, had to proffer opinions on an issue which, in more developed countries, only financial wizards would have been assembled to x-ray and come up with diagnosis and cure.

Next to the IMF debate was the national discussion on technological development and import substitution, a clear acceptance that something was wrong with our mode of technological growth without development. What has not occurred to the nation obsessed with the mechanisms for painless acquisition of material wealth, is that what makes a nation is not technology, but the human beings who make the technology.

The mode of association of these human beings in the struggle for power, wealth and privilege, sometimes handed down by technology, ought to have been the primary concern of the nation. Unfortunately, we talk of science and technology as if they are independent of human association. Mere instability in the political system can turn science and technology into an instrument for mass destruction. Hence I join the indomitable Kwame Nkrumah, and Herbert Spiro in asserting the primacy of politics even in economic and technological development. The siting of the oil refinery in Kaduna was not a decision based on technological expertise, but on socio-political consideration. The cure to the sickness of this nation, that is, the social and political maladies, can no more be found by medical doctors, than sociologists and political scientists can perform heart surgery on a sick patient. As I pointed out in Chapter III, my search for an alternative system which would ensure stability in this nation, dates back to the period of the civil war. It was quite clear to me that the youthfulness of the Nigerian Army, its inexperience in political matters, and above all the arrogance in-built in the armies of developing nations would not enable the soldiers to easily settle down to look for solutions. Rather, they must find initial scapegoats, before they think of solutions.

Having made the politicians of the First and Second Republics their scapegoats, even though the military have ruled this nation longer than the civilians, the military would not

accept the hypothesis that national socio-economic and political problems are cumulative, and could not have emerged during the civilian era alone. As has been pointed out in this book, the Murtala Muhammed's probe of the rulers during General Yakubu Gowon's regime, found 10 of the 12 Governors guilty of corruption. That, no doubt, shows that corruption is not a monopoly of the civilians. If probing were to be institutionalised after every regime, be it military or civilian, it would dawn on the nation that the civilians are not the only villains they have been painted to be.

The joy in producing this book at this time is that for the second time we have a military regime that listens to advise on the method of bringing about a viable political system in the country. General Murtala Muhammed was the first to accept my memorandum of July 1975, and conducted the 1976 Local Government Elections without political parties. When I wrote to the then Chief of General Staff, Commodore Ukiwe in September 1985, advising on the setting up of the Political Bureau and wrote to the President in October of the same year, little did I know that they would act with surprising dispatch. The recommendations contained in this book were made to the Government through my various papers to the political Bureau and to some key Government Officials. The adoption of many of the recommendations is the pride of this book.

There are many recommendations which the Bureau did not accept. That is the more reason why this book is imperative at this time, not necessarily to match the wisdom of one man with the wisdom of the fabulous collection of brains and experience that produced the monumental document that is destined to alter the course of this otherwise drifting nation, but to record just what the Bureau has failed to accept which may determine the success or failure of the Third Republic. It also provides a source of easily available information on what should be done should the Third Republican experiment run into some minor hitches.

If President Babangida finally hands over to the Civilian, he would become the second military ruler who voluntarily handed power to the civilians. But unlike Obasanjo, he is anxious not to hand over to the same batch of politicians who ruined

the previous Republic, and brought disgrace to the nation. Ocran, in his book referred to in this work, contends that it is not possible for a military regime to hand over power to a successful successor regime. Obasanjo's experiment confirms that. That is why in this forth-coming experiment we are very careful. Indeed, we intend to ensure that the successor regime has a firm foundation on which to build a successful government. The recommendation for the staggering of the elections, the conducting of the elections at the Local Government Level on a No-Party basis, and the decision to ban all those politicians, who, in one way or the other, ruined the First and Second Republics, are deliberate attempts to ensure that the Babangida administration proves Ocran wrong.

One however would like to caution the Government, because through undue public pressure, particularly from the new impatient political foxes, who believe it is their turn to rule the country, the Government might ban those who should not be banned. Political experience cannot be learned from the pages of text-books, nor is it acquired overnight. In the attempt to ban politicians, the government should distinguish three classes of politicians:

1. Those who participated in the First Republic
2. Those who participated in the first part of the Second Republic from 1979 to September, 1983
3. Those who participated in the second part of the Second Republic, that is from October 1983 to December, 1983.

While a ban may not be out of place for all politicians in the First Republic and the first part of the second Republic, one wonders if it would be fair to the nation to ban those who ruled only for three months. What time actually did they have to settle down? This does not mean that there could not have been some individuals, who were vast and fast in corruption. For those individuals, one could advise the government that any politician in the second part of the Second Republic who was found to be guilty of any acts of misconduct, should be banned for life. But it would not be fair to impose a general ban on participants in the second part of the Second Republic, many of whom were not even partisan politicians, but were invited on their individual merits to assist the government after

the elections. Some had not even resigned from their former jobs before the military coup swept them off their public offices. Such individuals who were thought fit by the governors of the states, and were invited to serve the nation cannot and should not be banned, because such a ban would be punishing them for accepting to place at the national service their expertise and experience. Within the three months they were in office, the nation could not have benefitted from their experience, and this experience would be lost to the nation if these individuals are banned.

The principle of Afrocracy is that African Political parties should be allowed and helped to evolve, and should not be imposed on the nation.

In a forth-coming work, "Continuity and Change in Developing Countries: The Military Punctuation", the author has argued that the two party system would have evolved in Nigeria and in fact had evolved in the First Republic before the Military struck. In the Second Republic, the theatre for the 1987 elections was already being prepared by the N.P.N. and the combination of the "progressive" parties. There was no way any single party could have defeated the N.P.N. at the 1987 elections. It was imperative that all the other parties ganged up against the N.P.N. There was no other choice. Just as the stage was being set for the emergence of the two grand parties, like the fate of the United Progressive Grand Alliance (U.P.G.A.) and The Nigerian National Alliance, (N.N.A.) in the First Republic, the Military struck.

It is the contention of this book that if the military had remained professional, and true to their calling, and had been a little more insulated from politics, the civilians could have sorted out the fate of this nation. We now have the political paradox, that the military who have no political wisdom, is supposed to teach professional politicians, political wisdom. Can they really do so without the aid of civilians? The book takes the reader through the experiences of the British in their effort to establish democracy. As in all democratic experiments, the problem starts with the patterns of elections and the electoral systems the countries have. The American experience and the

experience in the Soviet Union were also examined. It was clear from the comparative discussion, that in order to have a stable political system, the electoral system must be so arranged that the resultant government could lay some modicum of claim to legitimacy and responsibility. By staggering elections in Afrocracy, the stage is set for the capacity of the political system to control political participation, in order to ensure that participation does not outweigh political institutionalisation.

It is a deliberate plan to commence elections with the wards and the local governments. It is from these grass root politicians that a viable party system would evolve. For the moment, there seem to be enough rumbles to suggest that efforts are already being made to impose a party gargantuan from the top by some political king makers. The government must ensure that pressures from above by presidential and gubernatorial aspirants do not upset the Local Government Apple Cart. It is a difficult exercise, because Presidential and Gubernatorial aspirants will of a necessity sponsor candidates at the Local Government Levels. However, if the second elections are not held until after twelve months of the Local Government elections, the Councillors would have matured to exercise some independence before the next elections. This might frustrate some of their sponsors who might find their proteges a little wiser than when they sponsored them.

After one year as Local Government Councillors, and if the government, as a matter of deliberate policy, polices presidential and gubernatorial aspirants against sponsoring candidates, it will be easier for the parties to evolve from the aggregation of the interests of the common man. The interests would determine the ideological orientation of the common man, who will be a key factor in the evolution of political ideology.

Within the Local Government Levels, functions have been assigned to the traditional rulers. Details have been spelt out in Chapter V.

Without prejudice to the prescriptions made herein, the book ends with further prescriptions on how to mend a socio-porous nation. The illness from which Nigeria wishes eagerly to recover has been described as socioporosis — a social can-

cer that eats up the spiritual and material energy of the society, while leaving the society with the semblance of normalcy. It is hoped that if Nigerians and, indeed, Africans can assimilate the teachings of Afrocracy, military coups will be a thing of the past in Africa. Afrocracy is therefore dedicated to all Africans who sincerely seek stability in Africa, and who want to see the military return for good into the barracks.

CHAPTER 1

NIGERIA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM: PAST, PRESENT AND THE FUTURE

The evolution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria must be seen as the handwork of both the colonial masters and Nigerian nationalists. It is true that in order to create a large market for the British merchantilists, a number of historic cleavages had to intermix, or be brought together in circumstances beyond their control. What was at first seen as a geographic expression, gradually assumed characteristics of a nation, even if imperfectly. Nevertheless, the nation cannot continue bemoaning the ills of the colonial situation. There is a common adage that when the head of a family dies, the living can reassess the way he has shared his property and make adjustments if such adjustments will bring peace to the living.

It is here admitted that the creation of Nigeria into a political entity had its deficiencies beginning with Lord Lugard's obduracy in rejecting the sounder advice proffered by Morel and Temple to break up the Northern Protectorate. Further, the British forced together "inconsistent cognitive elements" without creating "linguistic or behavioural assertions" that would have created lasting bonds of unity and fraternity. This failure has continued to create stresses which force ethnic conglomerations to search for bases of survival in the new and unfamiliar political system.

The book examines the past, beginning with pre-independence experience at evolving political parties. Since independence conferred on Nigerians the right to reassess the colonial creation and make necessary corrections, an attempt will be made to take a cursory survey of Nigeria's political experience, to see why we failed to correct the pitfalls in the colonial creation, and why instability has remained the norm. Since my contention has been that the emergence of party politics in a culture of poverty, and in a 'nation' where local patriotism did not allow nationalist sentiments to weld the people into a nation in the real sense, prevented Nigerians from rising above mere geographic expression, I will begin my discussion with an examina-

tion of the evolution of the major political parties whose activities ruined the First and Second Republics. This preamble is necessary to show that a resuscitation of party politics in the Third Republic would only recreate the problems of the First and Second Republics.

This is not to say that economic and other social forces did not make significant contributions. Like Herber J. Spiro, I will dwell on the Primacy of Politics,¹ with politics, here, dealing with attempts to acquire power in order to control the allocation or distribution of wealth.

Until Joseph Chamberlain became the Secretary of State for the colonies, British involvement was unplanned and haphazard.² From exploration, the British interest passed on to the Niger Companies and other trading concerns. Towards the third quarter of the 19th century, there was a harvest of treaties in which Nigerian rulers surrendered their traditional rights to the British Crown in return for some frugal concessions. In the operation of party politics, these traditional rulers became a type of recurring variable, which the politicians manipulated as conditions warranted. But the fact remains that these traditional rulers are indispensable in the political calculus of the nation. Politicians woo them because they command significant influence in their respective communities. Even the military woo them for grass-root support. While it could be argued that retaining them as Local Monarchs in a Republican Nigeria contradicts all that the republican status implies, it is my contention that the importation of the concepts applicable to French and American republican statuses cannot help us achieve a coherent interpretation of what a republic means in the Nigerian context. Both the French and American republics emerged from the debries of apocalyptic revolutions in which the entire societies were re-organised in the spirits of the revolutions.

Our republican status was a purely constitutional enactment and did not result from the changed life experiences of

-
1. Herbert J. Spiro, (ed.) *Africa: The Primacy of Politics*, New York: Random House, 1966.
 2. John P. Machintosh, *Nigerian Government and Politics*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966, p. 144

Nigerians. Nigeria's status is republicanism in contradiction. At the Federal level, it ensures that no Gargantua can emerge as the Monarch, but at the local levels, it provides for local monarchs whose positions and stipends are guaranteed by the governments. As long as this situation exists, any advice to the government to do away with the traditional rulers because the institution is anachronistic is not realistic. Any government that tries it without being backed by a national revolution would fail. It is true that many of the traditional rulers are vindictive and retrogressive. Yet, there are communities in which no government can succeed without their co-operation.

A few scholars in search of socialism have called for the scrapping of the institution of traditional rulers. But they seem to forget that wherever socialism thrived, it grew from the experience of the people. We have our own experiences. The persistent undermining of these experiences has kept us always in search of the new. What Nigerians finally experimented upon, such as the Westminster model or the Presidential model has norms and regulations which grew out of some other people's way of life. Those norms are yet to be imbibed in Nigeria. Without them, no borrowed model can succeed.

A CURSORY SURVEY OF NIGERIAN POLITICAL PARTY EXPERIENCES

In this survey, only the major political parties will be examined. To understand the nature of the parties, the circumstances under which they were formed will be examined. Prior to 1922, what dominated the scene was the West African National Congress. It aimed at speaking for the entire black people of West Africa. There was thus a West African nationalist movement. By 1922 some constitutional concessions had been granted Nigerians which enabled them to elect four out of the ten members of the legislative council. Thus, some Nigerians who were initially Pan Africanist in their utterances regressed to the Nigerian scene and began working assiduously towards creating a political organisation that would help in the acquisition and consolidation of power.

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NIGERIA AND THE CAMEROONS

The Nigerian National Democratic Party was born in 1922. But its activities were limited to contesting elections into the Lagos based Council. There was nothing that could be called a nationalist party until 1944 when the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons was formed. It has been observed that if there was any party that could claim to be a truly national party, it was the N.C.N.C. But this claim was most appropriate only between 1945 and 1951.³ At that time, its membership contained the most articulate nationalist-conscious Nigerians, and the members did in fact, place Nigeria first.

The 1945 general strike had a significant impact on the dormant Northern Nigerians, and awakened their political consciousness. However, nothing was done until the Arthur Richards Constitution which made it imperative for the Northerners to organize themselves.

One creation of the colonial situation which contributed to the moulding of the character of the Nigerians was the segregation clause of Lord Lugard. In paragraphs 191 and 192 of his Report on the Amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Nigeria,⁴ Lugard defended his stand on the segregation of the Europeans from the Nigerians.

When Nigerian elite became heirs to the colonial officers, they moved into the colonial government's reservation areas and even set up new government reservations, thus perpetuating a system that increased the social and cultural distance between the bureaucratic elite and the ordinary Nigerians.

Lugard's discriminatory policy came to a head-on-collision with the new political order, when in April 1947, a colonial officer was not allowed accommodation at the Bristol Hotel simply because he was of a coloured race. This discrimination

3. K.W.J. Post, "The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, the Decision of December 1959" in John P. Mackintosh, *op. cit.* p. 407.

4. Sir Frederick D. Lugard, *Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria, and Administration 1912 - 1919*: London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1920 p.

galvanized the N.C.N.C. and the Nigerian Youth Movement into a United Front Committee to protest the treatment. Henceforth, most political organisations and their activities responded to local or situational grievances in search of independence from colonial discrimination. Many people, including the late Kwame Nkrumah felt that political independence would usher in a favourable atmosphere to rebuild the nation. Unfortunately, the Prospero and Caliban syndrome, characteristic of the colonial situation has been so imbibed, that the Nigerians were known more for what I call cultural apostasy, than for any original thinking. The prospero and caliban syndrome reflects a state of dependence in which Nigerians abandoned their traditional ways of doing things, and depended more on the white man in everything. Anything good was "Oyibo". In cultural apostasy, we abandoned our ways of doing things and clung rather tenaciously to the imported ways including the imported political system which our pre-independence political leaders struggled to participate in, to the detriment of the possibility of evolving a new system out of Nigeria's indigenous practices.

One could catalogue a long list of instances of protest movements to show that party political activities were essentially reactions to issues. Even after independence, political pronouncements of politicians were equally reactions to other pronouncements, tribal antagonism, or charges of one offence or the other. Even Zik and Awolowo, the most articulate of the lot, could not extricate themselves from the use of inciting and divisive vitriolics in attacking their opponents. The emergence of a national sentiment, borne out of identity of a common national fate thus became a twentieth century mirage.⁵ In thirteen years from now, the twentieth century would be over, and we have not evolved a nation.

THE RICHARDS CONSTITUTION THE OBDURACY AND IGNORANCE OF NIGERIA LEADERS

One other factor on which the political parties reacted was

5. B.I.C. Ijomah, "Nationalism, Patriotism and Alienation," Paper delivered at the National Political Science Association Conference held at University of Ilorin, 1985.

the Richards constitution of 1945. From the British perspective, the Arthur Richards constitution had more unifying potentials. Its intention was to organize representation from the native authorities at a lower tier into a Regional Council, and through the Regional Councils in the East, West and the North, to form a single legislature in Lagos. The Regional Councils could only consider such internal matters peculiar to the regions, but all legislations would have to be passed at the central legislature. The object of the constitution was to emphasize the Unity of Nigeria,⁶ while providing opportunities for the regions to deliberate and advise on their regional problems.

The N.C.N.C. in its Memorandum on the New constitution for Nigeria, wanted a Federal structure in which the Central Legislature controlled defence, foreign affairs and currency.⁷ With his idea that Nigeria was a mere geographic expression,⁸ Chief Obafemi Awolowo and the Action Group wanted a Federal structure. The Northern Region realised the imbalance between it and the South, and so opted for Federalism. The review of the existing constitution then, like the present political discussion, was carried down to the village levels from where representatives were sent to the divisional meetings, provincial meetings, regional meetings and finally there was the General Conference which was held at Ibadan in January 1950. The final recommendations included the establishment of three regions, with regional legislatures. With the recommendations of the conference at Ibadan, the three major parties regressed to their regions to plan how to fight for the allocation of power and revenue. On the allocation of seats at the centre, the conference recommended 30 for the North, and 22 each for the West and the East. Regional patriotism overwhelmed Nigerian Nationalism. The conference failed to recommend a Unitary Government because every regional representative wanted a strong regional set-up, and so it was. Engrossed with the idea of regional

6. John P. Mackintosh, *op. cit.* p. 22.

7. *N.C.N.C. Memorandum on the New Constitution of Nigeria*, Lagos 1945.

8. Obafemi Awolowo, *The Path to Nigerian Freedom*, London: Faber 1947, pp. 47 – 52.

autonomy, nobody seemed to have bothered about the implication of giving the North more than half of the combined representatives of the East and West. To preserve its strength and position, the North capitalised on regional autonomy and the distribution of power on the basis of population. Mackintosh aptly described the mood of the nation in the lamentation of the Hon. C. D. Onyeama: "we are always asking for autonomy in each region. . . Everybody is thinking about his region."⁹

The import of the foregoing analysis is that none of the leaders before independence was seriously concerned with the question of the nation. What was uppermost in their minds was how to preserve their own positions and check the domination of their region by any other. Since independence, Nigeria's policies have been dictated either by fear of domination or the bid to dominate others.

True enough, the N.C.N.C. when it dominated the scene, spent its energy mobilizing the followers. But as soon as many of them became conscious of the need to be independent, and the possible benefits, many left the N.C.N.C. and joined tribal or regional organizations. In 1942, the N.C.N.C. had to form a national front from multiple mushroom political parties which infested Lagos politics. Thus, the N.C.N.C. emerged as a national party by assimilating mushroom parties based on local grievances without a national ideology which could have assimilated these local orientations. Although the speeches of the leadership of the N.C.N.C. were geared towards mobilizing the masses, disseminating the ideas of representative democracy and parliamentary government, the time available before independence, and the impatience of politicians to "inherit the earth" did not allow the followers to be fully educated. The N.C.N.C. looked forward to a socialist commonwealth,¹⁰ but its leaders were capitalists — an incipient contradiction that continued to plague the nation till today.

-
9. John P. Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, 24 See also *Proceedings of the General Conference on Review of the Constitution*. January 1950 Lagos, Government Printer.
 10. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, An address delivered in the Rex Cinema, Onitsha, February 14, 1953.

THE RISE OF REGIONAL PARTIES AND THE CREATION OF THE GREAT HIATUS

The bid of politicians to create an independent power base, and personal disagreement with the leadership of the N.C.N.C. led to the emergence of pocket nationalism based on regional and personal ambitions as well as local grievances.

THE ACTION GROUP (A.G.)

It has been argued that tribalism as a political instrument dates as far back as 1944 when the N.C.N.C. was formed because the Ibo joined as "communal members"¹¹ The Yoruba, led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo interpreted this to mean unflinching loyalty to their kinsman, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, who was then the Secretary-General of the Party. The Ibo identification with the N.C.N.C. could not rightly have been called tribalism since the president of the N.C.N.C. at that time was a Yoruba man - Herbert Macauley. Nevertheless, the eulogy which Zik had for the Ibo nation could not have been expected of a nationalist of his stature. Addressing the Ibo state Assembly in June 1949, he observed that:

The Ibo people have reached a cross road and it is for us to decide which is right course to follow. . . but as I see it, there is only one road that I can recommend for us to tread, and it is the road to self-determination for the Ibo within the framework of a federated commonwealth of Nigeria. . . ¹² -

This speech has been differently interpreted.¹³ The interpretation offered here is perhaps a simplification of Zik's experiences in his effort to mobilize national consciousness. Nigeria is an amorphous entity, large and diverse. A large proportion of its citizens were not even aware that the colonial architects ha

-
11. B.I.C. Ijomah, *Nationalism and Socio-Political Integration in Nigeria* Cambridge Mass. Schenkman Publishing Company, 1973, Revised 1975, unpublished.
 12. Zik, *A Selection from the Speeches of Nnamdi Azikiwe*, Cambridge University Press 1961. p. 181.
 13. Akande Tugbiyele, *The Emergence of Nationalism and Federalism*

carved them out and lumped them with other ethnic groups. Even in 1986, one of our military Governors in Gongola State was reported to have discovered a village without school or traces of modern Nigeria.

At the time Zik spoke, the communication media were appallingly inadequate. To preach Nigeria Nationalism to people who knew little or nothing about the existence of Nigeria would have been ineffective. Perhaps this was why Zik contended that tribal nationalities should be recognized as "a pragmatic instrument for national unity".

However, in response to the Ibo National Union, the Yoruba under the leadership of Chief Awolowo decided to come together. The Chief observed that the Yoruba were "unorganized and were lacking in concerted programmes and effective leadership"¹⁴.

It should be pointed out that Chief Awolowo had in 1945 formed the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, a cultural organization for the expressed purpose of bringing the Yoruba together, and alerting them of the imminent domination of the Ibo. As a matter of fact, the Yoruba have been mentally set, in readiness to counter any move by the Ibo state Union. Consequently, when Zik made his 1949 speech, Chief Awolowo appeared to have considered the time most appropriate to transform the Egbe Omo Oduduwa into a political organization.. The Egbe Omo Oduduwa co-operated with the Nigerian Youth Movement, and the Action Group was an exuberant protrusion of this alliance. Initially, like its parent body, the Action Group assumed the texture of a tribal and cultural organization. But it soon waxed strong and became a serious threat to the supremacy of the N.C.N.C. Dr. Azikiwe came out to criticize the formation of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa as sowing the seeds of discord, and as a fertilizer of the soil of national disunity. He declared that:

Henceforth, the cry must be one of battle against Egbe Omo Oduduwa, its leaders at home and abroad, up hill and down dale, in the streets of Nigeria, and in the residences of its advocates

14. John P. Machintosh, op. cit., p. 428.

... It is the enemy of Nigeria; it must be crushed to the earth. . . There is no going back until the fascist organisation of Sir Adeyemo has been dismembered.¹⁵

Zik's inconsistency has continued to baffle critical scholars. On the 25th of June, 1949, exactly eleven days before he had attacked the Yoruba cultural organization, he had presented an address to the Ibo State Assembly in which he advocated the right of the Ibo people to national self-realisation. If Zik allowed the Ibo people to become communal members of the N.C.N.C., he had no moral basis to have criticised the Egbe Omo Oduduwa for identifying with the Action Group. But from the accounts of the growth of political parties in Nigeria this conflict marked the crystallization of the personal differences between Chief Awolowo and Dr. Azikiwe. When Dr. Azikiwe resigned from the Nigerian Youth Movement, the Ibo left with him, and what was left became the focal point of Yoruba intellectuals. The failure of the Yoruba to win positions of importance within the N.C.N.C. forced many of them out, and led to the formation of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa the following year.¹⁶ The personal rivalry between Dr. Azikiwe and Chief Awolowo made any possible reconciliation between the N.C.N.C. and the A.G. difficult. The rapprochement between the two parties did not take place until Zik had resigned from the leadership of the N.C.N.C. and Chief Awolowo had been thrown into the prison.

Even during the second Republic, it was speculated that Zik's sudden change of mind to contest on the N.P.P.'s platform, after he had declared himself retired, and assumed the garb of an elderly statesman, was to stop Awolowo from being elected. The fact that the U.P.G.A. waxed very strong before the civil war, showed the tremendous wedge which Zik and Awolowo placed on Southern Unity.

Besides personal rivalry, neither the N.C.N.C. nor the Action Group had any ideological orientation which could have cut across tribal animosity.

15. *The West African Pilot*, July 7, 1949.

16. Zik, *op. cit.* p. 32g

THE NORTHERN PEOPLES CONGRESS (NPC)

As its name implied, it was meant for the Northerners only. It therefore had no room for the Southerners. Although the Richards Constitution had taken the Northerners unprepared for self-government, it made them realise that with half of the seats at the centre, it did not need the Southern parties to win. It did also awaken in them the consciousness that they were moving so unevenly with the Southern politicians. For a long time however, they could not organize themselves into a movement because of the towering influences of the feudal overlords. Somehow, many of the alumni of the Katsina College met to form a platform for discussing the transition of the Northern Region into modern politics. The N.P.C. which grew out of this type of gathering has been described as a political expression rather than a political party. Its aim was to accommodate the religion and the tradition of the Northerners within the everchanging Nigerian political scene. At best it provided a forum for attacks on the Ibo¹⁷ who resided in the North and participated actively in the socio-political processes of the people. Inter-tribal hatred was manifested on all levels, and spread down to the masses whenever there was competition for any scarce valence. Party lines became synonymous with conflict boundaries among the ethnic groups. The formation of other minority parties like the UMBC (United Middle Belt Congress) of the late Tarka, followed closely, the emergence of local grievances like the demand for the creation of regions. In many instances these local grievances were engineered by ambitious politicians who had failed to make significant impacts under the existing parties. Such parties thrived only on the support of local people and had homogeneous cultural identifications.

Constant discrimination from the major tribes served as a glue that held the minorities together. The formation of the United Middle Belt Congress was described as an "exception to the normal pattern of Nigerian Politics"¹⁸

17. *Ibid*, p. 363.

18. *Ibid*, p. 461.

Also in the Northern Region, the Northern Element Progressive Union (NEPU) was an expression of disenchantment with the feudal North by the Talakawas.

GENERAL PATTERN

In the Western Region, many cultural organizations have assumed the garb of political parties primarily in order to win local elections. The leadership, on the other hand used such micro-organizations to exert pressure on the major parties for concessions and recognition. This resulted in fragile alliances that were not based on any similarity of ideological persuasion. The alliances followed the agreements among the leaders, and whenever the leaders disagreed, the alliances came to abrupt ends. Such was the fate of the NCNC/NPC alliance, the NCNC/UPP, NCNC/Dynamic Party Alliance, the NPC/Dynamic Party Alliance, the Action Group/Midwest Democratic Front alliance, the NPN/NPP alliance. Each party was a conglomeration of multiple interests, some cultural or local, others personal. None of the political parties ever had a homogeneous mass following because internal strifes were rampant. The point that is being made is that in each region, there was incessant struggle by the major party to absorb or eliminate the opposition or smaller parties. The assimilation is sometimes effected by the exchange of huge amount of money for party loyalty. Even within the major parties, there was complete absence of ideologies, and consequently what held the parties together was the extent to which they were threatened by the opposing parties, or how much money the parties could spend to buy support. Such purchasing of support necessarily leads to the institutionalization of corruption in every political organization. In both republics it was "normal" for a good percentage of any contract sum to be paid into the party funds, while some were diverted into personal accounts. For as long as political parties are allowed, for as long will corruption be pursued with institutional strength.

PARTY POLITICS AND NATIONAL STABILITY

B.J. Dudley, commenting on the formation of the Northern People's Congress, observed that "it is merely a political expression for the existing system of administration dyed

religion and innate traditions"¹⁹ The structure and function of politics in Nigeria were typical of what obtained in many other African countries. The three major ethnic groups — the Ibo, Hausa and Yoruba — have different political cultures, which may be described as "subject parochial" cultures, while the imported system for which the political parties were needed was based on the Western ideals, and was based on a "participant — political culture. As I have pointed out in the section on Afrocracy, most of the requirements for participant political culture were not met in Nigeria. Stress and instability were inevitable.

The Northern Nigeria's identification is consistent with Fred Von der Mehden's contention that every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action, that is a political culture.²⁰ Almond and Verba go further to stress that when political cultures are mixed, as was the case in France, Germany and Italy, "there are inevitable strains between cultures and structures, and a characteristic tendency toward structural instability"²¹ They contend that in such a mixture, participant political orientations do not replace subject — parochial political orientations. Individuals may become participants in the political process but do not give up their orientations as subject or as parochials.²² Each ethnic group in Nigeria during the First and Second Republics was an organization in itself, and easily transformed itself into a political party or political pressure group. Thus, it was easy to increase participation in the politics of the various ethnic groups by share normative response to appeals by political leaders from one's ethnic group.

Each party retained a consciousness of a kind and such local consciousness inhibited the emergence and the growth of

-
19. B.J. Dudley, "The Northern People's Congress," in J.P. Mackintosh, *op. cit.* p. 358
 20. Fred Von der Mehden, *Politics of Developing Nations*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965, p. 22
 21. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *Civic Culture*, Boston: The Little Brown and Company, 1965, p. 22
 22. *Ibid*, p. 30.

Nigerian consciousness. As a result of differences in education, political cultures, religion and micro-party sentiments, internal conflicts which plagued the Lagos — based politics found their ways into the regional as well as national politics. It has been contended that:

When in the course of human thinking, inconsistent cognitive elements are forced together by linguistic or behavioural assertion, stress is produced in proportion to the magnitude of the inconsistencies.²³

Another buttressing opinion holds that:

Where a number of historic cleavages intermix and create a basis for . . . politics, democracy will be unstable and weak, for by definition, such politics does not include the concept of tolerance.²⁴

Democracy calls for a high level of restraint.²⁵ When the colonial administration introduced party politics, it was into a country with multiple political cultures, each vying for supremacy. The diversities within Nigerian political movement appeared to have been accommodated in what has been described as "parties of representation",²⁶ in which parties emerge from political coalition for expressed purpose of maximizing the voter's turn out at elections. There is no ideological basis for such cleavages. As a matter of fact, it has been argued that not even the best Nigerian leaders could develop meaningful political ideology.²⁷

-
23. Charles Osgood, "Cognitive Dynamics in human Affairs" in E. Hollander and Raymond Hunt (eds.), *Current Perspectives in Social Psychology*, New York: O.U.P., 1953, p. 37
 24. S.M. Lipsat, *The Political Man*, New York: A Doubleday Anchor Book, 1963, p. 74.
 25. David Apter, *Ideology and Discontent*, New York: The Free Press, 1962, p. 32.
 26. David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965. p. 206.
 27. Henry L. Bretton, *Power and Stability in Nigeria*, New York: Frederick A Praeger, pp. 47 — 48

Each political party was based on the interests of a defined group, or of a given leader who used the group to promote his personal needs. This led to much instability in Nigeria since there is always a tendency on the part of the leader to see his views as sacrosanct, and therefore one that should not be challenged.

Every political behaviour must be seen to satisfy man's personal needs, demands and drives.²⁸ The love to stay in office on the part of the office holder, or the ruling group, and the ambition of the opposition to gain power, create fertile grounds for conflicts which are least desirable in developing nations, because they have not developed a culture of tolerance. That is why the ruling party or the independence party always tries to assimilate the opposition out of existence immediately after independence; where the opposition persists, it has in many countries been used by external forces to topple a ruling group.

To the nationalists, the development of one party system is indicative of the consensus of the people, or the acceptance of the legitimacy of the ruling party. Unfortunately, many Nigerians, in the absence of any thing new to offer, have been calling for one party system as the only answer to the nation's political instability. I am in sympathy with their limited horizon. Where parties are based on ethnic or tribal calculation, or struggle for group supremacy, which group would allow itself to be assimilated? One party system necessarily leads to dictatorship of a man or a tribal group. If one party system is adopted in the country, it will end up perpetuating the domination of one tribal group over the others.

The existence of multi-party system is a reflection of basic cultural, ethnic, economic and ideological divisions within the country, and as long as these divisions exist, the necessary consensus for perpetuating a stable system is missing. The experiment of one party system in Guinea, based on Sekou Toure's charisma and brand of oppression, justified the military intervention soon after his death. Let us recall the alienation of the

28. Heinz Eulau, *The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics*, New York: Random House, 1964, pp. 88 – 89.

masses with Kamuzu Banda's drift to one-party system in Malawi, Julius Nyerere's suppression of dissident voices, shrouded in a platitude of Ujamaa. We cannot so easily forget Dr. Milton Obote's brushes with the Kabaka of Uganda and the suppression of the followers of the Bugandans. The totalitarian postures of Nkrumah's C.P.P. led to military intervention in Ghana. In Ivory Coast, little is being reported of the ruthless hold on the people by Felix Houphet Boigny. In Nigeria, the N.P.C. was already moving towards consolidating its hold on the country before the Nzeogwu's coup stopped the move. It was already in control of the West through its agents, and was contemplating a state of emergency in the East.

During the Second Republic, the N.P.N. was waxing stronger by leaps and bounds. But for the military intervention of December 1983, no power in Nigeria could have removed the N.P.N., or prevented it from becoming totalitarian and fascist. Almost every Nigerian rejected in practice, the idea of a competitive party system, and contended that such a system was contradictory to the cultures of the people. Although Dr. Azikiwe, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and H.O. Davies defended openly the competitive party politics, they did in practice oppose the existence of the opposition, and laboured hard to eliminate it. When Dr. Azikiwe and Chief Awolowo were premiers, opposition to their governments dwindled to insignificance. This was true of all governments in Nigeria from Local councils to the Federal Government. Attempts by the ruling party to stifle the opposition only succeeded in driving the opposition underground.

President Soekarno of Indonesia was reported to have said that it was the adoption of the Western concept of active opposition which gave rise to Indonesia's difficulties and brought people to think in a manner alien to Indonesia.²⁹ In the same vein, Nkrumah observed that the "the C.P.P. is Ghana and Ghana is C.P.P.," and Ghana could not afford the luxury of the opposition party.

Four main patterns of a single party tendency were discernible: the extra-parliamentary restriction of the opposition,

29. Pupert Emerson "The Erosion of Democracy in the New States, and David Apter (eds.) *Comparative Politics*, N.Y. Free Press 1966 pp. 635 - 643.

regrouped or united front, the voluntary merger of the opposition with the ruling party, and the outlawry of the opposition. President Senghor of Senegal distinguishes between the single and the unified parties,³⁰ and Zolberg argues that in a unified party regime the opposition is allowed to exist, while in a single party state, the law forbids the existence of opposition. In Nigeria, however, we have had neither the single party nor the unified party. What we have had were more of patron parties where the ruling parties assimilated the minority parties, generally on the conditions laid down by the major party. Such assimilation or alliance lasted as long as the ruling party could find the smaller party useful. But whenever the major party felt it could do without the alliance, such an alliance broke down. The calculated gains of party politics in Nigeria were instant and never futuristic. To strengthen its position, the ruling party added the Obas to the list of its patronage.

The elimination of the opposition in Nigeria was possible only within the regional framework, where the parties drifted willy-nilly under the control of the major tribal groups. On the federal or national level, the absence of a national elite groups with class consciousness, coupled with the tribal dominance of the major parties, makes the existence of one-party system for Nigeria, another twentieth century political mirage.³¹ Political instability in Nigeria is due to the parochial complexion given to national issues in all the regions and later states, and the effects of this on national decision-making. In all African countries, because there is no objective cleavage on which to base political participation, politicians resorted to opportunism, and the only way open to many opportunists was to cash in on tribal and regional loyalties. In Nigeria, political participation and elite opportunism were characterized by the struggle for the national cake.

30. Aristide Zolberg, *Creating Political Order*, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966, p. 51.

31. B.I.C. Ijomah, "The Prospects of Nigerian Unity: A Twentieth Century Political Mirage," *Eagle Magazine*, Onitsha: Etudo Press Ltd. July, 1965

In Wiseman's term,

In a fragmented isolative culture, aggregation by parties is relatively narrow; coalitions are fragile; certain groups remain continuously alienated from the system; in Laski's phrase, there is politics of manoeuvre, not of policies.³²

CLASSIFICATION OF NIGERIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

Party politics in Nigeria was elitists, with the common man being used to service the needs of elites to the detriment of the same common man. In the first republic, there were four main political parties before the coup of January 15, 1966. The National Council of Nigerian Citizens (N.C.N.C.), the Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.), The Action Group (A.G.) and the Nigerian National Democratic Party (N.N.D.P.). These four political parties were classified as follows:

- N.C.N.C. — Modernizing Oligarchy
- N.P.C. — Traditional Oligarchy
- A.G. — Modernizing Oligarchy
- N.N.D.P. — Totalitarian Oligarchy.

In the second republic, all the parties could be classified as modernizing oligarchies. Even though there were similarities in some areas between the N.C.N.C. and the A.G. which qualify them for the category of modernizing oligarchy, there were fundamental differences which made their coalition to fail. In general, the parties were incompatible with one another. The alliances between the N.N.D.P. and the N.C.N.C., and later the N.C.N.C. and the A.G. merely reflected politics of manoeuvre, rather than of principles or ideology. No sooner was the alliance between the N.C.N.C. and the U.P.P. formalized, than the United People's Party, U.P.P. broke it in order to team up with the N.P.C. In the election that followed, rigging was at its worst — opponents were alleged to have been eliminated, ballot boxes and papers were distributed indiscriminately, people who failed were declared elected the press was censored and political opponents were dismissed from their jobs. In the 1979 elections,

32: H.V. Wiseman, *Political Systems*, New York: Frederick Praeger 1966, p. 144.

all parties rigged, and those who rigged most won. In the 1983 elections, the rigging techniques were perfected, and again, all the parties rigged.

In the first Republic, the regional parties were controlled by the elite. The conflict that led to the Military Intervention in January 1966, was caused by the elite. In the absence of political parties, the average citizen saw no reason for competitions with one another. But when politics became the profession of some members of the elite, they, the elite, organized and manipulated the common man.

The N.C.N.C. formed a coalition with the Action Group in anticipation of the on-coming elections. The coalition party was called (United Progressive Grand Alliance). U.P.G.A. The N.P.C. and the N.N.D.P formed alliance, and adopted the name of (The Nigerian National Alliance) N.N.A.

On the surface therefore, Nigeria had two grand parties forged out of incompatibles. An understanding of how they worked and failed is necessary to show how fragile these coalitions were, and why it is contended that the party system of any form is unworkable in Nigeria, at least in this century. My search for an alternative to the party system is based on the agonizing and dismal failures of any system of government based on party politics in Nigeria.

As has been seen earlier, the N.C.N.C. and N.P.C. formed a coalition government in 1959 shortly before independence. It was a marriage of convenience which was not based on any solid foundation. It could not last, and, indeed, it broke down before the 1964 elections. There ensued the politics of manoeuvre, and fragile realignment of forces. A break up of the Action Group with the active assistance of both the N.P.C. and the N.C.N.C. led to the emergence of the U.P.P., later renamed N.N.D.P., which went into alliance first with the N.C.N.C. and later with N.P.C. In order to survive, the battered fragment of the Action Group found a new partner in its one time political enemy, the N.C.N.C. Since the Action Group was essentially a conglomeration of the Yoruba, the tribe found itself caught between two equally attractive and equally repellent bride grooms. This accentuated the disunity and instability among the Yoruba.

Since power and the sharing of ministerial posts became a hotly-sought for luxury, the Yoruba, now in a state of political quandary did not seem to care which ever party helped them, since as a people in turmoil, they could not on their own achieve the goals of every political party, the control the Federal Government. Some of the Yoruba went through the N.C.N.C. to this goal, while others joined forces with the Northern People's Congress.³³

Thus, the Yoruba as a people found themselves in a state of internal disequilibrium, or in Kenneth Boulding's terminology, in a "state of psychological conflict or quandary"³⁴

It is submitted that as long as political parties are allowed to exist, there can never be unity among the Yoruba, and this will always create perpetual instability for the rest of the country.³⁵ The experience in the first republic was a replica of the behaviour of the political parties which ended the first republic. Any loosely united tribe that is excessively obsessed with struggling for power and status will be vulnerable to exploitation by other more cohesive groups. It was proposed that after the civil war, the Yoruba would revive their pristine cleavages, and the disunity which was not healed by the war, would become worse — another fruitful source for a post war crisis.³⁶

Figure 1 illustrates the Yoruba in a state of political quandary. Figure II illustrates the pattern of conflict, and shows that the classic theory of class formation and class conflict has not crystallized in Nigeria. At best what exists is horizontal conflict based on variable interests, while support is vertical either from the masses to their tribesman on top, or vice-versa to protect tribesmen below.


33. B.I.C. Ijomah, *Ph.D. Dissertation*, Evanston Northwestern University, 1969.


34. Kenneth Boulding, *Conflict and Defence*, New York: Harper Torchbook 1963, p. 83.

35. B.I.C. Ijomah, *op. cit.*, 1969

36. B.I.C. Ijomah, *Nationalism and Socio-Political Integration in Nigeria*, Cambridge Mass: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1973, Revised edition 1975 p. 228.

Fig. 1.





It illustrates the manipulation of the masses by the political elite group. Mob confrontation or inter-tribal rioting such as the Kano riot of 1953 or the pogrom against the Ibo in 1966 followed lines of cleavages among the political elite. When the N.C.N.C. formed an alliance with the N.P.C., the inter-tribal hostility between the Ibo and the Hausa was suspended. The Yoruba became their common enemy. When the alliance broke down towards the end of 1964, the pattern of conflict changed. There were coalitions at local levels based on local interests. But the grand coalition at the Federal level was fragile because it was not founded on solid ideological basis.

Politically, each elite group looked up to the parties for success. Each party looked down the hierarchy to the masses whose support for the political parties was based on ethnic or tribal affinity. The elite group in turn, looked down on the masses below for support whenever they fell out with the party bureaucracy. Strong party men with strong bases and clusters of loyal tribesmen were generally indisciplined in the party. Individuals from the masses were helped by their henchment to rise in the hierarchy. The Yoruba masses formed the ladder for the Yoruba elite, the Hausa man helped the Hausa, and the Ibo did so to his tribesmen. Thus integration was vertical while struggle was horizontal between Ibo man and Hausa, or Ibo versus Yoruba and so on across the tribal line. Until integration becomes horizontal and conflict vertical across tribal and ethnic lines, Nigeria cannot have the circulation of elite which would lead to the masses (bourgeoisie confrontation).

This type of situation breeds psychopants at the base, and leads to nepotism. When political affiliation and tribal consideration outweigh academic qualifications and experience, when the normal expectations of qualified people are violated in the name of the quota system, when the younger generation are not allowed to mature before they are used to fill state and tribal quotas, when they are rushed into positions without discipline and experience, when the qualified find their outcome far below their input, - in comparison with others whose qualifications are based on political considerations and nepotism, then a feeling of the existence of inequity will arise. This creates ten-

sion. But the tension line is horizontal. In Nigeria before the first military intervention this tension was at a critical threshold particularly in the military and civil service appointments where the Northernization policy was practically disrupting the progress of the nation. Quotas were allotted on sectional basis and there was no guarantee that the official so appointed was the best for the job. Consequently, when mediocrity replaces meritocracy, it is national hypocrisy to look for the causes of failure in many sectors of our national life.

Patronage of any kind, ossifies internal conflict, but increases external conflict, because objections would come from outside the party or tribal system.

What is being stressed here is that political conflicts, rioting and similar phenomena have been caused by the elite groups (not class). It has been contended that the masses do not corrupt themselves. If they are corrupt, they have been corrupted³⁷ by the political elite. It is also contended that the elite and the intellectuals constitute the pillars of moral community. If they are corrupt, and if they have in turn corrupted the masses, they are in their own turn, responding to the manipulations of political parties, and until party influences are neutralised, there can be no salvation either of the elite conscience or that of the masses.

In the above excursion into the past activities of Nigerian political parties, I have dwelt more on the first republic. What happened in the second republic was a replica of what happened in the first, though on a grander scale. It was clear in the second republic that no party had a vision of the enormous problems created by the profligacies of all the parties. I was wrong to have blamed the Shagari administration alone. Our state governors were teleguided by their political parties. Military intervention was predictable. But the military should have intervened to stop the farcical elections instead of allowing governments without legitimacy to be sworn in before they were overthrown. I am not even sure that the military has answers to the national questions. They cannot even identify the questions. So why look up to them for the answers.

37. B.I.C. Ijomah, *op. cit.* p. 233.

The next section will examine my alternative to the party system, the theory of Afrocracy. I have studied electoral processes even at the grassroots. It is my conviction based on empirical evidence, that a political system without political parties (Afrocracy) should be stabilised before another attempt at party formations. If this is not done, the military should standby and routinize their intervention.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Herbert J. Spiro, (ed.), *Africa: The Primacy of Politics*. New York: Random House, 1966.
2. John P. Mackintosh, *Nigerian Government and Politics*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966, p. 144.
3. K.W.J. Post, "The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, the Decision of December 1959" in John P. Mackintosh, *op. cit.* p. 407.
4. Sir Frederick D. Lugard, *Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria, and Administration 1912 - 1919*: H.M. Majesty's Stationary Office, 1920, p. 407.
5. B.I.C. Ijomah, "Nationalism, Patriotism and Alienation." Paper delivered at the National Political Science Association Conference held at University of Ilorin, 1985.
6. John P. Mackintosh, *op. cit.* p. 22.
7. N.C.N.C. *Memorandum on the New Constitution of Nigeria*, Lagos, 1945.
8. Obafemi Awolowo, *The Path to Nigerian Freedom*: London: Faber, 1947, pp. 47 - 52.
9. John P. Mackintosh, *op. cit.* p. 24 See also *Proceedings of the General Conference on Review of the Constitution* January 1950, Lagos, Government Printer.
10. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe An Address delivered in the Royal Cinema Onitsha, February 14, 1953.
11. B.I.C. Ijomah, *Nationalism and Socio-Political Integration in Nigeria*, Cambridge Mass. Schenkman Publishing Company, 1973.
12. Zik, *A Selection from the Speeches of Nnamdi Azikiwe* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1961, p. 181.
13. Akande Tugbiyele, *The Emergence of Nationalism and Federalism*.
14. John P. Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, p. 428.
15. *The West African Pilot*, July 7, 1949.
16. Zik, *op. cit.*, p. 329
17. *Ibid*, p. 363.
18. *Ibid*, p. 461.
19. B.J. Dudley, "The Northern People's Congress," in Mackintosh, *op. cit.* p. 358.

20. Fred Von der Mehden, *Politics of Developing Nations*, Eaglewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965. P. 22.
21. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *Civic Culture*, Boston: The Little Brown and Company, 1965. p. 22
22. *Ibid.* p. 30
23. Charles Osgood, "Cognitive Dynamics in human Affairs" in E.P. Hollander and Raymond Hunt (eds.) *Current Perspectives in Social Psychology*, New York: O.U.P., 1953, p. 37
24. S.M. Lipset, *The Political Man*, New York: A Double day Anchor Book, 1963, p. 74.
25. David Apter, *Ideology and Discontent*, New York: The Free Press, p. 32.
26. David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 47 — 48
27. Henry L. Bretton, *Power and Stability in Nigeria*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, p. 47 — 48.
28. Heinz Eulau, *The Behavioural Persuasion in Politics*, New York Random House, 1964, p. 88 — 89.
29. Pupert Emerson "The Erosion of Democracy in the New States," and David Apter (eds) in *Comparative Politics*, New York: Free Press 1966 pp. 635 — 643.
30. Aristide Zolberg, *Creating Political Order*, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966, p. 51.
31. B.I.C. Ijomah, "The Prospects of Nigerian Unity: A Twentieth Century Political Mirage," *Eagle Magazine*, Onitsha: Etudo Press Ltd., July, 1965.
32. H.V. Wiseman, *Political Systems*, New York: Frederick Praeger, 1966, p. 144.
33. B.I.C. Ijomah, *Ph.D Dissertation*, Evanston Northwestern University, 1969.
34. Kenneth Boulding, *Conflict and Defence*, New York: Harper Torchbook, 1963, p. 83.
35. B.I.C. Ijomah, *op. cit.*, 1969.
36. B.I.C. Ijomah, *Nationalism and Socio-Political Integration in Nigeria*, Cambridge Mass: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1973, Revised edition 1975, p. 228.
37. B.I.C. Ijomah, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

CHAPTER II

PROLOGUE

Once again, these times are times of chaos, opinions are scramble; organizations are a jumble, the language of new ideas has not been created; nothing is more difficult than to give definition to our needs. Every Nigerian feels he knows the answers but no one can identify the questions.

It is the problem of this generation to classify men and women by sorting the good from the bad. The so called New Nigerians are like passengers in a canoe controlled by the old generation. The New Nigerians cannot find a way in a sociopolitical nation without an apocalyptic transformation, call it a revolution if you like. Therefore, they must evolve from what is. There is no other way.

One hopes however, that those who are evolving, or who hope to evolve the New Social order, are themselves intellectually alert to know the complicated problems of tortured developing nations in the midst of complicated international geo-political social and economic order, in which the interests of the developing nations cannot be made paramount by the exploiting more developed nations. No advice either from the IMF or foreign consultants will put Africans at 'par' with the home countries of these foreign experts.

THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF AFROCRACY

Many radical workers, scholars and peasants seem to agree that socialism is the ideal ideology for the nation. It is acclaimed a preferred alternative to either Democracy, totalitarianism, fascism or communism. It is therefore pertinent to raise some issues on the possibilities of socialism in Nigeria before I discuss the ideological basis of Afrocracy.

Some scholars have called on the Government and people of Nigeria to adopt socialism as Nigeria's National Ideology. Some would even want undiluted marxism. I have nothing against socialism. If it were possible to introduce it into the country given the social, political and economic structures that we have now, I would go for it.

One Head of Department in one of our Universities led the public even further astray when he declared in a television interview that Nigeria did not need any other ideology since "Mixed Economy" was Nigeria's ideology. Sometime ago, another Head of Department in another University called on "African Nations to do away with capitalistic approach to development." Most of the advocates of socialism believe it is the only remedy to our socio-political pathologies.

What the advocates of Nigerian Socialism seem to have failed to understand, is that *you do not beg a capitalist to surrender his wealth for the benefit of the masses*. Socialism as the amelioration of the conditions of the working classes by the introduction of greater equality into economic relations is viewed as the economic philosophy of the suffering class, abated by some intellectuals. The celebrated sociologist Emile Durkheim defines socialism as:

A cry of grief, sometimes of anger uttered by men who feel most keenly our collective malaise. Socialism is to the facts which produce it what the groans of a sick man are to the illness with which he is afflicted.¹

He goes further to argue that it is a cry of collective anguish which is typical of the lamentations which the "wretched" of all epochs and societies have made — the claims of the poor against the rich.

The conflicts between the poor and the rich can no more be terminated than the human misery can end. They are the chronic illness of humanity which become more acute in transitory circumstances such as Nigeria is experiencing now. The cry of these "Socialists" are no more curative of our social maladies than the cry of a sick man can cure his illness.

But when the physician sets to cure the illness, sometimes the sick develops cold feet.

Whether we agree or not, this country inherited an unfortunate capitalist system. Our advocates of socialism, if they

1. Emile Durkheim, *Socialism*, Alvin Gouldner (ed.) New York: Collier Books 1958. p. 41.

claim to be propounding an ideology should first study our society to know whether, given the present structures and complexities in our society, socialism can be introduced without an apocalyptic revolution which would destroy many of the capitalists. One advocate of socialism wants Nigeria to go socialist, but he does not want violence. He does not want a bloody revolution, but wants a redistribution of the wealth of the few rich people. Our Socialist advocates also forget that the few rich people not only control the wealth of the nation but also the apparatuses of decision making and implementation. With this kind of capitalist entrenchment in Nigeria, socialism can only come about after perhaps a successful struggle against capitalist interests.

The difficulty in achieving socialism without a struggle lies in the simple fact that those who preach it are too busy with their own affairs to be able to carry out the organization, mobilization and education of the masses towards socialist orientation. You cannot re-educate the masses without grasping their actual living situations and rhythms. The masses are hungry. This is the one country I know, where an honest University Professor cannot buy a bag of rice. Yet there are records of clerks who own two or more cars by stealing. Such people ought to have been shot. The illness of this country is serious enough to sap the energies of the angels of the Lord, were it possible to make any of them our President. It is only by having an interpretative understanding of the real life experiences of the common man as well as the institutions which control his participation in the social system that we can predict with any reasonable measure of accuracy that the said common man will agree to be mobilized and oriented towards socialism. The masses of our people have been betrayed several times since independence by politicians, the military intellectuals and preachers of all descriptions, the same people still go on the illusion that whenever they ask the masses to move again they would.

During the civil war, those deeply and sincerely committed to "the principles of the Biafran revolution" subscribed to the "Ahiara" declaration. As Tony Momoh rightly pointed out:

The climate for mass mobilization was there during the civil war on both sides.²

Every loyal Nigerian shared an identity of common fate bound together by perceived bonds of oneness. But Momoh observed rightly that: the farther away one was from the war fronts, the less felt were the effects of the war and therefore the commitment to the war.³

In the "Biafran" territory, those who were less committed to the struggle nicknamed the "Ahiara" declarations "*Onye-ara*" declarations. (That is the "mad man's declarations"). Soon after the war, most of those war time socialists became the "new rich" of our time. They are behind the second tier foreign exchange system in order to consolidate the riches. Does the common man need the second tier foreign exchange system? With all the alleged frauds in the Central Bank, where will the nation find the real new breed to man the second tier? I sincerely hope that we do not bring in foreign advisers again. Let us adopt what we understand.

If we aspire to remold the Nigerian social order, we must have an INTERPRETATIVE understanding of the institutions of our society and how they relate to the changing order. It is only then that we can formulate a programme of action which the common man can understand.

There are three ways of tackling the problems of socialism in Nigeria.

(1) If the advocates feel strongly about it, they should set up a movement formidable enough to counterbalance the movements of the capitalists, particularly the "NEW RICH" who are most resistant to mass movements of a socialist nature.

These new rich in Nigeria have just risen from poverty to opulence within the last decade especially after the last civil war. The "socialist" must have to bleed them to death before they can snatch any wealth away from them. For every movement these "socialists" muster, the business men and the capitalists are feady for a counter movement even if it means bribing

2. Tony Momoh, Lagos *Sunday Times*, May 29, 1977, p. 5

3. *Ibid.*

their way through.

Of course they have no scruples that is why they are capitalists. It is easier for the capitalist to organize a movement than for the isolated University ideologues to organize the peasant in Nigeria. The peasant movement many succeed elsewhere but not in Nigeria. Let us take an example of a professor who professes socialism. His wife has a super market where the common man is also bled with exorbitant prices. He is also a member of the cooperative movement where goods bought at the cooperative prices find their way into his wife's shops. The next day, such professor goes on the illusion that the common man would follow him and his wife to overthrow the capitalists.

It is difficult for these advocates of socialism to organize the workers because the workers are living witnesses of the fraudulence of some Union leaders. What has become the fate of the one-time house-hold slogan of "Greater Tomorrow"? What has happened to the funds of the Socialist and Worker Party of the 1960s? There are many such insincere movements aimed at organising the workers to overthrow the capitalist system. They could have ended up providing capitals for the leadership?

(2) The second way in which this country can go socialist is by a legislation of the ruling elite. The military regime have stated clearly that it would not impose an ideology on Nigeria. It would have been difficult to impose a non-existent ideology. But could we not learn from the Ethiopian experiment?

Ideology is not any aggregation of fragmentary individual experiences. The fact that Dr. X has studied in the "socialist" countries and has seen socialism at work there does not mean that socialism would succeed in Nigeria. That one has read fragments of Karl Marx, does not make one a genuine marxist. If the advocates of socialism in Nigeria are sincere, their first move should be to carry out an empirical study of the Nigerian society, to see what social doctrines are likely to emerge from our practical experiences. Karl Marx's doctrines were a result of his interpretative understanding of European societies of his time. This has to be so because the understanding of ideology calls first for a understanding of the social situation within which men's activities take place. That is why any attempt to import the global

concept of socialism that is not contingent on our social experience would lead this country into catastrophe.

As Professor Ali Mazrui observes in his "Borrowed Theory and Original Practice in African Politics," apart from the idea of parliamentary democracy, other verbal equipment which the West has bequeathed to Africa includes such comprehensive concepts like socialism. Socialism is an abstraction from the European experiences. Parliamentary democracy is also an abstraction from Western experiences. Attempts to transplant them into Nigeria without an interpretative understanding of our social systems and the cultures that bind the systems resulted in the colossal tragedies which have thrown us to the winds in search of an alternative. Is socialism, another Western abstraction, a better alternative?

(3) The third way to bring in socialism is by revolution of people sharing a common ideological conviction.

A palace coup or a conventional military coup is not a revolution. A revolution implies an apocalyptic transformation of the social structure following some guidelines of an ideology, and this presupposes the existence of an acceptable leadership. In the absence of such an ideology, we have to continue pleading that the governments which are not of the common men should declare that the wealth of the rich be redistributed. What a platitudinous expectation!

What is being contended here is that no revolution is possible in Nigeria within this century. The ingredients of military coups are always present in any regime. All they need is a set of people to popularize them.

Secondly, the advocates of socialism in Nigeria are incapable of persuading the common man to join a movement that would overthrow the capitalist system.

It is therefore necessary that we approach the question of ideology with some kind of realism. We should think of what doctrines are likely to be contingent on our socio-political realities rather than what doctrines we could borrow again from Europeans. The audacious ambition of the world socialism as the "Association of All Classes of All Nations" is a doctrine borne "out of Utopia" and not out of practical national experiences.

If socialism should thrive in Nigeria, it must be socialism that is borne "out of Nigeria's collective experiences" and not out of fragmentary experiences of individuals.

Socialism demands a very high level of discipline, dedication and loyalty. These are attributes which are not easy to find in most Nigerians, no matter how articulate and belligerent they may be over socialism. If therefore we need socialism in this country we must first begin with the education and resocialisation of Nigerians. But what are the values and norms for this resocialisation, and who is to begin it? This is the question General Murtala's probes into General Gowon's administration found 10 out of the 12 military Governors corrupt. If the corrective military regime needs to be corrected, who then should begin the ethical revolution?

Even General Murtala himself had unanswered questions from the late Dr. Obarogie Ohombamu. In a later section, I will discuss some of the ills of the nation, and conclude that the nation is suffering from a disease which I have described as Socioporosis. It is a social malady which has consumed the inner core, leaving the outside with a facade of normalcy. The nation is sick to the core. People do not think. Everybody remembers how other people did their things their own ways. But that is only the *how*. No question is asked as to the *why*. If we cannot find out why people do what they do, it is impossible to stop what they do. The principal elements in social interaction are who, when, where, how, and why. While a knowledge of who, when, where, and how are descriptive, the answer to "why" must be analytical. It requires a thorough knowledge of the participants and their characteristics, the environment and the philosophical basis of their thinking.

To understand the ideological basis of Afrocracy, there is a need to return to *Africans qua Africans*, not to the marginalised Africans created, dehumanised and despirited by the colonial situation. A survey of the ideologies of past African leaders reveals a chronic ideological bankruptcy. Therefore, the only way for Nigeria to assert and enjoy its independence is for ideas to germinate from the indigenes of the country. A similar argument was made by Sigmund, when he wrote that:

One of the ways for a nation to assert its independence is to turn to its tradition for inspiration.⁴

This is the only way of establishing a link between the leaders and the unmobilized villagers. Since many of the leaders have been very marginalized, they can no longer speak for the villages without consulting them, or ensuring that the villagers understand their frames of reference. We know that so far, African politics is the game of the elite in which the masses are used as pawns. Most of the people have not been uprooted, modernized or secularized. How can they be expected to participate in the political games played, or which are supposed to be played according to the rules derived from different cultural experiences? Both Nasser and Bourguiba endeavoured to return to a traditional base for their reforms. The nearest they could go was to stick to the letters of the Koran. Bourguiba extolled the Koran as liberalizing the human mind. But he lamented the fact that Tunisians were enslaved to certain doctrinal matters which ought to have been reviewed in the light of changing circumstances. He argued that What surprised and pained him was that people argued that certain teachings could not be discussed, and went on to lament:

"Here we see the poverty of the chained mind.
How can we discuss this problem, since it has
never been discussed before"⁵

In spite of the African's intellectual sophistication in analysing acquired knowledge, he is yet to apply the sophistication in analysing himself and his circumstances. Consequently, when it is suggested that one should turn to one's traditional culture for inspiration, people hardly believe that the educated African knows very little about his traditional culture. In fact, even the little he knows, he tries to destroy so that his society can meet the prescriptions of the western society. It is not uncommon to hear scholars call for scrapping off of the institution of traditio-

4. Paul E. Sigmund, *The Ideologies of Developing Nations* New York: Frederick A Praeger, Publishers, 1967, p. 46.

5. Habib Bourguiba, "The Fast of Ramadan", Speech delivered on February 6, 1961.

nal rulers because, as they claim, it is anachronistic. But one does not know to what it is anachronistic.

Ataturk of Turkey, in his modernization drive used every resource available, including appeals to traditional religion as well as to the military. In the first republic, Nigeria's Northern People's Congress had attained Northern Nigerian nationalism dyed in Islamic culture and tradition. There were however pockets of resistance. But it was clear that the unity or cohesion of the party was brought about by the members' respect for their traditional culture.

I have elsewhere written about cultural apostasy and cultural orientation of the colonial situation. But during the colonial period the Africans were forced by oppression, exploitation and brainwashing to ABANDON THEIR TRADITIONAL 'SOULS' IN SEARCH OF THE HEAVENLY KINGDOM OF THE WHITE SLAVE TRADERS AND MERCANTILISTS. AS MEEK AS THE AFRICAN WAS, HE COULD NOT INHERIT THE LANDS OF HIS FOREFATHERS BECAUSE BY THE TIME HE RECOVERED FROM THE HALLUCINATING "MANTRAS" OF HIS RELIGION, THE WHITEMAN HAD CONCEALED THE BIBLE AND USED HIS GUNS TO DRIVE THE SOUTH AFRICANS, THE ZIMBABWEANS, THE ANGOLANS, THE ZAMBIANS, UGANDANS AND KENYANS OUT OF THEIR FERTILE GROUNDS.

Leopold Senghor noted that the

Slave trade had ravaged black Africa like a bush fire wiping out images and values in one art carnage.⁶

The African scholars who now accept the resultant situation, a situation borne out of the meeting of the whiteman and the black man, seem to forget that this same blackman (the Black Moors), held European civilization for over 800 years; and that black civilization flourished in the upper Paleolithic Age. What culture enabled the Doggons of Sudan to develop astronomical capabilities long before the birth of Christ? Sirius, which the western telescopes have just discovered was known to

6. Leopold Sedar Senghor, "What is Negritude" in Paul S. Sigmund, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

Africans thousands of years ago. Even if the branches of African traditional cultures have withered away under the scorching heat of colonialism, their roots are still deep rooted and can grow again, balzing a trail that will save the western world from the inevitable self-inflicted destruction.

Senghor described Negritude as a whole complex of civilized values:- cultural, economic, social, and political which characterize the black peoples.⁷

If Afrocracy must be seen in its proper perspective, it must be examined with reference to the whole complex of values in all aspects of life. It must be seen as an attempt to revive relevant native cultural roots which will provide the trunks for the new social order. It seeks to strike a balance between the traditional structures (with new functions), with the radical transformation of the entire society. It is a precautionary approach to the neo-radicals who would want the elimination of the traditional rulers from political influence, power and privilege. It should also be noted, with particular reference to Nigeria, that these traditional rulers whom these radicals vilify, are always the first to be courted by the radicals whenever they are elected into office. It has been noted that at Independence, the political parties dragged these traditional rulers out of their neutral positions. Thus, they were soiled and muddled by politics. Had they remained as detached as they were under the colonial regime, they would still have commanded their respects.

Paradoxically, many politicians who questioned the wisdom of retaining the traditional institutions were quick to ally with them when the need arose.⁸

Mokugwo Okoye accused Zik of inconsistency for having recommended the scrapping off of the institution of traditional rulers, while in his later days, he adorned himself with a chain of chieftaincy titles, and finally ended up as the Owelle of Onitsha. In his Political Blue Print for Nigeria, Zik had asked, "Are chiefs really necessary in post-war Nigeria?"⁹

7. *Ibid.*

8. More will be discussed on the Role of Traditional rulers in an Afrocracy.

9. Nnamdi Azikiwe, *Political Blue Print for Nigeria*, Lagos 1943, p. 20

THE INDIVIDUAL AS THE BASIC UNIT OF ANALYSIS IN AFROCRACY

Afrocracy begins with the individual as the basic unit, since it is the individuals that come together to forge either the oppressive machinery of exploitation or the salvaging instruments of a social order.

It is the individual who decides whether to allow a capitalist to exploit him, or whether to challenge the "primitive accumulation of capital". Whatever the individual decides, is determined by a number of questions such as:

- (1) Into what family is the individual born?
- (2) What are his life chances — his opportunities for future advancement?
- (3) Is he born into a pre-existing status or does he struggle to achieve his present status?

The education of the individual is of vital importance as he is the first ladder in the ascent in an Afrocracy.

One significant import of the nationalist movement and the emergence of party politics is the dissolution of social barriers.

The erstwhile 'Osu' and slaves joined the bandwagon and threw off the cloak of the untouchable. This is by no means a little achievement. Just as it was possible to liberate the slaves who were part of the African households before the arrival of the whiteman, without destroying the social structure, so also will it be possible to modernize traditional institutions without scrapping them off.

As will be shown later, in Britain, throughout the historical evolution of democracy, qualifications were laid out for those who were entitled to vote. Until the success of the Chartist movement in Britain in 1832, many people were not allowed to vote. As a matter of fact, the Chartist Movement merely added one million more voters to the electorate. The 1867 Act which more or less radicalized politics in Britain, included most of the poor classes. Still, it merely added two million votes to the electorate. In Germany, after the revolution in 1848, Bismarck granted the people universal suffrage as a price for supporting his policy of unity. In Prussia at that time, there was no universal suffrage nor was voting equal. The people obtained electo

power after they violently took it in the 1918 revolution. The 1919 constitution was simply an experiment in an untried system in search of stability. It worked.

In Britain, in the course of the evolution of democracy, people were allowed to vote if they had attained certain educational levels. In the United States, people had to pass literacy tests before they were allowed to vote. In both countries, there was a time when there were racial as well as sex qualifications. It was not until recently that the Black Americans were allowed to vote. Until the 20th century women were excluded from voting in Britain. As late as 1918 in Britain, voters were allowed two votes, chosen from among the following: residence, occupation and University degree. Herman Finer records that in 1945 there were about 200,000 occupational votes, and 175,000 University votes in Britain. There was thus enough stability to ensure the introduction of universal adult suffrage. Therefore the right to vote in a democracy, or in any system for that matter is not inalienable. Everybody cannot meaningfully vote and this is even confirmed in Nigeria by the exclusion of people under 18 years. They qualify to play for Nigeria abroad but they do not qualify to vote. Is it not more pathetic that an illiterate Butcher who cannot write his name can be a Senator, but a 17 year old undergraduate cannot vote?

But in Nigeria, with cultures of poverty, where the operation of democratic procedure for electing responsible individuals, and the people who elect the governments are not themselves responsible, the resultant governments can hardly be expected to be responsible.

Where an illiterate villager who does not appreciate the significance of ballot paper, votes a rogue into an office simply because he has been given a bicycle, the rogue should not be blamed for being irresponsible if he commits the sins of most Nigerian politicians. The law of Karma ordains that every nation deserves a government it elects. This preamble is necessary because it tries to answer the on-going question as to who will be entitled to vote, or who will not be entitled to hold public office. It is my contention that since many politicians, as a result of the activities of inexperienced individuals in a socio-porous society were bad, only the bad eggs should be banned.

A socioporous society is a society where everything appears normal but in which everything is completely rotten. New programmes are designed with honest intentions, but their implementations fail because the programmes are based on other people's cultural experiences. For every programme there must be some norms or values, without which the programme would fail. Programmes must be based on interdisciplinary approaches. When economists design recovery programmes based on sound economic principles, they tend to forget that the Nigerian personality is not an economic man but a bundle of socio-psychological entity embedded in a cobweb of social values. These values must form the basis of his involvement in any meaningful programme. I had once lamented that this country is suffering from socioporosis, a disease which cannot be cured by the kind of legislations we are having now. Consider the rate at which decrees and laws are made and reviewed. It shows that enough thinking devoid of emotions did not precede some pronouncements.

If the politicians were corrupt, I submit that both the system and the politicians were at fault. There is a kind of relationship between the politicians and the system, where both cooperate with each other. When the military operate within the system, they themselves are subjected to the corrupting influence of the system. The Murtala probe of governors found ten or twelve military governors guilty of corruption. This is a clear indication that that corruption is not limited to the civilian but is derived from the system we operate. Yet, Nigeria has not banned all the military from ruling. Many of them are good. There are some civilians. Therefore the attempt to impose a ban on the ex-politicians is in my opinion not only nebulous but unfair to some office holders who were not very powerful in the political system Nigeria operated, but who served Nigeria faithfully.

There were many politicians who did not hold offices, and there were many who were more powerful than the legislators or commissioners. Strictly speaking, the entire nation was under the five (5) political parties. There have been calls in recent times for the banning of traditional rulers from voting. Some have called for the banning of the military from voting so that they could remain insulated from politics.

Some have even called for the banning of the church leaders from voting. Now if all ex-politicians are banned from participating in politics (and some have recently called for the banning of ex-military officers from taking part in politics), if all church leaders and all ex-military officers and all ex-politicians are banned, Nigerians may be left with school children under 18 years to vote and to be voted for. That will be democracy carried to a ludicrous extent.

Therefore, in Afrocracy we adopt the principle that in Africa, a known thief cannot be allowed to rule on the throne of his father. If therefore, anybody has been found guilty of any act of misconduct, such a person could be banned from holding office for as long as it pleases the government. But it is wrong to throw a blanket ban on all people who took part in politics. That will include all the military, the churches, the universities and secondary school children; in fact, every Nigerian who voted or was voted for, who was invited to hold public office, even if he did not vote, because there were some people who were invited to serve because the rulers found certain qualities in them.

In Afrocracy we will exclude all politicians or office holders who have been tried properly, and who have been found guilty of some acts of misconduct. Having excluded this category of Nigerians, every other person is qualified to vote and be voted for according to the structural model set out for voting in Afrocracy.

Another salient point in Afrocracy is the elimination of the one day national election for any position. This will remove the trauma and hypertension often associated with elections, and will remove the urge for politicians to win at all cost. The basic contention in Afrocracy is that every individual is entitled to vote and be voted for at the primary stage of the elections. *Afrocracy also contends that in all African societies, everybody is not entitled to vote in all elections to select a national leader*, be it in the Ibo nation or the Yoruba nation or the Hausa/Fulani nation. Voting has always been by a few qualified people and this is the secret of the stability of the African traditional societies. It is also the reason for the success of democracy

in Britain and America over the years. Even in modern formal organizations, every member of the organization does not necessarily have to participate in selecting leaders. In the selection of a Pope, all the catholic reverend fathers are not entitled to vote; even the bishops are not qualified to vote. In a military coup, the choice of the leader is not done by all the solders. There will always be a group of kingmakers. The ideological reason for reducing the size of the electorate, particularly when the strength of the institution has not been adequately tested is that if the participation of the electorate overwhelms the political institutionalisation, there will be inevitable strain which will lead to the collapse of the system.

What happend in the past elections in this country where a few elite tried to mobilize the masses by bribery, intimidation, fraud and rigging, has shown that the electoral participation overwhelmed the structural strength of the political system. As I have argued in the main body of Afrocracy, where the level of participation far exceeds the level of political institutionalization, stress is produced in proportion to the magnitude of the inconsistencies between participation and institutionalization.

I also argued that a successful democracy is dependent on the systematic expansion of the electoral participation. It would appear that in Nigeria, we tried to achieve within six years what took Britain 950 years to evolve. In Afrocracy, elections will be as given in the model, and if the Political Bureau completes its assignments this year, the first election could commence in October 1987 and the last election would be in 1990. There will be military presence at one level or the other throughout the elections to ensure stability. In other words, the elected politicians on a no-party basis will be indoctrinated in the national orientation systematically from year to year until the President is elected. This will give the nation at least four years of stability before the elected President is allowed another five years to rule.

If he rules effectively for five years, the nation would have had nine years of stability during which a national orientation definitely would emerge. I will now discuss the structural mode of Afrocracy and the pattern of military dis-engagement from politics in Nigeria.

I wish to note that since I opened the issue of Afrocracy, many people appear to have accepted the imperative need for us to return to base in order to find an alternative and better bearing. A good many people have also supported the abolition of party politics, the staggering of elections, and my method of systematic disengagement of the military. *If the President performs the one day ceremonial handing over as General Obasanjo did, the third Republic would go the way of its predecessors.*

CHAPTER III

AFROCRACY (POLITICS WITHOUT POLITICAL PARTIES) BASIS FOR NATIONAL STABILITY

The collapse of the First and second Republics, the failure of the Parliamentary and Presidential Systems, and the plunging of the nation into the fratricidal warfare left many Nigerians wandering and groping in search of a basis for national stability after the civil war. Since 1967, I have carried out a number of researches, as well as presented papers in both Nigeria and America, in order to assess the reactions of the public to what I consider the only penance to the incessant political malady now plaguing the African continent. That malady is the inability of African nations to conduct valid and reliable elections. On March 28, 1967, I produced a paper of 67 pages on "In search of a Ideology, Democracy with Political Parties: The concept of Afrocracy". On October, 30, 1974, I presented another paper to the African Studies Association Conference in Chicago on "The African Military High Command". In November, 1974, I presented another paper at the same African Studies Association Conference in Chicago, entitled "Transition from Military to Civilian Rule: General Gowon's Dilemma".

In August, 1975, I sent a 9-page memorandum on "Alternative to Party Politics in Nigeria" to General Murtala Muhammed and a few top Military Officers in the Country. On July 1977, I gave a public lecture at Durbar Hotel in Kaduna on "Search of a Basis for National Stability After the Military Rule". This was extensively published in many of the Daily Newspapers. Enough has been written suggesting correct solutions to Nigeria's problems.

In another lecture at Idah Polytechnic, on "Student Unionism in Anomic Society", I x-rayed the problems of the country, and came to the sad conclusion that this country was suffering from a disease which I call *SOCIOPOROSIS*. It can only be cured through an apocalyptic transformation, a revolution and not through coups. Earlier in 1972, I had presented another paper at the African Studies Association Conference in Philadelphia. In that paper, I examined the social cl

racteristics of Nigeria's political decision makers before independence to see if we really had adequate preparations in terms of manpower, for the task of experimenting with Democracy. Perhaps it was only Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe who gave seasoned thought to the implications of constant military reinterventions in the country, and was bold to call for a Diarchy i.e., Democracy with Military Vigilance.¹

Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and I agree on two essentials: First, the alternative approach is a transitional method for the first five years. Second, the system should be reviewed periodically for a possible continuation. . . However, I have my reservations on some of his prescriptions. This is not to deny the fact that Zik is one of the most original thinkers of our time.

In my communications to both General Murtala Muhammed and General Muhammadu Buhari, I was under no illusions whatsoever that after being independent for so long, we really had not developed any sense of nationalism, and it would be a twentieth century political mirage to hope to attain nationalism in Nigeria now. Similarly, I contended that if the Military men were thinking of handing over power to the civilians they must consider the ferocity of the impatient, rapacious political foxes who after many years of military rule have even forgotten the little they learnt from their British mentors. I argued that:

Concurrent with the question of Political Parties is the disturbing question of the framework for conducting future elections . . . But perhaps it is the only stage at which the success or failure of the military men to establish a firm foundation for national unity may be tested. NO MIRACLE WILL ELIMINATE THE PROBABILITY OF A MILITARY RE-INTERVENTION IF POLITICAL PARTIES ARE ALLOWED TO SPRING

* I am aware that many of our military leaders do not want to talk of ideology. Ideology must be seen in terms of guidelines backed by functional consciousness and normative commitment. It is this general commitment that gives the guideline an orientation — a national orientation, if people accept and internalise these guidelines, and are willingly directed by the programmes. Ideology does not have to be socialism or communism. Communism or Socialism emerged from a nationally routinized programme for specified goals, and for specified societies, having problems which were peculiar to them.

UP BEFORE THE NATION IS GIVEN AN
IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS. . ."

I went further to argue that no elections can install a popular government if parties are allowed to spring up.²

It must be mentioned that the late General Murtala Muhammed had sufficient political sagacity to accept to experiment conducting elections into the Local Government Councils in 1976 without the instruments of Party Politics. Perhaps those elections were the most orderly elections Nigeria has ever known and will ever know, if party politics returns without first making sure that there is a national orientation. I had no doubt that if General Murtala Muhammed had lived longer, elections to State Assemblies and the national legislatures would not have been based on any party participation. We would have had politics no doubt. But it would have been a novel brand of political process which would be applicable to the African continent. Hence, I called the alternative, AFROCRACY.

When General Obasanjo handed power to the civilians, he did not ensure that the firm foundation which I had been calling for was laid. The mere provision of a constitution does not guarantee that the politicians would not turn the constitution into an instrument of oppression.

Worse still we went for the Presidential Constitution while Americans are still learning how to operate. While tolerance is imperative for experimenting on Parliamentary Democracy, we need in addition, seasoned political culture and maturity in order to implement the Presidential Constitution.

My proposition is that Nigeria as a socio-political entity did not develop favourable structures for the parliamentary presidential experiment. Consequently, it is hard for me to condemn Nigerians for their failure. Rather, I blame what we inherited from the colonial government and the acceptance of the western variant of democracy without developing the values attendant on it. In my letter to the late Head of State, General Murtala Muhammed, as well as General Buhari, I drew their attention to the fact that the level of political participation in Nigeria far exceeded the level of political institutionalization. Where this happens, stress is produced in proportion to

magnitude of the inconsistency, between participation and institutionalization. Thus, political instability is a function of the relationship between political institutionalization and political participation.

As we shall show later, all stable democracies had their political take-off at a stage when the level of political participation was lower than the level of political institutionalization. At that stage, the voters were so few indeed that the institutions could easily accommodate them. Where the level of political participation is low, stability depends on the type of institutional arrangements with which the said country confronts the processes of independence and modernization. The principal means of organizing political participation are, no doubt, the parties and their systems.

But the type of participation depends on the type of party system the society adopts. If the system is corrupt, as in Nigeria, participation **MUST** be corrupt, and the participating individuals become socialized into a culture of corruption.

Nigeria attained independence without any discernible political culture. There was nothing like a set of values which could have formed the basis of socializing Nigerians into a kind of political culture. If Nigeria had a well developed political institution, such could have been adapted to the new experiment in order to ensure that there was no great disparity between the levels of political participation and political institutionalization. Political parties are necessary supplements to institutional strength; they do not themselves become the political institutions.

Where parties like the NPN, NPP, and UPN failed to supplement, but assumed the role of political institutions, they socialized the society into the values and the norms of their political parties. The result was the inevitable corrupt and corrupting systems of the various political parties. Not only that the systems were corrupt, they had the grotesque capability of corrupting anybody; even if an angel dared to attain the leadership of this country on their platform, such an angel would have ended like President Shagari.

In order to appreciate the magnitude of Nigeria's problems, I will now examine the prescriptions of democracy and

stratocracy. Since Nigeria has experienced both democracy and stratocracy, we will be able to have a quick comparison in order to know which is better for the country. Perhaps it is necessary to stress at this point that Nigerians appeared to have placed an unnecessarily strong reliance on the capability of the political parties to wield the congeries of tribal entities into a functioning national consciousness. This was perhaps James Coleman's pre-occupation in discussing and believing that the various nationalist protest movements were synonymous with nationalism.³

In both medieval Europe and Britain, unity did not come through political parties but through social, religious and cultural institutions. In Nigeria, we allowed political parties to assume the roles of political institutions without ideologies, and also to have determined the fate and direction of socio-cultural organisations. But no organisation dependent on the political parties for its existence can out-function the parties in establishing a basis for national integration. Therefore when parties failed, the agencies dependent on them were bound to fail.

DEMOCRACY

After centuries of intellectual speculations as to the origin and nature of democracy, we seem to have come to the hard conclusion that democracy is an *ideal* towards which many nations strive. It is even harder to say which nation has achieved democracy. It is safer to argue that a nation, a method or an institution is democratic, implying that it is in the process of achieving the ideal, or that it adopts some principles which may be called democratic. Schumpeter (1962:242) in his incisive analysis based on economic model, views "democracy as a political method . . . a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions."⁴

It does not matter what the decisions are. They constitute the ends of the institutional arrangement. Democracy therefore as an institutional arrangement and a method of making decisions endeavours to ensure that the society thereby arrives at an orderly, stable and legitimate government which would guarantee the preservation of rights and freedom with which men are

endowed. It is therefore my contention that any method through which men are able to institute an orderly, stable legitimate government to the satisfaction and happiness of the greatest number is democratic.

If in the course of a people's historical evolution, this method becomes incompatible with the existing structure, and aspiration of the people, it would not be sacrilegious to modify it, for, as Schumpeter puts it,

It would be a negation of rational principles to defend a political method that was jeopardizing individual's ideals or interests.*

That is why I am asking for a re-examination of the electoral methods used in the first and second republics. Democracy, the Western variant, developed out of the capitalist culture. Once the practitioners have accepted the capitalist culture, this variant of democracy would collapse without capitalism. It is as feudalism was the characteristic institution of the Middle Ages.⁶

It implied a hierarchical arrangement of the society in such a way that there MUST be the haves and the have-nots. This is sharply contrary to the cardinal tenets of Marxism and socialism which many African countries would prefer in the face of their ideological poverty. But ideological speculation has not come to an end, contrary to the stand of Daniel Bell in *the End of Ideology*. That is why this search hopes to reopen the almost closed debate on the end of ideology.

Trevelyan (1928:133) observed that in Britain, under feudalism, the society moved forward from 1100 to 1500 towards new things — out of un-uniformity into a variety; out of feudal cosmopolitanism into national monarchy; out of the hegemony of priesthood into a lay emancipation; out of the rule of the knights into the world of the craftsman, the capitalist and the yeoman. But it was the same medieval period which left for Britain such enviable legacies as the Cathedrals, Universities the English Monarchy and the Parliament.

* This consideration is the stimulant for the present search for an alternative method. Western Democracy has failed to thrive in most African Countries because its values are alien to the African value system. The only political arrangement that can survive is that which germinates from the cultural experiences of the Africans. To the Africans, Western democracy is theoretical. It must be given African referents, and made contingent on our socio-cultural experiences.

Britain unfortunately, like colonized countries was tied to the apron of Medieval Europe, where the English Knight spoke French, and the English Churchman spoke Latin, and could travel through Europe while feeling at home. In Nigeria, we take pride in how much of the English Syntax we know, when we cannot speak fluently in our mother tongues!

However, after the Norman conquest, Britain reorganized in order to assert its territorial integrity, with the waters serving as a defensive moat. With this kind of insularity, Britain began developing characteristics typically British — THE BIRTH OF A NATION! Baker (1942:159) rightly observed that:

The essence of the nation is 'spirit', issuing in the form of will: 'a will for existence and for power; self-consciousness; personality;' A nation therefore is not a race; it is not territory; it is not number; it is a personality with the supreme attribute of will, which expresses itself in willing its own continued existence and its own increase of power. . . A nation is great when it translates into reality the force of its spirit.⁷

In Nigeria, we have no national will or spirit. We have the Ibo, Yoruba, Hausa, Urhobo, Edo, Efik, Ijaw, Ishan etc. wills or spirits. Unless these are consciously destroyed there will be no room for a national spirit or will.

For Britain feudalism continued to be the instrument of national unity until the reign of Queen Elizabeth 1 when she crushed feudalism after pacifying the Northern Earls, and executing the Duke of Norfolk. Up to that period, and after that period, the House of Lords provided seats for the nobility. It was necessary to create the House of Commons to reflect the aspirations of the growing middle class. As we shall show later the strength of the middle class increased unbelievably to the extent that the existence and survival of democracy, or of any institution for that matter, had of a necessity to depend on the size and importance of the middle class. The Greek philosopher — (Aristotle) noted this pre-condition earlier when he wrote:

. . . and democracies are safer and more permanent than oligarchies because they have a middle

class which is more numerous and has a greater share in government; for when there is no middle class, and the poor greatly exceed in number trouble arises and the state soon comes to an end.⁸

The Western variant of democracy grew out of the culture and experience of the Western World. In its unmodified form, it can no more thrive in Nigeria than Shango worship can thrive in London.

Finer (1949:219) holds that the aim of democracy is to install a responsible and representative government. He however, feels that responsibility would be attained if representativeness was achieved, and warns that where the process of attaining this representativeness is so hampered or interfered with, the resultant government cannot be called responsible.⁹

Rousseau (1947) puts it rather bluntly when he claims that:

there never has been a real democracy and there never will be. (9a)

The rest of this section will examine the bases for attaining this representativeness in some countries, with major emphasis on Britain. We will then consider the various elections in Nigeria to see whether Nigeria was able to elect or select representatives in such a way that the resultant governments could have been rightly called *responsible governments*.

There have always been different and conflicting schools of thought on the best way to achieve a responsible government. While John Stuart Mill was more concerned with the attainment of universal suffrage¹⁰, Macaulay (1959) was more concerned with the propertied class. In his view only those (the propertied class), who could safeguard property, ought to vote.¹¹ Defending the representations in the House of Commons, Paley (1825:392) has this to say:

We have a House of Commons composed of 548 members in which number are found the most considerable land-holders! and merchants of the kingdom, the heads of the army, the navy, and the law; the occupiers of great offices in the state,

together with many private individuals eminent by their knowledge, eloquence and activity.

If the country be not safe in such hands, in whom may it confide its interests? If such a number of such men be liable to the influence of corrupt motives what assembly of men will be secure from the same dangers? Does any new scheme of representation promise to collect together more wisdom or to produce firmer integrity?¹²

There are however, other exponents of other bases of selecting a representation that would guarantee responsible government.

THE INTEREST THEORY OF REPRESENTATION

The exponents of this theory may be classed with T.B. Macaulay (1859). They believe that wise laws could only be made by those sobered by ownership of property, or pursuing a lucrative occupation. Laws therefore became the emergent product of those monopolist interests which were often reflected in the mal-distribution of constituencies and various corrupt electoral practices.

This was the situation in England until 1832 when the increased number of the middle class forced itself in the Chartist Movement, on the nobility. Naturally, every exploiter would cling to power and wealth until removed by force. England before the Chartist Movement was comparable to Nigeria after independence. If this is true, then Nigeria is about 152 years behind Britain!!!

We are aware of how electoral malpractices, the mal-distribution of wards, and the unbridled excesses of the legislators contributed in no small measure to what motivated the military re-intervention in Nigeria on December 31st, 1983.

THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE

Exponents of this view would tend to agree with J.S. MILL in the concept of the equality of men. On this principle, everybody is qualified to be voted for. Unfortunately, I am not

one of the exponents of this view. The inequality of men had been noted by early pre-Christian writers. Amos, Micah and Isaiah had condemned the rich and powerful. The prophet Micah noted that the rich men of Israel

are full of violence; the princes and the judges
are asking for bribes; the merchants are using a
bag of deceitful weights.¹³

He described these practices as perverse and capable of destroying the nation. The observation was made 800 years before Christ. In Shagari's Nigeria, the statement was more credible.

However, in a contradictory version, in the LAWS OF MANU (200 B.C.), the Hindu priests contended that social inequality was divinely ordained for the good of the world. The Hindu view is conservative and may be referred to as the THESIS, while the Biblical view of Micah is radical and therefore the ANTITHESIS.

The controversies between these two schools of thought have engaged scholars throughout the ages in search of a SYNTHESIS. In other words, how do we accommodate the interests of the powerful lords who wanted the IMF loan to consolidate their economic grip on the country and the lower classes and yet achieve social harmony where no interests are threatened? We should not lose sight of the fact that the interests of the lords are nonetheless serviced by the lower classes. Socialists would call this exploitation.

The Greek Philosophers inherited this debate. Plato and Phaleas, just like the later levellers, wanted to see communal ownership of property — a radical view, while Aristotle tended to defend the Hindu stand, and saw the existing social order as ideal. He defended private property and serfdom. Phaleas wanted a redistribution of land on an egalitarian basis; Plato in the REPUBLIC¹⁴ wanted communal ownership of all forms of property, the establishment of a ruling class that would have wives and children in common. This ruling class would be selected on the basis of moral virtue, intellect and love of knowledge. Since these attributes are not evenly distributed, Plato would be subscribing to the idea of inherent inequality. He noted:

Until philosophers are kings or kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evil.

This is perhaps the SYNTHESIS which has eluded the world, or which nobody has had the courage to implement. Because every ruling class has lacked the moral and intellectual prescriptions of Plato, and this has always generated obvious contradictions within itself, and between itself and the ruled, this synthesis becomes at all stages of social evolution a more troublesome THESIS, and calls for a higher order ANTITHESIS. This radical antithesis came to intellectual maturity with the writing of the Communist Manifesto of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in 1848.

On the sovereignty of the people, Hegel, writing on the French Assembly, did not believe in the "free and equal vote" which he contends would disintegrate society. However, representatives, when elected, should only make laws and not exert authority. Hegel was probably unaware of the cohesive capability of well organized political parties, motivated by the spirit of the nation or ideology.

Herman Finer observed that it was only towards the beginning of the twentieth century that the whole body of adult population had achieved sovereign authority in the nation. But sovereignty must be seen to reside in the Assembly of representatives and not in the pulverized individuals.

WHO IS ENTITLED TO VOTE IN A DEMOCRACY

The right to vote and to be voted for, has engaged the attention of all believers in democratic principles. The right has varied with time, and place. Now, practically all adult males and females are entitled to vote. This right was not achieved without struggles. The successes of the Chartist Movement of 1832 added just one million more voters to the electorate in Britain. The 1867 Act which radicalised politics by including most of

the poor classes added two million more voters to the electorate. In Nigeria, the voting age has been reduced to eighteen. No reasons discernible from our socio-cultural experiences could be cited for this. Nigeria did it, I think, because America and Britain did it.

In Germany, after the abortive revolution of 1848, Bismark granted the people universal suffrage as a price for supporting his policy of unity. In Prussia at the time, there was no universal suffrage, nor was voting equal and direct. The people obtained electoral power after they violently took it in the 1918 revolution. The 1919 constitution was simply an experiment of an untried system in search of stability. It worked. The system I shall give below, though untried, will work; and as I have always dogmatically held, it is the only system that can save Nigeria from further military re-interventions as well as usher in the much needed stability.

I write once again as a cassandra prophet! If Nigeria adopts any other system short of *Afrocracy* there will be many more military re-interventions, and Latin American experience, would, by comparison, be a child's play. In discussing who may vote, I am merely trying to show that in all nations which claim to be democratic, the universal right to vote was not given without struggle. People fought for it and valued their acquisition. They treasured the right to vote because they fought for it. They could not be bribed to sacrifice what they fought for. In Nigeria, we got every right on a platter of gold, and therefore do not value what we did not struggle for. This explains why it was possible for politicians to buy ballot papers from the uninformed voters. Many of these voters did not see why the piece of paper called the voter's card could not be surrendered to a party agent for ₦10.00. It has been my contention that where the masses of the people suffer from a culture of poverty, any amount of money could sway their political calculations. This has been the situation in Nigeria.

Does the Nigerian voter know that the ballot paper is as sacred as the objects of his religious worship? Does he know that as religion makes for the unity and solidarity of those who have faith, so his ballot paper and his right to vote ensure the solidarity and continuity of Nigeria as a corporate entity?

EDUCATION AS A QUALIFICATION TO VOTE

In Britain, the voter was at first required to have attained certain minimum education, in order to understand his own interest and that of the nation, as well as the policy of the candidate to be voted for. He was also expected to understand the activity of parliament. The educated voter was deemed to have sound judgement which was a pre-requisite for responsible government.

In the United States, literacy tests were retained to ensure meaningful voting. Some states required ordinary ability to read; others required the ability to read and understand the constitution, and the ability to write the voter's name, six southern states required the ability to read and understand the constitution. The intentions were however clear: the restrictions were on the Black voters. Even from the Nigerian experience, we know that formal education would not necessarily make one a wiser voter. Although it is important that the voter be able to distinguish between what is 'possible' and what he 'wants', yet, the most corrupt voters in the past elections in Nigeria were the educated ones. They organized and manipulated the illiterate voters. This notwithstanding, it is necessary that the electorate be educated and enlightened because they will thus be equipped to withstand the manipulation of the elite.

OTHER QUALIFICATIONS

In Britain, there were other qualifications such as SEX and RACE. Until the 20th century, females were excluded from voting. However, women gradually won this right. The increasing strength of the feminist movement is probably a testimony to the discriminations the women had to battle against before they were allowed to vote. Now, they treasure the vote and determine the outcome of every election in any nation. On race qualifications, the Blacks in America were not allowed to vote until recently. Hitler considered the vote as a defence of the Volk people, and so did not allow the Jews to vote. Nationality qualification was a matter of national pride. With the extent of electoral malpractices in Nigeria during the last elections, one wonders if Ghanaians and Chadians did not vote in Nigeria!

In England, owing to the non-statement of the rational theory of representation in the Constitution or statute, voters had as many votes as they had positive qualifications. That gave rise to plural voting. However, by the reform act of 1918, voters were allowed two votes chosen from among the following qualifications:

1. Residence,
2. Occupation, and
3. University Degree.

Herman Finer records that in 1945, there were about 200,000 occupational votes, and 175,000 university votes in Britain. By the representation of the Peoples Act of 1943, plural vote was abolished. At that time, there were 12 members of the universities elected by the graduates of the universities.

The British and American fathers of democracy knew that in order to make democracy work, those who vote and those who are voted for must be responsible enough to know the interest and the spirit of the nation. It was, therefore, necessary to stipulate the above requirements to ensure that democracy did not degenerate into an instrument of oppression. It is paradoxical that those who for centuries did not allow their own people to vote until certain conditions were met could grant independence to Nigeria and many African countries with the declaration that universal adult suffrage was an inalienable right of all. I have witnessed many elections in Nigeria. I can say without fear of contradiction that the vote is not an inalienable right.


It has never been so throughout all nations. People had to learn, watch others vote, and prove by struggling that they also could vote intelligently. I admit that they do not have to struggle in Nigeria. But certainly, in a socio-political entity where premodial sentiments predominate, voting cannot be rational; democracy, the Western variant, cannot be defended.

It is my contention that when the poor, the uneducated, and therefore those ignorant of the complexities of the precarious international order participate in government and are allowed to formulate policies, their policies cannot transcend their ethnocentric experiences. It is like sending a village chief to the United Nations with village mentality.

Before we define stratocracy and examine its genesis in Nigeria, it is pertinent to note that wherever democracy has succeeded, the middle class outnumbered the upper class and the poor. In other words, where the country is relatively poor as in Nigeria and other African countries, *democracy is a luxury*. It cannot succeed, regardless of the good intentions of its practitioners. In America and Britain, there is a large middle class, between a small upper class and a small lower class. The shape of the society is Prismoid. See Fig. 1(b). In Africa, the shape of the society is triangular, Fig. 1(a). There is a small upper class, a small middle class, and a very large lower class, made up of very poor farmers, fishermen, petty contractors and those who for fiduciary drifts would sell their votes in order to obtain the where-withal to have three square meals a day. The lower class would include teachers, junior civil servants, craftsmen, etc. whose income is below ₦3,000.00 a year. Middle class would include those who earn between ₦6,000.00 - ₦10,000.00 a year. It would include university senior staff, senior civil servants, managerial and executive cadres. The upper class would include those who earn ₦11,000.00 and above. This definition is purely operational in terms of income. But the citizens must have status equilibration on a number of dimensions before real classes can emerge. Such people cannot meaningfully participate in any democratic experiment. In Nigeria as well as other African countries, it is a penticostal blessing to be born in a backward area, for even the most important representative of the people in the area, at times turns out to be a clog in the wheel of national progress, when confronted with the twentieth century politics of modernization. This is the irony of politics in many developing countries, where independence has transferred power to a majority of people, who have not been exposed to the practice of parliamentary democracy. Azikiwe (1974:18) was perhaps speaking for all the intelligentsia when he said that some politicians of the First Republic played politics of poverty, and thus betrayed the cause of national unity and independence. He also condemned some African leaders whose interpretation of democracy was alien to his own interpretation of democracy.¹⁶


THE NIGERIAN SCENE

Fig. 1(a)



THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN SCENES

Fig. 1(b)



SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DECISION MAKERS IN DEMOCRACY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (NIGERIA AND BRITAIN)

If one understood the background of Africa's elite, one would be a little less harsh in passing judgement on their omissions. In my curiosity to know why the First Republic failed, I examined the social characteristics of Nigeria's political decision makers before independence. It has been contended that by knowing the background of society's leaders, we can come some way in understanding how that society operates. (Mosk 1968).¹⁷ My earlier studies (Ijomah 1974)* show that if the social background of our leaders was anything to go by, the country obviously could not have escaped its fate. Very few of the participants could have understood the complexities of parliamentary democracy. Their language was uncomplimentary and generated more tribal animosity than national sentiment. The struggle between Zik and Ernest Ikoli, or between Zik and Awolowo, or the animosity between Chief Awolowo and his Northern critics were couched in such uncomplimentary vitriols that their supporters could not but assume that they were directed at their henchmen. Their caustic languages often marked the water-shed in inter-tribal relationship in the country.

When one examines the educational background of Nigerian leaders before 1960, the year of Independence, one sees nothing but a very low level educational attainment. In Britain, between 1924 and 1957, 72% of the cabinet members were educated in the public schools. Of these, 53% had attended the Clarendon schools, such as Eton and Harrow alone; 72% of all the cabinet members had university education. Of these, 55% went to Oxford and Cambridge.¹⁸ In Nigeria, the opposite was the story. In the period preceding Independence, only 23.35% of the leaders had university degrees, 61.8% had the School Certificate, Teacher's Certificate, Elementary or Koranic education.¹⁹ If we add the diploma holders, then about 72% of the Parliamentarians did not have a university degree. This

* For fuller discussion of the social characteristics of Nigeria's Political Decision Makers Before Independence by the author, see *THE CONCH* 1974

the exact opposite of what obtained in Britain. More than 90% of the parliamentarians in Nigeria succeeded in politics because of their affiliation with micro-cultural organisations. They thus did not have national identifications. Such representatives did not give priority to national issues. They could only see Nigeria as a mirror of their own micro-cultural background.

Although I had blamed what happened in Nigeria on the kind of imperfect system which we inherited from Britain, yet, it is equally true that the ability of the system to accommodate the problems of contradictions within it depends on the calibre of the leaders. Intelligent leaders would recruit intelligent followers.

THE VARIOUS ELECTIONS

Apart from the elections into the Councils supervised by the colonial government, and the elections into the local government councils under the late General Murtala Mohammed's administration, no other elections have been hitch-free in Nigeria. Even the elections of 1959 which marked the beginning of the First Republic were criticised for not being fair and free.

Since 1959, other elections in the country have been characterised by grotesque fraud and corruption, and brazen violation of the rights of the citizens, most of whom did not know the significance of surrendering the voting cards to party agents to vote on their behalf. From 1964 to 1965, Nigeria witnessed, for the first time, the shamelessness of politicians. In some parts of the country, many candidates were intimidated into withdrawing their candidacy. Ballot papers were freely distributed and in the Western region a woman who stuffed herself with ballot papers and claimed that she was pregnant was caught and aborted of the papers.

As I have argued above, representatives elected on the basis of corrupt practices which denied the electorate the opportunity to vote according to their conscience, cannot be said to be responsible. In fact the entire web of government became so irresponsible that the President, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, had to warn the politicians. In fact, the whole electioneering procedure was so prostituted that His Excellency, the President of the Federation had to warn that:

The way and manner electioneering campaign is being conducted leaves much to be desired. . . they (*referring to the politicians*) have no right to employ the instrument of power to perpetuate their stay in office.²⁰

Obstacles were contrived to prevent political opponent from filing their nomination papers, so that favoured candidates could be returned unopposed. By December 22, 1964, a total of 63 candidates of the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and 1 candidates of the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) had been returned unopposed. In order to successfully return their candidates unopposed, the dominant parties committed many irregular acts: many people were arrested on trumped up charges. There were unjustifiable detentions, arson and murder. The atmosphere was so charged that the President had to warn the politicians again:

If they have decided to destroy our national unity, then they should summon a round table conference to decide how our national assets should be divided before they seal their doom by satisfying their lust for office.^{20 (a)}

He observed that the confusion brought into the election in some parts of the country made it impossible for certain political parties to campaign. Obviously, in the Nigerian type of democracy, it would appear that it was not the inalienable right of anybody to move about freely, and campaign unmolested. In spite of the peace pact signed by the political parties to allow people campaign unmolested, events that followed this pact proved that the signatories to the pact betrayed the public trust. For, no sooner was the pact signed, than the politicians began committing all sorts of atrocities. Neither the law enforcement agencies, nor the leaders in the regions where these atrocities were perpetrated raised a voice against the culprits. As a matter of fact, on the question of party-based elections, the law enforcement agencies were known to have taken sides with one party or the other.

As a result of the chain of irregularities, the Eastern Region threatened that if democracy was not allowed to thrive in the

country, it would have no option than to secede from the Federation. Secession always begins as an extra-constitutional matter, and is always a last resort of a people who feel that the system is not being operated fairly and justly. It could be the climax of a long-standing disagreement that has defied all solutions.

All Nigerian elections are shaped by two antithetical calculations:

- (a) the calculation of the Fulani—Hausa group to perpetually dominate the country.
- (b) the calculation of the south to frustrate the possibility of such a domination.

Unfortunately, the south has not been able to unite because of the towering incompatibility of Zik and Awolowo. As the two of them are now singing their "*nunc dimitis*" from partisan politics,* I see a great possibility of the South uniting to challenge the Northern control of the country. I also see a strong possibility that the non-Fulani/Hausa groups would team up with the Southern front. When this happens, the country would become tense, and the little national sentiment that is currently being forged would be sacrificed on the altar of micro-nationalism or ethnicism. It is my submission that no politician has come to the lime-light without increasing the ingroup perception of the differences between his ethnic group and the others.

The repetition, during the 1965 Western Nigerian Elections, of the anomalies of the 1964 Federal Elections caused a great wave of discontent in the country. The irregularities were so glaring that the UPGA refused to accept a government formed as a result of the elections. Although the NNDP was unpopular in the West, and was aware of this fact, yet, it was prepared to be returned to power at all cost. Prior to the elections, some NNDP supporters had predicted the outcome of the elections, in obvious reference to their plans to rig the elections. Ballot papers and ballot boxes disappeared from Police custody. Ballot papers were being carried about, and a woman was caught with 2,500 ballot papers which she had wanted to dump in the ballot box.

What a democracy!!! Obviously, any government elected as a result of such prostituted "democratic" elections cannot

* Chief Awolowo has since died.

claim to be a responsible government, let alone, a representative one.

After these divisive elections, it became obvious that the country was drifting aimlessly. Like President Shehu Shagari the Prime Minister, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa appeared not to have understood the government he was heading. Corruption, nepotism and tribalism were the bane of Balewa's administration. The Military intervention in January 1966 was seen as God-sent, and prevented the country from grinding to a halt.

All the troubles followed the failure of the government to conduct honest elections. The elections after independence were the first elections without the transcendental supervision of the colonial masters. We failed woefully to demonstrate our ability to conduct honest, free and fair elections.

The census figures were so manipulated that Nigeria had an annual growth of 6.1%. Nigeria became the laughing stock of the world. We all hailed the Military intervention of Major General Nzeogwu. However, because of our micro-cultural and tribal orientations and the events that followed, many people saw the settling dust, other motivations for the coup. The consequences of this calculation prepared the grounds for the event that led to the civil war.

While the Military governments that followed ruled for 12 years, the civilian administration ruled for 10 years, punctuated by the military presence. There was no continuity to enable the government improve on its experience. Before the civilians came for the second attempt at Western democracy, it was obvious that they had forgotten the few lessons on democracy they had learnt under the British.

However, before we examine Military rule to identify its merits and demerits in Nigeria, it is my contention that democracy is an ideal, which we should continue to aim at. But it is also my submission that the present generation of Nigerians cannot be sufficiently disciplined to fulfil all the requirements for democratic experiments. We must therefore look at the military rule or stratocracy, or some other plausible alternative such as Afocracy.

STRATOCRACY

The word 'stratocracy' is derived from *Stratos*, a Greek word for the army, and *cracy*, a suffix of doubtful origin. It could have been derived from the medieval Latin— *Cratia*, or Greek — *Kratia*. It means strength, or the ruling body. *Cracy* is a suffix which means *rule of*. Stratocracy therefore means the rule of the army. Since the soldiers are known by their khaki uniforms, I have titled this section Khakitocracy Vs. Democracy. But I later changed it to what the reader could easily find in the dictionary. For me, *Khakitocracy* remains the rule of people in khaki dress. The difference between the Nigerian Politician and the soldier is not the gun. Many politicians were reported to have assembled armed thugs, and therefore had guns. I hope they had licences.

The difference is in the fact that the soldier is clothed in khaki authority. It is perhaps too early to assess the present regime. They have initiated many bold plans which take time to come to fruition. What I thought of Gowon's administration I have presented in a paper entitled "Transition From Military to Civilian Rule: Gowon's Dilemma." I would not like to repeat myself here. Suffice it to say that when an army succeeds itself, there must be sufficient reasons. If we believe that the late General Murtala Mohammed was a national hero, then he did not commit any crime to have succeeded Gowon.

S.E. Finer defined Military coup d'etat as "the armed forces' constrained substitution of their own policies and/or their persons, for those of the recognised civilian authorities."²¹ Harold Lasswell described his garrison state hypothesis as a 'developmental construct' depicting the future course of world politics. In his own abstract, he noted that:

The trend of the time is away from the dominance of the specialist on bargaining, who is the businessman, and toward the supremacy of the specialist on violence, the soldier.²²

Contemporary scholars of the more advanced countries would not agree with Harold Lasswell, particularly since many factors now abound to make the prospects of military takeover in America or the Soviet Union a very remote possibility.

In Germany, the significance of the military in domestic and international politics makes the prospects of military intervention unattractive to the military.

In the Soviet Union, there is a high degree of subjective civilian control which is highlighted by the civilianization of the military and its subsequent integration with the ruling party.

It has been contended that the civilian-military relations in the USSR from Lenin to Brezhnev is marked by the fact that the military is inextricably tied to the party, that the party exhibits permanent threat to the professional authority of the military, that there is permanent insecurity, and bitter and unequal rivalry (personal, professional and political), between the military and the party.²³ But in this relationship, the party seems to completely overwhelm the military or rather that the party has become so institutionalized that the threat to its supremacy is not a serious one. Besides, the massive size and complexity of the Soviet military, its presence in every facet of the Soviet life, makes the military a vulnerable partner in Soviet political life. Besides, the International credibility of the Soviet Government is based on its military potency and nuclear capability. Thus, as in the Soviet Union, the military is an integral part of the society, and as long as it continues to share the Bolshevik's ideology and commitment to the party, it will continue to share certain basic elements of Soviet nationalism, and continue to use its discipline and corporatism to champion Soviet course in global politics.

I have already examined the increasing role of the military in American decision-making.²⁴

The systematic attempt by the Americans to dominate the world permanently, is based on the calculated superior posture of the American Military. In the domestic sphere, the military men have been occupying civilian posts especially where decisions in decision are required. In addition, the military men have been important in influencing decisions and in lobbying. They have in fact moved into the mainstream of American public life without for a moment thinking of overthrowing civilian supremacy. It must be pointed out that when the military occupy civilian posts, they have always done so on the invita-

tion of Congress or the Executive. They are invited because their views on important issues are devoid of party or ideological influences. Besides, they are men of courage who could take criticisms.²⁵

On the African continent, however, the forty year old Garrison State Hypothesis would appear to be pertinent. At the time that Lasswell wrote, the world economic situation was quite gloomy. The economic dark clouds have merely shifted to the African Continent and the developing countries. It is therefore my view that the Garrison State Hypothesis cannot be dismissed simply because it has failed to apply to successful democracies. Aron contends that the reason why the Garrison State does not apply any more is because in the United States, the negotiation or the bargaining experts such as the administrators and the jurists hold very key positions in the nation. This however, gives the wrong impression that the Garrison State would emerge if the soldiers are denied access to top positions in the nations' administration. Zimmermann has listed a number of variables in search of Causal Model for military coups d'état. I will not belabour the reasons why soldiers coup. I want to believe that when they coup or counter-coup, they have some reasons. The ease with which the soldiers take over power in the country is a testimony to the weakness of the political system. The conventional applause of tomorrow's critics of the same military is either a reflection of the sickness of the society, or the failure of the soldiers to fulfil their promises.²⁶

However, when the soldiers take over, the borrowed western democracy comes to an abrupt end. Stratocracy takes over. Authority in a stratocracy is dictatorial and centralised. The power pyramid is expected to be very steep because power will be wielded by very few people. All the phrases about fundamental human rights, constitutional guarantees and the niceties of western democracy are quite alien in a stratocracy.

Justice becomes what the military authority calls it. It is in fact, the will of the government from which there can be no appeal. The Nigerian lawyers who challenged the composition of the military Tribunals should have known that if the armed forces had enough lawyers as soldiers, it would not have been

necessary to have invited judges at all. It is not a judicial tribunal but a military one. They should have realized that in a real stratocracy, the threat would be ignored. Their argument about the evidence procedure is very immaterial. These observations are necessary because many people who rejoice when the martial music is sounded as the military intervene, do not understand what they welcome. It must be said that Nigeria is lucky to have a benevolent stratocracy.

There are many good things to be said about military rule. For Nigeria, it is yet too early to praise or condemn it.

The country, barring the activities of saboteurs, ought to have a direction under a military rule in the absence of divisive partisan politics. My personal concern is that as the soldiers become politicised and civilianised, their capacity to protect the country in international encounters might wane in proportion to the growth of military significance in domestic issues.

There could be a counter argument that since the soldiers are in power, they could afford to modernise their military preparedness without waiting for the Senate to approve. Either contention is plausible. Personally, I prefer a military rule to a civilian regime of corrupt and shameless politicians. In three separate publications, in 1974, 1977 and 1978, I have clearly shown my preference for the military rule, but only as a temporary measure. It should not stay beyond a maximum of five years, and should do everything possible to correct the ills which led to the military intervention. Military interventions are like social strokes. Any country that has witnessed many coups should not expect to return to democracy again. It can only drift to a totalitarian state. Nigeria has witnessed the fifth successful coup. One wishes to hope that that should be the last. Since the soldiers are trained in the use of violence, one cannot blame them for failing to give this country a sound foundation for another return to stable civilian government during the second republic. The fact that the same soldiers who returned power to the civilians wrested the power from them confirms my earlier warning that no elections in this country could produce an acceptable government if political parties were allowed to return without certain pre-conditions.

I had further warned that if political parties were returned

as the government was planning, then, no miracle would eliminate the probability of a military re-intervention. Events in Nigeria have so far proved me right. Ocran (1977:1), observes also that:

It is rare for soldiers, having taken over absolute power to give the same generation of politicians who put an end to parliamentary government and brought the country to virtual economic and moral collapse, a second chance.²⁶

But now that this happened in Nigeria, I hope that the soldiers would have learnt their lessons. It is the responsibility of the present military administration to begin the search for a much more viable alternative. They cannot stay for ever, because military rule is not synonymous with stability. Even Ocran, himself a soldier, agrees that military governments have seldom provided the answers to any country's political, economic and social problems. He cites the case of Latin America where repeated military interventions have failed to bring about the much needed stability and progress. He personally does not believe in "permanent or semi-permanent military government, no matter how democratic or benevolent that government professes to be."²⁷

In his pessimism about military rule, Ocran says that no military regime has so far created a viable successor regime.

He ends the first four chapters of his book with the following observation:

Prevention of coups lies in clear, honest, constitutional government, sensible and successful economic policies and above all, the ballot box.²⁸

From the above account, the constitutional government failed us because by manipulating the electoral processes, the politicians condemned the legitimacy of their stay in office. Besides, where the electoral processes have been so unabashedly interfered with, any government installed through the corrupt practices cannot claim to be responsible. Nor are the soldiers better equipped to solve the country's political, social and economic problems. The answer then is in an alternative, Afrocracy, which I claim is the only panacea for stability, and the elimination of electoral malpractices.

The military government is hereby called upon to set up a Committee to examine the implications of Afrocracy, and work out the mechanics for implementing it. A successful implementation would interest other African Countries searching for a basis for national stability, unless the African military are interested in instability so that their interventions could be justified.

AFROCRACY

Bretton in his *Power and Stability* (1962) observes that pre-independence was a period of ideological poverty and starvation, and neither Dr. Azikiwe nor Chief Awolowo, the best Nigerian articulators of political thoughts and philosophy, have settled down to meaningful thoughts on themes for the political development of the country. He contends that all of Nigeria's exercises represented a display of borrowed goods, alien in origin, politically and socially indigestible.²⁹ The first republic ended in an ideological void; the first military regime apparently did not agree that an ideological orientation was *sine qua non* for political stability. The civilian regime during the second republic was a colossal failure, and made no attempt at formulating any ideological base. Even the present Military regime does not appear to be interested in ideology. If seen as a framework, or a guideline for actions around which the nation is mobilized, then ideology cannot but command the attention of the military. Perhaps it is necessary to invite sociologists and political scientists to advise on how the spirit of WAI could be transformed into an ideological current. Since sociologists cannot pronounce on human diseases, so non-sociologists and non-political scientists must stop amateurish adventures in diagnosing societal ills.

As discussed above, I have shown that where the level of political participation far exceeds the level of political institutionalization, there will be instability. This is so because the absence of effective institutionalization also means the absence of a national ideological orientation. Consequently, individuals participate in political processes without giving up their parochial orientations. Further, the corrupt practices have led to


much conflicts and bloodshed, and has for the second time led to military intervention.

Afrocracy proposes a political method which would eliminate political parties as an interim measure. Since democracy as a political method is an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions, it is my contention that any method, or any other alternative arrangement through which Nigerians and Africans can arrive at political decisions without instability to the nation, is democratic, and ought to be given a trial.

THE STRUCTURAL MODEL OF ELECTIONS IN AN AFROCRACY

Fig. II

... Head of Government



I have also shown that whenever the democratic method succeeded throughout history, it began with imperative preconditions aimed at controlling the size of the participants until the country had achieved effective political institutionalization. At such a low level of political participation, the political institutions would have the capability of absorbing new social forces, multiple cleavages and rising political participation into the system. I have also shown that the type of political participation in any country depends on the type of political institutions. If the system and the institutions are corrupt as in the second republic, political participation as well as the electoral processes must be corrupt. If we are able to keep political participation low at this initial stage, the political institutions to be developed would be able to absorb new elements into the system in defined order, and according to the rules of the game. If we can do this now that all political parties have been proscribed, this nation will spring up to greater promises, and the 1985 coup d'état could be the last that Nigeria would witness.

Afrocracy as a political method of arriving at political decisions at this stage, concentrates on the *effective methods of electing representatives* who would give this country a responsible government. Nigeria and indeed Africa, must of a necessity return to her old and now spoiled value systems, modernize them and use them at the appropriate level for achieving group cohesion.

Afrocracy sets certain functions for the traditional rulers, thus bringing to an end a system in which they occupy positions without functions. *Structurally, Afrocracy is a system of indirect election, after the primary stage which involves universal adult suffrage.* After this first level in which every qualified adult could vote or be voted for, the elected representatives would now have the mandate of their own electorates to vote for them at successive elections. This system would lead to a reduction in level of political participation in order to enable political institutions to be created, nurtured and to stabilize. It would give the nation time to create a common political culture into which future participants would be socialized.

THE STRUCTURE OF ELECTIONS IN AFROCRACY

Level 1: The Town or Community Council and the Precinct

Figure II illustrates the form Afrocratic system of representation would take. At level 1, every qualified adult is eligible to vote or be voted for. Level I is the WARD or the PRECINCT. Every precinct may be asked to elect specific number of representatives. Supposing every precinct is asked to elect TEN representatives each, then, in a city with about 100 precincts, there will be 1,000 representatives. The size of the representation could vary depending on the decision of the Electoral Commission. (But for the purposes of illustration, we will be using the figure of 10).

These 1,000 representatives will now vote to elect a CITY or Community Council or The CITY Government. This Council will be responsible for the day to day running of the towns and Communities. Since the traditional rulers are, by African tradition, the *de jure* owners of the towns over which they rule, it is an act of natural injustice to deprive them of their kingdoms. It is therefore necessary to realize that if the government must get to the heart of the people, the traditional ruler, while being insulated from partisan political activities, should be made the honorary president of the city administration, assisted by a Secretary to be appointed by the Council. He will continue to receive the remunerations set down for him by the State Government. However, the President of the town's Improvement or Development Union should be made the Executive Chairman of the Town Council. It will be recalled that in many isolated towns in this country, the Improvement Unions are the principal agents of development. They collect more levies than the government realises through taxation, and they utilize this amount in bringing essential services to the towns. Any government that hopes to get to the grassroot, particularly in the absence of political parties, must operate through these agencies and the traditional rulers.

Besides, once the government has recognized one development union, conflicts and internal squabbles within the town would be brought to an end, as every person who is genuinely interested in helping his town must have to work through the

recognized development union. Thus, most villages would know real peace, the traditional rulers and the customs of the people will be respected, while collectively, all will support the Government of the day.

In each town, the representatives elected from the precincts would constitute the electorate to elect those who would represent the towns at the local government elections. There will be two elections. The first is the election of the delegates who would vote to elect the delegates to the Local Government Area Elections, and the second is the election of the officials of the City Council.

Level II: The Local Government Area

Let us suppose that each City or Community within the Local Government Area has elected five representatives. (The figure could be more, depending on the calculations of the Electoral Commission based on the population of the towns). For very large towns and very small towns, arrangement would be made to ensure that the size of representation is *proportional* to size of the town. Let us suppose that for all the towns at the Local Government Level, there are 3,000 representatives.

- (1) They will be expected to elect the members of the Local Government Area Council;
- (2) They will be expected to elect delegates who would vote to elect representatives at the state House of Assembly.

If we take a theoretical example of a State with 20 Local Government Areas, we would have 20×3000 delegates who would constitute the electorate to vote for candidates into the State House of Assembly.

With this reduced size of the electorate, it will be easy to monitor any electoral malpractices in any shape or form.

Level III

At level III, all the delegates elected into the State House of Assembly would be expected to vote to elect the State Chief Executive and vote for the candidates seeking election into the Senate. Let us suppose that each State Legislature has on the

average 60 representatives. Then for the 19 States, there would be a total of 1140 delegates who would vote to select the 95 Senators — from candidates who have indicated their intentions to contest the elections. The size of the electorate at this level depends on the size of the State House of Assembly.

It is possible that certain factors may be taken into consideration which may increase the size of the electorate at this level.

Level IV:

The Senators would constitute the electoral college to choose a Head of Government, and NOT a Head of State. The Head of Government, who also is the Chief Executive will appoint his Ministers just like the State Chief Executive would appoint his cabinet. The appointment of the Ministers is subject to the approval of the President/Head of State, the Supreme/Presidential Council and the Senate. For the State, the House of Assembly would approve the appointment

HEAD OF STATE/PRESIDENT:

For the first FIVE years, the present Armed Forces Ruling Council could remain as presently constituted. This means that the present Head of State would remain to oversee the activities of the civilian regime and direct the regime on the development of national orientation. The President in consultation with the Armed Forces Ruling Council, would have the power to veto any decision of any Executive Council or any Legislature which in the opinion of the members could lead to instability. After the first five years, the President and the Service Chiefs and some elected members would continue to perform the functions of the Armed Forces Ruling Council. The name of the Council would be changed to the Presidential Council.

JUDICIARY

The Judiciary is independent of the Executive. It is responsible to the President and the Armed Forces Ruling Council for the first five years.

After which, it will be responsible to the National Judicial Council to be set up. It will thus be fully independent of the Executive control, and no pressure will be brought on the members in the discharge of their duties.

THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL

This will be made up of the President, the Service Chiefs, the Attorney-General, the Inspector-General of Police, the Head of Government and a few elected civilians.

ELECTION

1. The election procedure shall remain as outlined for levels I — IV. There shall be no political parties at any level, and each candidate must be seen as an individual completely detached from any recognisable pressure groups. Since the Military and the Police will not vote, their intelligence units will have to be increased to monitor all aspects of the elections. It is a contradiction for the Military to vote and participate in installing a government, and for the same Military to overthrow the government it voted for.
2. Voting shall be by secret ballot.
3. The ballot box shall be kept within public view at all stages of the elections, and after the voting, the counting shall take place immediately thereafter. Except for the level IV elections, every delegate will vote at two elections.
4. No candidate shall be allowed to stand for two elections. Those who wish to contest for the State House of Assembly would not qualify to contest for either the Senate or any other elections, neither can they be appointed into the Executive Council, as this will create room for unnecessary by-elections.
5. All candidates must be chosen on the basis of proven competence, integrity and the ability to deliver the goods. They must, above all, be strong believers in the concept of one Nigeria.
6. Members of the Legislatures are simply law makers,

and cannot vie for any executive position or interfere with the functions of the Executive.

7. A Senator must see himself as representing Nigeria, and must be able to see the problems of different parts of the country as his own problems. A Senator is a NIGERIAN SENATOR simpliciter: the Senate, as the highest law-making body in the country, must be seen at that height, and cannot be a platform for any nit-wit.

NATIONAL ORIENTATION

The Senate, the State Legislatures and the Executives, along with eminent Nigerians should work hand-in-hand to map out a new orientation for the country.

A Committee representing these bodies must be set up immediately to examine the frame-work of Afrocracy, and suggest modifications in the light of Nigerian and African experiences. The committee must be made up of people of the highest esteem, authority, integrity and responsibility. The deliberations of the Committee will pass through the State Legislatures, and the Senate. The concurrence of the Senate shall be the final stamp. A great premium is placed on the Senate as the voice of Nigeria. When Senate speaks, it is "NIGERIA SENATUSQUE".

ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AFTER THE FIRST FIVE YEARS

After the first five years, the President and the Head of State would be elected by all the representatives from the Local Government Councils to the Senate.

DURATION OF GOVERNMENT

Each government will last for five years, provided that the President and the Supreme Military Council and the legislature are satisfied that there is no cause to dissolve the government. Where a State Government is dissolved following a vote of no confidence in the legislature, the cabinet will resign but the legislature will remain to elect a new leader of Government who would be asked to form a new government. In order to ensure

orderly transition, any vote of no confidence must be ratified by the Presidential Council.

Where the Armed Forces Ruling Council or the Presidential Council is satisfied that the Federal Executive Government may lead the Country to chaos, if it is allowed to continue in office, the Head of Government will be called upon by the President in Council to resign, if Senate passes a vote of no confidence on the Executive. The Chief Executive shall do so with his entire executive members. The President would then fix a date when Senate would elect a new Chief Executive who would appoint his own cabinet ministers.

The Head of State and the Presidential Council would approve the dates of fresh elections on the recommendation of the Electoral Commission. Elections must be staggered in such a way that the country should be spared the trauma of nationwide elections taking place at the same time. Since the outcome of elections in one State or Local Government Area will not affect the outcome elsewhere, the elections should be staggered throughout the period. That is, if Bendel goes to the polls this week, Anambra or any other State may conduct its elections during the succeeding week.

LAW AND ORDER

It is hoped that our armed forces and the police are disciplined or will be disciplined enough to ensure that no election malpractices are entertained. The electorate must be educated on the value of their votes, and they must not allow themselves to be misused by the politicians.

SUMMARY

I have examined the prescriptions for a western variant of democracy as well as the various stages of experiments the developed nations went through. We have seen that the western variant of democracy in its unmodified form cannot succeed in the country. The fault certainly does not lie with the persons who had to operate what they were given. Our verdict is that the structure of politics in Nigeria was faulty, in that it threw the door of political participation too open without ensuring

that the political institutions were stable enough to absorb all the participants. The resultant dis-equilibrium between political participation and political institutionalization led to consistent instability which resulted in military interventions. The colonial government did not give Nigerians the time to create political culture, values and norms for political participation. Frequent military interventions, even when justified, do not allow civilians to mature in the governance of the country. The present military regime should therefore be seen as a *political tabula rasa* for creating new orientations, generating new awareness, values and norms, and for mobilizing and socializing Nigerians in these new orientations.

Since our political instability is a result of our inability to responsibly elect representatives because of various electoral malpractices, and since we have shown that, at this initial stage, as in all democratic experiments, the size of the electorate must be reduced to a manageable proportion, we introduce Afrocracy, as a political method for achieving this reduction in the electorate. Afrocracy is a system of politics without political parties and is based on delegated rights to vote.

More than 90% of independent African Countries have experienced coups, attempted coups, civil wars, or various acts of instability. Our inability to formulate an original frame of reference has continued to enslave us to the utopian ideals of liberal democracy, socialism and all the 'isms'. We know however that even Britain and America did not start with such liberal electoral processes as the Western world exported to Africa. Hence Afrocracy should appeal to all African countries and Nigeria at this particular period. I hasten to defend this system from the jaundiced eyes of scholars intellectually dependent on Western values, and I contend that any method or any institutional arrangement which guarantees free and fair elections, in which the people are adequately represented, and through which responsible governments are elected, is democratic.

I therefore commend Afrocracy to Africans.

THE MECHANICS FOR MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT IN NIGERIA

This section examines the stages of elections. As has been discussed earlier, electoral malpractices are strongly linked with military interventions in various African countries. It is therefore naturally logical that we seek first to solve the recurrent tragedy of electoral malpractices as a first step towards achieving stability. Unless political stability is achieved, it would be needless asking for other prescriptions which sustain Afrocracy as a viable method.

In Africa where the generality of the people are very poor, and the community could be aptly described as having a 'culture of poverty', politics of mass hysteria would tend to offer temporary relief to participants who rarely understand the motivations of candidates as well as the intentions and ideologies of their sponsoring parties. Political rallies and campaigns (the opium of the masses) are no doubt, instruments for the mobilization of the masses but at the same time, they are used to draw wool over the eyes of the participants who follow the politicians without questioning because they expect to be remembered for their loyal services during the difficult electioneering period. In order to cater for these loyal party men, the newly elected governments are saddled with a battalion of political sycophants for whom jobs must be provided. In doing so, the governments break all bounds of morality and rational judgement in order to place these people in jobs which many of them would not qualify to hold under normal circumstances.

The system enthrones nepotism, mediocrity and various corrupt practices. One does not have to go far to see why most government owned parastatals are run at losses since the appointments of people to the boards of the parastatals are mere patronages. All these are possible because there is no watch-dog to criticise the government. It is customary in Africa to witness a series of carpet-crossing from the party or parties that lost the elections to the winning party. People struggle to get hold of something for the next four years. Nobody really considers the need to ensure a smooth government. The lobbying for positions after the elections consumes most of the time of the elec-

ted officials so much so, that they scarcely find time to plan for their take-off.

The system being recommended here ensures that after each election, there are institutionalised watch-dogs to oversee the activities of the newly elected officials. Since there would be no political parties, the prospects of large scale nepotism, party patronages and catering for sectional interests would be minimal.

DISENGAGEMENT

It is expected that the military would not hand over power to elected officials in one day as was the case in the Obasanjo-Shagari handing over. Rather, the handing over should be gradual but programmed. No one expects the military to stay in political offices longer than is necessary. Therefore the military must begin to think very seriously on how it would hand over power to future politicians without leaving loopholes for it coming back.

It is therefore proposed that as a first step, the military should accept the proposition that simultaneous nation-wide elections be abolished in the country. Since no political parties exist, the results of elections in Sokoto State for instance cannot influence the outcome of the elections in Bendel or Anambra State. This would reduce the tension often associated with partisan elections. Secondly, the elections as given above would be held in different years. This would enable the military government watch systematically the performance of the elected officials to whom it would be expected to hand over power.

For purposes of illustration, the precinct and city elections could be held early in 1987. It may even be possible to hold the Local Government Council elections in the same year. Therefore for the next twelve calendar months, the military government should watch the administration of the various towns and the Local Government Councils before embarking on the next election. If the present military administration is satisfied that these levels are sufficiently responsible, and are functioning creditably, then arrangements would be made for the election of repre-

sentatives into the State House of Assembly. This would be followed by the election of the Head of Government for the State. He may be called a Governor or Premier depending on the type of Government we want to run. I would prefer the title "Governor" so that we reserve the title of Prime Minister for the Executive Head of the Federal Government. For the next 12 calendar months following election of the Governors, the State Governments, the Local Government Councils, the City Administration would function under the supervision of Armed Forces Ruling Council. The Federal Executive Council would continue to function as presently constituted until the next election when the Senate and the Head of the Federal Government would be elected. The Federal elections would only hold if the present administration is satisfied that after 12 months the State Governors have functioned satisfactorily.

After each Government has been sworn in, all the members of the armed forces at the various levels of government for which elections have been held would withdraw to the barracks unless they are specifically requested to stay on by the incoming administration. Such requests must have the approval of the Armed Forces Ruling Council.

Finally, the stage would be set for the election to the Senate. This would be followed by the election of the Prime Minister and Head of the Government. Then for the next 12 calendar months, the Armed Forces Ruling Council would supervise the activities of the Federal Government as well as the State and the Local Governments.

If they have successfully administered their various governments for the period, the stage would be set for the election of the Presidential Council and the President. As shown above, the Presidential Council would be made up of the service Chiefs, the Attorney-General, the Inspector-General of Police, the Director-General of the Nigerian Security Organisation, and the Prime Minister or Head of the Federal Government. Provision would be made for the election of five or more respected Nigerians who should run for the election on their own merits. The electorate would be all the elected representatives from the Local Government Levels to Senate. For the first five years, the most senior member of the Armed Forces would serve as the President and

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The President in Council would have the powers to dissolve any State Government on the recommendation of the State House of Assembly with the concurrence of the Senate.

The Electoral Commission would be under the office of the President. There should be different dates for the elections in the States. This would make it easier for the law enforcement agencies to effectively cover the elections.

TIMING:

If adequate arrangements could be made now to start the process of disengagement, and if the first elections could be held in 1987, I would expect that the military could effectively hand over power to the politicians by the end of 1990.*

This time table is very important because it allays the fears of impatient political foxes who might be suspecting that the military would stay on indefinitely. Besides, the dangling expectations before the politicians would make unnecessary any attempt by them to incite disaffection within the rank and file of the members of the Armed Forces. If the military cannot correct the ills in four years, it is not likely to correct them in eight years.

It is hoped that the present administration would see in these recommendations laudable ideals that could save this country from further deterioration and military re-intervention. If we fail to implement these again, the next civilian administration would not last four years before the soldiers come back. The cleaning up exercises going on now would have been valueless as the first political wind would blow the debries back to their *status quo ante*.

Finally, it is contended that this system would ensure stability, since the centrifugal forces of party politics would have been eliminated. Besides, Afrocracy taps from our pristine values and ensures that right from the grass-root, representation is indeed responsible. The traditional rulers are fully involved at their own levels in the governance of their respective domains.

* This date previously accepted by the President has recently been changed to 1992.

People have talked about the need to insulate traditional rulers from politics.

Unfortunately, such people confuse partisan politics with politics simpliciter. Every traditional ruler is a traditional politician in the first place. He is deeply involved in the intricacies of his people's politics. It is therefore not possible to insulate him from the traditional politics on whose platform he rose to be a traditional ruler. By making him the Honorary President of the town/community administration, the system ensures that he is able to control and direct the various programmes that would bring innovation to his people while at the same time taking directives from a higher administration for effective co-ordination and monitoring.

The next section will examine the role of the Military in an Afrocratic Political System.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Nnamdi Azikiwe, *Democracy with Military Vigilance*, Nsukka: African Book Company Limited, 1974.
2. B.I.C. Ijomah, "In Search of an Ideology: Democracy Without Political Parties, The Concept of Afrocracy, Unp. Mono. Evaston: Northwestern University, 1967 pp. 1-67.
3. James Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958.
4. Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* London: 1961 (ed.) p. 242.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Travelyan, *History of England*, London,: Longmans and Green
7. Ernest Baker, *Reflections on Government*, London: O.U.P., 1942, p. 159.
8. Aristotle, On Political Man and Conditions of the Democratic Order, cited in S.M. Lipset, *The Political Man*, New York: A Doubleday Anchor Book, 1963, p. vii
9. Herman Finer, *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, (Revised ed.), London: Methuen & Co. 1949, p. 219
- 9a. Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract and Discourses*, London: J. M. Bant & Sons Ltd. 1947 p. 55.
10. John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty, Representative Government, The Subjection of Women*, London: O.U.P. 1948, p.
11. T.B. Macaulay, *Essays on Parliamentary Reform*, London: 1859.
12. W. Paley, *The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*, Book VI, London: 1825, pp. 392 - 393.
13. Micah "Second and Third Chapters", *The Bible Revised*, ed. 1971. p.. 817 - 819.

In Nigeria, the current tribunals aim at recovering the ill-gotten money from ex-public officers. Bribery has never stopped since the time of Micah. Any expectation that it will stop may well be like the waiting for the second coming of the Lord!

In the markets, women have not ceased to use bags of deceitful measures. Cups are beaten in so that a small quantity can be sold for higher profit.

These practices contributed in no small measure towards the destruction of the First and Second Republics.

14. Plato, *The Republic*.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Nnamdi Azikiwe, *op. cit.*, pp. 18 – 19.
17. Charles Moskos, *Sociology of Independence*, Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1968, p. 26.
18. Samuel Beer, et al *Patterns of Government*, New York: Random House, 1962, For further details Beer may be consulted.
19. B.I.C. Ijomah, "The Social Characteristics of Nigeria's Political Decision Makers Before Independence" *Conch*, 1974.
20. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Broadcast to the Nation on the Federal Elections, *The Daily Times*, December 11, 1964 pp. 1, 8 and 9.
21. S. E. Finer, *The man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, London: Pall Mall, 1962, p. 23
22. Harold Lasswell, "The Garrison State Hypothesis Today", in Huntington ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, Glencoe Illinois: The Free Press, 1962, pp. 51 – 70
- 23(a). B.I.C. Ijomah, "The Military in World Politics" Presented at the Seminar to Mark the 21st Anniversary of the Nigerian Air Force, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, April 22, 1985.
- 23(b). B.I.C. Ijomah, "Electoral Competiton and Military Intervention in Africa", International Political Science Association (IPSA), free University of Berline, 1984.
24. *Ibid*, p. 16
25. *Ibid.*
26. A.K. Ocran, *Politics of the Sword*, London: Rec Collings, 1977, p. 1
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.*
29. Henry Bretton, *Power and stability in Nigeria: The Politics of Decolonization*, New York Frederick a Praeger, Publishers, 1962.

CHAPTER IV

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN NIGERIA: PROPOSALS FOR THE THIRD REPUBLIC

GENESIS: THE ORIGIN OF NIGERIAN MILITARY

What has evolved as the Nigerian Military began as a number of unco-ordinated gathering of Nigerians into some kind of armed forces to perform essentially constabulary duties for the British. The first of these was the 'Glover's Hausas', which the British used to suppress and conquer the country. Glover's Hausas comprised mainly runaway slaves who sought refuge with Lt. Glover, RN, and were first organised into a Force in Lagos in 1863. Following the proclamation of the Oil Rivers Protectorate, the 'Oil Rivers Irregulars' was organised in 1885. Six years later, it was renamed the 'Niger Coast Constabulary' and was stationed at Calabar. In 1886, Sir George Goldie's Chartered Company had organised the Royal Niger Company Constabulary. In 1900, Lord Lugard reorganised them into the Northern Nigerian Regiment which took part in the pacification of the Sultan Attahiru Ahmadu of Sokoto, in 1903. This pacification completed Lugard's process of annexation of the entire Northern Region or Protectorate, which was his own creation.

These crude forces were what the British used in divide and rule tactics to subjugate Nigeria, and literally compelled Nigerian traditional rulers to enter into treaties of cession which they did not understand.* Attraction to military service was at its low ebb. By 1956, the Nigerian Military Force had 250 officers and 6,400 other ranks.¹ In 1957 Brigadier Browne complained that educated young people in the Eastern and Western Nigeria appeared not to like military service.² In the Southern part of the country, military life was regarded with disdain. Generally, in Ibo, a person who had a soldier as his only child was regarded as childless. In spite of this low opinion people

* See the Role of Traditional Rulers in the next chapter.

1. N. J. Miners, *The Nigerian Army, 1956-1966* London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1971, p. 15.

2. *Ibid*, p. 41.

had of the military, some Southerners later joined as officers, although their authority was resented by the Northern platoon sergeants.³ The trust and confidence which should exist among fellow citizens were lacking in the Nigerian military *ab initio*. This mistrust was compounded when the Nigerianization exercise started in ways that questioned the basis of military discipline and ethics.

This difficulty was described by the British as being much more deep-seated, and formed the basis of the malaise that has continued to destabilise the Nigerian military today. To the British officers trained in strict military discipline, it was hard to believe that in order to Nigerianize, persons unwilling to undergo the hazards of military life should be induced to join the force. According to Miners.

The whole ethos of Army life, the belief in the virtues of service and self sacrifice, was against it. The task of the army officer was to set the standard, to let the demands of army life be made known, and to trust that sufficient numbers would come forward to fill the vacancies. To ask for less was like asking a clergy to seek converts by adulterating the gospel.⁴

Regardless of Miner's argument, we know the reverse to be true of modern military. The conscientious objectors, the draft dodgers, like Muhammad Ali, abound. We will not go into the internal problems of the Nigerian military. Suffice it to say that before the civil war, the significance of the military in deciding the political complexion of the country was well understood, and politicians left no stone unturned to make sure that they had their men within the Armed Forces.

Even the soldiers themselves admitted that "standards had dropped drastically, and discipline had also dropped and tribalism had risen like a phoenix in the Nigerian Army"⁵

A military that has been ripped off by the same cancer

3. Miners op. cit. p. 57

4. *Ibid*, p. 57.

5. Ben Gbulfe, *Nigeria's Five Majors*, Onitsha: Africana Educational Publishers, 1981, p. 13.

which ripped off the political parties in the first and second republics cannot be expected to do better than the politicians. But this is the background of the military whose role in the Third Republic we want to consider. It is clear that if tribalism and indiscipline persist in the military, the structural formation one would like to see in the third republic cannot materialise. Therefore, the role the military would be expected to perform in the third republic would depend on the type of military we have, and how the present regime disengages from political functions and returns to the barracks.

Furthermore, the purpose of the military during the colonial regime was not the protection of the territorial integrity of the nation, but essentially the pacification of the tribal groups that resisted British penetration into the country. In many places, such as Benin, the African militia aided and abetted the British in their punitive expeditions against many Nigerian rulers.

Shortly before independence, a number of moves were made to ensure some regional identities inspite of the creation of the West African Frontier Force. The Advisory Council which was recommended in 1953 was created in 1955, and held its first meeting in 1955. However, it was shortlived as the West African Command disintegrated in July 1956. By 1958, the Nigerian Constitutional Conference asked for a truly Nigerian Military with control in the hands of Nigerians. In February 1960, the change was effected with the late Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa taking over the portfolio of police and defence.⁶

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

The traditional duties of the military include the protection of the territorial integrity of the country and the defence of the nation in case of any external aggression. They also include such constabulary functions as may be determined from time to time. In discharging these roles, the diverse military expertise would be called into use. In time of war, the engineers, the

6. N. J. Miners, *op. cit.*

scientists, the psychologists and the sociologists as well as other experts would perform their respective roles in order to ensure the survival of the nation, or in order to ensure that the war was fought and won.

It is noteworthy that in keeping with strict military tradition, the military may fight a war, they are usually not the cause of war. In other words, the politicians may declare war, but it is the military who have to decide how the war should be fought.

The military profession arose because of the need to serve the nation. In order to protect the nation, policies must be formulated; and since professional military recruitment is based on proven competence, this calls for a hierarchical organization such that the most senior and the most professionally competent are at the top, and should formulate policies which run down the line for compliance by the junior ranks.

The responsibilities of the military include the assurance of the security of the state. Consequently, the military is expected to keep the political authorities informed as to what they consider necessary to ensure the security of the state, in the light of the nation's military capabilities. In keeping with the tradition of civilian supremacy, which demands military obedience to political authority, it has been contended that the military may withdraw this obedience if the performance of the political authority endangers the security of the State which the military have sworn to protect.

Thus, a coup becomes justified if the political authority by acts of commission or omission endangers the security of the state. Other than this, the military have no right whatsoever to challenge the professional competence of professional politicians. I admit, however, that Nigeria never had professional politicians. At best, what Nigeria had during the first and second civilian republics were mere rabble-rousers, demagogues and outright cheats. A professional politician is tolerant in defeat, seeks the genuine mandate of the people, and accepts the verdict of the ballot box with equanimity. In Nigeria, the political strategy of the politician was not how he could win the elections honestly, but how he could rig the elections.

If Nigeria had professional politicians, it would have been

impossible for the military to challenge the supremacy of the civilian authority. It would have been my contention that the military could not claim greater political wisdom as they are not competent to make pronouncements on non-military matters. Similarly, political authority may declare war, but politicians cannot teach the military how to win the war.

If the politicians, by bribing the electorate were elected the legitimacy of the resultant government could be called to question.

But it is not within the competence of the military to pass judgement because they do not have the political expertise to succeed where the politicians failed. Indeed, they do not succeed. No government elected on the platform of a political party can apply the coercive forces used by military administration. If it did, it could not hope to aspire to a second term. Without force or the threat of the use of force, no military administration, no matter how benevolent will succeed.

Besides, when soldiers fail to win a war, the civilians or politicians do not seize the barracks and assume military roles. The impunity with which young military officers are promoted in Nigeria leaves much to be desired because such promotions do not reflect their military accomplishments

For a contrast, we recall the fact that since taking over in Ethiopian, over a decade ago, Mengistu has remained a Colonel. Such people are aware of the fact that military ranks are rewards for successfully carrying out military functions and not political functions. It is therefore questionable whether a military officer should be promoted for performing political roles for which he is least qualified.

At independence, the nation inherited a ceremonial military that had little or no experience of war, yet in 27 years, we seem to have more Generals, Major-Generals and their equivalents than any other African Country.

EXPERIENCE OF FIGHTING A DEFENSIVE WAR:

The only experience of many of our Nigerian soldiers was the civil war. In that, the military lived up to expectation by preventing a disintegration of the country from within. *Besides the civil war, Nigerian soldiers would seem to have had a lot of*

time at their disposal and therefore did not have the actual functions of the military to tax their competence. There is a saying that an idle brain is the devil's workshop. Since the military were idle most of the time it is not unexpected that many of the soldiers had time to discuss non-military issues. General Ironsi had to regret that many of the young graduates in the army did nothing but read books about revolutions. One is therefore tempted to conclude that during the first and second republics the military had so much time, and that because of their functional redundancy in the absence of any external aggression, they dabbled much more into political, and therefore non-military issues than would a busy military. It has been contended that the very existence of any society depends upon its capacity to defend itself by force, and that covenants without the military would be nothing but mere words and pieces of paper. It has also been contended (Ijomah 1984/85) that as the military gets more and more involved in non-military issues, its capacity to defend the nation in any foreign encounter would wane in proportion to its involvement in non-military issues.

Since 1960, the year of independence, the military have ruled this nation for more than 16 years, which is about 62% of the period. During this time, apart from refresher courses in military institutions either in this country or abroad, and besides being used for special constabulary functions, the military, would, in the strict sense of the term be described as functionally redundant. And yet, they continue to promote themselves as experts in war without fighting. It is this state of functional redundancy that has created the fertile environment in which the individual ambitions of the military in non-military directions were nurtured. It would however be wrong to blame the Nigerian military for intervening in politics because as I pointed out (Ijomah 1984), there were the push and the pull factors that were responsible for every military intervention. The push factors are found within the society that has failed to manage its own affairs. It is therefore my contention that where the society has failed to enforce the civilian supremacy over the military in keeping with the spirit of the constitution, the mystique of civilian supremacy would disappear.

As a general world phenomenon it is held that whenever a society passes from traditional to modern, the old order crumbles, and there is usually the emergence of the civil service which normally takes transitory control of state matters in periods of decay. Daniel Lerner notes that because of the visionless rivalry among the intelligentsia, because of visionless ideological theorising, because of the crumbling of court order and the ineffective religious organisations, coupled with the rivalry of men of the pen, the men of the sword took over the control of politics.⁷ But because they themselves have no vision, they destroy even the little that the civil servants have saved, and have to return to the *status quo ante*, that is to our tradition to begin anew. Lerner goes further to contend that the military is also infested with corruption and the only thing it has succeeded in doing was to throw off the old guards and lapse into traditional ineffectiveness.

Besides the experience of the military south of the Sahara, in Otoman Turkey, the military was incapacitated by corruption and internal bickering. After the death of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the Military could not give Turkey the leadership, which Ataturk gave Turkey in the 1920s. It is a sociological fact that any attempt to perpetrate a military rule that has lost its leadership potentials, particularly its bearing in politics, would lead to stagnation and unnecessary pre-occupation with foreign policy. Such a military leadership would tend towards absolutism which leads to ever-recurring purging of the officer corps including the original group of the coup planners, and this naturally causes a split of the military. When this happens such a military regime would resort to decrees that question the existence of human rights. This is followed by national murmurs and grumbings like a volcano about to erupt. *Such are the signs that a coup of consolidation from within the military is not far away.* The military then wait for a social index such as mass demonstration, strikes, etc., that would make a coup acceptable to the public. During the various military inter-regna, we have seen the military pulsate between absolutism and "liberal stra-

7. Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, New York, The Free Press.

tocracy". Liberalism in a military regime, however, is an aberration because, in its attempt to enforce the strict discipline which characterises military ethics, the military government that would succeed cannot afford to be unnecessarily liberal.

Although in an earlier work (Ijomah 1974), I had shown that military intervention was becoming an African phenomenon, it would be wrong to limit our understanding of military intervention to the African experience. There are staggering experiences in Asia and Latin America. The chart of Military interventions shows Bolivia in the lead with an average of 1.2 coups a year, followed by Honduras with 92 coups a year. Nigeria has recorded five successful coups and three unsuccessful ones. I have recorded 25 cases of rumoured attempted coups, but only the military can say for sure how many threats they have received.

My calculation agrees with T. Y. Danjuma (1985) who records 180 coups in 139 years for Bolivia, and 115 coups in 125 years for Honduras. The Bolivian experience staggers one's imagination and shows that ambitious soldiers are hardly restrained when they want to seize power. One wonders whether Nigeria has seen her last coup. Although Europe is stable now, the beginning of the twentieth century saw a Europe in turmoil. Up to 1939, the army had always exercised tremendous sway in European politics. France witnessed her last military intervention in 1958, but there was a revolt of the French Army in Algeria in 1961. George Kourvetaris (1973) has done a comprehensive study of the military in Greek politics. After the overthrow of Caetano's regime by the military in Portugal in 1974 one hopes all would be calm.

FOR AND AGAINST MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

The argument often adduced in condemning military intervention derives from the notion of civilian supremacy over the military. But that is in a normal situation. When things are not normal, and the elected government proves irresponsible, and violates not only the human rights of the citizens but desecrates the very constitution it has sworn to uphold, and if the security of the nation becomes threatened thereby, the military

are quick to remember that they have a duty to maintain order in the country. But since they cannot call their civilian masters to order, the best way is to overthrow them. Such an overthrow is abnormal, and comes about only in abnormal circumstances.

Just as much as a coup is an aberration, so also is the reckless abandon with which the second republic was wrecked. Both the politicians and the military deviated from their traditional roles.

It must be emphasized that whenever the military intervene, democracy is not only stultified but also eroded. The new republic must begin with amateur politicians who have practised no politics during the period of military interregnum. Since they learnt nothing, they can hardly improve on the performance of their discredited predecessors. For every coup, led by younger officers, the senior officers with experience are retired. This constitutes a great loss to the military.

In discussing the role of the military in the third republic, cognisance must be taken of the revolution of rising expectations within the armed forces. The military has moved from Lt. Glover's Hausas and Goldie's Chartered Company, made up of battered runaway slaves and illiterates, to a modern military of graduate officers with sophisticated modern weapons — officers who would not in the face of modern nuclear technology allow any inept politician to push them around. The role of the military in the third republic should be seen within the framework of Afrocracy which a number of people have confused with zero party without ideology. Afrocracy is a zero-party, but it is much more than a zero party because it is based on a solid foundation of our African heritage which is the basis of a sound ideology.

The third republic that we envisage must be able to utilise the army as a lever for development while retaining civilian supremacy. The military should also be used as an instrument for imposing stability on the nation.

The third republic will be presumed to have understood the reasons for the failure of the first and second republics, and therefore would be based on the premise that all those factors which led to the fall of the first and second republics would be

handled in such a way that the military would give the nation the much needed stability. Since it has been held by a number of scholars that without political stability, the argument for the economic restructuring of the nation is futile (Ijomah 1985), a search for the role of the military in the third republic will commence with examining

- (1) how the military could be used to effect an orderly transition from military to civilian rule.
 - (2) how the military could impose stability.
 - (3) and finally how the military could be used to achieve modernization in the third republic.
- (i) In the system advocated, that is Afrocracy (Politics Without Political Party) based on African traditional models, the role of the military will be limited to supervisory activities, constabulary functions, construction and repair works, maintenance of military capability, and defending the nation if there is a foreign attack.

It has been shown earlier how electoral malpractices created governments which had no claim to legitimacy. The first role of the military in the third republic will be to ensure that the elections for a new civilian government are conducted in such a way that the resultant government or governments would be representative of the people and therefore responsible and legitimate. In Afrocracy it has been recommended that elections should be staggered to avoid the repetition of the national traumatic experiences which nearly destroyed the first and second republics. The absence of political parties imposes a heavy responsibility on the armed forces to ensure that no individual takes the laws into his hands as happened during the second republic. It has also been recommended that the military should withdraw gradually but systematically and in phases, into the barracks so that the members can be re-integrated piece meal into military professionalism. The elections have also been broken into five stages and should be organised in

such a way that the available personnel in the armed forces would be competent: to supervise the elections and enforce discipline on all participating politicians. Since the military would be completely insulated from politics, members of the armed forces should not be allowed to vote. This would ensure their impartiality in enforcing discipline.

- (ii) The second role of the military in the third republic, in the absence of external aggression against Nigeria would be confined to constabulary functions or peace-keeping functions. The system of elections advocated in the main chapter on Afrocracy is such that as elections are conducted from the communities to the Senate levels, all the military personnel functioning in any tier of government should withdraw into the barracks unless such members of the Armed Forces are invited by the government to take on non-military functions. When all the members of the Armed Forces withdraw into the barracks and return to purely military functions, there will be so many of them with very little to do. In order to avoid listlessness and functional redundancy, many of the members of the Armed Forces should be redeployed to the borders to protect our territorial integrity. The Navy as well as the Air Force should be mechanized and modernized so as to reduce the number of personnel, improve effectiveness, and reduce the overhead cost of maintaining a large standing army in the face of the present economic austerity.
- (iii) The third role of the military is in the area of modernization. In this respect, the recommendation of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk of Turkey is pertinent. He argues that as long as officers remain in the party or assume political functions, Turkey would neither build a strong party nor a strong army; and as long as any party has to appeal to the army for its strength, such a party cannot appeal to the nation. Therefore the isolation of the military from politics must be total.

The military must accept the supremacy of the civilian government, while acting as the defenders of the internal integrity of the nation. They should be able to defend the nation, while unpopular governments should be forced to resign and new ones selected. In other words in the new republic, the military must not intervene, no matter how unpopular a government is; rather they must use their position to ensure that the government is forced to resign and a new civilian government elected. Our experience so far has shown that ineffectiveness, corruption, and nepotism are not peculiar to the civilians. Just as the civilians have failed us, some of the military regimes have also failed us. The answer therefore is not in the diarchy, which begs the question, but in a government that merely uses the military as one of its agencies to achieve national development. Solid internal organization of any country is not due to the military as such, but to successful governments; and governments refer to both the military and civilian arms, each performing its professional responsibility. Nigeria cannot develop socially, economically and politically as long as the military continues to be involved in domestic politics. By development and modernization, which have been used interchangeably by some scholars, but which for purposes of this book I will take as two different phenomena, I am referring to the evolution of Nigeria's indigeneous practices in the face of culture contact with the Western World. By modernization I am referring to the acceptance of modern ways of doing things especially in the field of agriculture, education, medicine; in short, I am referring to the whole phenomenon of accepting the Western way of doing things to the total or partial abandonment of the traditional way.

In Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk achieved a lot of modernization, but he had to use the military as a vehicle for this modernization. The military in Nigeria have initiated a number of econo-

mic measures which have not succeeded because the practitioners appointed by the same military have often, failed to live up to expectation. It is also my contention, in spite of all the arguments to the contrary, that technological transformation of Nigeria is impossible without a transformation of the social and political system which will open the people's fullest potentials to accept the challenges of change and technological development. In this modernization process the military must accept the social and economic realities and must rationalize its own position and structure. As is experienced in many other developing countries, many soldiers are used as family servants by the officer corp. In Turkey after the reign of Kemal Ataturk, a number of soldiers used as family servants by the officer corp constituted a great waste of military manpower. One therefore would like to see the military in the third republic rationalize its manpower such that the number of officers who are chauffeur-driven will be drastically reduced and the number of officers who are entitled to family servants will also be drastically reduced. Nigeria has a large corp of retired officers who are under 50 years of age. Officers of certain ranks are fully maintained at the expense of the tax-payers money when they retire. This unnecessary maintenance of retired generals who are already millionaires should stop because it creates a situation where coup leaders rush to promote themselves so that they would be entitled to full maintenance on retirement. Further, on modernization of the Nigerian Army, the third republic must envisage a capable army with a credible force. It has been contended that:

A social structure with low performance standard can afford to base recruitment and promotion on status rather than on merit. As performance standards are raised, traditional social barriers break down and the key functions go to the man who can do the best without regard to their social stigma.⁸

This implies that in the third republic the Nigerian military must reassess itself and must purge itself of those characteristics which are capable of creating mistrust within the military. One

8. Henry Bienen (ed.), *The Military and Modernization*

of the allegations made for the intervention of the military in the first republic was the suspicion that many soldiers were promoted on considerations which were extra-military.⁹

There were claims and counter claims on the military interventions in the first republic. Regardless of what was true, it is a sociological fact that where the military modernize fast and acquire sophisticated equipment, recruitment and promotion into the military can no longer be based on status, ethnic background or on quota system. Mobility within the army in the third republic that we envisage should be based on expertise and professional competence. Should the third republic last long enough to take Nigeria into the nuclear age, it would become imperative that the personnel to man the nuclear plant must not be recruited on extra-professional consideration, otherwise the safety of the nation will be jeopardized.

The military in the third republic will be expected, having raised their standards of living within the military, to carry the same back to the village thereby increasing the tempo of modernization. The role of the military in accelerating the educational development of the country has been noted by many scholars.

In the absence of political organisations, the military become very potent instrument for the mobilization of the people. Unfortunately because of the requirement that the military should withdraw into the barracks during the third republic, mobilization at the grass root must be carried out with the active assistance of the traditional rulers. A fuller discussion of the role of traditional rulers in an Afrocracy will be presented later.

Finally if the premises of my first argument in Afrocracy, that the rate of mobilization and participation must balance the rate of organisation and institutionlisation is accepted, the military in the third republic, will be expected to ensure that political participation does not overwhelm political institutionalisation. Samuel P. Huntington defines political development as the institutionalisation of political organisation and procedures.

9. Ben Gbulie *op. cit.* p. 13

But he also notes that rapid modernization produces political decay.

As argued (Ijomah 1967), massive modernization of the masses without political organisation and procedures based on some ideological orientations will create great stress in the political system. If we accept Karl Deutsch's definition of modernization as involving social mobilization, increases in literacy, increases in urbanization, exposure to mass media, industrialization, per capital income, then modernization will mean increased political participation. Therefore the involvement of the military in the third republic will also include its acceptance of full responsibility to police the electoral system in order to avoid electoral malpractices. If the political institution is strong and has achieved autonomy and coherence over a period of time, military intervention will become a thing of the past, and political participation will be expanded.

One other role of the military in the third republic is the conduct of population census. Nigeria cannot claim to be modernized when it does not know how many people are Nigerians. During the first republic, it was clear how the census became an instrument of politics. If the present administration intends to hand over in 1990 there are two options open to it with respect to population census:

1. either it sets up the machinery to arrange to have a census early, in 1990, or
2. it must set up a machinery which will work in conjunction with the military even when the military has withdrawn to the barracks, to conduct the census early in the third republic.

Even if Nigerians cannot count themselves, at least for the sake of national pride and also to justify our often acclaimed leadership of black Africa, it is mandatory on the military administration to see that the nation is given an accurate population census while it still has the authority to instill discipline on politicians otherwise there will be no accurate census in the third republic.

On revenue allocation, the military has a responsibility to re-examine the allocation of the revenue of this country in the

face of a dwindling oil economy, and to work out an equitable formula for sharing this revenue. The experiences of the oil producing areas have shown that whilst the villages that produce the oil cry out for help, other areas of the country whose lands are not being devastated and whose inhabitants do not suffer the hardships of those in the oil producing areas, seem to enjoy the oil wealth more than these "wretched of the Delta Region", many of whom cannot drive to their villages; yet the Oil Companies have no scruples in using their better transportation facilities to drive to these villages, splashing mud on the helpless pedestrians.

The final role I will expect of the military in the third republic is the setting up of a standing probe-panel which will probe all office holders both military and civilian as a matter of national routine. By so doing the nation will be able to ensure that only those who have the nation at heart, and who are willing to be accountable to the nation accept public appointments.

DEMYSTIFICATION OF MODERN MILITARY

Reference has been made to the reluctance with which people joined the army. During the civil war, soldiers discovered how lucrative it was to join the army. A number of soldiers of fortune sprang up during and after the civil war. Many acquired questionable wealth. But genuine professionals could still be found in the military.

Before the civil war, around the independence period, people avoided close contact with the soldiers because of their low social esteem. But when being a military man became synonymous with being wealthy, and wealth increased the arrogance of the military, the social distance between the military and the civilians increased at the instance of the military. Intervention in politics gave the military a power base that commanded awe and respect.

In order to demystify the military life, and prepare the population to resist unpopular interventions, it is suggested that all able-bodied citizens above the age of 18 should be given military training.

Military service should be made compulsory for at least two years for people between 18 and 36 years old.

After a two year service they should go on the reserve list, to be called up in cases of emergency. In a few years, the youth of the country would have been so mobilized that when the military intervene unwarrantedly, they would form the corp of civilian resistance to such an intervention. The experience in the Philippines should be an object lesson.

DANGER:

There is a national danger! In any nation where the civil (administration) and military bureaucracies are more developed than the political bureaucracy (evidenced in party organizations), there will always be an institutional vaccum which the military will always be tempted to fill. The personnel in the Nigerian military since the civil war have systematically raised the level of education among themselves. By taking part in non-military functions for sixteen years, they can claim as much expertise as the professional politicians:

1. to give the nation a political orientation, so that any intending politician MUST keep his particular orientation to himself and follow a national programme.
2. to educate the would-be-politicians.

This political education is of great importance because it would prepare the future politicians and the electorate to participate meaningfully. Unless the programme on political education is completed, the military should not be in a hurry to hand over to ill-prepared civilians, because such a handing over will make the military "re-intervention-ready."

That is why in Afrocracy, the period between one level of election and the other is one year. It is expected that the out-going military administration would be able to monitor the progress of the elected government, and educate the electorate and the intending candidates before the actual elections.

This period also enables the out-going military administration to dissolve any inept government if there is a motion to that effect at the appropriate level, and conduct a bye-election. The period, in fact, will be used to consolidate the new political

institutions to be introduced, and also to effect the amalgamation of the new ones with whatever is found preservable of the old ones. This ability to amalgamate the old with the new, *without necessarily throwing away the old traditions completely*, is the basis of Japanese institutional strength.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this chapter calls for the depoliticalization of the Nigerian military, its return to its avowed professionalism and its acceptance of a posture that will make it the watch dog of the nation while at the same time allowing itself to be watched by an attentive civilian population. A large standing military force such as Nigeria has, cannot be justified in the face of dwindling economy. Rationalization should be extended to the military to ensure that in time of peace, only the essential requirements for national security (both internally and externally) are maintained, while at the same time ensuring the combat readiness of the military if there should arise external aggression.

No military personnel below the age of 55 should be permitted to retire with full benefits. Since the nation is not fighting wars, there has been no strain on the nation's military. The need for early retirement is therefore not necessary. At 55, most generals become real professionals and can discuss strategies and policies backed by years of experience. One civil war is not enough to breed the crop of generals that Nigeria now has either in service or on the reserve list.

REFERENCES

1. Okay Achike *Ground Work of Military Law and Military Rule in Nigeria*, Enugu: Fourth Dimension 1980.
2. Henry Bienen (ed.), *The Military and Modernization*, Chicago: Aldine, Atherton Press, 1971.
3. Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development" *American Political Science Review*, 55 (Sept.) 1961.
4. Ben Gbulie, *Nigeria's Five Majors*, Onitsha: Africana Educational Publishers, 1981.
5. B.I.C. Ijomah, "African Military High Command and Continental Defence Policy" in *Proceedings on African High Command*, Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1978.
6. B.I.C. Ijomah, "African Military Interventions" A prelude to African High Command", *Ufahamu*, University of California, Vol. V, No. 2, 1974.
7. B.I.C. Ijomah, "The Rationale for an African High Command" Chicago, *Armed Forces and Society*, 1977.
8. B.I.C. Ijomah, "Electoral Competition and Military Intervention in Africa", *Proceedings of International Political Science Association (IPSA)* West Berlin, The Free University of Berlin 1984.
9. B.I.C. Ijomah, "The Military in World Politics" *Proceedings of a Seminar to Mark the 21st Anniversary of the Nigerian Air Force*, Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1985.
10. John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America*, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1963.
11. Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, New York The Free Press.
12. N.J. Miners, *The Nigerian Army 1956-1966*, London: Methuen and Co., Ltd, 1971.
13. T. Y. Danjuma, "Democracy and the Military in Nigeria - Towards a New Political Order. *Sunday Guardian*, July, 1986.
14. George Kourvetaris "The Military in Greek Politics"

CHAPTER V

TRADITIONAL RULERS, MODERNIZATION AND THE NEW LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION

Conceptual Clarification

This chapter begins with a clarification of areas of perpetual controversy. Many quarrels have in the past centred on who is a traditional ruler? The experience of Nigerians during the abortive attempt to organise a movement in search of Anioma State has convinced me more than ever that if the State had been created, we would have had more problems than we had imagined. It was clear from the struggles of those who called themselves traditional rulers that either some of them did not understand who a traditional was, or else they were dazzled by some imagined benefits which traditional rulers enjoy. Consequently, some second class chiefs had in the past paraded themselves as traditional rulers. I must say at once that if the chiefs are traditional rulers by their own definition, they are not the traditional rulers to whom this chapter is addressed.

By traditional rulers, I am referring to those rulers who controlled independent territories, and who before the cession to the Britannic Majesty, owed no allegiance to, and paid no tribute to any other power. I am referring to those rulers who exercised legitimate authority over their subjects, and to whom the subjects paid fealty; I am referring to those traditional rulers who inherited their kingdoms from their forebears, and who would legitimately hand over the same kingdoms to their successors. I am not referring to 'warrant' chiefs created by colonial powers, or by some traditional rulers and who, because of their wealth, have become important. However, the Chieftaincy Acts, 1976, in this country recognised any head of a community as a traditional ruler. This definition would include such chieftains as Onotu-Uku and Okpala-Uku, who, otherwise, would not have been regarded as such.

From its Latin root, *tradition* is derived from *trado-tradere*, *traditum*. From *traditum*, we have tradition. *Trado* means, I hand to, I hand over to, I hand down to. Therefore, a traditional

ruler is a ruler to whom a kingdom has been handed down. His power and authority are derived from the very fact that his legitimacy is ascribed to him and not acquired. Even if he is a fool, the authority is still handed down to him, and nobody can legitimately challenge this authority simply because the individual has acquired some indices of power and wealth.

It is clear from this definition that my concept of a traditional ruler does not include the chiefs who are vassals of a traditional ruler. Thus, people like the Iyasele, Onotu-Uku, and Okpala-Uku, could not have qualified to be traditional rulers. Okpala-Uku, and Oduah (in Aboh) for instance, may be seen as an extension into the 20th century of decadent gerontocracy. The history of a people is a daily plebiscite. People review their past in the light of contemporary experiences, and they ask which of the relics of the past have any functional significance for the present and the future. They modify the past in order to make them meaningful for the present, and functional in preparing for a better and more positive future. That is why the chieftaincy Acts elevating the Okpala-Uku to the status of a traditional ruler must be accepted as a reasonable attempt to modernize the institution to accommodate the changes. The world of today is certainly not ideal for any governance based on gerontocracy. It is a world governed by the brain and not by age. It is a world in which payment of fealty to the traditional ruler is anachronistic and totally out of place. It is a world in which the precarious international order dictates the tune of domestic politics, a world in which the aged and illiterate traditional ruler finds his age an impediment to his authority.

Consequently, there is need to organise the traditional rulers in such a way that an order, which the Local Governments and the State Governments would accept can evolve.

ORIGINS OF THE TRADITIONAL RULERS

Practically every kingdom has one tradition of origin or the other. Some kingdoms were founded by some mythical heroes. The Obi of Ubulu-Uku, for instance, claims his authority by virtue of the fact that he descended from the legendary Ezemu. The Obi of the Isseles is inextricably linked with the mythical Ezechima. Yet, some kingdoms were founded by some migrant

groups of warriors who conquered their hosts and occupied their territories. The Obi of Aboh is descended from the first ruler of such migrant warriors who left Benin City sometime in the fifteenth or sixteenth century. His power and authority were therefore handed down to him. A good number of towns were founded by hunters who travelled from other places. Such places as Akwukwu-Igbo were alleged to have been founded by hunters. The hunters settled there until they were joined by others and a small community emerged. The hunter thus became the first ruler. His successors would be legitimate traditional rulers.

There are however, some villages that segmented, a part of them breaking up to form new settlements. There are such places as Ubulu-Okiti, Ubulu-Uno, Anikpu and many others. Such places have recently begun to agitate to be accorded a status that is not commensurate with their tradition of origin. No doubt, Ubulu-Uku people would frown at any person parading himself as the Obi or ruler of Ubulu-Okiti. If such a ruler emerges, he cannot be a traditional ruler in the context of this chapter, until his authority has been legitimized and routinized.

RULERS WERE KINGS AND NOT CHIEFS

Before the advent of the British, traditional rulers were kings in the true African signification of the word. But what factors led to the corrosion of their kingly authority? Let us take a little excursion into the historical archives to see the effect of the British contact with, and penetration into the interior of the country.

In July 1832, the Lander Brothers had visited the Obi of Aboh, and had agreed to some conditions of peaceful trade. But not much was made out of the contact except that the Obi of Aboh, Obi Ossai was very infuriated at the insinuation by the Lander Brothers that he was engaged in slave trade. So enraged was the Obi of Aboh, that he arranged with the King Boy of Brass and had the white men sold to the King Boy as slaves. Records show that trade along the Niger made many of the traditional rulers very powerful indeed. But the kingdoms were so isolated, small and powerless, that frequent incursions from

the neighbouring kingdoms exerted damaging tolls on the traditional rulers.

What happened in the Niger Delta was only a thread in the cobweb of the various contacts between the representatives of the British Crown and the various traditional rulers. For instance, after the deposition of King Kosoko of Lagos, Akintoye was brought to take his place. But the treaty by which the kingdom of Lagos was ceded to the British Crown was not signed until 6th August, 1861, by King Docemo and the Senior British Naval Officers on the Bight of Benin, along with the Acting British Consul.

The reasons given for this and subsequent treaties included the determination of the British Crown to assist, defend and protect the inhabitants of Lagos, to put an end to slave trade, and to check the incessant incursions of the Dahomean King in search of slaves. By that treaty, Docemo was to continue to bear the title 'King', and to decide disputes between one native of Lagos and the other. He was to receive an annual pension from the Queen of Britain. The value of the pension was estimated at 1,200 bags of cowries. For this, Docemo was to resign many of his entitlements to the British Crown.

On February 7, 1863, Epe was ceded; June 27, 1863, Addo was ceded; 29th June, the King and Chiefs of Pocrah ceded Pocrah; 4th July, 1863, Okoedan was ceded; 7th July, 1863, Badagry was ceded. The following thirty years witnessed a harvest of treaties between Nigerian Kings and the representatives of the British Crown. Different views have been expressed on the legality or validity of the treaties. What concerns us is not the legal issue but the social fact. It is a social and political fact that African kings gave away their kingdoms to the British in return for some pensions or some worthless provisions allegedly made for them. They thus surrendered their power and authority to the British Leviathan for protection.

The critical question is, having surrendered their political power to the British, and having helped the British to unite these ceded kingdoms into, first, protectorates, then later, by the amalgamation of 1914, into a country known as Nigeria, did the kings place themselves in positions where the importance of

their domains had to be compared with those of other kingdoms.

From 1884 to 1889, the British representatives would appear to have come to the Niger Protectorate and the Oil River Protectorate to fish for new towns to consolidate their hold on the area. This followed the condition laid down by the Europeans that before any claim could be made on any African territory, there must be evidence of effective occupation. These treaties were necessary to show that the British had in fact effectively occupied the territories. They were necessary to satisfy the conditions laid down at the Berlin Conference. I have carefully compiled some of the towns in Bendel East, showing the dates when the treaties were signed with the traditional rulers. Some other towns have their own dates. These dates in fact are critical turning points in the history of the areas. They marked the legitimate intervention of foreigners in the affairs of the people, the removal of most of their political and judicial powers, and the relegation of the traditional rulers to settling disputes and handling spiritual matters. They checked any further territorial ambitions of some of the traditional rulers. The same was true of most of the areas in Nigeria.

TABLE 1

DATES OF SOME TREATIES WITH TRADITIONAL RULERS

Abarra, November 11, 1884
Abaragada, March 11, 1885
Aboh, October 2, 1884
Adiawai, February 4, 1885
Affor, December 5, 1884
Illah, December 20, 1885
April 18, 1885.
Ashaka, December 12, 1885
Ibrede, December 9, 1884
Igbuku, December 8, 1884 .
Obikwere, February 5, 1885
Umuolu, February 23, 1885
Utoku, February 23, 1885
Utu, February 22, 1885

Igbuzor, May 17, 1889
 Akri, September 29, 1884
 Atani September 20, 1884
 Aninso, September 27, 1884
 Odekpe, September 24, 1884
 Oko Anala, October 9, 1884
 Oko Amakon, October 10, 1884
 Asaba, August 28, 1884
 Okpanam, October 22, 1884
 Uboru (Ubulu-Uku), October 25, 1884
 Agwe, October 9, 1884
 Akiri Ugili, October 26, 1884
 Ase, January 31, 1884
 Ndoni, October 9, 1884
 Odugiri, October 10, 1884
 Ogbakuma, October 15, 1884
 Osomari, October 16, 1884
 Utchi, October 13, 1884

At this juncture, it is pertinent to point out that while the British historians satisfy themselves with their own version of slanted colonial histories, showing how benevolent the British were in accepting the petitions of African Kings that the British should "condescend" to take over and protect their territories, we know for certain that African rulers were tricked into signing the treaties whose meanings they obviously did not understand.

Many of the traditional rulers revelled until they were completely drunk with the spirits and wine which the whitemen brought to them. The design was to make them drunk. These treaties were mostly signed when they, the kings, were drunk. There has been one school of thought which claims that the drinks were deliberately poisoned for the occasion. What, however, is incontestable, is that the African kingdoms were not signed off willingly, because the kings could not understand the meaning or the significance of the purported treaties.

This colonial deceit did not end with the stealing of our lands in the name of treaties, and in the name of commerce and peaceful trade. It continued in all dealings with the whiteman.

Even Lord Luggard, in his letter to his wife assured her that she would laugh if she knew what he did in order to amalgamate the North and the South, and how he diverted funds from the Southern Revenue into the consolidated accounts in order to obtain the money for the northern railway extension. He claimed to have had at his disposal, over one million pounds. He assured her that the South would never know how he did those things! The introduction of christian religion by people who were not more Godly than the Africans, cemented this relationship. As Dennis Osadebay laments in his *Africa Sings*,

They tell me close my eyes and pray,
Their brother thief my land away.

These treaties were necessary to the whiteman because they conferred on them the monopoly of trade in all these areas. For the Africans, they marked the beginning of the decline of their influence, power and authority. Prior to the advent of the British, these African monarchs had the power of life and death, could declare war, and conclude peace. But having brought all the African monarchs together (for instance, on July 24, 1874, Gold Coast and Lagos came under one jurisdiction as the Gold Coast Colony), it was no longer possible for any of the kings to exercise independently, any of those powers he was used to. They became, in their own kingdoms, subjects of the British Government through the representatives of the British Crown. But the Charter of the Royal Niger Company dated July 10, 1886 was revoked by Letters Patent of 28th December, 1899, and an Order in Council was passed on the 27th December, 1899, establishing the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. That ordinary trading companies could so easily and effortlessly outwit all the traditional rulers, shows the devastating effects of lack of unity. In each treaty, each traditional ruler was careful to impress upon the representatives of the Queen of England that his kingdom was perfectly independent, and paid no tribute to other powers. But this information was what the British needed, because it gave them the confidence of pitching one ruler against the other. This in fact, quickened the pacification of the whole country. Even in modern times, our traditional rulers continue to underate their colleagues.

This was how, by the acts of our ancestors and predecessors, we all became servants of the British colonial masters.

From the time Lagos was ceded to the British Crown, to the time Britain granted Nigeria Independence, was almost one hundred years, one hundred years, during which traditional authority and influence were corroded gradually but systematically. No doubt, what is left cannot be a true replica of what the earlier traditional rulers were.

INDEPENDENCE

At independence, Nigerian politicians became heirs to the British rulers. A prime representative of the British Crown emerged in the person of the Governor-General. The traditional rulers who 'paid no tribute to any other power' now swore their loyalty and allegiance to the Governor-General, and later to the President. Indeed, Nigeria absorbed all the minor potentates. Unfortunately, in the tussle for political supremacy, the politicians dragged the traditional rulers into politics. If they had remained insulated as they were under the British, they could have continued to exercise their authorities over their subjects.

The loss of local political power was compounded by the introduction of cash economy, and the requirement that taxes be paid in cash, and not in kind. This compelled young people to leave their villages for urban centres in search of jobs and cash. The improved communication system destroyed the erstwhile homogeneous composition of the villages and brought in new elements who questioned the authorities of the traditional rulers. A traditional ruler who joined the membership of a political party would not expect support from an opposing political party if the opposing party won the elections and formed the government. The fate of the traditional rulers under the Action Group Government is a living example.

The transition into the cash economy and the struggle for survival of individuals, as well as the increased responsibilities of individuals towards their own families reduced their capacity to serve the traditional ruler. Hunters began selling all their meat for money. Fishermen, farmers and, indeed, every worker began looking for money to survive. The pristine fealty to the traditional ruler became a thing of the past.

THE POST-INDEPENDENCE ORDER

In the post-independence order, the traditional rulers occupy structures with functions which are not clearly defined. By the agreement with the government, they are limited to such duties as settling domestic disputes, handling religious matters and presiding over the annual festivities of their towns.

The settling of disputes was possible in those days because the courts were few. But with the proliferation of courts, and the setting up of customary courts, it is now possible for every nook and corner to receive justice with minimum delay. Besides, sometimes the disputants came from different towns, and each would probably have preferred his own traditional ruler to arbitrate. Customary courts or the conventional courts became therefore necessary to handle inter-ethnic conflicts, or conflicts that cut across different loyalties.

Having lost their rights to settle disputes because of the increasing complexities of such disputes, having lost much of their claim to religious or spiritual leadership of their people, many traditional rulers now grope in the dark in search of meaningful roles.

Every age has to analyse itself critically to see whether it is fulfilling the positive functions of the age. Where certain practices are no longer compatible with current expectations, such practices must be reviewed, modernized or dropped.

Should the Institution of the traditional rulers be dropped? Many Nigerian politicians have questioned the usefulness of the traditional rulers. In fact, Mr. Mokugwo Okoye in his book, *A Letter to Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe* accused Zik of inconsistency for having recommended the scrapping off of the institution of traditional rulers while in his later days, he adorned himself with a chain of chieftaincy titles, and finally ended up as the Owelle of Onitsha. In his *Political Blue Print for Nigeria* (1943:20) Zik asked, "Are Chiefs really necessary in post war Nigeria?" In his answer, he suggested that "the existence of chieftaincies and emirates should not be encouraged", for with modern changes, "most chieftaincies would have become historic objects fit for study in museums and libraries devoted to ethnological and ethnographical studies". Many politicians did

not, in fact, see the need for the retention of the Institution; many only thought them useful as agents of political parties. For those of us who speak with prophetic authority based on objective analysis of what is, I am now raising the interesting question of what should be the role of the traditional rulers in a system of politics without political parties. This is what this country should have now. It is the only solution to our political crises, at least for now.

First, we must recognise that it is not possible to insulate the traditional rulers from politics. They should be insulated from partisan politics, but they cannot be insulated from political discourse. In the new system of politics without political parties which we are advocating, the traditional rulers as well as every other Nigerian should be involved at certain levels. The traditional rulers should find enough to do to justify their continued existence.

The complexities of modern administration even at the village level makes gerontocracy obsolete. An old Obi surrounded by a council of octogenarians cannot go far in the present day Nigeria. Who would listen to him? It is therefore recommended that as a deliberate policy, the traditional rulers should modernise and bring into their councils, young and very educated men, who are capable of carrying the town's decisions beyond the confines of the town. They should be able to constitute a formidable pressure group on behalf of the town. Any old chief who is adjudged by his behaviour and contributions to have out-lived his usefulness should be dropped or relegated to a structure without functions. He should become a ceremonial adviser. Thus, the Obi should have a council of educated and responsible men. Educational qualification should be clearly stipulated, and must not be compromised even if the incumbent Obi is not educated.

Secondly, it is hypothesised that the importance of an Obi is a function of his advisers, and the contributions of his people in National affairs. Therefore, every Obi should encourage his people to support the government of the day, in order to attract reasonable amenities to his people.

The maintenance of the Obi should be the concern of every citizen. As I have pointed out above, nobody is willing or

able to pay fealty to the Obi now. Some relatives do sometimes send some gifts of money or some items. But these are hardly sufficient to keep the Obi comfortable. It is therefore suggested that the towns be run on Committee basis. Specific items must be handled by appropriate committees. There should be standing Committees on road, water supply, electricity, land matters, festivals, review and maintenance of customs, including marriages, chieftaincy and related matters. The Obi should regularly meet with these committees to advise him on specific issues. Every committee should include an educated Secretary so that accurate records are kept even at village levels.

Every quarter of the town should send representatives to the committees. The Obi should look at the list of nominations and select those who meet the stipulated criteria. The President and the Secretary of the Development Union should be co-opted into the Advisory Council to the Obi.

A COUNCIL OR COMMITTEE

Traditional Rulers should be encouraged to set up a Council of Obis or Traditional Rulers in all Local Government Areas and all States. A Ruler with revered past and untarnished present, a ruler with commanding personality, a ruler that commands the confidence of the people and the government should be appointed chairman. Every other traditional ruler should acknowledge this appointment and everything should be done to promote him. He should be able to project the problems and the needs of the Local Government Areas to the State Government.

I am aware that many traditional rulers might see this as surrendering their authority. But authority that commands no one is no longer functional in modern day Nigeria. There must therefore be created (even if he does not exist), a *primus inter pares* at the Local Government levels. This calls for tolerance and sacrifice. The voices of traditional rulers must be heard. But when all of them speak at the same time and sometimes, in conflicting tones, nobody listens to them. They must, therefore, have a *vox populi*.

Where the emergence of a *primus inter pares* is not possible, each Local Government Area should send a revered tradi-

tional ruler: into a Committee or Council to represent the Local Government Area. There will thus be set up, a Committee or Council of traditional rulers, one from each Local Government Area, serviced by a Secretary. Gradually, a structure that will command the respect of everybody will emerge. The Chairmanship should rotate on agreed basis.

PREPARATION FOR THE SUCCESSOR

A marriage that has been brought to a divorce court cannot return home with the same amount of love. What has reduced the status of many of our traditional rulers has been the fact that many of them have either been dragged to the court or before some tribunals for arbitration by some ambitious subjects. I have personally read the proceedings of one of such tribunals. The exposures could be so horrible that even when the Obi succeeds in being crowned, some of the revelations at the inquiry would continue to ridicule him for the rest of his life.

It is therefore, my hope that every town should codify the methods of choosing a king. During the life time of the Obi, the heir apparent should be identified, and should be known to the people. At least, the heir apparent should be known to the kingmakers during the life time of the Obi, and he should be well schooled in the complicated task of ruling. It is superstitious to think that if the heir is known before the death of the incumbent, the life of the incumbent would be shortened. Every Obi must regard his role as temporary because he is holding everything in the community in trust for the living, the dead and the generations to come.

If the heir is a direct son of the Obi, the Obi must invest sufficiently to give him adequate training for the duties he would be expected to perform. Where the Obi is poor, an appropriate committee should handle the training of the son so that he understands his role in modern Nigeria.

On a serious note, the traditional rulers should avoid getting involved in any situation where their sense of impartiality would be questioned. No condition is permanent. The man that is opposed today, could become one's saviour tomorrow. In

order to ensure the financial independence of the Obi from his subjects, the committee charged with the upkeep of the palace should work out how the Obi should be cared for. The Obi must find his feet in business, through trusted agents. He must endeavour to establish his financial independence from everybody in the community.

THE NEW LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE OF TRADITIONAL RULERS

I do not intend to go into the origin and history of Local Government Administration in this country. A lot has been written by our colonial experts, foreign consultants and Nigerians who have imported the concept of the three-tier system of government into this country. However, our experiences from the administration of the Local Government system as the third and last tier of administration has shown how limited its effectiveness is in reaching the people for whom the system was designed. There should be a complete break with the system whose philosophy is so intricately interwoven with colonial paternalism. It is a system that has disasterously destroyed the traditional African Social and Political Organization. What we need is the modernization of our traditional system, not its replacement. It is, therefore, imperative that Nigerians must return to Nigeria, and discover Nigeria before any effective prescriptions could be made. A critical study of Lord Lugard's administration leaves no one in doubt that the intention was not to maximize the welfare programmes for Nigerians. The structure of local government administration was based on political and economic calculations of the colonial masters.

Even when Nigerians took over the administration, successive local governments have always reflected the wishes of the governments at the state level. Little or no consideration was given to what the people wanted or how they would like to be governed. Worse still, the experts who advised the governments saw nothing worth retaining of the indigenous local institutions.

The aim of this section, therefore, is to draw the attention of policy makers to areas where indigenous local institutions could contribute towards bringing the government down to the people.

Local governments as the name implies are indeed local since they are expected to tackle very local peculiarities of the people. To make the new system work, the traditional base of our social and economic organization must be revived and utilized.

LOCAL PECULIARITIES: THE NEED FOR TOWN GOVERNMENT.

The peculiarities of our people are vividly depicted in the diversity of our social organizations. Even within a given ethnic unit, the organization of the ward, the age grade system, which supplemented gerontocracy are strikingly dissimilar. Consequently when the level of analysis ends with the third tier of government the system fails to capture the rhythm of local life at the grass root.

It is for this reason that the theory of Afrocracy calls for a return to the city and town administration as the fourth tier of government. Any system of government that is silent on the role of traditional rulers and Development Unions of different towns in Nigeria does not expect to get to the people.

It is therefore, suggested that while allowance should be made for variations from town to town, every town must have its own system of government, which looks up to the District Council for co-ordination. In many local government areas, the cultural differences are so pronounced that the local government councils serve as a forum for high-lighting those things that actually question the existence of the local governments.

Looking back at the towns in the 1930's and even up to the 40's, one would recall the peaceful administration of the towns and villages. Unfortunately, in the efforts of politicians to be the spokesmen for their towns, and because of the treachery of the new elite based on Western ideologies, the traditional rulers with all the net-work of their administrative machinery were destroyed by party politics which could not replace the traditional system with an alternative derived from the African experience.

It is hard to realise, but any borrowed system is extraneous to the indigenous system. The conflict between the indigenous and the extraneous system does not always end in a synthesis. When Karl Marx wrote *The Capital* he made it clear that he was

writing on the basis of his experiences with the English industrial and agricultural labourers, and cautioned that if a German reader should shrug his shoulders because *The Capital* does not reflect exactly the German experience, then for such a reader, "*fabula narratur*".

The superiority of town administration lies in the fact that every quarter of the town is made to be functionally connected with other quarters.

For large cities with migrants from other parts of the country, there should be sectorial administration. If we may use a borrowed term, "County" administration. Members of the County Council would be elected on personal merits since the theory of Afrocracy calls for politics without political parties. This county or in the case of small towns, the town council would be responsible for the maintenance of law and order, for the effective cleanliness of the areas, for liaising with the district council on such matters as education, the police, judiciary, and such services as cannot be provided by the towns. It is even safer for the development unions of the various towns to be formally recognized and given some responsibilities with financial assistance from the government. In actual fact, many Development or Improvement Unions have developed the rural areas without government assistance.

The traditional ruler should be the honorary president of the council, while the president of the improvement union should be the chairman of the town council.

By adopting this method, the members of the town council will be expected by their own people to utilize government assistance to the maximum. Since the council is made up of indigenes in rural areas, the norms and values which make for group cohesion would apply to them. The town council would work hand in hand with the council of traditional rulers to ensure that the values of the community are upheld, and disseminated. Traditional discipline would be emphasized through the age grades to the schools. The uprooting of the children without any basic acculturation, exposes them to the contradictions of the urban life. Without any norm to look back to, the children become quick recruits for anti-social acts.

Charity must begin from the home.

THE FAILURE OF THE PRESENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM

Many people look up to the Local Government Secretariats for essential commodities. Where contracts are available, they go to some easily identifiable persons.

When one considers for instance the journey of rice from Lagos to the villages, one is faced with a pathetic image of the Local Government. 99% of the rural towns do not see the rice anyway. The bags end up at the Local Government Headquarters, and by the time the civil servants have taken care of themselves, the villagers only hear of, but do not see the rice.

Decisions taken at the Local Government Headquarters are not transmitted to the rural towns. In some areas, these rural towns are cut off from the headquarters because of the absence of roads or means of communication. Some Local Government Areas are too large to be effectively administered.

In Bendel one can name such Local Government Councils as Ndokwa and Orhiomwhon. Ndokwa Local Government Council was previously run as two separate units when the two units were jointly in Aboh Division. While the Ukwuani had its headquarters at Kwale, Ndosimili had its headquarters at Aboh. As the names imply, one area is riverine with many things in common among the towns making up the unit, while Ukwuani is upland. It is recommended that Ndokwa be split into at least two Local Government Areas, namely: Aboh or Ndosimili Local Government Area with headquarters in Aboh, and Ukwuani Local Government Area with headquarters in Kwale. Since the distance between Abarra in the North and Onya in the South is so much, and considering the difficulties of river transportation, it is proposed that the Ndosimili Local Government Area be divided into two districts – Aboh District from Okpai to Onya, with headquarters at Aboh, and Abarra/Utchi district with headquarters at Utchi.

Unless such is done, the internal squabbles and fear of domination by one section would continue to plague the Local Government, and for so long will the Ndosimili area from where the oil is drilled remain neglected without a single road connecting any two towns. Thanks to Col. John Mark Inienger, Aboh road is now under construction.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA

On the basis of the foregoing, the following structure is being proposed.

Local Government Area Council

District Council/Authority

Town or County
Administration

In terms of structure, the administration of the Local Government seems to be in three parts — the Town or County Administration, the District Authority Administration and the Local Government Administration. This tends to make the national structure a 5-tier system. But the District Authority Administration can be ignored to save cost. It should be borne in mind that at this initial stage, confusion is bound to arise when delimiting the boundaries. But this will be adjusted with time.

FUNCTIONS OF TOWN COUNCIL

The town council will be headed by the President of the Town's Improvement or Development Union. The traditional ruler will be the honorary president. The town council will advise the traditional rulers on matters affecting the customs and the welfare of the town. The council will be responsible for the following:

- (1) Construction and maintenance of the Market
- (2) Cleanliness of the town
- (3) Maintenance of the streets
- (4) Liaising with the District Authority or Local Government Area Council on the provision of Water to the citizens
- (5) Liaising with the Local Government (through the District Authority) for the supply of Electricity.
- (6) Supervising the schools within its jurisdiction, and making appropriate recommendation to the local Government Area.

- (7) Health Services
- (8) Collection of rates, radio and television rates, taxes, bicycle and motor cycle licences.
- (9) Initiating development plans for the town.
- (10) Registration of birth/deaths
- (11) Welfare Services
- (12) Promotion of traditional culture such as music, dances, and other aspects of the town's culture.

Membership

- (1) The traditional ruler — Honorary President
- (2) President of the Town's Improvement Union as its Chairman.
- (3) 5 members of the Improvement Union's Executive.
- (4) 7 other members elected by the town people.

The town council will maintain a secretariat, and should be able to supplement its internally generated revenue with government's subsidy. It should be noted that the development of the town is the primary responsibility of the Council.

DISTRICT AUTHORITY

Where the District Authority comprises a number of adjacent towns which are not large enough to form a town council, such small towns should combine to form a District Authority. The Chairman should be elected from amongst the members of the towns forming the District Authority. The Presidents of all the small towns Development Unions shall be members. The highest paramount ruler in the area will be the Honorary President.

FUNCTIONS

- (1) Co-ordination of all rate collections in the area — this includes: licensing of bicycles, trucks, wheel-barrows, carts, radios and televisions, river boats. etc.
- (2) Naming of streets and numbering of houses.
- (3) Maintenance of streets and inter-town roads.
- (4) Co-ordination of registration of births, deaths, marriages (either by native law and customs or any other form)

- (5) Pets and domestic animal control.
- (6) Maintenance of law and order.
- (7) Co-ordination of health services: — This includes co-ordination of the various maternity clinics.
- (8) Co-ordination of educational activities in the district.
- (9) Sanitation, food and drugs supervision.
- (10) Co-ordination of various cultural activities of the towns.
- (11) Liaising with the Local Government Council for effective distribution of essential commodities.
- (12) Co-ordination of postal services.

SIZE

It is recommended that the size of a District Authority Area should not be larger than 50,000. Thus, a Local Government Area of 100,000 persons could have two District Authority Councils.

It will be recalled that the Bendel State Government in Gazette No. 7 Volume 17, of 24th January 1980, had provided for the creation of District Authorities. However, since the boundary delimitations were so politically biased, it is recommended that a new exercise be carried out.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT: (i) SIZE

- (a) While it is recognized that this country has no census on which to base its planning, for what it is worth, the 1963 census has always been used for projections. Allowing for 3% annual growth, it is recommended that each Local Government Area should have a population of not less than 150,000 people.
- (b) It is further recommended that the historical background, physical features and cultural affinity be considered as important factors for the creation.
- (c) Cities with population of 100,000 or more should be administered as urban centres.

(ii) FUNCTIONS

The functions of the Local Government Areas would be as stated in the 4th schedule of the constitution, except that where necessary, amendments should be made to accommodate

the functions now being assigned to the fourth tier.

Local Government Area Council shall in collaboration with the State Government provide and maintain primary schools.

It shall liaise with the District Authority and the town Councils in a joint effort to collect internal revenues such as taxes.

(iii) SOURCES OF REVENUES

- (1) The reintroduction of flat rate taxes for all taxable adults.
- (2) *Income tax.* 50% of the income taxes collected in the Local Government Areas should be utilized for the development of the Local Government Areas. The remaining 50% should be utilized to improve the life of the rural people in the towns.
- (3) *Tenement Rates:* While tenement rates are necessary in the urban areas, they should not be introduced into the rural areas. At present, indigens are being encouraged to return to the villages to build residential units. Any introduction of tenement rates in the villages would scare potential builders. Tenement rates may however be collected where such village buildings are rented out to people on some fees.

(4) *Investment in Landed Property*

Local Governments should invest in landed property, should own companies from which income could be generated, and dare more into economic ventures.

(iv) SHARING OF REVENUES

The Federal Government statutory allocation should be shared as follows:

- (1) Equality 50%
- (2) Population (as reflected in the amount realized as flat rates) 30%
- (3) Land mass 5%
- (4) Riverine areas or areas with ecological problems, 5%
- (5) Oil producing areas 10%

DISTRICT AUTHORITY AND TOWN ADMINISTRATION

Since the District Authority and the Town Administration take on more than 40% of the Local Government Council's responsibilities, it is recommended that their share of the revenue should be 50%. This will be supplemented with 50% of whatever the districts and the towns can generate as taxes and rates.

All residents in an area must pay their dues where they live. This will prevent such residents from going back to their villages to pay their rates.

The thrust of this chapter is that the traditional rulers be brought more into the administration of their areas, and that the Local Governments, the District Authority and the Town Administration should become the fora for the search for those cultural elements which unite the people.

This system should eschew partisan politics. Members should be chosen on merit.

CHAPTER VI

MENDING A SOCIOPOROUS NATION BEFORE THE THIRD REPUBLIC*

RATIONALE

A former Registrar of the West African Examinations Council, Prof. V.C. Ike, described Nigeria as a country where no system works. Wole Soyinka on the eve of his retirement regretted that his was a wasted generation. In the lecture I delivered in 1977, to the staff and students of Idah Polytechnic, I described the socio-political pathology which has seriously sapped the energy of this country as socioporosis. *Socioporosis* is a disease that has eaten deep into the entire fabric of the society. Every conceivable solution has a loophole. Everything is in a flux; nothing is certain. Our legal system is porous; the political system is porous, and is being abandoned in search of a new and better one; the educational system is not only porous, but confusing. Nobody knows for how long the nation would try the 6-3-3-4, before the loopholes glare at us like the grand canyon of Colorado! The contradictions and inconsistencies in the religious systems have left many people wondering whether it is possible for the religious to do what they do "in God's Name." Watch the televisions every Sunday, and you will find it difficult to resist laughing at the "Clowns of God" who shout as if the Almighty were deaf. The commercialization of religion has driven Christianity underground, and elevated religiosity to the screens of the N.T.A. and State televisions. In spite of the unrivaled religious flare in this country, our actions have remained unchristian. Many religious people that I have come across have been completely bankrupt of Christian humility, and destitute of the very spiritual energy which Nigeria needs rather badly. There is no morality. People swear by, and lie by the Bible and the Koran. The family system is dying fast, marriage is no longer sacred; civil servants are no longer civil, the sacred has been profaned; the profane has been sanctified, and immorality and corruption have been tagged the order of the day. Politicians are

* Originally delivered in Benin, under the auspices of the Civil Service Forum, 4th April, 1986.

corrupt, the Military, the last hope of the common man, is suffering from anomie, and does not know how to return to its avowed professionalism. Students demonstrate, workers strike, politicians rig elections, and the military coup. The corruption of the civilians is exposed in military probes. But who probes the military? It is most unlikely that corruption is the monopoly of the civilians. Consequently, it is my view that until civilians probe the military, it will be difficult to tell who, indeed, sucked Nigeria dry.

GENESIS OF THE SOCIOPOROSIS

In this country, we have overtly accepted wealth, power and privilege as the culture goals of the nation. Everybody strives to achieve one or all of them. Those who have power, like successful politicians, want status equilibration. They use power to improve their status on wealth, and thereby demand some privileges. Those who have wealth, now want power. I am reliably informed that some people have already started movements for 1990*. It does not matter whether these people have anything to offer the nation. But because they are wealthy, they also want power and privilege. This is what I call status crystallization. But every culture goal has institutionalised means of achieving power, wealth and privilege. Conventionally, we assume that in order to get a good job, we must have the certificates. But the Nigerian experience has shown that with the quota system, it is quite illegitimately legitimate to have someone from a disadvantaged area to boss an intellectually superior officer who is also more competent. Where the institutionalised means of achieving a culture goal has been officially rejected, it is clear that many things would not work according to plan. The society will be bedevilled by subtle rivalry, and the principles of meritocracy would be thrown over board, and the system would be saddled with mediocrity. It is my contention that the inability of Nigerians to strive for the culture goals through the institutionalised means, is responsible for the various loopholes in our life patterns. The same country that cherishes fundamental human rights, and the right to live in any part of the country, could watch helplessly as some property belonging to Nigerians are described as ABANDONED. What kind of loyalty

* Now, 1992.

and commitment does the Nigerian Nation expect from people whose property have been declared abandoned against their wishes?

We must **understand** socioporosis before we can hope to mend the nation; and we must mend the nation if we hope to avoid the pitfalls of the First and Second Republics.

Writing on "Mending a Socioporous Nation," I actually feel the nausea in living in a socioporous society. It appears that every aspect of our national life is putrescent, and we the human actors are, in fact, putrid. The only recommendable cure for socioporosis is an apocalyptic transformation, a real revolution and not the changing-of-guard type of coup d'état, which leaves us without a solution because the coup leaders normally surround themselves with those they consider loyal even when it is clear that they have no effective advice that could solve the problems they are called upon to solve. But, like they say "The beautiful ones are not yet born"! We are, therefore, still waiting for the genuinely committed Nigerians to be called upon to serve the nation.

It is with this note of pessimism that I recall again Wole Soyinka's lamentation that this generation is a wasted generation. In thirteen years time, this century would be over. Nigeria might be matching into the twenty-first century, still groping for the answer to her social, economic and political questions. It is expected that if the President's deadline of 1990 (now 1992) for transition from military to civilian rule is adhered to, Nigerians must work overtime.

I have therefore chosen this chapter, "Mending A Socioporous Nation before the Third Republic," because I believe that only by critically reassessing our past and the present, can we make an honest transition into the third republic. On the basis of the past, we should be able to raise probable questions that would confront the third republic and seek objective answers to them. Early in the first republic, many of us foresaw the danger in experimenting with the Westminster model, and sounded many unheeded warnings. In October 1983, in a lecture entitled, "Can a Revolution Succeed in Nigeria?" I had warned that no revolution could succeed in our life time, but

that the dangerously dangling coups would not provide any solution to the illness of the nation.¹ Twenty-four years after, I have been proved right. From the moment of independence, the nation was plagued with the burning question of national unity. Again, some of us warned the nation. I wish to refer to my June 1965 publication in which I said as follows:

It is necessary to realise that mere appeal for national unity without practical demonstration can only succeed as long as the masses are still ignorant of what the politicians are doing. But with many universities turning our people more enlightened and more diplomatic than many politicians, it is obvious that the fateful days are drawing near when political appeals will be matched against political practices. The effects will be so cumulative that just as nothing can stop the birth of a child when the fateful hour has struck, so nothing can stop the outbreak of violence. It will no longer be a call for national unity, but a call for national reconstruction.

This may be a Cassandra prophecy, but until some leading politicians become more responsible and realise that one misplaced sentence can shatter the image of this country, our unity will remain a twentieth century political mirage, sought after but never achieved.²

At the end of the civil war, we were no longer calling for unity, we were more concerned with reconstruction and rehabilitation. Even as I write, national unity is still a mirage. Paradoxically, in Nigeria, the only thing that experience teaches us is that we learn nothing from experience. In our chequered history, we have had enough which could have helped us to avoid certain pitfalls. But in every venture, we have always managed

-
1. B.I.C. Ijomah, "Can a Revolution Succeed in Nigeria?" A lecture delivered at Isi-Enu, Nsukka, October 1963.
 2. B.I.C. Ijomah, "The Prospects of Nigerian Unity: A Twentieth Century Political Mirage", Onitsha: *The Eagle Magazine*, Etudo Press, June, 1965

to land on our heads.³ We know the problems, and probably the answers. But we do not yet have the leadership that can translate the answers into practice for the benefit of all, and not for the interest of the few privileged bourgeoisie. Let us examine a few areas of our national life in order to see the contradictions which have led to socioporosis.

LEADERSHIP

In a nation where sycophants praise leaders to their graves, even when the leaders have nothing to offer, and when their brains are as frozen as corpses in the mortuary, it is obvious that unnecessarily gratuitous adulations add nothing to the moral or intellectual quality of such leaders. In fact, they become blinded, quite oblivious of their negligible poor backgrounds, and indulge in premature gratification in which their sycophants aid and abet them in syphoning money out of the nation. Some gifted leaders foresaw this sad situation, and quickly warned the nation. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, writing in 1939 in the *West African Pilot* lamented that "It would seem as if our real need today is leadership. . . with character."⁴

In the same vein, Chief Dennis Osadebay lamented:

I have no leaders;
Pretenders would sell me for bread;
They babble and squabble;
And leave me deaf with empty noise.⁵

Both Dr. Azikiwe and Chief Dennis Osadebay have had their own opportunities to contribute their quota to the leadership of this nation. But I agree with both of them that this nation has never been blessed with a leader who has character. It is too early to assess President Babangida. He has started well. Let us hope that he can sustain the style and the tempo.

Zik, popularly regarded as the father of Nigerian Nationalism, inherited some of Macauley's journalistic vitriolics which

3. B.I.C. Ijomah, "How to stand on your feet when you have landed on your Head", Lecture delivered at the 25th Anniversary of A.G.G.S. Ughelli, published in the *Punch* December 14, 1985.

4. Nnamdi Azikiwe, *The West African Pilot*, Lagos, August 9, 1939.

5. Chief Dennis Osadebay, *Africa Sings*

did not endear him to some of the minorities. Macauley attacked Ernest Ikoli, and by extension of the inuendos, attacked the Brass people; and I want to stress that one misplaced sentence can shatter an image we have fought so hard to create. Macauley was credited with the following statement:

Ikoli is a brass
take away the 'b'
he is a rass;
take away the 'r'
he is an ass.⁶

But such statements while they formed good rhymes, did not attract the Brass people to Macauley's fold.

It is therefore not possible to say whether by Macauley's death, Nigeria was deprived of a leader with character. Practically all our leaders have vacillated from myopic tribalism to grandiose national postures when it suited them. There has been no leader within our living memory who championed the cause of one Nigeria regardless of his political reverses. Politics thrived by fanning the embers of regional, tribal or ethnic loyalties. Zik's theory of the "manifest destiny", propounded at Aba, on June 26, 1949, and his earlier identification with the fate of the Ibo people, Chief Awolowo's identification with Egbe Omo Odofin and Egbe Omo Oduduwa, and the Late Sir Ahmadu Bello's Northernization policy, no doubt, championed the sentiments of

North for Northerners
East for Easterners
West for Westerners

It was therefore not surprising that after the three leaders had succeeded in entrenching themselves in their respective regions, they turned round to preach one Nigeria, when, in fact they had created three powerful Nigerias. When people struggle to lead in order to be able to develop only their own areas, such leaders cannot claim to be speaking for Nigeria.

While I admit that these early leaders were, in fact, very young at the time they matched wits with the colonial officers,

6. Mokwugo Okoye, *Storms on the Niger*, Enugu: Eastern Nigeria Printing Corporation, p. 94

One cannot avoid criticising them for failing to avoid avoidable pitfalls. It is the right of future generation to assess us, and criticize us where we have fallen short of expectations.

Mokwugo Okoye's epiteth is worth quoting in detail:

The old order consisted of opportunists who took advantage of the painless acquisition of wealth, and, their objectives achieved, either confined themselves to their narrow ways or expanded, with disgusting greed, the avenues by which further wealth could be acquired; it consisted chiefly of doctors more interested in house-building than in efficient practice of medicine; of religious ministers who preached to their congregations the virtues of the simple life but easily out-mammoned Mammon in their private lives; of lawyers eager to win wealth more by foul than by fair means. These philistines, poppycocks that they were, developed inferiority complexes manifesting themselves in tribal and social discriminations and were marked by a studied aloofness and lack of patriotic fervour. . . .⁷

Frantz Fanon was no less virulent in his attack on leaders without vision. In his view, such leadership formed "cracks in the edifice"⁸ of the nation which leads to retrogression, and are pre-judicial to national efforts and national unity. He accuses leadership in Africa and the Third World of intellectual laziness and spiritual penury. They were not able to engage themselves in production, invention or building. They were instead "canalised into activities of intermediary type" which formed the basis of the neo-colonial economic order.

African leadership which inherited the statuses of the former colonial masters was under-developed economically, intellectually, morally and spiritually, and consequently was incapable of originating an ideological framework that would have sustained the new national consciousness. Colonialism was ideologically entrenched in the capitalist cobweb. To extricate

7. *Ibid*

8. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, New York: Grove Press Inc. 1963, pp. 121-163.

itself from the cobweb suspended between the "mother country" and the renascent Africa, African leadership needed a landing pad. Such a pad would have been provided by an ideological orientation which is the only means of cutting across tribal and ethnic loyalties which have been so entrenched, and which have succeeded in uniting people at a very micro level instead of looking at unity from a national point of view.

Any leadership that cannot articulate a coherent ideology which could swallow up tribalism, ethnicity and the nefarious quota system must not be allowed to rear its empty head during the third republic. Leadership must be chosen not on the basis of one's wealth. The Military Governor of Bendel State was quoted on the TV News on the 3rd of April, 1986, as condemning churches which "give deferential treatment to some people who acquire their wealth in dubious and questionable ways". Any leadership that is a slave to alien religious systems must not be allowed to poison the minds of the youths of this country in the third republic.

After 27 years of political independence, this country has no apologies for its inability to know that religion should not be allowed to intrude into our political calculations. Religion is like opium. Its adherents are not rational because there is a spirit of abandon to the unknown and unseen forces, which they claim, have the answers to all human problems.

As far as I know, the major problem confronting this nation is how we can survive as a nation without one group trying to dominate the other. We have always wished this. But it is true that we see every national calculation only with a mirror to our own ethnic needs. Nobody has seriously questioned why a Nigerian should be on contract in his own country, and nobody has seriously questioned why we discriminate against ourselves. Why was the largest oil refinery built hundreds of kilometers away from where oil is located? Was that in the interest of national unity?

Leadership in the third republic must see Nigeria as an entity that must be preserved for all of us. Neither the south nor the north must do anything that could create suspicion in any section of the country. It is true that we have no other

country. Therefore we must salvage this nation together. If the third republic fails, there may be no fourth republic.

NATIONALISM AND THE NATIONAL DILEMMA

To salvage Nigeria together, we must see ourselves as brethren, inspite of the fact that we were brought together not on our own terms, but through the fiat of the transcendental unity imposed on the country by the colonial administration. As I stressed in my paper presented at the Nigerian Political Science Association Conference at the University of Ilorin, our nationalist feeling developed out of reactions to the colonial situation. It was an anti-colonial feeling. What we need now is a feeling of mutual acceptance on equal terms, cemented by genuine love for the country and not only for the benefits derived from the country.

We must build sentiments which are capable of unifying the nation; we must create symbols of unity, and a coherent national ideology. There is no way any leadership can aspire to unite this country with its diversities without an ideology. Only a coherent ideology can break the barriers of religion, ethnicity, nepotism and other divisive characteristics. Speaking from experience, Frantz Fanon observes with regret that:

Inside a single nation, religion splits up the people into different spiritual communities, all of them kept up and stiffened by colonialism and its instruments. In regions where Catholicism or Protestantism predominates, we see the Moslem minorities flinging themselves with unaccustomed ardour into their devotions. The Islamic feast days are revived, and the moslem religion defends itself inch by inch against the violent absolutism of the *Christian* faith.^{8(a)}

This statement appears rather prophetic about Nigeria. In order to ensure religious tolerance and harmony, we have created a number of public holidays since independence. As if that was not enough, we are now concerned with whether Nigeria's membership in the Islamic League has advantages or disadvan-

8(a). Frantz Fanon, p. 130. *The underlined Christian is mine.*

tages. There is no way religions can unify us. Even the Christians can never be united, the Ecumenical Movement notwithstanding. It is even more difficult for the Moslems and the Christians, even though they are fellow travellers on this planet, to unite. Even Moslems have many factions. What is best therefore is that we learn to live and let live.

The apparently evasive nature of Nigerian nationalism and national unity is caused by the ignorance and the limited experience of those who have led us so far. We only gang up in order to share the usufruct, that is, the proceeds from the nation, not because there is a compelling love for the territorial entity called Nigeria. From Nigeria's studied difficulty in making a transition from the colonial to a stable post-colonial state, a difficulty unwittingly shared by practically all African nations once under colonial rule, it is hypothesised that before nations become conscious of themselves, such that they honestly desire unity, there is a long period in which the nationals follow a natural, vegetative existence, therefore developing love for their land and way of life.

But a love of one's homeland and the surroundings leads to a traditional and normative dependence on one's immediate environment; it leads to a sentimental attachment to a locale. This love of one's locale spreads outwards with broader socialization, like a ripple from oneself as the centre. This sentimental attachment to a locale, leads more to patriotism rather than to nationalism.⁹ Nationalism is meaningful only to the degree of the loyalty transferred from the locale to the nation.

It is in the light of the above hypothesis that I would like us to examine the nation to see if the ethnic groups or any of the regional aggregations have, in fact, transferred their loyalties from their respective locales to the Nigerian Nation. Until this is done, argument for Nigerian nationalism will remain theoretical. For the second time in two years, our ten leaders (Governors) in the North have held special meetings, obviously because they believe that there is something peculiar to their corporate existence. If they had cared to send out feelers, they would

9. B.I.C. Ijomah, "Nationalism, Alienation and Integration" Paper presented at the Nigerian Political Science Conference 7th - 11th May, 1985, at the University of Ilorin.

have known that some people down south grumble and frown at such meetings. Provincialism and local patriotism impede the growth of popular national unity. Similarly the three O'dua state (governors) meet in the Yoruba west.

When micro groupings attain social consciousness before the stage of nationalism is set, it is dangerous. Fanon argues that if this happens there will be fierce demands for social justice which paradoxically are allied with often primitive tribalism.¹⁰ Zik once called for the use of tribalism as a pragmatic instrument for national unity. Our experience so far has show that tribalism cannot lead to national unity, unless we allow national spirit to transcend tribal spirit. But it is a tragedy that after twenty-seven years of independence, we are still very suspicious of ourselves. The Ibo man does not trust a Yoruba man, nor does any member of an ethnic group trust a member of another ethnic group.

My brief study of the Civil Service structure in Bendel State shows that there is a correlation between the ethnicity of a boss and the ethnicity of most of his lieutenants. This should not happen if there is a national spirit. It is pertinent that I make this observation because the boss who wants his kinsman posted to him as his Secretary is in fact condemning himself, or accusing himself of what he fears a Secretary from a different ethnic group would do to him. It is similar to my argument that the penalty of a liar is not that people do not believe him, but that he himself does not believe anybody, including himself.

The suspicion that the northerners want to rule to the sea, a statement credited to the late Prime Minister, has kept southerners suspicious of any move by the northerners. The northerners also suspect southerners. For long, we have taken the question of Nigerian Nationalism for granted. There should be a deliberate effort by scholars to research into how the socio-cultural differences among the ethnic groups can be reduced. Creating more states may be desirable, but it is not the answer. The Federal Government *must* sponsor researchers in the social sciences. The researches must examine the social and psycholo-

10. Frantz Fanon, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

gical factors which impede nationalism, and those that can promote it.

In Alexandria, there is an inscription on the door of a library, "MAN KNOW THYSELF."⁴ We do not know ourselves either as individuals or as a nation. To me, this is the most imperative assignment. Policy makers who deride the social sciences because of their desire to join the scientific race, will eventually discover that while they are building miniature laboratories to study nematodes and frogs, the society which is the laboratory of the social scientist is so neglected that its collapse also means the collapse of the miniature science laboratories.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN A CULTURE OF POVERTY

By now, the reader is familiar with my opposition to the party system. Those who want Nigeria to survive, come the third republic, MUST acquaint themselves with my "Theory of Afrocracy: Alternative to the Party System," discussed in earlier chapters. I have written those chapters with a prophetic stance. I wish to state my stand since 1967 when I began developing the thought, that no miracle will eliminate military intervention if political parties are allowed to spring back before the nation is given an ideological orientation. I have since Murtala Muhammed's regime advised against the return of political parties at the inception of the second republic. My advice was unheeded. The republic created by the military regime collapsed.

Prior to independence, it was the consensus of scholars that only the N.C.N.C. had the semblance of a national political party. But the national posture of the N.C.N.C. was polluted and muddled by the Ibo domination of the party, as a good number of the members who were non-Ibos withdrew into the nests of their own ethnic formations. The formation of other minority parties had followed closely the emergence of local grievances. In many instances, these local grievances were created by ambitious politicians who had failed to make any significant impact under the existing parties. Every past political party was thus a conglomeration of multiple interests, some cultural, some local, some religious, and others personal. No party had a homogeneous mass following because internal strifes were ram-

Pant. There were concealed squabbles within the N.C.N.C., the A.G., and the N.P.C. The phenomenon was not altogether absent in the second republic. There were many court cases in which members of the same party dragged either the party or individuals to court to obtain personal redresses often covered in a veneer of corporate interests.

Nigeria is made up of many cultures which dye the political orientations of the participants. It has been contended that

When in the course of human thinking, inconsistent cognitive elements are forced together by linguistic or behavioural assertions, stress is produced in proportion to the magnitude of the inconsistencies.¹¹

Lipset further observes that

Where a number of historic cleavages intermix and create a basis for ideological politics, democracy will be unstable and weak for by definition, such politics does not include the concept of tolerance.¹²

The Nigerian political activities in the past twenty-seven years have been marked by gross intolerance, lack of restraint, visionless acquisition of wealth without a programme for investing the wealth in the interest of the nation. There is no wonder why Nigerians buy houses in London and America as a sign of their having arrived – a characteristic of the "new rich". During the last controversy over the IMF Loan, it dawned on Nigerians that if the nation repatriated half of individually owned wealth overseas, the country would not need the I.M.F. Loan. The wealth of our leaders in Switzerland would be enough to salvage this nation from the economic devastations of the last twenty-seven years. The decision of the Buhari regime that Nigerians should close their foreign accounts was one more illustration of the loopholes in our legislation. How many Nigerians closed

11. Charles Osgood, "Cognitive Dynamics in Human Affairs," in E.P. Hollander and Raymond Hunt eds. *Current perspectives in Social Psychology* New York: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 378

12. M. Lipset, *The Political Man*, New York: A Doubleday Anchor Book, 1963, p. 74

their accounts overseas? What did the Government do to implement that decision? Rules that cannot be enforced, merely embolden the deviants.

It is necessary to stress that the foreign account racket will continue until there is political stability in the country. Whenever Nigerians occupy positions of authority, they are quick to realise how fragile their positions are. They know that the soldiers are standing by, rather impatiently. The fear of being toppled compels them to acquire as much as would sustain them in self-exile, since they would not be able to face the myriad of probes that accompany each military intervention. It is my belief that if every military officer from General Gowon down the line is probed, if all the successful ex-military, now successful farmers and business men are probed as a matter of routine, and any ill-gotten good confiscated with adequate punishments, there would be no attraction for military interventions. The military do not necessarily intervene because they have the solution to the nation's socioporosis. In fact, they do not realise how serious the illness of the nation is before the intervention. Military intervention must be seen as a bold measure to save the nation from purposeless drifting.

But every military intervention takes the nation back, many years. Thus, the political system cannot stabilise and mature. At the end of every military rule, we grope for a new political experiment. The crux of the argument is that neither politics based on political parties, nor the most benevolent military administration can save this nation from its cancerous socioporosis. There must be a will and a national spirit. We had parliaments made up of the best assemblage of our people; we have the military, made up of the best that the nation can afford. But the various probes have shown that neither the civilians nor the military are free from the influences of corrupt motives. The oaths we have taken by the Bible and the Koran have proved ineffectual. A local disease must have a local cure. I will return to this cure later.

The prevalent corrupt motives which have led to socioporosis are as old as humanity. It will therefore be unfair to our leaders to say that they have done what others had not done.

As stated earlier, the Prophets Amos and Micah have condemned the rich and the powerful in pre-Christian era. The Prophet Micah noted that the rich men of Isreal

are full of violence; the princes and the judges are asking for bribes; the merchants are using a bag of deceitful weight.¹³

Perhaps there is equal condemnation in the Koran and African religious system. Such corrupt practices are perversive and capable of destroying the nation. The observation by Prophet Micah was made 800 years before the time of Christ. It is even most valid in Nigeria today.

A people deserves a government that it elects.

Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpson in *Corruption in Developing Countries* (Allen and Unwin, 1963) regarded the pre-independence trials of corrupt officials as "tiny splinters of vast iceberg".^{13(a)} And they went on to say that after independence, the wealth which public officials acquire through illegal use of public office looms large.

Venality or improbity is a sociological phenomenon which must be understood and tackled before a meaningful model of government can emerge. It affects politics, administration, business, education, relations between classes or even sexes, and a host of other crucial aspects of social life; sociologists can only study the frequency of reported cases because of official secrecy. Even reports of probes are not published in such a way that they are available to the public or even universities.

People are found guilty and are either imprisoned or made to cough out what they have stolen. But the probe only enables them under questioning by lawyers to know the loopholes in their methods, and to plug them next time they have the opportunity. If improbity in public places MUST be wiped out, copies of all probes in the country must be published as books for all to know the economic vampires, so that whenever they appear at public launchings, we would know how to receive their ill-gotten goods.

13. Micah, "The Bible, Second and Third Chapters, The Revised Ed. 1971, p. 817-819

13a. Ronald Wraith et al., *Corruption in Developing Countries*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1963.

There is, however, no country in which bribery and embezzlement are unknown. It is everywhere in different forms. In Britain, America, Europe, etc. In Poland, it is known as the "socialist handshake."

In spite of the prevalence of improper use of public office to enrich oneself in other countries, Africa, and Nigeria in particular appear to be on the grandest scale. This abuse of office among the old hands extinguish all dedicated and would-be dedicated new comers, because a good and dedicated worker in Nigeria is always slandered and pushed out by his colleagues, before he has had time to bring about some changes.

Stanislav Andreski, talks of "a free medical service which is quantitatively utterly inadequate and a mockery of medical practice which embitters the patients and corrupts the practitioners." He asks, "what is the point in employing the doctors and nurses when no money is left to pay cleaners, and in consequence, the hospitals become dangerous disseminators of disease?"

Missionary hospitals and schools were models of relative efficiency. But, in the name of nationalism, we took over hospitals and schools and made a mess of them.

From the police, clerks, custom officers, medical practitioners, engineers, teachers, even pastors and the military, one commandment is now a national ideology — *"Get rich quick, no matter how, and give out some at launchings to the same government from which you stole."*

In the last Military Tribunal, the Chairman described Major-General Vatsa as a rich general. How much was his total salary since he joined the army?

I have used the word corruption with caution because there was no model which the practices have corrupted. The cr-going probes show that politics, in a nation without political ideals, where the bonds of kinship are strong and the concept of nationhood remains artificial and doubtful, the struggle for power and wealth will assume any dimension; the amount of corruption depends on what is required to gain power, wealth and privilege. Neither the tribulations caused by the deluge of Noah, nor the salvaging drops of the blood of Christ means

much to the sick nation. The answer has to be found. Politics is a practical profession in which the assistance of the devil may be necessary, if that will drive sanity into our body politic.

ELECTORAL MALPRACTICES AND THE CULTURE OF POVERTY: WHO IS ENTITLED TO VOTE?

In politics of intolerance, contestants are not accustomed to defeat. Defeat not only removes an incumbent from office, but exposes him to the sharp scrutiny of his successor, where his innumerable pretences to what he has not been, could be exposed. A removal from the seat of power by the victory at the polls of his opponents, means loss of power, wealth and privilege. These three Criteria-power, wealth and privilege, which crystallize our social status, are pursued in developing countries with religious tenacity. In order to avoid failure, the incumbent employs every means at his disposal to remain in office like ex-President Marcos. This includes rigging, enfranchising those who should not vote, and where it favours the incumbent, disenfranchising those who are qualified to vote and be voted for. Many scholars have contended that where people cannot vote intelligently, where government does not represent the wishes of the people, and where candidates are forced on the electorate by the cryptic manipulation of the electoral processes, the resultant government cannot lay any claim to legitimacy. Its toppling by the military must be seen as a welcome relief.¹⁴

The electoral process began in Britain over 954 years ago. The right to vote varied with time and place. Now all adult males and females are entitled to vote. This right was not achieved without struggles. After the struggles of the Chartist Movement of 1832, only one million more voters were added to the British electorate.

There were pre-qualifications before people were allowed to vote (see Chapter III).

All these pre-qualifications were necessary in order to ensure that the voters voted intelligently, and were less prone to

14. B.I.C. Ijomah, "Afrocracy (Politics Without Political Parties): Basis for National Stability", Paper presented at the University of Ife Sociological Symposium, May 3, 1984. Revised August 1985.

electoral manipulations. But it had the additional advantage of making it possible to evolve an articulate electorate who could not be easily corrupted by the politicians.

Nigeria's first electoral crisis was caused by the introduction of universal adult suffrage in a population where even the candidates themselves were stack illiterates. Let us recall the trial of Shugaba who led his party in a State House of Assembly. It was ridiculously similar to sending an illiterate Chief to the United Nations with obviously village mentality. It is the contention of this chapter that where the majority of the people are illiterates and poor, democracy, is a luxury, and cannot work if we continue to copy the Western models. It took Britain 954 years to attain her present standard of efficiency. Critics in Nigeria wanted the first republic to have attained this efficiency in 6 years; It would have been an impossible miracle. This leads us to what I have called military anomie and military intervention. Before discussing this, let us examine one area which had contributed more than any single factor to socioporosis.

RELIGIOUS INDOCTRINATION WITHOUT CHRISTIAN PRINCIPLES

I confess that this section might unsettle many minds especially if they are bigotted. I offer my sincere apologies. If this aberration is responsible for the socioporosis in the country, then religious fanatics must spare me the indulgence of asking them to return strictly to the teachings of Christ. They have so deviated that if Christ were to come back to life, He would disown so many people deafening our ears on the televisions "In God's Name."

"I swear by the Almighty God. . ." So runs the oath of office in this country. But how many people keep to the oath. The former President, his Vice, many ex-Ministers, ex-Presidential Advisers, ex-Commissioners, some civil servants and ex-Legislators, etc. who subscribed to this oath, or to something similar to it, languished behind bars, or have faced probes not merely because they have committed some offences but because they broke what Marie Corelli in her novel, *VENDETTA*, calls the 11th Commandment, THOU SHALT NOT BE FOUND

OUT. They swore falsely, and did what they swore not to do. But they were not alone. Only they were found out. Nigeria is like Sodom and Gomorrah, and I bet you that if God could find *four* honest Nigerians, He would spare us from socioporosis.

The shock of the younger generation by the public exposition of corruption in high places has completely disoriented our youths who see the adult generation as a bunch of dastardly hypocrites. They watch their fathers being probed for what they were told not to do; they watch their mothers being sent to death for desecrating the part of the body through which all Divinely inspired lives pass to this earthly existence. The embryonic child struggles with cocaine for the woman's sanctuary.

No sanction so far imposed is adequate enough to clear the traumatic effects they have on the innocent generation. The soldier who introduced War Against Indiscipline is now accounting for his indiscipline. The pastor goes to the court for embezzlement. Religious preachers, those Bible merchants and moral entrepreneurs who are themselves destitute of moral fibres, in their attempts to modernise and internationalise the traditions of the Jewish people, have negated the traditional moral principles of their own people. People have been killed throughout history "in God's name", and yet God said, "Thou shalt not kill". God also said, "Thou shalt not steal". Most people, including the Vatican Bank of Bishop Marchinkus and Sindona were alleged to have stolen. Readers are advised to read David Yallop's book, *In God's Name*.

One of the Western introductions which has given some people the safety valves for fraud is the oath-taking by the Bible or the Koran. In time of faith, religion monitored discipline and was concerned with attempts to shape man's behaviour under the canopy of the unknown powers. The instant punishment of Ananias and Sapphira attested to the incomprehensible powers of the unknown God. Today, the massive ritualization of the Mass, has merely succeeded in tranquilizing the anxieties of the perturbed minds. Anxieties destroy old symbolic commitments, and allow men to seek new ones that offer a sense of immediate relief from pressing problems. But the ethical principles

enshrined in Christianity have lost grips on the overt participants in secularized religious observances. Thus it is my view that Christianity, which was established when Christ died, is dying with the proliferation of the syncretic religious bodies which have themselves lost touch with Christianity. The breaking away from the established churches to found new ones, and the unchecked multiplication of mushroom churches are a reflection of the growth of religion as an industry or a business concern, in which the pastors have shares, and occasionally share their collections, and, I hope, in proportion to their input! In the breaking up and fragmentation of the churches, religious luminaries have accused themselves of intolerance towards original leaders.

In time of Christian faith, Christians were forbidden to swear; and where swearing was permitted, oath taking by the Bible would prevent real Christians from committing crimes.

But oath-taking has no effect on the religious any more, because religiosity is not the same as Christianity. Examine the religious industries from the Vatican to the Salem City, and even to Benin City. Watch the frenzied moments on the television every Sunday. *Religion has truly become the opium of the people*, but not of genuine Christians. Every charlatan claims miracle hours, hours of redemption, etc., and even has the effrontery to order us while sitting in our houses to join the television service. I praise their courage. But when I shall see them healing like Christ did, in the streets of Benin and Warri, clearing the lunatics from the streets and healing them by mere touch, when I shall see power going out of them simply because a faithful has touched their flowing dresses, I shall be the first to come to their churches to ask for forgiveness. Because Christ said "and these signs shall follow them that believe, in my name shall they cast out devils, etc.", every miracle claimed in their assemblies has scientific explanation. There is no Divine Power in the preachers to heal. If they have this gift, why waste our money on drugs? University of Benin Teaching Hospital (UBTH) should include them in a "medical ecumenism".

No! The reader may wish to send for a copy of my paper on "the Uses of Dance with Respect to Religious Beliefs and Worships." Until then, let us recall the havoc done to families

by some of these syncretic religious pastors who deceive many house-wives by playing on their anxieties either to have children or social positions.

For oath-taking to be effective, it must touch on the sensibilities — the fears and expectations of the swearers. It must touch on their deep-seated beliefs, and must be based on a tradition that they are used to. Corruption is one of the indices of socioporosis because on the basis of available means, it cannot be eradicated. One million Bibles cannot eradicate it. Our social and extended family commitments, and the prevalence of premature gratifications will continue to make people live above their means.

But if Nigeria really wants to eradicate corruption, the solution is simple. What is difficult is having a leader with the courage to implement it. Religious hypocrites and those who are guilty would shout at such a leader and call him unchristian. But does the Bible not forbid us from swearing at all? By swearing by the Bible, we have disobeyed the same Bible's injunction. But corruption is a greater sin than swearing. So why don't we commit the lesser sin in order to eradicate the more grievous one?

It is my hypothesis that if every public official, every contractor, and every African swearer is made to swear by an African symbol, reputed to kill the perjurer within seven days, corruption would be wiped out from Nigeria within a year. Government decisions would be carried out to the letter. There would be no embezzlement, no padding of bills, no inflation of contract costs, no siphoning of the nation's wealth overseas, no nepotism, tribalism, bribes and kick-backs, etc. Socioporosis is a drastic illness and requires a drastic medicament. Since many of our leaders are deviants, if the results of the probes are anything to go by, it is expected that they would attack this proposition. They would even describe it as barbarous and primitive. But if a primitive solution can make us honest and get this country out of the cobweb into which it has been so inextricably woven, what would be the objection? If it is the fear of dying, have we not been condemning armed robbers, and have people not gone to watch their execution? If a man brings death on himself by swearing falsely, the better for the nation. There would be fewer probes.

It is a sociological truism that conformity can be brought about either by socialization, or by coercion. It is my submission that socialization would be ineffective and slow in Nigeria because the culture into which we would socialize our youth is already a discredited and polluted culture. Every polluted culture has a polluting effect on the participants. In a completely polluted society, where the sickness has been identified as socioporosis, solutions must be imposed and enforced. There cannot be any conformity without sanctions or punishment. If coup plotters must die for failing to succeed, because a successful coup is "legitimate," then those who steal millions and thousands after swearing to serve the nation honestly must be given punishment which they have voluntarily subscribed to. If we do not steal, more often than not, it is not because we are honest; it is because we are afraid of the consequences of being caught. Remember the 11th Commandment, "Thou Shalt not be Found Out!" In Africa, we have holy spots which the white man for want of a better word, has described as shrines, thus giving them derogatory connotations. They could be spots with positive electromagnetic fields which we have not been able to study. We accept the superstitions of the illiterate natives who were the first to discover them, and worship them. We accuse them of worshipping idols. But who created the magnetic fields? Certainly, not the natives. Such "shrines" when people swear by them do not kill the innocent persons. Only the wicked suffer. Is there anything wrong in punishing the wicked? If so, then we should close the prisons and let all the criminals go free. After twenty-seven years of independence, we must commission social scientists to study Nigerians because we do not understand ourselves and our environment. Only by knowing ourselves can we compare ourselves with other nations. Today, the best that we can do is to compare ourselves with the white man according to his own yard sticks, using his own concepts. What a tragedy!

If we do not take drastic steps to wipe out the bad eggs in the society, the nation will become so socioporous that the fate of Sodom and Gomorrah would be a child's play. The cure for the social maladies of this nation must be drastic. It must be apocalyptic. Anything less, is begging the question.

MILITARY ANOMIE AND MILITARY INTERVENTION

I have so far been analysing the ills of the nation with a greater focus on the civilians. But our military, in Janowitz's terms, is more of a pragmatic military than a professional one. It is against the background of its deviation from the canons of military professionalism that I want to examine what we in Political Sociology have called "military anomie."

The society is made up of many individuals, who in shakespearean view are actors. Each actor occupies a status, and each status has role or roles ascribed to it. Each actor has his motivational processes, and because of his different biological make up and peculiar socialization processes, he is likely to act in a different way, or in ways peculiar to him and his circumstances. For every status so defined by the society, there are expectations or the norms. Thus, an actor, occupying a given status, is expected by the society to act in certain normative ways. If the actor does not accept the institutionalized means of doing things, his observed behaviour would deviate from the societal expectation. Where many individuals do things in ways which the society does not expect of them, there will be lawlessness or an anomic situation.

It is the view of contemporary theorists on the military that the professional soldier should be apolitical, and should be bound by the rules and regulations guiding his profession. Unfortunately (or shall we say fortunately), because of the way the civilians have ruled this country in the past, the military have been constrained to displace the civilians and substitute them with themselves. By so doing, the military do not lay any claims to higher knowledge of the political situation. All that they imply is that the civilians have proved incapable of ruling the country, and of justifying the mandate of the people. By taking on political functions, which many theorists regard as aberrant, they, the military have in fact deviated from their professional calling, and accepted non-military functions. The military see themselves as being responsible for the security of the state, and not for the protection of government or individuals. Consequently, when in the eyes of the military, any government fails to do those things which should guarantee the security of

the state, and if the state thus gets threatened by the lapses of such a government, the military feel compelled to intervene in the interest of the state. Be that as it may, we are aware of members of the armed forces who have overthrown a government out of the personal ambitions of the officer corps. A situation where the military intervene at will, and where the life span of any regime depends on the whims and caprices of the military cannot lead to a stable socio-economic and political order. The ever dangling probabilities of military interventions in African and the Third World are responsible for the fear with which every politician accepts political appointments. Even when a General has successfully carried out a coup, his first few months in office are marked by imponderable uncertainties which make him relapse into the same civilian mentality of amassing wealth in anticipation of the rainy day when another cohort of the military might successfully overthrow him.

It is therefore my submission that unless military coups are checked by the military themselves, it is mere pious expectation to hope that corruption and the ten-percentage phenomena would be eradicated from the country. It is a state of lawlessness in which individual ambitions of the military can hardly be monitored, let alone checked. President Nasser's take-over in Egypt, the assassination of President Olympio in Togo, the Tanganyikan mutiny of 1964 were antecedents of military anomie in Nigeria. In the European countries, the military had their own share of military anomie. In France, the growing disenchantment with the futility of the Algerian War, and the growing purposelessness of the military led to the return to power in 1959 of Charles de Gaul.

In using the term "military anomie", Ali Mazrui was particularly referring to what he called "the twin problems of military anomie and military ambition" in Uganda.¹⁹ It is generally true that the colonial army was established to facilitate the interests of the colonial regime. Nevertheless, the soldiers found themselves poised to challenge the claims of the politicians whenever, in their opinion, the politicians were about to tear the nation asunder. Ijomah (1984) identifies the pull and the push

19. Ali A. Mazrui, *Cultural Engineering and Nation Building in East Africa*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, p. 170.

factors which characterise military interventions in Africa. Electoral malpractices are the first indicators of regime vulnerability. Regime vulnerability, or the illegitimacy of a party that has forced itself upon the people, is critical in pulling the military out of the barracks.²⁰ Ali Mazrui has described the military profession in Africa as a profession of the underprivileged, and felt that the impact of the military after independence must be seen in terms of equalizing power as the ascendancy of the educated Africans came to be challenged by semi-literate soldiers.²¹

About the time that military anomie was rearing its head, and driving Julius Nyerere underground in Tanganyika, there was a threat of military insurrection in Gabon. The isolated activities of the military in various mutinies, and the military's involvements in politics up to 1964, showed clearly the devastating political significance of the power of the gun in the hands of an army which had not yet learned how to tolerate the principles of civilian supremacy ingrained in the notion of objective military-civilian relationship.

With the exception of Libya and Ethiopia, there is no model of the military in African which has successfully done what the civilians failed to do. In all cases, the military seem to be prone to the same corrupting influences which destroyed the civilian regimes. The situation in Congo-Leopoldville was one of general chaos and military anomie, a complete breakdown of military responsibility and discipline. In Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Chad, Gambia and Senegal, Sierra-Leone and Liberia, the military have continued to abandon their professional calling and to dabble into political activities which in normal circumstances is an aberration from the dictates of military professionalism. It has been opined that the military are bound to be restless in the barracks in the face of their functional redundancy.

It is said that an idle brain is the devil's workshop. In the absence of any threats to the peace and stability of the nation,

20. Ijorhah, "Electoral Competition and Military Intervention in Africa", Paper presented at the International Political Science Association (IPSA) Study Group on Armed Forces and Society, Free University of West Berlin, 13 – 16 September, 1984.

21. Ali A. Mazrui, *op cit*, p. 174

the military are likely to spend a good deal of their time in idle speculations which make them sensitive to even the minutest mis-demeanour of the politicians. Further more, it is my contention that the military have arrived, and have imbibed a rising tide of expectation, an expectation which makes them look forward to a time when some of them would assume non-military functions. This feeling will persist for sometime, unless something is done to carve out new responsibilities for the military since the professional responsibility of defending the security of the nation has not been fully called to test. A few days ago, the President expressed the hope that Military intervention would stop and soldiers would return to their profession. The President however did not say how the individual ambitions of soldiers could be controlled.

Military anomie reflects not only the inability of the military to maintain discipline and keep to their professional calling, but it does, as in the case of Nigeria and other African countries, show the intrusion into the military of tribalism and ethnic factionalisation. The tragedy of Uganda is a case in point. It is my hope that the military in Nigeria will not reach the same level of anomic situation where we have to say 'good-bye' to military professionalism.

The first republic failed not only because the politicians were corrupt but because the military did not exercise necessary restraint. Even when the military decided to intervene, it was not a designed militarism which would have given the nation an alternative to partisan political system. Major Nzeogwu intervened only to discover that he could not carry the military with him. Major-General Ironsi who succeeded in taking over power did not seem to know what to do. The Northern-backed counter coup of July 1966, was more of a vendetta than a movement to unify the country under a viable system. My verdict is that in the 27 years of independence, the military has created as much of our problems as the civilians. The fragmentation of loyalty in the army is a matter of great concern to students of the sociology of the military.

It is therefore my sincere hope that before the third republic takes off, the nation would have adopted a political system that would make party politics unnecessary. Politics

without political party which I have been advocating since 1967, and which Nigeria finally experimented in 1976 has shown that there would be peace and stability in this country if we did away with party politics. In this system which I call Afrocracy, there will be elections based on the programme which I have worked out above. Contrary to some of the views being expressed by those who gave evidence before the Babalakin Inquiry into the activities of FEDECO, I would like to see elections staggered over a period of four years. The functions that would be assigned to the military would be such that military professionalism would be restored. This will be the first step towards bringing to an end, the spate of military interventions in the country.

Our problem now is not what to do with the civilians. The military has already taken care of them. But what do we do with the military? For how long will they continue to intervene without finding solutions to the issues plaguing the nation? We all hailed the present regime of President Ibrahim Babangida. Even if the abortive coup had succeeded, I doubt if Major-General Vatsa and his team had better solutions to the nation's socioporosis. Therefore, while we should do everything to introduce measures which would make the civilians responsible and dedicated to the cause of this nation, it is necessary that the military men who nourish the ambition to displace either a military regime or a civilian regime should learn to tolerate the leaders of the country, by giving them enough time to improve. After five successful coups and three official abortive coups, the nation is still asking for a bearing. It is therefore clear that coups do not provide answers to any nation's problems. Only a coup backed by an ideology can change a socioporous nation.

Finally, when the third republic does come, the government must give serious thinking to the future structure and functions of the the military so that their functional redundancy in terms of their professional calling is reduced. A busy professional army would hardly find time to think of intervention in politics. The military in the third republic must return to a truly professional spirit, and allow future politicians to develop a political culture for the nation. Military professionalism instills discipline and tolerance in the officer corps. This

factor ought to have effectively inhibited interventionist motivations. But when party politics or ineffective military administration is on the verge of destroying the nation, military intervention is always the better of two evils.

I was one of the student leaders who opposed the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact in 1961. In retrospect, I now question the wisdom. British intervention in 1964 saved Nyerere. He lasted long enough to give Tanzania an ideological orientation. Perhaps, such a pact would have checked the private ambitions of the military which have remained the most elusive variable in the study of military interventions in Nigeria.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ANDRESKI, Stanislav, *The African Predicament*. New York: Atherton Press, 1968.
- AZIKIWE, N. (1938): *The West African Pilot*, Lagos
- FANON, F. (1963): *The Wretched of the Earth*, New York, Grove Press
- IJOMAH, B.I.C. (1963): "Can a Revolution Succeed in Nigeria?" A Lecture delivered at Isi-Enu, Nsukka.
- IJOMAH, B.I.C. (1965): "The prospects of Nigerian Unity: A Twentieth Century Political Mirage", *The Eagle Magazine*, Onitsha: Etudo Press
- IJOMAH, B.I.C. (1984): "Electoral Competition and Military", A paper presented at the International Political Science Association (IPSA) Study Group on Armed Forces and Society, West Berlin, Free University
- IJOMAH, B.I.C. (1985): "Nationalism, Alienation and Integration. Paper presented at the Nigerian Political Science Association Conference held at the University of Ilorin.
- IJOMAH, B.I.C. (1985): "AFROCRACY (Politics Without Political Parties): Basis for National Stability", Paper presented at the University of Ife Sociological Symposium 1984 (Revised)
- IJOMAH, B.I.C. (1985): "How to Stand on Your Feet When You have Landed on Your Head" Lecture delivered at the 25th Anniversary of A.G.G.S., Ughelli.
- JANOWITZ, Morris, *Military in the Political Development of New Nations*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1964
- LIPSET, M (1963): *The Political Man*, New York: A Double Day Anchor Book.
- MAZRUI, A. A. (1972): *Cultural Engineering and Nation Building in East Africa*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press
- MICAH (1971): *The Holy Bible*, The Revised Standard Version
- OKOYE, M. (): *Storms on the Niger*, Enugu, Eastern Nigerian Printing Corporation.
- OSADEBAY, D. C. (1952): *Africa Sings*

OSGOOD, C. (1963): "Cognitive Dynamics in Human Affairs"
ed. by E.P. Hollander and Raymond Hunt in *Current Perspectives In Social Psychology*, New York, Oxford University Press

WRAITH Ronald and SIMPSON, EDGAR, *Corruption in Developing Countries*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1963

YALLOP, David, *In God's Name*, London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1984

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

STRATEGY FOR WINNING ELECTIONS IN A PARTYLESS DEMOCRACY

President Babangida's ban on some politicians and all ex-public officers will for long be debated. While one could point at many of the merits of the sweeping ban, critical minds could raise questions which could challenge the usefulness of the ban. But for the purposes of the 1987-92 transitional exercise, all affected politicians and ex-public officers should in the interest of national stability comply with the ban, even when it could be argued that the ban is unjust to them, and probably denies them their fundamental human rights. There are two categories of politicians who took part in the rigging of the last elections and who to all intents and purposes equally contributed to the demise of the first and second republics. The first category includes those who took part in the elections, who contested for offices, from the party chairmen at the ward level to party chairmen at the local government level, the state and national levels. One could also consider the activities of the party secretaries, the executive members at the ward levels and the party stalwarts at the local government levels who indeed did the actual rigging of the elections. It would appear that the ban did not affect these categories of people who were professional election riggers but who held no offices. The ban affected only the successful candidates at the polls and also the ex-public officers.

Unfortunately, however, those candidates who contested elections and took part in the rigging, but were "out-rigged" by the successful ones did not appear to have been affected by the sweeping ban. They are all mopping up, and getting ready to have a second trial. It would have been fair, if the ban had been extended to all those who contested elections whether they were successful or not.

Having said this, one is tempted to have a look at the warming up for the December 1987 local government elections. Obviously, the Presidential ban has reduced the number of candidates who were aspiring to the chairmanship of the local government councils or to the membership of the councils.

Many candidates have already withdrawn from the race. But still, many are working very hard, grouping, and forming clubs in the absence of party affiliations. There is no doubt that electing individuals on their merits, is not going to be an easy task. But as pointed out in the methods of elections in Afrocracy, it is not enough to charge the National Electoral Commission with the responsibility for conducting elections; the National Electoral Commission should be able to mobilize all the law enforcement agencies at both local and national levels. In other words, those responsible for the security of the elections and election materials, should be sent to every nook and corner to ensure that undue pressure groups do not unwittingly sabotage the efforts of the Federal Military Government. Of great concern in this respect are the election managers in the second republic. Since candidates are contesting on their individual merits, it is in their own interest to be the watch dog over the conducts of their opponents. They should report any irregularities to the electoral officers.

This chapter is designed to assist the new politicians who are entering politics for the first time. By the very principle of Afrocracy, candidates are expected to be in their bases, that is, their local government areas. Nobody who is not responsible to the electorate should be elected in an Afrocracy. This calls for all the candidates to return to base, identify themselves with all the organizations and all the problems of their constituencies, and also to explain to their constituencies what they can offer if elected. It is necessary to point out that by returning to the grass root, people who do not reside in the constituencies would find it difficult to warm the hearts of the electorates. Consequently, every candidate must find a way of endearing himself to his people, particularly those at home. The era of absentee political bosses has come to an end. Politicians who stay in Lagos and sponsor candidates to go home and contest elections and represent interests they do not understand, by the new federal electoral law, can no longer find their feet at home. The new local government electoral law requires that candidates must be resident in the local government areas for at least one year, and candidates residing outside the local government area should not just rush home to vote for interests that do not affect their

daily lives. Nothing, therefore, could come closer to the hearts of the people than their ability to elect people who understand and feel the daily pulsations of rural shocks, rural tragedies and rural drama. Candidates who live at home, would feel the problems at home and be able to project these problems to higher tiers of government outside their homes. This is the merit of the local government elections in a partyless democracy. If parties were to impose candidates, it is very clear that candidates who would win the elections are candidates resident in urban areas who come home to kill goats and cows, and deceive the innocent villagers that they are representing their interests. The villagers are therefore called to make maximum use of this rare opportunity which they may never have again if they elect the wrong persons into offices.

CAMPAIGNS

While I was writing this book, a friend of mine came to me to ask how campaigns could be conducted without the backing of a party organization? I quickly reminded the questioner that what made democracy succeed in Britain and America was not necessarily the party, but social, cultural, religious and other organizations which have become potent instruments for mobilising people towards national goals. Political parties without ideological orientations cannot foster national unity. Therefore, what can mobilize the people at the grass root, are cultural organizations and pressure groups that are based on certain identifiable interests, and these interests must reflect the interests of the communities to be represented by the candidates. It is therefore necessary that any candidates that hope to win the elections should not depend on the backing of the so called influential individuals whose participation lies in giving out money to the candidates they propose to sponsor. I therefore told my friend that if he hoped to win the election in his constituency, particularly in his ward, he should identify all the cultural organizations all the pressure groups, neutralize all oppositions, and identify himself with all the cultural organizations which make for the progress of the community. A membership of every organization in the the community is obviously the surest way to identify oneself

with the aspirations of one's community. Therefore, all intending candidates for the local government elections are advised to:

- i. identify all cultural organizations
- ii. identify with all of them, as well as religious organizations, social and welfare development associations, clubs, cultural dancing groups, prayer groups, and every organization that makes one kind of contribution or the other to the progress of the community.
- iii. to approach every organization, and become members of the organizations and in the traditional African way of presenting oneself as a candidate, inform them of their intentions, and receive their collective support. Having received their collective support, from one organization to the other at the grass root, it is very clear that no amount of money distributed by an absentee politician can sway the cultural homogeneity of these organizations. Once they have decided to vote for any candidate, any other person who comes home to distribute money, would be wasting his time because by the very nature of cultural identification with these groups, the candidate is being voted for as a corporate member of the organization; the individual candidate is seen as a brother rather than a candidate.

The question arises as to what should be done if two candidates belong to the same organization. My answer is that if two candidates belong to the same organization, the election would be resolved at the organizational level, where the members would look at the credentials of the two candidates and request one of them to step down for the other in the interest of the organization. This compromise is necessary to avoid splitting the organization by the rivalry of members. It should also be borne in mind that these organizations are non-political and therefore would not like to be split by the political interests of some members. Therefore the rivalry of candidates within the same cultural organizations, would be resolved at the organizational level such that no two individuals would contest for the same post from the same cultural organisation.

ELECTORAL SLATE AT LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL

In every Local Government Area, it is advised that qualified candidates form electoral slates. Each slate will be made up of a potential cabinet. It comprises the candidate for the post of the Chairman, and candidates for the posts of Councillors who share common interests. The slate is the basic unit of partisan politics. Members will exchange visits and draw up joint campaign programmes and strategies. All candidates for the posts of councillors on a chairmanship candidate's slate would, with their supporters in their constituencies campaign for the chairmanship candidate.

Each council has a Chairman, and some of the councillors hold such portfolios as councillors for Works, Health, Education, Finance, etc. The portfolio should be earmarked in advance to motivate would-be councillors to campaign more seriously. Some towns have heavy registration. These portfolios should be earmarked on the basis of the voting strength of the constituencies. For instance, where there are three candidates for the chairmanship, these candidates would solicit the cooperation of the councillorship candidates in forming slates. There will thus emerge three slates to which all the candidates would belong. Candidates who cannot be supported by a slate should consider withdrawing, as such candidates would have no chances. The evolution of the slate is the first step in the evolution of party politics, as each slate would have the backing of one or more of the existing clubs.

THE TWO PARTY SYSTEM

Afrocracy requires that democracy should germinate right from the grass root and should grow from the grass root to the local government areas and spread its branches to the state and the federal government levels. The root remains at the local government level. The American Presidential system has weak political parties, but very strong constituencies. senators or Congressmen do not vote to please the parties, but to press for the opinions of their constituencies. Unfortunately, however, the government has accepted the recommendation of the Political Bureau to impose a two party system. I have argued in the body

of this book that since independence, two party systems had tried to emerge on two successive occasions, and on each occasion, the military had intervened to punctuate this development. The first was in 1966 when the nation had been polarized into the UPGA and the NNA. Had the military not intervened, it was clear that those two grand alliances would have formed the bases for two major political parties, backed by different ideological persuasions that would have germinated to cement the relationships within the party organizations. It was also my expectation that if these two parties had lasted for fifty years, the difference in their orientations would have been insignificant, since the interest of the political parties would then have been the interest of the nation, and since there is only one nation, one could see the two parties trying to serve the same nation, but through different methodologies. By 1983, it was also clear that the NPP or the UPN or the GNPP or the PRP could not on its own have defeated the NPN at the 1987 elections. The grand alliance of the progressive parties was the first step towards the coalition of all the other parties in their concerted effort to challenge the supremacy of the NPN. It is my submission that if the military had not intervened, in December 1983, the 1987 elections would have been fought on the basis of two grand parties. The next elections after the 1987 could have been fought on the basis of ideological orientations, possibly the socialist Progressive Party and the capitalist National Party of Nigeria (NPN). However, one foresees an area of crisis. The period of transition from the partyless democracy at the local government level, to a party democracy at the state and national level would be a very trying period indeed. Trying, in the sense that the clubs that are currently being formed at state levels, will try to form some coalitions into political party organizations. But it would dawn on the party leadership at the state and federal levels that the candidates they had sponsored at the local government elections would, after one year of independence as councillors and chairmen of councils, have formed around themselves, their own groups of loyalists, and would challenge the patronage of the sponsoring parties. Where such happens, loyalty would be bought by the two major parties.

operating at the federal and state levels. The democracy which the afrocratic method would have established at the grass root, would now be bastardized and corrupted by the money-swaying politicians at the state and the federal levels. One, therefore, would like to request the Federal Government to consider very seriously the needlessness of imposing a two party system on an electoral system that begins with a partyless mode of election. The transition is not only going to be chaotic, it would destroy the consensus and the cultural homogeneity which a partyless election would have established at the grass root. It would bring in the corrupting influences of the political party king-pins who would distribute money through their agencies to the local government levels.

What I am trying to say is that the introduction of a two party system at the federal level, and the partyless democracy at the grass root or at the local government level would clash midway between the federal and the local government levels. This clash of methodology would bring about the corruption which could have been eliminated at the local government level.

WHAT THEN SHOULD BE DONE?

The first suggestion is that all the cultural organizations which have functioned as pressure groups to elect individuals on their own merits at the local government levels, should be encouraged by those aspiring to form political parties at the top.

Secondly, all the clubs now operating at the state levels should also move down to the grass roots to identify themselves with the various cultural organizations at the local government level and encourage them to continue to foster and to hold their people together. Thirdly, there should be a state summit where the leaders of these clubs would come together to form a movement based on some ideological persuasions. It is clear that the genesis of these clubs are multiple, and are based on local and individual ambitions; but when a summit of these clubs is formed, the leadership of these clubs would be welded together into a movement that could form the basis for a state political organization. If the summit is successful in welding these clubs

together, it is possible for a party to emerge from a particular state. This does not rule out the possibility that there could be dissidents who would be bought over by money coming from outside the state. Such individuals could form the basis of the emergent opposition party at the state level. A coalition of these state-based parties with some parties in other states, if well harnessed, could lead to the emergence of a two-party system at the national level.

But one regrets however, to observe that the two parties to be imposed are not based on ideological orientations. So, by the very fact of their imposition, they are not based on any ideological convictions. The individuals that would come together to form the parties, would be doing so merely for the purposes of winning elections. It is my submission in this work that parties formed solely to win elections cannot lead to national integration. It would need some crises, some election riggings, consolidation of powers, frustration of powers, intimidation of the opposition and elimination of the opposition, in order to have a bearing. One notes the evolution of one-party system in many African countries, and regrets that the very fact of imposition of any political party by any higher authority, easily degenerates into a one-party system. Nigeria, from all indications, cannot escape this fate. The only salvation therefore is for the Federal Government to ensure that the imposed political party organizations are not allowed to destroy the democracy and the cultural homogeneity which would have emerged as a result of partyless elections at the grass root.

It is hoped that all those who have cherished the idea of Nigeria as a nation, should, after 27 years of groping in the dark, ask very pertinent questions. As I watched Nigeria celebrate her 27th Independence anniversary, what bothered me was not the length of her independence but what she had achieved as a nation. There is no doubt that this country has made tremendous strides in so many directions. There is a lot to write home about, but there is also a lot to lament about.

When Nkrumah asked for the political kingdom so that every other thing could follow, very many people did not understand that he was giving primacy to political institutions

as a *sine qua non* for economic stability and technological development. The Nigerian experience has shown that where political instability has dominated the scene, electoral malpractices, technological prostitution, economic sabotage, and all kinds of malpractices which destabilize the nation are bound to follow. Where there is politics of consensus, or where politicians have the interest of the nation at heart, the Switzerland rackets of many politicians, and the impatience of political leaders would be curtailed. It is the intolerance of political leaders and the impatience of the military that have caused a lot of instability in the nation. One hopes that the present government would do everything possible to ensure that the Babangida administration is the last military intervention this country would experience. It has, however, to work very hard if it wants to be able to hand over to civilians in 1992.

PESSIMISM

One writes this with a note of pessimism because democracy is predicated upon accumulated experience. Senator Dirksen in the United States could talk with authority as a senator representing his constituency for more than 30 years. He could talk about comparative presidency; he could talk about comparative foreign policies of America, and he could talk about the comparative economic policies of various administrations. There are many senators who are still in senate, for very many years. Senator Kennedy has been in the senate for quite some time; Senator Percy of Illinois was just being elected when I got to the United States in the mid-sixties. He is still in senate. There is no amount of experience which the younger generation can accumulate overnight to match the political sagacity of these senatorial octogenarians. When a senator spoke in the Roman Senate, it was the voice of Rome and senate. A Senator was the voice of senate, and the senate was the voice of Rome. But with the banning of the experienced politicians, with the sweeping ban of all those who have a modicum of political experience, one sees the military bringing into the political arena, neophytes who would now begin to make their own mistakes. It is true that democracy survives on the basis of trial and error; but where a nation conti-

nues to have trial and error for 27 years, it is questionable when that nation will find stability. One can easily speculate that because of the inexperience of the new generation in experimenting a new constitution which will be promulgated in 1992, this new generation, will, like the generation that was new in 1960 and that formed Nigeria's first independent government, make its own mistakes, and probably excite the impatience of the younger military officers who would have taken over the mantle of military leadership when General Babangida leaves the scene. One wants to ask whether the assurances of the present administration could assuage the impatience of these younger military officers, and whether they would give the younger politicians a chance to correct their mistakes. For, obviously, the mistakes of the younger politicians, come 1992, will be many. Since the banned politicians may, if they choose, withdraw completely into their conches, they would like to see the magic wand with which the younger generation would lead to salvation a country that has been completely bastardized by the political foxes and military lions for 27 years. One also notes with concern that the ban which has affected many people found guilty of several acts of misconduct, failed to make provision for the probing of the military officers, as the civilians had been probed. The obvious consequence of the ban (though popular), is that the politicians would find themselves driven to the wall, and this might polarize the relationship between politicians and the military in the very near future, to such an extent that the politicians will become wiser in handling military generals whenever the civilians are elected into offices. It is not impossible to stop the military from intervening in Nigerian politics. Earlier in the last chapter, I had made reference to my regrets that some of us as students fought and demonstrated against the Anglo-Nigeria Defence Pact. With the spate of military interventions in Nigerian politics, and with the spate of corruption in Nigerian politics, one would have loved, in retrospect, to see the British continue for a little while until political stability was attained. One draws inspiration from the Tanganyikan experience, where Nyerere was toppled in 1964, but the timely intervention of British paratroopers saved him from the military administration that would have emerged. Nyerere ruled long enough to establish stability in

Tanzania, and to bring in an ideological orientation in the famous Ujamaa. The Tanzanian Socialism, was based on accumulated experience of the Tanzanians in government over a period of time, without military punctuation. One therefore hopes that if Nigerians sincerely want to stop military intervention, the solutions are very simple. I would not however, proffer advice in this book, because it is bound to be misunderstood.

But if Nigeria wants to be stable, and if Nigeria wants to enjoy democratic experiment, it must first be prepared to make its own mistakes, to correct its own mistakes, and to heal its own wounds. This calls for tolerance not only on the part of the politicians, but extreme tolerance on the part of the military. As I have said earlier, the military are trained in military professionalism. The politicians should be allowed to train in political wisdom. No nation ever sacks the entire military organization because it has failed to win a war. We all condemn the politicians because of their corruption. But it is also true to say that many politicians were forced into corruption because of their expectations that sooner or later the military would intervene. Therefore, in order to ensure that they did not lose both "head and tail", they were forced into a hurried accumulation of wealth which they siphoned out of the country, thereby depleting our foreign reserves. It is, therefore, my prayer that the military, who decide to remain professional, must develop the norms of military professionalism, and must see themselves as professionals who should be ready to tolerate the slow process of democratic experiment in a country saturated with a culture of poverty.

Finally, if every civilian administration should be probed at the end of its stewardship, whether terminated by military intervention or by a change of baton at the end of an election, then my call for the institutionalization of probes as a normal way of ensuring accountability of stewards, be they military or civilian, must be taken very seriously. That is to say, at the end of every stewardship, every steward at every level must be probed. This will ensure that any military that intervenes must see itself as truly corrective, and must not be guilty of those practices for which politicians have been sent to jail. One hopes

and prays that this nation under God would rise yet to a greater height.

But my friend asked a question: how do we rise to a greater height when statism has taken over Nigerian nationalism? My answer is that states would fade away when the greater majority of the masses have moved into the middle income brackets. When every Nigerian or a greater majority of Nigerians can afford three square meals, Nigerians would become preoccupied with more national issues than mere bread-and-butter politics. It is true that while we talk of nationhood and Nigerian nationalism, and one Nigeria, many Nigerians cannot even be employed in other states of the federation. This is a paradox, and anybody who hopes to lead this country to be one nation, must devise a way of ensuring that every Nigerian is employable in any part of Nigeria irrespective of his ethnic origin. This leads one to one important aspect of the new electoral system which must be praised. Obviously, many Nigerians have not thought very seriously of the implications of the requirement that anybody who has spent a year in a particular local government area is qualified to vote and be voted for in that local government area. I think this underscores the call Dr. Ogbemudia once made, that any Nigerian who has lived 10 years in a particular state should be able to take the citizenship of that state. Unless we have the boldness to accept citizenship in place of tribalism, this country cannot truly think of one and united Nigeria. When citizenship of a state based on residential qualifications and contributions to the development of that state becomes a more over-riding consideration than ethnic origin, then this country would have moved a step further towards detribalising the whole nation. If by staying 10 years in Okpebho Local Government Area, I have endeared myself to the hearts of Ishan people, and I have done what their own sons and daughters could not do, thereby choosing to identify myself with their destinies and aspirations, there is no reason why I should not be able to win elections in Okpebho; and if this policy of residential qualification were to be continued, the difficulties and the oppositions notwithstanding, one expects that in 50 years time, the younger generation would look at residential qualification and individual merits as the basis for

sponsoring candidates for elections. Tribalism, obviously, is a potent instrument for electioneering in a culture of poverty and in politics without ideological convictions. But as soon as political parties are organized around ideological orientations, and where these ideological orientations emphasize residential qualifications rather than tribal qualifications, political parties would have become potent instruments for the destruction of tribalism.

QUESTIONS ON CHAPTER ONE

1. Examine the origin and growth of the three major pre-independence parties — The NCNC, the A.G. and the N.P.C. What were their similarities and differences?
2. Pre-independence parties were reactions to localized grievances. For each political party examine the issues that led to its formation.
3. "Where a number of historic cleavages intermix and create basis for politics, democracy will be unstable and weak, for by definition such politics does not include the concept of tolerance." Discuss this contention with reference to Nigerian politics.
4. Distinguish between nationalism and nationalist movements.
5. Nigerian Nationalism has been described as a "twentieth Century Political mirage." Do you share this view and why?
6. Pareto's circulation of Elite hypothesis does not apply to Nigeria particularly in conflict situations. What factors are responsible?
7. In Nigeria, social or groups conflict is horizontal while support is vertical. To what extent does this militate against national integration.

QUESTIONS ON CHAPTER TWO

1. There can be no national orientation without an ideology. Discuss.

2. Ideology must reflect the practical experiences of a people, and must germinate from the cultural and practical lives of the people. Discuss.
3. Emile Durkheim defines socialism as:
 A cry of grief, sometimes of anger,
 uttered by men who feel most keenly our
 collective malaise.
 Is this a true assessment of socialism?
4. For as long as there are differential opportunities, the conflict between the poor and the rich will persist. Discuss.
5. Distinguish between a coup and a revolution.
6. One of the ways for a nation to assert its independence is to turn to its tradition for inspiration. Describe how Afrocracy uses this introspection as a basis for a new socio-political order.
7. If Afrocracy must be seen in its proper perspective it must be examined with reference to the whole complex of values in all aspects of life. It must be seen as an attempt to revive relevant native cultural roots which provide the trunks for the new social order. Assess the significance of Afrocracy in changing the national value orientation.
8. Delegated right to vote is not new in Africa nor is it a peculiarity of Afrocracy. Discuss

QUESTIONS ON CHAPTER THREE

1. Where political participation outweighs political institutionalization, no viable political system can emerge. Discuss.
2. Afrocracy seeks among other things to reduce the size of electoral participation in order to strengthen the political

institution. Describe the processes by which it has set out to do this.

3. All stable democracies have had periods of take-off, when everybody was not allowed to vote. Examine critically the evolution of universal adult suffrage in any stable democracy.
4. "It would be a negation of rational principles to defend a political method that was jeopardizing individual's ideals or interests." If the political methods Africa inherited from the colonial masters have been partly responsible for Africa's political instability, justify the search for an alternative method.
5. In a culture of poverty where the poor out-number the rich, Western democracy cannot survive. How does Afrocracy propose to use the masses as a bedrock for a stable political system?
6. "It is rare for soldiers, having taken over absolute power, to give the same generation of politicians who put an end to parliamentary government . . . a second chance."

In the light of the above, examine

(1) the failure of the second republic

(2) President Babangida's insistence on the new breed.

7. Critically examine the structure of elections in Afrocracy.

QUESTIONS ON CHAPTER FOUR

1. Examine the origin and growth of the Nigerian Military since 1863.
2. Why do the Military Intervene in Politics?
3. If the Military profession concerned with service to the

nation can you justify the overthrow of Governments by the military?

4. Since no politician can teach the professional military how to win a war, can you justify the claim of the military to teach politicians how to play politics?
5. No military administration will succeed where professional politicians have failed. Is this a true assessment of the African experience?
6. It has been contended, and some soldiers admit, that "standards had dropped drastically and discipline had also dropped, and tribalism had risen like a phoenix in the Nigerian Army" before the first military intervention in 1966. Assess the contribution of tribalism and ethnic fractionalization to the incursion of the military in the political arena.
7. Colonel Mengistu of Ethiopia, and Ghadaffi of Libya, have remained colonels since seizing political power. Is this a justification of the contention that "Military ranks are rewards for successfully carrying out military functions and not political functions?"

OR

Should a military officer be promoted for performing political roles?

8. At independence, the nation inherited a ceremonial military. Is this still a true assessment of the contemporary Nigerian military?
9. A large standing military set up that has not been fully engaged in military matters will always interfere in non-military matters. Discuss the phenomenon of functional redundancy in a professional military. What are the consequences to the nation?
10. As the military gets more and more involved in non-military issues, its capacity to defend the nation in any foreign encounter would wane in proportion to its involvement in non-military issues. Discuss.
11. The men of the sword took over control of politics because of the visionless rivalry of men of the pen and the intelli-

gentsia, and because of visionless ideological theorizing. Discuss.

12. What are the signals that a "coup of consolidation" is imminent?
13. To what extent is it true to say that both the military and the politicians deviated from their professional roles?
14. What are the effects of military intervention on the growth and development of democracy in Africa?
15. Compare and contrast Afrocracy with the Zero-party option.
16. What roles would you assign to the military in the third republic?
17. Discuss the role of the military as agents of modernization.
18. "Rapid modernization produces political decay" Discuss.

QUESTIONS OF CHAPTER FIVE

1. Distinguish between a traditional ruler and a warrant chief.
2. Why was it possible for the British Trading Company to bring all the traditional rulers who claimed that they "paid no tribute to any other power" under the British influence?
3. How did the scramble for Africa precipitate the signing of the various treaties?
4. The traditional rulers have been called upon to insulate themselves from politics. Is this possible?
5. Critically examine the view that traditional rulers occupy structures without functions in modern Nigeria.
6. People have called for the scarping off of the Institution of traditional rulers. Are traditional rulers useful in modern Nigeria?

7. What would you consider adequate roles for traditional rulers in an Afrocracy?


QUESTIONS ON CHAPTER SIX

1. What do you understand by the term socioporosis?
2. How can political, moral and social education form the basis for getting Nigeria out of her present predicament?
3. Tribalism can, if properly harnessed form a pragmatic instrument for national unity. Examine this assertion with reference to the Nigeria situation.
4. 'Inside a single nation, religion splits up the people into different spiritual communities, all of them kept up and stiffened by colonialism.' Discuss the proliferation of religious organizations in Nigeria, and their contribution to National Unity.
5. What would you consider to be the effects of Public probes and tribunals on
 - (a) the accused politicians
 - (b) the younger generation?
6. A call has been made for the Institutionalization of Public probes for military and non-military officers. Assess the significance of this call.
7. Oath-taking to be effective, must touch on the sensibilities, the fears and expectations of the swearers. Why have the Bible and the Koran failed to check the rising crime rate among their adherents?

QUESTIONS ON CHAPTER VII

1. Any strategy to win an election which can be predicted by the opponent is no longer a strategy. What then is the usefulness of this chapter?
2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of staggering the election dates?

3. Critically examine the call for the fourth tier of government.
4. The Universal adult suffrage without an ideology is utopian. Discuss.
5. Assess the importance of the Town's Development Union in bringing development to the grassroots.
6. Since every town always has rivalries within its development Union, what will be the impact of government recognition of, and financial assistance to one and only one Development Union per town?
7. The system of indirect election or delegated right to vote is African. Discuss.
8. Examine the importance of cultural organizations in the future elections in this country.
9. Is universal adult suffrage possible in a culture of poverty?
10. Draw up a strategy for winning any elections in your Local Government Area.



INDEX

- Abaragada (Abalagada) 128
- Abarra (Aballa) 128, 139
- Abarra/Utchi district 139
- Aboh, 125, 139
- Aboh, Obi of 126
- Abuse of office: effect of 160
- Achike Okey 123
- Act 1867, 55
- Action group government, 131
- Action group/Mid democratic front alliances 29
- Acting British Consul 127
- Adiawai 128
- A.F.R.C. composition of 93
- A.F.R.C. 100
- African monarchs: Power of life and death 130
- African politics: game of the elites 51
- African rulers: deception of 129
- African kings 130
- African Studies Association Conference, Chicago 61
- Afrocracy, 42, 59, 60, 72, 86, 81, 98, 114, 115, 178, 121, 176, 171, 138.
- Afrocracy: appeal to all African Countries 97.
- Basic Units of 55
- Definition of: as an ideology, 54
- Nature of election and voting 58
- Root of 101
- As Zero party based on African heritage, 113
- As a political method, 89, 90
- Ideological basis of 51
- Principles of 58
- Structural models of elections, 89, 93
- Affor, 128
- A.G. 35, 36, 38, 157
- A.G. modernising Oligarchy 39
- Agwe, 129
- Ahiara declarations, 47, 48
- Akintoye, King 127
- Akiri (Aki) 129
- Akwukwu Igbo 126
- Algeria French Army in 112
- Amakom, Oke 129
- America 59, 75, 83, 84, 157, 160
- Americans black 56
- Amos, 70, 159
- Ananias and Sapphira, 163
- Andreski, Stanislav, 173, 160
- Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact, 172, 184
- Anioma 124
- Anikpu 126
- Aninso 129
- Anti-thesis 70, 71
- Apocalyptic transformation, 45
- Apostasy: Cultural 53
- Apter, David 31, 33
- Aristotle, 103, 67
- Asaba, 129
- Ase, 129
- Ashaka, 128
- Association of all classes of all nations, 50

Atani, 129
 Ataturk of Turkey, Kemal 115,
 116, 117
 Attorney General, 100
 Awo, 33, 77, 80, 150
 Azikiwe, 33, 62, 75, 149, 173
 Azikiwe, (Zik) the Owelle of
 Onitsha, 52
 Azikiwe as president of the
 federation, 78, 103
 Azikiwe Nnamdi letter to 132

B

Babangida, 149, 171, 175
 Babangida administration, 183
 Babangida inquiry 171
 Badagry: cession of, 127
 Balewa Abubakar Tafawa
 (Alhaji) 81
 Balewa Abubakar Tafawa, 107
 Ballot boxes in police custody,
 80
 Ballot papers, 78
 Ban on politicians and public
 officers, 175
 Banda Kamuzu, 33
 Bank, Vatican, 163
 Banning of persons 58
 Baker Ernest 57, 103
 Beer Samuel, 104
 Benin, 107
 Bendel east 128
 Benin City 126, 164
 Bell Daniel, 66
 Berlin Conference, 128
 Biafran revolution, 47, 48
 Bible 158, 159
 Benin Bight 127

Bienen henry 117, 123
 Bismark 55
 Bolivia 112
 Borrowed theory 50
 Borrowed theory and original
 practice in African Politics,
 50
 Boiny Felix Houphet 33
 Bourguiba Habib, 51, 52
 Bourgeoisie confrontation 40
 Boulding Kenneth 37
 Boy of Brass King 126
 Brezhnev 83
 Bretton Henry, 31, 104
 Brigadier Browne 105
 Britain 55, 56, 59, 75
 Britain, the birth of a nation 67
 Britain Under feudalism 66, 67
 Britannic Majesty 124
 British, 126
 British Crown 127
 British Paratroopers 184
 Bugandans 33
 Buhari regime 157
 Buhari Muhammadu (General)
 62, 63

C

Caetano's regime: Overthrown
 of 112
 Calabar, 105
 Cambridge, 77
 Campaigns 177
 Capital 137, 138
 Capitalist System 50
 Cash economy: transition into
 131
 Categories of politicians who
 rigged elections, 175

Categories of politicians banned 175
 Chad, 169
 Chadians 73
 Chieftaincy Acts 124
 Chieftaincies: argument on their usefulness 132
 Christ 53, 159
 Christ: teaching, 162
 Christian religion, 130
 Civilian Supremacy, 110
 Civilian Corruption exposition of 146
 City government, 91
 Civil war, 47, 109, 120
 Clarendon Schools 77
 Coalition: grand 40
 Coleman James, 65
 Colonialism, 54
 Colonial deceit 129
 Colonialism and capitalism, 151
 Communism, socialism, 62
 Communist manifesto 71
 Commandment: the 11th, 162
 Congo — Leopoldville, 169
 Constitution: presidential, 62
 C.P.P. 33
 Corelli, Marie 162
 Corruption 98, 160
 Corruption: spread of 57
 Corruption: as index of socioporosis, 165
 Corruption of governors 51
 Corruption and the fear of military intervention 185
 Coup of consolidation, 111
 Coup: Justification of, 108
 Coup: January, 1966, 35, 36

Coup prevention of, 86
 Coup spread of in African countries 97
 Council of Obis, 134
 Council of Obi, rotation of chairmanship, 135
 Council (Town) 91
 Council: presidential 94
 Cultural organisations, 181
 Customary Courts, 132

D

Dahomean King, 127
 Danger: National 121
 Danjuma, T.Y. 112, 123
 David Yallop, 163, 174
 Davis, H.O. 33
 Docemo, King 127
 Defensive war experience of, 109
 DeGaul, Charles, 168
 Delta region, 120
 Democracy, 31, 65, 159.
 Social characteristics of
 sion makers, 77
 Effect of military intervention on, 113
 Parliamentary: 62, 75
 who is entitled to vote in, 71, 76
 Western variant, 68
 with military vigilance, 62
 Development Unions, 91, 92, 138
 Deviation, 167
 Deutsch, Karl 119, 123
 Dirksen, Senator, 183

District authority: size of, 142
 District authority: functions of 141
 Disengagement: timing of 101, 102
 Disengagement: mechanics for military 98, 102
 Disequilibrium between political participation and political institutionalization, 97
 Doggons of Sudan 53
 Dudley B. J. 29, 30
 Durbar Hotel, Kaduna, 61
 Dynamics: Cognitive, 31

E

Eagle magazine, 34
 Eastern Nigerian dislike for military service, 105
 Education as a qualification to vote, 73
 Effect of abandoned property 146, 147
 Efik, 38
 Elections: 1979, 35
 1983
 Staggering of 96
 abolition of nation wide election 99
 Local government council
 Western Nigerians 80
 Election of prime minister, 100
 Election of five respected Nigerians, 100
 Electoral commission 101
 malpractices, 69
 Electoral malpractices and the culture of poverty, 161, 162
 199

Electoral slate 179
 Emerson, Rupert, 33
 Emile Durkheim, 45
 Engels Friedrich, 71
 Epe: cession of 127
 Ethiopia, 109
 Ethiopian Experiment 49
 Eton, 77
 Eulau, Heinze, 32
 Europe 112, 160
 Europeans, 50
 Ezechima, 125

F

Farmers, 131
 Fedeco 171
 Federal Executive Council 100
 Federal Parliament as power valance, 38
 Finer, S.E. 88, 104
 Finer Herman, 56, 68, 74, 103
 Fishermen 131
 Fragmented Isolative culture, 35
 France, 168
 Frantz Fanon, 151, 153, 155
 Fulani 80
 Functional redundancy and military intervention, 110
 Functional redundancy, 171

G

Gabon: military insurrection in, 169
 Gabriel Almond, 30
 Gambia, 169

Gbulie Ben, 106, 118, 123

Germany, 83

Getting a bearing from two
party systems, 182

Ghana, 33, 169

Ghanians, 73

Glover's Hausas 105, 113

G.N.P.P. 180

Gold Coast, 130

Goldie's Chartered Company,
113

Governor, 100

Governor General, 131

Government: duration of, 95—
96

General Yakubu Gowon, 51,
82, 158

Greater tomorrow, 49

Guinea 32, 169

H

Harrow, 75

Hausa, 30, 80

Head of Government: choice,
of 93

Head of State/President, 93

Hegel, 71

Hindu, 70

Hollander, E.P. 157

Homogeneity of village destroyed 131

Honduras, 112

Horizontal conflict, 39

House of Commons: composition of 68

Hunt, Raymond, 157

Hypothesis: Garrison State, 83,
84.

Ibo, 30

Ibrede, 128

Idah Polytechnic, 6, 145

Ideological basis of Afrocracy,
45

Ideologies, 29, 31, 32

Ideologies of Past African leaders, 51

Ideology: Afrocracy as, 62

Ideology, 35, 40, 45, 49—50

62, 66, 87, 88

Communism, 45

Fascism, 45

a new national, 160

Igbuzor, 129

Igbuku, 128

Ijomah B.I.C. 34, 37, 41, 77,

103, 104, 110, 112, 114,

119, 123, 148, 149, 157.

168, 173.

Ike, V.C., 145

Iloki, Ernest, 77

Isseles, the Obi of 125

Illah, 128

Independence, 131

Indonesis, 33

Inienger, John Mark, — 139

Inspector — General of Police,
100

Institutionalization of probes
185 — 186

IMF, 45

IMF Loan, 157

Ironsi, 110, 170

Isiah, 70

Israel, 159

Israel, Corruption of man, 159

J

Janowitz, Morris, 173
 Japanese Institutional strength
 122
 Johnson, John J., 123
 Judiciary, 93 – 94

K

Kabaka, of Uganda, 33
 Karma: the law of, 56
 Kennedy, Senator, 183
 Kemal Ataturk of Turkey,
 115, 116, 117
 Kikakitocracy: definition of, 82
 Koran – the, 52, 158–159
 Koranic education, 77
 Kosoko, King of Lagos, 127
 Kourvetaris, Goerge, 112 123
 Kwale, 139

L

Lagos, 31, 131, 105
 Lagos: under Gold Coast
 Colony, 130
 Lander brothers, 126
 Laski, Harrold, 35, 88
 Latin America, 86, 112
 Learner, Daniel, 123
 Lenin, 83
 Letters patent, 130
 Liberalism in a military regime
 112.
 Liberia, 169
 Libya, 169
 Lipset, M., 157
 Local Government Areas, 134

Local Government: Area elec-
 tions, 92
 Electoral law, 176
 Size of, 142
 Functions, 142–143
 Source of revenue, 143
 Structure and the role of
 traditional Rulers, 136–
 138

Local Government System:
 failure of, 139
 Structure and functions,
 140–144

Local Government as third tier
 limitation of, 136

Local peculiarities and the
 need for Town government,
 137

London, 68, 157

Lower class, 76

Loyalties: regional, 34

Lugard, Lord F., 105, 130

Lugard, Lord F.: Administra-
 tion of, 136

M

Macauley's journalistic vitrio-
 lics, 149–150
 Macauley, T.B. 68, 69, 103
 Manifest destiny: Theory of,
 150
 Manu: Law of, 70
 Marchinkus Bishop, 163
 Marcos, ex-president, 161
 Marx, Karl, 49, 71, 137
 Marxism, 66
 Mazrui, Ali, 50, 168, 169, 173

Mehden, Fred Von der
 Mengistu, 109
 Micah, 70, 159, 173
 Middle Class 76
 Middle income bracket and
 the fading away of statism,
 186
 Military Anomie and Military
 intervention, 167, 172
 Military: Civilianization and
 politicization of, 85
 Military Government, 81
 Military in Creek Politics, 112
 Military intervention, 158
 Military interventions for and
 Against, 112
 Military intervention and ero-
 sion of democracy, 113
 Military leaders, 62
 Military obedience, 108
 Military in portugal. 112
 Military profession: origin of,
 108
 Military professionalism, 171
 Military: purpose of during
 colonial regime, 107
 Military rule, 81
 Military rule: Ocran's pessi-
 mism, 86
 Military rule: length of, 110
 Military Tribunals, 160
 Mill, J. Stuart, 68, 69, 103
 Milton Obote, 33
 Miners, N.J. 105, 107, 123
 Ministerial posts, 37
 Mobilization, 48
 Modern military: demystifica-
 tion of, 120

Modernization: definition of,
 116, 117
 Modernizing oligarchy, 35
 Mohammed, Murtala, 61, 63,
 78
 Momoh, Toney, 47, 48
 Moors, Black, 53
 Moskos, Charles, 77, 104
 Movement: Chartist, 55, 69, 71
 Multi-party, 32
 Murtala's probe of governors,
 51, 57

N

National Electoral Commission,
 176
 Nationalism and national
 dilemma, 153, 156
 Nationalism: Northern Nige-
 rian, 53
 Nationalist protest movement,
 65
 Nasser: take over in Egypt, 168
 NCNC, 35, 36; 37, 38, 156
 NCNC/Dynamic party alliance,
 29
 NCNC/NPC Alliance, 29
 Ndoni, 129
 Ndosimili Local Government
 area: need for creation, 139
 Negritude: 53, Negritude: def.
 of, 54
 Nepotism, 40
 The New Nigerians, 45
 The New Rich, 48
 Niger Coast constabulary, 105
 Niger Delta, 127
 Niger protectorate, 128

- Nigeria, 169
 - Nigerian constitutional conference, 107
 - Nigerian Military: origin of, 105
 - Nkrumah, Kwame, 33
 - NNA, 36, 79, 180
 - NNDP: Totalitarian oligarchy, 39
 - Noah, 160
 - Norfolk: Duke of, 67
 - Northern Earls, 67
 - Northern Nigeria, 36
 - Northern Nigeria Regiment, 105
 - Northern peoples congress, 53
 - Northern platoon sergeants, 106
 - Northern railway extension, 130
 - Northern region, 38
 - NPC, 30, 35, 36, 37, 38; 157
 - NPC/Dynamic party alliance, 29
 - NPC traditional oligarchy, 39
 - NPN, 180
 - NPN/NPP alliance, 29, 64
 - Nyerere, 33, 171, 184
 - Nzeogwu, Major Kaduna, 33, 80, 170
- O
- Oath of office, 162
 - Oath taking: effectiveness of, 165
 - Obarogie Ohombamu, 51
 - Obasanjo, O. 60
 - Obasanjo: Handing over to Shagari, 99
 - Obi: Maintenance of, 133, 134
 - Obi: preparation of successor, 135, 136
 - Obikwere, 128
 - Occupation 74 Qualification for voting 71 —75
 - Ocran, A.K., 86
 - Odekpe, 129
 - Odua, 125
 - Oduduwa: Egbe Omo, 150
 - Odugiri (Odugili), 129
 - Ogbakuma, 129
 - Ogbemudia; O, 186
 - Oil companies, 120
 - Oil Rivers Irregulars, 105
 - Oil Rivers: protectorate of, 105 128
 - Okoye, Mokugwo, 54, 132, 150, 151, 173
 - Okoedan: Cession of, 127
 - Okpala Uku, 124, 125
 - Okpanam, 129
 - Okpebho Local Government Area, 186
 - Oligarchy: Modernizing, 39
 - Totalitarian, 35
 - Olympio, S. Assassination of, 168
 - One party system, 33, 34,
 - Onitsha, 106
 - Onotu-Uku, 124, 125
 - Onya, 139
 - Onyeaara declarations, 48
 - Order in council, 130
 - Orientation: national, 95
 - Osadebay, Dennis, 149, 173
 - Lamentation of, 130
 - Osgold, Charles, 31, 157, 174
 - Osomari, 129
 - Ossai, Obi, 126

Qau, 56
 Ottoman, Turkey, 111
 Owelle of Onitsha, 132
 Oxford, 77

P

Pacification of the country:
 factors in, 130
 Paleolithic Age, 53
 Paley, W., 68, 103
 Parliamentary democracy, 50
 Party Politics, 35
 Patron Parties, 34
 Paul, E. Sigmund, 51, 52
 Pensions for king of Lagos, 127
 Percy (senator), 183
 Pessimism, 183
 Phaleas, 70
 Plato, 70, 71
 Pocrah: cession of, 127
 Political authority Vs. military
 authority, 108, 109
 Political education, 121
 Political institutionalization,
 64
 Political systems, 35
 Politics manoeuvre, 36
 Poland, 160
 Porosity of our social system,
 145, 146
 Poverty: of chained mind, 52
 President: election of, 95
 President: power to dissolve
 state government, 101
 President Sanghor, 34
 Presidential council: composi-
 tion of, 100
 Prismold, 76, 96

Probes: effect of, 159
 Procedure for handling elec-
 tion, 177, 178
 Protectorate of Southern
 Nigeria, 130
 Prussia, 55
 Push and pull factors in mili-
 tary intervention 110,

R

Race: as qualification to vote,
 74
 Region: Eastern, 38
 Eastern threat to secede,
 79, 80
 Western, 38
 Religion as opium of the
 people, 164
 Religious indoctrination with-
 out christian principles, 162
 166
 Representation: interest
 theory of, 69, 71
 Republic: first and second,
 collapse of, 61
 Residence: Qualification for
 voting, 74
 Revolution: of 1848 55, of
 1918, 56
 Riot: Kano of, 1953
 Ritualization of the mass, 162
 Rivalry of candidates within
 the same organisations, 178
 Role of the military in the
 third republic 105, 122
 Rome, 183
 Rousseau. J., 68, 103

Royal Niger company charter:
revocation of, 130
Royal Niger company constabulary, 105
Ruling elite, 49

S

Second Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM), 48
School Certificate Qualification, 77
Schumpeter, Joseph, 65, 66, 103, 104
Senghor, Leopold, 53, 54
Senator, 93, 95
Service Chiefs, 100
Sex qualification for voting, 73
Shagari Administration, 41
Shehu Shagari, 81, 99
Shango, 67
Sierra Leone, 169
Sirus, 53
Simpsons, Edger, 159, 174
Sindona, 163
Socialism 45, 46, 49, 50
Social interactions: components of, 51
Sodom and Gomorrah 163, 166
Sokoto, 99
Seokarno, 33
Socioprosis: definition of, 51
145, 146
Society, 56, 57
as a disease, 57
cure of, 61
genesis of, 146, 149
Socioprosis, 56, 57

Shrines as magnetic fields 166
State House of Assembly, 162
State House of Assembly:
election of representatives, 99, 100
election to, 92, 93
Strategy for winning elections in a partyless democracy, 175, 187
Stratocracy, 65, 81, 88
Samuel P. Huntington, 118
Southerners, officers, 106
Summit, 181, 183
Sovereignty of the people, 69, 71
Soviet Union, 83
Swearing by African symbol, 165
Switzerland rackets
Synthesis, 70, 71
Syncretic religious bodies, 164

T

Tanganyika, 169, 184
Tanganyika Mutiny, 168
Tanzania, 171, 185
Tanzanian socialism, 185
Teachers certificate: qualification, 77
Thesis, 70, 71
Third republic, 105, 107, 109, 110, 113, 114
Toure, Sekou, 32
Town council: functions of, 140
Membership of, 141
Treaties: different views, 127, 128
Trevelyan. G., 66

Tribal: Quotas, 40
 Will, 160, Groups:- Yoruba,
 Hausa, Urhobo, Edo, Efik,
 Ijaw, Ishan, 67
 Yoruba Elite, 40
 Tribalism and electioneering,
 187
 Tribalism: Intrusion into the
 military 170
 Tribalism in the Military, 107
 Tribe, 38, 40, 160
 Tribe: Hausa, 40
 Yoruba, 38
 Others, 67
 Tradition:
 as a basis for inspiration, 51
 52
 Traditional authority: corro-
 sion of, 131
 Traditional Oligarchy, 39
 Traditional rulers: conceptual
 clarification, 124
 definition of, 124
 dragged into politics, 131
 functions of, 132
 insulation from partisan
 politics, 133
 as kings, 126
 and new local government
 Adm., 124, 144
 relegation of, 128
 Traditional rulers signing of
 treaties, 105
 Traditional system: need for
 modernization
 Transition president and com-
 mander-in-chief of armed
 forces, 101

Trial and error in democracy,
 183, 184
 Totalitarian Oligarchy, 39
 Turkey: Ataturk of, 53
 Two party system: The effect
 on Afrocracy, 179, 180

U

Ubulu-Okiti, 126
 Ubulu-Uku: Obi of, 125
 Ubulu-Uno, 126
 Uganda, 33
 Ugili: Akili, 129
 Ukwuani Local Government
 Area: need for creation, 139
 Umuolu, 128
 United States of America, 183
 University of Benin Teaching
 Hospital (UBTH), 164
 University degree qualifica-
 tions, 74, 77
 University ideologues, 49
 UPGA 36, 39, 79, 80, 180
 UPP, 35, 36
 Upper class, 76
 Utchi (Uchi), 129
 Utoku, 128
 Utopia, 50
 Utu, 128

V

Vatsa, 16, 171
 Vampires, Economic, 159
 Verba, Sidney, 30
 Vendetta, 162
 Vertical conflict, 40
 Voting: qualifications for, 56

W

- Warning to politicians, 79
- Warrant Chiefs, 124
- War Against Indiscipline, 163
- West African command: disintegration of, 105
- West African frontier force, 107
- Western Nigerians dislike for military service, 105
- Wiseman, H.V., 35
- Wraith, Ronald, 159, 174

Y

- Yoruba, 30, 36, 37, 39, 40,

Z

- Zimmerman, 84
- Zolberg, 34



AFROCRACY

In any nation, a viable political system must gradually evolve out of the debris and confusion of a given national experience. Democracy thrives on cumulative experience — experience modified from time to time as the society becomes more complex. But it would appear that the impatience of the military has not given the civilians enough time to improve on their performance. True enough, African politicians are corrupt. But since our social structure has the capability of corrupting anybody, even an angel, it stands to reason that whenever the Military assume political roles, they cannot evade the corrupting influence of the social structure.

The rate at which constitutions are suspended and new ones adopted, does not make for continuity which is imperative if democracy is expected to survive in Africa. It is the pious expectation of this book that Africans need to inculcate in themselves the spirit of tolerance.

The imposition of political parties by a central authority is the surest way to destroy democracy, because by the very nature of such an imposition, only the propertied class can form the nuclei of viable political parties but not of a viable political system. This is why there are many unanswered questions in the chequered history of African nations.

Afrocracy calls for the evolution of parties from a partyless system based on national values and experience. What will happen in the third republic will commend Afrocracy to Africans.

Professor B.I.C. Ijomah obtained his B.A. (Hons) Second Class Upper in Sociology from the University of Nigeria Nsukka, M.A. and Ph.D in Sociology at Northwestern University Evanston. He has worked in various capacities in different Institutions of Higher learning. He rose to be a Registrar while at the same time holding to his academic calling. He also lectured at Northern Illinois University, Loyola University of Chicago, University of Nigeria Nsukka, and he is currently Professor of Sociology and Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Bendel State University, Ekpoma.

He has published extensively in different areas of Sociology.

ISBN 978-2340-50-2

